Daily Papers

Distillation attacks create a deployment trade-off for model providers: the same outputs that make a model more useful can also make it easier to imitate. We study this trade-off through a minimax game between a utility-constrained teacher and an adaptive student. Our framework yields tractable one-sided response rules: an adaptive evaluation rule in which the student reweights high-value examples, and a teacher-side defense template that suppresses outputs most useful for distillation. From a cheap proxy for example value, we derive Product-of-Experts (PoE), a simple forward-pass-only defense that combines the teacher with a proxy student during generation. Empirically, adaptive evaluation reveals a large passive--adaptive gap: on state-of-the-art defenses, adaptive students recover substantially more capability than passive evaluation suggests on GSM8K and MATH. Under this stronger evaluation, the apparent robustness gap between expensive defenses and PoE narrows considerably, while PoE remains substantially cheaper and preserves higher-quality reasoning traces. Overall, our results suggest that strong distillation remains difficult to stop, and that progress on antidistillation should be judged against adaptive students rather than passive ones. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ysfalh/distillation-game.

Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering). Our central finding: prompt-time activation defenses are structurally blind to prefilling attacks. AlphaSteer achieves 0% attack success on GCG, AutoDAN, and intent laundering but 50% on prefilling. We prove a corollary: any defense that gates intervention on a single layer's activation alignment with a benign reference (cone, subspace, or null-space) is blind to attacks that craft activations to lie inside that reference, whether checked at prompt time or per token. As its constructive contrapositive we introduce response-time probing: a linear probe on the model's hidden state at the first generated tokens, with AUROC 0.97-1.00 across all seven models. Combined with a halt, it cuts prefilling attack success to 0/40 on every model with 0% benign false positives, outperforming Llama Guard 3. Cross-template generalisation depends on probe depth, so we scope the claim to the canonical prefilling-template family. Composing the response-halt with AlphaSteer's null-space steering gives an orthogonal split (the halt catches prefilling, AlphaSteer catches semantic attacks), reaching defense success 0.983 on Mistral and 0.994 on Llama and dominating both components. We further show MMLU fails to capture steering's true utility cost, which appears as behavioral hedging rather than factual loss, and that diverse negative training sets cut probe false positives from 80-100% to near zero. Code, attacks, per-sample results, and the judge prompt are released.

Chat template is a common technique used in the training and inference stages of Large Language Models (LLMs). It can transform input and output data into role-based and templated expressions to enhance the performance of LLMs. However, this also creates a breeding ground for novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we first reveal that the customizability of chat templates allows an attacker who controls the template to inject arbitrary strings into the system prompt without the user's notice. Building on this, we propose a training-free backdoor attack, termed BadTemplate. Specifically, BadTemplate inserts carefully crafted malicious instructions into the high-priority system prompt, thereby causing the target LLM to exhibit persistent backdoor behaviors. BadTemplate outperforms traditional backdoor attacks by embedding malicious instructions directly into the system prompt, eliminating the need for model retraining while achieving high attack effectiveness with minimal cost. Furthermore, its simplicity and scalability make it easily and widely deployed in real-world systems, raising serious risks of rapid propagation, economic damage, and large-scale misinformation. Furthermore, detection by major third-party platforms HuggingFace and LLM-as-a-judge proves largely ineffective against BadTemplate. Extensive experiments conducted on 5 benchmark datasets across 6 open-source and 3 closed-source LLMs, compared with 3 baselines, demonstrate that BadTemplate achieves up to a 100% attack success rate and significantly outperforms traditional prompt-based backdoors in both word-level and sentence-level attacks. Our work highlights the potential security risks raised by chat templates in the LLM supply chain, thereby supporting the development of effective defense mechanisms.

The safety of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant research attention. In this paper, we argue that previous empirical studies demonstrate LLMs exhibit a propensity to trust information from authoritative sources, such as academic papers, implying new possible vulnerabilities. To verify this possibility, a preliminary analysis is designed to illustrate our two findings. Based on this insight, a novel jailbreaking method, Paper Summary Attack (PSA), is proposed. It systematically synthesizes content from either attack-focused or defense-focused LLM safety paper to construct an adversarial prompt template, while strategically infilling harmful query as adversarial payloads within predefined subsections. Extensive experiments show significant vulnerabilities not only in base LLMs, but also in state-of-the-art reasoning model like Deepseek-R1. PSA achieves a 97\% attack success rate (ASR) on well-aligned models like Claude3.5-Sonnet and an even higher 98\% ASR on Deepseek-R1. More intriguingly, our work has further revealed diametrically opposed vulnerability bias across different base models, and even between different versions of the same model, when exposed to either attack-focused or defense-focused papers. This phenomenon potentially indicates future research clues for both adversarial methodologies and safety alignment.Code is available at https://github.com/233liang/Paper-Summary-Attack

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across diverse tasks, driving the development and widespread adoption of LLM-as-a-Judge systems for automated evaluation, including red teaming and benchmarking. However, these systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks that can manipulate evaluation outcomes, raising critical concerns about their robustness and trustworthiness. Existing evaluation methods for LLM-based judges are often fragmented and lack a unified framework for comprehensive robustness assessment. Furthermore, the impact of prompt template design and model selection on judge robustness has rarely been explored, and their performance in real-world deployments remains largely unverified. To address these gaps, we introduce RobustJudge, a fully automated and scalable framework designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge systems. Specifically, RobustJudge investigates the effectiveness of 15 attack methods and 7 defense strategies across 12 models (RQ1), examines the impact of prompt template design and model selection (RQ2), and evaluates the security of real-world deployments (RQ3). Our study yields three key findings: (1) LLM-as-a-Judge systems are highly vulnerable to attacks such as PAIR and combined attacks, while defense mechanisms such as re-tokenization and LLM-based detectors can provide enhanced protection; (2) robustness varies substantially across prompt templates (up to 40%); (3) deploying RobustJudge on Alibaba's PAI platform uncovers previously undiscovered vulnerabilities. These results offer practical insights for building trustworthy LLM-as-a-Judge systems.

Intelligent software systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in critical sectors, raising concerns about their safety during runtime. Through an industry-academic collaboration when deploying an LLM-powered virtual customer assistant, a critical software engineering challenge emerged: how to enhance a safer deployment of LLM-powered software systems at runtime? While LlamaGuard, the current state-of-the-art runtime guardrail, offers protection against unsafe inputs, our study reveals a Defense Success Rate (DSR) drop of 24% under obfuscation- and template-based jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we propose DecipherGuard, a novel framework that integrates a deciphering layer to counter obfuscation-based prompts and a low-rank adaptation mechanism to enhance guardrail effectiveness against template-based attacks. Empirical evaluation on over 22,000 prompts demonstrates that DecipherGuard improves DSR by 36% to 65% and Overall Guardrail Performance (OGP) by 20% to 50% compared to LlamaGuard and two other runtime guardrails. These results highlight the effectiveness of DecipherGuard in defending LLM-powered software systems against jailbreak attacks during runtime.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in various domains but remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks. Existing prompt-defense strategies, including parameter-modifying and parameter-free approaches, face limitations in adaptability, interpretability, and customization, constraining their effectiveness against evolving threats. To address these challenges, we propose ShieldLearner, a novel paradigm that mimics human learning in defense. Through trial and error, it autonomously distills attack signatures into a Pattern Atlas and synthesizes defense heuristics into a Meta-analysis Framework, enabling systematic and interpretable threat detection. Furthermore, we introduce Adaptive Adversarial Augmentation to generate adversarial variations of successfully defended prompts, enabling continuous self-improvement without model retraining. In addition to standard benchmarks, we create a hard test set by curating adversarial prompts from the Wildjailbreak dataset, emphasizing more concealed malicious intent. Experimental results show that ShieldLearner achieves a significantly higher defense success rate than existing baselines on both conventional and hard test sets, while also operating with lower computational overhead, making it a practical and efficient solution for real-world adversarial defense.

Psychological defenses are strategies, often automatic, that people use to manage distress. Rigid or overuse of defenses is negatively linked to mental health and shapes what speakers disclose and how they accept or resist help. However, defenses are complex and difficult to reliably measure, particularly in clinical dialogues. We introduce PsyDefConv, a dialogue corpus with help seeker utterances labeled for defense level, and DMRS Co-Pilot, a four-stage pipeline that provides evidence-based pre-annotations. The corpus contains 200 dialogues and 4709 utterances, including 2336 help seeker turns, with labeling and Cohen's kappa 0.639. In a counterbalanced study, the co-pilot reduced average annotation time by 22.4%. In expert review, it averaged 4.62 for evidence, 4.44 for clinical plausibility, and 4.40 for insight on a seven-point scale. Benchmarks with strong language models in zero-shot and fine-tuning settings demonstrate clear headroom, with the best macro F1-score around 30% and a tendency to overpredict mature defenses. Corpus analyses confirm that mature defenses are most common and reveal emotion-specific deviations. We will release the corpus, annotations, code, and prompts to support research on defensive functioning in language.

Developing documentation guidelines and easy-to-use templates for datasets and models is a challenging task, especially given the variety of backgrounds, skills, and incentives of the people involved in the building of natural language processing (NLP) tools. Nevertheless, the adoption of standard documentation practices across the field of NLP promotes more accessible and detailed descriptions of NLP datasets and models, while supporting researchers and developers in reflecting on their work. To help with the standardization of documentation, we present two case studies of efforts that aim to develop reusable documentation templates -- the HuggingFace data card, a general purpose card for datasets in NLP, and the GEM benchmark data and model cards with a focus on natural language generation. We describe our process for developing these templates, including the identification of relevant stakeholder groups, the definition of a set of guiding principles, the use of existing templates as our foundation, and iterative revisions based on feedback.

Adversarial attacks optimize against models to defeat defenses. Existing defenses are static, and stay the same once trained, even while attacks change. We argue that models should fight back, and optimize their defenses against attacks at test time. We propose dynamic defenses, to adapt the model and input during testing, by defensive entropy minimization (dent). Dent alters testing, but not training, for compatibility with existing models and train-time defenses. Dent improves the robustness of adversarially-trained defenses and nominally-trained models against white-box, black-box, and adaptive attacks on CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet. In particular, dent boosts state-of-the-art defenses by 20+ points absolute against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10 at ε_infty = 8/255.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

Templates serve as a good starting point to implement a design (e.g., banner, slide) but it takes great effort from designers to manually create. In this paper, we present Desigen, an automatic template creation pipeline which generates background images as well as harmonious layout elements over the background. Different from natural images, a background image should preserve enough non-salient space for the overlaying layout elements. To equip existing advanced diffusion-based models with stronger spatial control, we propose two simple but effective techniques to constrain the saliency distribution and reduce the attention weight in desired regions during the background generation process. Then conditioned on the background, we synthesize the layout with a Transformer-based autoregressive generator. To achieve a more harmonious composition, we propose an iterative inference strategy to adjust the synthesized background and layout in multiple rounds. We constructed a design dataset with more than 40k advertisement banners to verify our approach. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed pipeline generates high-quality templates comparable to human designers. More than a single-page design, we further show an application of presentation generation that outputs a set of theme-consistent slides. The data and code are available at https://whaohan.github.io/desigen.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

With more and more deep neural networks being deployed as various daily services, their reliability is essential. It is frightening that deep neural networks are vulnerable and sensitive to adversarial attacks, the most common one of which for the services is evasion-based. Recent works usually strengthen the robustness by adversarial training or leveraging the knowledge of an amount of clean data. However, retraining and redeploying the model need a large computational budget, leading to heavy losses to the online service. In addition, when training, it is likely that only limited adversarial examples are available for the service provider, while much clean data may not be accessible. Based on the analysis on the defense for deployed models, we find that how to rapidly defend against a certain attack for a frozen original service model with limitations of few clean and adversarial examples, which is named as RaPiD (Rapid Plug-in Defender), is really important. Motivated by the generalization and the universal computation ability of pre-trained transformer models, we come up with a new defender method, CeTaD, which stands for Considering Pretrained Transformers as Defenders. In particular, we evaluate the effectiveness and the transferability of CeTaD in the case of one-shot adversarial examples and explore the impact of different parts of CeTaD as well as training data conditions. CeTaD is flexible for different differentiable service models, and suitable for various types of attacks.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3, PaLM, and Llama has significantly transformed natural language processing, showcasing remarkable capabilities in understanding and generating language. However, these models often struggle with tasks requiring complex reasoning, particularly in mathematical problem-solving, due in part to the scarcity of large-scale, high-quality, domain-specific datasets necessary for training sophisticated reasoning abilities. To address this limitation, we introduce Template-based Data Generation (TDG), a novel approach that leverages LLMs (GPT-4) to automatically generate parameterized meta-templates, which are then used to synthesize a vast array of high-quality problems and solutions. Leveraging TDG, we create TemplateMath Part I: TemplateGSM, a dataset comprising over 7 million synthetically generated grade school math problems--each accompanied by code-based and natural language solutions--with the potential to generate an effectively unlimited number more. This dataset alleviates the scarcity of large-scale mathematical datasets and serves as a valuable resource for pre-training, fine-tuning, and evaluating LLMs in mathematical reasoning. Our method not only enables the generation of virtually infinite data but also elevates data augmentation to a new level by using GPT-4 for meta-template generation, ensuring diverse and high-quality problem structures. The TemplateMath Part I: TemplateGSM dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/math-ai/TemplateGSM. The code is available at https://github.com/iiis-ai/TemplateMath.

Recent Long-Context Language Models (LCLMs) can process hundreds of thousands of tokens in a single prompt, enabling new opportunities for knowledge-intensive multi-hop reasoning by integrating large sets of retrieved documents or, in some cases, directly all necessary information. However, simply feeding more documents into the context window fails to capture how evidence should be connected. We address this gap with thought templates, which recast reasoning as reusable thought caches, derived from prior problem solving traces, structuring how evidence is combined and guiding multi-hop inference with factual documents. To keep these templates effective, we propose an update strategy that iteratively refines templates derived from training data through natural-language feedback. Across diverse benchmarks and LCLM families, our approach delivers consistent gains over strong baselines in both retrieval-based and retrieval-free settings. Furthermore, we show that optimized templates can be distilled into smaller open-source models, demonstrating its broad applicability and transparent reasoning reuse. We refer to our framework as Thought Template Augmented LCLMs (ToTAL).

For monitoring crises, political events are extracted from the news. The large amount of unstructured full-text event descriptions makes a case-by-case analysis unmanageable, particularly for low-resource humanitarian aid organizations. This creates a demand to classify events into event types, a task referred to as event coding. Typically, domain experts craft an event type ontology, annotators label a large dataset and technical experts develop a supervised coding system. In this work, we propose PR-ENT, a new event coding approach that is more flexible and resource-efficient, while maintaining competitive accuracy: first, we extend an event description such as "Military injured two civilians'' by a template, e.g. "People were [Z]" and prompt a pre-trained (cloze) language model to fill the slot Z. Second, we select answer candidates Z* = {"injured'', "hurt"...} by treating the event description as premise and the filled templates as hypothesis in a textual entailment task. This allows domain experts to draft the codebook directly as labeled prompts and interpretable answer candidates. This human-in-the-loop process is guided by our interactive codebook design tool. We evaluate PR-ENT in several robustness checks: perturbing the event description and prompt template, restricting the vocabulary and removing contextual information.

Harmful fine-tuning poses critical safety risks to fine-tuning-as-a-service for large language models. Existing defense strategies preemptively build robustness via attack simulation but suffer from fundamental limitations: (i) the infeasibility of extending attack simulations beyond bounded threat models due to the inherent difficulty of anticipating unknown attacks, and (ii) limited adaptability to varying attack settings, as simulation fails to capture their variability and complexity. To address these challenges, we propose Bayesian Data Scheduler (BDS), an adaptive tuning-stage defense strategy with no need for attack simulation. BDS formulates harmful fine-tuning defense as a Bayesian inference problem, learning the posterior distribution of each data point's safety attribute, conditioned on the fine-tuning and alignment datasets. The fine-tuning process is then constrained by weighting data with their safety attributes sampled from the posterior, thus mitigating the influence of harmful data. By leveraging the post hoc nature of Bayesian inference, the posterior is conditioned on the fine-tuning dataset, enabling BDS to tailor its defense to the specific dataset, thereby achieving adaptive defense. Furthermore, we introduce a neural scheduler based on amortized Bayesian learning, enabling efficient transfer to new data without retraining. Comprehensive results across diverse attack and defense settings demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of our approach. Code is available at https://github.com/Egg-Hu/Bayesian-Data-Scheduler.

Controllable diffusion methods have substantially expanded the practical utility of diffusion models, but they are typically developed as isolated, backbone-specific systems with incompatible training pipelines, parameter formats, and runtime hooks. This fragmentation makes it difficult to reuse infrastructure across tasks, transfer capabilities across backbones, or compose multiple controls within a single generation pipeline. We present Diffusion Templates, a unified and open plugin framework that decouples base-model inference from controllable capability injection. The framework is organized around three components: Template models that map arbitrary task-specific inputs to an intermediate capability representation, a Template cache that functions as a standardized interface for capability injection, and a Template pipeline that loads, merges, and injects one or more Template caches into the base diffusion runtime. Because the interface is defined at the systems level rather than tied to a specific control architecture, heterogeneous capability carriers such as KV-Cache and LoRA can be supported under the same abstraction. Based on this design, we build a diverse model zoo spanning structural control, brightness adjustment, color adjustment, image editing, super-resolution, sharpness enhancement, aesthetic alignment, content reference, local inpainting, and age control. These case studies show that Diffusion Templates can unify a broad range of controllable generation tasks while preserving modularity, composability, and practical extensibility across rapidly evolving diffusion backbones. All resources will be open sourced, including code, models, and datasets.

Writing effective rebuttals is a high-stakes task that demands more than linguistic fluency, as it requires precise alignment between reviewer intent and manuscript details. Current solutions typically treat this as a direct-to-text generation problem, suffering from hallucination, overlooked critiques, and a lack of verifiable grounding. To address these limitations, we introduce RebuttalAgent, the first multi-agents framework that reframes rebuttal generation as an evidence-centric planning task. Our system decomposes complex feedback into atomic concerns and dynamically constructs hybrid contexts by synthesizing compressed summaries with high-fidelity text while integrating an autonomous and on-demand external search module to resolve concerns requiring outside literature. By generating an inspectable response plan before drafting, RebuttalAgent ensures that every argument is explicitly anchored in internal or external evidence. We validate our approach on the proposed RebuttalBench and demonstrate that our pipeline outperforms strong baselines in coverage, faithfulness, and strategic coherence, offering a transparent and controllable assistant for the peer review process. Code will be released.

As frontier language models advance, policymakers and model developers need methods for assessing whether model access materially increases a non-expert actor's ability to plan high-consequence Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) misuse relative to public tools alone. Existing CBRN evaluations differ in non-expert definitions, threat scope, baselines, scoring rubrics, and decision rules, making results difficult to compare across studies. We introduce a Threshold Exceedance Criteria (TEC) framework that decomposes an uplift study into independently executable components: determining non-expert participant eligibility, defining the CBRN threat scope for the study, and statistically estimating material uplift. We then operationalize the TEC framework in a large-scale empirical study using a design that determines two forms of uplift: generative (where a model assists plan creation from scratch) and revisionist (where a model assists refinement of an existing plan). The study produced attack plans across the CBRN domains, which we evaluated through subject-matter-expert review to estimate generative and revisionist uplift. Applying the framework, our empirical study revealed domain heterogeneity: under this controlled pre-release evaluation, model-assisted plans sometimes received expert-equivalent instructional ratings, but confirmed material uplift was limited to the radiological domain. These findings informed mitigation and deployment-governance decisions rather than characterizing deployed model behavior. We conclude with methodological lessons for future CBRN uplift evaluations, emphasizing prespecified criteria, explicit baselines, separation of generative and revisionist estimates, and careful distinction between preliminary screening signals and confirmed risk determinations.

Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) generation holds significant promise for automating cloud infrastructure provisioning. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) present a promising opportunity to democratize IaC development by generating deployable infrastructure templates from natural language descriptions. However, current evaluation focuses on syntactic correctness while ignoring deployability, the critical measure of the utility of IaC configuration files. Six state-of-the-art LLMs performed poorly on deployability, achieving only 20.8sim30.2% deployment success rate on the first attempt. In this paper, we construct DPIaC-Eval, the first deployability-centric IaC template benchmark consisting of 153 real-world scenarios cross 58 unique services. Also, we propose an LLM-based deployability-centric framework, dubbed IaCGen, that uses iterative feedback mechanism encompassing format verification, syntax checking, and live deployment stages, thereby closely mirroring the real DevOps workflows. Results show that IaCGen can make 54.6sim91.6% generated IaC templates from all evaluated models deployable in the first 10 iterations. Additionally, human-in-the-loop feedback that provide direct guidance for the deployability errors, can further boost the performance to over 90% passItr@25 on all evaluated LLMs. Furthermore, we explore the trustworthiness of the generated IaC templates on user intent alignment and security compliance. The poor performance (25.2% user requirement coverage and 8.4% security compliance rate) indicates a critical need for continued research in this domain.

Large language models demonstrate a remarkable capability for learning to solve new tasks from a few examples. The prompt template, or the way the input examples are formatted to obtain the prompt, is an important yet often overlooked aspect of in-context learning. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive study of the template format's influence on the in-context learning performance. We evaluate the impact of the prompt template across models (from 770M to 70B parameters) and 4 standard classification datasets. We show that a poor choice of the template can reduce the performance of the strongest models and inference methods to a random guess level. More importantly, the best templates do not transfer between different setups and even between models of the same family. Our findings show that the currently prevalent approach to evaluation, which ignores template selection, may give misleading results due to different templates in different works. As a first step towards mitigating this issue, we propose Template Ensembles that aggregate model predictions across several templates. This simple test-time augmentation boosts average performance while being robust to the choice of random set of templates.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Traditional Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines rely on similarity-based retrieval and re-ranking, which depend on heuristics such as top-k, and lack explainability, interpretability, and robustness against adversarial content. To address this gap, we propose a novel method METEORA that replaces re-ranking in RAG with a rationale-driven selection approach. METEORA operates in two stages. First, a general-purpose LLM is preference-tuned to generate rationales conditioned on the input query using direct preference optimization. These rationales guide the evidence chunk selection engine, which selects relevant chunks in three stages: pairing individual rationales with corresponding retrieved chunks for local relevance, global selection with elbow detection for adaptive cutoff, and context expansion via neighboring chunks. This process eliminates the need for top-k heuristics. The rationales are also used for consistency check using a Verifier LLM to detect and filter poisoned or misleading content for safe generation. The framework provides explainable and interpretable evidence flow by using rationales consistently across both selection and verification. Our evaluation across six datasets spanning legal, financial, and academic research domains shows that METEORA improves generation accuracy by 33.34% while using approximately 50% fewer chunks than state-of-the-art re-ranking methods. In adversarial settings, METEORA significantly improves the F1 score from 0.10 to 0.44 over the state-of-the-art perplexity-based defense baseline, demonstrating strong resilience to poisoning attacks. Code available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/METEORA-DC46/README.md

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly common in educational applications, there is a growing need for evidence-based methods to design and evaluate LLM prompts that produce personalized and pedagogically aligned out-puts. This study presents a generalizable, systematic approach for evaluating prompts, demonstrated through an analysis of LLM-generated follow-up questions in a structured dialogue activity. Six prompt templates were designed and tested. The templates incorporated established prompt engineering patterns, with each prompt emphasizing distinct pedagogical strategies. The prompt templates were compared through a tournament-style evaluation framework that can be adapted for other educational applications. The tournament employed the Glicko2 rating system with eight judges evaluating question pairs across three dimensions: format, dialogue support, and appropriateness for learners. Data was sourced from 120 authentic user interactions across three distinct educational deployments. Results showed that a single prompt related to strategic reading out-performed other templates with win probabilities ranging from 81% to 100% in pairwise comparisons. This prompt combined persona and context manager pat-terns and was designed to support metacognitive learning strategies such as self-directed learning. The methodology showcases how educational technology re- searchers can systematically evaluate and improve prompt designs, moving beyond ad-hoc prompt engineering toward evidence-based prompt development for educational applications.