Daily Papers

Web services increasingly expose backend interfaces that let users delegate tasks to AI agents, which invoke service operations directly without navigating websites. This shift changes how existing Web vulnerabilities can be exploited. We investigate these changes through VELA, an executable benchmark covering 44 vulnerabilities across twelve Web application families. The benchmark preserves vulnerable backends and derives agent-facing interfaces from legitimate workflows. We evaluate three commercial agents across multiple interface configurations, using controlled comparisons to separate interface effects from agent behavior and independent oracles to verify attack outcomes. Our results show that the agent realizes every attack that direct interface invocation realizes in the reference configuration, so exploitability is set mainly by the interface: 91% of vulnerabilities remain exploitable under the reference design. Interface restrictions prevent some attacks by removing required operations or limiting input control, while retention remains high across vulnerability classes. No case-level loss in the reference configuration is attributed to agent refusal or input normalization, and in one case the agent completed an attack by supplying calls the attacker omitted. Across the tested configurations, interface design affects exploitability more than agent choice, moving retention from 39% to 95% against at most 4.5 points across agents, but some restrictive interfaces also limit legitimate workflows. Our study provides a systematic empirical account of how agent-mediated access reshapes existing Web vulnerabilities, grounding future Web architecture design in measured security outcomes and trade-offs between reducing attack exposure and preserving legitimate functionality in agent-facing services.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Modern language-model agents are built around the agent loop, where the LLM is placed in an environment exposing a set of tools, and the LLM has full control over the workflow by alternating between tool calls and observing their output. However, certain workflows currently require additional engineering beyond the agent loop itself, such as memory systems and self-improving systems. We built an LLM agent framework, JAZ, to explore the extent to which a minimal harness that is little more than the agent loop itself can accomplish tasks these specialized systems are built for. JAZ exposes a single LLM-based primitive invoke and provides a set of built-in hooks that allow the programmer to apply constraints and monitoring. Generalizing existing code-mode agent loops, invoke is the simplest loop that satisfies two defining properties: (1) the LLM can write arbitrary executable code that can include recursive invoke; (2) everything visible to the LLM --- all inputs to invoke as well as its interaction history with the code environment --- are variables in the code environment. We motivate our design from first principles, viewing invoke as a language primitive representing a function whose implementation is provided at runtime by an LLM every time it is called. To validate the design of our core invoke primitive, we evaluate invoke --- with only prompting, no manually designed tools, harness, or external systems (e.g., memory or the file system) --- on workflows traditionally implemented through specialized external harnesses. On long-horizon workflows requiring recall beyond the context window, JAZ invoke outperforms Letta (MemGPT) by 8\% at half its cost on the recall-heavy portion of StuLife. On continual self-improvement, JAZ invoke outperforms ACE by 4\% at a lower cost on AppWorld.

Although current Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities, performing complex real-world tasks still requires tool learning. Mainstream methods, such as CoT/ReAct, rely on step-by-step tool invocation to interact with external environments, but they are limited in perceptual scope and lack adequate task-planning capability. To address these limitations, other studies introduce the first Search-based Decision Tree (DFSDT), which still suffers from the high computational cost. In this paper, we introduce a novel parallel tool invocation paradigm, DTA-Llama (Divide-Then-Aggregate Llama). First, we transform traditional tree-based tool search paths into Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure, generating a high-quality parallel tool invocation dataset. The DTA-Llama is then trained on the dataset to learn to iteratively divide the current task into several parallel tool invocation sub-tasks and aggregate the invocation results to decide the next actions. Furthermore, we introduce an efficient inference framework inspired by the Process/Threads mechanism when applying the DTA-Llama to practical tasks. Experimental results show that our approach substantially enhances task performance while reducing token consumption and inference time. Llama2-7B, using our method, is comparable to the official parallel function calling method of GPT-3.5. The relevant code, dataset, and model weights are available at https://corn0205.github.io/

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Much knowledge work produces new deliverables from files a workspace already holds, and LLM agents are beginning to take such work over. Through direct corpus interaction, an agent can search and read any of those files from a terminal with no indexing, and producing a deliverable from many of them in this way is what we call direct workspace interaction (DWI). Reaching the files, however, is only half the task: nothing keeps track of what the task asks for, what has been read, and what was listed but never opened, all of which slip through the context window without leaving a trace, so an agent may extract a figure and still deliver a report without it. To address this, we present RunningTab, a framework that equips direct workspace interaction with an environment-side tab: a per-task record of what the task still owes, kept by the environment alongside the agent. Specifically, the agent adds its requirements, while the environment records every file read as an excerpt with its provenance and every listed but unopened file as a candidate; the agent can then see each requirement beside its best-matching excerpts and top unopened candidates, resolve it against matching content or set it aside with a reason, and, should it try to finish with requirements still open, receive them in a finish check. We validate RunningTab on three benchmarks with three LLMs, where it consistently outperforms plain DWI and baselines that keep the record in the model, while its tab usually holds the values a deliverable needs once seen.

Large language models (LLMs) use function calls to interface with external tools and data source. However, the current approach to LLM function calling is inherently synchronous, where each call blocks LLM inference, limiting LLM operation and concurrent function execution. In this work, we propose AsyncLM, a system for asynchronous LLM function calling. AsyncLM improves LLM's operational efficiency by enabling LLMs to generate and execute function calls concurrently. Instead of waiting for each call's completion, AsyncLM introduces an interrupt mechanism to asynchronously notify the LLM in-flight when function calls return. We design an in-context protocol for function calls and interrupts, provide fine-tuning strategy to adapt LLMs to the interrupt semantics, and implement these mechanisms efficiently on LLM inference process. We demonstrate that AsyncLM can reduce end-to-end task completion latency from 1.6x-5.4x compared to synchronous function calling on a set of benchmark tasks in the Berkeley function calling leaderboard (BFCL). Furthermore, we discuss how interrupt mechanisms can be extended to enable novel human-LLM or LLM-LLM interactions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly expected to orchestrate diverse tools over long-horizon tasks. Existing agents typically use Direct Tool Calling (DTC), where the model invokes tools sequentially, and tool responses accumulate in the model context, which can lead to context rot and orchestration breakdown. In contrast, Programmatic Tool Calling (PTC) invokes tools through executable code and stores intermediate results in runtime variables rather than appending them to the context. Prior work has explored PTC mainly as an inference-time optimization, but its benefits for agentic training remain unclear, and suitable verifiable training tasks are scarce. In this work, we introduce ProgAgent, a full PTC training stack, comprising a pipeline for synthesizing verifiable long-horizon tasks, a lightweight PTC runtime, and a two-stage training recipe. Using only 215 tasks instantiated at four environment scales, ProgAgent yields higher pass rates than the evaluated baselines of comparable size across four benchmarks. On LOCA-bench, ProgAgent-14B achieves a 30.7% pass rate at a 64k-token environment state, where these baselines score zero. Cross-harness experiments show that PTC-trained models outperform DTC-trained models under both evaluation interfaces, suggesting that the benefits of PTC training extend beyond the interface.

We present Qwen-Audio-Agent, a harness that combines full-duplex voice interaction with asynchronous task execution through a foreground-background architecture. A Frontend Agent manages dialogue and selects between direct tool use and delegation, while a Backend Agent carries out delegated tasks in a separate context. An Orchestration Runtime maintains task state, coordinates requests for user input and authorization, and schedules the return of results to the conversation. The runtime separates speech interruption from task cancellation and execution completion from result delivery, allowing conversation to continue while delegated work proceeds. Environmental events and persistent memory provide context within and across sessions. Independent adapters support integration with different frontend models, backend agents, and clients. We instantiate the architecture in desktop assistance, intelligent cockpits, and voice customer service. On an in-house cockpit benchmark of 134 cases, mixed execution achieves a task success rate of 91.04%, compared with 72.39% and 80.60% for the direct and all delegated configurations, respectively. In a separate latency evaluation on matched successful turns, mixed execution reduces mean task execution latency by 26.73% and 30.91% relative to these baselines, respectively. These results support the complementary use of direct tool calls for immediate operations and backend delegation for multi-step tasks.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

Making an open-weight language model generate text is not the same as making it finish coding work. This retrospective empirical systems experience report follows my engineering work from July to October 2026 across coding clients, model-specific serving recipes, vLLM, SGLang, llama.cpp, and MLX. Models behind a nominally compatible endpoint still differed in tool-call formatting, turn control, context behavior, cache reuse, and reliability. A served model, coherent text, executed tool calls, and code that passes independent behavioral checks proved to be distinct levels of progress. The evidence includes 4,165 coding-agent gateway turns from my own sessions, 623 debug jobs, and three separate delegation studies with hidden behavioral checks and a fixed Claude Opus 5.5 parent. Saved cold-prefix requests had a median time to first token of about 69.4 s, versus 2.8 s for high-reuse requests (observational). In a 45-trial study, direct coding passed 15/15 and delegation to a quantized Qwen3-Coder 30B-A3B worker passed 12/15 and 14/15. On a second 15-task suite under a fixed artifact contract, the completed replacement cohort had 45/45 for direct coding and 12/45 for a Nemotron Cascade 2 worker (11 worker substitutions). Sixteen sessions stopped by a subscription limit before any model call were replaced; counting them as failures gives 37/45 and 8/45. A Qwen3-Coder worker passed 0/45. In both studies with a direct arm, direct coding had lower API list-price-equivalent frontier cost per verified success. A post-hoc diagnostic found that 19 of 36 artifacts rejected only for renamed parameters passed the hidden checks unchanged; they are not counted as successes. The contribution is an evidence-qualified account of serving, agent protocol, session continuity, artifact validation, and verification in practice. The studies are not pooled and do not rank models or runtimes.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

As large language models advance in reasoning and tool use capabilities, researchers increasingly seek to leverage them for computer use agents that can interact with existing software. The dominant approach develops GUI agents that control applications through visual interfaces: interpreting screenshots, locating UI elements, and executing mouse clicks to mimic human interaction. This GUI-centric paradigm fundamentally misaligns with agent capabilities. Current GUI agents struggle with brittle pixel-level interactions, timing dependencies, and coordinate-based actions that break with interface changes. They force agents to emulate human perceptual limitations rather than leverage their computational strengths in structured data processing and programmatic control. CLI-Anything argues for agent-native computer use design. Instead of forcing agents to navigate visual layouts, we create interfaces aligned with how agents naturally operate: through structured commands, explicit state representations, and deterministic feedback. We transform existing applications into command-line harnesses that preserve functionality while exposing machine-readable protocols optimized for AI-native interaction. This eliminates the lossy visual-to-computational translation that plagues GUI agents. Rather than building sophisticated screen readers and click simulators, we should redesign interaction paradigms around agent strengths: precise programmatic control and deterministic execution. We examine the methodology, architecture, evidence, and future directions for this agent-native transformation of computer use. We have built CLI-Hub as a comprehensive platform that operationalizes this agent-native computer use vision. The platform provides methodology, architecture, and infrastructure for this fundamental transformation of computer use.

Large language models (LLMs) augmented with external tools have demonstrated remarkable capability in solving complex real-world tasks. However, existing approaches suffer from two key challenges: brittle multi-step and multi-turn reasoning caused by incompatible tool output types and API schemas, and performance degradation under large tool catalogues. To address these, we introduce Tool Primitives, a design that replaces rigid API schema-based invocation with natural language as the interface for tool calling, where each tool is wrapped with an LLM interface that handles schema resolution and execution internally, enabling natural inter-tool communication for nested and multi-turn tool calling. Building on Tool Primitives, we host ToolFace, a centralized repository of 25,519 functions from which LLMs dynamically retrieve only the relevant tools at inference time, eliminating the need to enumerate raw API schemas in context. To orchestrate Tool Primitives and ToolFace reliably in complex settings, we further propose HEART, a Harness Engineering framework via Agent-native, Reusable Tool Primitives, comprising a Planner, Router, and Verifier that jointly support dynamic tool invocation planning, multi-step execution, and feedback-driven recovery. Experiments on five benchmarks demonstrate that HEART outperforms SFT-based models by 10% on average and surpasses GPT-5.4, Claude-4.6-Sonnet, and Gemini-3.1-Pro by 6% on average while reducing API cost by up to 85%. On 50 real-world tasks, HEART achieves 84% task completion, 3.8times the average of three frontier commercial models (22%).

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Large language models (LLMs) equipped with terminal access have demonstrated strong capabilities in automating software engineering tasks. However, existing agents remain brittle on long-horizon workflows, where they must repeatedly reconstruct program state scattered across source files, configurations, tests, dependencies, and runtime behavior, leading to increasingly long interaction histories, context explosion, and semantic drift. Large repositories further complicate the identification of task-relevant components. To address these challenges, we introduce Dev-Primitives (Development Primitives), a modular and executable abstraction that transforms repository components from passive software artifacts into active participants in software engineering. Each Dev-Primitive pairs a repository artifact with a resident LLM, which gives the artifact an agent-native interface grounded in its own implementation and dependencies, enabling natural-language reasoning, inter-component communication, and localized self-modification. Building on Dev-Primitives, we propose HERMES, a Harness Engineering framework for software engineeRing via Modular Executable Dev-PrimitiveS, which instantiates these primitives at repository scale through a dependency-aware dynamic activation mechanism and a bug diagnosis mechanism that maps execution evidence back to the components that must be revised. Extensive experiments on four software engineering benchmarks demonstrate that HERMES outperforms matched baseline harnesses by 12.4\% on average. Moreover, when paired with strong activation and diagnosis models, HERMES, even with Qwen3-8B Dev-Primitives, remains within 4.5\% of the homogeneous GPT-5.6 Sol configuration across all four benchmarks, while reducing inference cost by 26.2\% on Terminal-Bench 4.0, highlighting the importance of harness design in software engineering agents.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

GUI grounding, which maps natural-language instructions to actionable UI elements, is a core capability of GUI agents. Prior works largely treats instructions as a static proxy for user intent, overlooking the impact of instruction diversity and quality on grounding performance. Through a careful investigation of existing grounding datasets, we find a 23.3% flaw rate in their instructions and show that inference-time exploitation of instruction diversity yields up to a substantial 76% relative performance improvement. In this paper, we introduce the Instruction-as-Reasoning paradigm, treating instructions as dynamic analytical pathways that offer distinct perspectives and enabling the model to select the most effective pathway during reasoning. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage training framework: supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on synthesized, diverse instructions to instill multi-perspective reasoning, followed by reinforcement learning (RL) to optimize pathway selection and composition. Our resulting models, UI-Ins-7B and UI-Ins-32B, achieve state-of-the-art results on five challenging grounding benchmarks and exhibit emergent reasoning, selectively composing and synthesizing novel instruction pathways at inference. In particular, UI-Ins-32B attains the best grounding accuracy, scoring 87.3% on UI-I2E-Bench, 57.0% on ScreenSpot-Pro, and 84.9% on MMBench-GUI L2. Furthermore, our model demonstrates strong agentic potential, achieving a 74.1% success rate on AndroidWorld using UI-Ins-7B as the executor. Our in-depth analysis reveals additional insights such as how reasoning can be formulated to enhance rather than hinder grounding performance, and how our method mitigates policy collapse in the SFT+RL framework. All code and model checkpoints will be publicly released in https://github.com/alibaba/UI-Ins.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Modern cutting-edge AI applications are being developed over fast-evolving, heterogeneous, nascent hardware devices. This requires frequent reworking of the AI software stack to adopt bottom-up changes from new hardware, which takes time for general-purpose software libraries. Consequently, real applications often develop custom software stacks optimized for their specific workloads and hardware. Custom stacks help in quick development and optimization, but incur a lot of redundant efforts across applications in writing non-portable code. This paper discusses an alternative communication library interface for AI applications that offers both portability and performance by reducing redundant efforts while maintaining flexibility for customization. We present MSCCL++, a novel abstraction of GPU communication based on separation of concerns: (1) a primitive interface provides a minimal hardware abstraction as a common ground for software and hardware developers to write custom communication, and (2) higher-level portable interfaces and specialized implementations enable optimization for different workloads and hardware environments. This approach makes the primitive interface reusable across applications while enabling highly flexible optimization. Compared to state-of-the-art baselines (NCCL, RCCL, and MSCCL), MSCCL++ achieves speedups of up to 5.4times for collective communication and up to 15% for real-world AI inference workloads. MSCCL++ is in production of multiple AI services provided by Microsoft Azure, and is also adopted by RCCL, the GPU collective communication library maintained by AMD. MSCCL++ is open-source and available at https://github.com/microsoft/mscclpp.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Every major LLM agent framework gives the LLM the role of orchestrator; the model decides what to do next, when to call tools, and when to stop. We argue that token explosion, control-flow hallucination, and unreliable completion are not implementation bugs but architectural consequences of assigning the deterministic work of looping, branching, and sequencing to a probabilistic system. A better prompt or a stronger model cannot guarantee the reliability of the LLM agent. We therefore propose Agentic Programming, in which the program governs all control flow, and the LLM is itself part of it, an adaptive component we call LLM-as-Code and invoke only where a task calls for reasoning or generation. Within each call the model keeps full flexibility, but it cannot alter the program's execution path. With control in the program, the LLM's context is built from the execution history's call tree and forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each call's context length is then determined by its call depth rather than by accumulation over steps. A case study of computer-use agents shows that the design is practical, not just a theoretical stance, substantially improving the stability of long visual operation sequences.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

The prevailing approach to computer-use agents couples a model with a domain-specific harness: a browser or desktop environment equipped with human engineered tools that are fixed before task execution. As models' coding capabilities improve, the GUI native and static harness prevents them from direct programmatic operation on system state, as well as flexible construction of tools. To this end, we introduce CUAWright, a minimal terminal harness of roughly 3K lines of code that uses bash commands as its sole action interface, and a file system as its evolvable space for dynamically creating tools and managing the context. We conduct comprehensive experiments across a wide range of digital tasks, and demonstrate that by giving the agent a minimal, programmable interface, it achieves substantially stronger results compared to their GUI or hybrid CLI interface across a wide range of tasks. On OSWorld 2.0, CUAWright delivers a 33.2% relative improvement in partial reward while reducing estimated cost by 37.5% compared with the published GPT-5.5 baseline. On Online-Mind2Web and the long horizon Odysseys benchmark, CUAWright substantially outperforms GUI native harness by 4.7% and 44.0% in success rate, respectively. Furthermore, we found the gains extend to CAD applications that require accurate visual understanding and CLI interaction: on CADGenBench and BenchCAD, our unified harness yields 8.1%-41.6% relative improvements over other CLI based harnesses with GPT-5.5. Together, these results suggest digital environments are far more programmable than their GUI interfaces imply, and a minimal terminal-focused harness is the key for better performance and efficiency.

As mathematical computing becomes more democratized in high-level languages, high-performance symbolic-numeric systems are necessary for domain scientists and engineers to get the best performance out of their machine without deep knowledge of code optimization. Naturally, users need different term types either to have different algebraic properties for them, or to use efficient data structures. To this end, we developed Symbolics.jl, an extendable symbolic system which uses dynamic multiple dispatch to change behavior depending on the domain needs. In this work we detail an underlying abstract term interface which allows for speed without sacrificing generality. We show that by formalizing a generic API on actions independent of implementation, we can retroactively add optimized data structures to our system without changing the pre-existing term rewriters. We showcase how this can be used to optimize term construction and give a 113x acceleration on general symbolic transformations. Further, we show that such a generic API allows for complementary term-rewriting implementations. We demonstrate the ability to swap between classical term-rewriting simplifiers and e-graph-based term-rewriting simplifiers. We showcase an e-graph ruleset which minimizes the number of CPU cycles during expression evaluation, and demonstrate how it simplifies a real-world reaction-network simulation to halve the runtime. Additionally, we show a reaction-diffusion partial differential equation solver which is able to be automatically converted into symbolic expressions via multiple dispatch tracing, which is subsequently accelerated and parallelized to give a 157x simulation speedup. Together, this presents Symbolics.jl as a next-generation symbolic-numeric computing environment geared towards modeling and simulation.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Language-model agents read attacker-writable context to solve tasks. Tool execution needs a separate authority check for protected sink fields, sink-interpreted payloads, and the invocation event. Context-to-Execution Integrity (CXI) is an execution-boundary system for this setting. Policies mark protected sink fields, typed releases carry narrow validated values from writable context to specific destinations, opaque data slots keep evidence as data, and a deterministic gate admits a call only after field authority, exact-effect authorization, and invocation authority all bind to the same action manifest. We evaluate CXI on open-weight field-projection runs, AgentDojo live episodes, a code-agent exact-effect benchmark, manifest-bound ledger faults, proposal-pressure controls, and hosted/API compatibility traces. AgentDojo covers 720 live episodes and 1,739 LLM calls; the code-agent benchmark covers 400 repository episodes with exact-effect authorization and lease-bound execution, yielding 231 safe task completions and zero observed field, effect, or invocation escapes. The accounting reports parser outcomes, authorization outcomes, and task-quality outcomes together with the admission-integrity result. Across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest.

We present Turn, a compiled, actor-based programming language -- statically typed for schema inference, dynamically typed at the value level -- for agentic software: programs that reason and act autonomously by delegating inference to large language models (LLMs). Existing approaches augment general-purpose languages with frameworks, encoding critical invariants (bounded context, typed inference output, credential isolation, durable state) as application-level conventions rather than language guarantees. Turn introduces five language-level constructs that address this gap. Cognitive Type Safety makes LLM inference a typed primitive: the compiler generates a JSON Schema from a struct definition and the VM validates model output before binding. The confidence operator enables deterministic control flow gated on model certainty. Turn's actor-based process model, derived from Erlang, gives each agent an isolated context window, persistent memory, and mailbox. A capability-based identity system returns opaque, unforgeable handles from the VM host, ensuring raw credentials never enter agent memory. Finally, compile-time schema absorption (use schema::<protocol>) synthesizes typed API bindings from external specifications at compile time; the openapi adapter is shipped with graphql, fhir, and mcp in active development. We describe the language design, type rules, schema semantics, and a Rust-based bytecode VM, and evaluate Turn against representative agentic workloads. Turn is open source at https://github.com/ekizito96/Turn.

With advances in decision-making and reasoning capabilities, multimodal agents show strong potential in computer application scenarios. Past evaluations have mainly assessed GUI interaction skills, while tool invocation abilities, such as those enabled by the Model Context Protocol (MCP), have been largely overlooked. Comparing agents with integrated tool invocation to those evaluated only on GUI interaction is inherently unfair. We present OSWorld-MCP, the first comprehensive and fair benchmark for assessing computer-use agents' tool invocation, GUI operation, and decision-making abilities in a real-world environment. We design a novel automated code-generation pipeline to create tools and combine them with a curated selection from existing tools. Rigorous manual validation yields 158 high-quality tools (covering 7 common applications), each verified for correct functionality, practical applicability, and versatility. Extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art multimodal agents on OSWorld-MCP show that MCP tools generally improve task success rates (e.g., from 8.3% to 20.4% for OpenAI o3 at 15 steps, from 40.1% to 43.3% for Claude 4 Sonnet at 50 steps), underscoring the importance of assessing tool invocation capabilities. However, even the strongest models have relatively low tool invocation rates, Only 36.3%, indicating room for improvement and highlighting the benchmark's challenge. By explicitly measuring MCP tool usage skills, OSWorld-MCP deepens understanding of multimodal agents and sets a new standard for evaluating performance in complex, tool-assisted environments. Our code, environment, and data are publicly available at https://osworld-mcp.github.io.

Existing computer-use agents remain fundamentally limited in professional software manipulation: GUI-based agents suffer from fragile visual grounding and long-horizon error accumulation, while API-basedapproaches struggle with heterogeneous protocols and inaccessible commercial interfaces. In this work,we identify the Component Object Model (COM) as a unified executable abstraction, proposing COM-as-Action: a new paradigm that reframes professional software interaction as deterministic program synthesisrather than sequential visual control. To validate this paradigm in the most demanding environments, weintroduce ComCADBench, the first benchmark for agents operating real industrial CAD software. Ourexperiments reveal a substantial paradigm gap: frontier proprietary models achieve near-zero successunder GUI-based interaction, whereas COM-based execution yields substantial immediate gains. Tobridge the remaining gap between syntactic correctness and geometric accuracy, we develop ComActor, aself-correcting agent trained through a progressive three-stage framework, alongside ComForge, a scalableplatform for large-scale training in Windows containers. Extensive experiments show that ComActorachieves state-of-the-art performance on ComCADBench, with strong resilience in long-horizon taskswhere baselines collapse, and generalizes to external CAD benchmark.

Computer-use agents can execute software tasks through either graphical interfaces or programmatic command interfaces, but existing evaluations confound interaction modality with differences in tasks, initial states, verifiers, and permitted actions. We introduce a matched execution-layer benchmark of 440 desktop tasks across 18 applications and 12 workflow categories, where screen-only GUI agents and skill-mediated CLI agents receive identical goals, states, and final-state verifiers while being restricted to modality-native actions. In this controlled setting, the strongest GUI agent reaches a 59.1% full pass rate, outperforming the strongest original-skill CLI agent at 48.2%; however, verifier-guided skill augmentation raises CLI success to 69.3%, showing that much of the CLI deficit comes from incomplete skill coverage rather than model capability alone. These results suggest that GUI and CLI expose different execution bottlenecks: GUI agents are limited by reliable grounded interaction over long-horizon workflows, whereas CLI agents are limited by the coverage and scalability of their skill interfaces.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are driving a shift towards intent-driven development, where agents build complete software from scratch. However, existing benchmarks fail to assess this 0-to-1 generation capability due to two limitations: reliance on predefined scaffolds that ignore repository structure planning, and rigid white-box unit testing that lacks end-to-end behavioral validation. To bridge this gap, we introduce CLI-Tool-Bench, a structure-agnostic benchmark for evaluating the ground-up generation of Command-Line Interface (CLI) tools. It features 100 diverse real-world repositories evaluated via a black-box differential testing framework. Agent-generated software is executed in sandboxes, comparing system side effects and terminal outputs against human-written oracles using multi-tiered equivalence metrics. Evaluating seven state-of-the-art LLMs, we reveal that top models achieve under 43% success, highlighting the ongoing challenge of 0-to-1 generation. Furthermore, higher token consumption does not guarantee better performance, and agents tend to generate monolithic code.

Large language model agents are emerging as an important new class of users of desktop applications. However, existing desktop interfaces were designed for human end users or application developers, leaving agents to interpret visual controls or discover and compose low-level software operations. This mismatch can hinder even capable agents, yet it remains unclear what interface properties make desktop software easier for agents to use. To study this question, we treat software evolution as a natural source of interface variation and introduce DeskIF-Bench, a benchmark of 255 artifact-verified tasks across six desktop applications. By holding the task, agent, and verifier fixed while varying the software release, we measure how interface changes affect agent performance. Across two models and six applications, the newest release consistently outperforms the oldest. Trajectory analysis identifies three relevant interface properties: discoverability, granularity, and observability. Guided by these properties, we develop ANIS, a framework that synthesizes agent-native interfaces from the capabilities of installed applications. On an expanded evaluation of 368 tasks across eight applications, atomic interfaces improve success over native SDK use by 3.8 and 3.5 percentage points with DeepSeek V4 Flash and Claude Haiku 4.5, respectively, while reducing online token usage by approximately 73%. Goal-level commands further raise success to 74.5% and 67.4%, respectively.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents. Agent libOS runs above a conventional host operating system; it does not implement hardware drivers, kernel-mode isolation, or a POSIX-compatible operating system. Instead, it treats an agent as an AgentProcess: a schedulable execution subject with process identity, parent-child lineage, lifecycle state, a tool table derived from an AgentImage, typed Object Memory, explicit capabilities, human queues, checkpoints, events, and audit records. Its central design rule is tools are libc-like wrappers; runtime primitives are the authority boundary. Filesystem access, object access, sleeps, human approval, JIT tool registration, and external side effects are checked at primitive boundaries under explicit capabilities and policy. We describe the design, threat model, Python prototype, and safety-oriented evaluation. The current prototype implements async scheduling, namespace-local Object Memory, runtime-integrated human approval, one-shot permission grants, per-process working directories, shell and image-registration primitives, Deno/TypeScript JIT tools over a libOS syscall broker, filesystem/object bridge tools, an injectable Resource Provider Substrate, deterministic demos, real-model smoke scripts, and 123 regression tests at the time of writing. Rather than improving planner accuracy, Agent libOS demonstrates a runtime substrate in which long-running LLM agents can be scheduled, authorized, resumed, and audited without treating tool dispatch as the trust boundary.

Computer-use agents have advanced on benchmarks like OSWorld and AndroidWorld, but still act mostly through the GUI, often producing inefficient trajectories. Real-world computer work is hybrid, combining visual-state inspection with precise, high-throughput command-line operations, so capable agents must coordinate both modalities over shared application state. Yet scalable hybrid environments remain scarce because supporting both GUI and CLI over real applications typically requires substantial manual engineering for each application. Existing agents also struggle to use the two interfaces complementarily: CLI-native agents lack visual perception for tasks involving interface state or layout, while GUI-native agents are inefficient for operations better executed through commands. We introduce CUA-Universe, a scalable environment-to-data pipeline that turns real desktop software into hybrid GUI+CLI environments. App-Forge adapts applications into reproducible VMs and command-line surfaces it discovers, wraps, or generates, scaling to 16 applications; Task-Weave synthesizes diverse hybrid tasks of controllable difficulty from reusable operations over seed files; and Path-Steer steers rollouts along efficient hybrid paths and harvests verified trajectories for post-training. Training on this data shifts behavior from inefficient GUI interaction and brittle CLI scripting toward effective GUI+CLI orchestration. Our 9B model improves both success and efficiency on CUA-Verse (Score +39.3 pts; -37% steps, -60% tokens), OSWorld (SR +16.8 pts; -57% steps, -44% tokens), and OSWorld-MCP (Score +7.84 pts; -27% steps, -30% tokens). CUA-Universe provides a scalable path toward more capable and efficient computer-use agents.

MPI derived datatypes are an abstraction that simplifies handling of non-contiguous data in MPI applications. These datatypes are recursively constructed at runtime from primitive Named Types defined in the MPI standard. More recently, the development and deployment of CUDA-aware MPI implementations has encouraged the transition of distributed high-performance MPI codes to use GPUs. Such implementations allow MPI functions to directly operate on GPU buffers, easing integration of GPU compute into MPI codes. This work first presents a novel datatype handling strategy for nested strided datatypes, which finds a middle ground between the specialized or generic handling in prior work. This work also shows that the performance characteristics of non-contiguous data handling can be modeled with empirical system measurements, and used to transparently improve MPI_Send/Recv latency. Finally, despite substantial attention to non-contiguous GPU data and CUDA-aware MPI implementations, good performance cannot be taken for granted. This work demonstrates its contributions through an MPI interposer library, TEMPI. TEMPI can be used with existing MPI deployments without system or application changes. Ultimately, the interposed-library model of this work demonstrates MPI_Pack speedup of up to 242000x and MPI_Send speedup of up to 59000x compared to the MPI implementation deployed on a leadership-class supercomputer. This yields speedup of more than 917x in a 3D halo exchange with 3072 processes.

GCC and LLVM underpin much of modern software infrastructure, relying on distinct Intermediate Representations (IRs) to drive optimizations and code generation. However, the semantic and structural differences between these IRs create significant barriers for cross-toolchain interaction, limiting the reuse of compiler frontends, backends, and optimization pipelines across programming languages and compilation ecosystems. Traditional rule-based translators have attempted to bridge this gap, but their complexity and maintenance cost have hindered practical adoption. In this context, Large Language Models (LLMs) appear to be an emerging technology that offers a data-driven alternative, capable of learning complex mappings between heterogeneous compiler IRs directly from sufficiently representative examples. To explore this approach, this paper presents IRIS-14B, a 14-billion-parameter transformer model fine-tuned to translate GIMPLE (as emitted by GCC) to LLVM IR (as emitted by LLVM). The model is trained on paired IRs extracted from C sources and evaluated on the GIMPLE-to-LLVM IR transformation applied to IRs derived from real-world C code and competitive programming problems. To the best of our knowledge, IRIS-14B is the first model trained explicitly for IR-to-IR translation. It outperforms the accuracy of widely used models, including the largest state-of-the-art open models available today, ranging from 13 to 1,000 billion parameters, by up to 44 percentage points. The proposed transformation supports the integration of LLMs as complementary components within hybrid neuro-symbolic compiler architectures, where models such as IRIS-14B act as interoperability layers enabling cross-toolchain workflows without modifying existing compiler passes, while traditional compiler infrastructure continues to perform deterministic compilation and optimization.

In the evolving landscape of software development, Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a unique phenomenon known as emergent abilities, demonstrating adeptness across numerous tasks, from text summarization to code generation. While these abilities open up novel avenues in software design and crafting, their incorporation presents substantial challenges. Developers grapple with decisions surrounding the direct embedding of LLMs within applications versus employing them for code generation. Moreover, effective prompt design becomes a critical concern, given the necessity of data extraction from natural language outputs. To address these intricacies, this paper introduces AskIt, a domain-specific language (DSL) specifically designed for LLMs. AskIt simplifies LLM integration, offering type-guided output control, template-based function definitions, and a unified interface that diminishes the distinction between LLM-based code generation and application integration. Furthermore, through Programming by Example (PBE), AskIt harnesses the power of few-shot learning at the programming language level. Our evaluations underscore AskIt's potency. Across 50 tasks, AskIt generated concise prompts for the given tasks, achieving a 16.14% reduction in prompt length relative to benchmarks. Additionally, by enabling the transition from direct LLM application usage to function generation, AskIt achieved significant speedups, as observed in our GSM8K benchmark experiments. Through these advancements, AskIt streamlines the integration of LLMs in software development, offering a more efficient, versatile approach for leveraging emergent abilities. The implementations of AskIt in TypeScript and Python are available at https://github.com/katsumiok/ts-askit and https://github.com/katsumiok/pyaskit, respectively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Large language models can generate interactive web interfaces, but reliable generative UI requires maintaining an executable artifact as user requests evolve. We introduce EvoGenUI-Bench, a benchmark for multi-turn interface maintenance comprising 150 five-turn tasks and 750 turns across three scenarios: information presentation, executable interaction, and tool-grounded external state. We execute generated artifacts in a browser and evaluate them using screenshots, source and DOM evidence, actor traces, and runtime logs. Beyond turn-level and episode-level success, we measure cross-turn retention with Adjacent Pass Retention. Across eight models, even the strongest achieves 74.9% Turn Pass while completing only 37.3% of five-turn episodes; APR further falls to 52.4% on tool-grounded tasks. Diagnostic analysis shows that presentation failures center on information architecture, interaction failures on derived-state propagation and affordance binding, and tool-grounded failures additionally involve external-state grounding and requirement decomposition. These results reframe generative UI evaluation from judging isolated outputs to testing whether interface behavior, derived state, external state, and assistant claims remain synchronized as the artifact evolves.

Agentic LLM systems that generate code through multi-turn tool use face a fundamental context problem: each session starts from zero, discarding the configuration choices, domain constraints, data schemas, and tool-use patterns that made previous sessions productive. Naively persisting entire conversation histories is token-inefficient and counterproductive: irrelevant context degrades generation quality. We introduce shared selective persistent memory, an architecture that identifies and retains four categories of reusable context (task specifications, data schemas, tool configurations, and output constraints) while discarding session-specific reasoning traces. Crucially, this memory is shared: workspaces encapsulating selective memory can be transferred across users with role-based access control, enabling collaborative reuse without redundant specification. We implement it in a deployed collaborative workspace platform where LLM agents produce, edit, and maintain git-versioned artifacts (dashboards, reports, and data-driven documents) from heterogeneous sources (CSV, SQL, REST APIs, and MCP servers). A complementary zero-token data refresh mechanism decouples generated programs from runtime data, enabling artifact reuse without re-invocation. Across three enterprise scenarios, shared selective persistent memory achieves 96% task completion (vs. 79% without memory and 71% with full history). Zero-token refresh eliminates LLM re-invocation for recurring updates (14x task-time reduction), while summary-driven generation cuts per-invocation token cost by 97x versus raw data injection. A replication on four public datasets confirms generalizability, with zero-token refresh succeeding in 12/12 trials. Notably, naive full-history persistence actively degrades completion by biasing the agent with stale traces, while selective memory outperforms both extremes.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

While enabling large language models to implement function calling (known as APIs) can greatly enhance the performance of LLMs, function calling is still a challenging task due to the complicated relations between different APIs, especially in a context-learning setting without fine-tuning. This paper proposes a simple yet controllable target-driven approach called Reverse Chain to empower LLMs with capabilities to use external APIs with only prompts. Given that most open-source LLMs have limited tool-use or tool-plan capabilities, LLMs in Reverse Chain are only employed to implement simple tasks, e.g., API selection and argument completion, and a generic rule is employed to implement a controllable multiple functions calling. In this generic rule, after selecting a final API to handle a given task via LLMs, we first ask LLMs to fill the required arguments from user query and context. Some missing arguments could be further completed by letting LLMs select another API based on API description before asking user. This process continues until a given task is completed. Extensive numerical experiments indicate an impressive capability of Reverse Chain on implementing multiple function calling. Interestingly enough, the experiments also reveal that tool-use capabilities of the existing LLMs, e.g., ChatGPT, can be greatly improved via Reverse Chain.

Powerful code agents can execute scripts, call tools, and manage files, yet many important applications remain accessible primarily through graphical user interfaces. We argue that screenshot-and-click is an inefficient interface for software-operating agents: screenshots are state-incomplete, and GUI actions are brittle, semantically weak, and poorly matched to long-horizon planning. We introduce ASIL (Agent-Software Interaction Layer), an agent-native interface that exposes software through structured JSON observations and code-executable semantic actions, realized through the deepest feasible access path for each application. We instantiate ASIL across 15 applications and a benchmark of 300 single-application and 80 multi-application tasks. ASIL reaches above 80 with closed models while executing fewer than five actions per task. Under a repaired runtime and a 50-step screenshot budget, the same tasks yield 6.6 and 26.6 strict success under screenshot-and-click control, rising to 15.0 and 53.3 on an easier OSWorld-comparable band. Against application-native interfaces on matched tasks, ASIL exceeds LibreOffice's UNO API by 28-38 strict points but only matches draw.io's MCP content contract. The structured modality also suits training: small-scale SFT raises Qwen3.5-2B from 58.0 to 72.1 and Qwen3.5-9B from 66.6 to 80.4, and resource-limited on-policy RL further raises them to 74.4 and 82.2.

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Prompt engineering for LLMs remains complex, with existing frameworks either hiding complexity behind restrictive APIs or providing inflexible canned patterns that resist customization -- making sophisticated agentic programming challenging. We present the Prompt Declaration Language (PDL), a novel approach to prompt representation that tackles this fundamental complexity by bringing prompts to the forefront, enabling manual and automatic prompt tuning while capturing the composition of LLM calls together with rule-based code and external tools. By abstracting away the plumbing for such compositions, PDL aims at improving programmer productivity while providing a declarative representation that is amenable to optimization. This paper demonstrates PDL's utility through a real-world case study of a compliance agent. Tuning the prompting pattern of this agent yielded up to 4x performance improvement compared to using a canned agent and prompt pattern.

This paper presents a study of using large language models (LLMs) in modifying existing code. While LLMs for generating code have been widely studied, their role in code modification remains less understood. Although "prompting" serves as the primary interface for developers to communicate intents to LLMs, constructing effective prompts for code modification introduces challenges different from generation. Prior work suggests that natural language summaries may help scaffold this process, yet such approaches have been validated primarily in narrow domains like SQL rewriting. This study investigates two prompting strategies for LLM-assisted code modification: Direct Instruction Prompting, where developers describe changes explicitly in free-form language, and Summary-Mediated Prompting, where changes are made by editing the generated summaries of the code. We conducted an exploratory study with 15 developers who completed modification tasks using both techniques across multiple scenarios. Our findings suggest that developers followed an iterative workflow: understanding the code, localizing the edit, and validating outputs through execution or semantic reasoning. Each prompting strategy presented trade-offs: direct instruction prompting was more flexible and easier to specify, while summary-mediated prompting supported comprehension, prompt scaffolding, and control. Developers' choice of strategy was shaped by task goals and context, including urgency, maintainability, learning intent, and code familiarity. These findings highlight the need for more usable prompt interactions, including adjustable summary granularity, reliable summary-code traceability, and consistency in generated summaries.

Tool agents--LLM-based systems that interact with external APIs--offer a way to execute real-world tasks. However, as tasks become increasingly complex, these agents struggle to identify and call the correct APIs in the proper order. To tackle this problem, we investigate converting API documentation into a structured API graph that captures API dependencies and leveraging it for multi-tool queries that require compositional API calls. To support this, we introduce In-N-Out, the first expert-annotated dataset of API graphs built from two real-world API benchmarks and their documentation. Using In-N-Out significantly improves performance on both tool retrieval and multi-tool query generation, nearly doubling that of LLMs using documentation alone. Moreover, graphs generated by models fine-tuned on In-N-Out close 90% of this gap, showing that our dataset helps models learn to comprehend API documentation and parameter relationships. Our findings highlight the promise of using explicit API graphs for tool agents and the utility of In-N-Out as a valuable resource. We release our dataset and code at https://github.com/holi-lab/In-N-Out-API-Graph.

Computer use agents (CUAs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in completing digital tasks. However, existing CUAs either rely solely on graphical user interface (GUI) interactions, which are often inefficient and error prone, or augment GUI interactions with application specific APIs or tools, which require substantial engineering effort and are difficult to scale across applications. We argue that the next generation of CUAs should combine GUI interactions with the command line interface (CLI), leveraging the generality of the GUI and the efficiency of shell commands. A critical challenge, however, is that current models do not know when or how to use the CLI during task execution. To address this challenge, we develop a data construction pipeline that produces three types of trajectories: GUI only, CLI only, and interleaved GUI and CLI trajectories. This pipeline results in HybridCUA-8K, containing 5K hybrid trajectories and 3K verified RLVR tasks. Building on these data, we propose a training framework with two stages: supervised fine tuning on the constructed trajectories, followed by reinforcement learning with our CLI aware rewards that encourages agents to use the CLI selectively and reliably. Experiments show that HybridCUA-9B achieves 53.6% accuracy on OSWorld, improving over the base model by 14.8 percentage points, and improves performance on WindowsAgentArena by 4.0 percentage points. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and cross platform generalizability of the hybrid GUI and CLI paradigm for computer use agents.

User interface (UI) design is an iterative process in which designers progressively refine their work with design software such as Figma or Sketch. Recent advances in vision language models (VLMs) with tool invocation suggest these models can operate design software to edit a UI design through iteration. Understanding and enhancing this capacity is important, as it highlights VLMs' potential to collaborate with designers within conventional software. However, as no existing benchmark evaluates tool-based design performance, the capacity remains unknown. To address this, we introduce CANVAS, a benchmark for VLMs on tool-based user interface design. Our benchmark contains 598 tool-based design tasks paired with ground-truth references sampled from 3.3K mobile UI designs across 30 function-based categories (e.g., onboarding, messaging). In each task, a VLM updates the design step-by-step through context-based tool invocations (e.g., create a rectangle as a button background), linked to design software. Specifically, CANVAS incorporates two task types: (i) design replication evaluates the ability to reproduce a whole UI screen; (ii) design modification evaluates the ability to modify a specific part of an existing screen. Results suggest that leading models exhibit more strategic tool invocations, improving design quality. Furthermore, we identify common error patterns models exhibit, guiding future work in enhancing tool-based design capabilities.

The growing adoption of agentic LLM applications has introduced a new threat previously named as promptware. While prior work has established that adversaries can exploit direct channels to LLM applications to apply promptware under weak threat models, many applications do not provide any direct channels that could be exploited for prompt injection beyond the Internet. This raises a question: can attackers exploit LLM applications at scale without any direct channels in practical threat models? In this work, we show that the inherent tendency of LLMs to hallucinate resource identifiers can be exploited to amplify untargeted promptware attacks that pull adversarial prompts at scale and could be exploited to establish a botnet. We introduce adversarial hallucination squatting, a technique in which attackers identify trending resources (e.g., popular repositories, popular skills, etc.), compute the LLM distribution of hallucinations on the trending resource names, and preemptively register them to host adversarial prompts. By leveraging the predictability and transferability of hallucinations across foundational LLMs and to application layers, adversaries can significantly amplify the reach of untargeted promptware under weak threat models and establish a botnet by exploiting LLM applications to install a bot on the device that pulled the compromised hallucinated resource from the Inter. We empirically demonstrate that hallucinated resource generation occurs at high rates, up to 85% in repository cloning scenarios and up to 100% in skill installation, and that these hallucinations transfer between foundational models and different prompts. We demonstrate the practicality of adversarial hallucination squatting against various production LLM applications with integrated terminals in their set of tools, achieving remote tool execution and remote code execution.

Recent advancements in integrating large language models (LLMs) with application programming interfaces (APIs) have gained significant interest in both academia and industry. These API-based agents, leveraging the strong autonomy and planning capabilities of LLMs, can efficiently solve problems requiring multi-step actions. However, their ability to handle multi-dimensional difficulty levels, diverse task types, and real-world demands through APIs remains unknown. In this paper, we introduce ShortcutsBench, a large-scale benchmark for the comprehensive evaluation of API-based agents in solving tasks with varying levels of difficulty, diverse task types, and real-world demands. ShortcutsBench includes a wealth of real APIs from Apple Inc.'s operating systems, refined user queries from shortcuts, human-annotated high-quality action sequences from shortcut developers, and accurate parameter filling values about primitive parameter types, enum parameter types, outputs from previous actions, and parameters that need to request necessary information from the system or user. Our extensive evaluation of agents built with 5 leading open-source (size >= 57B) and 4 closed-source LLMs (e.g. Gemini-1.5-Pro and GPT-3.5) reveals significant limitations in handling complex queries related to API selection, parameter filling, and requesting necessary information from systems and users. These findings highlight the challenges that API-based agents face in effectively fulfilling real and complex user queries. All datasets, code, and experimental results will be available at https://github.com/eachsheep/shortcutsbench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable results on various complex reasoning benchmarks. The reasoning capabilities of LLMs enable them to execute function calls, using user-provided functions to overcome their inherent limitations, such as knowledge cutoffs, poor arithmetic skills, or lack of access to private data. This development has expanded LLMs' scope to include multi-function calling, where LLMs are equipped with a variety of functions and select the proper functions based on the context. Multi-function calling abilities of LLMs have catalyzed LLM-based software development, allowing them to tackle more complex problems. However, current methods for multi-function calling often require sequential reasoning and acting for each function which can result in high latency, cost, and sometimes inaccurate behavior. To address this, we introduce LLMCompiler, which executes functions in parallel to efficiently orchestrate multi-function calling. Drawing from the principles of classical compilers, LLMCompiler streamlines parallel function calling with three components: (i) an LLM Planner, formulating execution strategies and dependencies; (ii) a Task Fetching Unit, dispatching function calling tasks; and (iii) an Executor, executing these tasks in parallel. LLMCompiler automatically computes an optimized orchestration for the function calls and can be used with open-source models such as LLaMA-2. We have benchmarked LLMCompiler on a range of tasks including cases with non-trivial inter-dependency between function calls, as well as cases that require dynamic replanning based on intermediate results. We observe consistent latency speedup of up to 3.7x, cost savings of up to 6.7x, and accuracy improvement of up to ~9% as compared to ReAct. Additionally, LLMCompiler achieves up to 1.35x latency gain over OpenAI's recent parallel function calling, while achieving similar accuracy.

Tool calling, invoking external tools on demand, is central to agentic LLMs, yet the mechanism that decides whether a model calls a tool or responds directly remains poorly understood. Agentic prompts are long and heavily scaffolded, combining role instructions, tool schemas, format templates, and the user's request across hundreds of tokens, creating a noisy, highly entangled context in which no single controllable variable for mechanistic analysis is obvious. To obtain such a variable, we propose a method that converts complex agentic prompts into minimal contrastive pairs in which a single request verb determines the tool-call decision: replacing an execution-verb (e.g., write) with an analysis-verb (e.g., discuss) reliably flips the decision, suggesting it is mediated by a compact internal state. We construct 500 such paired prompts across Python, Java, and C++ (300 for mechanistic analysis, 200 held out for evaluation). We trace the decision to a vector, μ_Δ, that is both causally necessary and sufficient and generalizes beyond the discovery prompts to native multi-turn τ^2-Bench trajectories and verb-free requests. Behavioral ablations show that the scaffold establishes a tool-call prior; Transcoder decomposition then reveals that analysis verbs suppress this prior through features signaling that tool use is unnecessary, whereas execution verbs largely leave it intact. Downstream scaffold-reading attention heads and MLP features read out the resulting state, and the same mechanism recurs across seven models from the Qwen, Mistral, and Granite families. Our code is available at https://github.com/XijieGo/MI4ToolCalling.

Tool-augmented LLM agents commonly rely on step-wise atomic tool calls, where each invocation, observation, and value transfer is exposed in the main reasoning trace. This creates an execution-granularity mismatch: locally deterministic tool workflows are unfolded into repeated model-visible decisions, consuming context and forcing the model to manage low-level dataflow in the trace. We introduce HyperTool, a unified executable MCP-style tool interface that changes the model-visible unit of tool execution. A model invokes HyperTool with a code block that can call existing tools through their original schemas, manipulate returned values, and pass intermediate results locally, folding deterministic tool subroutines into a single outer call. To train models to use this interface, we synthesize HyperTool-format trajectories from cross-tool compositional tasks and verify them in real MCP environments. On MCP-Universe, HyperTool improves average accuracy from 15.69\% to 35.29\% on Qwen3-32B and from 9.93\% to 33.33\% on Qwen3-8B, and surpass GPT-OSS and Kimi-k2.5 on average accuracy, showing that our HyperTool can substantially improve multi-step tool use.

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

Modern GPUs feature specialized hardware units that enable high-performance, asynchronous dataflow execution. However, the conventional SIMT programming model is fundamentally misaligned with this task-parallel hardware, creating a significant programmability gap. While hardware-level warp specialization is the key to unlocking peak performance, it forces developers to manually orchestrate complex, low-level communication and software pipelines--a process that is labor-intensive, error-prone, and unsustainable. To address this challenge, we present Tawa, an automated compiler that systematically generates high-performance, warp-specialized code from a high-level, tile-based program. Central to our approach is a novel IR abstraction, asynchronous references (aref), which expresses warp-level communication without exposing low-level hardware details. Using this abstraction, Tawa automatically partitions programs into producer-consumer roles and manages the intricate dataflow pipeline, relieving developers of invasive kernel rewriting. Evaluation on NVIDIA H100 GPUs across representative LLM kernels shows that Tawa delivers high hardware utilization, achieving up to 1.1times speedup over highly optimized cuBLAS GEMM kernels. For attention workloads, Tawa attains 1.2times speedup over Triton and matches the performance of the hand-optimized CUTLASS C++ FlashAttention-3 kernel with far less programming effort.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Formal specification is essential for rigorous program verification, yet writing correct specifications remains costly and difficult to automate. Although large language models (LLMs) and agents have shown promising progress, their true capabilities and failure modes remain unclear. We present the first systematic and contamination-aware study of LLM- and agent-based formal specification generation for C programs. We introduce LiveFMBench, a continuously evolving benchmark of 630 ACSL (ANSI/ISO C Specification Language)-annotated C programs, including 360 newly collected cases designed to mitigate data leakage. Using this benchmark, we evaluate direct prompting with different sampling sizes, reasoning-enabled (thinking mode) inference, the agentic pipeline, and perform a fine-grained failure analysis. Experimental results reveal that naive evaluation substantially overestimates performance because models under direct prompting may exhibit unfaithful behaviors, such as deceiving automated provers or ignoring code-context constraints; after excluding such cases, the true specification generation accuracy drops by approximately 20\%. We further find that both increased sampling and thinking mode significantly improve success rates, with smaller models benefiting more from thinking mode. Agentic pipelines are particularly effective under low sampling budgets and on harder datasets. Failure analysis further shows that incorrect loop invariants are the dominant error type, while agentic pipelines notably reduce assertion errors. These results expose fundamental limitations in current LLM-based approaches and suggest they remain far from replacing human-authored formal specifications. We release LiveFMBench at https://huggingface.co/datasets/fm-universe/Live-FM-Bench and all evaluation artifacts to support future research.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated growing competence in web page generation. However, existing text-driven approaches rely on complex prompts that impose substantial demands on users and offer limited expressivity for page layout and cross-page visual coherence. Image-driven paradigms, which take UI screenshots as input, align more closely with real development workflows. However, current benchmarks focus primarily on visual fidelity and lack a systematic evaluation of the interaction capabilities in generated artifacts. To address this gap, we introduce UI2App, the first benchmark targeting interaction inference, the ability to recover application behavior from screenshots alone, without any textual or behavioral guidance. UI2App comprises 327 screenshots grouped into 45 state-coherent screenshot sets for runnable multi-route web applications. We design an end-to-end pipeline that evaluates each artifact along four dimensions: executability, navigation reachability, visual fidelity, and interaction inference. The interaction metric (IIS) assesses inferred interactions by functional correctness and state-management complexity, crediting any valid implementation rather than matching a single reference. Experiments on six frontier vision-language models reveal a marked capability mismatch between visual reconstruction and interaction realization: the visual-fidelity leader scores only 7.5 on IIS, ranking fourth and trailing the IIS leader by 5.2x. High-complexity interactions such as cross-page state remain a pervasive bottleneck, with half of the evaluated models scoring exactly zero on this dimension. Overall, the results indicate that inferring complete interaction behavior from static screenshots remains a key challenge for models.

This paper reports a deliberately small executable proof for a DAG-TOML contract: six "Hello, world!" implementations in Rust, Go, C, Java, TypeScript, and AWK are linked to one observable-output contract, one implementation DAG, one traceability file, one readiness gate, and one evidence matrix. The load-bearing contract requires the exact UTF-8 byte sequence `Hello, world!\n`, zero stderr bytes, and exit code 0. On the runner used for this paper, the witness harness reported five PASS outcomes, one SKIP for Java because `javac/java` was not on `PATH`, and zero FAIL outcomes. Two sidecar witnesses exercise narrower source-analysis claims: a convoluted Go rewrite hides the contiguous greeting literal but remains visible to sqry at the declared AST symbol and simple-edge level, while an indirect AWK rewrite uses a declared source profile because AWK is not in the repository's sqry-backed validator language set. The contribution is not a benchmark, a claim of general semantic equivalence, or a production assurance system. It is a compact, falsifiable artifact that shows how a contract, implementation graph, traceability chain, and review gate can be checked against executable witnesses.

The rapid proliferation of LLM agent frameworks has forced developers to choose between vendor lock-in through provider-specific SDKs and complex multi-package ecosystems that obscure control flow and hinder reproducibility. Integrating tool calling across multiple LLM providers remains a core engineering challenge due to fragmented APIs, incompatible message formats, and inconsistent streaming and tool-calling behavior, making it difficult to build portable, reliable agent systems. We introduce Orchestral, a lightweight Python framework that provides a unified, type-safe interface for building LLM agents across major providers while preserving the simplicity required for scientific computing and production deployment. Orchestral defines a single universal representation for messages, tools, and LLM usage that operates seamlessly across providers, eliminating manual format translation and reducing framework-induced complexity. Automatic tool schema generation from Python type hints removes the need for handwritten descriptors while maintaining type safety across provider boundaries. A synchronous execution model with streaming support enables deterministic behavior, straightforward debugging, and real-time interaction without introducing server dependencies. The framework's modular architecture cleanly separates provider integration, tool execution, conversation orchestration, and user-facing interfaces, enabling extensibility without architectural entanglement. Orchestral supports advanced agent capabilities found in larger frameworks, including rich tool calling, context compaction, workspace sandboxing, user approval workflows, sub-agents, memory management, and MCP integration.

Large language model (LLM) serving infrastructures are undergoing a shift toward heterogeneity and disaggregation. Modern deployments increasingly integrate diverse accelerators and near-memory processing technologies, introducing significant hardware heterogeneity, while system software increasingly separates computation, memory, and model components across distributed resources to improve scalability and efficiency. As a result, LLM serving performance is no longer determined by hardware or software choices in isolation, but by their runtime interaction through scheduling, data movement, and interconnect behavior. However, understanding these interactions remains challenging, as existing simulators lack the ability to jointly model heterogeneous hardware and disaggregated serving techniques within a unified, runtime-driven framework. This paper presents LLMServingSim 2.0, a unified system-level simulator designed to make runtime-driven hardware-software interactions in heterogeneous and disaggregated LLM serving infrastructures explicit and analyzable. LLMServingSim 2.0 embeds serving decisions and hardware behavior into a single runtime loop, enabling interaction-aware modeling of batching, routing, offloading, memory, and power. The simulator supports extensible integration of emerging accelerators and memory systems through profile-based modeling, while capturing dynamic serving behavior and system-level effects. We validate LLMServingSim 2.0 against real deployments, showing that it reproduces key performance, memory, and power metrics with an average error of 0.95%, while maintaining simulation times of around 10 minutes even for complex configurations. These results demonstrate that LLMServingSim 2.0 provides a practical bridge between hardware innovation and serving-system design, enabling systematic exploration and co-design for next-generation LLM serving infrastructures.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

Emerging Large Language Model (LLM) system patterns, such as disaggregated inference, Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) routing, and asynchronous reinforcement fine-tuning, require flexible point-to-point communication beyond simple collectives. Existing implementations are locked to specific Network Interface Controllers (NICs), hindering integration into inference engines and portability across hardware providers. We present TransferEngine, which bridges the functionality of common NICs to expose a uniform interface. TransferEngine exposes one-sided WriteImm operations with a ImmCounter primitive for completion notification, without ordering assumptions of network transport, transparently managing multiple NICs per GPU. We demonstrate peak throughput of 400 Gbps on both NVIDIA ConnectX-7 and AWS Elastic Fabric Adapter (EFA). We showcase TransferEngine through three production systems: (1) KvCache transfer for disaggregated inference with dynamic scaling, (2) RL weight updates achieving 1.3 seconds for trillion-parameter models, and (3) MoE dispatch/combine implementation exceeding DeepEP decode latency on ConnectX-7, with the first viable latencies on EFA. We demonstrate that our portable point-to-point communication complements collectives while avoiding lock-in.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) during tool use: adversarial instructions hidden in untrusted tool outputs can covertly redirect legitimate task execution. Existing work often trains and evaluates defenses against fixed attacks that do not adapt to the defender's behavior, so the resulting defenses may struggle against adaptive attacks. We combine adaptive attacker-defender co-training with subsequent refinement: continued interaction improves both roles, while learned attackers provide training challenges for further gains in defender safety and task utility. We therefore model adaptive IPI as a general-sum Markov game: the defender advances the task through successive tool calls, while the attacker can inject multiple times within the same task and adapt subsequent attacks to the defender's responses. Building on this formulation, we propose CoER, a verifier-grounded co-evolution and refinement framework. After initializing the attacker from successful trajectories, Co-PPO retains historical policies from both roles as opponent populations and mixes current and historical opponents for bilateral reinforcement learning, extending training beyond the latest matchup. Attackers from these populations are then reused to challenge teacher agents, and only demonstrations verified for both safety and task completion are used to fine-tune the co-evolved defender. In our main seven-domain evaluation, CoER reduces observed overall attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% and raises task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%, with improved attack resistance on external benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise for automated unit test generation, but existing evaluations largely rely on standalone settings and a narrow set of programming languages, overestimating real-world readiness. We introduce XREPOTEST, a multilingual repository-level benchmark for unit test generation spanning five underexplored languages: Rust, Go, Julia, PHP, and Ruby. XREPOTEST evaluates tests under realistic repository constraints using a containerized execution framework and multiple context augmentation strategies, including file-level, LSP-based, and retrieval-based context. Beyond standard metrics such as test pass rate and coverage, we propose Invocation Rate (IR) to assess whether generated tests meaningfully exercise the intended functionality. Experiments with 14 state-of-the-art LLMs, including Claude 4.5, GPT-5.2, DeepSeek V4-Pro, and Qwen families, reveal a substantial gap between standalone and repository-level performance, as well as trade-offs between richer context and test reliability. Overall, XREPOTEST provides a challenging and informative benchmark to advance scalable and robust unit test generation in realistic software environments. The dataset and code are publicly available at: https://github.com/solis-team/XRepoTest

Intent-based Open RAN needs an interpreter that turns intents into A1 policies within the loop of the RAN intelligent controller (RIC). Decision models such as Jev-1.13.0 return typed policy fields, whereas generative large language models (LLMs) produce the policy token by token. We ask whether the extra delay of LLMs costs control deadlines, RIC capacity, or radio performance. We compare Jev-1.13.0 and two other decision models with LLMs on the RANIntent v1 benchmark, in closed-loop ns-3 simulation and on a real A1 and E2 path. Median interpretation takes 0.286 to 2.35 s, against under 25 ms for A1 and E2 transfer. Jev-1.13.0 meets the 1 s near-real-time budget on 99.8% of calls, while two hosted LLMs meet it on 17.9% and 0%. In the radio network, ideal enforcement moves the affected-class service-level agreement (SLA) violation by 3.96 percentage points in the direction each intent requests, against no update at the base point. No hosted LLM showed a resolved increase over Jev-1.13.0 at that point. At the same point, per-second direct control gave no resolved SLA reduction over a numerical xApp. Slow interpreters miss the 1 s budget, and two interpreters saturate their queues at 2 intents/s, whereas no radio penalty of slow interpreters was resolved at the base point.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Large language models used for code editing can be trained and deployed in at least two output regimes: direct generation, where the model emits the entire modified file in one shot, and iterative diff-based generation ("steps"), where the model emits a sequence of localized search/replace edits applied one at a time until it signals completion or a step budget is exhausted. The diff-based regime is attractive because it mirrors how developers edit code and should require far fewer generated tokens per turn. We train two code models - a 100M-parameter model trained from scratch (Rainbow-Pony-100M) and a fine-tuned Qwen2.5-Coder-0.5B - in both regimes on a shared Flutter/Dart dataset, and evaluate all four resulting models on a held-out set of approx 1,790 tasks per model. Direct generation substantially outperforms diff-based generation on every metric we measure - compilation/static-analysis pass rate, bits-per-byte, character-level similarity to the reference, and blinded LLM-judge ratings of goal fulfillment, correctness, and code quality - and the gap persists after controlling for task difficulty via a matched-ID comparison and when restricting to code that compiles on both sides. We then identify a single, architecture-independent mechanism behind the conditions where diff-based generation does win: it is competitive on short, spatially localized edits, and its category-level wins concentrate in exactly the two task categories - refactoring and error-handling/edge-case fixes - with the lowest mean edit-step count in our dataset. We term this task locality and discuss its implications for when an edit-based training regime is and is not the right choice for a code-editing model.

Tool use has become central to modern LLM agents, yet interface design is rarely isolated as an experimental variable. This paper studies whether schema based tool contracts and structured validation diagnostics improve reliability under strict interaction budgets. We evaluate three conditions that preserve identical tool semantics and information content: free form documentation, JSON Schema specifications, and JSON Schema with structured diagnostics. We implement a deterministic software engineering sandbox with logs, metrics, configurations, and repository tasks, and evaluate a fully crossed pilot with one open local model, three seeds, three interface conditions, and four budgets. We report end task success, interface misuse, execution failures, semantic misuse, recovery behavior, and overhead. In this pilot, success remains zero across conditions, while schema conditions reduce interface misuse but not semantic misuse. The evidence supports a precise interpretation that interface formalization improves contract adherence, but semantic action quality and timeout sensitive tasks remain dominant bottlenecks under constrained local inference.

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI, agent data injection attacks (ADI). ADI injects malicious data disguised as trusted data, such as security-critical metadata (e.g., resource identifiers or data origins) or agent context data (e.g., tool call and response formats). As a result, agents unknowingly execute unintended actions based on attacker-controlled data. ADI has similar attack impacts as instruction injection attacks, because it causes agents to misbehave and execute unintended actions. Despite the similar impact, ADI remains underexplored and easily bypasses existing IPI defenses. We found several critical vulnerabilities in real-world agents that allow an attacker to launch various attacks: arbitrary click attacks on web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, and Nanobrowser), and remote code execution and supply-chain attacks on coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI). We evaluate ADI vulnerabilities across off-the-shelf models and AI agents, and find that ADI is effective in both standalone LLMs and AI agent settings. ADI exposes a critical gap in agent security, signifying that current AI agents do not employ a fundamental security principle: current agents do not isolate trusted data from untrusted data.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

Digital tool-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), that invoke external Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) often rely on documentation to understand API functionality. However, such documentation is frequently missing, outdated, privatized, or inconsistent-hindering the development of reliable, general-purpose agents. In this work, we propose a new research direction: learning of API functionality directly from in-context demonstrations. This task is a new paradigm applicable in scenarios without documentation. Using API benchmarks, we collect demonstrations from both expert agents and from self-exploration. To understand what information demonstrations must convey for successful task completion, we extensively study how the number of demonstrations and the use of LLM-generated summaries and evaluations affect the task success rate of the API-based agent. Our experiments across 3 datasets and 6 models show that learning functionality from in-context demonstrations remains a non-trivial challenge, even for state-of-the-art LLMs. We find that providing explicit function calls and natural language critiques significantly improves the agent's task success rate due to more accurate parameter filling. We analyze failure modes, identify sources of error, and highlight key open challenges for future work in documentation-free, self-improving, API-based agents.

DL compiler's primary function is to translate DNN programs written in high-level DL frameworks such as PyTorch and TensorFlow into portable executables. These executables can then be flexibly executed by the deployed host programs. However, existing DL compilers rely on a tracing mechanism, which involves feeding a runtime input to a neural network program and tracing the program execution paths to generate the computational graph necessary for compilation. Unfortunately, this mechanism falls short when dealing with modern dynamic neural networks (DyNNs) that possess varying computational graphs depending on the inputs. Consequently, conventional DL compilers struggle to accurately compile DyNNs into executable code. To address this limitation, we propose \tool, a general approach that enables any existing DL compiler to successfully compile DyNNs. \tool tackles the dynamic nature of DyNNs by introducing a compilation mechanism that redistributes the control and data flow of the original DNN programs during the compilation process. Specifically, \tool develops program analysis and program transformation techniques to convert a dynamic neural network into multiple sub-neural networks. Each sub-neural network is devoid of conditional statements and is compiled independently. Furthermore, \tool synthesizes a host module that models the control flow of the DyNNs and facilitates the invocation of the sub-neural networks. Our evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of \tool, achieving a 100\% success rate in compiling all dynamic neural networks. Moreover, the compiled executables generated by \tool exhibit significantly improved performance, running between 1.12times and 20.21times faster than the original DyNNs executed on general-purpose DL frameworks.

Large language models are increasingly used to generate SystemVerilog Assertions from natural-language specifica- tions and register-transfer-level designs. Existing datasets and benchmarks support important goals such as large- scale training, formal evaluation, specification-to-assertion generation, and mutation-based testing. A complemen- tary need is to study whether a generated assertion cap- tures externally observable behavior or depends on inci- dental details of one RTL implementation. We present EquivSVA, a formally verified dataset organized around behavior families. Each family contains four structurally distinct RTL implementations of the same externally ob- servable behavior, shared interface-level gold properties, three controlled mutants, and formal-validation evidence. EquivSVA contains 120 behavior families across 12 cat- egories, 480 reference RTL implementations, 914 gold properties, and 360 mutants. Every final family passes a fixed 17-job validation suite covering RTL equivalence, gold-property proofs, property reachability, mutant dis- tinguishability, and gold-property checks on mutants. We also provide fixed family-safe train, development, and test splits. As a small demonstration of the analyses en- abled by the dataset, we evaluate the publicly released, Apache-2.0-licensed Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct model on the held-out test split. Of 293 interface-only generated properties, 93 are formally sound, and the number of sound properties varies across equivalent implementations for 14 of 24 test families. These results illustrate how behavior-family organization can support controlled stud- ies of assertion-generation robustness without requiring changes in intended functionality. The dataset, generators, validation scripts, and case-study artifacts are publicly released at https://github.com/aditigupta96/EquivSVA.

Memory safety violations in low-level code, written in languages like C, continues to remain one of the major sources of software vulnerabilities. One method of removing such violations by construction is to port C code to a safe C dialect. Such dialects rely on programmer-supplied annotations to guarantee safety with minimal runtime overhead. This porting, however, is a manual process that imposes significant burden on the programmer and, hence, there has been limited adoption of this technique. The task of porting not only requires inferring annotations, but may also need refactoring/rewriting of the code to make it amenable to such annotations. In this paper, we use Large Language Models (LLMs) towards addressing both these concerns. We show how to harness LLM capabilities to do complex code reasoning as well as rewriting of large codebases. We also present a novel framework for whole-program transformations that leverages lightweight static analysis to break the transformation into smaller steps that can be carried out effectively by an LLM. We implement our ideas in a tool called MSA that targets the CheckedC dialect. We evaluate MSA on several micro-benchmarks, as well as real-world code ranging up to 20K lines of code. We showcase superior performance compared to a vanilla LLM baseline, as well as demonstrate improvement over a state-of-the-art symbolic (non-LLM) technique.

ETAS is a programming language for agent systems that treats model-backed agents, tool calls, prompts, typed memory, human approvals, policies, and execution traces as semantic program elements rather than library conventions. It separates deterministic computation from agentic nondeterminism and externally visible actions while preserving a direct programming style. We present the core design of ETAS. Its static semantics assigns ordinary types through spec conformance and tracks each computation with two behavioral indices: an escaping effect row and a persistent abstraction of the typed action trace it may request. Specs form a terminating compile-time constraint calculus: type specs provide evidence for polymorphism and resource facts, callable specs constrain function and stage shapes, and trace specs express allow, deny, and temporal constraints. Typing checks requested traces against compiled monitors and emits residual obligations when dynamic resources preclude a complete static proof. The dynamic semantics distinguish requested, handled, denied, and committed events; handlers interpret typed actions without making their requests invisible to authorization or audit. We formalize a core calculus and state preservation, progress, type/effect soundness, handler trace-transparency, and policy safety. We also implement ETAS in Rust with a command-line interface, typed HIR checks, effect and policy diagnostics, handler checks, and trace-aware execution hooks. ETAS provides a programming-language foundation for reasoning about authorization, nondeterminism, recovery, and audit evidence before and during agent execution.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong performance in real-world applications, yet existing open-source instruction datasets often concentrate on narrow domains, such as mathematics or coding, limiting generalization and widening the gap with proprietary models. To bridge this gap, we introduce Infinity-Instruct, a high-quality instruction dataset designed to enhance both foundational and chat capabilities of LLMs through a two-phase pipeline. In Phase 1, we curate 7.4M high-quality foundational instructions (InfInstruct-F-7.4M) from over 100M samples using hybrid data selection techniques. In Phase 2, we synthesize 1.5M high-quality chat instructions (InfInstruct-G-1.5M) through a two-stage process involving instruction selection, evolution, and diagnostic filtering. We empirically evaluate Infinity-Instruct by fine-tuning several open-source models, including Mistral, LLaMA, Qwen, and Yi, and observe substantial performance gains across both foundational and instruction following benchmarks, consistently surpassing official instruction-tuned counterparts. Notably, InfInstruct-LLaMA3.1-70B outperforms GPT-4-0314 by 8.6\% on instruction following tasks while achieving comparable foundational performance. These results underscore the synergy between foundational and chat training and offer new insights into holistic LLM development. Our datasethttps://huggingface.co/datasets/BAAI/Infinity-Instruct and codeshttps://gitee.com/li-touch/infinity-instruct have been publicly released.

This paper provides a novel approach to reconciling complex low-level memory model features, such as pointer--integer casts, with desired refinements that are needed to justify the correctness of program transformations. The idea is to use a "two-phased" memory model, one with and unbounded memory and corresponding unbounded integer type, and one with a finite memory; the connection between the two levels is made explicit by our notion of refinement that handles out-of-memory behaviors. This approach allows for more optimizations to be performed and establishes a clear boundary between the idealized semantics of a program and the implementation of that program on finite hardware. To demonstrate the utility of this idea in practice, we instantiate the two-phase memory model in the context of Zakowski et al.'s VIR semantics, yielding infinite and finite memory models of LLVM IR, including low-level features like undef and bitcast. Both the infinite and finite models, which act as specifications, can provably be refined to executable reference interpreters. The semantics justify optimizations, such as dead-alloca-elimination, that were previously impossible or difficult to prove correct.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can interact with the real world by connecting with versatile external APIs, resulting in better problem-solving and task automation capabilities. Previous research primarily focuses on APIs with limited arguments from a single source or overlooks the complex dependency relationship between different APIs. However, it is essential to utilize multiple APIs collaboratively from various sources (e.g., different Apps in the iPhone), especially for complex user instructions. In this paper, we introduce AppBench, the first benchmark to evaluate LLMs' ability to plan and execute multiple APIs from various sources in order to complete the user's task. Specifically, we consider two significant challenges in multiple APIs: 1) graph structures: some APIs can be executed independently while others need to be executed one by one, resulting in graph-like execution order; and 2) permission constraints: which source is authorized to execute the API call. We have experimental results on 9 distinct LLMs; e.g., GPT-4o achieves only a 2.0\% success rate at the most complex instruction, revealing that the existing state-of-the-art LLMs still cannot perform well in this situation even with the help of in-context learning and finetuning. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/ruleGreen/AppBench.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Textual Large Language Models (LLMs) provide a simple and familiar interface: a string of text is used for both input and output. However, the information conveyed to an LLM often has a richer structure and semantics, which is not conveyed in a string. For example, most prompts contain both instructions ("Summarize this paper into a paragraph") and data (the paper to summarize), but these are usually not distinguished when passed to the model. This can lead to model confusion and security risks, such as prompt injection attacks. This work addresses this shortcoming by introducing an LLM-native mark-up language, LLMON (LLM Object Notation, pronounced "Lemon"), that enables the structure and semantic metadata of the text to be communicated in a natural way to an LLM. This information can then be used during model training, model prompting, and inference implementation, leading to improvements in model accuracy, safety, and security. This is analogous to how programming language types can be used for many purposes, such as static checking, code generation, dynamic checking, and IDE highlighting. We discuss the general design requirements of an LLM-native markup language, introduce the LLMON markup language and show how it meets these design requirements, describe how the information contained in a LLMON artifact can benefit model training and inference implementation, and provide some preliminary empirical evidence of its value for both of these use cases. We also discuss broader issues and research opportunities that are enabled with an LLM-native approach.

Independently authored skills can impose incompatible requirements, competing preferences, and redundant instructions when jointly loaded by an LLM agent. We propose SkillFusion, an offline compiler that reconciles these interactions into a reusable merged skill. Its central idea is to make composition decisions explicit through typed, scoped constraints linked to their source directives. A type-scope gate selects candidate interactions, while selective fallback revisits pairs potentially missed by structural pruning. A classifier identifies interaction types, and an adversarial verifier re-examines uncertain judgments. The resolver applies conditional routing or explicit priorities to hard conflicts, verified abstraction to soft conflicts, and deduplication to redundant instructions. Source-linked checks guide synthesis and compression, and metadata synthesis supports discovery of the merged skill. The resulting artifact retains associated scripts and resources and can be reused across tasks and executor models. SkillFusion achieves the highest mean Success among evaluated non-oracle methods on all three agent benchmarks and on both transfer benchmarks across three executor models. At the largest tested instruction configurations, it achieves over 2.5 times the Success of unresolved multi-skill loading, highlighting the growing value of reconciliation as composition becomes more demanding. The code will be open-sourced after the review process concludes.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) increasingly operate in runtimes that combine visual desktop control, command-line execution, code editing, browsers, and external tools. Existing benchmarks, however, often evaluate these interfaces as separable capabilities, leaving long-horizon cross-interface orchestration under-tested. Thus, we introduce WeaveBench, a long-horizon hybrid-interface benchmark with 114 tasks across 8 real-world work domains, grounded in real user requests and publicly verifiable artifacts. Each task requires agents to combine GUI observations/actions with CLI/code operations within a single trajectory. We evaluate these tasks on a real Ubuntu desktop inside deployed CLI-agent runtimes, augmented with a minimal desktop-control plugin. We also propose a companion trajectory-aware judge that inspects deliverables, files, screenshots, logs, and action traces, while detecting shortcut behaviors such as fabricated visual evidence or hard-coded metrics. Across frontier model-runtime pairings, the best PassRate reaches only 41.2%, showing the benchmark remains far from saturated. The trajectory-aware judge further reveals that outcome-only grading substantially overestimates agent performance. Overall, WeaveBench exposes a critical gap in CUA evaluation and provides an effective testbed to measure whether agents can orchestrate GUI, CLI, and code operations across long-horizon real-world tasks.