Daily Papers

Falsification searches for counterexamples to formal specifications in cyber-physical systems (CPS). With specifications written in Signal Temporal Logic (STL), falsification can be formulated as a robustness optimization problem, traditionally tackled with black-box search algorithms. In parallel, large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged as surprisingly effective optimizers when coupled with iterative prompting. In this work, we connect these ideas and introduce LLM-Falsifier, an LLM-based approach that falsifies specifications by minimizing the STL robustness degree. Beyond generic prompt-based optimization, our key idea is to expose the LLM to semantic information that is natural for language models but absent from standard numerical optimizers, including natural-language input and output names, output trajectories, and critical-time witnesses for the minimum robustness value. These additions enable smarter and more sample-efficient robustness search. On the ARCH-COMP falsification benchmarks, LLM-Falsifier is shown to outperform existing falsification tools based on a range of optimization paradigms, from surrogate-based and Bayesian optimization to search-based testing, on 14 of 21 specifications when measured by the average number of simulations required to find a counterexample.

Despite advances in learning-based methods, finding valid Lyapunov functions for nonlinear dynamical systems remains challenging. Current neural network approaches face two main issues: challenges in scalable verification and limited interpretability. To address these, we propose an end-to-end framework using transformers to construct analytical Lyapunov functions (local), which simplifies formal verification, enhances interpretability, and provides valuable insights for control engineers. Our framework consists of a transformer-based trainer that generates candidate Lyapunov functions and a falsifier that verifies candidate expressions and refines the model via risk-seeking policy gradient. Unlike Alfarano et al. (2024), which utilizes pre-training and seeks global Lyapunov functions for low-dimensional systems, our model is trained from scratch via reinforcement learning (RL) and succeeds in finding local Lyapunov functions for high-dimensional and non-polynomial systems. Given the analytical nature of the candidates, we employ efficient optimization methods for falsification during training and formal verification tools for the final verification. We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach on a range of nonlinear dynamical systems with up to ten dimensions and show that it can discover Lyapunov functions not previously identified in the control literature.

Counterexample-guided repair aims at creating neural networks with mathematical safety guarantees, facilitating the application of neural networks in safety-critical domains. However, whether counterexample-guided repair is guaranteed to terminate remains an open question. We approach this question by showing that counterexample-guided repair can be viewed as a robust optimisation algorithm. While termination guarantees for neural network repair itself remain beyond our reach, we prove termination for more restrained machine learning models and disprove termination in a general setting. We empirically study the practical implications of our theoretical results, demonstrating the suitability of common verifiers and falsifiers for repair despite a disadvantageous theoretical result. Additionally, we use our theoretical insights to devise a novel algorithm for repairing linear regression models based on quadratic programming, surpassing existing approaches.

Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools. Existing approaches mainly optimize attack success and preserve artifacts such as benchmarks, payloads, or attack programs, which record where attacks succeed but not the enabling conditions behind unsafe agent behavior. We study automated red-teaming for production LLM agents using one agentic research environment to discover reusable vulnerability knowledge about another. We present AHA, a falsifiable discovery loop that proposes a vulnerability hypothesis, constructs a falsifier, instantiates a valid attack, executes it in a sandboxed harness, reflects on the trajectory, and promotes confirmed findings into a Vulnerability Concept Graph (VCG). Each concept links an attacker-facing surface to an unsafe trajectory through a claim, enabling condition, falsifier, transfer prediction, and supporting evidence. Across Claude Code and Codex on three scenarios covering direct and indirect attacks, the discovered concepts reveal a reusable vulnerability core across models and agents. A frozen VCG requires no further search and outperforms the strongest frozen discovery baseline by 14.2 percentage points under the same single-shot protocol, while transferring across scenarios and attack channels. The resulting VCG provides an auditable artifact for production safety teams to inspect vulnerabilities, validate patches, and accumulate reusable safety knowledge. Our code is available at https://github.com/henrymao2004/Auto-research-red-teaming-in-sleep.

Reproducing a published 3DGS paper takes weeks of expert engineering before any extension can be proposed. Prior autonomous-research systems read papers, draft hypotheses, and write code, but are limited by short fixed templates, low executability, and weak traceability, and none has been demonstrated end-to-end in a live computer-vision subfield with intense activity. SplatLab is an autonomous research system for 3D Gaussian Splatting that addresses these limitations. Given a research prompt, a target-paper URL, or no input at all, it reproduces a published baseline, proposes an extension, trains and ablates across Mip-NeRF 360 and LLFF, writes the manuscript, and binds every reported number to a logged training run. Five design choices distinguish it: (i) candidates mutate plugins from a verified-reproduction backbone matched to published baselines; (ii) a cascade-weighted Elo tournament across eight islands scores candidates on measured GPU PSNR with verbal-gradient feedback; (iii) a standing falsifier subtracts Elo on failure, integrating stress-test survival into selection; (iv) every reported number is bound to a logged training run, and the run cannot terminate while any claim is unbacked; (v) a seven-category 3DGS taxonomy wraps EVOLVE-BLOCK markers in domain-aligned scaffolds transferable across 3DGS repositories. On PSNR-targeted runs, SplatLab's manuscripts beat their reproduced targets by +0.18 to +3.78 dB, including +3.78 dB on astrophotographic nebula rendering, for which no prior 3DGS method exists. The research cycle compresses from months of graduate-student time to days of mostly autonomous compute. Code, all manuscripts, experiment ledgers, and the cross-run paper store are available on the project page.

Position bias in multiple-choice LLM evaluation is widely cited as a confound in capability comparisons, but published measurements rely on single answer-order shuffles whose results confound the bias signal with content-level noise and sampling stochasticity. I introduce inspect_permute, an open-source extension to the inspect_ai evaluation framework that runs exhaustive answer-order permutations per question and reports the chi-squared / Cramer V signature of position bias with bootstrap confidence intervals. I apply the tool across four vendors (gpt-4o-mini, claude-haiku-4-5, gemini-2.5-flash, grok-3) on five MMLU subjects, 24,000 API calls under temperature-0 generation, with falsifier predictions pre-registered via a public SHA-256 hash before half the data was observed. Position bias turns out to be statistically detectable only within a roughly 60-95% base-accuracy Goldilocks zone. Below it, processing-load dominance swamps subject-specific signal; above it, ceiling effects compress the variance below the chi-squared test resolution. Detectable cells separate into two mechanism types: monotone A-to-D decrease (processing_load, in low-tier models) and non-monotone D-drop (content_ambiguity, in a narrow capability band). Standard MMLU places every frontier-tier model above the detection band, so absence of signal there should be read as not measurable, not unbiased. Together with the ceiling-effect characterisation in arXiv:2606.26185, this work brackets the detectable region of position-bias measurement and makes the field central question askable in a verifiable form. Package, data, preregistration under MIT.