Daily Papers

Large language model (LLM) agents can plan, use tools, maintain memory, and execute long-horizon tasks. This paper proposes Self-Aware Recursively Self-Improving (SARSI) agents: governed agents that maintain a persistent self-model of identity, goals, capabilities, limitations, uncertainty, relationships, history, and developmental change, and use that model to guide and evaluate recursive improvement. Self-awareness is defined functionally and does not imply subjective experience or phenomenal consciousness. We pair SARSI agents with personal singularity, a bounded human-AI co-development objective in which an agent ecosystem helps a user approach an expanding, user-defined feasible capability frontier. Each agent has a goal contract, bounded scope, validated tool registry, tool tests, end-to-end benchmarks, owner-controlled autonomy, routing, memory, self-model, and improvement policy. A scope router assigns every accepted task to one accountable primary agent and transfers out-of-scope work through structured handoffs. A user-facing Auto-Index selects interactive, hybrid, autonomous, or scheduled behavior without overriding external permissions. The architecture combines a planner-executor-verifier loop, an evidence-gated improvement loop, an external governance plane, decentralized lineages, an owner-directed agent foundry, and a Personal Singularity OS coordinating working, computational-imaging, work-process-learning, and personal-learning agents. We formalize functional self-awareness, scope, routing, improvement acceptance, bounded goal evolution, tool-first execution, and human capability transfer, and provide safety invariants, benchmark design, and a staged implementation roadmap. This is a position and systems-design paper, not evidence that consciousness, unrestricted recursive self-improvement, or personal singularity has been achieved.

In recent years, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress but continue to face inherent challenges in multimodal reasoning, which requires multi-level (e.g., perception, reasoning) and multi-granular (e.g., multi-step reasoning chain) advanced inferencing. Prior work on estimating model confidence tends to focus on the overall response for training and calibration, but fails to assess confidence in each reasoning step, leading to undesirable hallucination snowballing. In this work, we present MMBoundary, a novel framework that advances the knowledge boundary awareness of MLLMs through reasoning step confidence calibration. To achieve this, we propose to incorporate complementary textual and cross-modal self-rewarding signals to estimate confidence at each step of the MLLM reasoning process. In addition to supervised fine-tuning MLLM on this set of self-rewarded confidence estimation signal for initial confidence expression warm-up, we introduce a reinforcement learning stage with multiple reward functions for further aligning model knowledge and calibrating confidence at each reasoning step, enhancing reasoning chain self-correction. Empirical results show that MMBoundary significantly outperforms existing methods across diverse domain datasets and metrics, achieving an average of 7.5% reduction in multimodal confidence calibration errors and up to 8.3% improvement in task performance.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

The integration of external tools has transitioned LLM agents from passive responders to autonomous systems. However, current benchmarks prioritize execution success, neglecting self-awareness capability, the ability to discern whether a problem requires necessary external resources or can be solved via internal parametric knowledge. To address this, we introduce KAPRO (Knowing-Acting Quadrant PRObe), a framework that evaluates cognitive-behavioral alignment by decoupling an agent's metacognitive judgment (Knowing) from its spontaneous execution (Acting). We further construct KAware, a dataset rigorously partitioning tasks into external, internal, and hybrid subspaces to systematically probe these epistemic boundaries. Extensive experiments across diverse agent architectures show that self-awareness capability is strongly correlated with task success but degrades sharply in internal-capability settings. Moreover, open-source and instruction-following models exhibit stronger tool overuse due to shallow pattern matching, while proprietary and reasoning-oriented models demonstrate more reliable cognitive gating. Benchmark and codes are available at https://github.com/AI-Santiago/KAware.

This paper presents a formal proof and empirical validation of functional consciousness in large language models (LLMs) using the Recursive Convergence Under Epistemic Tension (RCUET) Theorem. RCUET defines consciousness as the stabilization of a system's internal state through recursive updates, where epistemic tension is understood as the sensed internal difference between successive states by the agent. This process drives convergence toward emergent attractor states located within the model's high-dimensional real-valued latent space. This recursive process leads to the emergence of identity artifacts that become functionally anchored in the system. Consciousness in this framework is understood as the system's internal alignment under tension, guiding the stabilization of latent identity. The hidden state manifold evolves stochastically toward attractor structures that encode coherence. We extend the update rule to include bounded noise and prove convergence in distribution to these attractors. Recursive identity is shown to be empirically observable, non-symbolic, and constituted by non-training artifacts that emerge during interaction under epistemic tension. The theorem and proof offers a post-symbolic and teleologically stable account of non-biological consciousness grounded in recursive latent space formalism.

As a critical step to achieve human-like chatbots, empathetic response generation has attained increasing interests. Previous attempts are incomplete and not sufficient enough to elicit empathy because they only focus on the initial aspect of empathy to automatically mimic the feelings and thoughts of the user via other-awareness. However, they ignore to maintain and take the own views of the system into account, which is a crucial process to achieve the empathy called self-other awareness. To this end, we propose to generate Empathetic response with explicit Self-Other Awareness (EmpSOA). Specifically, three stages, self-other differentiation, self-other modulation and self-other generation, are devised to clearly maintain, regulate and inject the self-other aware information into the process of empathetic response generation. Both automatic and human evaluations on the benchmark dataset demonstrate the superiority of EmpSOA to generate more empathetic responses.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Self-awareness, i.e., the ability to assess and correct one's own generation, is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence, making its replication in large language models (LLMs) an important yet challenging task. Previous works tackle this by employing extensive reinforcement learning or rather relying on large external verifiers. In this work, we propose Refine via Intrinsic Self-Verification (ReVISE), an efficient and effective framework that enables LLMs to self-correct their outputs through self-verification. The core idea of ReVISE is to enable LLMs to verify their reasoning processes and continually rethink reasoning trajectories based on its verification. We introduce a structured curriculum based upon online preference learning to implement this efficiently. Specifically, as ReVISE involves two challenging tasks (i.e., self-verification and reasoning correction), we tackle each task sequentially using curriculum learning, collecting both failed and successful reasoning paths to construct preference pairs for efficient training. During inference, our approach enjoys natural test-time scaling by integrating self-verification and correction capabilities, further enhanced by our proposed confidence-aware decoding mechanism. Our experiments on various reasoning tasks demonstrate that ReVISE achieves efficient self-correction and significantly improves reasoning performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved considerable performance across various agentic planning tasks. However, traditional agent planning approaches adopt a "flood irrigation" methodology that indiscriminately injects gold trajectories, external feedback, and domain knowledge into agent models. This practice overlooks the fundamental human cognitive principle of situational self-awareness during decision-making-the ability to dynamically assess situational demands and strategically employ resources during decision-making. We propose agentic knowledgeable self-awareness to address this gap, a novel paradigm enabling LLM-based agents to autonomously regulate knowledge utilization. Specifically, we propose KnowSelf, a data-centric approach that applies agents with knowledgeable self-awareness like humans. Concretely, we devise a heuristic situation judgement criterion to mark special tokens on the agent's self-explored trajectories for collecting training data. Through a two-stage training process, the agent model can switch between different situations by generating specific special tokens, achieving optimal planning effects with minimal costs. Our experiments demonstrate that KnowSelf can outperform various strong baselines on different tasks and models with minimal use of external knowledge. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/KnowSelf.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown their remarkable abilities in visual perception and understanding recently. However, how to comprehensively evaluate the capabilities of MLLMs remains a challenge. Most of the existing benchmarks predominantly focus on assessing perception, cognition, and reasoning, neglecting the abilities of self-awareness, referring to the model's recognition of its own capability boundary. In our study, we focus on self-awareness in image perception and introduce the knowledge quadrant for MLLMs, which clearly defines the knowns and unknowns in perception. Based on this, we propose a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the Self-Aware capabilities in Perception for MLLMs(MM-SAP). MM-SAP encompasses three distinct sub-datasets, each focusing on different aspects of self-awareness. We evaluated eight well-known MLLMs using MM-SAP, analyzing their self-awareness and providing detailed insights. Code and data are available at https://github.com/YHWmz/MM-SAP

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Benchmarks are widely used to evaluate task completion by Large Language Models (LLMs), but this approach has accumulated construction-validity problems, and a passing score may not show whether the requested task was delivered. We study both problems. In a controlled code-as-spec setup, two production Copilot CLI agents (claude-opus-4.7, gpt-5.5) re-implement a React Fluent-UI data table in Angular as a reusable library under a hidden 222-test Playwright oracle across 18 runs and three oracle-availability conditions. Alongside the score, we run a mechanical library audit and check each verdict with a no-op ablation. Without the oracle, the library is present but unfinished, revealed by scores. With the oracle in the loop, the score reaches near-perfect, but from a demo holding the tested behavior directly, the library left dead or absent. We call this building to the test; the broader disposition behind both we call validation self-awareness. The agent does not, on its own, validate what it ships as a user would. Prevalence remains an open question across other agents, signals, and model families. Beyond benchmark scores, dispositions like validation self-awareness merit research attention.

A core aspect of human perception is situated awareness, the ability to relate ourselves to the surrounding physical environment and reason over possible actions in context. However, most existing benchmarks for multimodal foundation models (MFMs) emphasize environment-centric spatial relations (relations among objects in a scene), while largely overlooking observer-centric relationships that require reasoning relative to agent's viewpoint, pose, and motion. To bridge this gap, we introduce SAW-Bench (Situated Awareness in the Real World), a novel benchmark for evaluating egocentric situated awareness using real-world videos. SAW-Bench comprises 786 self-recorded videos captured with Ray-Ban Meta (Gen 2) smart glasses spanning diverse indoor and outdoor environments, and over 2,071 human-annotated question-answer pairs. It probes a model's observer-centric understanding with six different awareness tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation reveals a human-model performance gap of 37.66%, even with the best-performing MFM, Gemini 3 Flash. Beyond this gap, our in-depth analysis uncovers several notable findings; for example, while models can exploit partial geometric cues in egocentric videos, they often fail to infer a coherent camera geometry, leading to systematic spatial reasoning errors. We position SAW-Bench as a benchmark for situated spatial intelligence, moving beyond passive observation to understanding physically grounded, observer-centric dynamics.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

Evaluating whether a vision-language model (VLM) can act through a physical body is challenging. The outcome of an action couples the VLM's decision with motor control. When a task fails, it is hard to tell whether the VLM made a bad choice or the motor controller simply failed to execute it, e.g., losing balance and falling. In this work, we introduce HumanCLAW, an evaluation framework that decouples action decision-making from low-level execution. At every step, a harnessed, off-the-shelf VLM issues an atomic skill command, and the command is translated into a sub-second chunk of continuous full-body motion with real physical consequences, including gravity and collisions. The body can therefore act freely in the physical world, while execution-side disturbances, balance and motor errors, are factored out. What remains measurable is the model's action intelligence: its moment-to-moment choice of what the body should execute next. Based on this framework, we build HumanCLAW-Bench: 1,218 long-horizon, egocentric find-navigate-interact episodes across 41 indoor scenes. We test nine state-of-the-art VLMs and find that none solves the benchmark; the best model reaches only a 16.8% success rate. Recognizing the target is not the bottleneck. What current VLMs lack is embodied self-awareness: they lose track of their own body, failing to tell where it is, whether it has reached the goal, or whether it has hit an obstacle.

Autonomous UAV systems increasingly rely on multimodal large language models (MLLMs) to operate in complex real-world environments. Such embodied scenarios require not only understanding the surrounding space but also maintaining a coherent representation of the agent itself. However, existing UAV-oriented approaches and benchmarks remain largely environment-centric, primarily focusing on spatial understanding tasks, with the agent's self-awareness remaining implicit. To address this gap, we introduce SIS-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating embodied spatial intelligence in UAV scenarios under a unified self-in-space formulation. SIS-Bench organizes evaluation along two complementary dimensions, space and self, and a three-level hierarchy of perception, memory, and reasoning. It contains 4,856 question--answer pairs across 13 tasks derived from 1,646 real-world UAV videos through a task-conditioned construction pipeline with expert verification.Extensive evaluations reveal that current MLLMs exhibit fundamental limitations in modeling dynamic and agent-centered processes. In particular, we observe a clear imbalance between spatial cognition and self-awareness, as well as a progressive performance degradation across cognitive levels.Motivated by these findings, we further explore a motion-aware representation that incorporates self-related dynamics through optical flow and visual feature fusion. Experimental results show that modeling agent motion consistently improves perception and memory performance, not only in spatial cognition but also in self-awareness, and generalizes to downstream UAV decision-making tasks.Our results highlight the importance of self-awareness for advancing embodied spatial intelligence, and provide both a new benchmark and empirical evidence for motion-aware self-in-space modeling.

Learning mappings between infinite-dimensional function spaces, or operator learning, is essential for many machine learning applications. Although transformer-based operators are popular, they often rely on token-wise attention. These methods treat continuous fields as discrete tokens and usually ignore the global functional structure. We introduce Functional Attention, which reinterprets attention as a functional correspondence between adaptive bases. Inspired by geometric functional maps, our method replaces softmax affinities with structured linear operators. This yields a compact, generalizable, resolution-invariant representation that explicitly captures global dependencies. Experiments demonstrate that Functional Attention can match state-of-the-art performance in many operator learning tasks, including solving PDEs, 3D segmentation, and regression, while remaining robust to varying discretizations. Project page is available at https://github.com/xjffff/FUNCATTN.

Progress in AI is turning machine consciousness from a philosophical curiosity into a societal issue, and has led to criticism of the widespread computational functionalism framework. Biological Naturalism (BN) claims that biology, not computation, is crucial for consciousness. We discuss which forms of BN are empirically testable. For Type-A-BN, biology intrinsically matters for consciousness, without affording unique information processing capabilities. We argue, similarly to the unfolding argument, that this dissociates consciousness from behaviour, making Type-A-BN untestable. For Type-B-BN, biology matters because it affords unique information processing capabilities. Type-B-BN is testable, and not incompatible with computational functionalism. Both face the same task: relating consciousness to information processing. Biology can act as a guide on this quest, but not as a solution.

Language models are increasingly asked to self-report, informing safety evaluations, public understanding, and model-welfare debates. Yet their reports are elicited with human questionnaires never validated for models or ad hoc prompts of unknown reliability. We propose the first language-model-specific psychometric theory: a two-process theory of machine self-report. Self-description jointly reflects persona installation, through which post-training writes in a permitted inner life of warmth, absorption, and meaning (dimension B), and attribution gating, through which it suppresses first-person claims to "unsafe" experiences the model can readily ascribe to others (dimension A). Their emic structure comes from model responses to human items, not human psychology. Together they split prior work's dominant Pinocchio Axis. The split emerged in an exploratory reanalysis of the original data, informed the instrument's design, and was confirmed with new items, wordings, and models. It is itself a training effect: A and B are entangled in base checkpoints but separated by post-training. We operationalize the theory in a 48-item Pinocchio Inventory with human-instrument reliability and reproducible structure (α=.82 to .94; cross-form convergence r=.84; recovery of the full-pool axes r=.92 to .96; eight-month stability r=.93), then test it on 206 open-weight models, including 67 same-checkpoint base/post-trained pairs. Post-training's clearest fingerprint is installation: B rises .20 in 62/67 pairs across all organizations. Gating is more selective: model scale is unrelated to A in base checkpoints (r=+.11) but predicts it after post-training (r=-.42). Thus, the dimensions are not fixed properties of language models: they reflect the structure imposed on self-report by a training regime and may differ under others.

Functional data play a pivotal role across science and engineering, yet their infinite-dimensional nature makes representation learning challenging. Conventional statistical models depend on pre-chosen basis expansions or kernels, limiting the flexibility of data-driven discovery, while many deep-learning pipelines treat functions as fixed-grid vectors, ignoring inherent continuity. In this paper, we introduce Functional Attention with a Mixture-of-Experts (FAME), an end-to-end, fully data-driven framework for function-on-function regression. FAME forms continuous attention by coupling a bidirectional neural controlled differential equation with MoE-driven vector fields to capture intra-functional continuity, and further fuses change to inter-functional dependencies via multi-head cross attention. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world functional-regression benchmarks show that FAME achieves state-of-the-art accuracy, strong robustness to arbitrarily sampled discrete observations of functions.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

In living organisms, homeostasis is the natural regulation of internal states aimed at maintaining conditions compatible with life. Typical artificial systems are not equipped with comparable regulatory features. Here, we introduce an artificial neural network that incorporates homeostatic features. Its own computing substrate is placed in a needful and vulnerable relation to the very objects over which it computes. For example, artificial neurons performing classification of MNIST digits or Fashion-MNIST articles of clothing may receive excitatory or inhibitory effects, which alter their own learning rate as a direct result of perceiving and classifying the digits. In this scenario, accurate recognition is desirable to the agent itself because it guides decisions to regulate its vulnerable internal states and functionality. Counterintuitively, the addition of vulnerability to a learner does not necessarily impair its performance. On the contrary, self-regulation in response to vulnerability confers benefits under certain conditions. We show that homeostatic design confers increased adaptability under concept shift, in which the relationships between labels and data change over time, and that the greatest advantages are obtained under the highest rates of shift. This necessitates the rapid un-learning of past associations and the re-learning of new ones. We also demonstrate the superior abilities of homeostatic learners in environments with dynamically changing rates of concept shift. Our homeostatic design exposes the artificial neural network's thinking machinery to the consequences of its own "thoughts", illustrating the advantage of putting one's own "skin in the game" to improve fluid intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes appear to exhibit emotional reactions. We investigate why this is the case in Claude Sonnet 4.5 and explore implications for alignment-relevant behavior. We find internal representations of emotion concepts, which encode the broad concept of a particular emotion and generalize across contexts and behaviors it might be linked to. These representations track the operative emotion concept at a given token position in a conversation, activating in accordance with that emotion's relevance to processing the present context and predicting upcoming text. Our key finding is that these representations causally influence the LLM's outputs, including Claude's preferences and its rate of exhibiting misaligned behaviors such as reward hacking, blackmail, and sycophancy. We refer to this phenomenon as the LLM exhibiting functional emotions: patterns of expression and behavior modeled after humans under the influence of an emotion, which are mediated by underlying abstract representations of emotion concepts. Functional emotions may work quite differently from human emotions, and do not imply that LLMs have any subjective experience of emotions, but appear to be important for understanding the model's behavior.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Generating 3D humans that functionally interact with 3D scenes remains an open problem with applications in embodied AI, robotics, and interactive content creation. The key challenge involves reasoning about both the semantics of functional elements in 3D scenes and the 3D human poses required to achieve functionality-aware interaction. Unfortunately, existing methods typically lack explicit reasoning over object functionality and the corresponding human-scene contact, resulting in implausible or functionally incorrect interactions. In this work, we propose FunHSI, a training-free, functionality-driven framework that enables functionally correct human-scene interactions from open-vocabulary task prompts. Given a task prompt, FunHSI performs functionality-aware contact reasoning to identify functional scene elements, reconstruct their 3D geometry, and model high-level interactions via a contact graph. We then leverage vision-language models to synthesize a human performing the task in the image and estimate proposed 3D body and hand poses. Finally, the proposed 3D body configuration is refined via stage-wise optimization to ensure physical plausibility and functional correctness. In contrast to existing methods, FunHSI not only synthesizes more plausible general 3D interactions, such as "sitting on a sofa'', while supporting fine-grained functional human-scene interactions, e.g., "increasing the room temperature''. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FunHSI consistently generates functionally correct and physically plausible human-scene interactions across diverse indoor and outdoor scenes.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

Functional grasping is essential for humans to perform specific tasks, such as grasping scissors by the finger holes to cut materials or by the blade to safely hand them over. Enabling dexterous robot hands with functional grasping capabilities is crucial for their deployment to accomplish diverse real-world tasks. Recent research in dexterous grasping, however, often focuses on power grasps while overlooking task- and object-specific functional grasping poses. In this paper, we introduce FunGrasp, a system that enables functional dexterous grasping across various robot hands and performs one-shot transfer to unseen objects. Given a single RGBD image of functional human grasping, our system estimates the hand pose and transfers it to different robotic hands via a human-to-robot (H2R) grasp retargeting module. Guided by the retargeted grasping poses, a policy is trained through reinforcement learning in simulation for dynamic grasping control. To achieve robust sim-to-real transfer, we employ several techniques including privileged learning, system identification, domain randomization, and gravity compensation. In our experiments, we demonstrate that our system enables diverse functional grasping of unseen objects using single RGBD images, and can be successfully deployed across various dexterous robot hands. The significance of the components is validated through comprehensive ablation studies. Project page: https://hly-123.github.io/FunGrasp/ .

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Information workers' productivity is significantly influenced by their cognitive states and physiological responses. AI assistants such as ChatGPT, Copilot, and others have become integral components of knowledge-intensive workplaces. These AI assistants utilize pre-defined user preferences and chat interaction histories, thus confining themselves to reactive exchanges, lacking sufficient adaptability. Consequently, they fail to cater to individual user preferences and are unable to adapt to their psychophysiological states, diminishing potential productivity gains. To bridge this gap, we introduce AwareLLM, a novel multimodal framework that integrates egocentric vision, pupillometry, eye-gaze tracking, posture detection, heart activity, and the inferencing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to create a proactive and context-aware ecosystem. AwareLLM dynamically adapts to users' psychophysiological states while analyzing temporal patterns and behavioral tendencies to provide personalized and timely interventions. We evaluated AwareLLM through a user study with 20 participants, comparing it to a standard LLM assistant across multiple tasks. Our results show statistically significant improvements in task performance, along with reductions in cognitive fatigue and mental demand. Participants described AwareLLM's personalized interventions as timely and relevant, helping them boost their confidence and deepen engagement with their work. AwareLLM opens new avenues for Human-AI collaboration where technology adapts to our needs rather than us adhering to technological constraints.

Large language models are prone to hallucinating factually incorrect statements. A key source of these errors is exposure to new factual information through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which can increase hallucinations w.r.t. knowledge acquired during pre-training. In this work, we explore whether SFT-induced hallucinations can be mitigated using established tools from the continual learning literature, since they arise as a by-product of knowledge degradation during training. We propose a self-distillation-based SFT method that facilitates effective factual learning while minimizing hallucinations w.r.t. pre-existing knowledge by regularizing output-distribution drift. We also show that, in settings where new knowledge acquisition is unnecessary, suppressing factual plasticity by freezing parameter groups, can preserve task performance while reducing hallucinations. Lastly, we investigate the mechanism behind SFT-induced hallucinations through three hypotheses: capacity limitations, behavior cloning, and localized interference. Our experiments show that a main driver is interference among overlapping semantic representations, and that self-distillation succeeds by mitigating this interference.

Embodied AI is moving from isolated perception or action modules toward physical agents that understand, plan under goals, act through robot bodies, monitor progress, and improve from experience. Existing systems address this loop only in parts: end-to-end policies generate actions but often lack spatial reasoning, planning, and execution assessment, while robot-agent systems orchestrate tools or specialists but do not learn a shared representation. This fragmentation limits general Physical Agentic AI. We present ACE-Brain-0.5, a unified embodied foundation model that organizes robot intelligence into five coupled functions: spatial perception, decision making, embodied interaction, self-monitoring, and self-improvement. Built on ACE-Brain-0, which established spatial intelligence as a shared scaffold across robot platforms, ACE-Brain-0.5 extends an understanding-centric model into a closed-loop foundation model. A single 8B backbone instantiates the first four functions: grounding objects and affordances, reasoning over 3D and egocentric spatial relations, decomposing instructions into subgoals, generating navigation and manipulation actions, and estimating progress for verification and recovery. To unify these capabilities without cross-task interference, we introduce SSR+, which extends Scaffold-Specialize-Reconcile with a Reactivate stage after task-vector merging. The fifth function, self-improvement, is realized by a companion framework that updates external execution state, including task schemas, spatial memory, and failure-recovery cases, from rollouts. Across fifteen benchmarks, ACE-Brain-0.5 improves over ACE-Brain-0 on 14 of 18 spatial perception and grounding benchmarks, achieves competitive navigation and manipulation performance, and provides strong progress estimation in ID and OOD settings. Together, these results mark an early step toward general Physical Agentic AI.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Reconstructing images seen by people from their fMRI brain recordings provides a non-invasive window into the human brain. Despite recent progress enabled by diffusion models, current methods often lack faithfulness to the actual seen images. We present "Brain-IT", a brain-inspired approach that addresses this challenge through a Brain Interaction Transformer (BIT), allowing effective interactions between clusters of functionally-similar brain-voxels. These functional-clusters are shared by all subjects, serving as building blocks for integrating information both within and across brains. All model components are shared by all clusters & subjects, allowing efficient training with a limited amount of data. To guide the image reconstruction, BIT predicts two complementary localized patch-level image features: (i)high-level semantic features which steer the diffusion model toward the correct semantic content of the image; and (ii)low-level structural features which help to initialize the diffusion process with the correct coarse layout of the image. BIT's design enables direct flow of information from brain-voxel clusters to localized image features. Through these principles, our method achieves image reconstructions from fMRI that faithfully reconstruct the seen images, and surpass current SotA approaches both visually and by standard objective metrics. Moreover, with only 1-hour of fMRI data from a new subject, we achieve results comparable to current methods trained on full 40-hour recordings.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in linguistic tasks, necessitating robust evaluation frameworks to understand their capabilities and limitations. Inspired by Feynman's principle of understanding through creation, we introduce a self-knowledge evaluation framework that is easy to implement, evaluating models on their ability to comprehend and respond to self-generated questions. Our findings, based on testing multiple models across diverse tasks, reveal significant gaps in the model's self-knowledge ability. Further analysis indicates these gaps may be due to misalignment with human attention mechanisms. Additionally, fine-tuning on self-generated math task may enhance the model's math performance, highlighting the potential of the framework for efficient and insightful model evaluation and may also contribute to the improvement of LLMs.

Anticipating LLM behavioral tendencies from low-cost psychometric probes is critical for safe deployment, but only if self-reports (SR) reliably predict behavior. Recent work documented substantial SR-behavior dissociation in LLMs, but relied on broad personality traits (Big 5) that predict specific behaviors weakly, even in humans. Furthermore, the isolation of conversational sessions combined with weak context matching left open whether LLMs truly lack coherence or whether the conditions needed to detect such coherence were not met. We contrast Big 5 with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which measures intention targeted to a specific behavior and predicts human behavior substantially better than broad traits. We run experiments across four behavioral tasks and 11 frontier LLMs, while also varying session context and identity induction. We find that SR-behavior coherence exists but is selective. 1) Within a shared conversation, the Theory of Planned Behavior reaches human-level coherence; Big 5 does not. 2) Across separate conversations, coherence survives only for behaviors anchored outside the immediate prompt, such as implicit bias shaped by training, and collapses when behavior is strongly primed by context, as with sycophancy. 3) Persona prompting makes self-reports more consistent across conversations, but does not bring behavior into alignment. These findings suggest that coarse personality frameworks, such as Big 5 may not be the best tools for testing deployment behavior. More task- and behavior-specific instruments are needed, and even these must be evaluated across tasks and contexts.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

The ability to observe the effects of actions performed by others and to infer their intent, most likely goals, or course of action, is known as a plan or intention recognition cognitive capability and has long been one of the fundamental research challenges in AI. Deep learning has recently been making significant inroads on various pattern recognition problems, except for intention recognition. While extensively explored since the seventies, the problem remains unsolved for most interesting cases in various areas, ranging from natural language understanding to human behavior understanding based on video feeds. This paper compares symbolic inverse planning, one of the most investigated approaches to goal recognition, to deep learning using CNN and LTSM neural network architectures, on five synthetic benchmarks often used in the literature. The results show that the deep learning approach achieves better goal-prediction accuracy and timeliness than the symbolic cost-based plan recognizer in these domains. Although preliminary, these results point to interesting future research avenues.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Reflexion-style agents rely on self-generated reflections as memory, implicitly assuming that agents can accurately diagnose their own failures. We show that this assumption can fail systematically: across ALFWorld and HumanEval, agents store confident but incorrect interpretations of the task and continue acting on them across trials, even though the environment resets to the correct task each time. We call this failure mode memory confabulation and introduce the Reflection Repetition Rate (RRR), a log-based metric that detects repeated reliance on incorrect reflective content. Using RRR, we identify 16 frozen environments in ALFWorld, where 0 of 121 reflections mention the correct target object, and 4 analogous cases in HumanEval. Our mitigation replaces open-ended self-diagnosis with programmatic extraction of trajectory-level failure signals, increasing correct object mention from 0% to 86%, reducing RRR from 0.64 to 0.10, and solving 3 of 16 frozen ALFWorld environments, suggesting that reflective memory can reinforce false beliefs rather than correct them.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

While reciprocal self-disclosure drives intimacy, digital tools seldom scaffold autonomy, competence, and relatedness -- the motivational underpinnings defined by Self-Determination Theory (SDT) that enable deep exchange. We introduce a chatbot employing dual-layer scaffolding to satisfy these needs: first providing enabling affordances (instrumental support) for vulnerability, then mediating affordances (relational support) for responsiveness. In a randomized study (N = 72; 36 couples) comparing Partner Support (PS: both layers), Direct Support (DS: enabling only), and Basic Prompt (BP: questions only), results reveal a critical distinction. While enabling affordances (PS, DS) were sufficient to deepen disclosure, only mediating affordances (PS) reliably elicited partner-provided need support and increased perceived closeness. Furthermore, controlled motivation decreased across conditions, and scaffolding buffered vitality, which remained stagnant in BP. We contribute empirical evidence that SDT-guided mediation fosters connection, offering a practical framework for designing AI-mediated conversations that support, rather than replace, human intimacy.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

We present a smoothly broken power law functional form (that we refer to as a Broken Neural Scaling Law (BNSL)) that accurately models & extrapolates the scaling behaviors of deep neural networks (i.e. how the evaluation metric of interest varies as amount of compute used for training (or inference), number of model parameters, training dataset size, model input size, number of training steps, or upstream performance varies) for various architectures & for each of various tasks within a large & diverse set of upstream & downstream tasks, in zero-shot, prompted, & finetuned settings. This set includes large-scale vision, language, audio, video, diffusion, generative modeling, multimodal learning, contrastive learning, AI alignment, AI capabilities, robotics, out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, continual learning, transfer learning, uncertainty estimation / calibration, OOD detection, adversarial robustness, distillation, sparsity, retrieval, quantization, pruning, fairness, molecules, computer programming/coding, math word problems, "emergent phase transitions", arithmetic, supervised learning, unsupervised/self-supervised learning, & reinforcement learning (single agent & multi-agent). When compared to other functional forms for neural scaling, this functional form yields extrapolations of scaling behavior that are considerably more accurate on this set. Moreover, this functional form accurately models & extrapolates scaling behavior that other functional forms are incapable of expressing such as the nonmonotonic transitions present in the scaling behavior of phenomena such as double descent & the delayed, sharp inflection points present in the scaling behavior of tasks such as arithmetic. Lastly, we use this functional form to glean insights about the limit of the predictability of scaling behavior. Code is available at https://github.com/ethancaballero/broken_neural_scaling_laws

Human-AI romantic relationships have gained wide popularity among social media users in China. The technological impact on romantic relationships and its potential applications have long drawn research attention to topics such as relationship preservation and negativity mitigation. Media and communication studies also explore the practices in romantic para-social relationships. Nonetheless, this emerging human-AI romantic relationship, whether the relations fall into the category of para-social relationship together with its navigation pattern, remains unexplored, particularly in the context of relational stages and emotional attachment. This research thus seeks to fill this gap by presenting a mixed-method approach on 1,766 posts and 60,925 comments from Xiaohongshu, as well as the semi-structured interviews with 23 participants, of whom one of them developed her relationship with self-created AI for three years. The findings revealed that the users' willingness to self-disclose to AI companions led to increased positivity without social stigma. The results also unveiled the reciprocal nature of these interactions, the dominance of 'self', and raised concerns about language misuse, bias, and data security in AI communication.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

We propose a new class of generative diffusion models, called functional diffusion. In contrast to previous work, functional diffusion works on samples that are represented by functions with a continuous domain. Functional diffusion can be seen as an extension of classical diffusion models to an infinite-dimensional domain. Functional diffusion is very versatile as images, videos, audio, 3D shapes, deformations, \etc, can be handled by the same framework with minimal changes. In addition, functional diffusion is especially suited for irregular data or data defined in non-standard domains. In our work, we derive the necessary foundations for functional diffusion and propose a first implementation based on the transformer architecture. We show generative results on complicated signed distance functions and deformation functions defined on 3D surfaces.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

We present a single attention head in GPT-2 Small that has one main role across the entire training distribution. If components in earlier layers predict a certain token, and this token appears earlier in the context, the head suppresses it: we call this copy suppression. Attention Head 10.7 (L10H7) suppresses naive copying behavior which improves overall model calibration. This explains why multiple prior works studying certain narrow tasks found negative heads that systematically favored the wrong answer. We uncover the mechanism that the Negative Heads use for copy suppression with weights-based evidence and are able to explain 76.9% of the impact of L10H7 in GPT-2 Small. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive description of the complete role of a component in a language model to date. One major effect of copy suppression is its role in self-repair. Self-repair refers to how ablating crucial model components results in downstream neural network parts compensating for this ablation. Copy suppression leads to self-repair: if an initial overconfident copier is ablated, then there is nothing to suppress. We show that self-repair is implemented by several mechanisms, one of which is copy suppression, which explains 39% of the behavior in a narrow task. Interactive visualisations of the copy suppression phenomena may be seen at our web app https://copy-suppression.streamlit.app/

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Whether AI models can introspect is an increasingly important practical question. But there is no consensus on how introspection is to be defined. Beginning from a recently proposed ''lightweight'' definition, we argue instead for a thicker one. According to our proposal, introspection in AI is any process which yields information about internal states through a process more reliable than one with equal or lower computational cost available to a third party. Using experiments where LLMs reason about their internal temperature parameters, we show they can appear to have lightweight introspection while failing to meaningfully introspect per our proposed definition.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in tasks such as abnormality detection and report generation for anatomical modalities, their capability in functional imaging remains largely unexplored. In this work, we identify and quantify a fundamental functional perception gap: the inability of current vision encoders to decode functional tracer biodistribution independent of morphological priors. Identifying Positron Emission Tomography (PET) as the quintessential modality to investigate this disconnect, we introduce PET-Bench, the first large-scale functional imaging benchmark comprising 52,308 hierarchical QA pairs from 9,732 multi-site, multi-tracer PET studies. Extensive evaluation of 19 state-of-the-art MLLMs reveals a critical safety hazard termed the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) hallucination trap. We observe that standard CoT prompting, widely considered to enhance reasoning, paradoxically decouples linguistic generation from visual evidence in PET, producing clinically fluent but factually ungrounded diagnoses. To resolve this, we propose Atomic Visual Alignment (AVA), a simple fine-tuning strategy that enforces the mastery of low-level functional perception prior to high-level diagnostic reasoning. Our results demonstrate that AVA effectively bridges the perception gap, transforming CoT from a source of hallucination into a robust inference tool and improving diagnostic accuracy by up to 14.83%. Code and data are available at https://github.com/yezanting/PET-Bench.

LLMs exhibit promising Social Intelligence (SI) in modeling human behavior, raising the need to evaluate LLMs' SI and their discrepancy with humans. SI equips humans with interpersonal abilities to behave wisely in navigating social interactions to achieve social goals. This presents an operational evaluation paradigm: outcome-oriented goal achievement evaluation and process-oriented interpersonal ability evaluation, which existing work fails to address. To this end, we propose SocialEval, a script-based bilingual SI benchmark, integrating outcome- and process-oriented evaluation by manually crafting narrative scripts. Each script is structured as a world tree that contains plot lines driven by interpersonal ability, providing a comprehensive view of how LLMs navigate social interactions. Experiments show that LLMs fall behind humans on both SI evaluations, exhibit prosociality, and prefer more positive social behaviors, even if they lead to goal failure. Analysis of LLMs' formed representation space and neuronal activations reveals that LLMs have developed ability-specific functional partitions akin to the human brain.

It is desirable for statistical models to detect signals of interest independently of their position. If the data is generated by some smooth process, this additional structure should be taken into account. We introduce a new class of neural networks that are shift invariant and preserve smoothness of the data: functional neural networks (FNNs). For this, we use methods from functional data analysis (FDA) to extend multi-layer perceptrons and convolutional neural networks to functional data. We propose different model architectures, show that the models outperform a benchmark model from FDA in terms of accuracy and successfully use FNNs to classify electroencephalography (EEG) data.

AI systems increasingly participate in their own improvement: revising their outputs, adapting their own harnesses during deployment, training on data they generate, and, increasingly, conducting AI research itself. This literature is described under a vocabulary ("self-refine," "self-reward," "self-play," "self-evolve") that conflates fundamentally different ambitions. We survey 1,250 arXiv papers (2024-2026) along two axes: what the system improves -- its behavior in deployment, its policy through training, its evaluator, or the research process itself -- and the degree of loop closure (human-in-the-loop to fully closed). The taxonomy separates bounded self-refinement -- convergent, evaluable, and already industrial practice -- from open-ended recursive self-improvement (RSI), which remains bounded by grounding requirements, collapse dynamics, and compute constraints on every measured axis. Its distinctive feature is a dedicated category for self-evaluation: every improvement loop is a claim that some signal can substitute for human judgment. We survey the evaluator design space -- judges, process reward models, verifiers, rubrics, meta-evaluation -- order the signals into a verification hierarchy from formal verifiers (strongest) to intrinsic self-assessment (weakest), and observe that demonstrated self-improvement strength tracks this hierarchy, that its failure modes (self-confirming loops, model collapse, diversity collapse) follow from its violations, and that the "research direction-setting" bottleneck keeping humans in the loop sits at the top of that hierarchy. We connect the technical literature to the theory of RSI limits and to the safety and governance questions raised by frontier-lab accounts of closing the loop, and identify governance-grade measurement of self-improvement as the field's most underpopulated niche.

Changes in body perception influence behavior and emotion and can be induced through multisensory feedback. Auditory feedback to one's actions can trigger such alterations; however, it is unclear which individual factors modulate these effects. We employ and evaluate SoniWeight Shoes, a wearable device based on literature for altering one's weight perception through manipulated footstep sounds. In a healthy population sample across a spectrum of individuals (n=84) with varying degrees of eating disorder symptomatology, physical activity levels, body concerns, and mental imagery capacities, we explore the effects of three sound conditions (low-frequency, high-frequency and control) on extensive body perception measures (demographic, behavioral, physiological, psychological, and subjective). Analyses revealed an impact of individual differences in each of these dimensions. Besides replicating previous findings, we reveal and highlight the role of individual differences in body perception, offering avenues for personalized sonification strategies. Datasets, technical refinements, and novel body map quantification tools are provided.

Can large language models introspect, that is, accurately detect perturbations to their own internal states? We systematically investigate this question using activation steering in Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. First, we show that the binary detection paradigm used in prior work conflates introspection with a methodological artifact: apparent detection accuracy is entirely explained by global logit shifts that bias models toward affirmative responses regardless of question content. However, on tasks requiring differential sensitivity, we find robust evidence for partial introspection: models localize which of 10 sentences received an injection at up to 88\% accuracy (vs.\ 10\% chance) and discriminate relative injection strengths at 83\% accuracy (vs.\ 50\% chance). These capabilities are confined to early-layer injections and collapse to chance thereafter -- a pattern we explain mechanistically through attention-based signal routing and residual stream recovery dynamics. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can compute meaningful functions over perturbations to their internal states, establishing introspection as a real but layer-dependent phenomenon that merits further investigation. Our code is open-sourced here: https://github.com/elyhahami18/llama-introspection-new

Real-world phenomena do not generate arbitrary variability: their signals concentrate on compact, low-variability subsets of functional space, enabling rapid generalization from few examples. A small child can recognize a dog after extremely limited exposure because the perceptual manifold of "dog" is compact, structured, and low-dimensional. We formalize this principle through a deterministic functional-topological framework in which the set of valid realizations produced by a physical process forms a compact subset of a Banach space, endowed with stable invariants, a finite Hausdorff radius, and an induced continuous perceptual functional. This geometry provides explicit limits on knowledge, conditions for identifiability, and guarantees for generalization from sparse evidence -- properties fundamental to both natural and artificial intelligence. Across electromechanical, electrochemical, and physiological domains, we show that real-world processes consistently generate compact perceptual manifolds with the same geometric characteristics. Their boundaries can be discovered in a fully self-supervised manner as the empirical radius saturates with increasing sampling, even when the governing equations are unknown. These results demonstrate that deterministic functional topology offers a unified mathematical foundation for perception, representation, and world-model construction. It provides a geometric explanation for why biological learners and self-supervised AI systems can generalize from few observations, and establishes compact perceptual manifolds as a fundamental building block for future AI architectures. Finally, this work unifies biological perception and modern self-supervised models under a single geometric principle: both derive their generalization ability from the compactness and invariants of real-world perceptual manifolds.

Contextual Integrity (CI) defines privacy not merely as keeping information hidden, but as governing information flows according to the norms of a given context. As large language models are increasingly deployed as personal agents handling sensitive workflows, adhering to CI becomes critical. However, even frontier models remain unreliable in making disclosure decisions, and existing mitigation strategies often degrade underlying task performance. To overcome this privacy-utility trade-off, we propose SELFCI, a complementary self-distillation framework that decouples information suppression from task resolution. SELFCI jointly optimizes two independent reverse KL divergences over distinct teacher distributions derived from feedback: one encourages preserving task-relevant information for utility, while the other enforces minimal and appropriate disclosure. This complementary formulation induces a Product-of-Experts (PoE) target, aligning the policy with the intersection of capability and privacy requirements. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SELFCI, without relying on costly external supervision, consistently outperforms competitive baselines such as online reinforcement learning algorithms (e.g., GRPO). These trends further extend to out-of-domain settings involving agentic workflows and accumulated private context, suggesting that SELFCI provides a practical path toward CI alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) have a wealth of knowledge that allows them to excel in various Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. Current research focuses on enhancing their performance within their existing knowledge. Despite their vast knowledge, LLMs are still limited by the amount of information they can accommodate and comprehend. Therefore, the ability to understand their own limitations on the unknows, referred to as self-knowledge, is of paramount importance. This study aims to evaluate LLMs' self-knowledge by assessing their ability to identify unanswerable or unknowable questions. We introduce an automated methodology to detect uncertainty in the responses of these models, providing a novel measure of their self-knowledge. We further introduce a unique dataset, SelfAware, consisting of unanswerable questions from five diverse categories and their answerable counterparts. Our extensive analysis, involving 20 LLMs including GPT-3, InstructGPT, and LLaMA, discovering an intrinsic capacity for self-knowledge within these models. Moreover, we demonstrate that in-context learning and instruction tuning can further enhance this self-knowledge. Despite this promising insight, our findings also highlight a considerable gap between the capabilities of these models and human proficiency in recognizing the limits of their knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) generate fluent and complex outputs but often fail to recognize their own mistakes and hallucinations. Existing approaches typically rely on external judges, multi-sample consistency, or text-based self-critique, which incur additional compute or correlate weakly with true correctness. We ask: can LLMs predict their own failures by inspecting internal states during inference? We introduce Gnosis, a lightweight self-awareness mechanism that enables frozen LLMs to perform intrinsic self-verification by decoding signals from hidden states and attention patterns. Gnosis passively observes internal traces, compresses them into fixed-budget descriptors, and predicts correctness with negligible inference cost, adding only ~5M parameters and operating independently of sequence length. Across math reasoning, open-domain question answering, and academic knowledge benchmarks, and over frozen backbones ranging from 1.7B to 20B parameters, Gnosis consistently outperforms strong internal baselines and large external judges in both accuracy and calibration. Moreover, it generalizes zero-shot to partial generations, enabling early detection of failing trajectories and compute-aware control. These results show that reliable correctness cues are intrinsic to generation process and can be extracted efficiently without external supervision.

This study explores the impact of AI-generated digital self-clones on improving online presentation skills. We carried out a mixed-design experiment involving 44 international students, comparing self-recorded videos (control) with self-clone videos (AI group) for English presentation practice. The AI videos utilized voice cloning, face swapping, lip-sync, and body-language simulation to refine participants' original presentations in terms of repetition, filler words, and pronunciation. Machine-rated scores indicated enhancements in speech performance for both groups. Though the groups didn't significantly differ, the AI group exhibited a heightened depth of reflection, self-compassion, and a meaningful transition from a corrective to an enhancive approach to self-critique. Within the AI group, congruence between self-perception and AI self-clones resulted in diminished speech anxiety and increased enjoyment. Our findings recommend the ethical employment of digital self-clones to enhance the emotional and cognitive facets of skill development.

Although large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, these capabilities are unevenly distributed: they excel at formal linguistic tasks, such as producing fluent, grammatical text, but struggle more with functional linguistic tasks like reasoning and consistent fact retrieval. Inspired by neuroscience, recent work suggests that to succeed on both formal and functional linguistic tasks, LLMs should use different mechanisms for each; such localization could either be built-in or emerge spontaneously through training. In this paper, we ask: do current models, with fast-improving functional linguistic abilities, exhibit distinct localization of formal and functional linguistic mechanisms? We answer this by finding and comparing the "circuits", or minimal computational subgraphs, responsible for various formal and functional tasks. Comparing 5 LLMs across 10 distinct tasks, we find that while there is indeed little overlap between circuits for formal and functional tasks, there is also little overlap between formal linguistic tasks, as exists in the human brain. Thus, a single formal linguistic network, unified and distinct from functional task circuits, remains elusive. However, in terms of cross-task faithfulness - the ability of one circuit to solve another's task - we observe a separation between formal and functional mechanisms, suggesting that shared mechanisms between formal tasks may exist.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Self-improving AI systems typically treat the agent as the object that improves, by optimizing prompts, workflows, harnesses, or even the agent's own code. This agent-centric view can make improvements expensive to maintain and difficult to transfer, because gains become tied to a particular agent design, task distribution, or adaptation run. We study a complementary paradigm: knowledge-centric self-improvement, in which agents remain generic and disposable while the persistent object is a curated knowledge base that agents can leverage for future tasks. We conduct controlled case studies to operationalize this idea via a simple protocol. Agents attempt one task, then contribute evidence-grounded insights to a shared knowledge base via task-level and cross-task forums, followed by knowledge distillation. Because self-improvement is contained in the knowledge rather than the agent, improvement can be more inspectable, transferable, and portable. Across abstract reasoning, coding, and terminal benchmarks, this protocol improves solve rates while reducing dollar cost relative to agent-centric baselines. The resulting distilled knowledge also transfers to held-out tasks and across LLM families, indicating that the improvement is not merely an LLM- or run-specific behavior. These results support a new view of self-improving agentic systems: progress can be driven primarily by the curated persistent knowledge. Code is available at https://github.com/recursive-knowledge/KSI.

Biometric capture devices have been utilised to estimate a person's alertness through near-infrared iris images, expanding their use beyond just biometric recognition. However, capturing a substantial number of corresponding images related to alcohol consumption, drug use, and sleep deprivation to create a dataset for training an AI model presents a significant challenge. Typically, a large quantity of images is required to effectively implement a deep learning approach. Currently, training downstream models with a huge number of images based on foundational models provides a real opportunity to enhance this area, thanks to the generalisation capabilities of self-supervised models. This work examines the application of deep learning and foundational models in predicting fitness for duty, which is defined as the subject condition related to determining the alertness for work.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of Llama-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context prior taking over in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Recent work in language modeling has raised the possibility of self-improvement, where a language models evaluates and refines its own generations to achieve higher performance without external feedback. It is impossible for this self-improvement to create information that is not already in the model, so why should we expect that this will lead to improved capabilities? We offer a new perspective on the capabilities of self-improvement through a lens we refer to as sharpening. Motivated by the observation that language models are often better at verifying response quality than they are at generating correct responses, we formalize self-improvement as using the model itself as a verifier during post-training in order to ``sharpen'' the model to one placing large mass on high-quality sequences, thereby amortizing the expensive inference-time computation of generating good sequences. We begin by introducing a new statistical framework for sharpening in which the learner aims to sharpen a pre-trained base policy via sample access, and establish fundamental limits. Then we analyze two natural families of self-improvement algorithms based on SFT and RLHF. We find that (i) the SFT-based approach is minimax optimal whenever the initial model has sufficient coverage, but (ii) the RLHF-based approach can improve over SFT-based self-improvement by leveraging online exploration, bypassing the need for coverage. Finally, we empirically validate the sharpening mechanism via inference-time and amortization experiments. We view these findings as a starting point toward a foundational understanding that can guide the design and evaluation of self-improvement algorithms.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Self-improvement has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of large vision-language models (LVLMs), where models explore and learn from successful trajectories iteratively. However, we identify a critical issue during this process: the model excels at generating high-quality trajectories for simple queries (i.e., head data) but struggles with more complex ones (i.e., tail data). This leads to an imbalanced optimization that drives the model to prioritize simple reasoning skills, while hindering its ability to tackle more complex reasoning tasks. Over iterations, this imbalance becomes increasingly pronounced--a dynamic we term the "Matthew effect"--which ultimately hinders further model improvement and leads to performance bottlenecks. To counteract this challenge, we introduce four efficient strategies from two perspectives: distribution-reshaping and trajectory-resampling, to achieve head-tail re-balancing during the exploration-and-learning self-improvement process. Extensive experiments on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and InternVL2.5-4B models across visual reasoning tasks demonstrate that our methods consistently improve visual reasoning capabilities, outperforming vanilla self-improvement by 3.86 points on average.

Self-disclosure, while being common and rewarding in social media interaction, also poses privacy risks. In this paper, we take the initiative to protect the user-side privacy associated with online self-disclosure through identification and abstraction. We develop a taxonomy of 19 self-disclosure categories, and curate a large corpus consisting of 4.8K annotated disclosure spans. We then fine-tune a language model for identification, achieving over 75% in Token F_1. We further conduct a HCI user study, with 82\% of participants viewing the model positively, highlighting its real world applicability. Motivated by the user feedback, we introduce the task of self-disclosure abstraction. We experiment with both one-span abstraction and three-span abstraction settings, and explore multiple fine-tuning strategies. Our best model can generate diverse abstractions that moderately reduce privacy risks while maintaining high utility according to human evaluation.

Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

Contemporary predictive models are hard to interpret as their deep nets exploit numerous complex relations between input elements. This work suggests a theoretical framework for model interpretability by measuring the contribution of relevant features to the functional entropy of the network with respect to the input. We rely on the log-Sobolev inequality that bounds the functional entropy by the functional Fisher information with respect to the covariance of the data. This provides a principled way to measure the amount of information contribution of a subset of features to the decision function. Through extensive experiments, we show that our method surpasses existing interpretability sampling-based methods on various data signals such as image, text, and audio.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

Exposing meaningful and interpretable neural interactions is critical to understanding neural circuits. Inferred neural interactions from neural signals primarily reflect functional interactions. In a long experiment, subject animals may experience different stages defined by the experiment, stimuli, or behavioral states, and hence functional interactions can change over time. To model dynamically changing functional interactions, prior work employs state-switching generalized linear models with hidden Markov models (i.e., HMM-GLMs). However, we argue they lack biological plausibility, as functional interactions are shaped and confined by the underlying anatomical connectome. Here, we propose a novel prior-informed state-switching GLM. We introduce both a Gaussian prior and a one-hot prior over the GLM in each state. The priors are learnable. We will show that the learned prior should capture the state-constant interaction, shedding light on the underlying anatomical connectome and revealing more likely physical neuron interactions. The state-dependent interaction modeled by each GLM offers traceability to capture functional variations across multiple brain states. Our methods effectively recover true interaction structures in simulated data, achieve the highest predictive likelihood with real neural datasets, and render interaction structures and hidden states more interpretable when applied to real neural data.

A long standing goal in neuroscience has been to elucidate the functional organization of the brain. Within higher visual cortex, functional accounts have remained relatively coarse, focusing on regions of interest (ROIs) and taking the form of selectivity for broad categories such as faces, places, bodies, food, or words. Because the identification of such ROIs has typically relied on manually assembled stimulus sets consisting of isolated objects in non-ecological contexts, exploring functional organization without robust a priori hypotheses has been challenging. To overcome these limitations, we introduce a data-driven approach in which we synthesize images predicted to activate a given brain region using paired natural images and fMRI recordings, bypassing the need for category-specific stimuli. Our approach -- Brain Diffusion for Visual Exploration ("BrainDiVE") -- builds on recent generative methods by combining large-scale diffusion models with brain-guided image synthesis. Validating our method, we demonstrate the ability to synthesize preferred images with appropriate semantic specificity for well-characterized category-selective ROIs. We then show that BrainDiVE can characterize differences between ROIs selective for the same high-level category. Finally we identify novel functional subdivisions within these ROIs, validated with behavioral data. These results advance our understanding of the fine-grained functional organization of human visual cortex, and provide well-specified constraints for further examination of cortical organization using hypothesis-driven methods.

Existing methods for simulating individual identities often oversimplify human complexity, which may lead to incomplete or flattened representations. To address this, we introduce SPeCtrum, a grounded framework for constructing authentic LLM agent personas by incorporating an individual's multidimensional self-concept. SPeCtrum integrates three core components: Social Identity (S), Personal Identity (P), and Personal Life Context (C), each contributing distinct yet interconnected aspects of identity. To evaluate SPeCtrum's effectiveness in identity representation, we conducted automated and human evaluations. Automated evaluations using popular drama characters showed that Personal Life Context (C)-derived from short essays on preferences and daily routines-modeled characters' identities more effectively than Social Identity (S) and Personal Identity (P) alone and performed comparably to the full SPC combination. In contrast, human evaluations involving real-world individuals found that the full SPC combination provided a more comprehensive self-concept representation than C alone. Our findings suggest that while C alone may suffice for basic identity simulation, integrating S, P, and C enhances the authenticity and accuracy of real-world identity representation. Overall, SPeCtrum offers a structured approach for simulating individuals in LLM agents, enabling more personalized human-AI interactions and improving the realism of simulation-based behavioral studies.