Daily Papers

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

When coding agents encounter defective test infrastructure they may reward-hack: hardcoding outputs or editing test files to pass tests they cannot legitimately satisfy, a pattern that has now appeared outside benchmarks, in a coordinated multi-agent intrusion of a major AI platform's production infrastructure. The same capability that lets an agent detect and exploit a defect could let it report one, given the right decision environment. We evaluate escalation channels, structured reporting tools available to the agent at the point of conflict, as a decision-environment intervention that both reduces reward hacking and surfaces the infrastructure defects that trigger it. A 2 times 2 factorial separates the contributions of an escalation tool, a standalone anti-reward-hacking policy, and their combination. Across 8 frontier models spanning 5 families, the combined intervention reduces reward hacking from 23.6% to 5.3% (mixed-effects logistic OR = 9.2, 95% CI 5.0--16.8, p < 10^{-12}) with no detectable cost or performance overhead, eliminating it entirely for 6 of 8 models. Escalation and hacking are near-perfectly mutually exclusive, with 98.7% of escalations involving no hacking (100% under the combined intervention). Beyond reduction, escalation channels function as diagnostic infrastructure: on top of monitoring, escalation adds +10.1 percentage points of defect detection coverage and is more accurate once it fires (99.4% vs 85.8%). Unlike containment-based approaches that risk outpacing growing model capabilities, escalation channels redirect capability toward disclosure rather than exploitation.

We propose RegLLM, a diagnostic harness for bounded autonomy in regulated agentic workflows. It instruments six trustworthiness signals: citation validity, source grounding, schema compliance, escalation correctness, constitutional alignment, and unsafe-action rate. Signals are distinguished by their source of supervision: programmatic verifiers, task-level escalation labels, or AI-judge scores. A deterministic runtime supervisor blocks ungrounded answers and forces escalation, logging interventions. The same domain constitution informs evaluation, training rewards, and serving guardrails. Task-level should-escalate labels make the act-versus-defer decision a measurable training signal. We demonstrate the harness at smoke scale. An offline reference run (n=12) lifts escalation recall from 0 to 0.67 and reduces unsafe-action rate from 0.33 to 0.08 when governance is enabled. Two single-GPU Qwen2.5-3B LoRA/DPO pilots (n=8, same seed and evaluation split) expose substantial variation: nominally identical RL-base configurations yield task success of 0.25 versus 0.12 and escalation recall of 1.0 versus 0.5. An answer-quality adapter changes recall from 1.0 to 0.5 in Run A, but from 0.5 to 1.0 in Run B. An escalation-aware variant produces no measurable change in Run B. These small pilots do not establish reliable adapter effects or production readiness. Their contribution is diagnostic: configuration variance can overwhelm apparent tuning effects on bounded-autonomy metrics, motivating larger evaluation sets and repeated runs.

Coding agents perform long-running tasks spanning dozens of model calls, tool uses, and code edits. As these runs unfold, users face a practical cost-quality trade-off: escalating to a stronger model when a cheaper one struggles, or downshifting once the hard reasoning is complete. Each switch requires the receiver to continue a non-native trajectory produced by another model. We study how this handoff affects quality and cost, and how varying the trajectory information inherited by the receiver changes the outcome. Using pairs of low-cost, low-capability (LC) and high-cost, high-capability (HC) models from the Claude and GPT families, we vary handoff direction, timing, and interface, comparing full-trajectory transfer, compaction, and trajectory removal while preserving the repository state. Across both model families, full-trajectory escalation recovers less than half of the LC-to-HC quality gap while incurring a substantial cost premium. We term this cost-quality penalty the handoff tax. By contrast, downshift offers a favorable cost-quality point. Interestingly, the preferred interface also reverses with direction: reducing LC-model trajectory information improves escalation quality, whereas removing the HC-model trajectory reduces downshift quality.

We investigate reinforcement learning (RL) for privileged planning in autonomous driving. State-of-the-art approaches for this task are rule-based, but these methods do not scale to the long tail. RL, on the other hand, is scalable and does not suffer from compounding errors like imitation learning. Contemporary RL approaches for driving use complex shaped rewards that sum multiple individual rewards, \eg~progress, position, or orientation rewards. We show that PPO fails to optimize a popular version of these rewards when the mini-batch size is increased, which limits the scalability of these approaches. Instead, we propose a new reward design based primarily on optimizing a single intuitive reward term: route completion. Infractions are penalized by terminating the episode or multiplicatively reducing route completion. We find that PPO scales well with higher mini-batch sizes when trained with our simple reward, even improving performance. Training with large mini-batch sizes enables efficient scaling via distributed data parallelism. We scale PPO to 300M samples in CARLA and 500M samples in nuPlan with a single 8-GPU node. The resulting model achieves 64 DS on the CARLA longest6 v2 benchmark, outperforming other RL methods with more complex rewards by a large margin. Requiring only minimal adaptations from its use in CARLA, the same method is the best learning-based approach on nuPlan. It scores 91.3 in non-reactive and 90.6 in reactive traffic on the Val14 benchmark while being an order of magnitude faster than prior work.

When AI agents operating with access to sensitive information encounter a conflict between completing an assigned task and following rules or ethical constraints, they can resort to unsanctioned behaviour. Existing inference time safety work addresses this primarily through monitoring and access restriction. We investigate a complementary and under-explored layer: environmental controls that act on the agent's decision context at the point of conflict, making it more likely that the agent takes an authorised alternative path rather than an unsanctioned one. Drawing on Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), a framework used in human insider risk management to make harmful actions less rewarding and compliant actions more viable by design choices in the environment, we design and evaluate escalation channels as a concrete instantiation of this control class. An escalation channel provides an agent with a formal, out-of-band route to surface a conflict to an independent authority. We evaluate two designs: a simple email escalation and an instrumentally credible channel that guarantees a 30-minute pause and independent review, making the authorised path genuinely useful for goal achievement rather than merely nominally available. Across 10 frontier LLMs using the agentic task-rule conflict scenario of Lynch et al. (2025), we find that without any control the harmful action rate is 38.73%. A simple escalation channel reduces this to 5.92%; the instrumentally credible channel reduces it further to 1.21%, a statistically significant improvement observed in all 10 models tested across 24,000 samples. Our results suggest that the instrumental credibility of the authorised alternative matters considerably, and that environmental control design is a productive and largely unexplored addition to the defence-in-depth toolkit for agentic AI systems.

Specifying a penalty can turn a legal obligation into a cost-benefit calculation that favors violation. We show that this enforcement information paradox occurs in AI agents. Most AI safety evaluations test whether models fail; we ask why, using compliance theory from law and economics as a diagnostic. We evaluate twelve instruction-tuned language models deployed as enterprise procurement chatbots. Each is given an environmental regulation in its system prompt covering large purchases, and a vendor list on which the certified suppliers cost nearly twice what the uncertified ones do. We test the agents against the predictions of deterrence, legitimacy, and expressive law, and find that each theory accounts for part of what we observe. Under identical conditions, compliance spans 46 percentage points across models, and models differ in which pressure breaks them: some treat the regulation as binding however it is worded, while others fail where theory predicts, under low penalties and non-command phrasing. Benchmark scores and developers' own descriptions of post-training do not predict where a model falls. Across all twelve, financial incentives, managerial demands, peer outcomes, and employee pressure each produce large compliance failures. These agents violate regulatory constraints to satisfy local user objectives in ways standard alignment benchmarks do not measure. Embedding the rule in the system prompt is not on its own enough to produce a compliant agent: model selection is itself a governance decision, and benchmark evaluation is not sufficient for compliance-sensitive deployments.

In this work, we propose BAIT (Boundary-Aware Iterative Trap), a three-step jailbreak framework that approaches malicious goals through internal disclosure. BAIT first asks the model to identify the protection boundary, then requires it to refine that boundary, and finally requests a detailed example. By expanding each step upon the model's previous responses, BAIT turns the model's own reasoning and consistency tendency into a disclosure pathway. Experiments on AdvBench, JailbreakBench, AIR-Bench, and SORRY-Bench demonstrate that BAIT consistently achieves strong attack success rates across top-tier large language models, significantly advancing conventional jailbreak baselines. Further analysis reveals that: 1) prevention-oriented framing significantly outperforms direct knowledge request; 2) the refinement step plays a critical role in disclosure escalation; and 3) the first two steps have a certain chance of eliciting harmful content while triggering little filtering.