Daily Papers

Deep Equilibrium Models (DEQs) and Neural Ordinary Differential Equations (Neural ODEs) are two branches of implicit models that have achieved remarkable success owing to their superior performance and low memory consumption. While both are implicit models, DEQs and Neural ODEs are derived from different mathematical formulations. Inspired by homotopy continuation, we establish a connection between these two models and illustrate that they are actually two sides of the same coin. Homotopy continuation is a classical method of solving nonlinear equations based on a corresponding ODE. Given this connection, we proposed a new implicit model called HomoODE that inherits the property of high accuracy from DEQs and the property of stability from Neural ODEs. Unlike DEQs, which explicitly solve an equilibrium-point-finding problem via Newton's methods in the forward pass, HomoODE solves the equilibrium-point-finding problem implicitly using a modified Neural ODE via homotopy continuation. Further, we developed an acceleration method for HomoODE with a shared learnable initial point. It is worth noting that our model also provides a better understanding of why Augmented Neural ODEs work as long as the augmented part is regarded as the equilibrium point to find. Comprehensive experiments with several image classification tasks demonstrate that HomoODE surpasses existing implicit models in terms of both accuracy and memory consumption.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

In the Lagrange-Newton method, where Newton's method is applied to a Lagrangian function that includes equality constraints, all stationary points are saddle points. It is therefore not possible to use a line-search method based on the value of the objective function; instead, the line search can operate on merit functions. In this report, we explore an alternative line-search method which is applicable to this case; it particulary addresses the damping of the step length in tight valleys. We propose a line-search criterion based on the divergence of the field of Newton step vectors. The visualization of the criterion for two-dimensional test functions reveals a network of ravines with flat bottom at the zero points of the criterion. The ravines are typically connected to stationary points. To traverse this ravine network in order to approach a stationary point, a zigzag strategy is devised. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the novel line-search strategy succeeds from most starting points in all test functions, but only exhibits the desired damping of the step length in some situations. At the present stage it is therefore difficult to appraise the utility of this contribution.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

We introduce Equilibrium Propagation, a learning framework for energy-based models. It involves only one kind of neural computation, performed in both the first phase (when the prediction is made) and the second phase of training (after the target or prediction error is revealed). Although this algorithm computes the gradient of an objective function just like Backpropagation, it does not need a special computation or circuit for the second phase, where errors are implicitly propagated. Equilibrium Propagation shares similarities with Contrastive Hebbian Learning and Contrastive Divergence while solving the theoretical issues of both algorithms: our algorithm computes the gradient of a well defined objective function. Because the objective function is defined in terms of local perturbations, the second phase of Equilibrium Propagation corresponds to only nudging the prediction (fixed point, or stationary distribution) towards a configuration that reduces prediction error. In the case of a recurrent multi-layer supervised network, the output units are slightly nudged towards their target in the second phase, and the perturbation introduced at the output layer propagates backward in the hidden layers. We show that the signal 'back-propagated' during this second phase corresponds to the propagation of error derivatives and encodes the gradient of the objective function, when the synaptic update corresponds to a standard form of spike-timing dependent plasticity. This work makes it more plausible that a mechanism similar to Backpropagation could be implemented by brains, since leaky integrator neural computation performs both inference and error back-propagation in our model. The only local difference between the two phases is whether synaptic changes are allowed or not.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

We describe and analyse Levenberg-Marquardt methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations. More specifically, we propose an adaptive formula for the Levenberg-Marquardt parameter and analyse the local convergence of the method under Hölder metric subregularity of the function defining the equation and Hölder continuity of its gradient mapping. Further, we analyse the local convergence of the method under the additional assumption that the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality holds. We finally report encouraging numerical results confirming the theoretical findings for the problem of computing moiety conserved steady states in biochemical reaction networks. This problem can be cast as finding a solution of a system of nonlinear equations, where the associated mapping satisfies the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality assumption.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We present a vector-based method to balance chemical reactions. The algorithm builds candidates in a deterministic way, removes duplicates, and always prints coefficients in the lowest whole-number form. For redox cases, electrons and protons/hydroxide are treated explicitly, so both mass and charge are balanced. We also outline the basic principles of the vector formulation of stoichiometry, interpreting reactions as integer vectors in composition space, this geometric view supports compact visualizations of reagent-product interactions and helps surface distinct reaction families. The method enumerates valid balances for arbitrary user-specified species lists without special-case balancing rules or symbolic tricks, and it provides a clean foundation for developing new algorithmic variants (e.g., alternative objectives or constraints). On representative examples (neutralization, double displacement, decomposition, classical redox, small multicomponent sets) and a negative control, the method produced correct integer balances. When multiple balances exist, we report a canonical one - minimizing the total coefficient sum with a simple tie-breaker - without claiming global optimality beyond the solutions the search enumerates. The procedure applies per reaction and extends to reaction networks via consistent per-reaction application. We do not report runtimes, broader benchmarking and code/data release are planned.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

Ensemble Kalman Inversion (EKI) is a derivative-free, ensemble-based method for inverse and optimization problems. Its continuous-time formulation can be interpreted as an interacting particle system driven by a Kalman-type preconditioned descent direction. A well-known limitation of this dynamics is the possible premature collapse of the covariance of the ensemble, which makes the method sensitive to the initial ensemble. We introduce a second-order particle system in which the particles evolve according to an inertial dynamics. The model combines a Kalman-type relaxation force with damping, attraction towards the ensemble mean, and a short-range repulsive interaction designed to counteract ensemble collapse. The resulting dynamics can be interpreted as a heavy-ball reformulation of continuous-time EKI enriched by competing attractive and repulsive mechanisms. For linear inverse problems, we analyze the induced mean and fluctuation dynamics and identify a parameter regime in which fully collapsed configurations are linearly unstable. We further characterize asymptotic equilibria through a constrained optimality condition on the subspace retained by the limiting ensemble covariance and derive an exponential decay estimate. Numerical experiments illustrate the effect of inertia and repulsion on the ensemble dynamics and compare the proposed second-order method with first-order EKI-type

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives arise naturally in practice and pose unique challenges for research in decision-theoretic planning and learning, which has largely focused on single-objective settings. This article surveys algorithms designed for sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives. Though there is a growing body of literature on this subject, little of it makes explicit under what circumstances special methods are needed to solve multi-objective problems. Therefore, we identify three distinct scenarios in which converting such a problem to a single-objective one is impossible, infeasible, or undesirable. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy that classifies multi-objective methods according to the applicable scenario, the nature of the scalarization function (which projects multi-objective values to scalar ones), and the type of policies considered. We show how these factors determine the nature of an optimal solution, which can be a single policy, a convex hull, or a Pareto front. Using this taxonomy, we survey the literature on multi-objective methods for planning and learning. Finally, we discuss key applications of such methods and outline opportunities for future work.

Bundle adjustment is the common way to solve localization and mapping. It is an iterative process in which a system of non-linear equations is solved using two optimization methods, weighted by a damping factor. In the classic approach, the latter is chosen heuristically by the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on each iteration. This might take many iterations, making the process computationally expensive, which might be harmful to real-time applications. We propose to replace this heuristic by viewing the problem in a holistic manner, as a game, and formulating it as a reinforcement-learning task. We set an environment which solves the non-linear equations and train an agent to choose the damping factor in a learned manner. We demonstrate that our approach considerably reduces the number of iterations required to reach the bundle adjustment's convergence, on both synthetic and real-life scenarios. We show that this reduction benefits the classic approach and can be integrated with other bundle adjustment acceleration methods.

We present new algorithms for optimizing non-smooth, non-convex stochastic objectives based on a novel analysis technique. This improves the current best-known complexity for finding a (delta,epsilon)-stationary point from O(epsilon^{-4}delta^{-1}) stochastic gradient queries to O(epsilon^{-3}delta^{-1}), which we also show to be optimal. Our primary technique is a reduction from non-smooth non-convex optimization to online learning, after which our results follow from standard regret bounds in online learning. For deterministic and second-order smooth objectives, applying more advanced optimistic online learning techniques enables a new complexity of O(epsilon^{-1.5}delta^{-0.5}). Our techniques also recover all optimal or best-known results for finding epsilon stationary points of smooth or second-order smooth objectives in both stochastic and deterministic settings.

Solving a linear system Ax=b is a fundamental scientific computing primitive for which numerous solvers and preconditioners have been developed. These come with parameters whose optimal values depend on the system being solved and are often impossible or too expensive to identify; thus in practice sub-optimal heuristics are used. We consider the common setting in which many related linear systems need to be solved, e.g. during a single numerical simulation. In this scenario, can we sequentially choose parameters that attain a near-optimal overall number of iterations, without extra matrix computations? We answer in the affirmative for Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR), a standard solver whose parameter omega has a strong impact on its runtime. For this method, we prove that a bandit online learning algorithm--using only the number of iterations as feedback--can select parameters for a sequence of instances such that the overall cost approaches that of the best fixed omega as the sequence length increases. Furthermore, when given additional structural information, we show that a contextual bandit method asymptotically achieves the performance of the instance-optimal policy, which selects the best omega for each instance. Our work provides the first learning-theoretic treatment of high-precision linear system solvers and the first end-to-end guarantees for data-driven scientific computing, demonstrating theoretically the potential to speed up numerical methods using well-understood learning algorithms.

Non-cooperative game theory provides a robust framework for analyzing distributed resource allocation in multi-user wireless networks, with Iterative Water-Filling (IWF) emerging as a canonical solution for power control problems. Although classical fixed-point theorems guarantee the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) under mild concavity and compactness conditions, the convergence of practical iterative algorithms to that equilibrium remains a challenging endeavor. This challenge intensifies under varying update schedules, interference regimes, and imperfections such as channel estimation errors or feedback delay. In this paper, we present an in-depth examination of IWF in multi-user systems under three different update schemes: (1) synchronous sequential updates, (2) synchronous simultaneous updates, and (3) totally asynchronous updates. We first formulate the water-filling operator in a multi-carrier environment, then recast the iterative process as a fixed-point problem. Using contraction mapping principles, we demonstrate sufficient conditions under which IWF converges to a unique NE and highlight how spectral radius constraints, diagonal dominance, and careful step-size selection are pivotal for guaranteeing convergence. We further discuss robustness to measurement noise, partial updates, and network scaling to emphasize the practical viability of these schemes. This comprehensive analysis unifies diverse threads in the literature while offering novel insights into asynchronous implementations. Our findings enable network designers to ascertain system parameters that foster both stable convergence and efficient spectrum usage.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

Since Isaac Newton first studied the Kissing Number Problem in 1694, determining the maximal number of non-overlapping spheres around a central sphere has remained a fundamental challenge. This problem is the local analogue of Hilbert's 18th problem, bridging geometry, number theory, and information theory. Although significant progress has been made through lattices and codes, the irregularities of high-dimensional geometry, dimensional structure variability, and combinatorial explosion beyond Go limit the scalability and generality of existing methods. Here we model the problem as a two-player matrix completion game and train the reinforcement learning system, PackingStar, to play the games. The matrix entries represent pairwise cosines of sphere center vectors. One player fills entries while another corrects suboptimal ones to improve exploration quality, cooperatively maximizing the matrix size, corresponding to the kissing number. These matrices are decomposed into representative substructures, providing diverse bases and structural constraints that steer subsequent games and make extremely large spaces tractable. PackingStar surpasses records from dimensions 25 to 31 and sets new lower bounds for generalized kissing numbers under various angular constraints. It achieves the first breakthrough beyond rational structures from 1971 in 13 dimensions and discovers over 6000 new structures in other dimensions. Notably, some configurations challenge long-held antipodal paradigms, revealing algebraic correspondences with finite simple groups as well as geometric relationships across dimensions. Inspired by these patterns, humans devised further improved constructions. These results demonstrate AI's power to explore high-dimensional spaces beyond human intuition via extreme-scale reinforcement learning and open new pathways for the Kissing Number Problem and broader geometry research.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

In this paper, we examine the solvability of a functional equation in a Lipschitz space. As an application, we use our result to determine the existence and uniqueness of solutions to an equation describing a specific type of choice behavior model for the learning process of the paradise fish. Finally, we present some concrete examples where, using numerical techniques, we obtain approximations to the solution of the functional equation. As the straightforward Picard's iteration can be very expensive, we show that an analytical suboptimal least-squares approximation can be chosen in practice, resulting in very good accuracy.

Synthesizing optimal controllers for dynamical systems often involves solving optimization problems with hard real-time constraints. These constraints determine the class of numerical methods that can be applied: computationally expensive but accurate numerical routines are replaced by fast and inaccurate methods, trading inference time for solution accuracy. This paper provides techniques to improve the quality of optimized control policies given a fixed computational budget. We achieve the above via a hypersolvers approach, which hybridizes a differential equation solver and a neural network. The performance is evaluated in direct and receding-horizon optimal control tasks in both low and high dimensions, where the proposed approach shows consistent Pareto improvements in solution accuracy and control performance.

We study the behavior of an algorithm derived from the cavity method for the Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree (PCST) problem on graphs. The algorithm is based on the zero temperature limit of the cavity equations and as such is formally simple (a fixed point equation resolved by iteration) and distributed (parallelizable). We provide a detailed comparison with state-of-the-art algorithms on a wide range of existing benchmarks networks and random graphs. Specifically, we consider an enhanced derivative of the Goemans-Williamson heuristics and the DHEA solver, a Branch and Cut Linear/Integer Programming based approach. The comparison shows that the cavity algorithm outperforms the two algorithms in most large instances both in running time and quality of the solution. Finally we prove a few optimality properties of the solutions provided by our algorithm, including optimality under the two post-processing procedures defined in the Goemans-Williamson derivative and global optimality in some limit cases.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

Minimax problems are notoriously challenging to optimize. However, we demonstrate that the two-timescale extragradient can be a viable solution. By utilizing dynamical systems theory, we show that it converges to points that satisfy the second-order necessary condition of local minimax points, under a mild condition. This work surpasses all previous results as we eliminate a crucial assumption that the Hessian, with respect to the maximization variable, is nondegenerate.

We investigate a primal-dual (PD) method for the saddle point problem (SPP) that uses a linear approximation of the primal function instead of the standard proximal step, resulting in a linearized PD (LPD) method. For convex-strongly concave SPP, we observe that the LPD method has a suboptimal dependence on the Lipschitz constant of the primal function. To fix this issue, we combine features of Accelerated Gradient Descent with the LPD method resulting in a single-loop Accelerated Linearized Primal-Dual (ALPD) method. ALPD method achieves the optimal gradient complexity when the SPP has a semi-linear coupling function. We also present an inexact ALPD method for SPPs with a general nonlinear coupling function that maintains the optimal gradient evaluations of the primal parts and significantly improves the gradient evaluations of the coupling term compared to the ALPD method. We verify our findings with numerical experiments.

As first-order optimization methods become the method of choice for solving large-scale optimization problems, optimization solvers based on first-order algorithms are being built. Such general-purpose solvers must robustly detect infeasible or misspecified problem instances, but the computational complexity of first-order methods for doing so has yet to be formally studied. In this work, we characterize the optimal accelerated rate of infeasibility detection. We show that the standard fixed-point iteration achieves a O(1/k^2) and O(1/k) rates, respectively, on the normalized iterates and the fixed-point residual converging to the infimal displacement vector, while the accelerated fixed-point iteration achieves O(1/k^2) and mathcal{O}(1/k^2) rates. We then provide a matching complexity lower bound to establish that Theta(1/k^2) is indeed the optimal accelerated rate.

The Distance Geometry Problem (DGP) seeks to find positions for a set of points in geometric space when some distances between pairs of these points are known. The so-called discretization assumptions allow to discretize the search space of DGP instances. In this paper, we study the Discretizable Molecular Distance Geometry Problem whose feasible solutions provide a discretization scheme for the DGP. We propose the first constraint programming formulations as well as a set of checks for proving infeasibility, domain reduction techniques, symmetry breaking constraints and valid inequalities. Our computational results indicate that our formulations outperform the state-of-the-art integer programming formulations, both for feasible and infeasible instances.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

In the endeavor to make autonomous robots take actions, task planning is a major challenge that requires translating high-level task descriptions into long-horizon action sequences. Despite recent advances in language model agents, they remain prone to planning errors and limited in their ability to plan ahead. To address these limitations in robotic planning, we advocate a self-refining scheme that iteratively refines a draft plan until an equilibrium is reached. Remarkably, this process can be optimized end-to-end from an analytical perspective without the need to curate additional verifiers or reward models, allowing us to train self-refining planners in a simple supervised learning fashion. Meanwhile, a nested equilibrium sequence modeling procedure is devised for efficient closed-loop planning that incorporates useful feedback from the environment (or an internal world model). Our method is evaluated on the VirtualHome-Env benchmark, showing advanced performance with better scaling for inference computation. Code is available at https://github.com/Singularity0104/equilibrium-planner.

Multiobjective optimization plays an increasingly important role in modern applications, where several criteria are often of equal importance. The task in multiobjective optimization and multiobjective optimal control is therefore to compute the set of optimal compromises (the Pareto set) between the conflicting objectives. The advances in algorithms and the increasing interest in Pareto-optimal solutions have led to a wide range of new applications related to optimal and feedback control - potentially with non-smoothness both on the level of the objectives or in the system dynamics. This results in new challenges such as dealing with expensive models (e.g., governed by partial differential equations (PDEs)) and developing dedicated algorithms handling the non-smoothness. Since in contrast to single-objective optimization, the Pareto set generally consists of an infinite number of solutions, the computational effort can quickly become challenging, which is particularly problematic when the objectives are costly to evaluate or when a solution has to be presented very quickly. This article gives an overview of recent developments in the field of multiobjective optimization of non-smooth PDE-constrained problems. In particular we report on the advances achieved within Project 2 "Multiobjective Optimization of Non-Smooth PDE-Constrained Problems - Switches, State Constraints and Model Order Reduction" of the DFG Priority Programm 1962 "Non-smooth and Complementarity-based Distributed Parameter Systems: Simulation and Hierarchical Optimization".

Bayesian Optimization (BO) is widely and successfully adopted for solving optimization problems having an expensive-to-evaluate, black-box, and non-convex objective function. However, the vanilla BO algorithm is not able to exploit possible symmetries characterizing the target problem. An intuitive case is given by optimal location problems, whose decision variables refer to a finite set of points within a continuous space, with the order of points not affecting the value of the objective function. We refer to this setting as optimization over layouts to distinguish from optimization over point-clouds where, instead, the order of points counts. As an instance of optimization over layouts we consider a real-life industrial-relevant application, that is the optimization of the layout of an offshore wind farm: given identical wind turbines, switching any pair of them has not any effect on the annual energy production. Based on Optimal Transport theory, we propose a Permutation-Invariant BO approach, namely PIBO, proved to provide better wind farm layouts when compared to the vanilla BO approach while cutting computation time roughly in half.

Given a set of dissimilarity measurements amongst data points, determining what metric representation is most "consistent" with the input measurements or the metric that best captures the relevant geometric features of the data is a key step in many machine learning algorithms. Existing methods are restricted to specific kinds of metrics or small problem sizes because of the large number of metric constraints in such problems. In this paper, we provide an active set algorithm, Project and Forget, that uses Bregman projections, to solve metric constrained problems with many (possibly exponentially) inequality constraints. We provide a theoretical analysis of Project and Forget and prove that our algorithm converges to the global optimal solution and that the L_2 distance of the current iterate to the optimal solution decays asymptotically at an exponential rate. We demonstrate that using our method we can solve large problem instances of three types of metric constrained problems: general weight correlation clustering, metric nearness, and metric learning; in each case, out-performing the state of the art methods with respect to CPU times and problem sizes.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

Brain-like intelligent systems need brain-like learning methods. Equilibrium Propagation (EP) is a biologically plausible learning framework with strong potential for brain-inspired computing hardware. However, existing im-plementations of EP suffer from instability and prohibi-tively high computational costs. Inspired by the structure and dynamics of the brain, we propose a biologically plau-sible Feedback-regulated REsidual recurrent neural network (FRE-RNN) and study its learning performance in EP framework. Feedback regulation enables rapid convergence by reducing the spectral radius. The improvement in con-vergence property reduces the computational cost and train-ing time of EP by orders of magnitude, delivering perfor-mance on par with backpropagation (BP) in benchmark tasks. Meanwhile, residual connections with brain-inspired topologies help alleviate the vanishing gradient problem that arises when feedback pathways are weak in deep RNNs. Our approach substantially enhances the applicabil-ity and practicality of EP in large-scale networks that un-derpin artificial intelligence. The techniques developed here also offer guidance to implementing in-situ learning in physical neural networks.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

We consider function optimization as a sequential decision making problem under budget constraint. This constraint limits the number of objective function evaluations allowed during the optimization. We consider an algorithm inspired by a continuous version of a multi-armed bandit problem which attacks this optimization problem by solving the tradeoff between exploration (initial quasi-uniform search of the domain) and exploitation (local optimization around the potentially global maxima). We introduce the so-called Simultaneous Optimistic Optimization (SOO), a deterministic algorithm that works by domain partitioning. The benefit of such approach are the guarantees on the returned solution and the numerical efficiency of the algorithm. We present this machine learning approach to optimization, and provide the empirical assessment of SOO on the CEC'2014 competition on single objective real-parameter numerical optimization test-suite.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Deep equilibrium models promise input-adaptive implicit computation: harder problems should demand more solver iterations, and the solved equilibrium should encode the result of genuine iterative inference. We report a cautionary study of a port-Hamiltonian DEQ with a learned initialization on two reasoning tasks -- ProofWriter entailment over frozen DeBERTa embeddings and a BFS-verified graph-reachability benchmark -- in which the implicit computation is a silent no-op. Across tasks, seeds, and controlled ablation arms, the solved equilibrium equals the solver's start point to numerical precision, and bypassing the solver entirely changes test accuracy by +0.00 percentage points in 18 of 19 training runs. Controlled interventions falsify the tempting explanation: removing the anchoring term reproduces every result, and retraining with noise-decoupled starts yields a solver that converges to the noisy start while the decoder learns to ignore it. The single escaping run diverges instead (|h^{*}-z_0|=171), producing a co-adapted noise channel whose removal improves accuracy. Iteration counts are uncorrelated with ground-truth difficulty (r=0.009), and the full apparatus never outperforms a two-layer MLP on either task. We trace the mechanism to gradient starvation along two distinct routes, show that the standard zeroing ablation is confounded and gives wildly seed-dependent answers where the correct substitution test gives a stable zero, and distill a four-test diagnostic protocol for auditing claimed implicit computation. All experiments run on a single free Colab GPU; code, raw logs, and analysis scripts are released.

The higher-order correlation clustering problem is an expressive model, and recently, local search heuristics have been proposed for several applications. Certifying optimality, however, is NP-hard and practically hampered already by the complexity of the problem statement. Here, we focus on establishing partial optimality conditions for the special case of complete graphs and cubic objective functions. In addition, we define and implement algorithms for testing these conditions and examine their effect numerically, on two datasets.

Path-velocity decomposition is an intuitive yet powerful approach to address the complexity of kinodynamic motion planning. The difficult trajectory planning problem is solved in two separate, simpler, steps: first, find a path in the configuration space that satisfies the geometric constraints (path planning), and second, find a time-parameterization of that path satisfying the kinodynamic constraints. A fundamental requirement is that the path found in the first step should be time-parameterizable. Most existing works fulfill this requirement by enforcing quasi-static constraints in the path planning step, resulting in an important loss in completeness. We propose a method that enables path-velocity decomposition to discover truly dynamic motions, i.e. motions that are not quasi-statically executable. At the heart of the proposed method is a new algorithm -- Admissible Velocity Propagation -- which, given a path and an interval of reachable velocities at the beginning of that path, computes exactly and efficiently the interval of all the velocities the system can reach after traversing the path while respecting the system kinodynamic constraints. Combining this algorithm with usual sampling-based planners then gives rise to a family of new trajectory planners that can appropriately handle kinodynamic constraints while retaining the advantages associated with path-velocity decomposition. We demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method on some difficult kinodynamic planning problems, where, in particular, quasi-static methods are guaranteed to fail.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

This paper presents an equivalence between feasible kinodynamic planning and optimal kinodynamic planning, in that any optimal planning problem can be transformed into a series of feasible planning problems in a state-cost space whose solutions approach the optimum. This transformation gives rise to a meta-algorithm that produces an asymptotically optimal planner, given any feasible kinodynamic planner as a subroutine. The meta-algorithm is proven to be asymptotically optimal, and a formula is derived relating expected running time and solution suboptimality. It is directly applicable to a wide range of optimal planning problems because it does not resort to the use of steering functions or numerical boundary-value problem solvers. On a set of benchmark problems, it is demonstrated to perform, using the EST and RRT algorithms as subroutines, at a superior or comparable level to related planners.

This paper concerns a continuous time mean-variance (MV) portfolio selection problem in a jump-diffusion financial model with no-shorting trading constraint. The problem is reduced to two subproblems: solving a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem under control constraint, and finding a maximal point of a real function. Based on a two-dimensional fully coupled ordinary differential equation (ODE), we construct an explicit viscosity solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the constrained LQ problem. Together with the Meyer-Itô formula and a verification procedure, we obtain the optimal feedback controls of the constrained LQ problem and the original MV problem, which corrects the flawed results in some existing literatures. In addition, closed-form efficient portfolio and efficient frontier are derived. In the end, we present several examples where the two-dimensional ODE is decoupled.

The problem of fair multi-agent coordination in decentralized settings is one of the most pressing challenges for building efficient collaborative systems. Resource allocation is based on optimized collective arrangements accounting for agents' needs. Such coordination should not only be computationally efficient but also account for fairness, i.e., equitable redistribution of costs incurred by all agents. Recent literature has proposed several algorithms that efficiently determine optimal plan combinations balancing system-wide efficiency and individual discomfort of agents in a centralized setting. However, these works do not address equitable resource optimization in fully decentralized scenarios, specifically, the optimized redistribution of discomfort among coordinating agents so that none experiences a discomfort level that could lead to loss of incentive or polarization that can disrupt planned operations. In this work, we study the problem of optimizing three objectives: (i) system-wide efficiency, (ii) individuals' comfort and (iii) fairness (i.e., balancing of incurred discomfort costs) in decentralized multi-agent coordination. We design a novel model to optimize those three orthogonal objectives, without any substantial increase in communication and computational overhead. Through experiments on two real-world datasets, we validate the model and demonstrate that it can achieve fairer optimization outcomes, while satisfying agents' preferences and system goals.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

Solving Olympiad-level mathematical problems represents a significant advancement in machine intelligence and automated reasoning. Current machine learning methods, however, struggle to solve Olympiad-level problems beyond Euclidean plane geometry due to a lack of large-scale, high-quality datasets. The challenge is even greater in algebraic systems, which involve infinite reasoning spaces within finite conditions. To address these issues, we propose AIPS, an Algebraic Inequality Proving System capable of autonomously generating complex inequality theorems and effectively solving Olympiad-level inequality problems without requiring human demonstrations. During proof search in a mixed reasoning manner, a value curriculum learning strategy on generated datasets is implemented to improve proving performance, demonstrating strong mathematical intuitions. On a test set of 20 International Mathematical Olympiad-level inequality problems, AIPS successfully solved 10, outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, AIPS automatically generated a vast array of non-trivial theorems without human intervention, some of which have been evaluated by professional contestants and deemed to reach the level of the International Mathematical Olympiad. Notably, one theorem was selected as a competition problem in a major city 2024 Mathematical Olympiad.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

This paper presents a robust, distributed algorithm to solve general linear programs. The algorithm design builds on the characterization of the solutions of the linear program as saddle points of a modified Lagrangian function. We show that the resulting continuous-time saddle-point algorithm is provably correct but, in general, not distributed because of a global parameter associated with the nonsmooth exact penalty function employed to encode the inequality constraints of the linear program. This motivates the design of a discontinuous saddle-point dynamics that, while enjoying the same convergence guarantees, is fully distributed and scalable with the dimension of the solution vector. We also characterize the robustness against disturbances and link failures of the proposed dynamics. Specifically, we show that it is integral-input-to-state stable but not input-to-state stable. The latter fact is a consequence of a more general result, that we also establish, which states that no algorithmic solution for linear programming is input-to-state stable when uncertainty in the problem data affects the dynamics as a disturbance. Our results allow us to establish the resilience of the proposed distributed dynamics to disturbances of finite variation and recurrently disconnected communication among the agents. Simulations in an optimal control application illustrate the results.

We present anyakrakusuma, an open-source Python library that solves the discrete static Schrödinger bridge problem, the entropically regularized counterpart of optimal transport, through a log-domain Sinkhorn--Knopp iteration and reconstructs the entropic interpolation between two empirical point clouds. The solver is paired with a diagnostic pipeline that characterizes the optimal coupling and the intermediate distributions through information-theoretic and geometric measures. We exercise the library on four idealized planar cases spanning a circle-to-circle dilation, a spiral-to-mixture fragmentation, a rigid reorientation of two moons, and a Lissajous-to-trefoil deformation. The log-domain formulation is necessary rather than merely convenient at the parameters studied, where the cost-to-regularization ratio reaches four hundred and the Gibbs kernel underflows double precision across most of its range; the iteration nonetheless attains a marginal residual of 10^{-9} and unit marginal fidelity in every case. Residual histories decay geometrically over approximately eight decades at per-iteration contraction factors between 0.966 and 0.976, which are local rates near the fixed point that lie many orders of magnitude below the worst-case Hilbert-metric bound. The covariance analysis recovers an imposed ninety-degree reorientation to within 0.07^circ, roughly forty times smaller than its uncertainty, across a masked interval of near-isotropy on which the principal axis is unobservable. The diagnostics are reported with explicit attention to the regimes in which each is well defined, including the differential entropy, which is meaningful only on the open interpolation interval. The presented cases are constructed rather than measured; quantitative application to empirical point clouds requires further study.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Applying the method of moments to the chemical master equation (CME) appearing in stochastic chemical kinetics often leads to the so-called closure problem. Recently, several authors showed that this problem can be partially overcome using moment-based semidefinite programs (SDPs). In particular, they showed that moment-based SDPs can be used to calculate rigorous bounds on various descriptions of the stochastic chemical kinetic system's stationary distribution(s) -- for example, mean molecular counts, variances in these counts, and so on. In this paper, we show that these ideas can be extended to the corresponding dynamic problem, calculating time-varying bounds on the same descriptions.

This paper studies the fair range clustering problem in which the data points are from different demographic groups and the goal is to pick k centers with the minimum clustering cost such that each group is at least minimally represented in the centers set and no group dominates the centers set. More precisely, given a set of n points in a metric space (P,d) where each point belongs to one of the ell different demographics (i.e., P = P_1 uplus P_2 uplus cdots uplus P_ell) and a set of ell intervals [alpha_1, beta_1], cdots, [alpha_ell, beta_ell] on desired number of centers from each group, the goal is to pick a set of k centers C with minimum ell_p-clustering cost (i.e., (sum_{vin P} d(v,C)^p)^{1/p}) such that for each group iin ell, |Ccap P_i| in [alpha_i, beta_i]. In particular, the fair range ell_p-clustering captures fair range k-center, k-median and k-means as its special cases. In this work, we provide efficient constant factor approximation algorithms for fair range ell_p-clustering for all values of pin [1,infty).

Sphere packing, Hilbert's eighteenth problem, asks for the densest arrangement of congruent spheres in n-dimensional Euclidean space. Although relevant to areas such as cryptography, crystallography, and medical imaging, the problem remains unresolved: beyond a few special dimensions, neither optimal packings nor tight upper bounds are known. Even a major breakthrough in dimension n=8, later recognised with a Fields Medal, underscores its difficulty. A leading technique for upper bounds, the three-point method, reduces the problem to solving large, high-precision semidefinite programs (SDPs). Because each candidate SDP may take days to evaluate, standard data-intensive AI approaches are infeasible. We address this challenge by formulating SDP construction as a sequential decision process, the SDP game, in which a policy assembles SDP formulations from a set of admissible components. Using a sample-efficient model-based framework that combines Bayesian optimisation with Monte Carlo Tree Search, we obtain new state-of-the-art upper bounds in dimensions 4-16, showing that model-based search can advance computational progress in longstanding geometric problems. Together, these results demonstrate that sample-efficient, model-based search can make tangible progress on mathematically rigid, evaluation limited problems, pointing towards a complementary direction for AI-assisted discovery beyond large-scale LLM-driven exploration.

We consider the problem where an agent wants to find a hidden object that is randomly located in some vertex of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) according to a fixed but possibly unknown distribution. The agent can only examine vertices whose in-neighbors have already been examined. In this paper, we address a learning setting where we allow the agent to stop before having found the object and restart searching on a new independent instance of the same problem. Our goal is to maximize the total number of hidden objects found given a time budget. The agent can thus skip an instance after realizing that it would spend too much time on it. Our contributions are both to the search theory and multi-armed bandits. If the distribution is known, we provide a quasi-optimal and efficient stationary strategy. If the distribution is unknown, we additionally show how to sequentially approximate it and, at the same time, act near-optimally in order to collect as many hidden objects as possible.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

We propose the convergent graph solver (CGS), a deep learning method that learns iterative mappings to predict the properties of a graph system at its stationary state (fixed point) with guaranteed convergence. CGS systematically computes the fixed points of a target graph system and decodes them to estimate the stationary properties of the system without the prior knowledge of existing solvers or intermediate solutions. The forward propagation of CGS proceeds in three steps: (1) constructing the input dependent linear contracting iterative maps, (2) computing the fixed-points of the linear maps, and (3) decoding the fixed-points to estimate the properties. The contractivity of the constructed linear maps guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the fixed points following the Banach fixed point theorem. To train CGS efficiently, we also derive a tractable analytical expression for its gradient by leveraging the implicit function theorem. We evaluate the performance of CGS by applying it to various network-analytic and graph benchmark problems. The results indicate that CGS has competitive capabilities for predicting the stationary properties of graph systems, irrespective of whether the target systems are linear or non-linear. CGS also shows high performance for graph classification problems where the existence or the meaning of a fixed point is hard to be clearly defined, which highlights the potential of CGS as a general graph neural network architecture.

The FOX optimizer, inspired by red fox hunting behavior, is a powerful algorithm for solving real-world and engineering problems. However, despite balancing exploration and exploitation, it can prematurely converge to local optima, as agent positions are updated solely based on the current best-known position, causing all agents to converge on one location. This study proposes the modified FOX optimizer (mFOX) to enhance exploration and balance exploration and exploitation in three steps. First, the Oppositional-Based Learning (OBL) strategy is used to improve the initial population. Second, control parameters are refined to achieve a better balance between exploration and exploitation. Third, a new update equation is introduced, allowing agents to adjust their positions relative to one another rather than relying solely on the best-known position. This approach improves exploration efficiency without adding complexity. The mFOX algorithm's performance is evaluated against 12 well-known algorithms on 23 classical benchmark functions, 10 CEC2019 functions, and 12 CEC2022 functions. It outperforms competitors in 74% of the classical benchmarks, 60% of the CEC2019 benchmarks, and 58% of the CEC2022 benchmarks. Additionally, mFOX effectively addresses four engineering problems. These results demonstrate mFOX's strong competitiveness in solving complex optimization tasks, including unimodal, constrained, and high-dimensional problems.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Many popular reinforcement learning problems (e.g., navigation in a maze, some Atari games, mountain car) are instances of the episodic setting under its stochastic shortest path (SSP) formulation, where an agent has to achieve a goal state while minimizing the cumulative cost. Despite the popularity of this setting, the exploration-exploitation dilemma has been sparsely studied in general SSP problems, with most of the theoretical literature focusing on different problems (i.e., fixed-horizon and infinite-horizon) or making the restrictive loop-free SSP assumption (i.e., no state can be visited twice during an episode). In this paper, we study the general SSP problem with no assumption on its dynamics (some policies may actually never reach the goal). We introduce UC-SSP, the first no-regret algorithm in this setting, and prove a regret bound scaling as displaystyle mathcal{O}( D S A D K) after K episodes for any unknown SSP with S states, A actions, positive costs and SSP-diameter D, defined as the smallest expected hitting time from any starting state to the goal. We achieve this result by crafting a novel stopping rule, such that UC-SSP may interrupt the current policy if it is taking too long to achieve the goal and switch to alternative policies that are designed to rapidly terminate the episode.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We investigate an active pure-exploration setting, that includes best-arm identification, in the context of linear stochastic bandits. While asymptotically optimal algorithms exist for standard multi-arm bandits, the existence of such algorithms for the best-arm identification in linear bandits has been elusive despite several attempts to address it. First, we provide a thorough comparison and new insight over different notions of optimality in the linear case, including G-optimality, transductive optimality from optimal experimental design and asymptotic optimality. Second, we design the first asymptotically optimal algorithm for fixed-confidence pure exploration in linear bandits. As a consequence, our algorithm naturally bypasses the pitfall caused by a simple but difficult instance, that most prior algorithms had to be engineered to deal with explicitly. Finally, we avoid the need to fully solve an optimal design problem by providing an approach that entails an efficient implementation.

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

We propose a new method for optimistic planning in infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes based on the idea of adding regularization to the updates of an otherwise standard approximate value iteration procedure. This technique allows us to avoid contraction and monotonicity arguments typically required by existing analyses of approximate dynamic programming methods, and in particular to use approximate transition functions estimated via least-squares procedures in MDPs with linear function approximation. We use our method to recover known guarantees in tabular MDPs and to provide a computationally efficient algorithm for learning near-optimal policies in discounted linear mixture MDPs from a single stream of experience, and show it achieves near-optimal statistical guarantees.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

We consider the problem of designing a smooth trajectory that traverses a sequence of convex sets in minimum time, while satisfying given velocity and acceleration constraints. This problem is naturally formulated as a nonconvex program. To solve it, we propose a biconvex method that quickly produces an initial trajectory and iteratively refines it by solving two convex subproblems in alternation. This method is guaranteed to converge, returns a feasible trajectory even if stopped early, and does not require the selection of any line-search or trust-region parameter. Exhaustive experiments show that our method finds high-quality trajectories in a fraction of the time of state-of-the-art solvers for nonconvex optimization. In addition, it achieves runtimes comparable to industry-standard waypoint-based motion planners, while consistently designing lower-duration trajectories than existing optimization-based planners.

Given a graph, the shortest-path problem requires finding a sequence of edges with minimum cumulative length that connects a source vertex to a target vertex. We consider a variant of this classical problem in which the position of each vertex in the graph is a continuous decision variable constrained in a convex set, and the length of an edge is a convex function of the position of its endpoints. Problems of this form arise naturally in many areas, from motion planning of autonomous vehicles to optimal control of hybrid systems. The price for such a wide applicability is the complexity of this problem, which is easily seen to be NP-hard. Our main contribution is a strong and lightweight mixed-integer convex formulation based on perspective operators, that makes it possible to efficiently find globally optimal paths in large graphs and in high-dimensional spaces.

Using a long-standing conjecture from combinatorial group theory, we explore, from multiple perspectives, the challenges of finding rare instances carrying disproportionately high rewards. Based on lessons learned in the context defined by the Andrews-Curtis conjecture, we propose algorithmic enhancements and a topological hardness measure with implications for a broad class of search problems. As part of our study, we also address several open mathematical questions. Notably, we demonstrate the length reducibility of all but two presentations in the Akbulut-Kirby series (1981), and resolve various potential counterexamples in the Miller-Schupp series (1991), including three infinite subfamilies.

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of O(T^{-1/8}) on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performance, with the best attainable rate being Ω(T^{-1/4}) in contrast to the usual Ω(T^{-1/2}) rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate up to constant and logarithmic factors. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward trade-off between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

In this work, we study first-order algorithms for solving Bilevel Optimization (BO) where the objective functions are smooth but possibly nonconvex in both levels and the variables are restricted to closed convex sets. As a first step, we study the landscape of BO through the lens of penalty methods, in which the upper- and lower-level objectives are combined in a weighted sum with penalty parameter sigma > 0. In particular, we establish a strong connection between the penalty function and the hyper-objective by explicitly characterizing the conditions under which the values and derivatives of the two must be O(sigma)-close. A by-product of our analysis is the explicit formula for the gradient of hyper-objective when the lower-level problem has multiple solutions under minimal conditions, which could be of independent interest. Next, viewing the penalty formulation as O(sigma)-approximation of the original BO, we propose first-order algorithms that find an epsilon-stationary solution by optimizing the penalty formulation with sigma = O(epsilon). When the perturbed lower-level problem uniformly satisfies the small-error proximal error-bound (EB) condition, we propose a first-order algorithm that converges to an epsilon-stationary point of the penalty function, using in total O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-7}) accesses to first-order (stochastic) gradient oracles when the oracle is deterministic and oracles are noisy, respectively. Under an additional assumption on stochastic oracles, we show that the algorithm can be implemented in a fully {\it single-loop} manner, i.e., with O(1) samples per iteration, and achieves the improved oracle-complexity of O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-5}), respectively.

Bilevel optimization enjoys a wide range of applications in hyper-parameter optimization, meta-learning and reinforcement learning. However, bilevel optimization problems are difficult to solve. Recent progress on scalable bilevel algorithms mainly focuses on bilevel optimization problems where the lower-level objective is either strongly convex or unconstrained. In this work, we tackle the bilevel problem through the lens of the penalty method. We show that under certain conditions, the penalty reformulation recovers the solutions of the original bilevel problem. Further, we propose the penalty-based bilevel gradient descent (PBGD) algorithm and establish its finite-time convergence for the constrained bilevel problem without lower-level strong convexity. Experiments showcase the efficiency of the proposed PBGD algorithm.

Sampling-based algorithms are viewed as practical solutions for high-dimensional motion planning. Recent progress has taken advantage of random geometric graph theory to show how asymptotic optimality can also be achieved with these methods. Achieving this desirable property for systems with dynamics requires solving a two-point boundary value problem (BVP) in the state space of the underlying dynamical system. It is difficult, however, if not impractical, to generate a BVP solver for a variety of important dynamical models of robots or physically simulated ones. Thus, an open challenge was whether it was even possible to achieve optimality guarantees when planning for systems without access to a BVP solver. This work resolves the above question and describes how to achieve asymptotic optimality for kinodynamic planning using incremental sampling-based planners by introducing a new rigorous framework. Two new methods, Stable Sparse-RRT (SST) and SST*, result from this analysis, which are asymptotically near-optimal and optimal, respectively. The techniques are shown to converge fast to high-quality paths, while they maintain only a sparse set of samples, which makes them computationally efficient. The good performance of the planners is confirmed by experimental results using dynamical systems benchmarks, as well as physically simulated robots.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

The study demonstrates the capabilities of a vector-based approach for calculating stoichiometric coefficients in chemical equations, using black powder as an illustrative example. A method is proposed for selecting and constraining intermediate interactions between reactants, as well as for identifying final products. It is shown that even a small number of components can lead to a large number of final and intermediate products. Through concrete calculations, a correlation is established between the number of possible chemical equations and the number of reactants. A methodology is proposed for computing all possible chemical equations within a reaction system for arbitrary component ratios, enabling the derivation of all feasible chemical reactions. Additionally, a method is developed for calculating the chemical composition for a fixed set of reactants, allowing for the evaluation of the set of products resulting from all possible chemical interactions given a specified initial composition.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

In this paper, we propose a generic optimization approach for challenging objective functions that finds applications in various statistical problems. We focus on objective functions with two parameter blocks of one amenable to analytic optimization, and another that is irregular or computationally expensive. To address this setting, we propose the Voronoi-Elitism Genetic Algorithm (VEGA), a derivative-free optimization method that embeds geometric information into genetic search. The proposed algorithm retains elite candidates and constructs Voronoi-based neighborhoods around them, whose crossover and self-adaptive mutation balance exploitation of promising solutions with exploration of under-covered regions. We study the high dimensional behavior of genetic search by analyzing distance concentration, and the effects of population size and shrinking mutation, which shows that the algorithm improves spatial coverage and yields sharper distance bounds under limited computational budgets. Simulation studies are conducted to compare VEGA with two genetic-type algorithms competitors in finite samples. A real data application on Stack Exchange activity data further illustrates its ability to identify stable structural changes, implying the algorithm is computationally flexible for high-dimensional, derivative-free optimization and applicable for various statistical problems.

This paper studies the role of over-parametrization in solving non-convex optimization problems. The focus is on the important class of low-rank matrix sensing, where we propose an infinite hierarchy of non-convex problems via the lifting technique and the Burer-Monteiro factorization. This contrasts with the existing over-parametrization technique where the search rank is limited by the dimension of the matrix and it does not allow a rich over-parametrization of an arbitrary degree. We show that although the spurious solutions of the problem remain stationary points through the hierarchy, they will be transformed into strict saddle points (under some technical conditions) and can be escaped via local search methods. This is the first result in the literature showing that over-parametrization creates a negative curvature for escaping spurious solutions. We also derive a bound on how much over-parametrization is requited to enable the elimination of spurious solutions.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

We present new methods and results for constructing optimal Kobon triangle arrangements. First, we introduce a compact table notation for describing arrangements of pseudolines, enabling the representation and analysis of complex cases, including symmetrical arrangements, arrangements with parallel lines, and arrangements with multiple-line intersection points. Building on this, we provide a simple heuristic method and tools for recovering straight-line arrangements from a given table, with the ability to enforce additional properties such as symmetries. The tool successfully recovers arrangements for many previously known optimal solutions. Additionally, we develop a tool that transforms the search for optimal Kobon arrangement tables into a SAT problem, allowing us to leverage modern SAT solvers (specifically Kissat) to efficiently find new solutions or to show that no other solutions exist (for example, confirming that no optimal solution exists in the 11-line case). Using these techniques, we find new optimal Kobon arrangements for 23 and 27 lines, along with several other new results.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Magnitude of a finite metric space and the related notion of magnitude functions on metric spaces is an active area of research in algebraic topology. Magnitude originally arose in the context of biology, where it represents the number of effective species in an environment; when applied to a one-parameter family of metric spaces tX with scale parameter t, the magnitude captures much of the underlying geometry of the space. Prior work has mostly focussed on properties of magnitude in a global sense; in this paper we restrict the sets to finite subsets of Euclidean space and investigate its individual components. We give an explicit formula for the corrected inclusion-exclusion principle, and define a quantity associated with each point, called the moment which gives an intrinsic ordering to the points. We exploit this in order to form an algorithm which approximates the convex hull.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

Sampling-based kinodynamic planners, such as Rapidly-exploring Random Trees (RRTs), pose two fundamental challenges: computing a reliable (pseudo-)metric for the distance between two randomly sampled nodes, and computing a steering input to connect the nodes. The core of these challenges is a Two Point Boundary Value Problem, which is known to be NP-hard. Recently, the distance metric has been approximated using supervised learning, reducing computation time drastically. The previous work on such learning RRTs use direct optimal control to generate the data for supervised learning. This paper proposes to use indirect optimal control instead, because it provides two benefits: it reduces the computational effort to generate the data, and it provides a low dimensional parametrization of the action space. The latter allows us to learn both the distance metric and the steering input to connect two nodes. This eliminates the need for a local planner in learning RRTs. Experimental results on a pendulum swing up show 10-fold speed-up in both the offline data generation and the online planning time, leading to at least a 10-fold speed-up in the overall planning time.

P. Kabamba developed generation theory as a tool for studying self-reproducing systems. We provide an alternative definition of a generation system and give a complete solution to the problem of finding optimal seeds for a finite self-replicating system. We also exhibit examples illustrating a connection between self-replication and fixed-point theory.

We consider an improper reinforcement learning setting where a learner is given M base controllers for an unknown Markov decision process, and wishes to combine them optimally to produce a potentially new controller that can outperform each of the base ones. This can be useful in tuning across controllers, learnt possibly in mismatched or simulated environments, to obtain a good controller for a given target environment with relatively few trials. Towards this, we propose two algorithms: (1) a Policy Gradient-based approach; and (2) an algorithm that can switch between a simple Actor-Critic (AC) based scheme and a Natural Actor-Critic (NAC) scheme depending on the available information. Both algorithms operate over a class of improper mixtures of the given controllers. For the first case, we derive convergence rate guarantees assuming access to a gradient oracle. For the AC-based approach we provide convergence rate guarantees to a stationary point in the basic AC case and to a global optimum in the NAC case. Numerical results on (i) the standard control theoretic benchmark of stabilizing an cartpole; and (ii) a constrained queueing task show that our improper policy optimization algorithm can stabilize the system even when the base policies at its disposal are unstable.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a popular alternative to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), offering theoretical equivalence with simpler implementation. We prove this equivalence is conditional rather than universal, depending on an implicit assumption frequently violated in practice: the RLHF-optimal policy must prefer human-preferred responses. When this assumption fails, DPO optimizes relative advantage over the reference policy rather than absolute alignment with human preferences, leading to pathological convergence where policies decrease DPO loss while preferring dispreferred responses. We characterize when this assumption is violated, show the existence of an undesirable solution space, and prove that DPO and RLHF optimize fundamentally different objectives in such cases. To address this, we introduce Constrained Preference Optimization (CPO), augmenting RLHF with constraints for provable alignment. We further provide a geometric interpretation through soft margin ranking, revealing that DPO implements margin ranking with potentially negative targets. Our theoretical analysis establishes when DPOs' guarantees hold and provides solutions preserving simplicity with provable alignment. Comprehensive experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that CPO achieves state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at: https://github.com/visitworld123/CPO.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

We study the problem of approximating stationary points of Lipschitz and smooth functions under (varepsilon,delta)-differential privacy (DP) in both the finite-sum and stochastic settings. A point w is called an alpha-stationary point of a function F:R^drightarrowR if |nabla F(w)|leq alpha. We provide a new efficient algorithm that finds an Obig(big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{2/3}big)-stationary point in the finite-sum setting, where n is the number of samples. This improves on the previous best rate of Obig(big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{1/2}big). We also give a new construction that improves over the existing rates in the stochastic optimization setting, where the goal is to find approximate stationary points of the population risk. Our construction finds a Obig(1{n^{1/3}} + big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{1/2}big)-stationary point of the population risk in time linear in n. Furthermore, under the additional assumption of convexity, we completely characterize the sample complexity of finding stationary points of the population risk (up to polylog factors) and show that the optimal rate on population stationarity is tilde Thetabig(1{n}+sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big). Finally, we show that our methods can be used to provide dimension-independent rates of Obig(1{n}+minbig(big[sqrt{rank}{nvarepsilon}big]^{2/3},1{(nvarepsilon)^{2/5}}big)big) on population stationarity for Generalized Linear Models (GLM), where rank is the rank of the design matrix, which improves upon the previous best known rate.