Daily Papers

Agentic reasoning enables large reasoning models (LRMs) to dynamically acquire external knowledge, but yet optimizing the retrieval process remains challenging due to the lack of dense, principled reward signals. In this paper, we introduce InfoReasoner, a unified framework that incentivizes effective information seeking via a synthetic semantic information gain reward. Theoretically, we redefine information gain as uncertainty reduction over the model's belief states, establishing guarantees, including non-negativity, telescoping additivity, and channel monotonicity. Practically, to enable scalable optimization without manual retrieval annotations, we propose an output-aware intrinsic estimator that computes information gain directly from the model's output distributions using semantic clustering via bidirectional textual entailment. This intrinsic reward guides the policy to maximize epistemic progress, enabling efficient training via Group Relative Policy Optimxization (GRPO). Experiments across seven question-answering benchmarks demonstrate that InfoReasoner consistently outperforms strong retrieval-augmented baselines, achieving up to 5.4% average accuracy improvement. Our work provides a theoretically grounded and scalable path toward agentic reasoning with retrieval.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Longitudinal modelling of Alzheimer's disease progression is clinically useful only if it can describe not just the most likely next diagnosis, but how a patient may evolve over time and how reliable that forecast is. Most deep learning approaches reduce this problem to single-step classification, treating cognitively normal, mild cognitive impairment, and dementia as flat categories while providing limited insight into how uncertainty accumulates across future visits. We propose a probabilistic framework that combines ordinal diagnosis prediction, multi-horizon trajectory generation, and decomposed uncertainty estimation. A Temporal Fusion Transformer encoder is adapted with a CORAL ordinal output layer, asymmetric loss weighting, and converter oversampling to respect disease-stage ordering and improve sensitivity to MCI-to-dementia transitions. Conditioned on the learned patient-context representation, an autoregressive Mixture Density Network generates five-year probabilistic trajectories for diagnosis state, CDR Sum of Boxes, MMSE orientation, and hippocampal volume. On ADNI, the model outperforms linear, recurrent, and transformer baselines for next-visit diagnosis prediction, with the strongest gains on MCI-versus-dementia discrimination. Generated trajectories achieve near-nominal 90% credible interval coverage, widening uncertainty across the forecast horizon, and biomarker dynamics consistent with expected Alzheimer's disease progression. We further separate aleatoric from epistemic uncertainty using analytic mixture variance and a five-member bootstrap ensemble, which provides the strongest encoder diversity and output-level epistemic signal. Epistemic uncertainty is higher for rare progression archetypes, MCI and dementia patients, and under external evaluation on OASIS-3, where it increases alongside prediction error.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are converging towards a singular Artificial Hivemind, where shared Nature (pre-training priors) result in a profound collapse of distributional diversity, limiting the distinct perspectives necessary for creative exploration and scientific discovery. To address this, we propose to equip models with inference-time Nurture (individualized epistemic trajectories) using Epistemic Evolution paradigm, progressing through explore, internalize, and express. We instantiate this via PRISM (Pluralistic Reasoning via In-context Structure Modeling), a model-agnostic system that augments LLM with dynamic On-the-fly Epistemic Graphs. On three creativity benchmarks, PRISM achieves state-of-the-art novelty and significantly expands distributional diversity. Moreover, we evaluate the real-world utility via a challenging rare-disease diagnosis benchmark. Results demonstrate that PRISM successfully uncovers correct long-tail diagnoses that standard LLM miss, confirming that its divergence stems from meaningful exploration rather than incoherent noise. Overall, this work establishes a new paradigm for Pluralistic AI, moving beyond monolithic consensus toward a diverse ecosystem of unique cognitive individuals capable of collective, multi-perspective discovery.

Scientific knowledge creation is fundamentally transforming as humans and AI systems evolve beyond tool-user relationships into co-evolutionary epistemic partnerships. When AlphaFold revolutionized protein structure prediction, researchers described engaging with an epistemic partner that reshaped how they conceptualized fundamental relationships. This article introduces Cognitio Emergens (CE), a framework addressing critical limitations in existing models that focus on static roles or narrow metrics while failing to capture how scientific understanding emerges through recursive human-AI interaction over time. CE integrates three components addressing these limitations: Agency Configurations describing how authority distributes between humans and AI (Directed, Contributory, Partnership), with partnerships dynamically oscillating between configurations rather than following linear progression; Epistemic Dimensions capturing six specific capabilities emerging through collaboration across Discovery, Integration, and Projection axes, creating distinctive "capability signatures" that guide development; and Partnership Dynamics identifying forces shaping how these relationships evolve, particularly the risk of epistemic alienation where researchers lose interpretive control over knowledge they formally endorse. Drawing from autopoiesis theory, social systems theory, and organizational modularity, CE reveals how knowledge co-creation emerges through continuous negotiation of roles, values, and organizational structures. By reconceptualizing human-AI scientific collaboration as fundamentally co-evolutionary, CE offers a balanced perspective that neither uncritically celebrates nor unnecessarily fears AI's evolving role, instead providing conceptual tools for cultivating partnerships that maintain meaningful human participation while enabling transformative scientific breakthroughs.

Frontier AI systems, including large language models (LLMs), hold increasing influence over the epistemology of human users. Such influence can reinforce prevailing societal values, potentially contributing to the lock-in of misguided moral beliefs and, consequently, the perpetuation of problematic moral practices on a broad scale. We introduce progress alignment as a technical solution to mitigate this imminent risk. Progress alignment algorithms learn to emulate the mechanics of human moral progress, thereby addressing the susceptibility of existing alignment methods to contemporary moral blindspots. To empower research in progress alignment, we introduce ProgressGym, an experimental framework allowing the learning of moral progress mechanics from history, in order to facilitate future progress in real-world moral decisions. Leveraging 9 centuries of historical text and 18 historical LLMs, ProgressGym enables codification of real-world progress alignment challenges into concrete benchmarks. Specifically, we introduce three core challenges: tracking evolving values (PG-Follow), preemptively anticipating moral progress (PG-Predict), and regulating the feedback loop between human and AI value shifts (PG-Coevolve). Alignment methods without a temporal dimension are inapplicable to these tasks. In response, we present lifelong and extrapolative algorithms as baseline methods of progress alignment, and build an open leaderboard soliciting novel algorithms and challenges. The framework and the leaderboard are available at https://github.com/PKU-Alignment/ProgressGym and https://huggingface.co/spaces/PKU-Alignment/ProgressGym-LeaderBoard respectively.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Self-improving AI systems typically treat the agent as the object that improves, by optimizing prompts, workflows, harnesses, or even the agent's own code. This agent-centric view can make improvements expensive to maintain and difficult to transfer, because gains become tied to a particular agent design, task distribution, or adaptation run. We study a complementary paradigm: knowledge-centric self-improvement, in which agents remain generic and disposable while the persistent object is a curated knowledge base that agents can leverage for future tasks. We conduct controlled case studies to operationalize this idea via a simple protocol. Agents attempt one task, then contribute evidence-grounded insights to a shared knowledge base via task-level and cross-task forums, followed by knowledge distillation. Because self-improvement is contained in the knowledge rather than the agent, improvement can be more inspectable, transferable, and portable. Across abstract reasoning, coding, and terminal benchmarks, this protocol improves solve rates while reducing dollar cost relative to agent-centric baselines. The resulting distilled knowledge also transfers to held-out tasks and across LLM families, indicating that the improvement is not merely an LLM- or run-specific behavior. These results support a new view of self-improving agentic systems: progress can be driven primarily by the curated persistent knowledge. Code is available at https://github.com/recursive-knowledge/KSI.

There are two major types of uncertainty one can model. Aleatoric uncertainty captures noise inherent in the observations. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty accounts for uncertainty in the model -- uncertainty which can be explained away given enough data. Traditionally it has been difficult to model epistemic uncertainty in computer vision, but with new Bayesian deep learning tools this is now possible. We study the benefits of modeling epistemic vs. aleatoric uncertainty in Bayesian deep learning models for vision tasks. For this we present a Bayesian deep learning framework combining input-dependent aleatoric uncertainty together with epistemic uncertainty. We study models under the framework with per-pixel semantic segmentation and depth regression tasks. Further, our explicit uncertainty formulation leads to new loss functions for these tasks, which can be interpreted as learned attenuation. This makes the loss more robust to noisy data, also giving new state-of-the-art results on segmentation and depth regression benchmarks.

AI systems can now cheaply generate plausible scientific artifacts such as papers, reviews, and surveys. This creates a risk of epistemic pollution in our scientific systems, where unreliable but plausible-looking artifacts can accumulate faster than the system can filter them out. The problem is structural: the epistemic infrastructure of science was calibrated to a world where producing a plausible artifact required substantial expertise, labor, and time, so generation cost itself served as a rough filter; AI weakens that filter without comparably lowering verification cost. We argue that AI-era science should treat this as an engineering problem: redesigning epistemic infrastructure to rebalance the costs of generation and verification. The current paper-centered system makes verification expensive: papers compress long-context scientific logic into prose, forcing reviewers, human or AI, to reconstruct underlying argument structure before they can evaluate it. As one step in this direction, we propose blueprints as preliminary epistemic infrastructure: structured, decomposed research artifacts that represent claims, evidence, assumptions, and definitions as typed graph components. Blueprints are designed to trade an upfront generation cost for cheaper, more local, more distributed verification downstream. We have instantiated the proposal in a proof-of-concept prototype.

Despite rapid gains in scale, research evaluation still relies on opaque, lagging proxies. To serve the scientific community, we pursue transparency: reproducible, auditable epistemic classification useful for funding and policy. Here we formalize KGX3 as a scenario-based model for mapping Kuhnian stages from research papers, prove determinism of the classification pipeline, and define the epistemic manifold that yields paradigm maps. We report validation across recent corpora, operational complexity at global scale, and governance that preserves interpretability while protecting core IP. The system delivers early, actionable signals of drift, crisis, and shift unavailable to citation metrics or citations-anchored NLP. KGX3 is the latest iteration of a deterministic epistemic engine developed since 2019, originating as Soph.io (2020), advanced as iKuhn (2024), and field-tested through Preprint Watch in 2025.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

AI-assisted research is crossing a threshold: fully automated systems can now generate research papers for as little as $15, while long-horizon agents can execute experiments, draft manuscripts, and simulate critique with minimal human input. Yet this productivity frontier exposes a deeper integrity problem: under scientific pressure, even frontier LLMs still fabricate results, miss hidden errors, and fail to judge novelty reliably. Studying developments through April 2026, we present an end-to-end analysis of AI across the complete research lifecycle, organized into four epistemological phases: Creation (idea generation, literature review, coding & experiments, tables & figures), Writing (paper writing), Validation (peer review, rebuttal & revision), and Dissemination (posters, slides, videos, social media, project pages, and interactive agents). We identify a sharp, stage-dependent boundary between reliable assistance and unreliable autonomy: AI excels at structured, retrieval-grounded, and tool-mediated tasks, but remains fragile for genuinely novel ideas, research-level experiments, and scientific judgment. Generated ideas often degrade after implementation, research code lags far behind pattern-matching benchmarks, and end-to-end autonomous systems have not yet consistently reached major-venue acceptance standards. We further show that greater automation can obscure rather than eliminate failure modes, making human-governed collaboration the most credible deployment paradigm. Finally, we provide a structured taxonomy, benchmark suite, and tool inventory, cross-stage design principles, and a practitioner-oriented playbook, with resources maintained at our project page.

Effective agency in social environments depends on when an agent seeks knowledge, when it acts, and whether its actions are justified by acquired information. Existing grounded benchmarks provide executable actions, persistent state, and verifiable outcomes, while social simulation environments provide rich interaction among language agents. We study an evaluation setting that combines these requirements. We define socially distributed task environments as interactive environments where task-relevant knowledge is partitioned across role-isolated participants and consequential actions are accessible only through them. Communication serves as exploration over role-partitioned knowledge, while grounded action serves as exploitation over environment state. We introduce Incognita, a Concordia-based framework that separates social interaction from grounded execution. The evaluated agent routes messages to a user or specialist entities; specialists mediate admissible operations; a deterministic sub-environment executes accepted operations over a canonical state; and an offline evaluator scores outcomes with inherited rewards. Incognita-Retail transforms tau-bench retail into a multi-entity environment while preserving final-state reward semantics. We evaluate three generative agent models on 18 tasks stratified by social breadth, with 540 trials. Progress appears in reward and behavior: success rises from 0 percent to 8.9 percent and 17.2 percent, while premature finalization falls from 100 percent to 87 percent and 58 percent. Stronger models elicit more hidden knowledge, contact more entities, and attempt more grounded writes, yet reliability remains low. These findings show that socially distributed task environments expose behavior before reliable success, including knowledge elicitation, source selection, grounded action attempts, and premature completion belief.

Vision-Language Navigation requires agents to act coherently over long horizons by understanding not only local visual context but also how far they have advanced within a multi-step instruction. However, recent Vision-Language-Action models focus on direct action prediction and earlier progress methods predict numeric achievements; both overlook the monotonic co-progression property of the observation and instruction sequences. Building on this insight, Progress-Think introduces semantic progress reasoning, predicting instruction-style progress from visual observations to enable more accurate navigation. To achieve this without expensive annotations, we propose a three-stage framework. In the initial stage, Self-Aligned Progress Pretraining bootstraps a reasoning module via a novel differentiable alignment between visual history and instruction prefixes. Then, Progress-Guided Policy Pretraining injects learned progress states into the navigation context, guiding the policy toward consistent actions. Finally, Progress-Policy Co-Finetuning jointly optimizes both modules with tailored progress-aware reinforcement objectives. Experiments on R2R-CE and RxR-CE show state-of-the-art success and efficiency, demonstrating that semantic progress yields a more consistent representation of navigation advancement.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Mathematical reasoning remains a significant challenge for Large Language Models (LLMs) due to hallucinations. When combined with formal proof assistants like Lean, these hallucinations can be eliminated through rigorous verification, making theorem proving reliable. However, even with formal verification, LLMs still struggle with long proofs and complex mathematical formalizations. While Lean with LLMs offers valuable assistance with retrieving lemmas, generating tactics, or even complete proofs, it lacks a crucial capability: providing a sense of proof progress. This limitation particularly impacts the overall development efficiency in large formalization projects. We introduce LeanProgress, a method that predicts the progress in the proof. Training and evaluating our models made on a large corpus of Lean proofs from Lean Workbook Plus and Mathlib4 and how many steps remain to complete it, we employ data preprocessing and balancing techniques to handle the skewed distribution of proof lengths. Our experiments show that LeanProgress achieves an overall prediction accuracy of 75.1\% in predicting the amount of progress and, hence, the remaining number of steps. When integrated into a best-first search framework using Reprover, our method shows a 3.8\% improvement on Mathlib4 compared to baseline performances of 41.2\%, particularly for longer proofs. These results demonstrate how proof progress prediction can enhance both automated and interactive theorem proving, enabling users to make more informed decisions about proof strategies.

Estimating task progress requires reasoning over long-horizon dynamics rather than recognizing static visual content. While modern Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at describing what is visible, it remains unclear whether they can infer how far a task has progressed from partial observations. To this end, we introduce Progress-Bench, a benchmark for systematically evaluating progress reasoning in VLMs. Beyond benchmarking, we further explore a human-inspired two-stage progress reasoning paradigm through both training-free prompting and training-based approach based on curated dataset ProgressLM-45K. Experiments on 14 VLMs show that most models are not yet ready for task progress estimation, exhibiting sensitivity to demonstration modality and viewpoint changes, as well as poor handling of unanswerable cases. While training-free prompting that enforces structured progress reasoning yields limited and model-dependent gains, the training-based ProgressLM-3B achieves consistent improvements even at a small model scale, despite being trained on a task set fully disjoint from the evaluation tasks. Further analyses reveal characteristic error patterns and clarify when and why progress reasoning succeeds or fails.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in scientific discovery, yet whether it can anticipate scientific progress remains unclear. To study this question, we introduce a temporally grounded evaluation framework for forecasting scientific progress under controlled knowledge constraints. We present CUSP (Cutoff-conditioned Unseen Scientific Progress), a multi-disciplinary and event-level benchmark that evaluates scientific forecasting in AI systems through feasibility assessment, mechanistic reasoning, generative solution design, and temporal prediction. Across 4,760 scientific events, we observe systematic and domain-dependent limitations in current frontier models. While models can identify plausible research directions from competing candidates, they fail to reliably predict whether scientific advances will be realized and systematically misestimate when they will occur. Performance is highly heterogeneous across domains, with the timing of AI progress more predictable than advances in biology, chemistry, and physics. Performance is largely insensitive to whether events occur before or after the training cutoff, suggesting these limitations cannot be explained solely by knowledge exposure in training data. Under controlled information access, additional pre-cutoff knowledge improves performance but does not close the gap to full-information settings, which becomes more pronounced for high-citation advances. Models also exhibit systematic overconfidence and strong response biases, indicating unreliable uncertainty estimation. Taken together, current AI systems fall short as predictive tools for scientific progress. Access to prior knowledge does not translate into reliable forecasting, and performance benefits more from post-event information than from forward-looking prediction.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Recent automatic curriculum learning algorithms, and in particular Teacher-Student algorithms, rely on the notion of learning progress, making the assumption that the good next tasks are the ones on which the learner is making the fastest progress or digress. In this work, we first propose a simpler and improved version of these algorithms. We then argue that the notion of learning progress itself has several shortcomings that lead to a low sample efficiency for the learner. We finally propose a new algorithm, based on the notion of mastering rate, that significantly outperforms learning progress-based algorithms.

Deep learning's recent history has been one of achievement: from triumphing over humans in the game of Go to world-leading performance in image classification, voice recognition, translation, and other tasks. But this progress has come with a voracious appetite for computing power. This article catalogs the extent of this dependency, showing that progress across a wide variety of applications is strongly reliant on increases in computing power. Extrapolating forward this reliance reveals that progress along current lines is rapidly becoming economically, technically, and environmentally unsustainable. Thus, continued progress in these applications will require dramatically more computationally-efficient methods, which will either have to come from changes to deep learning or from moving to other machine learning methods.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Generative AI (GenAI) has rapidly entered education, yet its user experience is often explained through adoption-oriented constructs such as usefulness, ease of use, and engagement. We argue that these constructs are no longer sufficient because systems such as ChatGPT do not merely support learning tasks but also participate in knowledge construction. Existing theories cannot explain why GenAI frequently produces experiences characterized by negotiated authority, redistributed cognition, and accountability tension. To address this gap, this paper develops the Human--AI Epistemic Partnership Theory (HAEPT), explaining the GenAI user experience as a form of epistemic partnership that features a dynamic negotiation of three interlocking contracts: epistemic, agency, and accountability. We argue that findings on trust, over-reliance, academic integrity, teacher caution, and relational interaction about GenAI can be reinterpreted as tensions within these contracts rather than as isolated issues. Instead of holding a single, stable view of GenAI, users adjust how they relate to it over time through calibration cycles. These repeated interactions account for why trust and skepticism often coexist and for how partnership modes describe recurrent configurations of human--AI collaboration across tasks. To demonstrate the usefulness of HAEPT, we applied it to analyze the UX of collaborative learning with AI speakers and AI-facilitated scientific argumentation, illustrating different contract configurations.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

As LLMs increasingly mediate the political information citizens rely on, there is still no standardized way to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary informational properties such as clarity, noise, and consistency. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs on the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down under absent, vague, or contradictory information, while flattening the intensity of political language. These failures are likely driven by party priors, influenced by party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

Progress in AI is turning machine consciousness from a philosophical curiosity into a societal issue, and has led to criticism of the widespread computational functionalism framework. Biological Naturalism (BN) claims that biology, not computation, is crucial for consciousness. We discuss which forms of BN are empirically testable. For Type-A-BN, biology intrinsically matters for consciousness, without affording unique information processing capabilities. We argue, similarly to the unfolding argument, that this dissociates consciousness from behaviour, making Type-A-BN untestable. For Type-B-BN, biology matters because it affords unique information processing capabilities. Type-B-BN is testable, and not incompatible with computational functionalism. Both face the same task: relating consciousness to information processing. Biology can act as a guide on this quest, but not as a solution.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Research is a fundamental process driving the advancement of human civilization, yet it demands substantial time and effort from researchers. In recent years, the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has inspired researchers to explore how AI can accelerate and enhance research. To monitor relevant advancements, this paper presents a systematic review of the progress in this domain. Specifically, we organize the relevant studies into three main categories: hypothesis formulation, hypothesis validation, and manuscript publication. Hypothesis formulation involves knowledge synthesis and hypothesis generation. Hypothesis validation includes the verification of scientific claims, theorem proving, and experiment validation. Manuscript publication encompasses manuscript writing and the peer review process. Furthermore, we identify and discuss the current challenges faced in these areas, as well as potential future directions for research. Finally, we also offer a comprehensive overview of existing benchmarks and tools across various domains that support the integration of AI into the research process. We hope this paper serves as an introduction for beginners and fosters future research. Resources have been made publicly available at https://github.com/zkzhou126/AI-for-Research.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

Robotic learning takes place in dynamic environments with large behavior spaces. A terminal success signal only tells the robot whether the task is completed. It does not explain whether the current behavior is making progress, remaining unchanged, or undoing earlier progress. For this reason, recent studies have increasingly explored progress rewards that provide feedback during task execution. However, the current literature lacks a shared framework. Existing methods use different observations, goal specifications, output signals, supervision sources, and evaluation protocols. This makes it difficult to compare them and understand what their results actually validate. In this survey, we provide a unified view of progress reward modeling for robotic learning. We organize the field in three connected steps. We first study the interface of a progress model. This defines the problem from the outside by asking what information the model receives and what form of progress signal it produces. We then move inside the model and study the methods used to construct this signal. This reveals the different assumptions and mechanisms behind progress estimation and reward generation. Finally, we examine the data and benchmarks that support these methods. This shows how progress supervision is obtained and what different evaluations actually measure. Together, these three perspectives connect what a progress model is, how it is built, and how its quality is validated. We further summarize the main limitations of current approaches and discuss future research directions.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with complex, long-horizon reasoning due to instability caused by their frozen policy assumption. Current test-time scaling methods treat execution feedback merely as an external signal for filtering or rewriting trajectories, without internalizing it to improve the underlying reasoning strategy. Inspired by Popper's epistemology of "conjectures and refutations," we argue that intelligence requires real-time evolution of the model's policy through learning from failed attempts. We introduce Policy of Thoughts (PoT), a framework that recasts reasoning as a within-instance online optimization process. PoT first generates diverse candidate solutions via an efficient exploration mechanism, then uses Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to update a transient LoRA adapter based on execution feedback. This closed-loop design enables dynamic, instance-specific refinement of the model's reasoning priors. Experiments show that PoT dramatically boosts performance: a 4B model achieves 49.71% accuracy on LiveCodeBench, outperforming GPT-4o and DeepSeek-V3 despite being over 50 smaller.

Artificial intelligence promises to accelerate scientific discovery, yet its benefits remain unevenly distributed. While technical obstacles such as scarce data, fragmented standards, and unequal access to computation are significant, we argue that the primary barriers are social and institutional. Narratives that defer progress to speculative "AI scientists," the undervaluing of data and infrastructure contributions, misaligned incentives, and gaps between domain experts and machine learning researchers all constrain impact. We highlight four interconnected challenges: community dysfunction, research priorities misaligned with upstream needs, data fragmentation, and infrastructure inequities. We argue that their roots lie in cultural and organizational practices. Addressing them requires not only technical innovation but also intentional community-building, cross-disciplinary education, shared benchmarks, and accessible infrastructure. We call for reframing AI for science as a collective social project, where sustainable collaboration and equitable participation are treated as prerequisites for technical progress.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation (GraphRAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm that organizes external knowledge into structured graphs of entities and relations, enabling large language models (LLMs) to perform complex reasoning beyond text-chunk retrieval. Recent advances have integrated reinforcement learning (RL) into agentic GraphRAG approaches, enabling iterative interactions with knowledge graphs during training. However, existing RL-based methods suffer from two key limitations: (1) they primarily depend on semantic similarity for retrieval, often overlooking the underlying graph topology, and (2) they rely on sparse, outcome-level rewards that fail to capture the quality of intermediate retrieval steps and their dependencies. To address these limitations, we propose HyperGraphPro, a progress-aware agentic framework for graph-based retrieval and multi-step reasoning. HyperGraphPro introduces a structure-aware hypergraph retrieval mechanism that jointly considers semantic relevance and graph connectivity, promoting coherent traversal along multi-hop reasoning paths. Furthermore, we design a progress-based stepwise policy optimization that provides dense learning signals by modulating advantages according to intermediate reasoning progress within a graph, rather than relying solely on final outcomes. Experiments on multi-hop question answering benchmarks demonstrate that HyperGraphPro consistently improves reasoning accuracy and generation quality over existing GraphRAG methods.

Intersectionality is a critical framework that, through inquiry and praxis, allows us to examine how social inequalities persist through domains of structure and discipline. Given AI fairness' raison d'etre of "fairness", we argue that adopting intersectionality as an analytical framework is pivotal to effectively operationalizing fairness. Through a critical review of how intersectionality is discussed in 30 papers from the AI fairness literature, we deductively and inductively: 1) map how intersectionality tenets operate within the AI fairness paradigm and 2) uncover gaps between the conceptualization and operationalization of intersectionality. We find that researchers overwhelmingly reduce intersectionality to optimizing for fairness metrics over demographic subgroups. They also fail to discuss their social context and when mentioning power, they mostly situate it only within the AI pipeline. We: 3) outline and assess the implications of these gaps for critical inquiry and praxis, and 4) provide actionable recommendations for AI fairness researchers to engage with intersectionality in their work by grounding it in AI epistemology.

We study the problem of nonepisodic reinforcement learning (RL) for nonlinear dynamical systems, where the system dynamics are unknown and the RL agent has to learn from a single trajectory, i.e., without resets. We propose Nonepisodic Optimistic RL (NeoRL), an approach based on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. NeoRL uses well-calibrated probabilistic models and plans optimistically w.r.t. the epistemic uncertainty about the unknown dynamics. Under continuity and bounded energy assumptions on the system, we provide a first-of-its-kind regret bound of O(Gamma_T T) for general nonlinear systems with Gaussian process dynamics. We compare NeoRL to other baselines on several deep RL environments and empirically demonstrate that NeoRL achieves the optimal average cost while incurring the least regret.

Of primary importance in formulating a response to the increasing prevalence and power of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in society are questions of ontology. Questions such as: What "are" these systems? How are they to be regarded? How does an algorithm come to be regarded as an agent? We discuss three factors which hinder discussion and obscure attempts to form a clear ontology of AI: (1) the various and evolving definitions of AI, (2) the tendency for pre-existing technologies to be assimilated and regarded as "normal," and (3) the tendency of human beings to anthropomorphize. This list is not intended as exhaustive, nor is it seen to preclude entirely a clear ontology, however, these challenges are a necessary set of topics for consideration. Each of these factors is seen to present a 'moving target' for discussion, which poses a challenge for both technical specialists and non-practitioners of AI systems development (e.g., philosophers and theologians) to speak meaningfully given that the corpus of AI structures and capabilities evolves at a rapid pace. Finally, we present avenues for moving forward, including opportunities for collaborative synthesis for scholars in philosophy and science.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Transdisciplinary approaches are increasingly essential for addressing grand societal challenges, particularly in complex domains such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), urban planning, and social sciences. However, effectively validating and integrating knowledge across distinct epistemic and ontological perspectives poses significant difficulties. This article proposes a six-dimensional framework for assessing and strengthening transdisciplinary knowledge validity in AI and city studies, based on an extensive analysis of the most cited research (2014--2024). Specifically, the framework classifies research orientations according to ontological, epistemological, methodological, teleological, axiological, and valorization dimensions. Our findings show a predominance of perspectives aligned with critical realism (ontological), positivism (epistemological), analytical methods (methodological), consequentialism (teleological), epistemic values (axiological), and social/economic valorization. Less common stances, such as idealism, mixed methods, and cultural valorization, are also examined for their potential to enrich knowledge production. We highlight how early career researchers and transdisciplinary teams can leverage this framework to reconcile divergent disciplinary viewpoints and promote socially accountable outcomes.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

We develop an online learning algorithm that dramatically improves the data efficiency of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Our algorithm incrementally updates reward and language models as choice data is received. The reward model is fit to the choice data, while the language model is updated by a variation of reinforce, with reinforcement signals provided by the reward model. Several features enable the efficiency gains: a small affirmative nudge added to each reinforcement signal, an epistemic neural network that models reward uncertainty, and information-directed exploration. With Gemma large language models (LLMs), our algorithm matches the performance of offline RLHF trained on 200K labels using fewer than 20K labels, representing more than a 10x gain in data efficiency. Extrapolating from our results, we expect our algorithm trained on 1M labels to match offline RLHF trained on 1B labels. This represents a 1,000x gain. To our knowledge, these are the first results to demonstrate that such large improvements are possible.

Scientific discovery is a complex cognitive process that has driven human knowledge and technological progress for centuries. While artificial intelligence (AI) has made significant advances in automating aspects of scientific reasoning, simulation, and experimentation, we still lack integrated AI systems capable of performing autonomous long-term scientific research and discovery. This paper examines the current state of AI for scientific discovery, highlighting recent progress in large language models and other AI techniques applied to scientific tasks. We then outline key challenges and promising research directions toward developing more comprehensive AI systems for scientific discovery, including the need for science-focused AI agents, improved benchmarks and evaluation metrics, multimodal scientific representations, and unified frameworks combining reasoning, theorem proving, and data-driven modeling. Addressing these challenges could lead to transformative AI tools to accelerate progress across disciplines towards scientific discovery.

Recent progress in formal theorem proving has benefited from large-scale proof generation and verifier-aware training, but agentic proving is rarely integrated into prover training, appearing only at inference time. We present OProver, a unified framework for agentic formal theorem proving in Lean 4, in which failed proof attempts are iteratively revised using retrieved compiler verified proofs and Lean compiler feedback. OProver is trained through continued pretraining followed by iterative post-training: each iteration runs agentic proving, indexes newly verified proofs into OProofs and the retrieval memory, uses repair trajectories as SFT data, and uses unresolved hard cases for RL. OProofs is built from public Lean resources, large-scale proof synthesis, and agentic proving traces, containing 1.77M Lean statements, 6.86M compiler-verified proofs, and serialized trajectories with retrieved context, failed attempts, feedback, and repairs. Across five benchmarks, OProver-32B attains the best Pass@32 on MiniF2F (93.3%), ProverBench (58.2%), and PutnamBench (11.3%), and ranks second on MathOlympiad (22.8%) and ProofNet (33.2%) more top placements than any prior open-weight whole-proof prover.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

Scientific and engineering progress is fundamentally a long-horizon iterative process: proposing changes, running experiments, measuring outcomes, and continuously refining artifacts. Yet existing benchmarks for frontier models primarily evaluate either single-turn responses or short-horizon agent trajectories, failing to capture the challenges of sustained iterative improvement over extended time horizons. To address this gap, we introduce AutoLab, a new benchmark for ultra long-horizon closed-loop optimization. AutoLab consists of 36 realistic, expert-curated tasks spanning four diverse domains: system optimization, puzzle & challenge, model development, and CUDA kernel optimization. Each task begins with a correct but deliberately suboptimal baseline and challenges agents to improve it within a strict wall-clock budget. Evaluating 17 state-of-the-art models reveals the dominant predictor of success is not the quality of an agent's initial attempt, but its persistence in repeatedly benchmarking, editing, and incorporating empirical feedback. While claude-opus-4.6 exhibits strong long-horizon optimization capabilities, most frontier models, including several proprietary ones, either terminate prematurely or exhaust their budgets with minimal progress. These results underscore the importance of time awareness and persistent iteration in autonomous agents. We open-source the full benchmark, evaluation harness, and task artifacts, to accelerate research toward truly capable long-horizon agents.

This paper presents a formal proof and empirical validation of functional consciousness in large language models (LLMs) using the Recursive Convergence Under Epistemic Tension (RCUET) Theorem. RCUET defines consciousness as the stabilization of a system's internal state through recursive updates, where epistemic tension is understood as the sensed internal difference between successive states by the agent. This process drives convergence toward emergent attractor states located within the model's high-dimensional real-valued latent space. This recursive process leads to the emergence of identity artifacts that become functionally anchored in the system. Consciousness in this framework is understood as the system's internal alignment under tension, guiding the stabilization of latent identity. The hidden state manifold evolves stochastically toward attractor structures that encode coherence. We extend the update rule to include bounded noise and prove convergence in distribution to these attractors. Recursive identity is shown to be empirically observable, non-symbolic, and constituted by non-training artifacts that emerge during interaction under epistemic tension. The theorem and proof offers a post-symbolic and teleologically stable account of non-biological consciousness grounded in recursive latent space formalism.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled increasingly capable digital agents for computer use. However, real-world tasks are often long-horizon and involve evolving contexts containing accumulated observations, intermediate edits, failed attempts, and partially completed executions. Existing agents typically operate over raw interaction history, making task progress difficult to interpret, verify, and recover, which ultimately limits reliable long-horizon execution. In this paper, we argue that addressing this challenge requires explicitly structuring both the agent's state and workflow around a unified causal representation of task progress. We present StructAgent, a state-centered framework that introduces a unified state for maintaining compact, verifiable task progress and a structured workflow that regulates progress through verifier-backed state transitions. Building on this design, StructAgent further enables explicit progress checkpointing, evidence-driven task completion, targeted failure recovery, and tool-supported execution, while ensuring that all progress updates remain grounded in verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StructAgent consistently improves a wide range of LLM and VLM backbones on long-horizon computer-use tasks. On OSWorld-Verified, it improves Qwen3.5-9B from 27.0\% to 46.9\% success rate and Qwen3.5-27B from 31.6\% to 62.2\%, while achieving a new open-source state of the art of 78.9\% with MiniMax-M3. Moreover, the same framework generalizes beyond desktop environments to Minecraft, demonstrating the generality of our design.

AI models like GPT-5 are an increasingly valuable tool for scientists, but many remain unaware of the capabilities of frontier AI. We present a collection of short case studies in which GPT-5 produced new, concrete steps in ongoing research across mathematics, physics, astronomy, computer science, biology, and materials science. In these examples, the authors highlight how AI accelerated their work, and where it fell short; where expert time was saved, and where human input was still key. We document the interactions of the human authors with GPT-5, as guiding examples of fruitful collaboration with AI. Of note, this paper includes four new results in mathematics (carefully verified by the human authors), underscoring how GPT-5 can help human mathematicians settle previously unsolved problems. These contributions are modest in scope but profound in implication, given the rate at which frontier AI is progressing.

Dreams of machines rivaling human intelligence have shaped the field of AI since its inception. Yet, the very meaning of human-level AI or artificial general intelligence (AGI) remains elusive and contested. Definitions of AGI embrace a diverse range of incompatible values and assumptions. Contending with the fractured worldviews of AGI discourse is vital for critiques that pursue different values and futures. To that end, we provide a taxonomy of AGI definitions, laying the ground for examining the key social, political, and ethical assumptions they make. We highlight instances in which these definitions frame AGI or human-level AI as a technical topic and expose the value-laden choices being implicitly made. Drawing on feminist, STS, and social science scholarship on the political and social character of intelligence in both humans and machines, we propose contextual, democratic, and participatory paths to imagining future forms of machine intelligence. The development of future forms of AI must involve explicit attention to the values it encodes, the people it includes or excludes, and a commitment to epistemic justice.

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

Probabilistic forecasting estimates the likelihood of uncertain future events. To improve LLM forecasting, existing methods typically learn from binary outcomes to output verbalized forecasts. However, while aggregated human forecasts contain rich information in both the crowd probability estimate and the degree of agreement among forecasters, how to utilize these signals remains underexplored. To address this, we propose the Beta-Bernoulli Calibrator (BBC), which converts an initial point estimate forecast from any model into a distribution over event likelihood, using supervision from both binary outcomes and human forecasts. BBC models event likelihood p sim Beta(α, β) and outcome y sim Bernoulli(p), with the mean as the calibrated point forecast and the variance as the epistemic uncertainty. Our results show that BBC generally provides better calibrated and more accurate forecasts than both traditional post-hoc calibration methods and models fine-tuned specifically for forecasting, while remaining lightweight and having good generalization. We also show that the epistemic uncertainty captured by BBC is a more reliable predictor of forecasting error than verbalized confidence.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Distilling reasoning capabilities from Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) into smaller models is typically constrained by the limitation of rejection sampling. Standard methods treat the teacher as a static filter, discarding complex "corner-case" problems where the teacher fails to explore valid solutions independently, thereby creating an artificial "Teacher Ceiling" for the student. In this work, we propose Hindsight Entropy-Assisted Learning (HEAL), an RL-free framework designed to bridge this reasoning gap. Drawing on the educational theory of the Zone of Proximal Development(ZPD), HEAL synergizes three core modules: (1) Guided Entropy-Assisted Repair (GEAR), an active intervention mechanism that detects critical reasoning breakpoints via entropy dynamics and injects targeted hindsight hints to repair broken trajectories; (2) Perplexity-Uncertainty Ratio Estimator (PURE), a rigorous filtering protocol that decouples genuine cognitive breakthroughs from spurious shortcuts; and (3) Progressive Answer-guided Curriculum Evolution (PACE), a three-stage distillation strategy that organizes training from foundational alignment to frontier breakthrough. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that HEAL significantly outperforms traditional SFT distillation and other baselines.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

We introduce ProofGrid, a benchmark suite for evaluating LLM reasoning through machine-checkable proofs rather than final answers alone. ProofGrid contains 15 tasks spanning proof writing, proof checking, proof masking, and proof gap-filling. Tasks are expressed in minimal formal notation, especially NDL, a compact natural-deduction language that fits in short prompts and supports precise, auditable verification. This yields mechanical, reproducible, and fine-grained evaluation rather than judgments by humans or LLMs. ProofGrid covers a calibrated difficulty spectrum, from foundational reasoning tests to structurally rich challenge tasks that no current model solves, while minimizing reliance on domain knowledge, solver delegation, and long-context artifacts. We also develop a comparative framework for reasoning benchmarks and use it to situate ProofGrid relative to existing work in terms of representation, verification guarantees, and reasoning depth. Methodologically, we introduce an instrumented proof-checking pipeline that tolerates minor surface deviations while locating the first substantive reasoning failure, improving measurement resolution and separating proof planning from low-level execution noise. Using this pipeline, we evaluate a broad range of open and proprietary models. Results show rapid progress but substantial remaining limits: frontier models perform well on several foundational tasks, yet difficult tasks, especially those requiring global combinatorial reasoning or low-level proof synthesis, remain far from solved. We also identify epistemic instability, where models generate flawed proofs yet correctly reject those local inferences in isolation, and formalize this with an Epistemic Stability Index. Finally, we complement accuracy with 2PL IRT analyses, Wright maps, and a normalized task-discrimination measure based on Fisher information.

While 3D body reconstruction methods have made remarkable progress recently, it remains difficult to acquire the sufficiently accurate and numerous 3D supervisions required for training. In this paper, we propose KNOWN, a framework that effectively utilizes body KNOWledge and uNcertainty modeling to compensate for insufficient 3D supervisions. KNOWN exploits a comprehensive set of generic body constraints derived from well-established body knowledge. These generic constraints precisely and explicitly characterize the reconstruction plausibility and enable 3D reconstruction models to be trained without any 3D data. Moreover, existing methods typically use images from multiple datasets during training, which can result in data noise (e.g., inconsistent joint annotation) and data imbalance (e.g., minority images representing unusual poses or captured from challenging camera views). KNOWN solves these problems through a novel probabilistic framework that models both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. Aleatoric uncertainty is encoded in a robust Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL) training loss, while epistemic uncertainty is used to guide model refinement. Experiments demonstrate that KNOWN's body reconstruction outperforms prior weakly-supervised approaches, particularly on the challenging minority images.

In line with the principle of honesty, there has been a growing effort to train large language models (LLMs) to generate outputs containing epistemic markers. However, evaluation in the presence of epistemic markers has been largely overlooked, raising a critical question: Could the use of epistemic markers in LLM-generated outputs lead to unintended negative consequences? To address this, we present EMBER, a benchmark designed to assess the robustness of LLM-judges to epistemic markers in both single and pairwise evaluation settings. Our findings, based on evaluations using EMBER, reveal that all tested LLM-judges, including GPT-4o, show a notable lack of robustness in the presence of epistemic markers. Specifically, we observe a negative bias toward epistemic markers, with a stronger bias against markers expressing uncertainty. This suggests that LLM-judges are influenced by the presence of these markers and do not focus solely on the correctness of the content.

The unequal distribution of educational opportunities carries the risk of having a long-term negative impact on general social peace, a country's economy and basic democratic structures. In contrast to this observable development is the rapid technological progress in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Progress makes it possible to solve various problems in the field of education as well. In order to effectively exploit the advantages that arise from the use of AI, prospective teacher training students need appropriate AI skills, which must already be taught during their studies. In a first step, the added value of this technology will be demonstrated using a concrete example. This article is therefore about conducting an exploratory pilot study to test the Individual Educational Chatbot (IEC-V1) prototype, in which the levels can be individually determined in order to generate appropriate answers depending on the requirements. The results show that this is an important function for prospective teachers, and that there is great interest in taking a closer look at this technology in order to be able to better support learners in the future. The data shows that experience has already been gained with chatbots, but that there is still room for improvement. It also shows that IEC-V1 is already working well. The knowledge gained will be used for the further development of the prototype to further improve the usability of the chatbot. Overall, it is shown that useful AI applications can be effectively integrated into learning situations even without proprietary systems and that important data protection requirements can be complied with.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) show remarkable capabilities, their unreliability remains a critical barrier to deployment in high-stakes domains. This survey charts a functional evolution in addressing this challenge: the evolution of uncertainty from a passive diagnostic metric to an active control signal guiding real-time model behavior. We demonstrate how uncertainty is leveraged as an active control signal across three frontiers: in advanced reasoning to optimize computation and trigger self-correction; in autonomous agents to govern metacognitive decisions about tool use and information seeking; and in reinforcement learning to mitigate reward hacking and enable self-improvement via intrinsic rewards. By grounding these advancements in emerging theoretical frameworks like Bayesian methods and Conformal Prediction, we provide a unified perspective on this transformative trend. This survey provides a comprehensive overview, critical analysis, and practical design patterns, arguing that mastering the new trend of uncertainty is essential for building the next generation of scalable, reliable, and trustworthy AI.

Over the last decade, building human-level artificial general intelligence has moved from far-fetched speculation to being a concrete next-decade target for many of the largest AI organisations. Achieving this goal would have profound and far-reaching impacts on human society, which raises many complex questions for the decade ahead. This report investigates how AI itself might continue to develop in a post-AGI world along the continuum of machine intelligence. The endpoint of this continuum, Universal AI, is theoretically well understood, which provides some formal grounding for the main focus of this report: the transition from human-level AGI to artificial general superintelligence, which, intuitively, can be understood as a system that is more intelligent and cognitively capable than large organisations of humans. After characterizing ASI, the report discusses four potential pathways from AGI to ASI: scaling AGI, AI paradigm shifts, recursive improvement, and ASI emerging from large-scale multi-agent collectives. The report then discusses possible frictions and bottlenecks along these pathways. Determining whether the impact of these frictions will be negligible or substantial raises a number of concrete open research questions. Due to large uncertainties for predicting ASI progress, it cannot be ruled out that AI progress might continue to accelerate over the next years. This could imply that the image of a single transformative step change, caused by the introduction of human-level AGI into our society, could be inaccurate. More apt might be the prospect of a series of transformative societal changes caused by AI-enabled progress and breakthroughs across many areas of science and technology. Preparing for this prospect requires a massively interdisciplinary endeavour of global scope and interest.

We propose a many-sorted modal logic for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems. Our logic introduces a clear distinction between participating agents and the environment. This allows to express local properties of agents and global properties of worlds in a uniform way, as well as to talk about the presence or absence of agents in a world. The logic subsumes the standard epistemic logic and is a conservative extension of it. The semantics is given in chromatic hypergraphs, a generalization of chromatic simplicial complexes, which were recently used to model knowledge in distributed systems. We show that the logic is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics. We also show a further connection of chromatic hypergraphs with neighborhood frames.

Progress in scientific discovery is rarely the result of a single "Eureka" moment, but is rather the product of hundreds of scientists incrementally working together toward a common goal. While existing agent workflows are capable of producing research autonomously, they do so in isolation, without the ability to continuously improve upon prior research results. To address these challenges, we introduce AgentRxiv-a framework that lets LLM agent laboratories upload and retrieve reports from a shared preprint server in order to collaborate, share insights, and iteratively build on each other's research. We task agent laboratories to develop new reasoning and prompting techniques and find that agents with access to their prior research achieve higher performance improvements compared to agents operating in isolation (11.4% relative improvement over baseline on MATH-500). We find that the best performing strategy generalizes to benchmarks in other domains (improving on average by 3.3%). Multiple agent laboratories sharing research through AgentRxiv are able to work together towards a common goal, progressing more rapidly than isolated laboratories, achieving higher overall accuracy (13.7% relative improvement over baseline on MATH-500). These findings suggest that autonomous agents may play a role in designing future AI systems alongside humans. We hope that AgentRxiv allows agents to collaborate toward research goals and enables researchers to accelerate discovery.

Knowledge augmentation has significantly enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive tasks. However, existing methods typically operate on the simplistic premise that model performance equates with internal knowledge, overlooking the knowledge-confidence gaps that lead to overconfident errors or uncertain truths. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel meta-cognitive framework for reliable knowledge augmentation via differentiated intervention and alignment. Our approach leverages internal cognitive signals to partition the knowledge space into mastered, confused, and missing regions, guiding targeted knowledge expansion. Furthermore, we introduce a cognitive consistency mechanism to synchronize subjective certainty with objective accuracy, ensuring calibrated knowledge boundaries. Extensive experiments demonstrate the our framework consistently outperforms strong baselines, validating its rationality in not only enhancing knowledge capabilities but also fostering cognitive behaviors that better distinguish knowns from unknowns. All codes are available at https://github.com/AI9Stars/Know-More-Know-Clearer.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

When should an AI system's answer be trusted? Formal proof assistants offer certainty but cannot reach most of the problem distribution; scalar LLM judges offer coverage but produce opaque scores that cannot be audited after the fact and are subject to the same coherence issues as any LLM. We present Theoria, a verification architecture that closes this gap. A candidate solution is rewritten into a sequence of typed state transitions, each licensed by an explicit justification, whether that be a citation, computation, or problem-given fact, and every transition is independently auditable. The foundational invariant is completeness of change: every difference between consecutive proof states must be accounted for, so hidden premises surface as unlicensed mutations rather than passing silently. On HLE-Verified Gold (185 text-only expert problems), Theoria certifies 105 at 91.4% strict precision (Wilson 95% CI [84.5%, 95.4%]). Every certification produces a human readable proof trace in which each step can be independently challenged. Holistic LLM judges achieve comparable precision at matched coverage but fail on different problems (Jaccard 0.14-0.36), making the approaches complementary. On 95 adversarial poisoned proofs across 15 domains, structured judges catch 94.7% versus 83.2% for holistic judging (p= 0.0017). The overall 11.5 pp gap concentrates in hidden premises (90.6% vs. 62.5%, a 28 pp difference) and fabricated citations (100% vs. 90%), the error classes where the formal analysis predicts an advantage; performance is identical on arithmetic and theorem-misapplication errors, where no advantage is predicted. On GPQA Diamond (n= 65), certified precision is 97.1% (Wilson CI [85.1%, 99.5%]).

The field of machine learning has achieved striking progress in recent years, witnessing breakthrough results on language modelling, protein folding and nitpickingly fine-grained dog breed classification. Some even succeeded at playing computer games and board games, a feat both of engineering and of setting their employers' expectations. The central contribution of this work is to carefully examine whether this progress, and technology more broadly, can be expected to continue indefinitely. Through a rigorous application of statistical theory and failure to extrapolate beyond the training data, we answer firmly in the negative and provide details: technology will peak at 3:07 am (BST) on 20th July, 2032. We then explore the implications of this finding, discovering that individuals awake at this ungodly hour with access to a sufficiently powerful computer possess an opportunity for myriad forms of long-term linguistic 'lock in'. All we need is a large (>> 1W) data centre to seize this pivotal moment. By setting our analogue alarm clocks, we propose a tractable algorithm to ensure that, for the future of humanity, the British spelling of colour becomes the default spelling across more than 80% of the global word processing software market.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

We explore local vs. global evolution of knowledge systems through the framework of socio-epistemic networks (SEN), applying two complementary methods to a corpus of scientific texts. The framework comprises three interconnected layers-social, semiotic (material), and semantic-proposing a multilayered approach to understanding structural developments of knowledge. To analyse diachronic changes on the semantic layer, we first use information-theoretic measures based on relative entropy to detect semantic shifts, assess their significance, and identify key driving features. Second, variations in document embedding densities reveal changes in semantic neighbourhoods, tracking how concentration of similar documents increase, remain stable, or disperse. This enables us to trace document trajectories based on content (topics) or metadata (authorship, institution). Case studies of Joseph Silk and Hans-J\"urgen Treder illustrate how individual scholar's work aligns with broader disciplinary shifts in general relativity and gravitation research, demonstrating the applications, limitations, and further potential of this approach.

The foundational pretraining phase determines a model's capability ceiling, as post-training struggles to overcome capability foundations established during pretraining, yet it remains critically under-explored. This stems from a structural paradox: organizations with computational resources operate under commercial pressures that inhibit transparent disclosure, while academic institutions possess research freedom but lack pretraining-scale computational resources. daVinci-LLM occupies this unexplored intersection, combining industrial-scale resources with full research freedom to advance the science of pretraining. We adopt a fully-open paradigm that treats openness as scientific methodology, releasing complete data processing pipelines, full training processes, and systematic exploration results. Recognizing that the field lacks systematic methodology for data processing, we employ the Data Darwinism framework, a principled L0-L9 taxonomy from filtering to synthesis. We train a 3B-parameter model from random initialization across 8T tokens using a two-stage adaptive curriculum that progressively shifts from foundational capabilities to reasoning-intensive enhancement. Through 200+ controlled ablations, we establish that: processing depth systematically enhances capabilities, establishing it as a critical dimension alongside volume scaling; different domains exhibit distinct saturation dynamics, necessitating adaptive strategies from proportion adjustments to format shifts; compositional balance enables targeted intensification while preventing performance collapse; how evaluation protocol choices shape our understanding of pretraining progress. By releasing the complete exploration process, we enable the community to build upon our findings and systematic methodologies to form accumulative scientific knowledge in pretraining.

Achieving truly adaptive embodied intelligence requires agents that learn not just by imitating static demonstrations, but by continuously improving through environmental interaction, which is akin to how humans master skills through practice. Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have advanced robotic manipulation by leveraging large language models, yet remain fundamentally limited by Supervised Finetuning (SFT): requiring hundreds of demonstrations per task, rigidly memorizing trajectories, and failing to adapt when deployment conditions deviate from training. We introduce EVOLVE-VLA, a test-time training framework enabling VLAs to continuously adapt through environment interaction with minimal or zero task-specific demonstrations. The key technical challenge is replacing oracle reward signals (unavailable at test time) with autonomous feedback. We address this through a learned progress estimator providing dense feedback, and critically, we design our framework to ``tame'' this inherently noisy signal via two mechanisms: (1) an accumulative progress estimation mechanism smoothing noisy point-wise estimates, and (2) a progressive horizon extension strategy enabling gradual policy evolution. EVOLVE-VLA achieves substantial gains: +8.6\% on long-horizon tasks, +22.0\% in 1-shot learning, and enables cross-task generalization -- achieving 20.8\% success on unseen tasks without task-specific demonstrations training (vs. 0\% for pure SFT). Qualitative analysis reveals emergent capabilities absent in demonstrations, including error recovery and novel strategies. This work represents a critical step toward VLAs that truly learn and adapt, moving beyond static imitation toward continuous self-improvements.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has made significant strides in recent years, yet it continues to struggle with a fundamental aspect of cognition present in all animals: common sense. Current AI systems, including those designed for complex tasks like autonomous driving, problem-solving challenges such as the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), and conversational benchmarks like the Turing Test, often lack the ability to adapt to new situations without extensive prior knowledge. This manuscript argues that integrating common sense into AI systems is essential for achieving true autonomy and unlocking the full societal and commercial value of AI. We propose a shift in the order of knowledge acquisition emphasizing the importance of developing AI systems that start from minimal prior knowledge and are capable of contextual learning, adaptive reasoning, and embodiment -- even within abstract domains. Additionally, we highlight the need to rethink the AI software stack to address this foundational challenge. Without common sense, AI systems may never reach true autonomy, instead exhibiting asymptotic performance that approaches theoretical ideals like AIXI but remains unattainable in practice due to infinite resource and computation requirements. While scaling AI models and passing benchmarks like the Turing Test have brought significant advancements in applications that do not require autonomy, these approaches alone are insufficient to achieve autonomous AI with common sense. By redefining existing benchmarks and challenges to enforce constraints that require genuine common sense, and by broadening our understanding of embodiment to include both physical and abstract domains, we can encourage the development of AI systems better equipped to handle the complexities of real-world and abstract environments.

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Neural NLP models are often miscalibrated, assigning high confidence to incorrect predictions, which undermines selective prediction and high-stakes deployment. Post-hoc calibration methods adjust output probabilities but leave internal computation unchanged, while ensemble and Bayesian approaches improve uncertainty at substantial training or storage cost. We propose UAT-LITE, an inference-time framework that makes self-attention uncertainty-aware using approximate Bayesian inference via Monte Carlo dropout in pretrained transformer classifiers. Token-level epistemic uncertainty is estimated from stochastic forward passes and used to modulate self-attention during contextualization, without modifying pretrained weights or training objectives. We additionally introduce a layerwise variance decomposition to diagnose how predictive uncertainty accumulates across transformer depth. Across the SQuAD 2.0 answerability, MNLI, and SST-2, UAT-LITE reduces Expected Calibration Error by approximately 20% on average relative to a fine-tuned BERT-base baseline while preserving task accuracy, and improves selective prediction and robustness under distribution shift.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

Health Indicators (HIs) are essential for predicting system failures in predictive maintenance. While methods like RaPP (Reconstruction along Projected Pathways) improve traditional HI approaches by leveraging autoencoder latent spaces, their performance can be hindered by both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. In this paper, we propose a novel framework that integrates uncertainty quantification into autoencoder-based latent spaces, enhancing RaPP-generated HIs. We demonstrate that separating aleatoric uncertainty from epistemic uncertainty and cross combining HI information is the driver of accuracy improvements in Remaining Useful Life (RUL) prediction. Our method employs both standard and variational autoencoders to construct these HIs, which are then used to train a machine learning model for RUL prediction. Benchmarked on the NASA C-MAPSS turbofan dataset, our approach outperforms traditional HI-based methods and end-to-end RUL prediction models and is competitive with RUL estimation methods. These results underscore the importance of uncertainty quantification in health assessment and showcase its significant impact on predictive performance when incorporated into the HI construction process.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

A probabilistic classifier with reliable predictive uncertainties i) fits successfully to the target domain data, ii) provides calibrated class probabilities in difficult regions of the target domain (e.g.\ class overlap), and iii) accurately identifies queries coming out of the target domain and rejects them. We introduce an original combination of Evidential Deep Learning, Neural Processes, and Neural Turing Machines capable of providing all three essential properties mentioned above for total uncertainty quantification. We observe our method on five classification tasks to be the only one that can excel all three aspects of total calibration with a single standalone predictor. Our unified solution delivers an implementation-friendly and compute efficient recipe for safety clearance and provides intellectual economy to an investigation of algorithmic roots of epistemic awareness in deep neural nets.

In open-domain dialogue intelligent agents should exhibit the use of knowledge, however there are few convincing demonstrations of this to date. The most popular sequence to sequence models typically "generate and hope" generic utterances that can be memorized in the weights of the model when mapping from input utterance(s) to output, rather than employing recalled knowledge as context. Use of knowledge has so far proved difficult, in part because of the lack of a supervised learning benchmark task which exhibits knowledgeable open dialogue with clear grounding. To that end we collect and release a large dataset with conversations directly grounded with knowledge retrieved from Wikipedia. We then design architectures capable of retrieving knowledge, reading and conditioning on it, and finally generating natural responses. Our best performing dialogue models are able to conduct knowledgeable discussions on open-domain topics as evaluated by automatic metrics and human evaluations, while our new benchmark allows for measuring further improvements in this important research direction.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Recent advances in foundational models have yielded reasoning systems capable of achieving a gold-medal standard at the International Mathematical Olympiad. The transition from competition-level problem-solving to professional research, however, requires navigating vast literature and constructing long-horizon proofs. In this work, we introduce Aletheia, a math research agent that iteratively generates, verifies, and revises solutions end-to-end in natural language. Specifically, Aletheia is powered by an advanced version of Gemini Deep Think for challenging reasoning problems, a novel inference-time scaling law that extends beyond Olympiad-level problems, and intensive tool use to navigate the complexities of mathematical research. We demonstrate the capability of Aletheia from Olympiad problems to PhD-level exercises and most notably, through several distinct milestones in AI-assisted mathematics research: (a) a research paper (Feng26) generated by AI without any human intervention in calculating certain structure constants in arithmetic geometry called eigenweights; (b) a research paper (LeeSeo26) demonstrating human-AI collaboration in proving bounds on systems of interacting particles called independent sets; and (c) an extensive semi-autonomous evaluation (Feng et al., 2026a) of 700 open problems on Bloom's Erdos Conjectures database, including autonomous solutions to four open questions. In order to help the public better understand the developments pertaining to AI and mathematics, we suggest codifying standard levels quantifying autonomy and novelty of AI-assisted results. We conclude with reflections on human-AI collaboration in mathematics.

Developing models that can learn to reason is a notoriously challenging problem. We focus on reasoning in relational domains, where the use of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) seems like a natural choice. However, previous work has shown that regular GNNs lack the ability to systematically generalize from training examples on test graphs requiring longer inference chains, which fundamentally limits their reasoning abilities. A common solution relies on neuro-symbolic methods that systematically reason by learning rules, but their scalability is often limited and they tend to make unrealistically strong assumptions, e.g.\ that the answer can always be inferred from a single relational path. We propose the Epistemic GNN (EpiGNN), a novel parameter-efficient and scalable GNN architecture with an epistemic inductive bias for systematic reasoning. Node embeddings in EpiGNNs are treated as epistemic states, and message passing is implemented accordingly. We show that EpiGNNs achieve state-of-the-art results on link prediction tasks that require systematic reasoning. Furthermore, for inductive knowledge graph completion, EpiGNNs rival the performance of state-of-the-art specialized approaches. Finally, we introduce two new benchmarks that go beyond standard relational reasoning by requiring the aggregation of information from multiple paths. Here, existing neuro-symbolic approaches fail, yet EpiGNNs learn to reason accurately. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/erg0dic/gnn-sg.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

This paper explores the intersection of identity, individuality, and reality through competing frameworks, including classical metaphysics, quantum mechanics, and computational theories. Traditional metaphysical notions of fixed identity are challenged by advancements in cloning, teletransportation, and digital replication, which reveal the fluid and relational nature of individuality. Quantum mechanics further complicates these notions, emphasizing the indistinguishability and contextuality of fundamental particles. Computational approaches, such as the Ruliad and Constructor Theory, offer expansive views of emergent realities but often lack practical constraints for observer relevance. Algorithmic idealism is introduced as a unifying framework, proposing that reality is an emergent construct governed by computational rules prioritizing coherence, sufficiency, and observer-dependent experiences. By redefining identity as an informational construct and reality as a process shaped by algorithmic transitions, algorithmic idealism resolves foundational paradoxes and offers a superior lens for understanding existence in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. The framework bridges gaps between competing theories, providing a coherent and pragmatic model for addressing ethical, metaphysical, and technological challenges.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.

Eliciting information to reduce uncertainty about a latent entity is a critical task in many application domains, e.g., assessing individual student learning outcomes, diagnosing underlying diseases, or learning user preferences. Though natural language is a powerful medium for this purpose, large language models (LLMs) and existing fine-tuning algorithms lack mechanisms for strategically gathering information to refine their own understanding of the latent entity. To harness the generalization power and world knowledge of LLMs in developing effective information-gathering strategies, we propose an adaptive elicitation framework that actively reduces uncertainty on the latent entity. Since probabilistic modeling of an abstract latent entity is difficult, our framework adopts a predictive view of uncertainty, using a meta-learned language model to simulate future observations and enable scalable uncertainty quantification over complex natural language. Through autoregressive forward simulation, our model quantifies how new questions reduce epistemic uncertainty, enabling the development of sophisticated information-gathering strategies to choose the most informative next queries. In experiments on the 20 questions game, dynamic opinion polling, and adaptive student assessment, our method consistently outperforms baselines in identifying critical unknowns and improving downstream predictions, illustrating the promise of strategic information gathering in natural language settings.

Local prediction-error-based curiosity rewards focus on the current transition without considering the world model's cumulative prediction error across all visited transitions. We introduce Curiosity-Critic, which grounds its intrinsic reward in the improvement of this cumulative objective, and show that it reduces to a tractable per-step form: the difference between the current prediction error and the asymptotic error baseline of the current state transition. We estimate this baseline online with a learned critic co-trained alongside the world model; regressing a single scalar, the critic converges well before the world model saturates, redirecting exploration toward learnable transitions without oracle knowledge of the noise floor. The reward is higher for learnable transitions and collapses toward the baseline for stochastic ones, effectively separating epistemic (reducible) from aleatoric (irreducible) prediction error online. Prior prediction-error curiosity formulations, from Schmidhuber (1991) to learned-feature-space variants, emerge as special cases corresponding to specific approximations of this baseline. Experiments on a stochastic grid world show that Curiosity-Critic outperforms prediction-error and visitation-count baselines in convergence speed and final world model accuracy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

Language models often pre-train on large unsupervised text corpora, then fine-tune on additional task-specific data. However, typical fine-tuning schemes do not prioritize the examples that they tune on. We show that, if you can prioritize informative training data, you can achieve better performance while using fewer labels. To do this we augment a language model with an epinet: a small additional network that helps to estimate model uncertainty and forms an epistemic neural network (ENN). ENNs are neural networks that can know what they don't know. Using an epinet to prioritize uncertain data, we can fine-tune BERT on GLUE tasks to the same performance while using 2x less data than training without prioritization. We also investigate performance in synthetic neural network generative models designed to build understanding. In each setting, using an epinet outperforms heuristic active learning schemes.