Daily Papers

Steering vectors work for some concepts and layers but fail for others, and practitioners have no way to predict which setting applies before running an intervention. We introduce the Linear Accessibility Profile (LAP), a per-layer diagnostic that repurposes the logit lens as a predictor of steering vector effectiveness. The key measure, A_{lin}, applies the model's unembedding matrix to intermediate hidden states, requiring no training. Across 24 controlled binary concept families on five models (Pythia-2.8B to Llama-8B), peak A_{lin} predicts steering effectiveness at ρ= +0.86 to +0.91 and layer selection at ρ= +0.63 to +0.92. A three-regime framework explains when difference-of-means steering works, when nonlinear methods are needed, and when no method can work. An entity-steering demo confirms the prediction end-to-end: steering at the LAP-recommended layer redirects completions on Gemma-2-2B and OLMo-2-1B-Instruct, while the middle layer (the standard heuristic) has no effect on either model.

Can a language model estimate its familiarity with an entity before generating an answer? We study activations at the final prompt token in twelve instruction-tuned models from the Bielik, PLLuM, Gemma-4, and Qwen3 families, using a new dataset of 1,440 Polish entities spanning four domains and ten Wikipedia-pageview deciles, plus fabricated controls. Familiarity-probe scores separate real from fabricated entities in every family; in the Polish-adapted Bielik and PLLuM families they additionally track entity popularity (model-mean Spearman ρ 0.28-0.57, versus at most 0.11 in Gemma-4 and Qwen3), a pattern more strongly associated with Polish adaptation than with parameter count in this model sample. In a paired experiment on two families, probes retain 96-101% of within-language AUROC when the Polish question stem is replaced with an English one around unchanged entity names, showing robustness to prompt language in this setting. In Gemma-4-12B, the only model that natively refuses, adding a one-dimensional familiarity direction at a single layer moves refusal rates monotonically in both directions (0.24 to 1.00 on well-known entities; 0.73 to 0.00 on unknown ones). Finally, a calibrated familiarity probe is competitive among pre-generation abstention gates, although post-generation detectors better predict behavioral error on average. These results support a graded pre-generation entity-familiarity readout, and a separation between representational familiarity and the policy that converts it into abstention.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it. This rests on a hidden premise -- that the direction which detects a behavior and the direction which controls it are the same, or close. We test this geometrically: what is the angle between the direction that best detects a behavior and the one that best causes it? If detection implies control the cosine is near 1; otherwise it quantifies a detection-intervention gap. On Gemma 2-2B-it, output format (clean JSON vs markdown fencing) collapses both roles onto one axis. Hallucination does not: the model detects fake entities with perfect linear separability (AUC = 1.000 from layer 5), yet that direction sits at cos = 0.12 (about 83 degrees) from the direction producing a refusal -- a small, reproducible alignment, far from the cos = 1 that "detection is control" would require. A detector built from activations, with no chosen tokens, likewise fails to align (cos = -0.06). The gap generalizes: across four models from three families and two scales (1B-9B), cos stays in [0.12, 0.20], identical before and after instruction tuning (0.1197 vs 0.1200), placing its origin in pretraining. A 15-degree rotation toward the refusal direction partially bridges it -- 73% and 60% refusal on two held-out fake-entity categories at 1.8% false positives. We then ask whether this cosine predicts steerability, and it does not: detection is a high-dimensional class, not a single direction, and what separates the steerable case is functional, not readable from a static angle. The cosine is a weight-computable signature of the dissociation between knowing and steering, not a predictor of it.