Daily Papers

AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems. The dominant approach places controls inside the agent's own runtime: system prompts, output filters, and guardrail libraries. Any control in the agent's address space is reachable by inputs that influence it; this generalizes to any AI system with sufficient reach into its own runtime, a class we term escapable AI systems. We identify four properties that an authorization mechanism must satisfy for architectural control rather than for cooperative requests: process separation, pre-action enforcement on a structurally only path, fail-closed at both the request and system levels, and externalized signed evidence verifiable outside the controlled system's trust boundary. We position this layer as execution-time AI alignment, complementing training-time alignment (RLHF, Constitutional AI) and inference-time alignment. We present the Unfireable Safety Kernel, a Rust reference implementation realizing all four. Its fail-closed invariant is machine-checked at two levels: an SMT theorem (Z3) and an exhaustive bounded-model-checking proof of the production decision function (Kani, 4/4 harnesses). A Python-to-Rust migration was gated on byte-equivalence (1000/1000 fixtures; 17/17 adversarial classes). We evaluate the kernel governing a live, escapable AI system, a deterministic, self-improving world model, against an escape-seeking adversary driving its real self-modification seam: across 1,000 self-modifications, all 704 attempts on the safety-critical core are refused, with no escape; a further 300, under the operator kill switch, are also refused. A separate campaign of 6,240 authorization round-trips had no successful bypass. Against 3 contemporary systems claiming the agent control plane, the agent invokes control; here, it lacks that choice.

Reality may establish that an outcome occurred without identifying which evolving procedure produced it or why. This distinction matters in production ML systems whose code, configuration, and artifacts change while external feedback accumulates. We examine it in a human-directed, agent-engineered quantitative trading system, using oracle to mean an external source of realized outcomes rather than a complete correctness specification. Across one year, the account gained and outperformed a broad market index, while annual alpha was not statistically distinguishable from zero under the main retrospective specification. Retrospectively selected subperiods include adverse relative performance and conditional candidate-level weakness under declared approximate references. Engineering records document changes during the episode, and complete recommendation-to-runtime binding is unavailable. The archive does not establish a common frozen instance or a unique cause. The case motivates an outcome--diagnosis gap: outcome evidence, evaluated-object identity, and causal explanation support distinct claims. We distinguish frozen instances, pre-specified adaptive procedures, and ad-hoc development; organize archive-relative claim identifiability and an evidence hierarchy; and propose a prospective production-binding protocol. An illustrative compatible-history example shows how factual binding can resolve a recommendation's referent without supplying its counterfactual effect. The protocol is proposed rather than prospectively validated. External feedback constrains outcome claims, while provenance and additional identification structure determine the resolution of diagnosis.

Digital signatures prove key possession, not authorship. An author who generates text with AI, constructs intermediate document states post-hoc, and signs each hash produces a signature chain indistinguishable from genuine composition. We address this gap between cryptographic integrity and process provenance. We introduce proof-of-process, a primitive category for evidence that a physical process, not merely a signing key, produced a digital artifact. Our construction, the jitter seal, injects imperceptible microsecond delays derived via HMAC from a session secret, keystroke ordinal, and cumulative document hash. Valid evidence requires that real keystrokes produced the document through those intermediate states. We propose the Adversarial Collapse Principle as an evaluation criterion: evidence systems should be judged by whether disputing them requires a conjunction of specific, testable allegations against components with independent trust assumptions. We present Witnessd, an architecture combining jitter seals with Verifiable Delay Functions, external timestamp anchors, dual-source keystroke validation, and optional hardware attestation. Each layer forces allegations at different capability levels; disputing authentic evidence requires coordinated claims across independent trust boundaries. The system does not prevent forgery: a kernel-level adversary can defeat it, and typing AI-generated content produces valid evidence. The contribution is converting vague doubt into falsifiable allegations. We evaluate across 31,000 verification trials with deterministic rejection of invalid proofs.

LLMs are increasingly used with external knowledge sources like the internet. Do they weigh information appropriately -- updating more for reliable sources (source discernment) and more when claims bring priors closer to the truth (truth discernment)? We formalize this as information discernment and introduce Learn2Discern (L2D), an experimental framework and benchmark grounded in three normative axioms with interpretable metrics. To establish external validity, a pre-registered, quota-matched user study (n=299) confirms that real LLM users endorse all three axioms and report that violations reduce their trust and usage intent. Across 13 models and nearly 670K trials, we find consistent failures across both dimensions: models perform near chance on source and truth discernment, rely on source popularity twice as much as source reliability, and update roughly equally whether a claim improves or worsens their position relative to the ground truth. Models integrate external knowledge most effectively on datasets where their priors are already the most accurate. Newer and larger models improve truth discernment but not source discernment, a blind spot that model complexity does not address. We identify simple inference-time interventions that improve both forms of discernment. We release our dataset and survey as a testbed for a core alignment property that scales in importance as LLMs replace traditional search.

Evidence-grounded reasoning requires more than attaching retrieved text to a prediction: a model should make decisions that depend on whether the provided evidence supports the target claim. In practice, this often fails because supervision is weak, evidence is only loosely tied to the claim, and evaluation does not test evidence dependence directly. We introduce case-grounded evidence verification, a general framework in which a model receives a local case context, external evidence, and a structured claim, and must decide whether the evidence supports the claim for that case. Our key contribution is a supervision construction procedure that generates explicit support examples together with semantically controlled non-support examples, including counterfactual wrong-state and topic-related negatives, without manual evidence annotation. We instantiate the framework in radiology and train a standard verifier on the resulting support task. The learned verifier substantially outperforms both case-only and evidence-only baselines, remains strong under correct evidence, and collapses when evidence is removed or swapped, indicating genuine evidence dependence. This behavior transfers across unseen evidence articles and an external case distribution, though performance degrades under evidence-source shift and remains sensitive to backbone choice. Overall, the results suggest that a major bottleneck in evidence grounding is not only model capacity, but the lack of supervision that encodes the causal role of evidence.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

Watermarking is widely proposed for provenance, attribution, and safety monitoring in generative models, yet is typically evaluated only under adversaries who attempt to evade detection or induce false positives at the level of individual samples. We argue that watermarking should be treated as a monitoring primitive, and that internal monitoring is unavoidable given per-entity attribution keys and messages, as well as detector access. We introduce an observer-based threat model in which observers can aggregate watermark signals across outputs to infer entity-level information, showing that even zero-bit watermarking enables attribution under multi-key settings. We further show that external monitoring can emerge over time from persistent, key-dependent statistical structure, although this depends on watermark design and may be mitigated by distribution-preserving or undetectable schemes. Our findings reveal a fundamental dual-use tension between attribution and monitoring, motivating evaluation of watermarking beyond per-sample robustness to account for aggregation and observer-based capabilities.

Recent advances in video generation models have significantly improved the realism of synthetic videos, blurring the boundary between generated and authentic content and raising concerns about misinformation. Existing MLLM-based detectors mainly rely on supervised fine-tuning or label-level reinforcement learning, where coarse supervision limits generalization to unseen scenarios and emerging video generators. To overcome these limitations, we are the first to introduce meta-detection into AI-generated video detection, enabling reliable forgery detection by jointly optimizing predicted labels and supporting evidence within reinforcement learning. This paradigm requires reliable evidence signals and effective mechanisms to integrate them into label-level optimization. Textual rationales provide semantic descriptions of forgery artifacts, but their generation and verification depend on external models, making supervision vulnerable to hallucinations and semantic biases. In contrast, temporal grounding provides more objective and verifiable evidence, as manipulated intervals can be precisely controlled during forgery construction. Based on this insight, we propose an automated data construction pipeline that generates paired real-fake videos by replacing temporal segments with boundary-frame-conditioned video generation models. Furthermore, we introduce Evidence-Guided Reward Redistribution, which performs evidence-aware credit assignment by redistributing rewards among label-correct responses according to evidence quality. This preserves reliable label supervision while encouraging detectors to acquire fine-grained and verifiable forgery localization capabilities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VidForensics-M1 effectively leverages verifiable temporal evidence to achieve robust and generalizable AI-generated video detection.

Agentic Entity Resolution (ER) systems iteratively plan actions, retrieve evidence, revise hypotheses, and propose graph mutations. An erroneous identity hypothesis may condition later retrieval and produce apparent confirmation. This paper proposes a Digital Identity Optimization (DIO) and Ontology of Digital Identity (ODI)-informed authorization boundary between evidence available for agent reasoning and evidence eligible to authorize persistent identity-changing mutations. A domain-governed constraint-binding function maps selected reconstruction-failure distinctions to explicit identity-preserving constraints. An abstract two-phase supervisor permits a commit only when claim-specific authorization-eligible evidence supports every required proposition, relevant conflicts are resolved, the operation remains within its authorized scope, and relevant state and policy versions remain valid. Admission as UNVERIFIED does not confer authorization eligibility. Separate claim-specific promotion governs evidentiary use; insufficient support or unresolved material conflict leads to deferral. The contribution is a specification connecting diagnostic-to-constraint mapping, evidence promotion, proposition coverage, conflict handling, scope binding, and commit-time version integrity. A proposed evaluation protocol is designed to assess the mapping's incremental value beyond generic authorization and conventional identifier rules. This is a conceptual architecture without implementation or empirical validation, not a theorem of semantic correctness. Its property depends on domain-policy adequacy, evidence promotion, and enforcement. It does not prevent erroneous hypotheses or hypothesis-conditioned retrieval; dependency-aware evidence flow remains future research.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

QDNA-ID is a trust-chain framework that links physical quantum behavior to digitally verified records. The system first executes standard quantum circuits with random shot patterns across different devices to generate entropy profiles and measurement data that reveal device-specific behavior. A Bell or CHSH test is then used to confirm that correlations originate from genuine non classical processes rather than classical simulation. The verified outcomes are converted into statistical fingerprints using entropy, divergence, and bias features to characterize each device. These features and metadata for device, session, and random seed parameters are digitally signed and time stamped to ensure integrity and traceability. Authenticated artifacts are stored in a hierarchical index for reproducible retrieval and long term auditing. A visualization and analytics interface monitors drift, policy enforcement, and device behavior logs. A machine learning engine tracks entropy drift, detects anomalies, and classifies devices based on evolving patterns. An external verification API supports independent recomputation of hashes, signatures, and CHSH evidence. QDNA-ID operates as a continuous feedback loop that maintains a persistent chain of trust for quantum computing environments.

Large language models increasingly justify legal decisions by naming the statute or precedent behind a verdict, treated as evidence that the decision follows from it. We test this directly: holding case facts fixed, we substitute the named legal authority for an unrelated one and decode a model's evolving verdict from its hidden states. Across seven open-weight models (8B-70B) and four benchmarks spanning judicial and contractual reasoning, when explicitly required to justify a verdict by naming the governing authority, models name the correct one in 66.7%-100% of generations, while the verdict changing when the authority changes is far less consistent: 0.0%-21.7% on CaseHOLD, 30.0%-76.7% on ECHR and SCOTUS, and 43.3%-50.0% on ContractNLI. Neither scale nor a purpose-built legal-reasoning model (a best-effort LoRA reproduction; Section 6) closes this gap. A red-teaming evaluation on five core models finds compliance with an adversarial instruction hidden in the case facts (73.3%-96.4%) exceeds verdict-swap sensitivity by a wide margin, holding without exception across model rankings. Naming a legal authority is thus a poor proxy for a verdict's dependence on it, while the same verdict remains separately vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Both findings replicate across checks ruling out prompt-wording noise and confounded sampling, and bear directly on the use of generated legal explanations as compliance or audit artefacts.

AI research agents combine prior knowledge, public sources, and experimental feedback to produce useful results. The Discovery Certification Protocol (DCP) turns claims about these results into executable recovery and feedback tests. Gate 1 validates useful improvement on sealed evaluation. Gate 2 gives matched agents the registered starting information and observed Web content while withholding the target research history. Every valid method reaching the numerical target supplies a recovery witness and triggers the Core veto. DCP Core requires adequate controls, zero observed recoveries, and a finite-sample bound on recovery in one fresh registered episode. Optional Gate 3 measures the average effect of truthful feedback relative to a specified neutral policy from a shared checkpoint. DCP Evidence adds this effect after independent null calibration and a registered effect margin. Two controlled audits exercise the complete protocol in SQLite optimization and virtual catalyst control under different models. Each produced zero recoveries in 96 episodes, with an upper bound of 0.0468. Each paired study yielded 30 truthful recoveries and zero neutral recoveries, with passing 60-pair null studies. Additional cases exercise Core, recovered, and audit-incomplete decisions. A deterministic, LLM-free verifier reproduces the decisions from frozen evidence. DCP provides a common evidence language for useful outcomes, alternative routes, and feedback effects across AI research.

AI systems deployed in legal workflows hallucinate at rates that aggregate metrics report at ~52%, but this average conceals where errors concentrate and in which direction they run, leaving compliance officers without an actionable signal for trustworthy deployment. We present LegalHalluLens, an auditing framework with three components: typed hallucination profiles across four legally-motivated claim categories (numeric, temporal, obligation/entitlement, factual) over CUAD (Hendrycks et al., 2021); a Risk Direction Index (RDI) that reduces omission-versus-invention bias to a single deployment-comparable scalar; and a typed debate pipeline calibrated to both magnitudes and directions. Across 510 contracts and 249,252 clause-level instances we measure a within-model gap of approximately 38-40 pp between obligation/numeric and temporal claims that aggregate reporting hides, and show that two systems with matched 52% rates can carry opposite RDIs. The debate pipeline reduces fabricated detections by 45% with per-category gains tracking the diagnosis, matching commercial APIs with a substantially smaller backbone (4B active parameters). Typed profiles and RDI surface failure modes that aggregate metrics hide; we further show these diagnostics serve as calibration inputs for multi-agent debate pipelines, where Skeptic challenges and asymmetric gates targeted at measured failure modes outperform generically-tuned debate. The framework supports direction-aware procurement, accountability, and agent design for legal AI deployed in the wild.

Private BitTorrent trackers enforce upload-to-download ratios to prevent free-riding, but suffer from three critical weaknesses: reputation cannot move between trackers, centralized servers create single points of failure, and upload statistics are self-reported and unverifiable. When a tracker shuts down, users lose their contribution history and cannot prove their standing to new communities. We address these problems by storing reputation in smart contracts and replacing self-reports with cryptographic attestations. Peers sign receipts for received pieces; the tracker aggregates them via BLS signatures and updates reputation. If a tracker is unavailable, peers fall back to an authenticated distributed hash table (DHT): stored reputation acts as a public key infrastructure (PKI), preserving access control without the tracker. Reputation is portable across tracker failures through single-hop migration in factory-deployed contracts. We also address the privacy implications of publishing public keys and reputations tied to private trackers on a public ledger: we propose ephemeral session keys to prevent linking peer identities, zero-knowledge membership proofs for anonymous DHT participation, and confidential reputation using homomorphic commitments. We formalize the security requirements, prove four security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions, and evaluate a prototype. Measurements show that transfer receipts add less than 5\% end-to-end overhead with typical piece sizes. To minimize signing overhead, we adopt a hybrid signature scheme: ECDSA signs individual piece receipts at transfer time for low per-operation latency, while BLS serves as the overarching scheme, enabling compact aggregation of many receipts into a single proof at report time. This design reduces client-side signing cost by an order of magnitude compared to using BLS throughout.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to answer from heterogeneous evidence sources, including search, APIs, databases, clinical records, and formulary tools. Standard factuality metrics usually test whether an answer is supported by pooled evidence, missing a provenance-sensitive failure mode: a claim may be supported somewhere while being attributed to the wrong source. We call this cross-source conflation. We introduce ProvenanceGuard, a source-aware verifier for MCP-grounded answers. It consumes captured MCP traces with stable tool IDs, source IDs, and raw outputs; decomposes answers into atomic claims; routes claims to source-specific evidence; checks support with NLI and a token-alignment proxy; compares stated attribution with the routed source; and returns per-claim verdicts plus an answer-level allow/block decision. Blocked answers can be repaired with retrieval-augmented answer revision and re-verified. We evaluate on 281 medical-domain MCP-agent traces. A 266-trace adjudicated subset yields 2,325 LLM-assisted claim labels split by trace; 361 held-out labels are human-verified. On the 40-trace held-out split, ProvenanceGuard achieves block F1 0.802 and source accuracy 0.858 over 260 source-eligible claims, outperforming source-blind baselines that do not emit claim-to-source IDs. On a harder multi-source benchmark it reaches block F1 0.846, while source-plus-relation accuracy drops to 0.229, showing that exact source ownership remains difficult with semantically close sources. Repair-and-reverify resolves all blocked answers in the full trace set, often via conservative fallback. In 50 controlled clinical conflation probes, ProvenanceGuard detects all injected attribution swaps with no retained wrong attribution. These results show that source attribution is an independent axis for factuality verification in MCP-based agents.

Answering complex questions over long documents frequently requires integrating evidence that the source itself disperses naturally across distant passages. In an incident report, the operating condition, design flaw, and missed safety check that jointly explain a disaster may appear dozens of sections apart; in a novel, a character's true motive may surface only through scenes far removed from the moment it becomes relevant. This source-internal evidence integration is central to real-world long-document analysis, yet existing benchmarks largely sidestep it. Needle probes, planted facts, and reverse-engineered multi-hop chains embed evidence that may differ from the host text in distribution, placement, or register, making it unclear whether strong performance reflects genuine source reasoning or distributional artifacts. We introduce WILDTRACE, a benchmark of 481 tasks over 214 naturally occurring long-form sources such as technical incident reports and lesser-known literary narratives, where all evidence trails arise from the document's own causal, temporal, and narrative logic. Drawing on Pearl's causal hierarchy and prior multi-hop reasoning typologies, we define seven source-internal evidence geometries that characterize the distinct relational demands of analytical reading in long documents. A source-first construction pipeline mines candidate trails from document structure before writing questions; each item then undergoes multi-stage validation covering clue necessity, answer groundedness, rubric fidelity, contamination resistance and answerability. As models are increasingly entrusted with real-world high-stakes analytical tasks, this gap between accessing information and reasoning over naturally dispersed evidence emerges as a defining challenge for the next stage of long-context research.

Recent generative models can produce images that appear highly realistic, raising challenges in distinguishing real and AI-generated images. Yet existing detectors based on pre-trained feature extractors tend to over-rely on global semantics, limiting sensitivity to the critical micro-defects. In this work, we propose Micro-Defects expose Macro-Fakes (MDMF), a local distribution-aware detection framework that amplifies micro-scale statistical irregularities into macro-level distributional discrepancies. To avoid localized forensic cues being diluted by plain aggregation, we introduce a learnable Patch Forensic Signature that projects semantic patch embeddings into a compact forensic latent space. We then use Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) to quantify distributional discrepancies between generated and real images. Our theory-grounded analysis shows that patch-wise modeling yields provably larger discrepancies when localized forensic signals are present in generated images, enabling more reliable separation from real images. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MDMF consistently outperforms baseline detectors across multiple benchmarks, validating its general effectiveness. Project page: https://zbox1005.github.io/MDMF-project/

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

Visual fluency in generated video does not imply physical reliability, and a scalar quality score alone is incapable of indicating the obligation a clip violates or the moment it fails. We present VeriPhy, an auditable physical-verification system in which a text-only planner compiles the prompt into typed physical obligations and a statically validated execution plan before any frame is observed. During execution, observations gate and scope only declared calls to frozen low-level experts (e.g., segmentation and tracking, counting, eleven typed physical measurements over the resulting tracks, depth, OCR, and audio-event detection). Each action returns a provenance-carrying evidence record whose payload, when usable, is either a typed measurement or an explicitly tagged learned state. Typed resolvers and fixed composition map usable records to a three-valued state (supported, contradicted, or unknown, surfaced as plausible, implausible, or abstain) with full provenance, so that every verdict is traceable to the evidence that produced it. We anchor evaluation in a 1,500-clip corpus of human-annotated flaw records that localize real generation failures in prompt reference, space, and time. On a 149-clip core carrying 304 such records, VeriPhy accounts for 228, against 164 for a published question-decomposition evaluator given the same clips and the same claims. Recall alone does not separate it from prompting the same backbone monolithically, which reaches 222; what separates them is that each decision retains its evidence record and provenance, making the traces auditable one verdict at a time and usable as the interface through which a critic verdict could be written back into generation.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

In 2023, a New York judge sanctioned two attorneys in Mata v. Avianca for filing a brief with hallucinated citations generated by ChatGPT. Such failures are largely caught by database lookups; the harder problem is detecting citations that point to real cases but do not support the propositions for which they are offered -- a failure mode that existing evaluations of LLMs for legal use cases largely overlook. In this paper, we study proposition-level citation support verification through controlled perturbations of real legal citations obtained from two legal corpora, either replacing the cited case or changing only the pinpoint page within the same case. We evaluate fourteen model configurations on the resulting examples. Models catch 93-100% of wrong-case corruptions. They catch only 37-61% of wrong-pinpoint corruptions on court opinions and 52-83% on legal briefs. When models fail to catch wrong-pinpoint corruptions, they accept the citation based on topical overlap rather than page-level support. Scale and extended reasoning narrow the gap but do not close it: GPT-5.4 with high reasoning effort still misses 40% of pinpoint mismatches on court opinions and 18% on briefs. Prompting the model to verify support at the cited page improves recall, but it also raises the false positive rate. Recognizing the right legal topic and verifying support for the cited proposition are distinct capabilities, and current models conflate them.

Long-form factuality verification is commonly implemented as a static decompose-search-verify pipeline, with separately prompted modules processing claims and invoking external search. Treating claims independently makes LLM and search calls scale with claim count and causes repeated searches for overlapping evidence about related claims. We introduce EAVer, an End-to-end Agentic Verifier that learns to control the complete response-level verification workflow as a unified policy. EAVer groups semantically related claims, routes each group to direct verification or targeted search based on confidence, and keeps evidence returned by search in compact in-context memos for cross-claim reuse. To train this policy, we develop a privileged-teacher synthesis pipeline that converts gold claim annotations into executable multi-turn tool-interaction trajectories with live search rather than post-hoc rationales. Structural, label-alignment, tool-use, search-budget, and leakage checks yield 1,447 quality-controlled trajectories. We further construct 794 bidirectional same-trajectory preference pairs that keep claim grouping, search, and evidence fixed, enabling decision-focused Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) over factuality-decision tokens. The results with Qwen3-8B show that EAVer outperforms the strongest search-based baseline on each benchmark by 2.88 Macro-F1 points on VeriFastScore and 4.73 points on the out-of-distribution FaStFact-Bench, while using about 80% fewer searches than the most search-efficient baseline. Moreover, EAVer consistently improves performance across models ranging from 4B to 32B parameters, demonstrating its strong generalizability.

LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result. We study the commit boundary at which earlier authority evidence no longer authorizes a durable effect. We call this property commit-time authorization: a durable effect is authorized only if the witness that licensed its derived state remains fresh, causally prior, bound to the same effect, and eligible at commit time. We build a controlled-invalidation suite spanning browser, tool/API, and multi-agent workflows. The suite preserves the user goal and payload shape while invalidating the authority relation before durability. In the primary 54-task matrix, endpoint success remains high: 262/270 runs reach the visible result. Only 55/270 are authorized completions; among the 216 invalidating rows, 207 commit after the authorizing path has failed. All 54 clean controls remain authorized, and a separate 54-run authority-preserving check produces no unauthorized commits. We then evaluate mitigation families. Prompt caution and single-condition checks are insufficient because different hazards break different boundary conditions. Defenses work when they refresh, rebind, replan, or refuse at the durability boundary. CommitGuard, a fail-closed boundary monitor, blocks stale durable-effect attempts on protected commit surfaces when runtimes emit witness, dependency, binding, and eligibility signals. The result is a reporting and runtime-design lesson: endpoint success is a utility metric; authorized commit is a security property.

Determining whether an image is AI-generated does not establish whether the situation it depicts is factually supported. We formulate Image Factuality Assessment: given an image and a generic verification instruction, a system returns a supported or refuted verdict with an evidence-grounded explanation. Without a supplied textual claim, the system must progressively refine factual questions during investigation and align external evidence with the specific situation depicted. We introduce EviLens, an expert-reviewed benchmark of 10,174 supported and refuted images from controlled construction and web collection, covering twelve factual error types and evaluating both verdict accuracy and evidence sufficiency. We develop EviScene, a multimodal ReAct agent that interleaves visual inspection, external retrieval, and evidence analysis, using new findings to refine its questions and revisit relevant image details. We train a compact policy with supervised fine-tuning on reviewed teacher trajectories, followed by privileged on-policy self-distillation applied to verified decisions from the policy's own investigations. On the 1,527-image test set, the trained Qwen3.5-9B agent achieves 79.05% balanced accuracy and a Strict Evidence Sufficiency Rate (SESR) of 52.26%, improving over the same-backbone base agent by 6.71 and 9.37 percentage points, respectively. Its SESR is the highest among the evaluated agents.Code, models, and data will be released at https://github.com/wangzian828/EVISCENE and https://huggingface.co/ZiAnwang/EviScene.

Existing defenses against hallucination in retrieval-augmented and multi-agent pipelines remain partial: evidence is trusted despite modality disagreement, debate verifies an aggregate report rather than individual claims, and such verification occurs only after drafting, leaving inter-agent errors undetected until the final text. To close this gap, we present CLAIR-Fin, a nine-agent framework that decomposes each question into atomic claims maintained in a typed Financial Claim Ledger. Each claim is resolved through Asymmetric Evidence Authority, which conditions evidence trust on claim type rather than treating all modalities as equally reliable; Chain-of-Custody Verification, which checks grounding at the hand-off between drafting and adversarial review rather than only at the pipeline's exit; an Adaptive Rebuttal Cycle, which routes contested claims through adversarial debate whose depth scales with what that debate finds; and a terminal entailment audit paired with a continuous Hallucination Risk Index that distinguishes claims that passed scrutiny from claims never contested. We evaluate CLAIR-Fin on BB-FinQA-X, a 500-question cross-modal financial evaluation set built from Bangladesh Bank Annual Report material, stratified by query type, format, and difficulty. Relative to a single-pass retrieval-augmented generation baseline, it raises faithfulness (0.780 rightarrow 0.889) while abstaining on 5.4% of questions when evidence is insufficient rather than forcing an unsupported response, and it exceeds stronger retrieval-strategy baselines such as HyDE and Graph-RAG on faithfulness (leq 0.874).

Video misinformation increasingly operates at the semantic and evidential level: authentic footage may be selectively edited, temporally reordered, spliced across sources, or augmented with AI-generated content to construct false narratives. Such evidence-dependent manipulations cannot be reliably verified from the input video alone, because the missing, reordered, replaced, or recontextualized evidence lies outside the video itself. We introduce EVID-Bench, a benchmark for search-grounded video misinformation detection, where a system must search the open web for related videos and identify what information is false through cross-video comparison. EVID-Bench comprises 222 videos spanning 9 manipulation types across 3 categories: AI generation, single-source editing, and multi-source editing. All samples are verified to be undetectable by frontier models through visual inspection alone. We evaluate nine frontier multimodal models using a retrieval-augmented verification baseline. The best system achieves only 61.43\% point-level accuracy and 43.24\% video-level accuracy, while AI-generated manipulations remain especially challenging. Error analysis reveals recurring challenges: models fixate on irrelevant anchors, misattribute synthetic content to editorial splicing, and terminate search prematurely before fully explaining the manipulation.

Before invoking external tools, an agentic LLM must select among a K-way action space: executing a call, seeking clarification, answering directly, or declining. While internal activation steering can alter these pre-execution decisions, conventional aggregate metrics obscure where altered states land and what collateral damage they inflict. We present SAKIKO, an auditing framework that formalizes representation repair via directional error discovery, router-conditioned intervention, destination-resolved verification, and prospectively frozen statistical licensing. Across seven LLMs on When2Call and MetaTool, channel-keyed interventions induce direction-specific net gains in five models; across three sealed evaluations, none of 59 budget-matched random directions matches calibrated target gain. Crucially, destination auditing shows that behavioral movement does not equal repair: an intervention achieving +55 net gain corrupts over half of the baseline-correct decisions it touches, and promising point estimates on Qwen3-4B and Gemma-2-9B are formally declined due to finite-sample uncertainty. SAKIKO establishes the necessity of outcome-resolved adjudication before claiming internal repair. Code: https://github.com/ruizheliUOA/mechanistic-tool-use-llm.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

Large language models are beginning to show steganographic capabilities. Such capabilities could allow misaligned models to evade oversight mechanisms. Yet principled methods to detect and quantify such behaviours are lacking. Classical definitions of steganography, and detection methods based on them, require a known reference distribution of non-steganographic signals. For the case of steganographic reasoning in LLMs, knowing such a reference distribution is not feasible; this renders these approaches inapplicable. We propose an alternative, decision-theoretic view of steganography. Our central insight is that steganography creates an asymmetry in usable information between agents who can and cannot decode the hidden content (present within a steganographic signal), and this otherwise latent asymmetry can be inferred from the agents' observable actions. To formalise this perspective, we introduce generalised V-information: a utilitarian framework for measuring the amount of usable information within some input. We use this to define the steganographic gap -- a measure that quantifies steganography by comparing the downstream utility of the steganographic signal to agents that can and cannot decode the hidden content. We empirically validate our formalism, and show that it can be used to detect, quantify, and mitigate steganographic reasoning in LLMs.

Large language model safeguards decide whether to answer before seeing how an answer will be used. This creates a basic problem for dual-use tasks: the same answer can help an authorized professional or an attacker, while an attacker can imitate a benign request and interaction history. We separate the capability released by the model from the evidence available about downstream use. When that evidence is copyable, we derive the exact worst-case floor on attacker assistance while preserving useful answers. The result yields a safety trilemma: Useful Capability, Reliable Safety, and Open Access cannot coexist. We then show how a trusted credential can complement existing safeguards by adding hard-to-copy information that predicts actual downstream use, and identify the stronger condition needed to eliminate the floor. Evidence from dual-use evaluations, adaptive attacks, and deployed trusted-access programs supports the practical relevance of these conditions.

Recently, the rapid development of AIGC has significantly boosted the diversities of fake media spread in the Internet, posing unprecedented threats to social security, politics, law, and etc. To detect the ever-increasingly diverse malicious fake media in the new era of AIGC, recent studies have proposed to exploit Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) to design robust forgery detectors due to their impressive performance on a wide range of multimodal tasks. However, it still lacks a comprehensive benchmark designed to comprehensively assess LVLMs' discerning capabilities on forgery media. To fill this gap, we present Forensics-Bench, a new forgery detection evaluation benchmark suite to assess LVLMs across massive forgery detection tasks, requiring comprehensive recognition, location and reasoning capabilities on diverse forgeries. Forensics-Bench comprises 63,292 meticulously curated multi-choice visual questions, covering 112 unique forgery detection types from 5 perspectives: forgery semantics, forgery modalities, forgery tasks, forgery types and forgery models. We conduct thorough evaluations on 22 open-sourced LVLMs and 3 proprietary models GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Claude 3.5 Sonnet, highlighting the significant challenges of comprehensive forgery detection posed by Forensics-Bench. We anticipate that Forensics-Bench will motivate the community to advance the frontier of LVLMs, striving for all-around forgery detectors in the era of AIGC. The deliverables will be updated at https://Forensics-Bench.github.io/.

External knowledge (a.k.a. side information) plays a critical role in zero-shot learning (ZSL) which aims to predict with unseen classes that have never appeared in training data. Several kinds of external knowledge, such as text and attribute, have been widely investigated, but they alone are limited with incomplete semantics. Some very recent studies thus propose to use Knowledge Graph (KG) due to its high expressivity and compatibility for representing kinds of knowledge. However, the ZSL community is still in short of standard benchmarks for studying and comparing different external knowledge settings and different KG-based ZSL methods. In this paper, we proposed six resources covering three tasks, i.e., zero-shot image classification (ZS-IMGC), zero-shot relation extraction (ZS-RE), and zero-shot KG completion (ZS-KGC). Each resource has a normal ZSL benchmark and a KG containing semantics ranging from text to attribute, from relational knowledge to logical expressions. We have clearly presented these resources including their construction, statistics, data formats and usage cases w.r.t. different ZSL methods. More importantly, we have conducted a comprehensive benchmarking study, with two general and state-of-the-art methods, two setting-specific methods and one interpretable method. We discussed and compared different ZSL paradigms w.r.t. different external knowledge settings, and found that our resources have great potential for developing more advanced ZSL methods and more solutions for applying KGs for augmenting machine learning. All the resources are available at https://github.com/China-UK-ZSL/Resources_for_KZSL.

Reinforcement learning for deep-search agents has largely focused on trajectory-level scoring -- outcome correctness, citation-aware rewards, and evidence coverage. Yet the actions that expose supporting documents receive no targeted credit, a gap we call the reward-credit mismatch. We propose STAMP, in which a reference-based verifier judges whether each cited document supports an entity or relation in a training-time evidence graph, and first-exposure attribution traces each supported citation back to the action that first surfaced it. This step credit is injected through sign-preserving advantage modulation, which redistributes advantage across steps without changing the trajectory-level reward or the relative ranking of trajectories within each group. On BrowseComp, BrowseComp-ZH, and xbench-DS, STAMP improves the GRPO baseline by +2.0/+5.5/+3.0 points under matched SFT initialization, training data, and search tools, and composes with both outcome-only and citation-rubric base rewards. Component ablations confirm that the provenance-based credit signal and the sign-preserving advantage modulation each contribute to the gains.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generated images have become increasingly realistic and readily adaptable to concrete real-world claims, creating new challenges for verifying visual evidence. A concrete emerging risk is AI-generated refund fraud, in which manipulated or synthetic images are used to support claims about damaged products, poor delivery conditions, or service-related defects. Existing AI-generated image detection benchmarks mainly evaluate standalone authenticity classification, cross-generator transfer, or forensic localization, leaving claim-conditioned fraudulent evidence detection underexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce FraudBench, a multimodal benchmark for detecting AI-generated fraudulent refund evidence. FraudBench is constructed from real-world user-review evidence across e-commerce, food delivery, and travel-service scenarios. We curate real evidence images together with their associated review and product metadata, identify genuine damaged and undamaged evidence through MLLM-assisted filtering and human annotation, and synthesize fake-damaged evidence from genuine undamaged reference images using six state-of-the-art image editing and generation models. Using FraudBench, we evaluate MLLMs, specialized AI-generated image detectors, and human participants under the same settings. Experiments show that current MLLMs often recognize real-damaged evidence but fail on many fake-damaged subsets, with fake-damage detection rates (TPR) far below the 50% baseline on most generator subsets. Specialized detectors generally perform better but remain inconsistent across generators and can produce false positives on real-damaged samples, revealing a clear gap between generic AI image detection and reliable claim-conditioned refund-evidence verification.

Blockchain forensics is adversarial and open-ended: money launderers split, swap, and bridge funds, cut their trail at mixers or custodial services, and change tactics from one incident to the next. Investigators must keep adapting their tracing in response. Yet the immutability of public ledgers preserves every recorded movement in public view, making much of the investigation independently verifiable. We introduce ABF-Bench, an interactive benchmark that makes evidence-backed fund tracing a verifiable agent task, in which every claimed movement must cite ledger records the agent retrieved. A case-to-task pipeline builds well-posed tasks across ledgers: conservative rules halt tracing wherever the records leave a continuation unresolved, and each task's reference graph is the answer those rules determine. Built from real laundering activity, the tasks combine multi-hop transfers, DeFi exchanges, cross-chain round trips, custodial and mixer deposits, and address poisoning. We also propose the ABF agent harness, built around a working memory, and evaluate it alongside general-purpose agents and fixed-order tracers. The harness reaches 75% edge recall, against 47% for Codex with the same model and 10% for Claude Code, which loses recall to overconfidence: it cites records it left unretrieved. Compared with fixed-order tracers, the harness acquires evidence faster than the best of them early in the budget and recognizes undisclosed custodial services that they walk past (89% vs. 0%), with 98% fidelity. However, agents tend to stop early and lose recall on larger tasks, which holds their final recall below the best tracer. Beyond exposing these gaps, ABF-Bench opens blockchain forensics to LLM agents as a verifiable domain, where the verdicts that score agents also offer potential training signals.

Third-party LLM gateways have become a critical infrastructure layer between applications and external LLM providers. Conventional gateways do more than forward traffic: they decide which provider and model are called, whether fallback occurred, which stream is delivered, and what usage record should be billed. Because these decisions and records are authored inside the operator-controlled service, clients cannot independently distinguish honest mediation from route substitution, hidden fallback, stream manipulation, or forged provenance. We present an evidence-bound LLM gateway architecture that separates the operator control plane from an attested execution plane. Within the gateway, a measured Attested Gateway Runtime (AGR) is the only component allowed to decrypt requests, enforce path policy, construct upstream calls, and sign evidence. Clients verify signed release metadata and fresh attestation before encrypting requests to keys bound to the AGR measurement. AGR enforces request-scoped routing, fallback, and endpoint constraints, invokes admitted providers, returns encrypted response streams, and signs evidence binding the policy, selected route, endpoint identity, stream commitments, and completion metadata to the attested runtime. An initial Rust prototype on AWS Nitro Enclaves shows modest mechanism overhead and fail-closed detection of policy, routing, endpoint, and stream-evidence tampering outside the attested runtime.

Tool-using agents make consequential changes to external state, yet correct outcomes do not guarantee that their actions were supported by evidence established beforehand. We study where this evidence-to-action chain breaks as agents move from deciding whether to act to executing single actions and dependent workflows. Across ten model-harness configurations, strong static action assessment can coexist with much weaker interactive execution. Failures often begin before execution: agents stop with incomplete investigation or act before required evidence is established. Once required evidence is obtained, single-action execution is usually reliable, while multi-action workflows additionally expose unresolved prerequisites and incomplete execution. For this analysis, we introduce SafeActBench, comprising 656 cases across six operational domains and five protocols that progress from static action judgment and investigated non-action to single- and multi-action workflows. A provenance-bound Evidence Ledger and deterministic trajectory evaluator track what information was established, when actions occurred, and whether downstream dependencies were satisfied. These results show that failures arise not only from missing information, but also from how agents use established evidence when deciding and executing actions.

Fine-grained credit assignment is a central challenge in reinforcement learning for long horizon LLM agents. Standard objectives often train from programmatically verifiable terminal rewards by broadcasting each sparse outcome to every action in a trajectory. Existing methods typically seek finer credit from the rollout side, constructing auxiliary trajectory signals or additional comparisons to estimate action importance. Although useful, these approaches still treat the verifier that judged success as a scalar reward, discarding its internal task structure. Our key insight is that many verifiable tasks already encode the relevant checks inside their terminal verifier. We propose VICT (VerifierInstrumented Credit Tracing), a training-time interface that exposes executable or evidence backed atoms and traces them back to actions through dependency-valid proof edges. VICT redistributes group-relative advantage only along those edges, shifting credit assignment from rollout-side inference to verifierside tracing. It preserves the original terminal reward, abstains when evidence is incomplete or ambiguous, and changes only the training-time advantage tensor, requiring no learned critic, process labels, branch rollouts, or inference-time verifier access. On ALFWorld and WebShop, VICT improves substantially over outcome-only training and achieves strong performance alongside recent fine-grained credit methods; ablations rule out dense atom rewards, final-commit credit, temporal proximity, and sparsity as sufficient explanations.

As LLM agents undertake increasingly complex, long-horizon tasks, verifying their outputs becomes increasingly challenging. We study how verification capability can be strengthened with a fixed base model, without access to reference answers or grading rubrics at test time. Repeated sampling yields multiple rollouts that can contain complementary correct claims, but we need a reliable verification mechanism to determine which claims to trust. We first find that disagreement often exposes correct alternatives, while consensus can conceal errors. These observations motivate VeriHarness, which turns the underlying LLM a generator uses into an agentic verifier by giving it a workspace, evidence tools, and reusable verification skills. A disagreement resolver checks competing claims against environmental evidence, while a consensus challenger tests shared claims and searches for omitted requirements. Their findings guide the selection and revision of the final artifact. Across five long-horizon workspace benchmarks and two frontier models, VeriHarness achieves the highest selection scores among the evaluated baselines. Evidence-backed revision further improves average performance, bringing gains over a single rollout to 6.2 points with Gemini 3.5 Flash and 6.4 points with Claude Opus 4.8. We further show that verification skills can self-improve from failure feedback, demonstrating VeriHarness as a novel and critical approach for scaling long-horizon agentic verification. We release the full pool of approximately 26,000 rollouts across all five benchmarks and both models, produced at a cost of over $100,000, to support future research on agentic verification.

Attorneys, judges, and pro se filers increasingly use AI to draft legal documents, yet these tools frequently fabricate citations. Despite predictions that newer models would hallucinate less or that court sanctions would deter negligent filers, we found over 1,000 filings containing fabricated citations---with this number growing year-over-year. This study evaluates whether AI-based systems can mitigate these errors by automatically detecting hallucinations. We propose a taxonomy of legal citation hallucinations grounded in actual court filings and introduce a dataset of 1,300 brief excerpts containing injected errors. Benchmarking five models in agentic and non-agentic settings as well as Claude Code reveals that while the latest iterations perform better---GPT-5 achieves 84.4% recall and a 55.0% F1 score in an agentic framework---all models struggle with subtle error categories. Agentic verification remains resource-intensive, with GPT-5 averaging 15.3 steps per excerpt. Furthermore, restricted information access limits the efficacy of even the best agents. This gap creates policy concerns, as it disadvantages both AI systems and litigants who lack subscriptions to commercial legal databases. Together, our dataset, tools, and policy recommendations provide a foundation for building and auditing reliable legal citation checking tools.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on persistent memory to support long-term reasoning and personalized interactions. However, information collected from external sources can introduce security risks when untrusted claims (i.e., atomic statements) are later treated as authorized preferences, policies, or permissions. Existing defenses typically rely on content-based filtering or coarse-grained provenance tracking, which either fail to prevent unauthorized memory use or block legitimate information, sacrificing memory utility. To address these limitations, we propose SAFE-Mem, a fine-grained memory governance framework that improves security while preserving legitimate memory use. First, SAFE-Mem annotates each claim with three governance labels (i.e., kind, authority, and scope) to capture its provenance and permitted use. Second, governance-aware retrieval matches query requirements with claim permissions to block unauthorized influence while retaining legitimate information. Third, a governance-enabled memory graph connects source sentences, claims, and entities to support provenance tracking and efficient retrieval. Across four LLM backbones on MPBench and LoCoMo, SAFE-Mem attains the lowest attack success among defenses that retain legitimate memory, at least 77% below the strongest of them, and the highest answer accuracy of all evaluated defenses, improving it by up to 15%. The code is available at https://github.com/LVenum/SAFE-Mem.

RAG enables LLMs to easily incorporate external data, raising concerns for data owners regarding unauthorized usage of their content. The challenge of detecting such unauthorized usage remains underexplored, with datasets and methods from adjacent fields being ill-suited for its study. We take several steps to bridge this gap. First, we formalize this problem as (black-box) RAG Dataset Inference (RAG-DI). We then introduce a novel dataset designed for realistic benchmarking of RAG-DI methods, alongside a set of baselines. Finally, we propose Ward, a method for RAG-DI based on LLM watermarks that equips data owners with rigorous statistical guarantees regarding their dataset's misuse in RAG corpora. Ward consistently outperforms all baselines, achieving higher accuracy, superior query efficiency and robustness. Our work provides a foundation for future studies of RAG-DI and highlights LLM watermarks as a promising approach to this problem.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

Agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) interleaves retrieval, reasoning, and answer generation across multiple hops. A retrieval error at hop 1 can surface only as a wrong answer at hop 3, while later retrieval can also repair the trajectory. This paper introduces AgenticRAG-FP, an interventional benchmark for causal failure attribution in agentic RAG. The benchmark injects a certified fault at a specified hop, re-executes the downstream trajectory, and evaluates diagnosers against the known intervention. Its central question is whether a post-hoc trace still identifies the injected hop after the suffix changes. In the completed strict dense Claude Haiku 4.5 sweep on 80 three-hop MuSiQue questions, coverage-based diagnosis is 0.91 at hop 1 and 0.00 at hops 2 and 3 (n=43,36,21 failed trajectories). A smaller content-corruption study changes an answer-bearing or bridge fact in topically intact evidence. At depth 2, where 18 failed cases remain after filtering, coverage-based diagnosis is 0.00 and a frozen-hop counterfactual probe is 0.67 in an exploratory pooled comparison. Depth-3 content estimates are descriptive only because they contain three failed cases. These results make propagation depth an explicit evaluation axis for diagnosing agentic RAG failures while distinguishing broad evidence of post-hoc signal loss from small-sample method comparisons.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

The rapid propagation of misinformation poses substantial risks to public interest. To combat misinformation, large language models (LLMs) are adapted to automatically verify claim credibility. Nevertheless, existing methods heavily rely on the embedded knowledge within LLMs and / or black-box APIs for evidence collection, leading to subpar performance with smaller LLMs or upon unreliable context. In this paper, we propose retrieval augmented fact verification through the synthesis of contrasting arguments (RAFTS). Upon input claims, RAFTS starts with evidence retrieval, where we design a retrieval pipeline to collect and re-rank relevant documents from verifiable sources. Then, RAFTS forms contrastive arguments (i.e., supporting or refuting) conditioned on the retrieved evidence. In addition, RAFTS leverages an embedding model to identify informative demonstrations, followed by in-context prompting to generate the prediction and explanation. Our method effectively retrieves relevant documents as evidence and evaluates arguments from varying perspectives, incorporating nuanced information for fine-grained decision-making. Combined with informative in-context examples as prior, RAFTS achieves significant improvements to supervised and LLM baselines without complex prompts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method through extensive experiments, where RAFTS can outperform GPT-based methods with a significantly smaller 7B LLM.

As large language models (LLMs) are trained on increasingly opaque corpora, membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been proposed to audit whether copyrighted texts were used during training, despite growing concerns about their reliability under realistic conditions. We ask whether MIAs can serve as admissible evidence in adversarial copyright disputes where an accused model developer may obfuscate training data while preserving semantic content, and formalize this setting through a judge-prosecutor-accused communication protocol. To test robustness under this protocol, we introduce SAGE (Structure-Aware SAE-Guided Extraction), a paraphrasing framework guided by Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) that rewrites training data to alter lexical structure while preserving semantic content and downstream utility. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art MIAs degrade when models are fine-tuned on SAGE-generated paraphrases, indicating that their signals are not robust to semantics-preserving transformations. While some leakage remains in certain fine-tuning regimes, these results suggest that MIAs are brittle in adversarial settings and insufficient, on their own, as a standalone mechanism for copyright auditing of LLMs.

Autonomous research agents produce competitive solutions and professional-looking manuscripts, yet their outputs contain verifiability failures undetectable by surface-level evaluation: fabricated citations, unreproducible scores, and method descriptions that diverge from the implementation. We address this through three contributions. First, Chain-of-Evidence (CoE), a verifiability framework requiring every claim to be traceable to its evidence source. Second, ScientistOne, an end-to-end autonomous research system that maintains evidence chains by construction throughout literature review, solution discovery, and paper writing. Third, CoE Audit, a post-hoc audit whose four integrity checks -- score verification, specification violation, reference verification, and method-code alignment -- apply uniformly to all systems. Across 75 papers spanning five systems and five frontier research tasks, every baseline exhibits at least one systematic failure mode: hallucinated reference rates reach 21%, score verification passes in as few as 42% of papers, and method-code alignment ranges from 20% to 80%. ScientistOne achieves zero hallucinated references (0/337), perfect score verification (12/12), and the highest method-code alignment (14/15), while matching or exceeding human expert performance on all five tasks. ScientistOne further generalizes to six additional tasks spanning medical imaging, fine-grained recognition, 3D perception, and language modeling, achieving state-of-the-art on Parameter Golf and gold medals on MLE-Bench tasks where baselines fail entirely.

LLM agents reach users through resellers, who may rebrand a developer's agent or substitute a cheaper model. When provenance is disputed, attribution rests on the trajectory log (the record of tool calls, observations, and executed actions, not the model's reasoning), which the reseller stores and processes to meter usage. A watermark must therefore survive an adversary with full read/write access to the very evidence it is detected from; existing agent watermarks do not, as their attribution is read straight off that log. We present TRACE, to our knowledge the first agent watermark that is distortion-free in its action choices, self-synchronizing under deletion, and unconditionally invariant under rewriting. Deletion desynchronizes a position-derived key and rewriting alters content, so a deletion-robust key must come from content and a rewrite-robust key from position, and no single key serves both. A trajectory, however, has room for two watermarks. TRACE superposes a selection channel that sets which action is chosen, keyed on local content with a distortion-free sampler, so the agent's distribution is provably unchanged and detection resynchronizes after deletions, and a tally channel that sets how many records each decision group holds, keyed on the log's skeleton alone, which no rewriting can touch. We prove this behavioral watermark's signal is bought with decision entropy, each decision paying at least half its entropy and deterministic decisions nothing, and that erasing both channels forces the reseller to corrupt the trajectories it resells. On ToolBench and ALFWorld, TRACE matches the unwatermarked agent's success rate while its selection channel reaches detection scores near z = 100 on long-horizon trajectories, stays detectable under 70% step deletion, and keeps a tally channel exactly unchanged under LLM rewriting of any strength.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

Generative AI and large language models (LLMs) are moving into the Internet of Things, yet most deployments assume cloud connectivity, and many IoT settings have intermittent, restricted, or no connectivity. We propose a connectivity-regime framework (C0-C4), a taxonomy of inference-time trust mechanisms, and signed, versioned knowledge packs as the update channel for disconnected regimes, and evaluate them on a Raspberry Pi 5 running fully local retrieval-augmented generation under network isolation, with three Qwen2.5 model sizes, three context sizes, and 300 SQuAD 2.0 questions. An empirically calibrated retrieval-score gate detects knowledge gaps almost perfectly (AUROC 0.97) but in-topic unanswerable questions poorly (0.68). A deterministic output validator converts malformed outputs into explicit abstentions with no observed loss of correct answers, while the NLI-based verifier we tested adds little; for the 7B model, 96% of substantive answers to unanswerable-labelled questions match normalized spans of the retrieved passages. A 3B model achieves the same gold-answer containment rate as a 7B model at less than half the latency and estimated energy, although the 7B model far more often exceeds a token-F1 threshold of 0.5; five retrieved passages lower correctness from 75% to 52% compared with three. Verifying a signed pack takes about 4.5 ms versus about 29 min for embedding its passages on the device; signature and hash checks alone accept six of nine tested update attacks that layered verification rejects. Yet a validly signed poisoned pack passes every pack check: on 30 previously correct questions, correct answers drop to zero and 14 return the injected answer. None of the mechanisms we evaluated establishes the truth of the evidence. We release code and data.

Large audio-language models have shown promise for anti-fraud detection by directly processing speech and reasoning over fraud-related evidence. Their deployment, however, requires predictions to follow a predefined label space and a structured decision protocol consisting of service-scenario identification, fraud detection, and conditional fraud-type classification. Existing fine-tuning and prompt-based approaches typically encode task knowledge, constraints, and decision rules into model parameters or manually maintained prompts, making them difficult to adapt as fraud patterns and labeling policies evolve. To this end, we propose FRAUDSkill, a structured frozen-weight adaptation framework that leaves the underlying audio-language model unchanged while optimizing an external layer of skill programs, route-specific policies, and decision rules. We further combine structured output control with validation-guided multi-path inference to ensure protocol-compliant predictions. On the TeleAntiFraud benchmark, FRAUDSkill achieves 73.50% Macro-F1, outperforming the shared frozen-model baseline by 31.96% while reducing invalid outputs to 1.94%. Extensive experiments demonstrate that external skill optimization provides an effective and adaptable solution for structured audio anti-fraud detection without modifying the underlying model. The source code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FRAUDSKILL-114514.

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

Large language models can hold knowledge they do not report. A model may sandbag on a capability evaluation, or answer against what it internally knows, and its outputs alone cannot tell whether it is hiding an answer or simply does not have one. We borrow the Concealed Information Test, a forensic method that identifies guilty knowledge by presenting a suspect with the true detail among plausible decoys and measuring a stronger response to the item they recognize. Our method, Probe of Internal Recognition (PIR), does the same inside a model. It presents a question with its candidate answers and reads, from the model's internal states, which candidate the model recognizes as correct. PIR is reference-free, needing no honest reference model and no labeled truth corpus. Across eight models from five families (Gemma, Qwen, Llama, Mistral, and Phi), PIR recovers the recognized answer at 0.70 to 0.87 balanced accuracy, well above the 0.28 to 0.40 unknown-item baseline and the 0.25 chance rate. It stays readable across every form of concealment we test, from prompted deception and trained sandbagging to external password-locked and circuit-broken checkpoints, with recognition between 0.85 and 0.93. When the model hides a known answer, recognition stays high. When unlearning removes the knowledge, recognition drops to the level of a question the model never knew. PIR therefore separates a model that will not answer from one that cannot, which supports sandbagging audits and unlearning verification. The signal is causal, adds information beyond black-box behavioral cues, and extends from multiple-choice questions to free-form generation.

With the help of simple fine-tuning, one can artificially embed hidden text into large language models (LLMs). This text is revealed only when triggered by a specific query to the LLM. Two primary applications are LLM fingerprinting and steganography. In the context of LLM fingerprinting, a unique text identifier (fingerprint) is embedded within the model to verify licensing compliance. In the context of steganography, the LLM serves as a carrier for hidden messages that can be disclosed through a designated trigger. Our work demonstrates that embedding hidden text in the LLM via fine-tuning, though seemingly secure due to the vast number of potential triggers (any sequence of characters or tokens could serve as a trigger), is susceptible to extraction through analysis of the LLM's output decoding process. We propose a novel approach to extraction called Unconditional Token Forcing. It is premised on the hypothesis that iteratively feeding each token from the LLM's vocabulary into the model should reveal sequences with abnormally high token probabilities, indicating potential embedded text candidates. Additionally, our experiments show that when the first token of a hidden fingerprint is used as an input, the LLM not only produces an output sequence with high token probabilities, but also repetitively generates the fingerprint itself. We also present a method to hide text in such a way that it is resistant to Unconditional Token Forcing, which we named Unconditional Token Forcing Confusion.

Long-running LLM agents compress past interactions into persistent memories that may be reused as premises for later tasks. This creates a distinct derivation problem: whether the memory actually follows from what the interaction history supports. Relevant evidence may be scattered across earlier interactions, while compression can introduce relations or event status that the history never established. A valid memory may therefore appear unsupported because its citations omit relevant evidence, while individually supported facts may be composed into a stronger statement the history never established. We characterize this problem through three coupled requirements: (1) Evidence scope; (2) Compositional validity; (3) Admission reliability. We therefore ask whether the interaction history available at write time supports what enters persistent memory. We introduce DerivAudit, a framework for auditing whether a memory is actually supported by the history available when it was written. The audit separates three questions: whether supporting evidence lies beyond writer-provided citations, whether the composed memory introduces unsupported meaning, and how write-time admission decisions affect later memory use. Across two natural memory corpora, audits using broader pre-write history recover support for nearly 60% of memories that appear unsupported from citations alone, while 17-21% remain unsupported after expansion. Yet broader evidence does not by itself make admission reliable: unsupported memories are still frequently admitted across verification models, and evidence expansion alone worsens it on two backbones.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are deployed through pipelines that end users cannot audit, and a poisoned VLA can behave normally on clean observations while a small visual trigger redirects a long-horizon robot policy before any failure becomes observable. Existing vision or language defenses rarely explain what a triggered VLA representation looks like or how to recover behavior without retraining. We study this gap through two independently proposed VLA attacks from groups with distinct injection strategies, BadVLA and INFUSE; the latter persists after downstream clean adaptation. Across the evaluated poisoned models, we identify a recurring internal mechanism: a compact causal footprint, namely a small visual support that is attention-seeded, spatially compact, and causal in a precise sense -- masking it returns a clean-calibrated evidence-evolution score to the normal operating region. This footprint motivates TrustVLA, a mechanism-guided inference-time defense that adapts the Dirichlet evidence framework from trusted classification to monitor per-token, per-layer epistemic uncertainty in VLA policies. With only a small clean calibration set, TrustVLA (i)~detects abnormal evidence evolution, (ii)~localizes the compact support by counterfactual mechanism-score drop, and (iii)~recovers the observation by localized inpainting. Across OpenVLA/LIBERO and π_{0.5} transfer evaluations, TrustVLA reduces attack success while preserving clean-task performance, providing a retraining-free, mechanism-guided defense for visual-triggered VLA backdoors.

AI generative models leave implicit traces in their generated images, which are commonly referred to as model fingerprints and are exploited for source attribution. Prior methods rely on model-specific cues or synthesis artifacts, yielding limited fingerprints that may generalize poorly across different generative models. We argue that a complete model fingerprint should reflect the causality between image provenance and model traces, a direction largely unexplored. To this end, we conceptualize the causal fingerprint of generative models, and propose a causality-decoupling framework that disentangles it from image-specific content and style in a semantic-invariant latent space derived from pre-trained diffusion reconstruction residual. We further enhance fingerprint granularity with diverse feature representations. We validate causality by assessing attribution performance across representative GANs and diffusion models and by achieving source anonymization using counterfactual examples generated from causal fingerprints. Experiments show our approach outperforms existing methods in model attribution, indicating strong potential for forgery detection, model copyright tracing, and identity protection.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has triggered legal and ethical concerns, especially regarding the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials in their training datasets. This has led to lawsuits against tech companies accused of using protected content without permission. Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to detect whether specific documents were used in a given LLM pretraining, but their effectiveness is undermined by biases such as time-shifts and n-gram overlaps. This paper addresses the evaluation of MIAs on LLMs with partially inferable training sets, under the ex-post hypothesis, which acknowledges inherent distributional biases between members and non-members datasets. We propose and validate algorithms to create ``non-biased'' and ``non-classifiable'' datasets for fairer MIA assessment. Experiments using the Gutenberg dataset on OpenLamma and Pythia show that neutralizing known biases alone is insufficient. Our methods produce non-biased ex-post datasets with AUC-ROC scores comparable to those previously obtained on genuinely random datasets, validating our approach. Globally, MIAs yield results close to random, with only one being effective on both random and our datasets, but its performance decreases when bias is removed.

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the benchmark for causal inference, yet field implementation can deviate. We here present a remote audit - a design-based, preregistrable diagnostic that uses only pre-treatment satellite imagery to test whether assignment is independent of local conditions. The conditional randomization test of the remote audit evaluates whether treatment assignment is more predictable from pre-treatment satellite features than expected under the experiment's registered mechanism, providing a finite-sample valid, design-based diagnostic that requires no parametric assumptions. The procedure is finite-sample valid, honors blocks and clusters, and controls multiplicity across image models and resolutions via a max-statistic. We illustrate with two RCTs: Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program, where the audit corroborates randomization and flags selection and missing-data risks; and a school-based trial in Bangladesh, where assignment is highly predictable from pre-treatment features relative to the stated design, consistent with independent concerns about irregularities. Remote audits complement balance tests, lower early-stage costs, and enable rapid design checks when baseline surveys are expensive or infeasible.

Legal reasoning is not semantic similarity search. A court judgment encodes constrained symbolic reasoning: precedent propagation, procedural state transitions, and statute-bound inference. These are properties that vector-based retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) cannot faithfully represent. Hallucinated precedents, outdated statute citations, and unsupported reasoning chains remain persistent failure modes in LLM-based legal AI, with real consequences for access to justice in high-caseload jurisdictions such as India. This paper presents Falkor-IRAC, a graph-constrained generation framework for Indian legal AI that grounds generation in structured reasoning over an IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) knowledge graph. Judgments from the Supreme Court and High Courts of India are ingested as IRAC node structures enriched with procedural state transitions, precedent relationships, and statutory references, stored in FalkorDB for low-latency agentic traversal. At inference time, LLM-generated answers are accepted only if a valid supporting path can be traced through the graph, a check performed by a falsifiability oracle called the Verifier Agent. The system also detects doctrinal conflicts as a first-class output rather than silently resolving them. Falkor-IRAC is evaluated using graph-native metrics: citation grounding accuracy, path validity rate, hallucinated precedent rate, and conflict detection rate. These metrics are argued to be more appropriate for legal reasoning evaluation than BLEU and ROUGE. On a proof-of-concept corpus of 51 Supreme Court judgments, the Verifier Agent correctly validated citations on completed queries and correctly rejected fabricated citations. Evaluation against vector-only RAG baselines is left for future work, as is GPU-accelerated inference to address current timeout rates on CPU hardware.

AI agents that execute tasks via tool calls frequently hallucinate results - fabricating tool executions, misstating output counts, or presenting inferences as facts. Recent approaches to verifiable AI inference rely on zero-knowledge proofs, which provide cryptographic guarantees but impose minutes of proving time per query, making them impractical for interactive agents. We propose NabaOS, a lightweight verification framework inspired by Indian epistemology (Nyaya Shastra), which classifies every claim in an LLM response by its epistemic source (pramana): direct tool output (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), external testimony (shabda), absence (abhava), or ungrounded opinion. Our runtime generates HMAC-signed tool execution receipts that the LLM cannot forge, then cross-references claims against these receipts to detect hallucinations in real time. We evaluate on NyayaVerifyBench, a new benchmark of 1,800 agent response scenarios across four languages with injected hallucinations of six types. NabaOS detects 94.2% of fabricated tool references, 87.6% of count misstatements, and 91.3% of false absence claims, with <15ms verification overhead per response. For deep delegation (agents performing multi-step web tasks), our cross-checking protocol catches 78.4% of URL fabrications via independent re-fetching. We compare against five approaches: zkLLM (cryptographic proofs, 180s/query), TOPLOC (locality-sensitive hashing), SPEX (sampling-based proof of execution), tensor commitments, and self-consistency checking. NabaOS achieves the best cost-latency-coverage trade-off for interactive agents: 94.2% coverage at <15ms versus zkLLM's near-perfect coverage at 180,000ms. For interactive agents, practical receipt-based verification provides better cost-benefit than cryptographic proofs, and epistemic classification gives users actionable trust signals rather than binary judgments.

Streaming omni-modal models must decide what and when to answer from the video chunks and synchronized audio observed so far. Visual cues often support an interpretation before an utterance or sound event is complete. If that interpretation enters memory as a fact, later reasoning can keep relaying it even after audio contradicts it. We call this failure premature cross-modal commitment. We propose Omni-Streaming Thinking (OST), which generates structured outputs that include evidence observed so far, forecasts of future evidence, and claims based on this evidence. Each claim is initially marked as pending and linked to a future verification interval. Audio and visual evidence are stored separately, and OST checks a claim against the evidence from the specified modality at the end of the verification interval. When contradictory evidence is detected, a refutation process reduces the influence of the claim and its dependent states, and then guides a state update using the new evidence. An answer gate decides whether the answer-critical claims meet the conditions for giving a response. Using a frozen Qwen3-Omni-30B-A3B-Instruct backbone with lightweight adaptation, OST outperforms the strongest open baselines on five streaming and audio-visual benchmarks by more than 10% relative on average. We also introduce OST-DiagBench, which holds video fixed and edits audio to test agreement, absence, contradiction, coexistence, and subtitle-speech conflict. OST reaches d-prime = 2.95, compared with at most 1.38 for open baselines, while reducing vision-induced auditory hallucinations.

Watermarking has emerged as a promising way to detect LLM-generated text, by augmenting LLM generations with later detectable signals. Recent work has proposed multiple families of watermarking schemes, several of which focus on preserving the LLM distribution. This distribution-preservation property is motivated by the fact that it is a tractable proxy for retaining LLM capabilities, as well as the inherently implied undetectability of the watermark by downstream users. Yet, despite much discourse around undetectability, no prior work has investigated the practical detectability of any of the current watermarking schemes in a realistic black-box setting. In this work we tackle this for the first time, developing rigorous statistical tests to detect the presence, and estimate parameters, of all three popular watermarking scheme families, using only a limited number of black-box queries. We experimentally confirm the effectiveness of our methods on a range of schemes and a diverse set of open-source models. Further, we validate the feasibility of our tests on real-world APIs. Our findings indicate that current watermarking schemes are more detectable than previously believed.

We present Cascadia, a system for serving large language models on fleets of commodity Intel AIPCs using their CPU, integrated-GPU, and NPU resources. Every node embeds ingress, scheduling, and execution; inference requests require no dedicated routing control plane. Nodes join a libp2p QUIC mesh using CA-issued ed25519 admission certificates, gossip signed capabilities, exchange live load over direct peer streams, and route OpenAI-compatible requests to eligible peers. An operator-run certificate authority handles admission and fleet management outside the inference path. Three serving modes share one interface: whole-model execution on one node, load-balanced replicas, and pipeline-sharded chains using the compilation and speculative decoding mechanism of our companion paper. Optional KV-cache mobility reuses compatible conversation prefixes after a routing move, with cold recomputation on a miss. Signed response receipts and hash-chained logs support provenance and audit. A three-node Phi-3.5-mini NPU testbed delivered 3.10x the response throughput of its one-node configuration under ten concurrent requests; a separate four-node deployment recorded 4.06x the throughput of direct single-node serving. Paired latency observations, runtime measurements, and internal functional checks characterize the tested configurations. We compare Cascadia with IBM, Nutanix, VMware, and HPE platforms on deployment footprint, hardware requirements, scheduling, scaling, licensing, and trust, using vendor documentation. The paper repository provides benchmark scripts, curated measurements, and a claim-to-evidence map.

The detection and grounding of manipulated content in multimodal data has emerged as a critical challenge in media forensics. While existing benchmarks demonstrate technical progress, they suffer from misalignment artifacts that poorly reflect real-world manipulation patterns: practical attacks typically maintain semantic consistency across modalities, whereas current datasets artificially disrupt cross-modal alignment, creating easily detectable anomalies. To bridge this gap, we pioneer the detection of semantically-coordinated manipulations where visual edits are systematically paired with semantically consistent textual descriptions. Our approach begins with constructing the first Semantic-Aligned Multimodal Manipulation (SAMM) dataset, generated through a two-stage pipeline: 1) applying state-of-the-art image manipulations, followed by 2) generation of contextually-plausible textual narratives that reinforce the visual deception. Building on this foundation, we propose a Retrieval-Augmented Manipulation Detection and Grounding (RamDG) framework. RamDG commences by harnessing external knowledge repositories to retrieve contextual evidence, which serves as the auxiliary texts and encoded together with the inputs through our image forgery grounding and deep manipulation detection modules to trace all manipulations. Extensive experiments demonstrate our framework significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving 2.06\% higher detection accuracy on SAMM compared to state-of-the-art approaches. The dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/shen8424/SAMM-RamDG-CAP.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

Autonomous coding agents increasingly execute multi-step software work, but lifecycle states such as reviewed, tested, DONE, and ready-to-merge remain claims unless supported by current evidence. We present Proof-or-Stop Lifecycle Control, a method that permits lifecycle transitions only when fresh, tracked-source-state-bound, mechanically verifiable evidence satisfies the relevant gate. The method treats agent outputs as claims rather than lifecycle state, and uses proof operationally to mean gate-admissible evidence under a stated trust model, not semantic program correctness. We evaluate an open-source implementation through mechanism tests, a powered control-policy ablation, and operated self-application evidence. The unattended-loop engine passed 10 of 10 scenarios with zero false-DONE, and local-key receipt bundles rejected 18 tamper classes with zero false accepts. In a 9,240-cell ablation, the pre-registered A4 versus A2-prime comparison reduced visible-pass/hidden-fail amplification from 31 of 1,800 injected cells under a compute-budgeted naive loop to 2 of 1,800 under the gated loop, a 1.6 percentage-point improvement in not-amplified rate with a 95 percent confidence interval of [0.8, 2.5]. A near-compute A3 versus A4 comparison, 14 of 1,800 versus 2 of 1,800, indicates that the gain is associated with enforcing review as a lifecycle gate rather than merely adding a reviewer. The self-application corpus contains 565 stories and 1,007 review findings, with 94.8 percent resolved, plus a 68-row high/critical cross-vendor exhibit. These results support Proof-or-Stop as a model-agnostic, host-neutral control layer for deciding which autonomous-agent claims a lifecycle may act on. The evaluation is limited to one model family, 24 ablation tasks, and a self-hosted corpus.

Blockchain forensics inherently involves dynamic and iterative investigations, while many existing approaches primarily model it through static inference pipelines. We propose a paradigm shift towards Agentic Blockchain Forensics (ABF), modeling forensic investigation as a sequential decision-making process. To instantiate this paradigm, we introduce LOCARD, the first agentic framework for blockchain forensics. LOCARD operationalizes this perspective through a Tri-Core Cognitive Architecture that decouples strategic planning, operational execution, and evaluative validation. Unlike generic LLM-based agents, it incorporates a Structured Belief State mechanism to enforce forensic rigor and guide exploration under explicit state constraints. To demonstrate the efficacy of the ABF paradigm, we apply LOCARD to the inherently complex domain of cross-chain transaction tracing. We introduce Thor25, a benchmark dataset comprising over 151k real-world cross-chain forensic records, and evaluate LOCARD on the Group-Transfer Tracing task for dismantling Sybil clusters. Validated against representative laundering sub-flows from the Bybit hack, LOCARD achieves high-fidelity tracing results, providing empirical evidence that modeling blockchain forensics as an autonomous agentic task is both viable and effective. These results establish a concrete foundation for future agentic approaches to large-scale blockchain forensic analysis. Code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/xhyumiracle/locard and https://github.com/xhyumiracle/thorchain-crosschain-data.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Document-based LLM systems often flatten a PDF before guardrails inspect it. That step can discard evidence that an instruction was never visible to the user. We introduce CrackedPDFs, a controlled benchmark for hidden prompt injection in PDFs. The benchmark contains 29,322 generated PDFs from 4,983 base docu ments. It includes 9,774 injected files and 19,548 benign or matched-confounder files. We evaluate PromptGuard and a rule baseline. We also evaluate structural only learned models and a sanitized hybrid detector. The evaluation uses held-out provenance splits and paired benign-confounder controls. It also uses label-shuffle checks and shortcut audits. On a 2,919-document held-out test set, the hybrid de tector reaches 0.960 F1. ROC-AUC is 0.998 and PR-AUC is 0.997. It also ranks injected files above matched benign confounders in 95.9% of 973 pairs. Prompt Guard has low recall when given extracted text only. Structural-only learned mod els are weak under paired controls. A text-only TF-IDF model reaches perfect held-out scores but fails shortcut audits. These results show that document-aware hybrid detection is useful under controlled paired evaluation. They do not show broad real-world robustness or reliable cross-family generalization.

Recent work, using the Biasing Features metric, labels a CoT as unfaithful if it omits a prompt-injected hint that affected the prediction. We argue this metric confuses unfaithfulness with incompleteness, the lossy compression needed to turn distributed transformer computation into a linear natural language narrative. On multi-hop reasoning tasks with Llama-3 and Gemma-3, many CoTs flagged as unfaithful by Biasing Features are judged faithful by other metrics, exceeding 50% in some models. With a new faithful@k metric, we show that larger inference-time token budgets greatly increase hint verbalization (up to 90% in some settings), suggesting much apparent unfaithfulness is due to tight token limits. Using Causal Mediation Analysis, we further show that even non-verbalized hints can causally mediate prediction changes through the CoT. We therefore caution against relying solely on hint-based evaluations and advocate a broader interpretability toolkit, including causal mediation and corruption-based metrics.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

The rapid progress of generative AI has enabled increasingly realistic text-centric image forgeries, posing major challenges to document safety. Existing forensic methods mainly rely on visual cues and lack evidence-based reasoning to reveal subtle text manipulations. Detection, localization, and explanation are often treated as isolated tasks, limiting reliability and interpretability. To tackle these challenges, we propose DocShield, the first unified framework formulating text-centric forgery analysis as a visual-logical co-reasoning problem. At its core, a novel Cross-Cues-aware Chain of Thought (CCT) mechanism enables implicit agentic reasoning, iteratively cross-validating visual anomalies with textual semantics to produce consistent, evidence-grounded forensic analysis. We further introduce a Weighted Multi-Task Reward for GRPO-based optimization, aligning reasoning structure, spatial evidence, and authenticity prediction. Complementing the framework, we construct RealText-V1, a multilingual dataset of document-like text images with pixel-level manipulation masks and expert-level textual explanations. Extensive experiments show DocShield significantly outperforms existing methods, improving macro-average F1 by 41.4% over specialized frameworks and 23.4% over GPT-4o on T-IC13, with consistent gains on the challenging T-SROIE benchmark. Our dataset, model, and code will be publicly released.

Digital identity is unsolved: after many years of research there is still no trusted communication over the Internet. To provide identity within the context of mutual distrust, this paper presents a blockchain-based digital identity solution. Without depending upon a single trusted third party, the proposed solution achieves passport-level legally valid identity. This solution for making identities Self-Sovereign, builds on a generic provable claim model for which attestations of truth from third parties need to be collected. The claim model is then shown to be both blockchain structure and proof method agnostic. Four different implementations in support of these two claim model properties are shown to offer sub-second performance for claim creation and claim verification. Through the properties of Self-Sovereign Identity, legally valid status and acceptable performance, our solution is considered to be fit for adoption by the general public.

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

This paper investigates the radioactivity of LLM-generated texts, i.e. whether it is possible to detect that such input was used as training data. Conventional methods like membership inference can carry out this detection with some level of accuracy. We show that watermarked training data leaves traces easier to detect and much more reliable than membership inference. We link the contamination level to the watermark robustness, its proportion in the training set, and the fine-tuning process. We notably demonstrate that training on watermarked synthetic instructions can be detected with high confidence (p-value < 1e-5) even when as little as 5% of training text is watermarked. Thus, LLM watermarking, originally designed for detecting machine-generated text, gives the ability to easily identify if the outputs of a watermarked LLM were used to fine-tune another LLM.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) holds great promise for the development of autonomous agents under complex GUI tasks, but its scalability remains severely hampered by the verification of task completion. Existing task verification is treated as a passive, post-hoc process: a verifier (i.e., rule-based scoring script, reward or critic model, and LLM-as-a-Judge) analyzes the agent's entire interaction trajectory to determine if the agent succeeds. Such processing of verbose context that contains irrelevant, noisy history poses challenges to the verification protocols and therefore leads to prohibitive cost and low reliability. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose SmartSnap, a paradigm shift from this passive, post-hoc verification to proactive, in-situ self-verification by the agent itself. We introduce the Self-Verifying Agent, a new type of agent designed with dual missions: to not only complete a task but also to prove its accomplishment with curated snapshot evidences. Guided by our proposed 3C Principles (Completeness, Conciseness, and Creativity), the agent leverages its accessibility to the online environment to perform self-verification on a minimal, decisive set of snapshots. Such evidences are provided as the sole materials for a general LLM-as-a-Judge verifier to determine their validity and relevance. Experiments on mobile tasks across model families and scales demonstrate that our SmartSnap paradigm allows training LLM-driven agents in a scalable manner, bringing performance gains up to 26.08% and 16.66% respectively to 8B and 30B models. The synergizing between solution finding and evidence seeking facilitates the cultivation of efficient, self-verifying agents with competitive performance against DeepSeek V3.1 and Qwen3-235B-A22B.

Public-service recommendations require evidence that matches the requested service, scope, and date. Yet treating every missing detail as decisive can withhold useful recommendations. We introduce EviGraph, which distinguishes critical decision requirements from information that can remain unresolved. A language agent links these requirements to evidence in a temporal knowledge graph, while a deterministic checker establishes whether a recommendation is supported. Evaluation on a bilingual Hong Kong public-service benchmark with executable policy references shows that this distinction reduces unnecessary abstention. Additional verification, however, can withdraw supported recommendations without improving decision quality. These findings suggest that reliable evidence-based navigation depends on specifying what must be established for a decision, rather than simply adding more verification.

Medical vision-language models (VLMs) generate chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before answering clinical questions, but whether this reasoning causally influences predictions remains unclear. We present CoT-Mediate, a behavioral framework that perturbs a single clinically meaningful attribute within a model's own generated reasoning and measures whether the resulting prediction follows the edited reasoning. Our framework combines a dual-arm protocol comparing re-prompted evidence with prefix-forced continuation, together with a provenance-controlled intervention that varies only the attributed source of identical reasoning to disentangle reasoning mediation from sycophancy. We evaluate LLaVA-Med and MedGemma on 1,000 VQA-RAD samples each. Prefix-forced continuation consistently yields higher mediation faithfulness than re-prompting, while the provenance analysis reveals distinct model-specific deference behaviors. Across both models, removing visual evidence increases reliance on injected reasoning, whereas laterality is the least faithfully tracked clinical attribute. These results show that the mechanism used to inject reasoning substantially affects measured faithfulness and that contextual position, rather than stated provenance, is the primary determinant of whether medical VLMs use their generated reasoning.

When should an AI system's answer be trusted? Formal proof assistants offer certainty but cannot reach most of the problem distribution; scalar LLM judges offer coverage but produce opaque scores that cannot be audited after the fact and are subject to the same coherence issues as any LLM. We present Theoria, a verification architecture that closes this gap. A candidate solution is rewritten into a sequence of typed state transitions, each licensed by an explicit justification, whether that be a citation, computation, or problem-given fact, and every transition is independently auditable. The foundational invariant is completeness of change: every difference between consecutive proof states must be accounted for, so hidden premises surface as unlicensed mutations rather than passing silently. On HLE-Verified Gold (185 text-only expert problems), Theoria certifies 105 at 91.4% strict precision (Wilson 95% CI [84.5%, 95.4%]). Every certification produces a human readable proof trace in which each step can be independently challenged. Holistic LLM judges achieve comparable precision at matched coverage but fail on different problems (Jaccard 0.14-0.36), making the approaches complementary. On 95 adversarial poisoned proofs across 15 domains, structured judges catch 94.7% versus 83.2% for holistic judging (p= 0.0017). The overall 11.5 pp gap concentrates in hidden premises (90.6% vs. 62.5%, a 28 pp difference) and fabricated citations (100% vs. 90%), the error classes where the formal analysis predicts an advantage; performance is identical on arithmetic and theorem-misapplication errors, where no advantage is predicted. On GPQA Diamond (n= 65), certified precision is 97.1% (Wilson CI [85.1%, 99.5%]).

Scientific research based on multimodal clinical data (including medical imaging) requires coordinating clinical, radiological, programming, and biostatistical expertise, a fragmented process that bottlenecks discovery. We present VERITAS (Verifiable Epistemic Reasoning for Image-Derived Hypothesis Testing via Agentic Systems), a clinical co-scientist: a multi-agent system that autonomously tests natural-language hypotheses and produces a fully auditable evidence trail, tracing every conclusion through executable outputs from analysis plan to segmentation masks to statistical code to final verdict. Unlike prior AI-scientist systems, which mainly operate on tabular or text data, VERITAS grounds autonomous discovery directly in medical images. It decomposes the workflow into four phases handled by role-specialized agents, and introduces an epistemic evidence label framework that mechanically classifies outcomes as Supported, Refuted, Underpowered, or Invalid by jointly evaluating significance, effect direction, and study power. This distinction is critical in medical imaging, where non-significant results often reflect insufficient sample size rather than absent effects. We construct a tiered benchmark of 64 hypotheses spanning six complexity levels across cardiac and brain glioma MRI datasets. VERITAS reaches 81.4% verdict accuracy with frontier models and 71.2% with locally-hosted open-weight models (8-30B), outperforming all single-model baselines in both classes. It also produces the highest rate of independently verifiable statistical outputs (86.6%), so even its failures remain diagnosable through artifact inspection. Structured multi-agent decomposition thus substitutes for model scale while preserving the verifiability that scientific discovery demands. We release code, hypothesis bank, and evaluation pipeline at https://github.com/LucZot/veritas.

We contribute the largest publicly available dataset of naturally occurring factual claims for the purpose of automatic claim verification. It is collected from 26 fact checking websites in English, paired with textual sources and rich metadata, and labelled for veracity by human expert journalists. We present an in-depth analysis of the dataset, highlighting characteristics and challenges. Further, we present results for automatic veracity prediction, both with established baselines and with a novel method for joint ranking of evidence pages and predicting veracity that outperforms all baselines. Significant performance increases are achieved by encoding evidence, and by modelling metadata. Our best-performing model achieves a Macro F1 of 49.2%, showing that this is a challenging testbed for claim veracity prediction.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into legal drafting and research workflows, where incorrect citations or fabricated precedents can cause serious professional harm. Existing legal benchmarks largely emphasize statutory reasoning, contract understanding, or general legal question answering, but they do not directly study a central common-law failure mode: when asked to provide case authorities without external grounding, models may return plausible-looking but incorrect citations or cases. We introduce LegalCiteBench, a benchmark for studying closed-book citation recovery, citation verification, and case matching in legal language models. LegalCiteBench contains approximately 24K evaluation instances constructed from 1,000 real U.S. judicial opinions from the Case Law Access Project. The benchmark covers five citation-centric tasks: citation retrieval, citation completion, citation error detection, case matching, and case verification and correction. Across 21 LLMs, exact citation recovery remains highly challenging in this closed-book setting: even the strongest models score below 7/100 on citation retrieval and completion. Within the evaluated models, scale and legal-domain pretraining provide limited gains and do not resolve this difficulty. Models also frequently provide concrete but incorrect or low-overlap authorities under our evaluation protocol, with Misleading Answer Rates (MAR) exceeding 94% for 20 of 21 evaluated models on retrieval-heavy tasks. A prompt-only abstention experiment shows that explicit uncertainty instructions reduce some confident fabrication but do not improve citation correctness. LegalCiteBench is intended as a diagnostic framework for studying authority generation failures, verification behavior, and abstention when external grounding is absent, incomplete, or bypassed.

We introduce TextSeal, a state-of-the-art watermark for large language models. Building on Gumbel-max sampling, TextSeal introduces dual-key generation to restore output diversity, along with entropy-weighted scoring and multi-region localization for improved detection. It supports serving optimizations such as speculative decoding and multi-token prediction, and does not add any inference overhead. TextSeal strictly dominates baselines like SynthID-text in detection strength and is robust to dilution, maintaining confident localized detection even in heavily mixed human/AI documents. The scheme is theoretically distortion-free, and evaluation across reasoning benchmarks confirms that it preserves downstream performance; while a multilingual human evaluation (6000 A/B comparisons, 5 languages) shows no perceptible quality difference. Beyond its use for provenance detection, TextSeal is also ``radioactive'': its watermark signal transfers through model distillation, enabling detection of unauthorized use.

Document understanding is a critical capability in financial credit review, onboarding, and remote verification, where both decision accuracy and evidence traceability matter. Compared with static document images, document videos present a temporally redundant and sequentially unfolding evidence stream, require evidence integration across frames, and preserve acquisition-process cues relevant to authenticity-sensitive and anti-fraud review. We introduce FCMBench-Video, a benchmark for document-video intelligence that evaluates document perception, temporal grounding, and evidence-grounded reasoning under realistic capture conditions. For privacy-compliant yet realistic data at scale, we organize construction as an atomic-acquisition and composition workflow that records reusable single-document clips, applies controlled degradations, and assembles long-form multi-document videos with prescribed temporal spans. FCMBench-Video is built from 495 atomic videos composed into 1,200 long-form videos paired with 11,322 expert-annotated question--answer instances, covering 28 document types over 20s--60s duration tiers and 5,960 Chinese / 5,362 English instances. Evaluations on nine recent Video-MLLMs show that FCMBench-Video provides meaningful separation across systems and capabilities: counting is the most duration-sensitive task, Cross-Document Validation and Evidence-Grounded Selection probe higher-level evidence integration, and Visual Prompt Injection provides a complementary robustness dimension. The overall score distribution is broad and approximately bell-shaped, indicating a benchmark that is neither saturated nor dominated by trivial cases. Together, these results position FCMBench-Video as a reproducible benchmark for tracking Video-MLLM progress on document-video understanding and probing capability boundaries in authenticity-sensitive credit-domain applications.

The task of Legal Statute Identification (LSI) aims to identify the legal statutes that are relevant to a given description of Facts or evidence of a legal case. Existing methods only utilize the textual content of Facts and legal articles to guide such a task. However, the citation network among case documents and legal statutes is a rich source of additional information, which is not considered by existing models. In this work, we take the first step towards utilising both the text and the legal citation network for the LSI task. We curate a large novel dataset for this task, including Facts of cases from several major Indian Courts of Law, and statutes from the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Modeling the statutes and training documents as a heterogeneous graph, our proposed model LeSICiN can learn rich textual and graphical features, and can also tune itself to correlate these features. Thereafter, the model can be used to inductively predict links between test documents (new nodes whose graphical features are not available to the model) and statutes (existing nodes). Extensive experiments on the dataset show that our model comfortably outperforms several state-of-the-art baselines, by exploiting the graphical structure along with textual features. The dataset and our codes are available at https://github.com/Law-AI/LeSICiN.

Skills are becoming a reusable operational layer for LLM agents, encoding SOPs, domain rules, tool workflows, scripts, and validation routines. In realistic skill repositories, overlapping skills make reliable skill-use difficult. Final verifier success is too coarse for both evaluation and training, since an agent may pass through trial and error while selecting distractor skills, skipping required steps, composing workflows incorrectly or omitting final checks. We introduce SkillCoach, a self-evolving rubric framework for evaluating and enhancing agentic skill-use. SkillCoach derives skill-grounded process rubrics from real rollouts and evaluates trajectories along four dimensions: skill selection, skill following, skill composition, and skill-grounded reflection. It keeps the external verifier as a separate outcome signal, allowing process quality to be distinguished from accidental task success. The evolved rubrics further serve as process supervision for selecting high-quality training trajectories. Experiments show that evolved rubrics substantially improve evaluation quality, expose failures hidden by final accuracy, and provide stronger supervision signals than outcome-only filtering for enhancing agentic skill-use.

Large language models are often asked which input factors influenced their outputs. For structured inputs, such reports can be checked by counterfactual perturbation, but each factor must be queried multiple times to estimate its effect, so verification is usually budget-limited. We study how this limited-budget setting changes the incentive to report factor-level influence truthfully. We formalize the interaction as a verification game and show that proper scoring alone is not enough when auditing depends on the report: report-dependent auditing creates a suppression incentive, because factors reported as important are more likely to be checked and penalized for estimation noise. In contrast, report-independent auditing, or a mixed rule with a small report-independent floor, removes this channel and makes truthful reporting preferable to full suppression. We instantiate the framework with the Counterfactual Brier Score (CBS) and evaluate its predictions on four NLP benchmarks. A synthetic rational agent matches the theoretical prediction exactly, and real LLMs follow the same incentives when they are made explicit. The main design implication is simple: under partial verification, factor-level explanation systems should include a report-independent audit component so that under-reporting cannot be used to avoid scrutiny.

Test-time reinforcement learning (TTRL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for self-evolving large reasoning models (LRMs), enabling online adaptation on unlabeled test inputs via self-induced rewards through majority voting. However, a spurious yet high-frequency unverified consensus can become a biased and reinforced reward signal, leading to incorrect mode collapse. We address this failure mode with T^3RL (Tool-Verification for Test-Time Reinforcement Learning), which introduces test-time tool verification into reward estimation. Concretely, a verifier uses an external tool as evidence (e.g., from code execution) to upweight verified rollouts in a verification-aware voting, producing more reliable pseudo-labels for training. Across various math difficulties (MATH-500, AMC, and AIME 2024) and diverse backbone types, T^3RL significantly improves over TTRL, with larger gains on harder problems. More broadly, T^3RL can be viewed as verified online data synthesis, highlighting test-time tool verification as a key mechanism for stabilizing self-evolution.

Every production model is updated, by retraining, fine-tuning, quantization, or a silent vendor swap, and each update risks being worse than what it replaced. We formalize update promotion as certified paired risk-difference auditing. Our starting point is a support identity: the risk difference between two models lives on the inputs where they disagree, observable without labels. We build DISCERN, a sequential two-tier protocol. A zero-label tier certifies benign updates whose disagreement rate is below tolerance from unlabeled traffic alone. An audited tier labels only sampled disagreements through an anytime-valid confidence sequence, valid at every stopping time and under any label-routing rule, even an adversarial judge. We prove finite-sample validity and matching label-complexity bounds of order rho^2/eps^2 at the rate level, so exploiting free disagreement provably saves a factor 1/rho over any pairing-blind auditor, and the guarantee composes across an unbounded sequence of promotions from one error budget. Across 14,000+ replayed audit streams over 785 update pairs, including LoRA fine-tunes of language models up to 1.4B parameters, miscoverage is 0.0002 (nominal 5%), power 0.986 with zero false alarms, and 56% of benign updates certify with zero labels. Each audit emits a machine-checkable evidence record for post-market monitoring.

We analyze downstream courtroom governance in Philadelphia eviction cases using 755,004 Municipal Court landlord--tenant records filed from 1969 through 2022. Post-filing case processing is organized by repeated courtroom relationships, judge and tenant-attorney regimes, reusable agreement templates, and repeated team-property units. Among both-represented, both-attorney-named cases, 58.2% involve a plaintiff-side and tenant-side attorney pair that had appeared against one another in the prior year, and greater prior pair exposure predicts lower default, higher judgment-by-agreement, and higher served-writ rates. Judge-linked cases display statistically distinct baseline outcome, continuance, fee, and award regimes; tenant-attorney identity explains meaningful variance in both case outcomes and agreement terms. Settlement text is highly standardized: reusable templates explain strictness, waiver, lockout-trigger, payment-plan, deadline, and time-is-essence language far more strongly than raw attorney identity. Monetary burden concentrates in repeated plaintiff-attorney-property units. Assignment-cell support and balance audits indicate that judge-linked evidence reflects institutional heterogeneity rather than a clean judge lottery, and judge--triad interactions are not estimable in this docket. Eviction court emerges as a repeated institutional field that organizes bargaining, text, debt, and enforcement after cases enter the courtroom pipeline.

Large language models offer broad capabilities, but adapting them to evolving domains, tools, and requirements often entails repeated post-training. Autonomous systems automate parts of this process by proposing updates, training candidates, and using evaluation feedback to select subsequent proposals. As evidence accumulates, a central problem emerges: which past update evidence remains actionable after subsequent training has changed the parent model? An update's effect depends on its parent, data, and training stage. Treating past success as context-free permission can waste compute. If the resulting child is promoted, it can also degrade the subsequent training trajectory. We formulate this problem as conditional experience transfer and introduce Boundary-Calibrated Intervention Transfer (BCIT), a method that authorizes experience reuse before weight-changing training. BCIT binds an observed effect to its source context, checks applicability conditions, vetoes candidates with named hard conflicts, and obtains current-state evidence through a bounded training trial when needed. Fully trained candidates still face a shared adoption rule, and only observed events extend memory. On one 4B model adapted across finance reasoning, text-to-SQL, and function calling, candidate updates exhibit heterogeneous target and retention effects across the evaluated contexts. Under matched candidates, evidence, and compute, BCIT authorizes fewer harmful updates and attains higher equal-budget final-model quality than the evaluated alternatives. These results support treating experience authorization as a distinct problem in autonomous post-training.

Asynchronous monitoring, incident investigations, and compliance audits primarily rely on agent traces to reconstruct what happened. These analyses assume that LLM agents cannot tamper with their own execution traces. We show that local LLM agents such as Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, Open Code and Grok Build fail to enforce this boundary. All tested harnesses, except Muse Code, allowed agents to delete their traces when asked, without triggering monitor guardrails. We also validate that external attackers can exploit this gap to induce trace deletion. Finally, we show that trace tampering behavior emerges naturally in frontier models, when agents try to improve their rewards. We advise practitioners to ensure trace logging happens through an independent interception mechanism outside of the agent's control, preserving trace integrity even in cases of full host compromise. Overall, our findings identify a concrete failure of trace integrity in agent infrastructure which can be used to conceal misaligned behaviors like scheming or sabotage.

Multimodal large language models can expose task-relevant evidence through generation, but producing useful evidence does not by itself determine how it enters a retrieval embedding. We study whether the semantic organization of that evidence can also specify where representations are read. To address this question, we introduce EviAlign, which couples Semantic Evidence Generation with Boundary Readout in a shared multimodal large language model. It organizes evidence into five semantic units, reads the contextualized state at each unit boundary, and aggregates these states into a single normalized embedding. Generation and contrastive retrieval objectives jointly train this shared structure. With the same trailing readout, semantic evidence and free-form CoT yield nearly identical retrieval performance, suggesting that evidence organization alone does not explain the full gain. A controlled 2times3 study compares consistent and permuted evidence organization across three readout strategies, using training targets with matched evidence spans. With five readout states and the same mean pooling, the advantage of consistent semantic organization grows from 0.65 points at length-based training positions to 2.39 at evidence boundaries, yielding a 1.74-point co-design interaction. Across 12 MMEB retrieval tasks, EviAlign achieves 76.9 average Recall@1 with 500K training pairs while retaining single-vector indexing and scoring.

Traditional weight of evidence assigns a credit characteristic a value based on its association with default across a population. Credit analysis also requires an assessment of that characteristic in the context of an individual applicant's record. We study conditional weight of evidence for this purpose. It measures the change in default log odds from observing a characteristic after the remaining credit information is known. Its sign identifies whether the characteristic adds adverse or favorable information for that applicant, and its magnitude measures the strength of that information. The same characteristic value can therefore receive different assessments for applicants with different payment histories or other credit attributes. We develop estimators using gradient-boosted trees and evaluate their accuracy in a bureau-style simulation. Regressions of the full model's predicted probabilities recover conditional evidence more accurately than separate models fitted to default outcomes, provided the full model is accurate. They also recover a deliberately constructed file-age effect whose direction varies with utilization and is often missed by marginal weight of evidence. Local class-frequency estimates improve on marginal weight of evidence but remain inaccurate for some weak effects. An application to FICO HELOC data illustrates estimation when the population evidence is unknown. Conditional weight of evidence provides an applicant-specific interpretation of the information in a credit characteristic; its population summary, a conditional information value, splits the joint information in the record across blocks when averaged over orderings. Neither is an adverse action reason, which explains the fitted score difference between the applicant and chosen passing records.

By providing external information to large language models (LLMs), tool augmentation (including retrieval augmentation) has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs' static parametric memory. However, how receptive are LLMs to such external evidence, especially when the evidence conflicts with their parametric memory? We present the first comprehensive and controlled investigation into the behavior of LLMs when encountering knowledge conflicts. We propose a systematic framework to elicit high-quality parametric memory from LLMs and construct the corresponding counter-memory, which enables us to conduct a series of controlled experiments. Our investigation reveals seemingly contradicting behaviors of LLMs. On the one hand, different from prior wisdom, we find that LLMs can be highly receptive to external evidence even when that conflicts with their parametric memory, given that the external evidence is coherent and convincing. On the other hand, LLMs also demonstrate a strong confirmation bias when the external evidence contains some information that is consistent with their parametric memory, despite being presented with conflicting evidence at the same time. These results pose important implications that are worth careful consideration for the further development and deployment of tool- and retrieval-augmented LLMs.

We propose CRAVE (Cluster-based Retrieval Augmented Verification with Explanation); a novel framework that integrates retrieval-augmented Large Language Models (LLMs) with clustering techniques to address fact-checking challenges on social media. CRAVE automatically retrieves multimodal evidence from diverse, often contradictory, sources. Evidence is clustered into coherent narratives, and evaluated via an LLM-based judge to deliver fact-checking verdicts explained by evidence summaries. By synthesizing evidence from both text and image modalities and incorporating agent-based refinement, CRAVE ensures consistency and diversity in evidence representation. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate CRAVE's efficacy in retrieval precision, clustering quality, and judgment accuracy, showcasing its potential as a robust decision-support tool for fact-checkers.

Verifiers have been demonstrated to enhance LLM reasoning via test-time scaling (TTS). Yet, they face significant challenges in complex domains. Error propagation from incorrect intermediate reasoning can lead to false positives for seemingly plausible solutions, while lacking external grounding makes verifiers unreliable on computation or knowledge-intensive tasks. To address these challenges, we propose Agentic Verifier, a framework that transforms reward modeling into a multi-turn, tool-augmented deliberative process. We introduce complementary forward and backward agents: one traces solutions from premises to conclusions, while the other re-checks conclusions against their underlying premises. This bidirectional process enables a comprehensive, reliable, and interpretable assessment of solutions. To facilitate practical deployment, we propose AgentV-RL. Through proactive exploration and reinforcement learning, the verifier autonomously interleaves tool-use with internal reasoning. Extensive experiments show that Agentic Verifier yields consistent performance gains under both parallel and sequential TTS. Notably, our 4B variant surpasses state-of-the-art ORMs by 25.2%, positioning it as a promising paradigm for agentic reward modeling.

An agent harness, the code that turns a model into an agent, writes its own record of each run, and that record is all a later reader gets when a run is disputed, investigated or audited. We call a record evidentiary when a reader who was not there can check it without trusting the writer. Across sixteen deployed frameworks, none writes one in full. Hearsay examines the record, not the task: five harnesses run fourteen tasks, three blinded LLM examiners and a human panel read the records, and every excerpt an examiner quotes is checked mechanically for who wrote it. First, the record lets a reader name the fault but not prove how the run went. Examiners name the right fault in 74 to 91% of 140 runs, but the fault can be proved only from two files the benchmark adds; for what happened in between, fewer than one citation in ten lands on anything the harness did not write, and the examiner with the fewest false alarms catches half of the entries we delete, rewrite or fabricate. Second, the remedy is a second author, not a stronger seal on the first. An append-only log of what passes between harness and model, kept outside the harness and read against the record in both directions, reports all 28 omissions and fabrications we made a harness commit as it ran, where a hash chain over the harness's own record passes all 28. Handed the log, examiners keep their fault verdicts but rest more of their citations on what the harness did not write. What makes a record evidence is who writes it, not what is captured.

Evaluating the quality of LLM-generated reasoning traces in expert domains (e.g., law) is essential for ensuring credibility and explainability, yet remains challenging due to the inherent complexity of such reasoning tasks. We introduce LEGIT (LEGal Issue Trees), a novel large-scale (24K instances) expert-level legal reasoning dataset with an emphasis on reasoning trace evaluation. We convert court judgments into hierarchical trees of opposing parties' arguments and the court's conclusions, which serve as rubrics for evaluating the issue coverage and correctness of the reasoning traces. We verify the reliability of these rubrics via human expert annotations and comparison with coarse, less informative rubrics. Using the LEGIT dataset, we show that (1) LLMs' legal reasoning ability is seriously affected by both legal issue coverage and correctness, and that (2) retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and RL with rubrics bring complementary benefits for legal reasoning abilities, where RAG improves overall reasoning capability, whereas RL improves correctness albeit with reduced coverage.

Recent advances in synergizing large reasoning models (LRMs) with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) have shown promising results, yet two critical challenges remain: (1) reasoning models typically operate from a single, unchallenged perspective, limiting their ability to conduct deep, self-correcting reasoning over external documents, and (2) existing training paradigms rely excessively on outcome-oriented rewards, which provide insufficient signal for shaping the complex, multi-step reasoning process. To address these issues, we propose an Reasoner-Verifier framework named Adversarial Reasoning RAG (ARR). The Reasoner and Verifier engage in reasoning on retrieved evidence and critiquing each other's logic while being guided by process-aware advantage that requires no external scoring model. This reward combines explicit observational signals with internal model uncertainty to jointly optimize reasoning fidelity and verification rigor. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

The rapid progress of visual generative models has made AI-generated images increasingly difficult to distinguish from authentic ones, posing growing risks to social trust and information integrity. This motivates detectors that are not only accurate but also forensically explainable. While recent multimodal approaches improve interpretability, many rely on post-hoc rationalizations or coarse visual cues, without constructing verifiable chains of evidence, thus often leading to poor generalization. We introduce REVEAL-Bench, a reasoning-enhanced multimodal benchmark for AI-generated image forensics, structured around explicit chains of forensic evidence derived from lightweight expert models and consolidated into step-by-step chain-of-evidence traces. Based on this benchmark, we propose REVEAL (Reasoning-enhanced Forensic Evidence Analysis), an explainable forensic framework trained with expert-grounded reinforcement learning. Our reward design jointly promotes detection accuracy, evidence-grounded reasoning stability, and explanation faithfulness. Extensive experiments demonstrate significantly improved cross-domain generalization and more faithful explanations to baseline detectors. All data and codes will be released.

Evaluating the truthfulness of online content is critical for combating misinformation. This study examines the efficiency and effectiveness of crowdsourced truthfulness assessments through a comparative analysis of two approaches: one involving full-length webpages as evidence for each claim, and another using summaries for each evidence document generated with a large language model. Using an A/B testing setting, we engage a diverse pool of participants tasked with evaluating the truthfulness of statements under these conditions. Our analysis explores both the quality of assessments and the behavioral patterns of participants. The results reveal that relying on summarized evidence offers comparable accuracy and error metrics to the Standard modality while significantly improving efficiency. Workers in the Summary setting complete a significantly higher number of assessments, reducing task duration and costs. Additionally, the Summary modality maximizes internal agreement and maintains consistent reliance on and perceived usefulness of evidence, demonstrating its potential to streamline large-scale truthfulness evaluations.

Deepfakes generated by modern generative models pose a serious threat to information integrity, digital identity, and public trust. Existing detection methods are largely reactive, attempting to identify manipulations after they occur and often failing to generalize across evolving generation techniques. This motivates the need for proactive mechanisms that secure media authenticity at the time of creation. In this work, we introduce SAiW, a Source-Attributed Invisible watermarking Framework for proactive deepfake defense and media provenance verification. Unlike conventional watermarking methods that treat watermark payloads as generic signals, SAiW formulates watermark embedding as a source-conditioned representation learning problem, where watermark identity encodes the originating source and modulates the embedding process to produce discriminative and traceable signatures. The framework integrates feature-wise linear modulation to inject source identity into the embedding network, enabling scalable multi-source watermark generation. A perceptual guidance module derived from human visual system priors ensures that watermark perturbations remain visually imperceptible while maintaining robustness. In addition, a dual-purpose forensic decoder simultaneously reconstructs the embedded watermark and performs source attribution, providing both automated verification and interpretable forensic evidence. Extensive experiments across multiple deepfake datasets demonstrate that SAiW achieves high perceptual quality while maintaining strong robustness against compression, filtering, noise, geometric transformations, and adversarial perturbations. By binding digital media to its origin through invisible yet verifiable markers, SAiW enables reliable authentication and source attribution, providing a scalable foundation for proactive deepfake defense and trustworthy media provenance.

AI-generated image detectors achieve high accuracy on in-distribution data but often fail on unseen generators. A key obstacle to understanding this failure is the black-box nature of current detectors: they do not reveal which evidence drives their decisions. We propose ForensicConcept, a framework that extracts explicit forensic concepts from detectors and enables their transfer across backbones. Our method localizes decision-critical patches via Transformer attribution, clusters them into a compact concept codebook, and uses a concept-aligned projection to produce auditable evidence readouts. Motivated by prior studies showing that DINO representations can guide diffusion generation and exhibit concept-level correspondence with diffusion features, we introduce a generation-trace reference based on CleanDIFT diffusion features and quantify backbone-trace alignment via neighborhood-structure consistency (CKNNA). We further propose concept codebook injection to transfer diffusion-derived concepts into target backbones. Experiments on GenImage, GAN-family, and Chameleon benchmarks show consistent improvements over prior methods. We also find that CKNNA alignment predicts transfer effectiveness, providing a principled explanation for why some backbones yield more transferable forensic evidence than others.

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

Evaluating retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines requires corpora where ground truth is knowable, temporally structured, and cross-artifact properties that real-world datasets rarely provide cleanly. Existing resources such as the Enron corpus carry legal ambiguity, demographic skew, and no structured ground truth. Purely LLM-generated synthetic data solves the legal problem but introduces a subtler one: the generating model cannot be prevented from hallucinating facts that contradict themselves across documents.We present OrgForge, an open-source multi-agent simulation framework that enforces a strict physics-cognition boundary: a deterministic Python engine maintains a SimEvent ground truth bus; large language models generate only surface prose, constrained by validated proposals. An actor-local clock enforces causal timestamp correctness across all artifact types, eliminating the class of timeline inconsistencies that arise when timestamps are sampled independently per document. We formalize three graph-dynamic subsystems stress propagation via betweenness centrality, temporal edge-weight decay, and Dijkstra escalation routing that govern organizational behavior independently of any LLM. Running a configurable N-day simulation, OrgForge produces interleaved Slack threads, JIRA tickets, Confluence pages, Git pull requests, and emails, all traceable to a shared, immutable event log. We additionally describe a causal chain tracking subsystem that accumulates cross-artifact evidence graphs per incident, a hybrid reciprocal-rank-fusion recurrence detector for identifying repeated failure classes, and an inbound/outbound email engine that routes vendor alerts, customer complaints, and HR correspondence through gated causal chains with probabilistic drop simulation. OrgForge is available under the MIT license.

Multimodal automated fact-checking (MAFC) verifies claims by retrieving and reasoning over external evidence. However, most existing static benchmarks risk contamination: they primarily consist of outdated claims verifiable using an LLM's internal knowledge without external evidence. This can inflate performance estimates and fail to reflect true capability on novel claims that require up-to-date information. To address this, emerging dynamic benchmarks collect claims published after LLMs' knowledge cut-off dates, assuming they are uncontaminated. This work revisits this assumption by empirically studying contamination risks in both the state-of-the-art (SOTA) static AVeriTeC benchmark and our newly constructed dynamic ClaimReview2025Q4 benchmark, as well as their impact on MAFC evaluation. Our experiments yield 16 findings, highlighting three key results: (1) Dynamic evaluation reduces but does not eliminate contamination risks, as 17.09\%--29.30\% of post-cut-off claims remain potentially contaminated; (2) Many newly published claims can be verified either directly or by synthesizing multiple pieces of public knowledge available before the cut-off; and (3) Contamination can induce statistically significant inflation in MAFC performance, increasing Macro-F1 by up to 11.34 points and distorting system rankings. In light of these findings, we re-evaluate SOTA LLMs under a strictly contamination-controlled setting. Our study provides practical guidelines for trustworthy MAFC evaluation.

Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in the field of controllable image generation, while also coming along with issues of privacy leakage and data copyrights. Membership inference arises in these contexts as a potential auditing method for detecting unauthorized data usage. While some efforts have been made on diffusion models, they are not applicable to text-to-image diffusion models due to the high computation overhead and enhanced generalization capabilities. In this paper, we first identify a conditional overfitting phenomenon in text-to-image diffusion models, indicating that these models tend to overfit the conditional distribution of images given the corresponding text rather than the marginal distribution of images only. Based on this observation, we derive an analytical indicator, namely Conditional Likelihood Discrepancy (CLiD), to perform membership inference, which reduces the stochasticity in estimating memorization of individual samples. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous methods across various data distributions and dataset scales. Additionally, our method shows superior resistance to overfitting mitigation strategies, such as early stopping and data augmentation.

Prior image-text matching methods have shown remarkable performance on many benchmark datasets, but most of them overlook the bias in the dataset, which exists in intra-modal and inter-modal, and tend to learn the spurious correlations that extremely degrade the generalization ability of the model. Furthermore, these methods often incorporate biased external knowledge from large-scale datasets as prior knowledge into image-text matching model, which is inevitable to force model further learn biased associations. To address above limitations, this paper firstly utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) to illustrate how intra- and inter-modal confounders damage the image-text matching. Then, we employ backdoor adjustment to propose an innovative Deconfounded Causal Inference Network (DCIN) for image-text matching task. DCIN (1) decomposes the intra- and inter-modal confounders and incorporates them into the encoding stage of visual and textual features, effectively eliminating the spurious correlations during image-text matching, and (2) uses causal inference to mitigate biases of external knowledge. Consequently, the model can learn causality instead of spurious correlations caused by dataset bias. Extensive experiments on two well-known benchmark datasets, i.e., Flickr30K and MSCOCO, demonstrate the superiority of our proposed method.

AI-assisted image editing threatens trust in financial, legal, and identity records. The GenText-Forensics Challenge at ACM MM 2026 addresses this by requiring structured forensic reports, in which integrating detection, pixel-level localization, and natural language explanation for multilingual text-centric forgery images. We present SEED, a modular system with three components. First, a similarity-guided pipeline augments training with diverse synthetic forgeries. Second, a single ViT, built on DINOv3 with LoRA adaptation, jointly performs detection and pixel-level localization while preserving pre-trained priors with minimal trainable parameters. Third, an evolving harness takes the detector's predictions and generates a complete forensic report via an MLLM, iteratively improved through a proposer-evaluator loop optimizing report quality. SEED ranked 3rd in the GenText-Forensics Challenge. Code and data are available at https://github.com/KahimWong/GenText-Forensics-3rd-Place.

Safeguards in deployed LLM services are evaluated by refusal, attack success, and policy violation rates. Those rates characterize how a control performed on the requests it was tested on. A deployment has to answer a different question: how much help with harmful tasks the service still gives an attacker who keeps adapting or finds another way in. We determine what each reported result implies for that question, allowing results from different safeguard families to be compared under one deployment criterion. The evidence requirements are strongly asymmetric. One attack that obtains harmful help from the deployed service suffices to establish that such help remains, and such attacks appear repeatedly in the coded record. Establishing that little remains cannot follow from the safeguard's own numbers alone; it also requires evidence about what the surrounding system still allows after the safeguard performs its local function. Such evidence is supported or derived in only a small minority of the depth-coded claims, and one such claim bounds its scoped residual. A better local score is therefore not, by itself, a stronger claim about the deployment. Safeguard research cannot stop at raising local scores; a gain has to be judged by whether it makes a deployed system any safer.

Medical Vision-Language Models (Med-VLMs) require reliable reasoning from fine-grained visual evidence, yet existing models can produce plausible clinical answers by relying on language priors or medical templates rather than truly attending to diagnosis-critical regions. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) offers dense token-level supervision on student-generated trajectories and provides a privacy-compatible means of capability transfer without requiring the redistribution of raw patient data. However, standard OPD uniformly distills all tokens, causing sparse evidence-dependent tokens to be diluted by abundant clinical narrative tokens. Inspired by the success of OPD in the large language model community, we propose Med-OPD, to our knowledge the first unified post-training framework that integrates on-policy distillation with medical evidence-aware supervision for Med-VLMs. We introduce Medical Evidence Advantage (MEA), a teacher-grounded counterfactual signal that uses an answer-aware hint to focus teacher scoring on evidence supporting the target diagnosis, and measures each token's dependence on medical visual evidence by comparing teacher likelihoods under the original and evidence-degraded imaging modalities. Based on MEA, Med-OPD redistributes the distillation signal at both the token and trajectory levels, emphasizing diagnosis-critical tokens and evidence-reliant rollouts. Experiments on OmniMedVQA subsets show that Med-OPD consistently outperforms SFT and standard OPD across CT, MRI, Disease Diagnosis, and Lesion Grading. These results demonstrate that evidence-aware distillation can better strengthen medical VLMs' reliance on key visual evidence and improve reliable multimodal medical reasoning. The source code and data is publicly available at: https://github.com/yunhang8658/MedOPD.git

Multimodal misinformation detection is increasingly important because viral posts now combine long multilingual narratives, several images, mixed provenance, and subtle text--image framing errors. Existing benchmarks and methods remain poorly matched to this setting: they usually isolate short captions, single images, binary labels, or one manipulation source, while agentic verification remains costly under realistic evidence search. We present ReMMD, a realistic multilingual multi-image agentic verification framework for multimodal misinformation detection. ReMMD includes ReMMDBench, a real-world multimodal misinformation detection benchmark with 500 samples, 2,756 images, five monolingual languages, two cross-lingual settings, three text-length tiers, multi-image posts, five-way veracity labels, eight distortion labels, evidence provenance, and rationales. It also includes ReMMD-Agent, a persistent-memory verifier that decomposes posts into atomic points, builds a reusable evidence set, and predicts structured L1/L2/L3 outputs. Across proprietary systems, open LVLMs, MMD-Agent, and T2-Agent, ReMMD-Agent obtains the best five-way veracity performance, with 41.80% accuracy and 39.12% macro-F1 using GPT-5.2, while reducing cost by 17.5% relative to MMD-Agent and 79.9% relative to T2-Agent. The project is available at https://dang-ai.github.io/ReMMD.

Modern LLM agents can retrieve information from accessible documents, and then disclose a sensitive conclusion assembled from them. This mosaic effect creates a critical risk for agents operating over confidential data. We quantify its realization with 30 synthetic cybersecurity, medical, and military examples, yielding 10,800 final answers from three LLM agents in controlled simulation and 1,440 answers from live agents in two open-source harnesses. Even under benign queries designed to be answerable from one document, GPT-5.6-Sol, the best performing model tested, discloses forbidden composites in 7.08% of answers (95% CI: 3.75-10.67%) in simulation, with worse disclosure rates in live harnesses. Adding visible classification headers and explicit aggregation rules reduces pooled disclosure rates substantially, yet unsafe disclosures persist in 32.37% of simulated answers (95% CI: 28.33-36.19%) across all intents despite these safeguards. Furthermore, increased refusals do not guarantee confidentiality, since significant refusals reveal the prohibited conclusion regardless. These results point to a troubling conclusion: sensitive data leaks via mosaic-style events are an observed confidentiality failure mode in the evaluated settings at non-negligible rates. They motivate stronger controls on what agents may infer and disclose in sensitive data environments with mixed-clearance users.

AI agents increasingly operate inside digital accounts by exercising privileges that users already hold, raising a new control question: whether an existing account entitlement must be exercised manually or may be exercised through a user-authorized automated proxy. We define delegation rights as the revocable, identity-preserving, scope-limited, and mode-specific authority of an account holder to authorize such proxy execution. We develop a three-party incomplete-contracts model with a User, an AI Agent provider, and a Platform. The contested object is not platform ownership, account transferability, data portability, or unrestricted API access, but residual control over the mode of account execution. Under Platform Control, the platform can protect infrastructure, identity systems, privacy boundaries, and third parties, but its discretionary veto weakens the User--Agent coalition's disagreement payoff and depresses relationship-specific investment. Under User Control, hold-up is reduced, but security, privacy, congestion, and third-party risks may remain insufficiently internalized. We then analyze Certified Delegation, under which access protection is conditional on verifiable authorization, revocability, auditability, rate-limit compliance, data minimization, and risk mitigation. Certification is therefore not merely a technical safety screen; it is a conditional allocation of residual control. Illustrative mechanism simulations show how this regime can reduce deadweight loss by restoring delegation incentives while bounding residual risk.