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Nov 16

CFG-Policy: Unified Diffusion Policy Learning Framework via Classifier-free Guidance

Diffusion policies are increasingly used in robotic control and manipulation, vision-language-action models, and world-model-based agents. Their ability to represent multimodal action distributions offers rich opportunities for exploration in reinforcement learning (RL). However, optimizing diffusion policies with RL can reduce the behavioral diversity and further limit their exploration capability. In RL post-training, directly fine-tuning a pretrained policy may also disrupt its acquired capabilities, while action-space residuals may lack the expressive power for multimodal exploration. Together, these issues reveal a common challenge across online and offline-to-online diffusion RL: improving task performance while retaining the behavioral diversity and capabilities needed for continued adaptation. We introduce CFG-Policy, a unified, plug-and-play framework that separates exploration and exploitation into two generative policies and combines their score or velocity fields during sampling through classifier-free guidance. For online RL, a frozen exploration branch sustains behavioral diversity while an exploitation branch learns from task rewards; for offline-to-online RL, a pretrained exploitation branch remains frozen while a trainable branch steers the composed behavior. CFG-Policy preserves the underlying RL objectives and improves performance with QSM and QVPO on 5 MuJoCo tasks and with Flow-SDE+PPO on 4 RoboTwin manipulation tasks. Project page is at https://zhy-liu.github.io/cfg-policy-page.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 9

WarpGuard: Protected-Site Control-Flow Integrity for CUDA SASS Binaries

Recent CUDA exploitation work shows that GPU memory bugs can escalate into device-side control-flow corruption, as kernels later consume corrupted return continuations, function pointers, dispatch-table entries, or branch targets. For deployed CUDA binaries, the relevant security boundary is executed NVIDIA SASS, after PTX lowering, inlining, ABI decisions, register allocation, spills, predication, and SIMT execution; source- or PTX-level policies do not capture this boundary. We present WarpGuard, to our knowledge the first protected-site CFI system for CUDA device binaries operating on executed SASS. WarpGuard enforces at protected sites: recovered SASS instructions or sequences that consume control-flow state, provide sufficient binary evidence to derive policy, are checked before release, and fail closed on violation. It authenticates backward-edge continuation state for instrumented returns, validates recoverable forward targets per site, and reports fixed-edge, unsupported, profile-excluded, fallback, and no-surface outcomes outside the protected denominator. On 77 CUDA artifacts, WarpGuard classifies 51,621 SASS control-flow sites, including 1,343 returns and 154 supported forward target-set entries, and records 52.2 million dynamic checks. In representative backward- and forward-edge corruption attacks, native execution reaches attacker-selected behavior, detect-only mode records the expected violation, and enforcement fails closed before releasing the invalid protected transfer. Public-code evidence shows that the same SASS consumption patterns occur in real CUDA systems, including runtime dispatch tables, cuFFT callbacks, generated callable tables, and uploaded device-function pointers. WarpGuard delivers auditable protected-site CFI for CUDA SASS and separates dynamic-instrumentation enforcement from callback-free SASS timing and patch-cache feasibility.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 9

TreeSeeker: Tree-Structured Trial, Error, and Return in Deep Search

Deep search requires agents to answer complex questions through multi-step web search, browsing, evidence comparison, and synthesis. A central challenge is deciding how to search when several directions look plausible but only some will later lead to reliable evidence. If an agent greedily follows the current best-looking direction, it may keep extending a weak continuation. If it explores without discipline, it may waste budget on disconnected trials. We propose TreeSeeker, an inference-time framework for controlled trial-and-error in deep search. TreeSeeker organizes search as branch-and-return search over tree-structured states, where each branch is a tentative direction for a sub-goal. At each round, TreeSearch reads all sub-goal trees, identifies active goals, and uses textual UCB signals of value, uncertainty, and risk to select among exploiting a promising branch, exploring an uncertain alternative, or pruning an unproductive continuation and returning to an earlier branch point. TreeMem supports this control loop by keeping evidence, uncertainty, conflicts, progress, and failure cues attached to the branches that produced them, so trial outcomes can guide later decisions. Experiments on XBench-DeepSearch, BrowseComp, and BrowseComp-ZH show that TreeSeeker consistently outperforms strong open-source baselines, suggesting that explicit branch-and-return control complements stronger reasoning and tool execution.

  • 11 authors
·
Jun 9 3

MLEvolve: A Self-Evolving Framework for Automated Machine Learning Algorithm Discovery

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly applied to long-horizon tasks such as scientific discovery and machine learning engineering (MLE), where sustained self-evolution becomes a key capability. However, existing MLE agents suffer from inter-branch information isolation, memoryless search, and lack of hierarchical control, which together hinder long-horizon optimization. We present MLEvolve, an LLM-based self-evolving multi-agent framework for end-to-end machine learning algorithm discovery. By extending tree search to Progressive MCGS, MLEvolve enables cross-branch information flow through graph-based reference edges and gradually shifts the search from broad exploration to focused exploitation with an entropy-inspired progressive schedule. To allow the agent to evolve with accumulated experience, we introduce Retrospective Memory, which combines a cold-start domain knowledge base with a dynamic global memory for task-specific experience retrieval and reuse. For stable long-horizon iteration, we further decouple strategic planning from code generation with adaptive coding modes. Evaluation on MLE-Bench shows that MLEvolve achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple dimensions including average medal rate and valid submission rate under a 12-hour budget (half the standard runtime). Moreover, MLEvolve also outperforms specialized algorithm discovery methods including AlphaEvolve on mathematical algorithm optimization tasks, demonstrating strong cross-domain generalization. Our code is available at https://github.com/InternScience/MLEvolve.

  • 14 authors
·
Jun 3 2

ExploitBench: A Capability Ladder Benchmark for LLM Cybersecurity Agents

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

  • 2 authors
·
May 12

ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

  • 16 authors
·
May 10