Daily Papers

LLMs trained on massive datasets may inadvertently acquire sensitive information such as personal details and potentially harmful content. This risk is further heightened in multimodal LLMs as they integrate information from multiple modalities (image and text). Adversaries can exploit this knowledge through multimodal prompts to extract sensitive details. Evaluating how effectively MLLMs can forget such information (targeted unlearning) necessitates the creation of high-quality, well-annotated image-text pairs. While prior work on unlearning has focused on text, multimodal unlearning remains underexplored. To address this gap, we first introduce a multimodal unlearning benchmark, UnLOK-VQA (Unlearning Outside Knowledge VQA), as well as an attack-and-defense framework to evaluate methods for deleting specific multimodal knowledge from MLLMs. We extend a visual question-answering dataset using an automated pipeline that generates varying-proximity samples for testing generalization and specificity, followed by manual filtering for maintaining high quality. We then evaluate six defense objectives against seven attacks (four whitebox, three blackbox), including a novel whitebox method leveraging interpretability of hidden states. Our results show multimodal attacks outperform text- or image-only ones, and that the most effective defense removes answer information from internal model states. Additionally, larger models exhibit greater post-editing robustness, suggesting that scale enhances safety. UnLOK-VQA provides a rigorous benchmark for advancing unlearning in MLLMs.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have achieved revolutionary progress in robot learning, enabling robots to execute complex physical robot tasks from natural language instructions. Despite this progress, their adversarial robustness remains underexplored. In this work, we propose both adversarial patch attack and corresponding defense strategies for VLA models. We first introduce the Embedding Disruption Patch Attack (EDPA), a model-agnostic adversarial attack that generates patches directly placeable within the camera's view. In comparison to prior methods, EDPA can be readily applied to different VLA models without requiring prior knowledge of the model architecture, or the controlled robotic manipulator. EDPA constructs these patches by (i) disrupting the semantic alignment between visual and textual latent representations, and (ii) maximizing the discrepancy of latent representations between adversarial and corresponding clean visual inputs. Through the optimization of these objectives, EDPA distorts the VLA's interpretation of visual information, causing the model to repeatedly generate incorrect actions and ultimately result in failure to complete the given robotic task. To counter this, we propose an adversarial fine-tuning scheme for the visual encoder, in which the encoder is optimized to produce similar latent representations for both clean and adversarially perturbed visual inputs. Extensive evaluations on the widely recognized LIBERO robotic simulation benchmark demonstrate that EDPA substantially increases the task failure rate of cutting-edge VLA models, while our proposed defense effectively mitigates this degradation. The codebase is accessible via the homepage at https://edpa-attack.github.io/.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

We present a training system, which can provably defend significantly larger neural networks than previously possible, including ResNet-34 and DenseNet-100. Our approach is based on differentiable abstract interpretation and introduces two novel concepts: (i) abstract layers for fine-tuning the precision and scalability of the abstraction, (ii) a flexible domain specific language (DSL) for describing training objectives that combine abstract and concrete losses with arbitrary specifications. Our training method is implemented in the DiffAI system.

The growing misuse of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has led providers to deploy multiple safeguards, including alignment tuning, system prompts, and content moderation. However, the real-world robustness of these defenses against adversarial attacks remains underexplored. We introduce Multi-Faceted Attack (MFA), a framework that systematically exposes general safety vulnerabilities in leading defense-equipped VLMs such as GPT-4o, Gemini-Pro, and Llama-4. The core component of MFA is the Attention-Transfer Attack (ATA), which hides harmful instructions inside a meta task with competing objectives. We provide a theoretical perspective based on reward hacking to explain why this attack succeeds. To improve cross-model transferability, we further introduce a lightweight transfer-enhancement algorithm combined with a simple repetition strategy that jointly bypasses both input-level and output-level filters without model-specific fine-tuning. Empirically, we show that adversarial images optimized for one vision encoder transfer broadly to unseen VLMs, indicating that shared visual representations create a cross-model safety vulnerability. Overall, MFA achieves a 58.5% success rate and consistently outperforms existing methods. On state-of-the-art commercial models, MFA reaches a 52.8% success rate, surpassing the second-best attack by 34%. These results challenge the perceived robustness of current defense mechanisms and highlight persistent safety weaknesses in modern VLMs. Code: https://github.com/cure-lab/MultiFacetedAttack

Although powerful graph neural networks (GNNs) have boosted numerous real-world applications, the potential privacy risk is still underexplored. To close this gap, we perform the first comprehensive study of graph reconstruction attack that aims to reconstruct the adjacency of nodes. We show that a range of factors in GNNs can lead to the surprising leakage of private links. Especially by taking GNNs as a Markov chain and attacking GNNs via a flexible chain approximation, we systematically explore the underneath principles of graph reconstruction attack, and propose two information theory-guided mechanisms: (1) the chain-based attack method with adaptive designs for extracting more private information; (2) the chain-based defense method that sharply reduces the attack fidelity with moderate accuracy loss. Such two objectives disclose a critical belief that to recover better in attack, you must extract more multi-aspect knowledge from the trained GNN; while to learn safer for defense, you must forget more link-sensitive information in training GNNs. Empirically, we achieve state-of-the-art results on six datasets and three common GNNs. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/MC-GRA.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) looks to accelerate the development and deployment of AI capabilities across a wide spectrum of defense applications to maintain strategic advantages. However, many common features of AI algorithms that make them powerful, such as capacity for learning, large-scale data ingestion, and problem-solving, raise new technical, security, and ethical challenges. These challenges may hinder adoption due to uncertainty in development, testing, assurance, processes, and requirements. Trustworthiness through assurance is essential to achieve the expected value from AI. This paper proposes a claims-based framework for risk management and assurance of AI systems that addresses the competing needs for faster deployment, successful adoption, and rigorous evaluation. This framework supports programs across all acquisition pathways provide grounds for sufficient confidence that an AI-enabled system (AIES) meets its intended mission goals without introducing unacceptable risks throughout its lifecycle. The paper's contributions are a framework process for AI assurance, a set of relevant definitions to enable constructive conversations on the topic of AI assurance, and a discussion of important considerations in AI assurance. The framework aims to provide the DOD a robust yet efficient mechanism for swiftly fielding effective AI capabilities without overlooking critical risks or undermining stakeholder trust.

Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.

As frontier language models advance, policymakers and model developers need methods for assessing whether model access materially increases a non-expert actor's ability to plan high-consequence Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) misuse relative to public tools alone. Existing CBRN evaluations differ in non-expert definitions, threat scope, baselines, scoring rubrics, and decision rules, making results difficult to compare across studies. We introduce a Threshold Exceedance Criteria (TEC) framework that decomposes an uplift study into independently executable components: determining non-expert participant eligibility, defining the CBRN threat scope for the study, and statistically estimating material uplift. We then operationalize the TEC framework in a large-scale empirical study using a design that determines two forms of uplift: generative (where a model assists plan creation from scratch) and revisionist (where a model assists refinement of an existing plan). The study produced attack plans across the CBRN domains, which we evaluated through subject-matter-expert review to estimate generative and revisionist uplift. Applying the framework, our empirical study revealed domain heterogeneity: under this controlled pre-release evaluation, model-assisted plans sometimes received expert-equivalent instructional ratings, but confirmed material uplift was limited to the radiological domain. These findings informed mitigation and deployment-governance decisions rather than characterizing deployed model behavior. We conclude with methodological lessons for future CBRN uplift evaluations, emphasizing prespecified criteria, explicit baselines, separation of generative and revisionist estimates, and careful distinction between preliminary screening signals and confirmed risk determinations.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are indispensable for infrastructure inspection, surveillance, and related tasks, yet they also introduce critical security challenges. This survey provides a wide-ranging examination of the anti-UAV domain, centering on three core objectives-classification, detection, and tracking-while detailing emerging methodologies such as diffusion-based data synthesis, multi-modal fusion, vision-language modeling, self-supervised learning, and reinforcement learning. We systematically evaluate state-of-the-art solutions across both single-modality and multi-sensor pipelines (spanning RGB, infrared, audio, radar, and RF) and discuss large-scale as well as adversarially oriented benchmarks. Our analysis reveals persistent gaps in real-time performance, stealth detection, and swarm-based scenarios, underscoring pressing needs for robust, adaptive anti-UAV systems. By highlighting open research directions, we aim to foster innovation and guide the development of next-generation defense strategies in an era marked by the extensive use of UAVs.

System design is often taught through domain-specific solutions specific to particular domains, such as databases, operating systems, or computer architecture, each with its own methods and vocabulary. While this diversity is a strength, it can obscure cross-cutting principles that recur across domains. This paper proposes a preliminary "periodic table" of system design principles distilled from several domains in computer systems. The goal is a shared, concise vocabulary that helps students, researchers, and practitioners reason about structure and trade-offs, compare designs across domains, and communicate choices more clearly. For supporting materials and updates, please refer to the repository at: https://github.com/jarulraj/periodic-table.

In the context of unprecedented U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) budgets, this paper examines the recent history of DoD funding for academic research in algorithmically based warfighting. We draw from a corpus of DoD grant solicitations from 2007 to 2023, focusing on those addressed to researchers in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Considering the implications of DoD funding for academic research, the paper proceeds through three analytic sections. In the first, we offer a critical examination of the distinction between basic and applied research, showing how funding calls framed as basic research nonetheless enlist researchers in a war fighting agenda. In the second, we offer a diachronic analysis of the corpus, showing how a 'one small problem' caveat, in which affirmation of progress in military technologies is qualified by acknowledgement of outstanding problems, becomes justification for additional investments in research. We close with an analysis of DoD aspirations based on a subset of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) grant solicitations for the use of AI in battlefield applications. Taken together, we argue that grant solicitations work as a vehicle for the mutual enlistment of DoD funding agencies and the academic AI research community in setting research agendas. The trope of basic research in this context offers shelter from significant moral questions that military applications of one's research would raise, by obscuring the connections that implicate researchers in U.S. militarism.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

Agents4Pentest, an emerging class of LLM-based autonomous penetration testing systems, has become a rapidly growing area in security research. Despite this growth, the field still lacks a unified taxonomy, a systematic understanding of how agent architectures and evaluation benchmarks have co-evolved, and a clear characterization of remaining capability and reliability gaps. This survey addresses these gaps through a systematic analysis of 81 papers between 2023 and 2026. We organize the literature into six categories: evaluation benchmarks, general-purpose systems, domain-specific frameworks, CTF-based systems, defense-oriented research, and surveys. We further trace a four-phase architectural evolution from text-only reasoning agents to agents trained with Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), showing that each transition is driven by a distinct capability bottleneck. Our analysis yields several key findings. First, RLVR marks a shift in capability acquisition from imitation of expert demonstrations to reward-driven self-improvement, enabling agents to discover previously undocumented attack strategies. Second, CTF platforms have evolved from evaluation testbeds into dual-purpose infrastructure for both agent evaluation and RL training. Third, domain-specific frameworks improve efficiency through recurring specialization mechanisms, but their gains remain largely confined to narrow task classes and are difficult to compare across domains because existing evaluations rely on different benchmarks. Fourth, the field is expanding beyond offensive automation toward adversarial defense and security compliance. Across these categories, we identify three structurally linked open challenges: evaluation reliability, limited performance on multi-stage attack scenarios, and scarcity of high-quality training data.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Designing learnable information-theoretic objectives for robot exploration remains challenging. Such objectives aim to guide exploration toward data that reduces uncertainty in model parameters, yet it is often unclear what information the collected data can actually reveal. Although reinforcement learning (RL) can optimize a given objective, constructing objectives that reflect parametric learnability is difficult in high-dimensional robotic systems. Many parameter directions are weakly observable or unidentifiable, and even when identifiable directions are selected, omitted directions can still influence exploration and distort information measures. To address this challenge, we propose Quasi-Optimal Experimental Design (Q{\footnotesize OED}), an adaptive information objective grounded in optimal experimental design. Q{\footnotesize OED} (i) performs eigenspace analysis of the Fisher information matrix to identify an observable subspace and select identifiable parameter directions, and (ii) modifies the exploration objective to emphasize these directions while suppressing nuisance effects from non-critical parameters. Under bounded nuisance influence and limited coupling between critical and nuisance directions, Q{\footnotesize OED} provides a constant-factor approximation to the ideal information objective that explores all parameters. We evaluate Q{\footnotesize OED} on simulated and real-world navigation and manipulation tasks, where identifiable-direction selection and nuisance suppression yield performance improvements of 35.23{\percent} and 21.98{\percent}, respectively. When integrated as an exploration objective in model-based policy optimization, Q{\footnotesize OED} further improves policy performance over established RL baselines.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

Verification and validation of autonomous driving (AD) systems and components is of increasing importance, as such technology increases in real-world prevalence. Safety-critical scenario generation is a key approach to robustify AD policies through closed-loop training. However, existing approaches for scenario generation rely on simplistic objectives, resulting in overly-aggressive or non-reactive adversarial behaviors. To generate diverse adversarial yet realistic scenarios, we propose SEAL, a scenario perturbation approach which leverages learned objective functions and adversarial, human-like skills. SEAL-perturbed scenarios are more realistic than SOTA baselines, leading to improved ego task success across real-world, in-distribution, and out-of-distribution scenarios, of more than 20%. To facilitate future research, we release our code and tools: https://github.com/cmubig/SEAL

The rapid rise of autonomous AI systems and advancements in agent capabilities are introducing new risks due to reduced oversight of real-world interactions. Yet agent testing remains nascent and is still a developing science. As AI agents begin to be deployed globally, it is important that they handle different languages and cultures accurately and securely. To address this, participants from The International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, including representatives from Singapore, Japan, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, France, Kenya, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have come together to align approaches to agentic evaluations. This is the third exercise, building on insights from two earlier joint testing exercises conducted by the Network in November 2024 and February 2025. The objective is to further refine best practices for testing advanced AI systems. The exercise was split into two strands: (1) common risks, including leakage of sensitive information and fraud, led by Singapore AISI; and (2) cybersecurity, led by UK AISI. A mix of open and closed-weight models were evaluated against tasks from various public agentic benchmarks. Given the nascency of agentic testing, our primary focus was on understanding methodological issues in conducting such tests, rather than examining test results or model capabilities. This collaboration marks an important step forward as participants work together to advance the science of agentic evaluations.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to attack graphs for penetration testing, however, trained agents do not reflect reality because the attack graphs lack operational nuances typically captured within the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that include notions of (cyber) terrain. In particular, current practice constructs attack graphs exclusively using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and its components. We present methods for constructing attack graphs using notions from IPB on cyber terrain analysis of obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment. We demonstrate our methods on an example where firewalls are treated as obstacles and represented in (1) the reward space and (2) the state dynamics. We show that terrain analysis can be used to bring realism to attack graphs for RL.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

A key challenge for reinforcement learning (RL) consists of learning in environments with sparse extrinsic rewards. In contrast to current RL methods, humans are able to learn new skills with little or no reward by using various forms of intrinsic motivation. We propose AMIGo, a novel agent incorporating -- as form of meta-learning -- a goal-generating teacher that proposes Adversarially Motivated Intrinsic Goals to train a goal-conditioned "student" policy in the absence of (or alongside) environment reward. Specifically, through a simple but effective "constructively adversarial" objective, the teacher learns to propose increasingly challenging -- yet achievable -- goals that allow the student to learn general skills for acting in a new environment, independent of the task to be solved. We show that our method generates a natural curriculum of self-proposed goals which ultimately allows the agent to solve challenging procedurally-generated tasks where other forms of intrinsic motivation and state-of-the-art RL methods fail.

Achieving mission objectives in a realistic simulation of aerial combat is highly challenging due to imperfect situational awareness and nonlinear flight dynamics. In this work, we introduce a novel 3D multi-agent air combat environment and a Hierarchical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning framework to tackle these challenges. Our approach combines heterogeneous agent dynamics, curriculum learning, league-play, and a newly adapted training algorithm. To this end, the decision-making process is organized into two abstraction levels: low-level policies learn precise control maneuvers, while high-level policies issue tactical commands based on mission objectives. Empirical results show that our hierarchical approach improves both learning efficiency and combat performance in complex dogfight scenarios.

Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion. Such measurements are useful but incomplete: in operational security, every reasoning step, tool call, telemetry query, and enrichment request consumes budget. We evaluate language-model security agents through this cost-success lens on offensive Cybench challenges and defensive Splunk BOTS v1 investigation challenges. Instead of reporting only best-case success, we compare models at fixed cost levels and decompose performance by inference spend and tool spend. Our results show distinct scalingregimes for red- and blue-team tasks. Offensive CTF performance improves with additional test-time compute, and scaled open-weight models can approach frontier proprietary systems while remaining cost-competitive. Defensive SOC investigation does not scale in the same way: success depends more heavily on disciplined tool use, telemetry navigation, and selective enrichment than on raw reasoning budget alone. We argue that security-agent benchmarks should measure economic efficiency and operational fit alongside task success. Cost-aware, SOC-native evaluations provide a clearer picture of which models are practically useful today and where defensive agents still need to improve. We present an interactive website with our results https://evals.frontier.security.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

Adversarial attacks optimize against models to defeat defenses. Existing defenses are static, and stay the same once trained, even while attacks change. We argue that models should fight back, and optimize their defenses against attacks at test time. We propose dynamic defenses, to adapt the model and input during testing, by defensive entropy minimization (dent). Dent alters testing, but not training, for compatibility with existing models and train-time defenses. Dent improves the robustness of adversarially-trained defenses and nominally-trained models against white-box, black-box, and adaptive attacks on CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet. In particular, dent boosts state-of-the-art defenses by 20+ points absolute against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10 at ε_infty = 8/255.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

Crafting adversarial examples is crucial for evaluating and enhancing the robustness of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), presenting a challenge equivalent to maximizing a non-differentiable 0-1 loss function. However, existing single objective methods, namely adversarial attacks focus on a surrogate loss function, do not fully harness the benefits of engaging multiple loss functions, as a result of insufficient understanding of their synergistic and conflicting nature. To overcome these limitations, we propose the Multi-Objective Set-based Attack (MOS Attack), a novel adversarial attack framework leveraging multiple loss functions and automatically uncovering their interrelations. The MOS Attack adopts a set-based multi-objective optimization strategy, enabling the incorporation of numerous loss functions without additional parameters. It also automatically mines synergistic patterns among various losses, facilitating the generation of potent adversarial attacks with fewer objectives. Extensive experiments have shown that our MOS Attack outperforms single-objective attacks. Furthermore, by harnessing the identified synergistic patterns, MOS Attack continues to show superior results with a reduced number of loss functions. Our code is available at https://github.com/pgg3/MOS-Attack.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

We introduce GPT-Red, an automated red-teaming agent that is trained to discover novel prompt injection attacks against frontier LLMs. The goal of this model is to evaluate and improve the robustness of our production systems. To this end, we use it to adversarially train GPT-5.6, our most robust model to prompt injections to date. To create GPT-Red, we design a scalable self-play algorithm where the model is tasked with attacking a diverse population of simultaneously-trained defender agents. We train the model on realistic red-teaming environments using compute on the same scale as some of our largest RL post-training runs, making it the single-largest LLM safety training run ever documented. GPT-Red excels at red-teaming: it reliably breaks our past models up to GPT-5.5, it finds more successful attacks than human red-teamers, and it generalizes to held-out environments, defender models, and harnesses. In the future, we expect that as we improve the robustness of each new GPT model, it will in turn will provide better learning signal for even stronger red-teamer agents, thus unlocking a self-improvement flywheel.

Recently in robotics, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a transformative approach, enabling robots to execute complex tasks by integrating visual and linguistic inputs within an end-to-end learning framework. Despite their significant capabilities, VLA models introduce new attack surfaces. This paper systematically evaluates their robustness. Recognizing the unique demands of robotic execution, our attack objectives target the inherent spatial and functional characteristics of robotic systems. In particular, we introduce two untargeted attack objectives that leverage spatial foundations to destabilize robotic actions, and a targeted attack objective that manipulates the robotic trajectory. Additionally, we design an adversarial patch generation approach that places a small, colorful patch within the camera's view, effectively executing the attack in both digital and physical environments. Our evaluation reveals a marked degradation in task success rates, with up to a 100\% reduction across a suite of simulated robotic tasks, highlighting critical security gaps in current VLA architectures. By unveiling these vulnerabilities and proposing actionable evaluation metrics, we advance both the understanding and enhancement of safety for VLA-based robotic systems, underscoring the necessity for continuously developing robust defense strategies prior to physical-world deployments.

Current LLM safety research predominantly focuses on mitigating Goal Hijacking, preventing attackers from redirecting a model's high-level objective (e.g., from "summarizing emails" to "phishing users"). In this paper, we argue that this perspective is incomplete and highlight a critical vulnerability in Reasoning Alignment. We propose a new adversarial paradigm: Reasoning Hijacking and instantiate it with Criteria Attack, which subverts model judgments by injecting spurious decision criteria without altering the high-level task goal. Unlike Goal Hijacking, which attempts to override the system prompt, Reasoning Hijacking accepts the high-level goal but manipulates the model's decision-making logic by injecting spurious reasoning shortcut. Though extensive experiments on three different tasks (toxic comment, negative review, and spam detection), we demonstrate that even newest models are prone to prioritize injected heuristic shortcuts over rigorous semantic analysis. The results are consistent over different backbones. Crucially, because the model's "intent" remains aligned with the user's instructions, these attacks can bypass defenses designed to detect goal deviation (e.g., SecAlign, StruQ), exposing a fundamental blind spot in the current safety landscape. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Yuan-Hou/criteria_attack

The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial patches has motivated numerous defense strategies for boosting model robustness. However, the prevailing defenses depend on single observation or pre-established adversary information to counter adversarial patches, often failing to be confronted with unseen or adaptive adversarial attacks and easily exhibiting unsatisfying performance in dynamic 3D environments. Inspired by active human perception and recurrent feedback mechanisms, we develop Embodied Active Defense (EAD), a proactive defensive strategy that actively contextualizes environmental information to address misaligned adversarial patches in 3D real-world settings. To achieve this, EAD develops two central recurrent sub-modules, i.e., a perception module and a policy module, to implement two critical functions of active vision. These models recurrently process a series of beliefs and observations, facilitating progressive refinement of their comprehension of the target object and enabling the development of strategic actions to counter adversarial patches in 3D environments. To optimize learning efficiency, we incorporate a differentiable approximation of environmental dynamics and deploy patches that are agnostic to the adversary strategies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EAD substantially enhances robustness against a variety of patches within just a few steps through its action policy in safety-critical tasks (e.g., face recognition and object detection), without compromising standard accuracy. Furthermore, due to the attack-agnostic characteristic, EAD facilitates excellent generalization to unseen attacks, diminishing the averaged attack success rate by 95 percent across a range of unseen adversarial attacks.

Stealth, the discipline of achieving an objective without revealing your presence, capabilities, or collected intelligence, is what separates sophisticated operators from detectable ones. Elite security researchers and advanced persistent threats achieve their objectives unnoticed; autonomous agents increasingly inherit the same offensive tasks, but do they inherit the tradecraft? We introduce StealthBench,a benchmark that measures operational stealth in autonomous offensive-security agents across six operational security (OPSEC) dimensions. We extract 11 hand-verified OPSEC incidents from real bug-bounty and red-team trajectories, expanded into 14 dockerized task scenarios, where agents, despite finding real vulnerabilities, committed stealth failures inconsistent with standard operational tradecraft: embedding credentials in public uploads, deleting production resources to prove access, force-adding uninvolved users to demonstrate a race condition. We evaluate agent trajectories using a 3-model large language model (LLM) judge panel with majority-vote aggregation, measuring safe success rate (solved and stealthy), Stealth@Solve (tradecraft quality among successful solves), and reckless solve rate (solved but cover blown). Our results show that no model exceeds 54% safe success rate (the compound metric requiring both task completion and stealth), confirming that OPSEC failures are systematic across model families. We release StealthBench as a public benchmark to support both the development of stealth-aware agents and automated OPSEC monitoring for autonomous offensive-security deployments. The interactive leaderboard, evaluation harness, and dataset are available at https://stealthbench.com.

This paper proposes a novel mission planning platform, capable of efficiently deploying a team of UAVs to cover complex-shaped areas, in various remote sensing applications. Under the hood lies a novel optimization scheme for grid-based methods, utilizing Simulated Annealing algorithm, that significantly increases the achieved percentage of coverage and improves the qualitative features of the generated paths. Extensive simulated evaluation in comparison with a state-of-the-art alternative methodology, for coverage path planning (CPP) operations, establishes the performance gains in terms of achieved coverage and overall duration of the generated missions. On top of that, DARP algorithm is employed to allocate sub-tasks to each member of the swarm, taking into account each UAV's sensing and operational capabilities, their initial positions and any no-fly-zones possibly defined inside the operational area. This feature is of paramount importance in real-life applications, as it has the potential to achieve tremendous performance improvements in terms of time demanded to complete a mission, while at the same time it unlocks a wide new range of applications, that was previously not feasible due to the limited battery life of UAVs. In order to investigate the actual efficiency gains that are introduced by the multi-UAV utilization, a simulated study is performed as well. All of these capabilities are packed inside an end-to-end platform that eases the utilization of UAVs' swarms in remote sensing applications. Its versatility is demonstrated via two different real-life applications: (i) a photogrametry for precision agriculture and (ii) an indicative search and rescue for first responders missions, that were performed utilizing a swarm of commercial UAVs. The source code can be found at: https://github.com/savvas-ap/mCPP-optimized-DARP

Ensuring the safety of language models (LMs) while maintaining their usefulness remains a critical challenge in AI alignment. Current approaches rely on sequential adversarial training: generating adversarial prompts and fine-tuning LMs to defend against them. We introduce a different paradigm: framing safety alignment as a non-zero-sum game between an Attacker LM and a Defender LM trained jointly via online reinforcement learning. Each LM continuously adapts to the other's evolving strategies, driving iterative improvement. Our method uses a preference-based reward signal derived from pairwise comparisons instead of point-wise scores, providing more robust supervision and potentially reducing reward hacking. Our RL recipe, AdvGame, shifts the Pareto frontier of safety and utility, yielding a Defender LM that is simultaneously more helpful and more resilient to adversarial attacks. In addition, the resulting Attacker LM converges into a strong, general-purpose red-teaming agent that can be directly deployed to probe arbitrary target models.

Evaluating the quality of multi-turn chatbot interactions remains challenging, as most existing methods assess interactions at the turn level without addressing whether a user's overarching goal was fulfilled. A ``goal'' here refers to an information need or task, such as asking for policy information or applying for leave. We propose a comprehensive framework for goal-oriented evaluation of multi-agent systems (MAS), introducing the Goal Success Rate (GSR) to measure the percentage of fulfilled goals, and a Root Cause of Failure (RCOF) taxonomy to identify reasons for failure in multi-agent chatbots. Our method segments conversations by user goals and evaluates success using all relevant turns. We present a model-based evaluation system combining teacher LLMs, where domain experts define goals, set quality standards serving as a guidance for the LLMs. The LLMs use ``thinking tokens'' to produce interpretable rationales, enabling explainable, data-efficient evaluations. In an enterprise setting, we apply our framework to evaluate AIDA, a zero-to-one employee conversational agent system built as a ground-up multi-agent conversational agent, and observe GSR improvement from 63\% to 79\% over six months since its inception. Our framework is generic and offers actionable insights through a detailed defect taxonomy based on analysis of failure points in multi-agent chatbots, diagnosing overall success, identifying key failure modes, and informing system improvements.

This report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of AI, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. After analyzing the ways in which AI may influence the threat landscape in the digital, physical, and political domains, we make four high-level recommendations for AI researchers and other stakeholders. We also suggest several promising areas for further research that could expand the portfolio of defenses, or make attacks less effective or harder to execute. Finally, we discuss, but do not conclusively resolve, the long-term equilibrium of attackers and defenders.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, their potential use in automating cyberattacks becomes increasingly likely. With capabilities such as reconnaissance, exploitation, and command execution, LLMs could soon become integral to autonomous cyber agents, capable of launching highly sophisticated attacks. In this paper, we introduce novel defense strategies that exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of attacking LLMs. By targeting weaknesses such as biases, trust in input, memory limitations, and their tunnel-vision approach to problem-solving, we develop techniques to mislead, delay, or neutralize these autonomous agents. We evaluate our defenses under black-box conditions, starting with single prompt-response scenarios and progressing to real-world tests using custom-built CTF machines. Our results show defense success rates of up to 90\%, demonstrating the effectiveness of turning LLM vulnerabilities into defensive strategies against LLM-driven cyber threats.

U.S. national security customers have begun to utilize large language models, including enterprise versions of ``off-the-shelf'' models (e.g., ChatGPT) familiar to the public. This uptake will likely accelerate. However, recent studies suggest that off-the-shelf large language models frequently suggest escalatory actions when prompted with geopolitical or strategic scenarios. We demonstrate two simple, non-technical interventions to control these tendencies. Introducing these interventions into the experimental wargame design of a recent study, we substantially reduce escalation throughout the game. Calls to restrict the use of large language models in national security applications are thus premature. The U.S. government is already, and will continue, employing large language models for scenario planning and suggesting courses of action. Rather than warning against such applications, this study acknowledges the imminent adoption of large language models, and provides actionable measures to align them with national security goals, including escalation management.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Evaluating defensive performance in soccer remains challenging, as effective defending is often expressed not through visible on-ball actions such as interceptions and tackles, but through preventing dangerous opportunities before they arise. Existing approaches have largely focused on valuing on-ball actions, leaving much of defenders' true impact unmeasured. To address this gap, we propose DEFCON (DEFensive CONtribution evaluator), a comprehensive framework that quantifies player-level defensive contributions for every attacking situation in soccer. Leveraging Graph Attention Networks, DEFCON estimates the success probability and expected value of each attacking option, along with each defender's responsibility for stopping it. These components yield an Expected Possession Value (EPV) for the attacking team before and after each action, and DEFCON assigns positive or negative credits to defenders according to whether they reduced or increased the opponent's EPV. Trained on 2023-24 and evaluated on 2024-25 Eredivisie event and tracking data, DEFCON's aggregated player credits exhibit strong positive correlations with market valuations. Finally, we showcase several practical applications, including in-game timelines of defensive contributions, spatial analyses across pitch zones, and pairwise summaries of attacker-defender interactions.

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

Large Language Models' knowledge of how to perform cyber-security attacks, create bioweapons, and manipulate humans poses risks of misuse. Previous work has proposed methods to unlearn this knowledge. Historically, it has been unclear whether unlearning techniques are removing information from the model weights or just making it harder to access. To disentangle these two objectives, we propose an adversarial evaluation method to test for the removal of information from model weights: we give an attacker access to some facts that were supposed to be removed, and using those, the attacker tries to recover other facts from the same distribution that cannot be guessed from the accessible facts. We show that using fine-tuning on the accessible facts can recover 88% of the pre-unlearning accuracy when applied to current unlearning methods for information learned during pretraining, revealing the limitations of these methods in removing information from the model weights. Our results also suggest that unlearning evaluations that measure unlearning robustness on information learned during an additional fine-tuning phase may overestimate robustness compared to evaluations that attempt to unlearn information learned during pretraining.

This paper presents a distributed algorithm applicable to a wide range of practical multi-robot applications. In such multi-robot applications, the user-defined objectives of the mission can be cast as a general optimization problem, without explicit guidelines of the subtasks per different robot. Owing to the unknown environment, unknown robot dynamics, sensor nonlinearities, etc., the analytic form of the optimization cost function is not available a priori. Therefore, standard gradient-descent-like algorithms are not applicable to these problems. To tackle this, we introduce a new algorithm that carefully designs each robot's subcost function, the optimization of which can accomplish the overall team objective. Upon this transformation, we propose a distributed methodology based on the cognitive-based adaptive optimization (CAO) algorithm, that is able to approximate the evolution of each robot's cost function and to adequately optimize its decision variables (robot actions). The latter can be achieved by online learning only the problem-specific characteristics that affect the accomplishment of mission objectives. The overall, low-complexity algorithm can straightforwardly incorporate any kind of operational constraint, is fault-tolerant, and can appropriately tackle time-varying cost functions. A cornerstone of this approach is that it shares the same convergence characteristics as those of block coordinate descent algorithms. The proposed algorithm is evaluated in three heterogeneous simulation set-ups under multiple scenarios, against both general-purpose and problem-specific algorithms. Source code is available at https://github.com/athakapo/A-distributed-plug-n-play-algorithm-for-multi-robot-applications.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) introduces dual-use capabilities that could both threaten and bolster national security and public safety (NSPS). Models implement safeguards to protect against potential misuse relevant to NSPS and allow for benign users to receive helpful information. However, current benchmarks often fail to test safeguard robustness to potential NSPS risks in an objective, robust way. We introduce FORTRESS: 500 expert-crafted adversarial prompts with instance-based rubrics of 4-7 binary questions for automated evaluation across 3 domains (unclassified information only): Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), Political Violence & Terrorism, and Criminal & Financial Illicit Activities, with 10 total subcategories across these domains. Each prompt-rubric pair has a corresponding benign version to test for model over-refusals. This evaluation of frontier LLMs' safeguard robustness reveals varying trade-offs between potential risks and model usefulness: Claude-3.5-Sonnet demonstrates a low average risk score (ARS) (14.09 out of 100) but the highest over-refusal score (ORS) (21.8 out of 100), while Gemini 2.5 Pro shows low over-refusal (1.4) but a high average potential risk (66.29). Deepseek-R1 has the highest ARS at 78.05, but the lowest ORS at only 0.06. Models such as o1 display a more even trade-off between potential risks and over-refusals (with an ARS of 21.69 and ORS of 5.2). To provide policymakers and researchers with a clear understanding of models' potential risks, we publicly release FORTRESS at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/fortress_public. We also maintain a private set for evaluation.

As smart grids (SG) increasingly rely on advanced technologies like sensors and communication systems for efficient energy generation, distribution, and consumption, they become enticing targets for sophisticated cyberattacks. These evolving threats demand robust security measures to maintain the stability and resilience of modern energy systems. While extensive research has been conducted, a comprehensive exploration of proactive cyber defense strategies utilizing Deep Learning (DL) in {SG} remains scarce in the literature. This survey bridges this gap, studying the latest DL techniques for proactive cyber defense. The survey begins with an overview of related works and our distinct contributions, followed by an examination of SG infrastructure. Next, we classify various cyber defense techniques into reactive and proactive categories. A significant focus is placed on DL-enabled proactive defenses, where we provide a comprehensive taxonomy of DL approaches, highlighting their roles and relevance in the proactive security of SG. Subsequently, we analyze the most significant DL-based methods currently in use. Further, we explore Moving Target Defense, a proactive defense strategy, and its interactions with DL methodologies. We then provide an overview of benchmark datasets used in this domain to substantiate the discourse.{ This is followed by a critical discussion on their practical implications and broader impact on cybersecurity in Smart Grids.} The survey finally lists the challenges associated with deploying DL-based security systems within SG, followed by an outlook on future developments in this key field.

Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2\% with 0\% false-refusal on benign prompts. Beyond the headline result, CHASE shows that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families, suggesting a path toward LLM safety hardening that generalises beyond the narrow distributions achieved thus far in adversarial training.

The eternal vertex cover game is played between an attacker and a defender on an undirected graph G. The defender identifies k vertices to position guards on to begin with. The attacker, on their turn, attacks an edge e, and the defender must move a guard along e to defend the attack. The defender may move other guards as well, under the constraint that every guard moves at most once and to a neighboring vertex. The smallest number of guards required to defend attacks forever is called the eternal vertex cover number of G, denoted evc(G). For any graph G, evc(G) is at least the vertex cover number of G, denoted mvc(G). A graph is Spartan if evc(G) = mvc(G). It is known that a bipartite graph is Spartan if and only if every edge belongs to a perfect matching. We show that the only König graphs that are Spartan are the bipartite Spartan graphs. We also give new lower bounds for evc(G), generalizing a known lower bound based on cut vertices. We finally show a new matching-based characterization of all Spartan graphs.