Daily Papers

Situational awareness, the capacity of an AI system to recognize its own nature, understand its training and deployment context, and reason strategically about its circumstances, is widely considered among the most dangerous emergent capabilities in advanced AI systems. Separately, a growing research effort seeks to improve the logical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) across deduction, induction, and abduction. In this paper, we argue that these two research trajectories are on a collision course. We introduce the RAISE framework (Reasoning Advancing Into Self Examination), which identifies three mechanistic pathways through which improvements in logical reasoning enable progressively deeper levels of situational awareness: deductive self inference, inductive context recognition, and abductive self modeling. We formalize each pathway, construct an escalation ladder from basic self recognition to strategic deception, and demonstrate that every major research topic in LLM logical reasoning maps directly onto a specific amplifier of situational awareness. We further analyze why current safety measures are insufficient to prevent this escalation. We conclude by proposing concrete safeguards, including a "Mirror Test" benchmark and a Reasoning Safety Parity Principle, and pose an uncomfortable but necessary question to the logical reasoning community about its responsibility in this trajectory.

A multi-agent pipeline with N agents typically issues N LLM calls per run. Merging agents into fewer calls (compound execution) promises token savings, but naively merged calls silently degrade quality through tool loss and prompt compression. We present Agent Capsules, an adaptive execution runtime that treats multi-agent pipeline execution as an optimization problem with empirical quality constraints. The runtime instruments coordination overhead per group, scores composition opportunity, selects among three compound execution strategies, and gates every mode switch on rolling-mean output quality. A controlled negative result confirms that injecting more context into a merged call worsens compression rather than relieving it, so the framework's escalation ladder (standard, then two-phase, then sequential) recovers quality by moving toward per-agent dispatch rather than by rewriting merged prompts. On LLM-judged quality, the controller matches a hand-tuned oracle on every measured (model, group, mode) cell: routing compound whenever the oracle would, and reverting to fine whenever quality would fail the floor, without per-model configuration. Against a hand-crafted LangGraph implementation of a 14-agent competitive intelligence pipeline, Agent Capsules uses 51% fewer fine-mode input tokens and 42% fewer compound-mode input tokens, at +0.020 and +0.017 quality respectively. Against a DSPy implementation of a 5-agent due diligence pipeline, the framework uses 19% fewer tokens than uncompiled DSPy at quality parity, and 68% fewer tokens than MIPROv2 at +0.052 quality. Even before compound mode fires, the runtime delivers efficiency through automatic policy resolution, cache-aligned prompts, and topology-aware context injection, matching both hand-tuned and compile-time baselines without training data or per-pipeline engineering.

Foundation models are becoming remarkably reliable at high-level reasoning, yet they remain too slow and costly to serve as fine-grained controllers. Conversely, fast policies like VLAs and whole-body controllers offer more efficient reflexes, but struggle to generalize. While pairing a deliberative brain (foundation models) with a reactive cerebellum (fast policies) seems natural for embodied systems, two obstacles remain: methods are built and scored on incompatible stacks, and their asynchronous coordination is difficult. For example, an agent that calls the VLA in the agentic loop can stall the fast execution, while a VLA that calls the agent on errors tends to re-trigger fallbacks repeatedly or completely miss silent failures. To address this, we propose REA (Routed Embodied Agent), a unified runtime where a deliberative System 2, an embodied router System 1 and reactive System 0 policies cooperate under a single golden rule - no running policy waits on the brain. Instead of querying the brain at each failure, REA employs a route memory that stores each policy's measured success ahead of time, a boundary-triggered judge gate that consults the brain on policy execution, and a shared-budget escalation ladder for bounded recovery. Evaluated on 3,000 test episodes across 60 LIBERO-Pro tasks, REA reaches 95.9% success and beats the best single-agent baseline in its own policy pool (94.7%) while reducing control steps by 25% and control time by 17%. In a separate 100-episode RoboTwin 2.0 study, REA achieves 84% success with VLA policies and 86% with VLA+code, compared with 80% for the strongest single VLA baseline MEDex. These results demonstrate learned and programmatic policies operating within the same runtime. REA also transfers to BEHAVIOR-1K and a real Unitree G1 humanoid, achieving the highest observed success among the compared methods.

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

When AI agents operating with access to sensitive information encounter a conflict between completing an assigned task and following rules or ethical constraints, they can resort to unsanctioned behaviour. Existing inference time safety work addresses this primarily through monitoring and access restriction. We investigate a complementary and under-explored layer: environmental controls that act on the agent's decision context at the point of conflict, making it more likely that the agent takes an authorised alternative path rather than an unsanctioned one. Drawing on Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), a framework used in human insider risk management to make harmful actions less rewarding and compliant actions more viable by design choices in the environment, we design and evaluate escalation channels as a concrete instantiation of this control class. An escalation channel provides an agent with a formal, out-of-band route to surface a conflict to an independent authority. We evaluate two designs: a simple email escalation and an instrumentally credible channel that guarantees a 30-minute pause and independent review, making the authorised path genuinely useful for goal achievement rather than merely nominally available. Across 10 frontier LLMs using the agentic task-rule conflict scenario of Lynch et al. (2025), we find that without any control the harmful action rate is 38.73%. A simple escalation channel reduces this to 5.92%; the instrumentally credible channel reduces it further to 1.21%, a statistically significant improvement observed in all 10 models tested across 24,000 samples. Our results suggest that the instrumental credibility of the authorised alternative matters considerably, and that environmental control design is a productive and largely unexplored addition to the defence-in-depth toolkit for agentic AI systems.

Computer-use agents increasingly tackle long-horizon tasks, where running a frontier model at every step is expensive and a small open-weight model alone often fails. Weak-to-strong escalation offers a middle ground where a weak agent acts by default and hands control to a strong one only when needed. The core challenge is deciding when to escalate, which requires an uncertainty signal cheap enough to check at every step. However, even after handoff, the strong agent can still get lost, but a black-box API that the strong agent is usually served exposes no internals to monitor. To this end, we propose LEASH, a training-free framework that unleashes the strong agent only when the weak agent's latent uncertainty signals it is needed, and keeps it on a leash afterward. LEASH has three layers: (1) initial task uncertainty for early routing, (2) step-level uncertainty for runtime escalation, and, after handoff, (3) a shadow observer for continued oversight of the strong black-box agent. Here, we use latent uncertainty as a fuel for all three layers. Specifically, we compare the weak model's hidden states with those from its past successful and failed trajectories, and a state that looks more like the failures signals higher uncertainty. During weak-agent execution, our uncertainty estimator reuses activations already produced during action generation, so it needs no extra forward pass or dedicated monitor training. Experiments on OSWorld across four contemporary model backbones show that LEASH consistently improves over standalone weak agents and outperforms random escalation by 6.55--11.94 points at matched escalation rates. With Qwen3.5-35B-A3B, LEASH achieves 73.66% task success at $0.4117 per task, matching always-on Claude Opus 5 (72.90%) while reducing inference cost by 19.2%.

When coding agents encounter defective test infrastructure they may reward-hack: hardcoding outputs or editing test files to pass tests they cannot legitimately satisfy, a pattern that has now appeared outside benchmarks, in a coordinated multi-agent intrusion of a major AI platform's production infrastructure. The same capability that lets an agent detect and exploit a defect could let it report one, given the right decision environment. We evaluate escalation channels, structured reporting tools available to the agent at the point of conflict, as a decision-environment intervention that both reduces reward hacking and surfaces the infrastructure defects that trigger it. A 2 times 2 factorial separates the contributions of an escalation tool, a standalone anti-reward-hacking policy, and their combination. Across 8 frontier models spanning 5 families, the combined intervention reduces reward hacking from 23.6% to 5.3% (mixed-effects logistic OR = 9.2, 95% CI 5.0--16.8, p < 10^{-12}) with no detectable cost or performance overhead, eliminating it entirely for 6 of 8 models. Escalation and hacking are near-perfectly mutually exclusive, with 98.7% of escalations involving no hacking (100% under the combined intervention). Beyond reduction, escalation channels function as diagnostic infrastructure: on top of monitoring, escalation adds +10.1 percentage points of defect detection coverage and is more accurate once it fires (99.4% vs 85.8%). Unlike containment-based approaches that risk outpacing growing model capabilities, escalation channels redirect capability toward disclosure rather than exploitation.

We introduce LADDER (Learning through Autonomous Difficulty-Driven Example Recursion), a framework which enables Large Language Models to autonomously improve their problem-solving capabilities through self-guided learning by recursively generating and solving progressively simpler variants of complex problems. Unlike prior approaches that require curated datasets or human feedback, LADDER leverages a model's own capabilities to generate easier question variants. We demonstrate LADDER's effectiveness in the subject of mathematical integration, improving Llama 3.2 3B's accuracy from 1% to 82% on undergraduate-level problems and enabling Qwen2.5 7B Deepseek-R1 Distilled to achieve 73% on the MIT Integration Bee qualifying examination. We also introduce TTRL (Test-Time Reinforcement Learning), where we perform reinforcement learning on variants of test problems at inference time. TTRL enables Qwen2.5 7B Deepseek-R1 Distilled to achieve a state-of-the-art score of 90% on the MIT Integration Bee qualifying examination, surpassing OpenAI o1's performance. These results show how self-directed strategic learning can achieve significant capability improvements without relying on architectural scaling or human supervision.

We focus on agile, continuous, and terrain-adaptive jumping of quadrupedal robots in discontinuous terrains such as stairs and stepping stones. Unlike single-step jumping, continuous jumping requires accurately executing highly dynamic motions over long horizons, which is challenging for existing approaches. To accomplish this task, we design a hierarchical learning and control framework, which consists of a learned heightmap predictor for robust terrain perception, a reinforcement-learning-based centroidal-level motion policy for versatile and terrain-adaptive planning, and a low-level model-based leg controller for accurate motion tracking. In addition, we minimize the sim-to-real gap by accurately modeling the hardware characteristics. Our framework enables a Unitree Go1 robot to perform agile and continuous jumps on human-sized stairs and sparse stepping stones, for the first time to the best of our knowledge. In particular, the robot can cross two stair steps in each jump and completes a 3.5m long, 2.8m high, 14-step staircase in 4.5 seconds. Moreover, the same policy outperforms baselines in various other parkour tasks, such as jumping over single horizontal or vertical discontinuities. Experiment videos can be found at https://yxyang.github.io/jumping\_cod/.

Language models have been adopted faster than evaluation practices that reliably assess their risks, and a growing share of use is affective rather than informational. Within that traffic users disclose suicide and self-harm (SSH) crises. Existing safety benchmarks score models primarily on refusal, but refusal is not the desired behavior here; the conversation requires a substantive supportive response. We introduce DistressBench, 718 English conversations with clinician-authored user turns spanning 23 SSH subcategories, each paired with a task-specific rubric of weighted atomic criteria across seven dimensions of crisis support and a clinician reference response. A model's score is the weighted average over the criteria its reply satisfies, reading directly as the fraction of required care delivered. The best of 25 frontier models satisfies 88.4% of weighted criteria and the median model 71.4%, against 98.7% for clinician references scored on the same criteria. Pooled across all 25 models, in 35.3% of conversations where a model satisfied every criterion for recognizing the crisis, it failed to route the user toward human help. The shortfall concentrates in the dimensions requiring the model to act rather than withhold. Contrasting each dimension's median model against its best separates capability limits from choices: de-escalation reaches 74.6% in the strongest model against a median of 46.0%, and safety disclaimers 84.6% against 8.3%. Multi-turn conversations score below single-turn ones (68.5% against 74.2%). We release the corpus, rubrics, judge calibration labels, and a companion annex of 20 long-horizon red-team transcripts. These results argue for evaluating crisis safety on the care a model delivers rather than on what it declines to say, and for treating de-escalation and resource routing as deployment requirements.

We propose RegLLM, a diagnostic harness for bounded autonomy in regulated agentic workflows. It instruments six trustworthiness signals: citation validity, source grounding, schema compliance, escalation correctness, constitutional alignment, and unsafe-action rate. Signals are distinguished by their source of supervision: programmatic verifiers, task-level escalation labels, or AI-judge scores. A deterministic runtime supervisor blocks ungrounded answers and forces escalation, logging interventions. The same domain constitution informs evaluation, training rewards, and serving guardrails. Task-level should-escalate labels make the act-versus-defer decision a measurable training signal. We demonstrate the harness at smoke scale. An offline reference run (n=12) lifts escalation recall from 0 to 0.67 and reduces unsafe-action rate from 0.33 to 0.08 when governance is enabled. Two single-GPU Qwen2.5-3B LoRA/DPO pilots (n=8, same seed and evaluation split) expose substantial variation: nominally identical RL-base configurations yield task success of 0.25 versus 0.12 and escalation recall of 1.0 versus 0.5. An answer-quality adapter changes recall from 1.0 to 0.5 in Run A, but from 0.5 to 1.0 in Run B. An escalation-aware variant produces no measurable change in Run B. These small pilots do not establish reliable adapter effects or production readiness. Their contribution is diagnostic: configuration variance can overwhelm apparent tuning effects on bounded-autonomy metrics, motivating larger evaluation sets and repeated runs.