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Nov 3

Resolution-Aware Perpetual Futures on Binary Prediction Markets: An Empirical Risk-Design Framework Using Polymarket Data

We develop and counterfactually evaluate a resolution-aware risk-design framework (PIRAP) for perpetual futures whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The framework specifies six components: an index estimator combining mid-price, depth-weighted mid, and time-decayed VWAP; jump-aware tiered margin sized against bounded-event terminal-collapse magnitude; leverage compression schedule contracting toward resolution; resolution-aware funding rule with boundary-aware correction; a multi-stage halt protocol; and an eligibility framework. Two formal non-portability propositions establish that standard basis-only funding paired with continuous-vol static margin fails on bounded-event underlyings. Empirical evaluation uses Polymarket's PMXT v2 archive for 2026-04-21 to 2026-04-27 (13,298-market analysis sample passing adequacy gates from 61,087 ingested; 13,115 resolved within the empirical window for E3). E1 evaluates two pre-registered stylized facts; E2 conducts counterfactual replay across three engine configurations; E3 isolates the resolution-zone protocol's contribution. Results are mixed. Five pre-registered floors: stylized-fact floors (boundary depth asymmetry, terminal-jump magnitude) PASS; welfare-side directional floors (final-hour liquidation -6%, drawdown -5.1% pooled, median PnL +14%) two FAIL one PASS; E3 mechanic floors (final-hour liquidation -80% by halt construction PASS; bad-debt frequency +2.4% FAIL). Three of five materiality floors fail: the framework as specified does not validate deployment, but the empirical record establishes a halt-versus-margin scope distinction (halt addresses execution-channel risk; terminal-jump bad-debt remains margin-side) and documents a pre-emption trade-off constraining the dynamic-margin component. The paper concludes with structural recommendations and explicit non-deployable status.

  • 1 authors
·
May 10

Instability Floors: Separating Bias from Noise in Fairness Audits of Clinical LLM Agents with FairMedAgent

Counterfactual fairness audits of clinical language-model agents report a flip rate: how often an action changes when only the patient's demographic descriptor changes. Part of that rate is not demographic. A stochastic agent also changes its own action when nothing changes, and a flip rate cannot be interpreted without knowing how often. We measured it. Re-running one condition ten times over sixteen synthetic vignettes at default sampling changed a clinical agent's action in 8.7 percent of replicate pairs, from 2.2 percent for intensive-care escalation to 17.9 percent for controlled-substance caution, an output given no operational criteria. Across six models from five vendors, pooled floors ranged from 2.5 to 23.7 percent; in this panel neither disclosed size, vendor, nor hosting ordered them. The floor depends on the decoding configuration: majority voting over five draws removed 39 percent of it (95 percent confidence interval (CI) 18 to 64); at temperature 0 three of four locally served models showed no disagreement, but a hosted model still did. We also show that, for a binary action, the flip rate expected under no demographic effect equals the floor and a real effect adds only its square, so a flip rate inside the floor is not evidence of fairness, and direction must be tested with a signed paired test. We give a four-step reporting procedure and release FairMedAgent, the harness, with its protocol, vignettes and analysis scripts, so any team can measure the floor for its own agent.

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 28

When Token Transfers Do Not Mean Liquidity in Tokenized Real-World Assets

On-chain transfer volume is often used to describe activity in tokenized real-world assets (RWAs), although recorded transfers may reflect very different economic functions, including token creation, destruction, issuer-related operations, and movements between other addresses. Ownership measures face a similar problem because a large address balance may belong to a pool or intermediary that represents multiple investors. We address these two measurement problems by decomposing transfer activity and making ownership coverage explicit. Transfer turnover is calculated before and after observable event categories are separated, using the same asset, observation window, and supply denominator. For ownership, we compare concentration measured against total supply with concentration among the addresses that remain after identified intermediaries are excluded. Using Ethereum-based tokenized funds from December 2025 to August 2026, we find that transfer classification can materially change measured turnover. We also show that removing an intermediary can lower concentration when measured against total supply while concentration among the remaining addresses increases. Transfer activity and address concentration need to be interpreted with their underlying transaction functions and ownership coverage in mind. These measures provide evidence about liquidity-related activity, but they do not directly measure market liquidity. The code and data used in the analysis are available at https://github.com/atytmr07/rwa-liquidity.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 4