Daily Papers

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Reinforcement learning (RL) provides a framework for sequential decision making under explicit objectives. In its classical form, RL studies how an agent should act to maximise long-term reward in a dynamic environment. In richer settings, the problem extends beyond a single agent and fixed environment: intelligent behavior may require strategic interaction, adaptation to uncertainty, and reasoning over high-dimensional worlds. This thesis studies RL from two perspectives: algorithms in games and RL in the era of foundation models. The first part focuses on multi-agent RL in games. It examines how incentives, policies, and equilibrium concepts interact in competitive and general-sum environments, spanning two-player zero-sum games, large-scale video games, and multi-player settings with general structure. These works investigate learning in multi-agent systems and the behavior of RL methods in interactive environments. The second part studies RL with generative and foundation models, motivated by the idea that prior knowledge can enrich sequential decision making. Pretrained generative models and learned world models serve as representation tools and structured priors for planning, control, and policy optimization. The thesis develops diffusion-based world models, investigates RL for efficient video generation, explores generative models as policy classes, and studies interactive video world models in which actions shape future observations. It also addresses long-horizon modeling through architectures with memory. Together, these contributions present a unified view of RL as objective-driven adaptation in complex sequential domains. From strategic games to generative world models, the thesis highlights how RL connects decision making, environment modeling, and emerging foundation-model capabilities, offering a broader perspective on the principles underlying intelligent behavior.

Personalized image generation has made significant strides in adapting content to novel concepts. However, a persistent challenge remains: balancing the accurate reconstruction of unseen concepts with the need for editability according to the prompt, especially when dealing with the complex nuances of facial features. In this study, we delve into the temporal dynamics of the text-to-image conditioning process, emphasizing the crucial role of stage partitioning in introducing new concepts. We present PersonaMagic, a stage-regulated generative technique designed for high-fidelity face customization. Using a simple MLP network, our method learns a series of embeddings within a specific timestep interval to capture face concepts. Additionally, we develop a Tandem Equilibrium mechanism that adjusts self-attention responses in the text encoder, balancing text description and identity preservation, improving both areas. Extensive experiments confirm the superiority of PersonaMagic over state-of-the-art methods in both qualitative and quantitative evaluations. Moreover, its robustness and flexibility are validated in non-facial domains, and it can also serve as a valuable plug-in for enhancing the performance of pretrained personalization models.

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides agents with evidence that other similar agents are likely to cooperate too, resulting in gains from trade for all. This could be a crucial consideration for altruists. I develop a game-theoretic model of ECL as an incomplete information bargaining problem. The model incorporates uncertainty about others' value systems and empirical situations, and addresses the problem of selecting a compromise outcome. Using the model, I investigate issues with ECL and outline open technical and philosophical questions. I show that all cooperators must maximize the same weighted sum of utility functions to reach a Pareto optimal outcome. However, I argue against selecting a compromise outcome implicitly by normalizing utility functions. I review bargaining theory and argue that the Nash bargaining solution could be a relevant Schelling point. I introduce dependency equilibria (Spohn 2007), an equilibrium concept suitable for ECL, and generalize a folk theorem showing that the Nash bargaining solution is a dependency equilibrium. I discuss gains from trade given uncertain beliefs about other agents and analyze how these gains decrease in several toy examples as the belief in another agent decreases. Finally, I discuss open issues in my model. First, the Nash bargaining solution is sometimes not coalitionally stable, meaning that a subset of cooperators can unilaterally improve payoffs by deviating from the compromise. I investigate conditions under which stable payoff vectors exist. Second, I discuss how to model agents' default actions without ECL.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

The principle of detailed balance states that in equilibrium each elementary process is equilibrated by its reverse process. For many real physico-chemical complex systems (e.g. homogeneous combustion, heterogeneous catalytic oxidation, most enzyme reactions etc), detailed mechanisms include both reversible and irreversible reactions. In this case, the principle of detailed balance cannot be applied directly. We represent irreversible reactions as limits of reversible steps and obtain the principle of detailed balance for complex mechanisms with some irreversible elementary processes. We proved two consequences of the detailed balance for these mechanisms: the structural condition and the algebraic condition that form together the extended form of detailed balance. The algebraic condition is the principle of detailed balance for the reversible part. The structural condition is: the convex hull of the stoichiometric vectors of the irreversible reactions has empty intersection with the linear span of the stoichiometric vectors of the reversible reaction. Physically, this means that the irreversible reactions cannot be included in oriented pathways. The systems with the extended form of detailed balance are also the limits of the reversible systems with detailed balance when some of the equilibrium concentrations (or activities) tend to zero. Surprisingly, the structure of the limit reaction mechanism crucially depends on the relative speeds of this tendency to zero.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

The paper sets forth comprehensive basics of Discrete Thermodynamics of Chemical Equilibria (DTD), developed by the author during the last decade and spread over series of publications. Based on the linear equations of irreversible thermodynamics, De Donder's definition of the thermodynamic force, and the Le Chatelier principle, DTD brings forward a notion of chemical equilibrium as a balance of internal and external thermodynamic forces, acting against a chemical system. The basic expression of DTD is a logistic map that ties together energetic characteristics of the chemical transformation in the system, its deviation from true thermodynamic equilibrium, and the sum of thermodynamic forces, causing that deviation. System deviation from thermodynamic equilibrium is the major variable of the theory. Solutions to the basic map define the chemical system domain of states comprising bifurcation diagrams with four areas, from true thermodynamic equilibrium to chaos, having specific distinctive meaning for chemical systems. The theory is derived from the currently recognized ideas of chemical thermodynamics and binds classical and contemporary thermodynamics of chemical equilibria into a unique concept. DTD opens new opportunities in understanding and analysis of equilibria in chemical systems. Some new results, included in the paper, have never been published before.

Motor control is a fundamental process that underlies all voluntary behavioral responses. Several different theories based on different principles (task dynamics, equilibrium-point theory, passive-motion paradigm, active inference, optimal control) account for specific aspects of how actions are produced, but fail to provide a unified view on this problem. Here we propose a concise theory of motor control based on three principles: optimal feedback control, control with a receding time horizon, and task representation by a series of via-points updated at fixed frequency. By construction, the theory provides a suitable solution to the degrees-of-freedom problem, i.e. trajectory formation in the presence of redundancies and noise. We show through computer simulations that the theory also explains the production of discrete, continuous, rhythmic and temporally-constrained movements, and their parametric and statistical properties (scaling laws, power laws, speed/accuracy tradeoffs). The theory has no free parameters and only limited variations in its implementation details and in the nature of noise are necessary to guarantee its explanatory power.

We introduce Equilibrium Propagation, a learning framework for energy-based models. It involves only one kind of neural computation, performed in both the first phase (when the prediction is made) and the second phase of training (after the target or prediction error is revealed). Although this algorithm computes the gradient of an objective function just like Backpropagation, it does not need a special computation or circuit for the second phase, where errors are implicitly propagated. Equilibrium Propagation shares similarities with Contrastive Hebbian Learning and Contrastive Divergence while solving the theoretical issues of both algorithms: our algorithm computes the gradient of a well defined objective function. Because the objective function is defined in terms of local perturbations, the second phase of Equilibrium Propagation corresponds to only nudging the prediction (fixed point, or stationary distribution) towards a configuration that reduces prediction error. In the case of a recurrent multi-layer supervised network, the output units are slightly nudged towards their target in the second phase, and the perturbation introduced at the output layer propagates backward in the hidden layers. We show that the signal 'back-propagated' during this second phase corresponds to the propagation of error derivatives and encodes the gradient of the objective function, when the synaptic update corresponds to a standard form of spike-timing dependent plasticity. This work makes it more plausible that a mechanism similar to Backpropagation could be implemented by brains, since leaky integrator neural computation performs both inference and error back-propagation in our model. The only local difference between the two phases is whether synaptic changes are allowed or not.

Brain-like intelligent systems need brain-like learning methods. Equilibrium Propagation (EP) is a biologically plausible learning framework with strong potential for brain-inspired computing hardware. However, existing im-plementations of EP suffer from instability and prohibi-tively high computational costs. Inspired by the structure and dynamics of the brain, we propose a biologically plau-sible Feedback-regulated REsidual recurrent neural network (FRE-RNN) and study its learning performance in EP framework. Feedback regulation enables rapid convergence by reducing the spectral radius. The improvement in con-vergence property reduces the computational cost and train-ing time of EP by orders of magnitude, delivering perfor-mance on par with backpropagation (BP) in benchmark tasks. Meanwhile, residual connections with brain-inspired topologies help alleviate the vanishing gradient problem that arises when feedback pathways are weak in deep RNNs. Our approach substantially enhances the applicabil-ity and practicality of EP in large-scale networks that un-derpin artificial intelligence. The techniques developed here also offer guidance to implementing in-situ learning in physical neural networks.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Boltzmann generators approach the sampling problem in many-body physics by combining a normalizing flow and a statistical reweighting method to generate samples in thermodynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium distribution is usually defined by an energy function and a thermodynamic state. Here we propose temperature-steerable flows (TSF) which are able to generate a family of probability densities parametrized by a choosable temperature parameter. TSFs can be embedded in generalized ensemble sampling frameworks to sample a physical system across multiple thermodynamic states.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We formulate nonequilibrium thermodynamics in which intensive variables acquire operational meaning through measurement protocols consistent with local reciprocity. Using physical equilibrium as a reference, conjugate observables are constructed by continuously adjusting devices along the local tangent space of the statistical manifold. In this relativity of observation, Onsager reciprocity holds locally, allowing inference-based Lagrange multipliers to be directly measured. This provides a systematic method to extend operational definitions of intensive variables to nonequilibrium states, highlighting their context-dependent nature and offering a concrete experimental strategy.

The massive overactuation in the human musculoskeletal system makes it challenging to train musculoskeletal models to generate human-like motion via reinforcement learning, primarily because exploration in the resulting high-dimensional and redundant action space is extremely inefficient. To address this problem, we propose the λ-hold controller, inspired by the equilibrium-point (EP) hypothesis, which has been widely supported by extensive evidence from human motor control studies. The policy's control variable is the per-muscle EP threshold length λ, from which a stretch-reflex recruitment law computes the muscle excitations automatically. Holding each λ over an interval of the gait phase also sharply reduces the frequency at which the policy must be queried. Consequently, the controller, to our knowledge for the first time, enables a muscle-actuated skeletal model to learn human-like sprinting using only a minimal reward within an hour of training. The efficient exploration through the proposed λ-hold controller is not merely an engineering trick but an approach grounded in physiology, bringing together the EP hypothesis, intermittent control, and optimal feedback control. Beyond encapsulating human-like behavior in predictive simulation, this achievement contributes to developing a learnable model of the human motor controller.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

We continue study of equilibrium of two species of 2d coulomb charges (or point vortices in 2d ideal fluid) started in Lv. Although for two species of vortices with circulation ratio -1 the relationship between the equilibria and the factorization/Darboux transformation of the Schrodinger operator was established a long ago, the question about similar relationship for the ratio -2 remained unanswered. Here we present the answer.

We develop and analyse a conforming piecewise affine finite element method for the Grad--Mercier equation, a nonlocal elliptic model for magnetic equilibria whose source depends on the global rank of a flux function. The principal difficulty is that the unique continuum equilibrium has a maximum plateau of prescribed positive area. The solution therefore samples the rank law only above the plateau mass, while perturbations that separate equal values may distribute this mass over several numerical ranks and thereby alter the non-strict rank source. We exploit the continuum well-posedness structure to replace the rank law by an equivalent clipped, nonnegative law, and replace Lebesgue measure by a mass-lumped nodal measure. Equal nodal values are assigned a common rank interval, thereby retaining the full lumped mass of each tied level. The resulting weighted rearrangement gives a strictly convex discrete energy and hence a unique finite element equilibrium. On meshes satisfying a discrete comparison principle, the discrete equilibrium is nonnegative and bounded above by a computable barrier. A Poisson-preconditioned rearrangement iteration converges on each fixed mesh and admits computable a posteriori energy and energy-norm bounds. As polygonal finite element domains converge to the physical cross-section, the discrete equilibria converge strongly in H^1_0(Ω) and uniformly on overlineΩ to the unique Grad--Mercier equilibrium. Reconstructed equilibrium sources converge weak-* in L^{infty}(Ω) to the original nonlocal source.

We provide a concise framework for generalized ensemble theory through a matrix-based approach. By introducing an observation matrix, any discrete probability distribution, including those for non-equilibrium steady states, can be expressed as a generalized Boltzmann distribution, with observables and conjugate variables as the basis and coordinates in a linear space. In this framework, we identify the minimal sufficient statistics required for inferring the Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, we show that the Hadamard and Vandermonde matrices are suitable observation matrices for spin systems and random walks. In master equation systems, the probability flux observation matrix facilitates the identification of detailed balance violations. Our findings provide a new approach to developing generalized ensemble theory for non-equilibrium steady-state systems.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new framework based on Alternative Set Theory (AST). This framework represents different cognitive perspectives on a long history of events using distinct topologies. These topologies define an indiscernibility equivalence that formally treats huge, indistinguishable quantities as equivalent. This offers criterion-dependent resolutions to long-standing paradoxes, such as Selten's chain store paradox and Rosenthal's centipede game. Our framework reveals new intuitive subgame perfect equilibria, the characteristics of which depend on the chosen temporal perspective and payoff evaluation. Ultimately, by grounding its mathematical foundation in different modes of human cognition, our work expands the explanatory power of game theory for long-horizon scenarios.

A selector that allocates work across opaque components must evaluate them without being told how they performed. We study the least communication that suffices. Each parent maintains an allocation vector over its children and updates it from outcomes by proportional redistribution. Each child reads the sign of its own allocation change, one bit per round it is selected, so no evaluation message crosses the parent-child boundary. (1) The update preserves the simplex with strict positivity. (2) Conditional on being selected, a child's sign is exactly the root outcome at every depth, a sufficient statistic. The conditioning is necessary. (3) Under interiority a single selector has a unique interior equilibrium, exact and closed-form for N=2, with almost sure convergence under decreasing steps. For general N an equi-ratio condition gives an explicit affine equilibrium. (4) The linearised mean flow has real, strictly negative tangent eigenvalues with explicit bounds for all N >= 2. (5) The mean flow converges globally. An explicit potential, up to normalisation the KL divergence between the failure and slack distributions, decreases at a rate equal to the variance of the equi-ratio statistic. Without interiority the rule drops exactly the children below the surviving support's threshold. (6) The update law composes along a single active path, since ancestors select a node's active rounds but do not alter a realised signal. No joint convergence theorem for a hierarchy whose levels adapt simultaneously is claimed. (7) The one-bit interface admits exactly four deterministic memoryless distortions, and at a single selector passing the bit on unchanged delivers strictly higher mean quality upward than negation or constant transmission. Illustrations on synthetic hierarchies up to 16,384 leaves and three real datasets (3.4 billion comparisons, no mismatches) are consistent with the theory.

We revisit Tirole's classic paper "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations" (1985, Econometrica) in the case of a dividend-paying asset. Recently, Pham and Toda (2026) constructed a counterexample to Proposition 1(c), showing that Tirole's equilibrium classification is incorrect as stated and that long-run outcomes can depend on initial capital. This paper characterizes the entire set of equilibrium initial asset prices under capital over-accumulation. Exactly one of three regimes occurs: (i) a unique bubbleless equilibrium with capital converging to zero (capital collapse), (ii) a unique asymptotically bubbly equilibrium converging to a positive steady state (bubble necessity), or (iii) a continuum of equilibria with different long-run bubble behavior (indeterminacy). We further derive a threshold for initial capital under the bubble necessity condition, establish preference-free sufficient conditions for capital collapse, and show that the continuum in the pure bubble model survives sufficiently small dividend perturbations. Closed-form examples illustrate the possible long-run outcomes.

Accurate free-energy estimation is essential in molecular simulation, yet the periodic boundary conditions (PBC) commonly used in computer simulations have rarely been explicitly exploited. Equilibrium methods such as umbrella sampling, metadynamics, and adaptive biasing force require extensive sampling, while non-equilibrium pulling with Jarzynski's equality suffers from poor convergence due to exponential averaging. Here, we introduce a physics-informed, score-based diffusion framework: by mapping PBC simulations onto a Brownian particle in a periodic potential, we derive the Fokker-Planck steady-state score that directly encodes free-energy gradients. A neural network is trained on non-equilibrium trajectories to learn this score, providing a principled scheme to efficiently reconstruct the potential of mean force (PMF). On benchmark periodic potentials and small-molecule membrane permeation, our method is up to one order of magnitude more efficient than umbrella sampling.

A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes, and, (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.

We establish an existence of equilibrium result for a class of non-Markovian mean-field games with unbounded control space in weak formulation. Our result is based on new existence and stability results for quadratic-growth generalized McKean-Vlasov BSDEs. Unlike earlier approaches, our approach does not require boundedness assumptions on the model parameters or time horizons and allows for running costs that are quadratic in the control variable.

From a viewpoint of stochastic thermodynamics, we derive equations that describe the collective dynamics near the order-disorder transition in the globally coupled XY model and near the synchronization-desynchronization transition in the Kuramoto model. A new way of thinking is to interpret the deterministic time evolution of a macroscopic variable as an external operation to a thermodynamic system. We then find that the irreversible work determines the equation for the collective dynamics. When analyzing the Kuramoto model, we employ a generalized concept of irreversible work which originates from a non-equilibrium identity associated with steady state thermodynamics.

Limited attention forces organizations to decide not only how much to discuss, but also which issues merit discussion. We study strategic communication about a multidimensional decision when a receiver can respond only along a few endogenously chosen issues. Players agree on the ideal action but prioritize different errors. In equilibrium, communicated and omitted issues must be statistically unrelated and separable according to the sender's preferences. Thus, the sender's priorities determine the agenda; the receiver's do not. Synchronized priorities raise the receiver's best equilibrium payoff but lower his worst, so he may prefer a less synchronized sender.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

A theoretical approach to describing transport of an entire ensemble of clusters with different sizes as a single species in gas has been developed. The major assumption is an existence of local partial chemical equilibrium between the clusters. It is shown that thermal diffusion emerges in the collective description as a significant factor even if it is negligible when transport of the original molecular species is considered. Analytical expressions for the effective diffusion and thermal diffusion coefficients at temperature, pressure, and chemical composition gradients have been derived. The theory has been applied to a technology of H2S conversion in a centrifugal plasma-chemical reactor and has made it possible to account for sulfur clusters in numerical process modeling.

We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas are created via private investment and spread between firms. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual property, and openness, which facilitates learning from others. Their decisions determine interaction rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities in a learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative externalities, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense networks. At equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction dominates: the innovation rate and welfare would be dramatically higher if the network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the critical threshold. Nevertheless, several natural types of interventions fail to move the equilibrium away from criticality. One effective policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another.

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

We present a new approach to modeling sequential data: the deep equilibrium model (DEQ). Motivated by an observation that the hidden layers of many existing deep sequence models converge towards some fixed point, we propose the DEQ approach that directly finds these equilibrium points via root-finding. Such a method is equivalent to running an infinite depth (weight-tied) feedforward network, but has the notable advantage that we can analytically backpropagate through the equilibrium point using implicit differentiation. Using this approach, training and prediction in these networks require only constant memory, regardless of the effective "depth" of the network. We demonstrate how DEQs can be applied to two state-of-the-art deep sequence models: self-attention transformers and trellis networks. On large-scale language modeling tasks, such as the WikiText-103 benchmark, we show that DEQs 1) often improve performance over these state-of-the-art models (for similar parameter counts); 2) have similar computational requirements to existing models; and 3) vastly reduce memory consumption (often the bottleneck for training large sequence models), demonstrating an up-to 88% memory reduction in our experiments. The code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/deq .

Text-to-image models produce images that align well with natural language prompts, but compositional generation has long been a central challenge. Models often struggle to satisfy multiple concepts within a single prompt, frequently omitting some concepts and resulting in partial success. Such failures highlight the difficulty of jointly optimizing multiple concepts during reward optimization, where competing concepts can interfere with one another. To address this limitation, we propose Correlation-Weighted Multi-Reward Optimization (\ours), a framework that leverages the correlation structure among concept rewards to adaptively weight each attribute concept in optimization. By accounting for interactions among concepts, \ours balances competing reward signals and emphasizes concepts that are partially satisfied yet inconsistently generated across samples, improving compositional generation. Specifically, we decompose multi-concept prompts into pre-defined concept groups (\eg, objects, attributes, and relations) and obtain reward signals from dedicated reward models for each concept. We then adaptively reweight these rewards, assigning higher weights to conflicting or hard-to-satisfy concepts using correlation-based difficulty estimation. By focusing optimization on the most challenging concepts within each group, \ours encourages the model to consistently satisfy all requested attributes simultaneously. We apply our approach to train state-of-the-art diffusion models, SD3.5 and FLUX.1-dev, and demonstrate consistent improvements on challenging multi-concept benchmarks, including ConceptMix, GenEval 2, and T2I-CompBench.

Building upon a thermodynamic formalism, we show that self-gravitating systems in hydrostatic equilibrium with a uniform density are maximal entropy states when submitted to perturbations which are slow on dynamical timescale. We coin this phenomenon "thermodynamic blocking", given its similarity with the more general "kinetic blocking". This result underlines the importance of the thermodynamic formalism which proves useful when kinetic equations break down.

This monograph attempts a theory of every 'thing' that can be distinguished from other things in a statistical sense. The ensuing statistical independencies, mediated by Markov blankets, speak to a recursive composition of ensembles (of things) at increasingly higher spatiotemporal scales. This decomposition provides a description of small things; e.g., quantum mechanics - via the Schrodinger equation, ensembles of small things - via statistical mechanics and related fluctuation theorems, through to big things - via classical mechanics. These descriptions are complemented with a Bayesian mechanics for autonomous or active things. Although this work provides a formulation of every thing, its main contribution is to examine the implications of Markov blankets for self-organisation to nonequilibrium steady-state. In brief, we recover an information geometry and accompanying free energy principle that allows one to interpret the internal states of something as representing or making inferences about its external states. The ensuing Bayesian mechanics is compatible with quantum, statistical and classical mechanics and may offer a formal description of lifelike particles.

In this work, we explore two classes of density dependent relativistic mean-field models, their predictions of proton fractions at high densities and neutron star structure. We have used a metamodelling approach to these relativistic density functionals. We have generated a large ensemble of models with these classes and then applied constraints from theoretical and experimental nuclear physics and astrophysical observations. We find that both models produce similar equations of state and neutron star mass-radius sequences. But, their underlying compositions, denoted by the proton fraction in this case, are vastly different. This reinstates previous findings that information on composition gets masqueraded in beta-equilibrium. Additional observations of non-equilibrium phenomena are necessary to pin it down.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Classical theories of chemical kinetics assume independent reactions in dilute solutions, whose rates are determined by mean concentrations. In condensed matter, strong interactions alter chemical activities and create inhomogeneities that can dramatically affect the reaction rate. The extreme case is that of a reaction coupled to a phase transformation, whose kinetics must depend on the order parameter -- and its gradients, at phase boundaries. This Account presents a general theory of chemical kinetics based on nonequilibrium thermodynamics. The reaction rate is a nonlinear function of the thermodynamic driving force (free energy of reaction) expressed in terms of variational chemical potentials. The Cahn-Hilliard and Allen-Cahn equations are unified and extended via a master equation for non-equilibrium chemical thermodynamics. For electrochemistry, both Marcus and Butler-Volmer kinetics are generalized for concentrated solutions and ionic solids. The theory is applied to intercalation dynamics in the phase separating Li-ion battery material Li_xFePO_4.

A central problem in machine learning involves modeling complex data-sets using highly flexible families of probability distributions in which learning, sampling, inference, and evaluation are still analytically or computationally tractable. Here, we develop an approach that simultaneously achieves both flexibility and tractability. The essential idea, inspired by non-equilibrium statistical physics, is to systematically and slowly destroy structure in a data distribution through an iterative forward diffusion process. We then learn a reverse diffusion process that restores structure in data, yielding a highly flexible and tractable generative model of the data. This approach allows us to rapidly learn, sample from, and evaluate probabilities in deep generative models with thousands of layers or time steps, as well as to compute conditional and posterior probabilities under the learned model. We additionally release an open source reference implementation of the algorithm.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

Ensemble Kalman Inversion (EKI) is a derivative-free, ensemble-based method for inverse and optimization problems. Its continuous-time formulation can be interpreted as an interacting particle system driven by a Kalman-type preconditioned descent direction. A well-known limitation of this dynamics is the possible premature collapse of the covariance of the ensemble, which makes the method sensitive to the initial ensemble. We introduce a second-order particle system in which the particles evolve according to an inertial dynamics. The model combines a Kalman-type relaxation force with damping, attraction towards the ensemble mean, and a short-range repulsive interaction designed to counteract ensemble collapse. The resulting dynamics can be interpreted as a heavy-ball reformulation of continuous-time EKI enriched by competing attractive and repulsive mechanisms. For linear inverse problems, we analyze the induced mean and fluctuation dynamics and identify a parameter regime in which fully collapsed configurations are linearly unstable. We further characterize asymptotic equilibria through a constrained optimality condition on the subspace retained by the limiting ensemble covariance and derive an exponential decay estimate. Numerical experiments illustrate the effect of inertia and repulsion on the ensemble dynamics and compare the proposed second-order method with first-order EKI-type

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

Many chemical concepts can be well defined in the context of quantum chemical theories. Examples are the electronegativity scale of Mulliken and Jaffe and the hard and soft acids and bases concept of Pearson. The sound theoretical basis allows for a systematic definition of such concepts. However, while they are often used to describe and compare chemical processes in terms of reactivity, their predictive power remains unclear. In this work, we elaborate on the predictive potential of chemical reactivity concepts, which can be crucial for autonomous reaction exploration protocols to guide them by first-principles heuristics that expoit these concepts.

Both classical and quantum version of two models of price competition in duopoly market, the one is realistic and the other is idealized, are investigated. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of the realistic model exists under stricter condition than that of the idealized one in the classical form game. This is the problem known as Edgeworth paradox in economics. In the quantum form game, however, the former converges to the latter as the measure of entanglement goes to infinity.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We introduce a unified mathematical and probabilistic framework for understanding and comparing diverse AI agent strategies. We bridge the gap between high-level agent design concepts, such as ReAct, multi-agent systems, and control flows, and a rigorous mathematical formulation. Our approach frames agentic processes as a chain of probabilities, enabling a detailed analysis of how different strategies manipulate these probabilities to achieve desired outcomes. Our framework provides a common language for discussing the trade-offs inherent in various agent architectures. One of our many key contributions is the introduction of the "Degrees of Freedom" concept, which intuitively differentiates the optimizable levers available for each approach, thereby guiding the selection of appropriate strategies for specific tasks. This work aims to enhance the clarity and precision in designing and evaluating AI agents, offering insights into maximizing the probability of successful actions within complex agentic systems.

The relationship between balance laws and the Principle of Virtual Work as well as the structure of contact interactions in continua remain foundational issues in Mechanics. In this work, we revisit these issues within the distributional framework emphasized by Paul Germain. We show that while the Principle of Virtual Work implies balance of forces and moments for nth-gradient continua, balance laws alone do not suffice to characterize equilibrium for n geq 2. We then reexamine Noll's classical theorem asserting that surface contact forces depend solely on the unit normal to the surface and identify the precise role of his additional assumptions, namely the absence of edge and wedge contact interactions and the boundedness of the surface contact density on the space of oriented surfaces. We demonstrate that these hypotheses fail for general higher-gradient continua. Consequently, the presence of curvature-dependent surface contact forces in such materials does not conflict with Noll's theorem and refutes his claim of their nonexistence.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Many examples of cooperation exist in biology. In chemical systems however, which can sometimes be quite complex, we do not appear to observe intricate cooperative interactions. A key question for the origin of life, is then how can molecular cooperation first arise in an abiotic system prior to the emergence of biological replication. We postulate that selection at the molecular level is a driving force behind the complexification of chemical systems, particularly during the origins of life. In the theory of multilevel selection the two selective forces are: within-group and between-group, where the former tends to favor "selfish" replication of individuals and the latter favor cooperation between individuals enhancing the replication of the group as a whole. These forces can be quantified using the Price equation, which is a standard tool used in evolutionary biology to quantify evolutionary change. Our central claim is that replication and heredity in chemical systems are subject to selection, and quantifiable using the multilevel Price equation. We demonstrate this using the Graded Autocatalysis Replication Domain computer model, describing simple protocell composed out of molecules and its replication, which respectively analogue to the group and the individuals. In contrast to previous treatments of this model, we treat the lipid molecules themselves as replicating individuals and the protocells they form as groups of individuals. Our goal is to demonstrate how evolutionary biology tools and concepts can be applied in chemistry and we suggest that molecular cooperation may arise as a result of group selection. Further, the biological relation of parent-progeny is proposed to be analogue to the reactant-product relation in chemistry, thus allowing for tools from evolutionary biology to be applied to chemistry and would deepen the connection between chemistry and biology.

All current formulations of thermodynamics invoke some form of coarse-graining or ensembles as the supposed link between their own laws and the microscopic laws of motion. They deal only with ensemble-averages, expectation values, macroscopic limits, infinite heat baths, etc., not with the details of physical variables of individual microscopic systems. They are consistent with the laws of motion for finite systems only in certain approximations, which improve with increasing scale, given various assumptions about initial conditions which are neither specified precisely nor even thought to hold exactly in nature. Here I propose a new formulation of the zeroth, first and second laws, improving upon the axiomatic approach to thermodynamics (Carath\'eodory, 1909; Lieb & Yngvason, 1999), via the principles of the recently proposed constructor theory. Specifically, I provide a non-approximative, scale-independent formulation of 'adiabatic accessibility'; this in turn provides a non-approximative, scale-independent distinction between work and heat and reveals an unexpected connection between information theory and the first law of thermodynamics (not just the second). It also achieves the long-sought unification of the axiomatic approach with Kelvin's.

Active matter systems, from self-propelled colloids to motile bacteria, are characterized by the conversion of free energy into useful work at the microscopic scale. These systems generically involve physics beyond the reach of equilibrium statistical mechanics, and a persistent challenge has been to understand the nature of their nonequilibrium states. The entropy production rate and the magnitude of the steady-state probability current provide quantitative ways to do so by measuring the breakdown of time-reversal symmetry and the strength of nonequilibrium transport of measure. Yet, their efficient computation has remained elusive, as they depend on the system's unknown and high-dimensional probability density. Here, building upon recent advances in generative modeling, we develop a deep learning framework that estimates the score of this density. We show that the score, together with the microscopic equations of motion, gives direct access to the entropy production rate, the probability current, and their decomposition into local contributions from individual particles, spatial regions, and degrees of freedom. To represent the score, we introduce a novel, spatially-local transformer-based network architecture that learns high-order interactions between particles while respecting their underlying permutation symmetry. We demonstrate the broad utility and scalability of the method by applying it to several high-dimensional systems of interacting active particles undergoing motility-induced phase separation (MIPS). We show that a single instance of our network trained on a system of 4096 particles at one packing fraction can generalize to other regions of the phase diagram, including systems with as many as 32768 particles. We use this observation to quantify the spatial structure of the departure from equilibrium in MIPS as a function of the number of particles and the packing fraction.

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

In this work, we extend the Equilibrium Propagation framework to skew-gradient systems and show an equivalence between deep Energy-Based Models and Hamiltonian neural networks. We focus on networks of diffusively coupled Fitzhugh-Nagumo neurons as a prototypical example. We show that since stationary solutions of the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model are described by self-adjoint operators, the methods of equilibrium propagation for performing credit assignment can be applied. Furthermore, for Fitzhugh-Nagumo networks with the topology of a deep residual network, we show that the steady state solutions admit a (spatial) Hamiltonian, and thus the methods of Hamiltonian Echo Backpropagation can be applied. We end by deriving an explicit layer-wise Hamiltonian recurrence relation governing inference for stationary solutions of both deep Fitzhugh-Nagumo networks and deep Energy-Based Models.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

This paper extends the creep tide theory to exoplanetary systems with significant obliquities. The extended theory allows us to obtain the stellar and planetary hydrodynamic equilibrium tides and the evolution of the rotational state of the bodies. The dynamic ellipsoidal figure of equilibrium of the body is calculated taking into account that its reaction to external forces is delayed by its viscosity. The derived equations are used to determine the motion of the tidal bulge of the planetary companion CoRoT-3b (a brown dwarf) and its host star. We show how the tides deform the figure of the companion and how its tidal bulge moves close to the substellar meridian from one hemisphere to another. The stellar lag is mostly positive and is braking the star's rotation.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We introduce a novel approach for concept blending in pretrained text-to-image diffusion models, aiming to generate images at the intersection of multiple text prompts. At each time step during diffusion denoising, our algorithm forecasts predictions w.r.t. the generated image and makes informed text conditioning decisions. Central to our method is the unique analogy between diffusion models, which are rooted in non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and the Black-Scholes model for financial option pricing. By drawing parallels between key variables in both domains, we derive a robust algorithm for concept blending that capitalizes on the Markovian dynamics of the Black-Scholes framework. Our text-based concept blending algorithm is data-efficient, meaning it does not need additional training. Furthermore, it operates without human intervention or hyperparameter tuning. We highlight the benefits of our approach by comparing it qualitatively and quantitatively to other text based concept blending techniques, including linear interpolation, alternating prompts, step-wise prompt switching, and CLIP-guided prompt selection across various scenarios such as single object per text prompt, multiple objects per text prompt and objects against backgrounds. Our work shows that financially inspired techniques can enhance text-to-image concept blending in generative AI, paving the way for broader innovation. Code is available at https://github.com/divyakraman/BlackScholesDiffusion2024.

Fluctuation theorems impose constraints on possible work extraction probabilities in thermodynamical processes. These constraints are stronger than the usual second law, which is concerned only with average values. Here, we show that such constraints, expressed in the form of the Jarzysnki equality, can be bypassed if one allows for the use of catalysts - additional degrees of freedom that may become correlated with the system from which work is extracted, but whose reduced state remains unchanged so that they can be re-used. This violation can be achieved both for small systems but also for macroscopic many-body systems and leads to positive work extraction per particle with finite probability from macroscopic states in equilibrium. In addition to studying such violations for a single system, we also discuss the scenario in which many parties use the same catalyst to induce local transitions. We show that there exist catalytic processes that lead to highly correlated work distributions, expected to have implications for stochastic and quantum thermodynamics.

The two-body problem of variational electrodynamics possesses differential-delay equations of motion with state-dependent delays of neutral type and solutions that can have velocity discontinuities on countable sets. From a periodic orbit possessing some mild properties at breaking points, we define a synchronization function in R x R3, which is further used to construct two bounded oscillatory functions vanishing at breaking points and whose first derivatives are continuous and defined everywhere but at breaking points. The oscillatory functions are associated with a PDE identity in H2(R3), and we postulate ordering conditions for the PDE identity to define a Fredholm-Schroedinger operator with an O(1/r2) spin-orbit forcing term belonging to L2(R3). As an application, we introduce the Chemical Principle criterion to select orbits with asymptotically vanishing far-fields and estimate the Bohr radius parameter of the Fredholm-Schroedinger PDE using the boundary-layer of orbits chosen according to the Chemical Principle criterion. Last, working backward, we derive a Chemical Principle-like condition from the ordering conditions.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

In multi-agent tasks, the central challenge lies in the dynamic adaptation of strategies. However, directly conditioning on opponents' strategies is intractable in the prevalent deep reinforcement learning paradigm due to a fundamental ``representational bottleneck'': neural policies are opaque, high-dimensional parameter vectors that are incomprehensible to other agents. In this work, we propose a paradigm shift that bridges this gap by representing policies as human-interpretable source code and utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) as approximate interpreters. This programmatic representation allows us to operationalize the game-theoretic concept of Program Equilibrium. We reformulate the learning problem by utilizing LLMs to perform optimization directly in the space of programmatic policies. The LLM functions as a point-wise best-response operator that iteratively synthesizes and refines the ego agent's policy code to respond to the opponent's strategy. We formalize this process as Programmatic Iterated Best Response (PIBR), an algorithm where the policy code is optimized by textual gradients, using structured feedback derived from game utility and runtime unit tests. We demonstrate that this approach effectively solves several standard coordination matrix games and a cooperative Level-Based Foraging environment.

Magnitude of a finite metric space and the related notion of magnitude functions on metric spaces is an active area of research in algebraic topology. Magnitude originally arose in the context of biology, where it represents the number of effective species in an environment; when applied to a one-parameter family of metric spaces tX with scale parameter t, the magnitude captures much of the underlying geometry of the space. Prior work has mostly focussed on properties of magnitude in a global sense; in this paper we restrict the sets to finite subsets of Euclidean space and investigate its individual components. We give an explicit formula for the corrected inclusion-exclusion principle, and define a quantity associated with each point, called the moment which gives an intrinsic ordering to the points. We exploit this in order to form an algorithm which approximates the convex hull.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.