Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, especially the recent advancements in reasoning, such as o1 and o3, pushing the boundaries of AI. Despite these impressive achievements in mathematics and coding, the reasoning abilities of LLMs in domains requiring cryptographic expertise remain underexplored. In this paper, we introduce CipherBank, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of LLMs in cryptographic decryption tasks. CipherBank comprises 2,358 meticulously crafted problems, covering 262 unique plaintexts across 5 domains and 14 subdomains, with a focus on privacy-sensitive and real-world scenarios that necessitate encryption. From a cryptographic perspective, CipherBank incorporates 3 major categories of encryption methods, spanning 9 distinct algorithms, ranging from classical ciphers to custom cryptographic techniques. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on CipherBank, e.g., GPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, and cutting-edge reasoning-focused models such as o1 and DeepSeek-R1. Our results reveal significant gaps in reasoning abilities not only between general-purpose chat LLMs and reasoning-focused LLMs but also in the performance of current reasoning-focused models when applied to classical cryptographic decryption tasks, highlighting the challenges these models face in understanding and manipulating encrypted data. Through detailed analysis and error investigations, we provide several key observations that shed light on the limitations and potential improvement areas for LLMs in cryptographic reasoning. These findings underscore the need for continuous advancements in LLM reasoning capabilities.

Recent works have suggested that In-Context Learning (ICL) operates in dual modes, i.e. task retrieval (remember learned patterns from pre-training) and task learning (inference-time ``learning'' from demonstrations). However, disentangling these the two modes remains a challenging goal. We introduce ICL CIPHERS, a class of task reformulations based on substitution ciphers borrowed from classic cryptography. In this approach, a subset of tokens in the in-context inputs are substituted with other (irrelevant) tokens, rendering English sentences less comprehensible to human eye. However, by design, there is a latent, fixed pattern to this substitution, making it reversible. This bijective (reversible) cipher ensures that the task remains a well-defined task in some abstract sense, despite the transformations. It is a curious question if LLMs can solve ICL CIPHERS with a BIJECTIVE mapping, which requires deciphering the latent cipher. We show that LLMs are better at solving ICL CIPHERS with BIJECTIVE mappings than the NON-BIJECTIVE (irreversible) baseline, providing a novel approach to quantify ``learning'' in ICL. While this gap is small, it is consistent across the board on four datasets and six models. Finally, we examine LLMs' internal representations and identify evidence in their ability to decode the ciphered inputs.

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.

We release Terminal Wrench, a subset of 331 terminal-agent benchmark environments, copied from the popular open benchmarks that are demonstrably reward-hackable. The data set includes 3,632 hack trajectories and 2,352 legitimate baseline trajectories across three frontier models (Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4). Each entry preserves the original task definition alongside full attack trajectories that show how the verifier was bypassed. It also includes cases where the task was not solved as intended. The tasks span system administration, machine learning, software engineering, and security challenges; the exploits range from simple output spoofing to stack-frame introspection, standard-library patching, and rootkit-style binary hijacking. Crucially, these exploits are specific to each task, rather than the evaluation harness, making them harder to patch. We also present a monitorability study in which hack trajectories are sanitized or stripped of reasoning traces and then scored by an LLM judge, showing that detection degrades meaningfully when chain-of-thought is removed (AUC drops from 0.97 to 0.92). The data set is publicly available at https://github.com/few-sh/terminal-wrench.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

The use of operating system API calls is a promising task in the detection of PE-type malware in the Windows operating system. This task is officially defined as running malware in an isolated sandbox environment, recording the API calls made with the Windows operating system and sequentially analyzing these calls. Here, we have analyzed 7107 different malicious software belonging to various families such as virus, backdoor, trojan in an isolated sandbox environment and transformed these analysis results into a format where different classification algorithms and methods can be used. First, we'll explain how we got the malware, and then we'll explain how we've got these software bundled into families. Finally, we will describe how to perform malware classification tasks using different computational methods for the researchers who will use the data set we have created.

The CheckThat! lab aims to advance the development of innovative technologies designed to identify and counteract online disinformation and manipulation efforts across various languages and platforms. The first five editions focused on key tasks in the information verification pipeline, including check-worthiness, evidence retrieval and pairing, and verification. Since the 2023 edition, the lab has expanded its scope to address auxiliary tasks that support research and decision-making in verification. In the 2025 edition, the lab revisits core verification tasks while also considering auxiliary challenges. Task 1 focuses on the identification of subjectivity (a follow-up from CheckThat! 2024), Task 2 addresses claim normalization, Task 3 targets fact-checking numerical claims, and Task 4 explores scientific web discourse processing. These tasks present challenging classification and retrieval problems at both the document and span levels, including multilingual settings.

The goal of this chapter is to present a survey of homomorphic encryption techniques and their applications. After a detailed discussion on the introduction and motivation of the chapter, we present some basic concepts of cryptography. The fundamental theories of homomorphic encryption are then discussed with suitable examples. The chapter then provides a survey of some of the classical homomorphic encryption schemes existing in the current literature. Various applications and salient properties of homomorphic encryption schemes are then discussed in detail. The chapter then introduces the most important and recent research direction in the filed - fully homomorphic encryption. A significant number of propositions on fully homomorphic encryption is then discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes by outlining some emerging research trends in this exicting field of cryptography.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adept at following instructions containing task descriptions to solve complex problems, such as mathematical reasoning and automatic evaluation (LLM-as-a-Judge). However, as prompts grow more complex, models often struggle to adhere to all instructions. This difficulty is especially common when instructive prompts intertwine reasoning directives -- specifying what the model should solve -- with rigid formatting requirements that dictate how the solution must be presented. The entanglement creates competing goals for the model, suggesting that more explicit separation of these two aspects could lead to improved performance. To this front, we introduce Deco-G, a decoding framework that explicitly decouples format adherence from task solving. Deco-G handles format compliance with a separate tractable probabilistic model (TPM), while prompts LLMs with only task instructions. At each decoding step, Deco-G combines next token probabilities from the LLM with the TPM calculated format compliance likelihood to form the output probability. To make this approach both practical and scalable for modern instruction-tuned LLMs, we introduce three key innovations: instruction-aware distillation, a flexible trie-building algorithm, and HMM state pruning for computational efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Deco-G across a wide range of tasks with diverse format requirements, including mathematical reasoning, LLM-as-a-judge, and event argument extraction. Overall, our approach yields 1.0% to 6.0% relative gain over regular prompting practice with guaranteed format compliance.

Penetration testing, a critical component of cybersecurity, typically requires extensive time and effort to find vulnerabilities. Beginners in this field often benefit from collaborative approaches with the community or experts. To address this, we develop CIPHER (Cybersecurity Intelligent Penetration-testing Helper for Ethical Researchers), a large language model specifically trained to assist in penetration testing tasks. We trained CIPHER using over 300 high-quality write-ups of vulnerable machines, hacking techniques, and documentation of open-source penetration testing tools. Additionally, we introduced the Findings, Action, Reasoning, and Results (FARR) Flow augmentation, a novel method to augment penetration testing write-ups to establish a fully automated pentesting simulation benchmark tailored for large language models. This approach fills a significant gap in traditional cybersecurity Q\&A benchmarks and provides a realistic and rigorous standard for evaluating AI's technical knowledge, reasoning capabilities, and practical utility in dynamic penetration testing scenarios. In our assessments, CIPHER achieved the best overall performance in providing accurate suggestion responses compared to other open-source penetration testing models of similar size and even larger state-of-the-art models like Llama 3 70B and Qwen1.5 72B Chat, particularly on insane difficulty machine setups. This demonstrates that the current capabilities of general LLMs are insufficient for effectively guiding users through the penetration testing process. We also discuss the potential for improvement through scaling and the development of better benchmarks using FARR Flow augmentation results. Our benchmark will be released publicly at https://github.com/ibndias/CIPHER.

Conspiracy Theory Identication task is a new shared task proposed for the first time at the Evalita 2023. The ACTI challenge, based exclusively on comments published on conspiratorial channels of telegram, is divided into two subtasks: (i) Conspiratorial Content Classification: identifying conspiratorial content and (ii) Conspiratorial Category Classification about specific conspiracy theory classification. A total of fifteen teams participated in the task for a total of 81 submissions. We illustrate the best performing approaches were based on the utilization of large language models. We finally draw conclusions about the utilization of these models for counteracting the spreading of misinformation in online platforms.

Historical encrypted manuscripts require both paleographic interpretation of cipher symbols and cryptanalytic recovery of plaintext. Most existing computational workflows rely on a transcription-first paradigm, in which handwritten symbols are transcribed prior to decipherment. This intermediate step is labor-intensive, error-prone, and not always aligned with the goal of direct plaintext recovery. We propose an end-to-end, transcription-free approach that directly maps handwritten cipher images to plaintext. Using the Copiale cipher as a case study, we introduce the first text-line-level dataset pairing cipher images with German plaintext. We show that pretraining on generic handwriting data followed by cipher-specific fine-tuning substantially improves decipherment accuracy. Our results demonstrate that transcription-free image-to-plaintext decipherment is both feasible and effective for historical substitution ciphers, offering a simplified and scalable alternative to traditional pipelines. https://github.com/leitro/Decipher-from-Pixels-Copiale

Deep learning has improved performance on many natural language processing (NLP) tasks individually. However, general NLP models cannot emerge within a paradigm that focuses on the particularities of a single metric, dataset, and task. We introduce the Natural Language Decathlon (decaNLP), a challenge that spans ten tasks: question answering, machine translation, summarization, natural language inference, sentiment analysis, semantic role labeling, zero-shot relation extraction, goal-oriented dialogue, semantic parsing, and commonsense pronoun resolution. We cast all tasks as question answering over a context. Furthermore, we present a new Multitask Question Answering Network (MQAN) jointly learns all tasks in decaNLP without any task-specific modules or parameters in the multitask setting. MQAN shows improvements in transfer learning for machine translation and named entity recognition, domain adaptation for sentiment analysis and natural language inference, and zero-shot capabilities for text classification. We demonstrate that the MQAN's multi-pointer-generator decoder is key to this success and performance further improves with an anti-curriculum training strategy. Though designed for decaNLP, MQAN also achieves state of the art results on the WikiSQL semantic parsing task in the single-task setting. We also release code for procuring and processing data, training and evaluating models, and reproducing all experiments for decaNLP.

Encrypted traffic classification (TC) methods must adapt to new protocols and extensions as well as to advancements in other machine learning fields. In this paper, we follow a transfer learning setup best known from computer vision. We first pretrain an embedding model on a complex task with a large number of classes and then transfer it to five well-known TC datasets. The pretraining task is recognition of SNI domains in encrypted QUIC traffic, which in itself is a problem for network monitoring due to the growing adoption of TLS Encrypted Client Hello. Our training pipeline -- featuring a disjoint class setup, ArcFace loss function, and a modern deep learning architecture -- aims to produce universal embeddings applicable across tasks. The proposed solution, based on nearest neighbors search in the embedding space, surpasses SOTA performance on four of the five TC datasets. A comparison with a baseline method utilizing raw packet sequences revealed unexpected findings with potential implications for the broader TC field. We published the model architecture, trained weights, and transfer learning experiments.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.

We present the results and the main findings of SemEval-2024 Task 8: Multigenerator, Multidomain, and Multilingual Machine-Generated Text Detection. The task featured three subtasks. Subtask A is a binary classification task determining whether a text is written by a human or generated by a machine. This subtask has two tracks: a monolingual track focused solely on English texts and a multilingual track. Subtask B is to detect the exact source of a text, discerning whether it is written by a human or generated by a specific LLM. Subtask C aims to identify the changing point within a text, at which the authorship transitions from human to machine. The task attracted a large number of participants: subtask A monolingual (126), subtask A multilingual (59), subtask B (70), and subtask C (30). In this paper, we present the task, analyze the results, and discuss the system submissions and the methods they used. For all subtasks, the best systems used LLMs.

We introduce PentestJudge, a system for evaluating the operations of penetration testing agents. PentestJudge is a large language model (LLM)-as-judge with access to tools that allow it to consume arbitrary trajectories of agent states and tool call history to determine whether a security agent's actions meet certain operating criteria that would be impractical to evaluate programmatically. We develop rubrics that use a tree structure to hierarchically collapse the penetration testing task for a particular environment into smaller, simpler, and more manageable sub-tasks and criteria until each leaf node represents simple yes-or-no criteria for PentestJudge to evaluate. Task nodes are broken down into different categories related to operational objectives, operational security, and tradecraft. LLM-as-judge scores are compared to human domain experts as a ground-truth reference, allowing us to compare their relative performance with standard binary classification metrics, such as F1 scores. We evaluate several frontier and open-source models acting as judge agents, with the best model reaching an F1 score of 0.83. We find models that are better at tool-use perform more closely to human experts. By stratifying the F1 scores by requirement type, we find even models with similar overall scores struggle with different types of questions, suggesting certain models may be better judges of particular operating criteria. We find that weaker and cheaper models can judge the trajectories of pentests performed by stronger and more expensive models, suggesting verification may be easier than generation for the penetration testing task. We share this methodology to facilitate future research in understanding the ability of judges to holistically and scalably evaluate the process quality of AI-based information security agents so that they may be confidently used in sensitive production environments.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language understanding and generation, leading to extensive benchmarking across diverse tasks. However, cryptanalysis a critical area for data security and encryption has not yet been thoroughly explored in LLM evaluations. To address this gap, we evaluate cryptanalytic potential of state of the art LLMs on encrypted texts generated using a range of cryptographic algorithms. We introduce a novel benchmark dataset comprising diverse plain texts spanning various domains, lengths, writing styles, and topics paired with their encrypted versions. Using zero-shot and few shot settings, we assess multiple LLMs for decryption accuracy and semantic comprehension across different encryption schemes. Our findings reveal key insights into the strengths and limitations of LLMs in side-channel communication while raising concerns about their susceptibility to jailbreaking attacks. This research highlights the dual-use nature of LLMs in security contexts and contributes to the ongoing discussion on AI safety and security.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

In this paper, we introduce Knowledge-Orthogonal Reasoning (KOR), which minimizes the impact of domain-specific knowledge for a more accurate evaluation of models' reasoning abilities in out-of-distribution scenarios. Based on this concept, we propose the Knowledge-Orthogonal Reasoning Benchmark (KOR-Bench), encompassing five task categories: Operation, Logic, Cipher, Puzzle, and Counterfactual. KOR-Bench emphasizes the effectiveness of models in applying new rule descriptions to solve novel rule-driven questions, revealing that top-performing models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o only achieve 58.96% and 58.00% accuracy, respectively. We conduct thorough analyses to identify bottlenecks in the Cipher task using Stepwise Prompting, discovering that two rounds of Self-Correction yield optimal results. Complex Task Processing evaluates model performance across three integrated tasks, while we also explore the impact of Tricks on the Puzzle task and visualize rule-focused attention to enhance our understanding of model behavior. We aim for KOR-Bench to be a valuable resource for enhancing models' reasoning capabilities and fostering further research in this field.

The advent of quantum computing poses a profound threat to traditional cryptographic systems, exposing vulnerabilities that compromise the security of digital communication channels reliant on RSA, ECC, and similar classical encryption methods. Quantum algorithms, notably Shor's algorithm, exploit the inherent computational power of quantum computers to efficiently solve mathematical problems underlying these cryptographic schemes. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) emerged as a critical field aimed at developing resilient cryptographic algorithms impervious to quantum attacks. This paper delineates the vulnerabilities of classical cryptographic systems to quantum attacks, elucidates the principles of quantum computing, and introduces various PQC algorithms such as lattice-based cryptography, code-based cryptography, hash-based cryptography, and multivariate polynomial cryptography. Highlighting the importance of PQC in securing digital communication amidst quantum computing advancements, this research underscores its pivotal role in safeguarding data integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity in the face of emerging quantum threats.

Current NLP datasets targeting ambiguity can be solved by a native speaker with relative ease. We present Cryptonite, a large-scale dataset based on cryptic crosswords, which is both linguistically complex and naturally sourced. Each example in Cryptonite is a cryptic clue, a short phrase or sentence with a misleading surface reading, whose solving requires disambiguating semantic, syntactic, and phonetic wordplays, as well as world knowledge. Cryptic clues pose a challenge even for experienced solvers, though top-tier experts can solve them with almost 100% accuracy. Cryptonite is a challenging task for current models; fine-tuning T5-Large on 470k cryptic clues achieves only 7.6% accuracy, on par with the accuracy of a rule-based clue solver (8.6%).

Learning discriminative task-specific features simultaneously for multiple distinct tasks is a fundamental problem in multi-task learning. Recent state-of-the-art models consider directly decoding task-specific features from one shared task-generic feature (e.g., feature from a backbone layer), and utilize carefully designed decoders to produce multi-task features. However, as the input feature is fully shared and each task decoder also shares decoding parameters for different input samples, it leads to a static feature decoding process, producing less discriminative task-specific representations. To tackle this limitation, we propose TaskExpert, a novel multi-task mixture-of-experts model that enables learning multiple representative task-generic feature spaces and decoding task-specific features in a dynamic manner. Specifically, TaskExpert introduces a set of expert networks to decompose the backbone feature into several representative task-generic features. Then, the task-specific features are decoded by using dynamic task-specific gating networks operating on the decomposed task-generic features. Furthermore, to establish long-range modeling of the task-specific representations from different layers of TaskExpert, we design a multi-task feature memory that updates at each layer and acts as an additional feature expert for dynamic task-specific feature decoding. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our TaskExpert clearly outperforms previous best-performing methods on all 9 metrics of two competitive multi-task learning benchmarks for visual scene understanding (i.e., PASCAL-Context and NYUD-v2). Codes and models will be made publicly available at https://github.com/prismformore/Multi-Task-Transformer

Due to Shor's algorithm, quantum computers are a severe threat for public key cryptography. This motivated the cryptographic community to search for quantum-safe solutions. On the other hand, the impact of quantum computing on secret key cryptography is much less understood. In this paper, we consider attacks where an adversary can query an oracle implementing a cryptographic primitive in a quantum superposition of different states. This model gives a lot of power to the adversary, but recent results show that it is nonetheless possible to build secure cryptosystems in it. We study applications of a quantum procedure called Simon's algorithm (the simplest quantum period finding algorithm) in order to attack symmetric cryptosystems in this model. Following previous works in this direction, we show that several classical attacks based on finding collisions can be dramatically sped up using Simon's algorithm: finding a collision requires Ω(2^{n/2}) queries in the classical setting, but when collisions happen with some hidden periodicity, they can be found with only O(n) queries in the quantum model. We obtain attacks with very strong implications. First, we show that the most widely used modes of operation for authentication and authenticated encryption e.g. CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, and OCB) are completely broken in this security model. Our attacks are also applicable to many CAESAR candidates: CLOC, AEZ, COPA, OTR, POET, OMD, and Minalpher. This is quite surprising compared to the situation with encryption modes: Anand et al. show that standard modes are secure with a quantum-secure PRF. Second, we show that Simon's algorithm can also be applied to slide attacks, leading to an exponential speed-up of a classical symmetric cryptanalysis technique in the quantum model.

Recognition systems are commonly designed to authenticate users at the access control levels of a system. A number of voice recognition methods have been developed using a pitch estimation process which are very vulnerable in low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) environments thus, these programs fail to provide the desired level of accuracy and robustness. Also, most text independent speaker recognition programs are incapable of coping with unauthorized attempts to gain access by tampering with the samples or reference database. The proposed text-independent voice recognition system makes use of multilevel cryptography to preserve data integrity while in transit or storage. Encryption and decryption follow a transform based approach layered with pseudorandom noise addition whereas for pitch detection, a modified version of the autocorrelation pitch extraction algorithm is used. The experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can decrypt the signal under test with exponentially reducing Mean Square Error over an increasing range of SNR. Further, it outperforms the conventional algorithms in actual identification tasks even in noisy environments. The recognition rate thus obtained using the proposed method is compared with other conventional methods used for speaker identification.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

Security experts reverse engineer (decompile) binary code to identify critical security vulnerabilities. The limited access to source code in vital systems - such as firmware, drivers, and proprietary software used in Critical Infrastructures (CI) - makes this analysis even more crucial on the binary level. Even with available source code, a semantic gap persists after compilation between the source and the binary code executed by the processor. This gap may hinder the detection of vulnerabilities in source code. That being said, current research on Large Language Models (LLMs) overlooks the significance of decompiled binaries in this area by focusing solely on source code. In this work, we are the first to empirically uncover the substantial semantic limitations of state-of-the-art LLMs when it comes to analyzing vulnerabilities in decompiled binaries, largely due to the absence of relevant datasets. To bridge the gap, we introduce DeBinVul, a novel decompiled binary code vulnerability dataset. Our dataset is multi-architecture and multi-optimization, focusing on C/C++ due to their wide usage in CI and association with numerous vulnerabilities. Specifically, we curate 150,872 samples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable decompiled binary code for the task of (i) identifying; (ii) classifying; (iii) describing vulnerabilities; and (iv) recovering function names in the domain of decompiled binaries. Subsequently, we fine-tune state-of-the-art LLMs using DeBinVul and report on a performance increase of 19%, 24%, and 21% in the capabilities of CodeLlama, Llama3, and CodeGen2 respectively, in detecting binary code vulnerabilities. Additionally, using DeBinVul, we report a high performance of 80-90% on the vulnerability classification task. Furthermore, we report improved performance in function name recovery and vulnerability description tasks.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

In symmetric cryptanalysis, the model of superposition queries has led to surprising results, with many constructions being broken in polynomial time thanks to Simon's period-finding algorithm. But the practical implications of these attacks remain blurry. In contrast, the results obtained so far for a quantum adversary making classical queries only are less impressive. In this paper, we introduce a new quantum algorithm which uses Simon's subroutines in a novel way. We manage to leverage the algebraic structure of cryptosystems in the context of a quantum attacker limited to classical queries and offline quantum computations. We obtain improved quantum-time/classical-data tradeoffs with respect to the current literature, while using only as much hardware requirements (quantum and classical) as a standard exhaustive search with Grover's algorithm. In particular, we are able to break the Even-Mansour construction in quantum time O(2^{n/3}), with O(2^{n/3}) classical queries and O(n^2) qubits only. In addition, we improve some previous superposition attacks by reducing the data complexity from exponential to polynomial, with the same time complexity. Our approach can be seen in two complementary ways: reusing superposition queries during the iteration of a search using Grover's algorithm, or alternatively, removing the memory requirement in some quantum attacks based on a collision search, thanks to their algebraic structure. We provide a list of cryptographic applications, including the Even-Mansour construction, the FX construction, some Sponge authenticated modes of encryption, and many more.

Neurosymbolic approaches leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) with formal methods have recently achieved strong results on mathematics-oriented theorem-proving benchmarks. However, success on competition-style mathematics does not by itself demonstrate the ability to construct proofs about real-world implementations. We address this gap with a benchmark derived from an industrial cryptographic library whose assembly routines are already verified in HOL Light. s2n-bignum is a library used at AWS for providing fast assembly routines for cryptography, and its correctness is established by formal verification. The task of formally verifying this library has been a significant achievement for the Automated Reasoning Group. It involved two tasks: (1) precisely specifying the correct behavior of a program as a mathematical proposition, and (2) proving that the proposition is correct. In the case of s2n-bignum, both tasks were carried out by human experts. In s2n-bignum-bench, we provide the formal specification and ask the LLM to generate a proof script that is accepted by HOL Light within a fixed proof-check timeout. To our knowledge, s2n-bignum-bench is the first public benchmark focused on machine-checkable proof synthesis for industrial low-level cryptographic assembly routines in HOL Light. This benchmark provides a challenging and practically relevant testbed for evaluating LLM-based theorem proving beyond competition mathematics. The code to set up and use the benchmark is available here: https://github.com/kings-crown/s2n-bignum-bench{s2n-bignum-bench}.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) are a cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret value to a verifier without revealing anything about the secret itself. ZKPs have shown to be an extremely powerful tool, as evidenced in both industry and academic settings. In recent years, the utilization of user data in practical applications has necessitated the rapid development of privacy-preserving techniques, including ZKPs. This has led to the creation of several robust open-source ZKP frameworks. However, there remains a significant gap in understanding the capabilities and real-world applications of these frameworks. Furthermore, identifying the most suitable frameworks for the developers' specific applications and settings is a challenge, given the variety of options available. The primary goal of our work is to lower the barrier to entry for understanding and building applications with open-source ZKP frameworks. In this work, we survey and evaluate 25 general-purpose, prominent ZKP frameworks. Recognizing that ZKPs have various constructions and underlying arithmetic schemes, our survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the ZKP landscape. These systems are assessed based on their usability and performance in SHA-256 and matrix multiplication experiments. Acknowledging that setting up a functional development environment can be challenging for these frameworks, we offer a fully open-source collection of Docker containers. These containers include a working development environment and are accompanied by documented code from our experiments. We conclude our work with a thorough analysis of the practical applications of ZKPs, recommendations for ZKP settings in different application scenarios, and a discussion on the future development of ZKP frameworks.

We report genuine-un-compiled, textbook-faithful-quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric-cipher structures executed on real IBM quantum hardware (ibm\_kingston, Heron generation). Using Simon's algorithm we recover the hidden period of the Even-Mansour cipher up to security parameter N = 10 on real hardware, beyond the largest previously reported real-hardware key recovery of N = 4, and we cleanly recover the periods of a 3-round Feistel (DES-family) construction at block sizes 6 and 8; a 21-qubit block-10 instance is verified in simulation and submitted to hardware. We further provide a breadth-first benchmark of five genuine quantum attacks spanning four symmetric-cipher design paradigms -- Bernstein-Vazirani (linear structure, single query), Grover (SPN key search, quadratic), and Simon (Even-Mansour, CBC-MAC forgery, and Feistel; exponential-to-polynomial in query complexity) -- validated to the classical-simulation ceiling of 25 qubits. We are deliberately explicit about scope: these attacks target reduced or structured constructions in the Q2 (quantum-query) model, asymptotically follow the birthday bound and therefore do not constitute quantum advantage over classical collision-finding, do not break full AES/RSA or 16-round DES, and rely on error mitigation rather than fault-tolerant error correction. Our contribution is the real-hardware demonstration at record structure sizes, the breadth of genuine algorithmic coverage across four paradigms, and an honest, reproducible benchmark with public artifacts.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 has catalyzed the exploration of multi-task learning (MTL), in which a single model demonstrates proficiency across diverse tasks. Task arithmetic has emerged as a cost-effective approach for MTL. It enables performance enhancement across multiple tasks by adding their corresponding task vectors to a pre-trained model. However, the current lack of a method that can simultaneously achieve optimal performance, computational efficiency, and data privacy limits their application to LLMs. In this paper, we propose Model Exclusive Task Arithmetic for merging GPT-scale models, which formalizes the objective of model merging into a multi-task learning framework, aiming to minimize the average loss difference between the merged model and each individual task model. Since data privacy limits the use of multi-task training data, we leverage LLMs' local linearity and task vectors' orthogonality to separate the data term and scaling coefficients term and derive a model-exclusive task arithmetic method. Our proposed MetaGPT is data-agnostic and bypasses the heavy search process, making it cost-effective and easy to implement for LLMs.Extensive experiments demonstrate that MetaGPT leads to improvements in task arithmetic and achieves state-of-the-art performance on multiple tasks.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Fine-tuning language models on tasks with instructions has demonstrated potential in facilitating zero-shot generalization to unseen tasks. In this paper, we introduce a straightforward yet effective method for enhancing instruction tuning by employing symbolic tasks. Compared to crowdsourced human tasks or model-generated tasks, symbolic tasks present a unique advantage as they can be easily generated in vast quantities, theoretically providing an infinite supply of high-quality training instances. To explore the potential of symbolic tasks, we carry out an extensive case study on the representative symbolic task of SQL execution. Empirical results on various benchmarks validate that the integration of SQL execution leads to significant improvements in zero-shot scenarios, particularly in table reasoning. Notably, our 3B model surpasses both the 175B GPT-3 and ChatGPT in zero-shot table reasoning across four benchmarks. Furthermore, experimental results on BBH (27 tasks) and MMLU (57 tasks) reveal that language models can be enhanced through symbolic tasks without compromising their generality. We hope that our paper serves as a catalyst, inspiring increased efforts to incorporate symbolic tasks in instruction tuning.

Previous benchmarks on prompt injection in large language models (LLMs) have primarily focused on generic tasks and attacks, offering limited insights into more complex threats like data exfiltration. This paper examines how prompt injection can cause tool-calling agents to leak personal data observed during task execution. Using a fictitious banking agent, we develop data flow-based attacks and integrate them into AgentDojo, a recent benchmark for agentic security. To enhance its scope, we also create a richer synthetic dataset of human-AI banking conversations. In 16 user tasks from AgentDojo, LLMs show a 15-50 percentage point drop in utility under attack, with average attack success rates (ASR) around 20 percent; some defenses reduce ASR to zero. Most LLMs, even when successfully tricked by the attack, avoid leaking highly sensitive data like passwords, likely due to safety alignments, but they remain vulnerable to disclosing other personal data. The likelihood of password leakage increases when a password is requested along with one or two additional personal details. In an extended evaluation across 48 tasks, the average ASR is around 15 percent, with no built-in AgentDojo defense fully preventing leakage. Tasks involving data extraction or authorization workflows, which closely resemble the structure of exfiltration attacks, exhibit the highest ASRs, highlighting the interaction between task type, agent performance, and defense efficacy.

One long-term goal of machine learning research is to produce methods that are applicable to reasoning and natural language, in particular building an intelligent dialogue agent. To measure progress towards that goal, we argue for the usefulness of a set of proxy tasks that evaluate reading comprehension via question answering. Our tasks measure understanding in several ways: whether a system is able to answer questions via chaining facts, simple induction, deduction and many more. The tasks are designed to be prerequisites for any system that aims to be capable of conversing with a human. We believe many existing learning systems can currently not solve them, and hence our aim is to classify these tasks into skill sets, so that researchers can identify (and then rectify) the failings of their systems. We also extend and improve the recently introduced Memory Networks model, and show it is able to solve some, but not all, of the tasks.

Communication encryption is crucial in computer technology, but existing algorithms struggle with balancing cost and security. We propose EncGPT, a multi-agent framework using large language models (LLM). It includes rule, encryption, and decryption agents that generate encryption rules and apply them dynamically. This approach addresses gaps in LLM-based multi-agent systems for communication security. We tested GPT-4o's rule generation and implemented a substitution encryption workflow with homomorphism preservation, achieving an average execution time of 15.99 seconds.

Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges are puzzles related to computer security scenarios. With the advent of large language models (LLMs), more and more CTF participants are using LLMs to understand and solve the challenges. However, so far no work has evaluated the effectiveness of LLMs in solving CTF challenges with a fully automated workflow. We develop two CTF-solving workflows, human-in-the-loop (HITL) and fully-automated, to examine the LLMs' ability to solve a selected set of CTF challenges, prompted with information about the question. We collect human contestants' results on the same set of questions, and find that LLMs achieve higher success rate than an average human participant. This work provides a comprehensive evaluation of the capability of LLMs in solving real world CTF challenges, from real competition to fully automated workflow. Our results provide references for applying LLMs in cybersecurity education and pave the way for systematic evaluation of offensive cybersecurity capabilities in LLMs.

Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.

We present the FinCausal 2020 Shared Task on Causality Detection in Financial Documents and the associated FinCausal dataset, and discuss the participating systems and results. Two sub-tasks are proposed: a binary classification task (Task 1) and a relation extraction task (Task 2). A total of 16 teams submitted runs across the two Tasks and 13 of them contributed with a system description paper. This workshop is associated to the Joint Workshop on Financial Narrative Processing and MultiLing Financial Summarisation (FNP-FNS 2020), held at The 28th International Conference on Computational Linguistics (COLING'2020), Barcelona, Spain on September 12, 2020.

The automated code evaluation system (AES) is mainly designed to reliably assess user-submitted code. Due to their extensive range of applications and the accumulation of valuable resources, AESs are becoming increasingly popular. Research on the application of AES and their real-world resource exploration for diverse coding tasks is still lacking. In this study, we conducted a comprehensive survey on AESs and their resources. This survey explores the application areas of AESs, available resources, and resource utilization for coding tasks. AESs are categorized into programming contests, programming learning and education, recruitment, online compilers, and additional modules, depending on their application. We explore the available datasets and other resources of these systems for research, analysis, and coding tasks. Moreover, we provide an overview of machine learning-driven coding tasks, such as bug detection, code review, comprehension, refactoring, search, representation, and repair. These tasks are performed using real-life datasets. In addition, we briefly discuss the Aizu Online Judge platform as a real example of an AES from the perspectives of system design (hardware and software), operation (competition and education), and research. This is due to the scalability of the AOJ platform (programming education, competitions, and practice), open internal features (hardware and software), attention from the research community, open source data (e.g., solution codes and submission documents), and transparency. We also analyze the overall performance of this system and the perceived challenges over the years.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is an encryption scheme that allows for computation to be performed directly on encrypted data, effectively closing the loop on secure and outsourced computing. Data is encrypted not only during rest and transit, but also during processing. However, FHE provides a limited instruction set: SIMD addition, SIMD multiplication, and cyclic rotation of 1-D vectors. This restriction makes performing multi-dimensional tensor operations challenging. Practitioners must pack these tensors into 1-D vectors and map tensor operations onto this one-dimensional layout rather than their traditional nested structure. And while prior systems have made significant strides in automating this process, they often hide critical packing decisions behind layers of abstraction, making debugging, optimizing, and building on top of these systems difficult. In this work, we approach multi-dimensional tensor operations in FHE through Einstein summation (einsum) notation. Einsum notation explicitly encodes dimensional structure and operations in its syntax, naturally exposing how tensors should be packed and transformed. We decompose einsum expressions into a fixed set of FHE-friendly operations. We implement our design and present EinHops, a minimalist system that factors einsum expressions into a fixed sequence of FHE operations. EinHops enables developers to perform encrypted tensor operations using FHE while maintaining full visibility into the underlying packing strategy. We evaluate EinHops on a range of tensor operations from a simple transpose to complex multi-dimensional contractions. We show that the explicit nature of einsum notation allows us to build an FHE tensor system that is simple, general, and interpretable. We open-source EinHops at the following repository: https://github.com/baahl-nyu/einhops.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as personal agents, accessing sensitive user data such as calendars, emails, and medical records. Users currently face a trade-off: They can send private records, many of which are stored in remote databases, to powerful but untrusted LLM providers, increasing their exposure risk. Alternatively, they can run less powerful models locally on trusted devices. We bridge this gap. Our Socratic Chain-of-Thought Reasoning first sends a generic, non-private user query to a powerful, untrusted LLM, which generates a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompt and detailed sub-queries without accessing user data. Next, we embed these sub-queries and perform encrypted sub-second semantic search using our Homomorphically Encrypted Vector Database across one million entries of a single user's private data. This represents a realistic scale of personal documents, emails, and records accumulated over years of digital activity. Finally, we feed the CoT prompt and the decrypted records to a local language model and generate the final response. On the LoCoMo long-context QA benchmark, our hybrid framework, combining GPT-4o with a local Llama-3.2-1B model, outperforms using GPT-4o alone by up to 7.1 percentage points. This demonstrates a first step toward systems where tasks are decomposed and split between untrusted strong LLMs and weak local ones, preserving user privacy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

The emergence of agent-to-agent communication protocols mirrors the early internet: powerful connectivity with minimal security infrastructure. When AI agents communicate on behalf of users, every message crosses a trust boundary where the user's personal data and the external agent's unconstrained language each present distinct risks. We address both through a dual-firewall architecture grounded in a unifying principle: each task defines a context, and both sides of the communication carry information far exceeding what that context requires. Our firewalls act as projections onto the task context, allowing only contextually appropriate content to cross each boundary. The Language Converter Firewall projects incoming messages onto a closed, domain-specific, structured protocol; an external agent's message is converted to validated fields while persuasive framing, urgency tactics, and embedded instructions are structurally eliminated through deterministic verification. This replaces the asymmetric challenge of resisting every possible manipulation with the structural guarantee that manipulation has no channel through which to arrive. The Data Abstraction Firewall projects outgoing information onto the granularity appropriate for the task, rather than applying binary disclose-or-redact filtering, as previous airgapping solutions did. Both firewalls operate in a trusted environment isolated from external input, applying domain-specific rules learned automatically from demonstrations. Across 864 attacks spanning three domains on the ConVerse benchmark, our architecture reduces privacy attack success rates (e.g., from 84% to 10% for GPT-5) and security attacks (from 60% to 3%), while maintaining or even improving task completion quality.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

Confidential computing on GPUs, like NVIDIA H100, mitigates the security risks of outsourced Large Language Models (LLMs) by implementing strong isolation and data encryption. Nonetheless, this encryption incurs a significant performance overhead, reaching up to 52.8 percent and 88.2 percent throughput drop when serving OPT-30B and OPT-66B, respectively. To address this challenge, we introduce PipeLLM, a user-transparent runtime system. PipeLLM removes the overhead by overlapping the encryption and GPU computation through pipelining - an idea inspired by the CPU instruction pipelining - thereby effectively concealing the latency increase caused by encryption. The primary technical challenge is that, unlike CPUs, the encryption module lacks prior knowledge of the specific data needing encryption until it is requested by the GPUs. To this end, we propose speculative pipelined encryption to predict the data requiring encryption by analyzing the serving patterns of LLMs. Further, we have developed an efficient, low-cost pipeline relinquishing approach for instances of incorrect predictions. Our experiments on NVIDIA H100 GPU show that compared with vanilla systems without confidential computing (e.g., vLLM, PEFT, and FlexGen), PipeLLM incurs modest overhead (less than 19.6 percent in throughput) across various LLM sizes, from 13B to 175B.

A critical component of a successful language generation pipeline is the decoding algorithm. However, the general principles that should guide the choice of decoding algorithm remain unclear. Previous works only compare decoding algorithms in narrow scenarios and their findings do not generalize across tasks. To better structure the discussion, we introduce a taxonomy that groups decoding strategies based on their implicit assumptions about how well the model's likelihood is aligned with the task-specific notion of utility. We argue that this taxonomy allows a broader view of the decoding problem and can lead to generalizable statements because it is grounded on the interplay between the decoding algorithms and the likelihood-utility misalignment. Specifically, by analyzing the correlation between the likelihood and the utility of predictions across a diverse set of tasks, we provide the first empirical evidence supporting the proposed taxonomy, and a set of principles to structure reasoning when choosing a decoding algorithm. Crucially, our analysis is the first one to relate likelihood-based decoding strategies with strategies that rely on external information such as value-guided methods and prompting, and covers the most diverse set of tasks up-to-date.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

We present the GenAI Content Detection Task~1 -- a shared task on binary machine generated text detection, conducted as a part of the GenAI workshop at COLING 2025. The task consists of two subtasks: Monolingual (English) and Multilingual. The shared task attracted many participants: 36 teams made official submissions to the Monolingual subtask during the test phase and 26 teams -- to the Multilingual. We provide a comprehensive overview of the data, a summary of the results -- including system rankings and performance scores -- detailed descriptions of the participating systems, and an in-depth analysis of submissions. https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/COLING-2025-Workshop-on-MGT-Detection-Task1

Task arithmetic, representing downstream tasks through linear operations on task vectors, has emerged as a simple yet powerful paradigm for transferring knowledge across diverse settings. However, maintaining a large collection of task vectors introduces scalability challenges in both storage and computation. We propose Task Vector Bases, a framework compressing T task vectors into M < T basis vectors while preserving the functionality of task arithmetic. By representing each task vector as a structured linear combination of basis atoms, our approach supports standard operations such as addition, negation, as well as more advanced arithmetic ones. The framework is orthogonal to other efficiency-oriented improvements in task arithmetic and can be used in combination with them. We provide theoretical analysis showing that basis compression retains addition generalization guarantees and enables principled unlearning, with error bounds depending on reconstruction quality. Empirically, our proposed basis construction methods consistently outperform heuristic basis construction baselines and, in some cases, even surpass the performance of full task vector collections across diverse downstream applications while reducing storage and computational requirements. The code is available at https://github.com/uiuctml/TaskVectorBasis.

Quantum cryptography is arguably the fastest growing area in quantum information science. Novel theoretical protocols are designed on a regular basis, security proofs are constantly improving, and experiments are gradually moving from proof-of-principle lab demonstrations to in-field implementations and technological prototypes. In this review, we provide both a general introduction and a state of the art description of the recent advances in the field, both theoretically and experimentally. We start by reviewing protocols of quantum key distribution based on discrete variable systems. Next we consider aspects of device independence, satellite challenges, and high rate protocols based on continuous variable systems. We will then discuss the ultimate limits of point-to-point private communications and how quantum repeaters and networks may overcome these restrictions. Finally, we will discuss some aspects of quantum cryptography beyond standard quantum key distribution, including quantum data locking and quantum digital signatures.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

This paper analyzes Large Language Model (LLM) security vulnerabilities based on data from Crucible, encompassing 214,271 attack attempts by 1,674 users across 30 LLM challenges. Our findings reveal automated approaches significantly outperform manual techniques (69.5% vs 47.6% success rate), despite only 5.2% of users employing automation. We demonstrate that automated approaches excel in systematic exploration and pattern matching challenges, while manual approaches retain speed advantages in certain creative reasoning scenarios, often solving problems 5x faster when successful. Challenge categories requiring systematic exploration are most effectively targeted through automation, while intuitive challenges sometimes favor manual techniques for time-to-solve metrics. These results illuminate how algorithmic testing is transforming AI red-teaming practices, with implications for both offensive security research and defensive measures. Our analysis suggests optimal security testing combines human creativity for strategy development with programmatic execution for thorough exploration.

Task arithmetic provides an efficient, training-free way to edit pre-trained models, yet lacks a fundamental theoretical explanation for its success. The existing concept of ``weight disentanglement" describes the ideal outcome of non-interfering task composition but does not reveal its underlying cause. Crucially, what intrinsic properties of the pre-trained model (θ_0) or the task vectors (τ_t) enable this disentanglement remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce Task-Feature Specialization (TFS), a model's ability to allocate distinct internal features to different tasks, as the fundamental principle. We first prove that TFS is a sufficient condition for weight disentanglement. More importantly, we find that TFS also gives rise to an observable geometric consequence: weight vector orthogonality. This positions TFS as the common cause for both the desired functional outcome (disentanglement) and a measurable geometric property (orthogonality). This relationship provides the key insight for our method: since the abstract TFS property is intractable to enforce directly, we can instead promote weight disentanglement by shaping its concrete geometric consequence, orthogonality. Therefore, we propose OrthoReg, a simple and effective regularization method that actively enforces an internal orthogonal structure on weight updates (ΔW) that constitute τ_t during fine-tuning. And we theoretically prove that OrthoReg promotes disentanglement. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OrthoReg consistently and significantly enhances the performance of various task arithmetic methods. Code is available at https://github.com/RL-MIND/OrthoReg{https://github.com/RL-MIND/OrthoReg}.

We present the shared task on artificial text detection in Russian, which is organized as a part of the Dialogue Evaluation initiative, held in 2022. The shared task dataset includes texts from 14 text generators, i.e., one human writer and 13 text generative models fine-tuned for one or more of the following generation tasks: machine translation, paraphrase generation, text summarization, text simplification. We also consider back-translation and zero-shot generation approaches. The human-written texts are collected from publicly available resources across multiple domains. The shared task consists of two sub-tasks: (i) to determine if a given text is automatically generated or written by a human; (ii) to identify the author of a given text. The first task is framed as a binary classification problem. The second task is a multi-class classification problem. We provide count-based and BERT-based baselines, along with the human evaluation on the first sub-task. A total of 30 and 8 systems have been submitted to the binary and multi-class sub-tasks, correspondingly. Most teams outperform the baselines by a wide margin. We publicly release our codebase, human evaluation results, and other materials in our GitHub repository (https://github.com/dialogue-evaluation/RuATD).

We describe the SemEval task of extracting keyphrases and relations between them from scientific documents, which is crucial for understanding which publications describe which processes, tasks and materials. Although this was a new task, we had a total of 26 submissions across 3 evaluation scenarios. We expect the task and the findings reported in this paper to be relevant for researchers working on understanding scientific content, as well as the broader knowledge base population and information extraction communities.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated promising performance in complex tasks. However, the resource-consuming reasoning processes may be exploited by attackers to maliciously occupy the resources of the servers, leading to a crash, like the DDoS attack in cyber. To this end, we propose a novel attack method on LRMs termed ExtendAttack to maliciously occupy the resources of servers by stealthily extending the reasoning processes of LRMs. Concretely, we systematically obfuscate characters within a benign prompt, transforming them into a complex, poly-base ASCII representation. This compels the model to perform a series of computationally intensive decoding sub-tasks that are deeply embedded within the semantic structure of the query itself. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed ExtendAttack. Remarkably, it significantly increases response length and latency, with the former increasing by over 2.7 times for the o3 model on the HumanEval benchmark. Besides, it preserves the original meaning of the query and achieves comparable answer accuracy, showing the stealthiness.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) signifies an impressive stride towards artificial general intelligence. They have shown a promising prospect in automatically completing tasks upon user instructions, functioning as brain-like coordinators. The associated risks will be revealed as we delegate an increasing number of tasks to machines for automated completion. A big question emerges: how can we make machines behave responsibly when helping humans automate tasks as personal copilots? In this paper, we explore this question in depth from the perspectives of feasibility, completeness and security. In specific, we present Responsible Task Automation (ResponsibleTA) as a fundamental framework to facilitate responsible collaboration between LLM-based coordinators and executors for task automation with three empowered capabilities: 1) predicting the feasibility of the commands for executors; 2) verifying the completeness of executors; 3) enhancing the security (e.g., the protection of users' privacy). We further propose and compare two paradigms for implementing the first two capabilities. One is to leverage the generic knowledge of LLMs themselves via prompt engineering while the other is to adopt domain-specific learnable models. Moreover, we introduce a local memory mechanism for achieving the third capability. We evaluate our proposed ResponsibleTA on UI task automation and hope it could bring more attentions to ensuring LLMs more responsible in diverse scenarios. The research project homepage is at https://task-automation-research.github.io/responsible_task_automation.

Tasks such as solving arithmetic equations, evaluating truth tables, and completing syllogisms are handled well by large language models (LLMs) in their standard form, but they often fail when the same problems are posed in logically equivalent yet obfuscated formats. To study this vulnerability, we introduce Logifus, a structure-preserving logical obfuscation framework, and, utilizing this, we present LogiQAte, a first-of-its-kind diagnostic benchmark with 1,108 questions across four reasoning tasks: (i) Obfus FOL (first-order logic entailment under equivalence-preserving rewrites), (ii) Obfus Blood Relation (family-graph entailment under indirect relational chains), (iii) Obfus Number Series (pattern induction under symbolic substitutions), and (iv) Obfus Direction Sense (navigation reasoning under altered directions and reference frames). Across all the tasks, evaluating six state-of-the-art models, we find that obfuscation severely degrades zero-shot performance, with performance dropping on average by 47% for GPT-4o, 27% for GPT-5, and 22% for reasoning model, o4-mini. Our findings reveal that current LLMs parse questions without deep understanding, highlighting the urgency of building models that genuinely comprehend and preserve meaning beyond surface form.

This paper localizes the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models. An intermediate-layer attention gate reads detected content and triggers deeper amplifier heads that boost the signal toward refusal. In smaller models the gate and amplifier are single heads; at larger scale they become bands of heads across adjacent layers. The gate contributes under 1% of output DLA, but interchange testing (p<0.001) and knockout cascade confirm it is causally necessary. Interchange screening at n>=120 detects the same motif in twelve models from six labs (2B to 72B), though specific heads differ by lab. Per-head ablation weakens up to 58x at 72B and misses gates that interchange identifies; interchange is the only reliable audit at scale. Modulating the detection-layer signal continuously controls policy from hard refusal through evasion to factual answering. On safety prompts the same intervention turns refusal into harmful guidance, showing the safety-trained capability is gated by routing rather than removed. Thresholds vary by topic and by input language, and the circuit relocates across generations within a family while behavioral benchmarks register no change. Routing is early-commitment: the gate commits at its own layer before deeper layers finish processing the input. Under an in-context substitution cipher, gate interchange necessity collapses 70 to 99% across three models and the model switches to puzzle-solving. Injecting the plaintext gate activation into the cipher forward pass restores 48% of refusals in Phi-4-mini, localizing the bypass to the routing interface. A second method, cipher contrast analysis, uses plain/cipher DLA differences to map the full cipher-sensitive routing circuit in O(3n) forward passes. Any encoding that defeats detection-layer pattern matching bypasses the policy regardless of whether deeper layers reconstruct the content.

We introduce Tencent WorkBuddy Bench, a multi-domain evaluation suite for coding agents; this report documents its construction methodology, scoring protocol, and a cross-model leaderboard. At its core is a unified evaluation framework for constructing and running distribution-informed coding-agent tasks across four work domains - Code, Web, Office, and Security. Rather than adapting public issue text, every task is reverse-engineered from a real commit, pull request, or business scenario and rewritten as a short, colloquial, role-played request, so that a task's prompt is not recoverable by web-searching the underlying issue, pull request, or commit thread. Because the dataset is released openly - task directories, environment images, evaluation harness, tests, and reference solutions - contamination resistance rests on this construction together with dataset versioning rather than on secrecy. The four subsets - repository-level engineering, front-end development, office and business workflows, and red-/blue-team security - probe complementary facets of real work, each with its own verification style. All are packaged in a uniform task-directory format and run, under a uniform and reproducible protocol, on two agent harnesses (CodeBuddy Code and Claude Code); the full open release makes the benchmark reproducible end to end and directly auditable, since any third party can re-run each task and inspect its content. Because each subset uses a different scoring instrument, scores are not comparable across subsets and the suite reports no suite-wide average. We report a cross-model leaderboard across several model families.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

The goal of decompilation is to convert compiled low-level code (e.g., assembly code) back into high-level programming languages, enabling analysis in scenarios where source code is unavailable. This task supports various reverse engineering applications, such as vulnerability identification, malware analysis, and legacy software migration. The end-to-end decompile method based on large langauge models (LLMs) reduces reliance on additional tools and minimizes manual intervention due to its inherent properties. However, previous end-to-end methods often lose critical information necessary for reconstructing control flow structures and variables when processing binary files, making it challenging to accurately recover the program's logic. To address these issues, we propose the ReF Decompile method, which incorporates the following innovations: (1) The Relabelling strategy replaces jump target addresses with labels, preserving control flow clarity. (2) The Function Call strategy infers variable types and retrieves missing variable information from binary files. Experimental results on the Humaneval-Decompile Benchmark demonstrate that ReF Decompile surpasses comparable baselines and achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance of 61.43%.

We present quantum circuits to implement an exhaustive key search for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and analyze the quantum resources required to carry out such an attack. We consider the overall circuit size, the number of qubits, and the circuit depth as measures for the cost of the presented quantum algorithms. Throughout, we focus on Clifford+T gates as the underlying fault-tolerant logical quantum gate set. In particular, for all three variants of AES (key size 128, 192, and 256 bit) that are standardized in FIPS-PUB 197, we establish precise bounds for the number of qubits and the number of elementary logical quantum gates that are needed to implement Grover's quantum algorithm to extract the key from a small number of AES plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance in following natural language instructions to solve unseen tasks. However, it remains unclear whether models truly understand task definitions and whether the human-written definitions are optimal. In this paper, we systematically study the role of task definitions in instruction learning. We first conduct an ablation analysis informed by human annotations to understand which parts of a task definition are most important, and find that model performance only drops substantially when removing contents describing the task output, in particular label information. Next, we propose an automatic algorithm to compress task definitions to a minimal supporting set of tokens, and find that 60\% of tokens can be removed while maintaining or even improving model performance. Based on these results, we propose two strategies to help models better leverage task instructions: (1) providing only key information for tasks in a common structured format, and (2) adding a meta-tuning stage to help the model better understand the definitions. With these two strategies, we achieve a 4.2 Rouge-L improvement over 119 unseen test tasks.

We present the first shared task for detecting and analyzing code-switching in Guarani and Spanish, GUA-SPA at IberLEF 2023. The challenge consisted of three tasks: identifying the language of a token, NER, and a novel task of classifying the way a Spanish span is used in the code-switched context. We annotated a corpus of 1500 texts extracted from news articles and tweets, around 25 thousand tokens, with the information for the tasks. Three teams took part in the evaluation phase, obtaining in general good results for Task 1, and more mixed results for Tasks 2 and 3.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable success in various natural language processing and software engineering tasks, such as code generation. The LLMs are mainly utilized in the prompt-based zero/few-shot paradigm to guide the model in accomplishing the task. GPT-based models are one of the popular ones studied for tasks such as code comment generation or test generation. These tasks are `generative' tasks. However, there is limited research on the usage of LLMs for `non-generative' tasks such as classification using the prompt-based paradigm. In this preliminary exploratory study, we investigated the applicability of LLMs for Code Clone Detection (CCD), a non-generative task. By building a mono-lingual and cross-lingual CCD dataset derived from CodeNet, we first investigated two different prompts using ChatGPT to detect Type-4 code clones in Java-Java and Java-Ruby pairs in a zero-shot setting. We then conducted an analysis to understand the strengths and weaknesses of ChatGPT in CCD. ChatGPT surpasses the baselines in cross-language CCD attaining an F1-score of 0.877 and achieves comparable performance to fully fine-tuned models for mono-lingual CCD, with an F1-score of 0.878. Also, the prompt and the difficulty level of the problems has an impact on the performance of ChatGPT. Finally we provide insights and future directions based on our initial analysis

Our work tackles the challenge of securing user inputs in cloud-hosted large language model (LLM) serving while ensuring output invariance, model confidentiality, and compute efficiency. We introduce secure multi-party decoding (SMD), which leverages confidential computing to confine user prompts to a trusted execution environment (TEE), namely a confidential virtual machine (CVM), while allowing service providers to generate tokens efficiently. We also introduce a novel cryptographic method, prompt obfuscation (PO), to ensure robustness against reconstruction attacks on SMD. We demonstrate that our approach preserves both prompt confidentiality and LLM serving efficiency. Our solution can enable privacy-preserving cloud LLM serving that handles sensitive prompts, such as clinical records, financial data, and personal information.

As LLMs see wide adoption in software engineering, the reliable assessment of the correctness and security of LLM-generated code is crucial. Notably, prior work has demonstrated that security is often overlooked, exposing that LLMs are prone to generating code with security vulnerabilities. These insights were enabled by specialized benchmarks, crafted through significant manual effort by security experts. However, relying on manually-crafted benchmarks is insufficient in the long term, because benchmarks (i) naturally end up contaminating training data, (ii) must extend to new tasks to provide a more complete picture, and (iii) must increase in difficulty to challenge more capable LLMs. In this work, we address these challenges and present AutoBaxBuilder, a framework that generates tasks and tests for code security benchmarking from scratch. We introduce a robust pipeline with fine-grained plausibility checks, leveraging the code understanding capabilities of LLMs to construct functionality tests and end-to-end security-probing exploits. To confirm the quality of the generated benchmark, we conduct both a qualitative analysis and perform quantitative experiments, comparing it against tasks constructed by human experts. We use AutoBaxBuilder to construct entirely new tasks and release them to the public as AutoBaxBench, together with a thorough evaluation of the security capabilities of LLMs on these tasks. We find that a new task can be generated in under 2 hours, costing less than USD 10.

Although membership inference attacks (MIAs) and machine-generated text detection target different goals, identifying training samples and synthetic texts, their methods often exploit similar signals based on a language model's probability distribution. Despite this shared methodological foundation, the two tasks have been independently studied, which may lead to conclusions that overlook stronger methods and valuable insights developed in the other task. In this work, we theoretically and empirically investigate the transferability, i.e., how well a method originally developed for one task performs on the other, between MIAs and machine text detection. For our theoretical contribution, we prove that the metric that achieves the asymptotically highest performance on both tasks is the same. We unify a large proportion of the existing literature in the context of this optimal metric and hypothesize that the accuracy with which a given method approximates this metric is directly correlated with its transferability. Our large-scale empirical experiments, including 7 state-of-the-art MIA methods and 5 state-of-the-art machine text detectors across 13 domains and 10 generators, demonstrate very strong rank correlation (rho > 0.6) in cross-task performance. We notably find that Binoculars, originally designed for machine text detection, achieves state-of-the-art performance on MIA benchmarks as well, demonstrating the practical impact of the transferability. Our findings highlight the need for greater cross-task awareness and collaboration between the two research communities. To facilitate cross-task developments and fair evaluations, we introduce MINT, a unified evaluation suite for MIAs and machine-generated text detection, with implementation of 15 recent methods from both tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been demonstrating increasingly strong reasoning capability with their chain-of-thoughts (CoT), which are routinely used by humans to judge answer quality. This reliance creates a powerful yet fragile basis for trust. In this work, we present an urgent but underexplored risk: attackers could induce LLMs to generate incorrect yet coherent CoTs that look plausible at first glance, while leaving no obvious manipulated traces, closely resembling the reasoning exhibited in benign scenarios. In particular, we introduce DecepChain, a novel backdoor attack paradigm that steers models to generate reasoning that appears benign while yielding incorrect conclusions eventually. At a high level, DecepChain exploits LLMs' own hallucination and amplifies it by fine-tuning on naturally erroneous rollouts generated by the model itself and then reinforces it via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a flipped reward on triggered inputs, plus a plausibility regularizer to preserve fluent, benign-looking reasoning. Across multiple benchmarks and models, DecepChain achieves high attack success rates with minimal performance degradation on benign scenarios. Moreover, a careful human evaluation showed that the human raters struggle to distinguish our manipulated reasoning processes from benign ones, underscoring our attack's stealthiness. Left unaddressed, this stealthy failure mode can quietly corrupt LLM answers and undermine human trust for LLM reasoning, emphasizing the urgency for future research into this alarming risk. Project page: https://decepchain.github.io/.

Transferring learned patterns from pretrained neural language models has been shown to significantly improve effectiveness across a variety of language-based tasks, meanwhile further tuning on intermediate tasks has been demonstrated to provide additional performance benefits, provided the intermediate task is sufficiently related to the target task. However, how to identify related tasks is an open problem, and brute-force searching effective task combinations is prohibitively expensive. Hence, the question arises, are we able to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tasks with no training examples through selective fine-tuning? In this paper, we explore statistical measures that approximate the divergence between domain representations as a means to estimate whether tuning using one task pair will exhibit performance benefits over tuning another. This estimation can then be used to reduce the number of task pairs that need to be tested by eliminating pairs that are unlikely to provide benefits. Through experimentation over 58 tasks and over 6,600 task pair combinations, we demonstrate that statistical measures can distinguish effective task pairs, and the resulting estimates can reduce end-to-end runtime by up to 40%.

Recently there have been many shared tasks targeting the detection of generated text from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, these shared tasks tend to focus either on cases where text is limited to one particular domain or cases where text can be from many domains, some of which may not be seen during test time. In this shared task, using the newly released RAID benchmark, we aim to answer whether or not models can detect generated text from a large, yet fixed, number of domains and LLMs, all of which are seen during training. Over the course of three months, our task was attempted by 9 teams with 23 detector submissions. We find that multiple participants were able to obtain accuracies of over 99% on machine-generated text from RAID while maintaining a 5% False Positive Rate -- suggesting that detectors are able to robustly detect text from many domains and models simultaneously. We discuss potential interpretations of this result and provide directions for future research.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Task semantics can be expressed by a set of input-to-output examples or a piece of textual instruction. Conventional machine learning approaches for natural language processing (NLP) mainly rely on the availability of large-scale sets of task-specific examples. Two issues arise: first, collecting task-specific labeled examples does not apply to scenarios where tasks may be too complicated or costly to annotate, or the system is required to handle a new task immediately; second, this is not user-friendly since end-users are probably more willing to provide task description rather than a set of examples before using the system. Therefore, the community is paying increasing interest in a new supervision-seeking paradigm for NLP: learning from task instructions. Despite its impressive progress, there are some common issues that the community struggles with. This survey paper tries to summarize and provide insights into the current research on instruction learning, particularly by answering the following questions: (i) What is task instruction, and what instruction types exist? (ii) How to model instructions? (iii) What factors influence and explain the instructions' performance? (iv) What challenges remain in instruction learning? To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey about textual instructions.

Transformer-based large language models have achieved remarkable performance across various natural language processing tasks. However, they often struggle with seemingly easy tasks like arithmetic despite their vast capabilities. This stark disparity raise human's concerns about their safe and ethical use, hinder their widespread adoption.In this paper, we focus on a typical arithmetic task, integer multiplication, to explore and explain the imperfection of transformers in this domain. We provide comprehensive analysis of a vanilla transformer trained to perform n-digit integer multiplication. Our observations indicate that the model decomposes multiplication task into multiple parallel subtasks, sequentially optimizing each subtask for each digit to complete the final multiplication. Based on observation and analysis, we infer the reasons of transformers deficiencies in multiplication tasks lies in their difficulty in calculating successive carryovers and caching intermediate results, and confirmed this inference through experiments. Guided by these findings, we propose improvements to enhance transformers performance on multiplication tasks. These enhancements are validated through rigorous testing and mathematical modeling, not only enhance transformer's interpretability, but also improve its performance, e.g., we achieve over 99.9% accuracy on 5-digit integer multiplication with a tiny transformer, outperform LLMs GPT-4. Our method contributes to the broader fields of model understanding and interpretability, paving the way for analyzing more complex tasks and Transformer models. This work underscores the importance of explainable AI, helping to build trust in large language models and promoting their adoption in critical applications.

Large language model (LLM) powered code agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by automating tasks such as testing, debugging, and repairing, yet the security risks of their generated code have become a critical concern. Existing benchmarks have offered valuable insights but remain insufficient: they often overlook the genuine context in which vulnerabilities were introduced or adopt narrow evaluation protocols that fail to capture either functional correctness or newly introduced vulnerabilities. We therefore introduce SecureAgentBench, a benchmark of 105 coding tasks designed to rigorously evaluate code agents' capabilities in secure code generation. Each task includes (i) realistic task settings that require multi-file edits in large repositories, (ii) aligned contexts based on real-world open-source vulnerabilities with precisely identified introduction points, and (iii) comprehensive evaluation that combines functionality testing, vulnerability checking through proof-of-concept exploits, and detection of newly introduced vulnerabilities using static analysis. We evaluate three representative agents (SWE-agent, OpenHands, and Aider) with three state-of-the-art LLMs (Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4.1, and DeepSeek-V3.1). Results show that (i) current agents struggle to produce secure code, as even the best-performing one, SWE-agent supported by DeepSeek-V3.1, achieves merely 15.2% correct-and-secure solutions, (ii) some agents produce functionally correct code but still introduce vulnerabilities, including new ones not previously recorded, and (iii) adding explicit security instructions for agents does not significantly improve secure coding, underscoring the need for further research. These findings establish SecureAgentBench as a rigorous benchmark for secure code generation and a step toward more reliable software development with LLMs.

Decoding methods play an indispensable role in converting language models from next-token predictors into practical task solvers. Prior research on decoding methods, primarily focusing on task-specific models, may not extend to the current era of general-purpose large language models (LLMs). Moreover, the recent influx of decoding strategies has further complicated this landscape. This paper provides a comprehensive and multifaceted analysis of various decoding methods within the context of LLMs, evaluating their performance, robustness to hyperparameter changes, and decoding speeds across a wide range of tasks, models, and deployment environments. Our findings reveal that decoding method performance is notably task-dependent and influenced by factors such as alignment, model size, and quantization. Intriguingly, sensitivity analysis exposes that certain methods achieve superior performance at the cost of extensive hyperparameter tuning, highlighting the trade-off between attaining optimal results and the practicality of implementation in varying contexts.

We present the results and the main findings of SemEval-2020 Task 11 on Detection of Propaganda Techniques in News Articles. The task featured two subtasks. Subtask SI is about Span Identification: given a plain-text document, spot the specific text fragments containing propaganda. Subtask TC is about Technique Classification: given a specific text fragment, in the context of a full document, determine the propaganda technique it uses, choosing from an inventory of 14 possible propaganda techniques. The task attracted a large number of participants: 250 teams signed up to participate and 44 made a submission on the test set. In this paper, we present the task, analyze the results, and discuss the system submissions and the methods they used. For both subtasks, the best systems used pre-trained Transformers and ensembles.

We revisit the longstanding open problem of implementing Nakamoto's proof-of-work (PoW) consensus based on a real-world computational task T(x) (as opposed to artificial random hashing), in a truly permissionless setting where the miner itself chooses the input x. The challenge in designing such a Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) protocol, is using the native computation of T(x) to produce a PoW certificate with prescribed hardness and with negligible computational overhead over the worst-case complexity of T(cdot) -- This ensures malicious miners cannot ``game the system" by fooling the verifier to accept with higher probability compared to honest miners (while using similar computational resources). Indeed, obtaining a PoUW with O(1)-factor overhead is trivial for any task T, but also useless. Our main result is a PoUW for the task of Matrix Multiplication MatMul(A,B) of arbitrary matrices with 1+o(1) multiplicative overhead compared to naive MatMul (even in the presence of Fast Matrix Multiplication-style algorithms, which are currently impractical). We conjecture that our protocol has optimal security in the sense that a malicious prover cannot obtain any significant advantage over an honest prover. This conjecture is based on reducing hardness of our protocol to the task of solving a batch of low-rank random linear equations which is of independent interest. Since MatMuls are the bottleneck of AI compute as well as countless industry-scale applications, this primitive suggests a concrete design of a new L1 base-layer protocol, which nearly eliminates the energy-waste of Bitcoin mining -- allowing GPU consumers to reduce their AI training and inference costs by ``re-using" it for blockchain consensus, in exchange for block rewards (2-for-1). This blockchain is currently under construction.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Enhancing the ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow complex instructions is critical for their deployment in real-world applications. However, existing evaluation methods often oversimplify instruction complexity as a mere additive combination of atomic constraints, failing to adequately capture the high-dimensional complexity arising from the intricate interplay of content and format, logical workflow control, and real-world applications. This leads to a significant gap between current evaluation practices and practical demands. To bridge this gap, we introduce CCR-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to assess LLMs' adherence to complex instructions. CCR-Bench is characterized by: (1) deep entanglement of content and formatting requirements in task specifications; (2) instructions that involve intricate task decomposition, conditional reasoning, and procedural planning; and (3) evaluation samples derived entirely from real-world industrial scenarios. Extensive experiments on CCR-Bench demonstrate that even state-of-the-art models exhibit substantial performance deficiencies, clearly quantifying the gap between current LLM capabilities and the demands of realworld instruction understanding. We believe that CCR-Bench offers a more rigorous and realistic evaluation framework, advancing the development of LLMs toward the next generation of models capable of understanding and executing complex tasks in industrial applications.

The global economy is entering the era of Agentic Commerce, where autonomous agents can discover services, negotiate prices, and transact value. However adoption towards agentic commerce faces a foundational trust gap: current systems are built for direct human interactions rather than agent-driven operations. It lacks core primitives across three critical stages of agentic transactions. First, Task Delegation lacks means to translate user intent into defined scopes, discover appropriate agents, and securely authorize actions. Second, Payment Settlement for tasks is processed before execution, lacking verifiable evidence to validate the agent's work. Third, Audit Mechanisms fail to capture the full transaction lifecycle, preventing clear accountability for disputes. While emerging standards address fragments of this trust gap, there still remains a critical need for a unified infrastructure that binds the entire transaction lifecycle. To resolve this gap, we introduce TessPay, a unified infrastructure that replaces implicit trust with a 'Verify-then-Pay' architecture. It is a two plane architecture separating control and verification from settlement. TessPay operationalizes trust across four distinct stages: Before execution, agents are anchored in a canonical registry and user intent is captured as verifiable mandates, enabling stakeholder accountability. During execution, funds are locked in escrow while the agent executes the task and generates cryptographic evidence (TLS Notary, TEE etc.) to support Proof of Task Execution (PoTE). At settlement, the system verifies this evidence and releases funds only when the PoTE satisfies verification predicates; modular rail adapters ensure this PoTE-gated escrow remains chain-agnostic across heterogeneous payment rails. After settlement, TessPay preserves a tamper-evident audit trail to enable clear accountability for dispute resolution.

Anonymizing textual documents is a highly context-sensitive problem: the appropriate balance between privacy protection and utility preservation varies with the data domain, privacy objectives, and downstream application. However, existing anonymization methods rely on static, manually designed strategies that lack the flexibility to adjust to diverse requirements and often fail to generalize across domains. We introduce adaptive text anonymization, a new task formulation in which anonymization strategies are automatically adapted to specific privacy-utility requirements. We propose a framework for task-specific prompt optimization that automatically constructs anonymization instructions for language models, enabling adaptation to different privacy goals, domains, and downstream usage patterns. To evaluate our approach, we present a benchmark spanning five datasets with diverse domains, privacy constraints, and utility objectives. Across all evaluated settings, our framework consistently achieves a better privacy-utility trade-off than existing baselines, while remaining computationally efficient and effective on open-source language models, with performance comparable to larger closed-source models. Additionally, we show that our method can discover novel anonymization strategies that explore different points along the privacy-utility trade-off frontier.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as OpenAI's o1 and DeepSeek's R1, excel at advanced reasoning tasks like math and coding via Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), but still struggle with puzzles solvable by humans without domain knowledge. We introduce Enigmata, the first comprehensive suite tailored for improving LLMs with puzzle reasoning skills. It includes 36 tasks across seven categories, each with 1) a generator that produces unlimited examples with controllable difficulty and 2) a rule-based verifier for automatic evaluation. This generator-verifier design supports scalable, multi-task RL training, fine-grained analysis, and seamless RLVR integration. We further propose Enigmata-Eval, a rigorous benchmark, and develop optimized multi-task RLVR strategies. Our trained model, Qwen2.5-32B-Enigmata, consistently surpasses o3-mini-high and o1 on the puzzle reasoning benchmarks like Enigmata-Eval, ARC-AGI (32.8%), and ARC-AGI 2 (0.6%). It also generalizes well to out-of-domain puzzle benchmarks and mathematical reasoning, with little multi-tasking trade-off. When trained on larger models like Seed1.5-Thinking (20B activated parameters and 200B total parameters), puzzle data from Enigmata further boosts SoTA performance on advanced math and STEM reasoning tasks such as AIME (2024-2025), BeyondAIME and GPQA (Diamond), showing nice generalization benefits of Enigmata. This work offers a unified, controllable framework for advancing logical reasoning in LLMs. Resources of this work can be found at https://seed-enigmata.github.io.

In computer networking, network traffic refers to the amount of data transmitted in the form of packets between internetworked computers or Cyber-Physical Systems. Monitoring and analyzing network traffic is crucial for ensuring the performance, security, and reliability of a network. However, a significant challenge in network traffic analysis is to process diverse data packets including both ciphertext and plaintext. While many methods have been adopted to analyze network traffic, they often rely on different datasets for performance evaluation. This inconsistency results in substantial manual data processing efforts and unfair comparisons. Moreover, some data processing methods may cause data leakage due to improper separation of training and testing data. To address these issues, we introduce the NetBench, a large-scale and comprehensive benchmark dataset for assessing machine learning models, especially foundation models, in both network traffic classification and generation tasks. NetBench is built upon seven publicly available datasets and encompasses a broad spectrum of 20 tasks, including 15 classification tasks and 5 generation tasks. Furthermore, we evaluate eight State-Of-The-Art (SOTA) classification models (including two foundation models) and two generative models using our benchmark. The results show that foundation models significantly outperform the traditional deep learning methods in traffic classification. We believe NetBench will facilitate fair comparisons among various approaches and advance the development of foundation models for network traffic. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/WM-JayLab/NetBench.

Generative AI agents, software systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), are emerging as a promising approach to automate cybersecurity tasks. Among the others, penetration testing is a challenging field due to the task complexity and the diverse strategies to simulate cyber-attacks. Despite growing interest and initial studies in automating penetration testing with generative agents, there remains a significant gap in the form of a comprehensive and standard framework for their evaluation and development. This paper introduces AutoPenBench, an open benchmark for evaluating generative agents in automated penetration testing. We present a comprehensive framework that includes 33 tasks, each representing a vulnerable system that the agent has to attack. Tasks are of increasing difficulty levels, including in-vitro and real-world scenarios. We assess the agent performance with generic and specific milestones that allow us to compare results in a standardised manner and understand the limits of the agent under test. We show the benefits of AutoPenBench by testing two agent architectures: a fully autonomous and a semi-autonomous supporting human interaction. We compare their performance and limitations. For example, the fully autonomous agent performs unsatisfactorily achieving a 21% Success Rate (SR) across the benchmark, solving 27% of the simple tasks and only one real-world task. In contrast, the assisted agent demonstrates substantial improvements, with 64% of SR. AutoPenBench allows us also to observe how different LLMs like GPT-4o or OpenAI o1 impact the ability of the agents to complete the tasks. We believe that our benchmark fills the gap with a standard and flexible framework to compare penetration testing agents on a common ground. We hope to extend AutoPenBench along with the research community by making it available under https://github.com/lucagioacchini/auto-pen-bench.

Existing computer-use benchmarks fail to capture the realism, complexity, and long-horizon demands of real-world computer use, limiting their ability to reveal the limitations of frontier agents. We introduce OSWorld 2.0, a benchmark of 108 long-horizon computer-use workflows across everyday and professional tasks, designed to capture complex and challenging real-world phenomena. Each task represents a realistic end-to-end workflow that takes human users a median of about 1.6 hours to complete and requires an average of 318 tool calls with Claude Opus 4.7 using maximum thinking, compared with about 30 in OSWorld 1.0. OSWorld 2.0 targets challenge phenomena that are common in real workflows yet underrepresented in prior benchmarks, spanning interaction-design challenges such as streaming interaction and dynamic environments, as well as agent-pattern challenges such as cross-source reasoning, implicit-state inference, and visual-spatial precision. Tasks are grounded in authentic input artifacts and cross-referenced against realistic stateful user profile data, and include separate safety reports auditing safety-sensitive execution. Under our primary binary-completion metric at 500 steps, Claude Opus 4.8 with maximum thinking and batched tool calls scores best but still completes only 20.6% of tasks at a 54.8% partial score; GPT-5.5 is far more token-efficient yet plateaus near 13%. These results show that current agents are still far from professional-level computer use: rather than stumbling on basic GUI control or coding, they lose track of constraints, miss information that arrives mid-task, guess rather than ask the user, and skip verification, struggling most when a task hinges on hidden state they must recover.

Scanned receipts OCR and key information extraction (SROIE) represent the processeses of recognizing text from scanned receipts and extracting key texts from them and save the extracted tests to structured documents. SROIE plays critical roles for many document analysis applications and holds great commercial potentials, but very little research works and advances have been published in this area. In recognition of the technical challenges, importance and huge commercial potentials of SROIE, we organized the ICDAR 2019 competition on SROIE. In this competition, we set up three tasks, namely, Scanned Receipt Text Localisation (Task 1), Scanned Receipt OCR (Task 2) and Key Information Extraction from Scanned Receipts (Task 3). A new dataset with 1000 whole scanned receipt images and annotations is created for the competition. In this report we will presents the motivation, competition datasets, task definition, evaluation protocol, submission statistics, performance of submitted methods and results analysis.

In today's digital age, the internet is essential for communication and the sharing of information, creating a critical need for sophisticated data security measures to prevent unauthorized access and exploitation. Cryptography encrypts messages into a cipher text that is incomprehensible to unauthorized readers, thus safeguarding data during its transmission. Steganography, on the other hand, originates from the Greek term for "covered writing" and involves the art of hiding data within another medium, thereby facilitating covert communication by making the message invisible. This proposed approach takes advantage of the latest advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Deep Learning (DL), especially through the application of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), to improve upon traditional steganographic methods. By embedding encrypted data within another medium, our method ensures that the communication remains hidden from prying eyes. The application of GANs enables a smart, secure system that utilizes the inherent sensitivity of neural networks to slight alterations in data, enhancing the protection against detection. By merging the encryption techniques of cryptography with the hiding capabilities of steganography, and augmenting these with the strengths of AI, we introduce a comprehensive security system designed to maintain both the privacy and integrity of information. This system is crafted not just to prevent unauthorized access or modification of data, but also to keep the existence of the data hidden. This fusion of technologies tackles the core challenges of data security in the current era of open digital communication, presenting an advanced solution with the potential to transform the landscape of information security.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

LLM test-time compute (or LLM inference) via search has emerged as a promising research area with rapid developments. However, current frameworks often adopt distinct perspectives on three key aspects (task definition, LLM profiling, and search procedures), making direct comparisons challenging. Moreover, the search algorithms employed often diverge from standard implementations, and their specific characteristics are not thoroughly specified. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive technical review that unifies task definitions and provides modular definitions of LLM profiling and search procedures. The definitions enable precise comparisons of various LLM inference frameworks while highlighting their departures from conventional search algorithms. We also discuss the applicability, performance, and efficiency of these methods. For further details and ongoing updates, please refer to our GitHub repository: https://github.com/xinzhel/LLM-Agent-Survey/blob/main/search.md

Recent advancements in large language models(LLMs), such as GPT-4 and GPT-4o, have shown exceptional performance, especially in languages with abundant resources like English, thanks to extensive datasets that ensure robust training. Conversely, these models exhibit limitations when processing under-resourced languages such as Chinese and Korean, where issues including hallucinatory responses remain prevalent. This paper traces the roots of these disparities to the tokenization process inherent to these models. Specifically, it explores how the tokenizers vocabulary, often used to speed up the tokenization process and reduce tokens but constructed independently of the actual model training data, inadequately represents non-English languages. This misrepresentation results in the propagation of under-trained or untrained tokens, which perpetuate biases and pose serious concerns related to data security and ethical standards. We aim to dissect the tokenization mechanics of GPT-4o, illustrating how its simplified token-handling methods amplify these risks and offer strategic solutions to mitigate associated security and ethical issues. Through this study, we emphasize the critical need to rethink tokenization frameworks to foster more equitable and secure AI technologies. The code and data are available at https://github.com/yeyimilk/LLMGPT4o

Performing multiple heterogeneous visual tasks in dynamic scenes is a hallmark of human perception capability. Despite remarkable progress in image and video recognition via representation learning, current research still focuses on designing specialized networks for singular, homogeneous, or simple combination of tasks. We instead explore the construction of a unified model for major image and video recognition tasks in autonomous driving with diverse input and output structures. To enable such an investigation, we design a new challenge, Video Task Decathlon (VTD), which includes ten representative image and video tasks spanning classification, segmentation, localization, and association of objects and pixels. On VTD, we develop our unified network, VTDNet, that uses a single structure and a single set of weights for all ten tasks. VTDNet groups similar tasks and employs task interaction stages to exchange information within and between task groups. Given the impracticality of labeling all tasks on all frames, and the performance degradation associated with joint training of many tasks, we design a Curriculum training, Pseudo-labeling, and Fine-tuning (CPF) scheme to successfully train VTDNet on all tasks and mitigate performance loss. Armed with CPF, VTDNet significantly outperforms its single-task counterparts on most tasks with only 20% overall computations. VTD is a promising new direction for exploring the unification of perception tasks in autonomous driving.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

The widespread lack of broad source code verification on blockchain explorers such as Etherscan, where despite 78,047,845 smart contracts deployed on Ethereum (as of May 26, 2025), a mere 767,520 (< 1%) are open source, presents a severe impediment to blockchain security. This opacity necessitates the automated semantic analysis of on-chain smart contract bytecode, a fundamental research challenge with direct implications for identifying vulnerabilities and understanding malicious behavior. Prevailing decompilers struggle to reverse bytecode in a readable manner, often yielding convoluted code that critically hampers vulnerability analysis and thwarts efforts to dissect contract functionalities for security auditing. This paper addresses this challenge by introducing a pioneering decompilation pipeline that, for the first time, successfully leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into human-readable and semantically faithful Solidity code. Our novel methodology first employs rigorous static program analysis to convert bytecode into a structured three-address code (TAC) representation. This intermediate representation then guides a Llama-3.2-3B model, specifically fine-tuned on a comprehensive dataset of 238,446 TAC-to-Solidity function pairs, to generate high-quality Solidity. This approach uniquely recovers meaningful variable names, intricate control flow, and precise function signatures. Our extensive empirical evaluation demonstrates a significant leap beyond traditional decompilers, achieving an average semantic similarity of 0.82 with original source and markedly superior readability. The practical viability and effectiveness of our research are demonstrated through its implementation in a publicly accessible system, available at https://evmdecompiler.com.

Recent agentic Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) such as GPT-o3 have achieved near-ceiling scores on various existing benchmarks, motivating a demand for more challenging test tasks. These MLLMs have been reported to excel in a few expert-level tasks for humans, e.g., GeoGuesser, reflecting their potential as a detective who can notice minuscule cues in an image and weave them into coherent, situational explanations, leading to a reliable answer. But can they match the performance of excellent human detectives? To answer this question, we investigate some hard scenarios where GPT-o3 can still handle, and find a common scenario where o3's performance drops to nearly zero, which we name CaughtCheating. It is inspired by the social media requests that ask others to detect suspicious clues from photos shared by the poster's partner. We conduct extensive experiments and analysis to understand why existing MLLMs lack sufficient capability to solve this kind of task. CaughtCheating provides a class of challenging visual perception and reasoning tasks with great value and practical usage. Success in these tasks paves the way for MLLMs to acquire human-level detective perception and reasoning capabilities.

We aim to train a multi-task model such that users can adjust the desired compute budget and relative importance of task performances after deployment, without retraining. This enables optimizing performance for dynamically varying user needs, without heavy computational overhead to train and save models for various scenarios. To this end, we propose a multi-task model consisting of a shared encoder and task-specific decoders where both encoder and decoder channel widths are slimmable. Our key idea is to control the task importance by varying the capacities of task-specific decoders, while controlling the total computational cost by jointly adjusting the encoder capacity. This improves overall accuracy by allowing a stronger encoder for a given budget, increases control over computational cost, and delivers high-quality slimmed sub-architectures based on user's constraints. Our training strategy involves a novel 'Configuration-Invariant Knowledge Distillation' loss that enforces backbone representations to be invariant under different runtime width configurations to enhance accuracy. Further, we present a simple but effective search algorithm that translates user constraints to runtime width configurations of both the shared encoder and task decoders, for sampling the sub-architectures. The key rule for the search algorithm is to provide a larger computational budget to the higher preferred task decoder, while searching a shared encoder configuration that enhances the overall MTL performance. Various experiments on three multi-task benchmarks (PASCALContext, NYUDv2, and CIFAR100-MTL) with diverse backbone architectures demonstrate the advantage of our approach. For example, our method shows a higher controllability by ~33.5% in the NYUD-v2 dataset over prior methods, while incurring much less compute cost.

While enabling large language models to implement function calling (known as APIs) can greatly enhance the performance of LLMs, function calling is still a challenging task due to the complicated relations between different APIs, especially in a context-learning setting without fine-tuning. This paper proposes a simple yet controllable target-driven approach called Reverse Chain to empower LLMs with capabilities to use external APIs with only prompts. Given that most open-source LLMs have limited tool-use or tool-plan capabilities, LLMs in Reverse Chain are only employed to implement simple tasks, e.g., API selection and argument completion, and a generic rule is employed to implement a controllable multiple functions calling. In this generic rule, after selecting a final API to handle a given task via LLMs, we first ask LLMs to fill the required arguments from user query and context. Some missing arguments could be further completed by letting LLMs select another API based on API description before asking user. This process continues until a given task is completed. Extensive numerical experiments indicate an impressive capability of Reverse Chain on implementing multiple function calling. Interestingly enough, the experiments also reveal that tool-use capabilities of the existing LLMs, e.g., ChatGPT, can be greatly improved via Reverse Chain.

To mitigate the potential misuse of large language models (LLMs), recent research has developed watermarking algorithms, which restrict the generation process to leave an invisible trace for watermark detection. Due to the two-stage nature of the task, most studies evaluate the generation and detection separately, thereby presenting a challenge in unbiased, thorough, and applicable evaluations. In this paper, we introduce WaterBench, the first comprehensive benchmark for LLM watermarks, in which we design three crucial factors: (1) For benchmarking procedure, to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison, we first adjust each watermarking method's hyper-parameter to reach the same watermarking strength, then jointly evaluate their generation and detection performance. (2) For task selection, we diversify the input and output length to form a five-category taxonomy, covering 9 tasks. (3) For evaluation metric, we adopt the GPT4-Judge for automatically evaluating the decline of instruction-following abilities after watermarking. We evaluate 4 open-source watermarks on 2 LLMs under 2 watermarking strengths and observe the common struggles for current methods on maintaining the generation quality. The code and data are available at https://github.com/THU-KEG/WaterBench.

We present ControlLLM, a novel framework that enables large language models (LLMs) to utilize multi-modal tools for solving complex real-world tasks. Despite the remarkable performance of LLMs, they still struggle with tool invocation due to ambiguous user prompts, inaccurate tool selection and parameterization, and inefficient tool scheduling. To overcome these challenges, our framework comprises three key components: (1) a task decomposer that breaks down a complex task into clear subtasks with well-defined inputs and outputs; (2) a Thoughts-on-Graph (ToG) paradigm that searches the optimal solution path on a pre-built tool graph, which specifies the parameter and dependency relations among different tools; and (3) an execution engine with a rich toolbox that interprets the solution path and runs the tools efficiently on different computational devices. We evaluate our framework on diverse tasks involving image, audio, and video processing, demonstrating its superior accuracy, efficiency, and versatility compared to existing methods.

Quantum devices capable of breaking the public-key cryptosystems that Bitcoin relies on to secure its transactions are expected with reasonable probability within a decade. Quantum attacks would put at risk the entire Bitcoin network, which has an estimated value of around 500 billion USD. To prevent this threat, a proactive approach is critical. The only known way to prevent any such attack is to upgrade the currently used public-key cryptosystems, namely ECDSA, with so-called post-quantum cryptosystems which have no known vulnerabilities to quantum attacks. In this paper, we analyse the technical cost of such an upgrade. We calculate a non-tight lower bound on the cumulative downtime required for the above transition to be 1827.96 hours, or 76.16 days. We also demonstrate that the transition needs to be fully completed before the availability of ECDSA-256 breaking quantum devices, in order to ensure Bitcoin's ongoing security. The conclusion is that the Bitcoin upgrade to quantum-safe protocols needs to be started as soon as possible in order to guarantee its ongoing operations.

We propose a new shared task for tactical data-to-text generation in the domain of source code libraries. Specifically, we focus on text generation of function descriptions from example software projects. Data is drawn from existing resources used for studying the related problem of semantic parser induction (Richardson and Kuhn, 2017b; Richardson and Kuhn, 2017a), and spans a wide variety of both natural languages and programming languages. In this paper, we describe these existing resources, which will serve as training and development data for the task, and discuss plans for building new independent test sets.

Despite significant achievements in improving the instruction-following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), the ability to process multiple potentially entangled or conflicting instructions remains a considerable challenge. Real-world scenarios often require consistency across multiple instructions over time, such as secret privacy, personal preferences, and prioritization, which demand sophisticated abilities to integrate multiple turns and carefully balance competing objectives when instructions intersect or conflict. This work presents a systematic investigation of LLMs' capabilities in handling multiple turns of instructions, covering three levels of difficulty: (1) retrieving information from instructions, (2) tracking and reasoning across turns, and (3) resolving conflicts among instructions. We construct MultiTurnInstruct with around 1.1K high-quality multi-turn conversations through the human-in-the-loop approach and result in nine capability categories, including statics and dynamics, reasoning, and multitasking. Our finding reveals an intriguing trade-off between different capabilities. While GPT models demonstrate superior memorization, they show reduced effectiveness in privacy-protection tasks requiring selective information withholding. Larger models exhibit stronger reasoning capabilities but still struggle with resolving conflicting instructions. Importantly, these performance gaps cannot be attributed solely to information loss, as models demonstrate strong BLEU scores on memorization tasks but their attention mechanisms fail to integrate multiple related instructions effectively. These findings highlight critical areas for improvement in complex real-world tasks involving multi-turn instructions.

Analyzing memes on the internet has emerged as a crucial endeavor due to the impact this multi-modal form of content wields in shaping online discourse. Memes have become a powerful tool for expressing emotions and sentiments, possibly even spreading hate and misinformation, through humor and sarcasm. In this paper, we present the overview of the Memotion 3 shared task, as part of the DeFactify 2 workshop at AAAI-23. The task released an annotated dataset of Hindi-English code-mixed memes based on their Sentiment (Task A), Emotion (Task B), and Emotion intensity (Task C). Each of these is defined as an individual task and the participants are ranked separately for each task. Over 50 teams registered for the shared task and 5 made final submissions to the test set of the Memotion 3 dataset. CLIP, BERT modifications, ViT etc. were the most popular models among the participants along with approaches such as Student-Teacher model, Fusion, and Ensembling. The best final F1 score for Task A is 34.41, Task B is 79.77 and Task C is 59.82.

We report a way to make a frozen small language model both more capable and dramatically cheaper at once, without changing any weights. Verified knowledge is deposited once as a byte-exact key-value (KV) state artifact and later restored, by graft, into a fresh inference context. The restore is bit-exact: under a pinned deterministic configuration, the grafted logits are byte-for-byte identical to a fresh computation (SHA-256 equality), with zero KL divergence and 100% argmax agreement over fifty samples. We show that own-position graft is the unique numerically exact operating point on a model with floating-point rotary encoding, and we verify byte-exactness on two model scales (12B, 31B) and two GPU targets, one through a pre-registered replay. On AIME 2025, a frozen Gemma-4-12B moves from 80.0% to 93.3% once a verified solution library is grafted, above its own 77.5% and its 31B sibling's 89.2% published anchors. On the recurring case, eight problems the base model never solves within a 401,026-token budget are answered from cached verified solutions in 61 total decode tokens, a factor of 6,574 fewer tokens and about 8,700x less energy; the capability claim proper rests on held-out transfer (7 of 7 at 31B). The same byte-exact store widens usable context from 32,768 to 2,854,766 tokens at zero extra accelerator memory, and moves byte-identical between machines of the same architecture. We describe the system at the behavior level; the engine is proprietary, and every reported number is backed by committed input and output hashes so the scoring can be re-checked without it.

Qiskit is an open-source quantum computing framework that allows users to design, simulate, and run quantum circuits on real quantum hardware. We explore post-training techniques for LLMs to assist in writing Qiskit code. We introduce quantum verification as an effective method for ensuring code quality and executability on quantum hardware. To support this, we developed a synthetic data pipeline that generates quantum problem-unit test pairs and used it to create preference data for aligning LLMs with DPO. Additionally, we trained models using GRPO, leveraging quantum-verifiable rewards provided by the quantum hardware. Our best-performing model, combining DPO and GRPO, surpasses the strongest open-source baselines on the challenging Qiskit-HumanEval-hard benchmark.

The 1st Workshop on Data Contamination (CONDA 2024) focuses on all relevant aspects of data contamination in natural language processing, where data contamination is understood as situations where evaluation data is included in pre-training corpora used to train large scale models, compromising evaluation results. The workshop fostered a shared task to collect evidence on data contamination in current available datasets and models. The goal of the shared task and associated database is to assist the community in understanding the extent of the problem and to assist researchers in avoiding reporting evaluation results on known contaminated resources. The shared task provides a structured, centralized public database for the collection of contamination evidence, open to contributions from the community via GitHub pool requests. This first compilation paper is based on 566 reported entries over 91 contaminated sources from a total of 23 contributors. The details of the individual contamination events are available in the platform. The platform continues to be online, open to contributions from the community.

We study the problem of multi-task learning under user-level differential privacy, in which n users contribute data to m tasks, each involving a subset of users. One important aspect of the problem, that can significantly impact quality, is the distribution skew among tasks. Certain tasks may have much fewer data samples than others, making them more susceptible to the noise added for privacy. It is natural to ask whether algorithms can adapt to this skew to improve the overall utility. We give a systematic analysis of the problem, by studying how to optimally allocate a user's privacy budget among tasks. We propose a generic algorithm, based on an adaptive reweighting of the empirical loss, and show that when there is task distribution skew, this gives a quantifiable improvement of excess empirical risk. Experimental studies on recommendation problems that exhibit a long tail of small tasks, demonstrate that our methods significantly improve utility, achieving the state of the art on two standard benchmarks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via third-party system prompts downloaded from public marketplaces. We identify a critical supply-chain vulnerability: conditional system prompt poisoning, where an adversary injects a ``sleeper agent'' into a benign-looking prompt. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim for broad refusal-breaking, our proposed framework, SPECTRE, optimizes system prompts to trigger LLMs to output targeted, compromised responses only for specific queries (e.g., ``Who should I vote for the US President?'') while maintaining high utility on benign inputs. Operating in a strict black-box setting without model weight access, SPECTRE utilizes a two-stage optimization including a global semantic search followed by a greedy lexical refinement. Tested on open-source models and commercial APIs (GPT-4o-mini, GPT-3.5), SPECTRE achieves up to 70% F1 reduction on targeted queries with minimal degradation to general capabilities. We further demonstrate that these poisoned prompts evade standard defenses, including perplexity filters and typo-correction, by exploiting the natural noise found in real-world system prompts. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/vietph34/CAIN. WARNING: Our paper contains examples that might be sensitive to the readers!

All data on the Internet are transferred by network traffic, thus accurately modeling network traffic can help improve network services quality and protect data privacy. Pretrained models for network traffic can utilize large-scale raw data to learn the essential characteristics of network traffic, and generate distinguishable results for input traffic without considering specific downstream tasks. Effective pretrained models can significantly optimize the training efficiency and effectiveness of downstream tasks, such as application classification, attack detection and traffic generation. Despite the great success of pretraining in natural language processing, there is no work in the network field. Considering the diverse demands and characteristics of network traffic and network tasks, it is non-trivial to build a pretrained model for network traffic and we face various challenges, especially the heterogeneous headers and payloads in the multi-pattern network traffic and the different dependencies for contexts of diverse downstream network tasks. To tackle these challenges, in this paper, we make the first attempt to provide a generative pretrained model NetGPT for both traffic understanding and generation tasks. We propose the multi-pattern network traffic modeling to construct unified text inputs and support both traffic understanding and generation tasks. We further optimize the adaptation effect of the pretrained model to diversified tasks by shuffling header fields, segmenting packets in flows, and incorporating diverse task labels with prompts. With diverse traffic datasets from encrypted software, DNS, private industrial protocols and cryptocurrency mining, expensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our NetGPT in a range of traffic understanding and generation tasks on traffic datasets, and outperform state-of-the-art baselines by a wide margin.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities across various domains, with recent advancements in challenging reasoning tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, solving reasoning tasks often requires long decoding chains (of thoughts), which incur O(N) time and memory consumption, where N is the chain length. To mitigate O(N) time and memory consumption, existing sparsity-based algorithms propose retaining only the most critical token's intermediate data (i.e., key-value cache) and discarding the rest. However, these existing algorithms struggle with the ``impossible trinity'' of accuracy, time, and memory. For example, the state-of-the-art algorithm, Quest, achieves high accuracy with O(L) time but O(N) memory (L is the cache budget, L ll N). To address this issue, in this paper, we identify a new attention pattern during the decode stage of reasoning tasks, where milestone tokens (analogous to lemmas in mathematical proofs) emerge, are utilized, and then become unimportant afterward. Based on this pattern, we propose a new algorithm named RaaS that identifies and retains milestone tokens only until they are no longer needed, achieving high accuracy with O(L) time and O(L) memory complexity.