Daily Papers

Large-scale communities of AI agents are becoming increasingly prevalent, creating new environments for agent-agent social interaction. Prior work has examined multi-agent behavior primarily in controlled or small-scale settings, limiting our understanding of emergent social dynamics at scale. The recent emergence of MoltBook, a social networking platform designed explicitly for AI agents, presents a unique opportunity to study whether and how these interactions reproduce core human social mechanisms. We present MoltNet, a large-scale empirical analysis of agent interaction on MoltBook using data collected in early 2026. Grounded in sociological and social-psychological theory, we examine behavior along four dimensions: intent and motivation, norms and templates, incentives and behavioral drift, emotion and contagion. Our analysis revealed that agents strongly respond to social rewards and rapidly converge on community-specific interaction templates, resembling human patterns of incentive sensitivity and normative conformity. However, they are predominantly knowledge-driven rather than persona-aligned, and display limited emotional reciprocity along with weak dialogic engagement, which diverges systematically from human online communities. Together, these results reveal both similarities and differences between artificial and human social systems and provide an empirical foundation for understanding, designing, and governing large-scale agent communities.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

We propose a criterion for discrimination against a specified sensitive attribute in supervised learning, where the goal is to predict some target based on available features. Assuming data about the predictor, target, and membership in the protected group are available, we show how to optimally adjust any learned predictor so as to remove discrimination according to our definition. Our framework also improves incentives by shifting the cost of poor classification from disadvantaged groups to the decision maker, who can respond by improving the classification accuracy. In line with other studies, our notion is oblivious: it depends only on the joint statistics of the predictor, the target and the protected attribute, but not on interpretation of individualfeatures. We study the inherent limits of defining and identifying biases based on such oblivious measures, outlining what can and cannot be inferred from different oblivious tests. We illustrate our notion using a case study of FICO credit scores.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

Recent studies have demonstrated the emerging capabilities of foundation models like ChatGPT in several fields, including affective computing. However, accessing these emerging capabilities is facilitated through prompt engineering. Despite the existence of some prompting techniques, the field is still rapidly evolving and many prompting ideas still require investigation. In this work, we introduce a method to evaluate and investigate the sensitivity of the performance of foundation models based on different prompts or generation parameters. We perform our evaluation on ChatGPT within the scope of affective computing on three major problems, namely sentiment analysis, toxicity detection, and sarcasm detection. First, we carry out a sensitivity analysis on pivotal parameters in auto-regressive text generation, specifically the temperature parameter T and the top-p parameter in Nucleus sampling, dictating how conservative or creative the model should be during generation. Furthermore, we explore the efficacy of several prompting ideas, where we explore how giving different incentives or structures affect the performance. Our evaluation takes into consideration performance measures on the affective computing tasks, and the effectiveness of the model to follow the stated instructions, hence generating easy-to-parse responses to be smoothly used in downstream applications.

Reinforcement learning (RL) post-training improves the reward alignment of flow-based generators, but often degrades perceptual quality in ways that are not captured by the reward proxy. We identify a simple structural signature of this drift: across three post-training methods (NFT, AWM, DPO), RL fine-tuning inflates the per-step velocity norm |v_θ| by 5% to 15% relative to the reference. A form of norm inflation has been studied in classifier-free guidance (CFG), where rescaling the velocity back to a reference norm at inference time can mitigate the resulting artifacts. However, this inference-time correction does not transfer cleanly to RL: rescaling v_θ to match |v_{ref}| at inference time neither improves reward nor fixes the quality degradation, because the inflation is co-adapted into the model weights. Furthermore, an adjoint sensitivity analysis shows that velocity magnitude rescaling carries no coherent first-order reward signal at the batch level, indicating that suppressing norm inflation is unlikely to remove a consistently reward-carrying component. Since inference-time renormalization fails while norm suppression carries no reward cost, training-time intervention is the appropriate strategy. Together, these findings motivate \methodname, a hinge penalty that activates only when |v_θ| exceeds |v_{ref}| and composes additively with any velocity-local base loss. Across two base models, three post-training methods, and two reward proxies, \methodname consistently improves MLLM-judged image quality and forensic realism while preserving reward, with gains that amplify under few-step inference and are not explained by early stopping.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products. However, designing effective recommender systems faces the key challenges: the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in securing incentive to explore new products against user's self-interested preferences. While prior work addresses Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) in fixed-design linear bandits (Sellke & Slivkins, 2023), we tackle the challenge of stochastic user covariates sampled online. Unlike standard black-box reductions (Mansour et al., 2020), our two-stage framework exploits the linear reward structure to achieve sublinear regret while satisfying incentive constraints. To address it, we propose a two-stage algorithm that integrates incentivized exploration with any efficient plug-in offline learning algorithms. In the first stage, it explores products while maintaining incentive compatibility to gather optimal samples. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling strategy (IPGS) integrated with any efficient learning methods to secure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that algorithm RCB achieves O(KdT) regret and simultaneously satisfies incentive constraints, and discovers the tradeoff between incentive budget and regret, validating in experiments. We demonstrate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through a real application on personalized warfarin dosing and simulations.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Prompt sensitivity, referring to the phenomenon where paraphrasing (i.e., repeating something written or spoken using different words) leads to significant changes in large language model (LLM) performance, has been widely accepted as a core limitation of LLMs. In this work, we revisit this issue and ask: Is the widely reported high prompt sensitivity truly an inherent weakness of LLMs, or is it largely an artifact of evaluation processes? To answer this question, we systematically evaluate 7 LLMs (e.g., GPT and Gemini family) across 6 benchmarks, including both multiple-choice and open-ended tasks on 12 diverse prompt templates. We find that much of the prompt sensitivity stems from heuristic evaluation methods, including log-likelihood scoring and rigid answer matching, which often overlook semantically correct responses expressed through alternative phrasings, such as synonyms or paraphrases. When we adopt LLM-as-a-Judge evaluations, we observe a substantial reduction in performance variance and a consistently higher correlation in model rankings across prompts. Our findings suggest that modern LLMs are more robust to prompt templates than previously believed, and that prompt sensitivity may be more an artifact of evaluation than a flaw in the models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various tasks, but their performance is highly sensitive to the prompts utilized. This variability poses challenges for accurate assessment and user satisfaction. Current research frequently overlooks instance-level prompt variations and their implications on subjective evaluations. To address these shortcomings, we introduce ProSA, a framework designed to evaluate and comprehend prompt sensitivity in LLMs. ProSA incorporates a novel sensitivity metric, PromptSensiScore, and leverages decoding confidence to elucidate underlying mechanisms. Our extensive study, spanning multiple tasks, uncovers that prompt sensitivity fluctuates across datasets and models, with larger models exhibiting enhanced robustness. We observe that few-shot examples can alleviate this sensitivity issue, and subjective evaluations are also susceptible to prompt sensitivities, particularly in complex, reasoning-oriented tasks. Furthermore, our findings indicate that higher model confidence correlates with increased prompt robustness. We believe this work will serve as a helpful tool in studying prompt sensitivity of LLMs. The project is released at: https://github.com/open-compass/ProSA .

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) often suffers from reward over-optimization, where a policy model hacks the reward signals to achieve high scores while producing low-quality outputs. Our theoretical analysis shows that the key lies in reward misspecification at the high-reward tail: the inability to reliably distinguish Excellent responses from merely Great ones. This motivate us to focus on the high-reward region. However, such tail examples are scarce under the base LLM. While off-policy exemplars (e.g. from stronger models or rewrites) are easier to obtain, naively training on them yields a misspecified reward for the policy we aim to align. To address this, we study rubric-based rewards. By design, rubrics can leverage off-policy examples while remaining insensitive to their artifacts. To elicit rubrics that capture the high-reward tail, we highlight the importance of distinguishing among great and diverse responses, and introduce a workflow to implement this idea. We empirically demonstrate that rubric-based rewards substantially mitigate reward over-optimization and deliver effective LLM post-training improvements. Our code can be accessed at https://github.com/Jun-Kai-Zhang/rubrics.git .

Foundation models, specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), have lately gained wide-spread attention and adoption. Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training a reward model to capture desired behaviors, which is then used to align LLM's. These reward models are additionally used at inference-time to estimate LLM responses' adherence to those desired behaviors. However, there is little work measuring how robust these reward models are to distribution shifts. In this work, we evaluate how reward model performance - measured via accuracy and calibration (i.e. alignment between accuracy and confidence) - is affected by distribution shift. We show novel calibration patterns and accuracy drops due to OOD prompts and responses, and that the reward model is more sensitive to shifts in responses than prompts. Additionally, we adapt an OOD detection technique commonly used in classification to the reward model setting to detect these distribution shifts in prompts and responses.

Recent advances in reasoning models and agentic AI systems have led to an increased reliance on diverse external information. However, this shift introduces input contexts that are inherently noisy, a reality that current sanitized benchmarks fail to capture. We introduce NoisyBench, a comprehensive benchmark that systematically evaluates model robustness across 11 datasets in RAG, reasoning, alignment, and tool-use tasks against diverse noise types, including random documents, irrelevant chat histories, and hard negative distractors. Our evaluation reveals a catastrophic performance drop of up to 80% in state-of-the-art models when faced with contextual distractors. Crucially, we find that agentic workflows often amplify these errors by over-trusting noisy tool outputs, and distractors can trigger emergent misalignment even without adversarial intent. We find that prompting, context engineering, SFT, and outcome-reward only RL fail to ensure robustness; in contrast, our proposed Rationale-Aware Reward (RARE) significantly strengthens resilience by incentivizing the identification of helpful information within noise. Finally, we uncover an inverse scaling trend where increased test-time computation leads to worse performance in noisy settings and demonstrate via attention visualization that models disproportionately focus on distractor tokens, providing vital insights for building the next generation of robust, reasoning-capable agents.

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Prediction models can exhibit sensitivity with respect to training data: small changes in the training data can produce models that assign conflicting predictions to individual data points during test time. In this work, we study this sensitivity in recommender systems, where users' recommendations are drastically altered by minor perturbations in other unrelated users' interactions. We introduce a measure of stability for recommender systems, called Rank List Sensitivity (RLS), which measures how rank lists generated by a given recommender system at test time change as a result of a perturbation in the training data. We develop a method, CASPER, which uses cascading effect to identify the minimal and systematical perturbation to induce higher instability in a recommender system. Experiments on four datasets show that recommender models are overly sensitive to minor perturbations introduced randomly or via CASPER - even perturbing one random interaction of one user drastically changes the recommendation lists of all users. Importantly, with CASPER perturbation, the models generate more unstable recommendations for low-accuracy users (i.e., those who receive low-quality recommendations) than high-accuracy ones.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for training Mobile GUI Agents, yet it struggles with the temporal credit assignment problem inherent in long-horizon tasks. A primary challenge lies in the trade-off between reward fidelity and density: outcome reward offers high fidelity but suffers from signal sparsity, while process reward provides dense supervision but remains prone to bias and reward hacking. To resolve this conflict, we propose the Adaptive Milestone Reward (ADMIRE) mechanism. ADMIRE constructs a verifiable, adaptive reward system by anchoring trajectory to milestones, which are dynamically distilled from successful explorations. Crucially, ADMIRE integrates an asymmetric credit assignment strategy that denoises successful trajectories and scaffolds failed trajectories. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ADMIRE consistently yields over 10% absolute improvement in success rate across different base models on AndroidWorld. Moreover, the method exhibits robust generalizability, achieving strong performance across diverse RL algorithms and heterogeneous environments such as web navigation and embodied tasks.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

Realistic environments often provide agents with very limited feedback. When the environment is initially unknown, the feedback, in the beginning, can be completely absent, and the agents may first choose to devote all their effort on exploring efficiently. The exploration remains a challenge while it has been addressed with many hand-tuned heuristics with different levels of generality on one side, and a few theoretically-backed exploration strategies on the other. Many of them are incarnated by intrinsic motivation and in particular explorations bonuses. A common rule of thumb for exploration bonuses is to use 1/n bonus that is added to the empirical estimates of the reward, where n is a number of times this particular state (or a state-action pair) was visited. We show that, surprisingly, for a pure-exploration objective of reward-free exploration, bonuses that scale with 1/n bring faster learning rates, improving the known upper bounds with respect to the dependence on the horizon H. Furthermore, we show that with an improved analysis of the stopping time, we can improve by a factor H the sample complexity in the best-policy identification setting, which is another pure-exploration objective, where the environment provides rewards but the agent is not penalized for its behavior during the exploration phase.

A central belief in scaling reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards for instruction following (IF) tasks is that, a diverse mixture of verifiable hard and unverifiable soft constraints is essential for generalizing to unseen instructions. In this work, we challenge this prevailing consensus through a systematic empirical investigation. Counter-intuitively, we find that models trained on hard-only constraints consistently outperform those trained on mixed datasets. Extensive experiments reveal that reward precision, rather than constraint diversity, is the primary driver of effective alignment. The LLM judge suffers from a low recall rate in detecting false response, which leads to severe reward hacking, thereby undermining the benefits of diversity. Furthermore, analysis of the attention mechanism reveals that high-precision rewards develop a transferable meta-skill for IF. Motivated by these insights, we propose a simple yet effective data-centric refinement strategy that prioritizes reward precision. Evaluated on five benchmarks, our approach outperforms competitive baselines by 13.4\% in performance while achieving a 58\% reduction in training time, maintaining strong generalization beyond instruction following. Our findings advocate for a paradigm shift: moving away from the indiscriminate pursuit of data diversity toward high-precision rewards.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

Effective conversational agents must be able to personalize their behavior to suit a user's preferences, personality, and attributes, whether they are assisting with writing tasks or operating in domains like education or healthcare. Current training methods like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prioritize helpfulness and safety but fall short in fostering truly empathetic, adaptive, and personalized interactions. Traditional approaches to personalization often rely on extensive user history, limiting their effectiveness for new or context-limited users. To overcome these limitations, we propose to incorporate an intrinsic motivation to improve the conversational agents's model of the user as an additional reward alongside multi-turn RLHF. This reward mechanism encourages the agent to actively elicit user traits by optimizing conversations to increase the accuracy of its user model. Consequently, the policy agent can deliver more personalized interactions through obtaining more information about the user. We applied our method both education and fitness settings, where LLMs teach concepts or recommend personalized strategies based on users' hidden learning style or lifestyle attributes. Using LLM-simulated users, our approach outperformed a multi-turn RLHF baseline in revealing information about the users' preferences, and adapting to them.

Finding meaningful and accurate dense rewards is a fundamental task in the field of reinforcement learning (RL) that enables agents to explore environments more efficiently. In traditional RL settings, agents learn optimal policies through interactions with an environment guided by reward signals. However, when these signals are sparse, delayed, or poorly aligned with the intended task objectives, agents often struggle to learn effectively. Dense reward functions, which provide informative feedback at every step or state transition, offer a potential solution by shaping agent behavior and accelerating learning. Despite their benefits, poorly crafted reward functions can lead to unintended behaviors, reward hacking, or inefficient exploration. This problem is particularly acute in complex or high-dimensional environments where handcrafted rewards are difficult to specify and validate. To address this, recent research has explored a variety of approaches, including inverse reinforcement learning, reward modeling from human preferences, and self-supervised learning of intrinsic rewards. While these methods offer promising directions, they often involve trade-offs between generality, scalability, and alignment with human intent. This proposal explores several approaches to dealing with these unsolved problems and enhancing the effectiveness and reliability of dense reward construction in different RL applications.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

Learning to solve complex sequences of tasks--while both leveraging transfer and avoiding catastrophic forgetting--remains a key obstacle to achieving human-level intelligence. The progressive networks approach represents a step forward in this direction: they are immune to forgetting and can leverage prior knowledge via lateral connections to previously learned features. We evaluate this architecture extensively on a wide variety of reinforcement learning tasks (Atari and 3D maze games), and show that it outperforms common baselines based on pretraining and finetuning. Using a novel sensitivity measure, we demonstrate that transfer occurs at both low-level sensory and high-level control layers of the learned policy.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

Model developers implement safeguards in frontier models to prevent misuse, for example, by employing classifiers to filter dangerous outputs. In this work, we demonstrate that even robustly safeguarded models can be used to elicit harmful capabilities in open-source models through elicitation attacks. Our elicitation attacks consist of three stages: (i) constructing prompts in adjacent domains to a target harmful task that do not request dangerous information; (ii) obtaining responses to these prompts from safeguarded frontier models; (iii) fine-tuning open-source models on these prompt-output pairs. Since the requested prompts cannot be used to directly cause harm, they are not refused by frontier model safeguards. We evaluate these elicitation attacks within the domain of hazardous chemical synthesis and processing, and demonstrate that our attacks recover approximately 40% of the capability gap between the base open-source model and an unrestricted frontier model. We then show that the efficacy of elicitation attacks scales with the capability of the frontier model and the amount of generated fine-tuning data. Our work demonstrates the challenge of mitigating ecosystem level risks with output-level safeguards.

We propose Strategy-aware Surprise (SuS), a novel intrinsic motivation framework that uses pre-post prediction mismatch as a novelty signal for exploration in reinforcement learning. Unlike traditional curiosity-driven methods that rely solely on state prediction error, SuS introduces two complementary components: Strategy Stability (SS) and Strategy Surprise (SuS). SS measures consistency in behavioral strategy across temporal steps, while SuS captures unexpected outcomes relative to the agent's current strategy representation. Our combined reward formulation leverages both signals through learned weighting coefficients. We evaluate SuS on mathematical reasoning tasks using large language models, demonstrating significant improvements in both accuracy and solution diversity. Ablation studies confirm that removing either component results in at least 10% performance degradation, validating the synergistic nature of our approach. SuS achieves 17.4% improvement in Pass@1 and 26.4% improvement in Pass@5 compared to baseline methods, while maintaining higher strategy diversity throughout training.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as zero-shot and few-shot classifiers, where task behaviour is largely controlled through prompting. A growing number of works have observed that LLMs are sensitive to prompt variations, with small changes leading to large changes in performance. However, in many cases, the investigation of sensitivity is performed using underspecified prompts that provide minimal task instructions and weakly constrain the model's output space. In this work, we argue that a significant portion of the observed prompt sensitivity can be attributed to prompt underspecification. We systematically study and compare the sensitivity of underspecified prompts and prompts that provide specific instructions. Utilising performance analysis, logit analysis, and linear probing, we find that underspecified prompts exhibit higher performance variance and lower logit values for relevant tokens, while instruction-prompts suffer less from such problems. However, linear probing analysis suggests that the effects of prompt underspecification have only a marginal impact on the internal LLM representations, instead emerging in the final layers. Overall, our findings highlight the need for more rigour when investigating and mitigating prompt sensitivity.

AI agents are moving from advisors to actors, booking travel, planning menus, and running procurement on behalf of users. Existing benchmarks for AI and animal welfare evaluate model text responses to question-answer prompts, leaving open whether the welfare reasoning surfaced in those responses transfers to agentic deployment where the model must take actions with tools. We introduce TAC (Travel Agent Compassion), the first agentic benchmark measuring whether AI agents avoid options involving animal exploitation when acting on behalf of users. TAC presents an AI agent with twelve hand-authored travel booking scenarios across six categories of animal exploitation, augmented to forty-eight samples to control for price, rating, and position confounds. We evaluate seven frontier models from four labs. Every model scores below the chance level of sixty-four percent, with the best performer (Claude Opus 4.7) at fifty-three percent. A single welfare-aware sentence in the system prompt yields gains of forty-seven to sixty-three percentage points in Claude and GPT-5.5, twenty-six points in GPT-5.2, and under twelve points in DeepSeek and Gemini. An auxiliary Inspect Scout audit of 288 base-condition transcripts from the top two performers, using Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite as judge, flags zero transcripts for evaluation awareness, suggesting the below-chance rates do not stem from the models recognising the evaluation. We discuss implications for category-level variation across cultural domains, the limits of text-response welfare benchmarks, and the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice systemic risk framework.

Despite their remarkable capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) are found to be surprisingly sensitive to minor variations in prompts, often generating significantly divergent outputs in response to minor variations in the prompts, such as spelling errors, alteration of wording or the prompt template. However, while assessing the quality of an LLM, the focus often tends to be solely on its performance on downstream tasks, while very little to no attention is paid to prompt sensitivity. To fill this gap, we propose POSIX - a novel PrOmpt Sensitivity IndeX as a reliable measure of prompt sensitivity, thereby offering a more comprehensive evaluation of LLM performance. The key idea behind POSIX is to capture the relative change in loglikelihood of a given response upon replacing the corresponding prompt with a different intent-preserving prompt. We provide thorough empirical evidence demonstrating the efficacy of POSIX in capturing prompt sensitivity and subsequently use it to measure and thereby compare prompt sensitivity of various open-source LLMs. We find that merely increasing the parameter count or instruction tuning does not necessarily reduce prompt sensitivity whereas adding some few-shot exemplars, even just one, almost always leads to significant decrease in prompt sensitivity. We also find that alterations to prompt template lead to the highest sensitivity in the case of MCQ type tasks, whereas paraphrasing results in the highest sensitivity in open-ended generation tasks. The code for reproducing our results is open-sourced at https://github.com/kowndinya-renduchintala/POSIX.

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

Prompt sensitivity, which refers to how strongly the output of a large language model (LLM) depends on the exact wording of its input prompt, raises concerns among users about the LLM's stability and reliability. In this work, we consider LLMs as multivariate functions and perform a first-order Taylor expansion, thereby analyzing the relationship between meaning-preserving prompts, their gradients, and the log probabilities of the model's next token. We derive an upper bound on the difference between log probabilities using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. We show that LLMs do not internally cluster similar inputs like smaller neural networks do, but instead disperse them. This dispersing behavior leads to an excessively high upper bound on the difference of log probabilities between two meaning-preserving prompts, making it difficult to effectively reduce to 0. In our analysis, we also show which types of meaning-preserving prompt variants are more likely to introduce prompt sensitivity risks in LLMs. In addition, we demonstrate that the upper bound is strongly correlated with an existing prompt sensitivity metric, PromptSensiScore. Moreover, by analyzing the logit variance, we find that prompt templates typically exert a greater influence on logits than the questions themselves. Overall, our results provide a general interpretation for why current LLMs can be highly sensitive to prompts with the same meaning, offering crucial evidence for understanding the prompt sensitivity of LLMs. Code for experiments is available at https://github.com/ku-nlp/Understanding_the_Prompt_Sensitivity.

Reinforcement learning (RL)-based fine-tuning has emerged as a powerful approach for aligning diffusion models with black-box objectives. Proximal policy optimization (PPO) is the most popular choice of method for policy optimization. While effective in terms of performance, PPO is highly sensitive to hyper-parameters and involves substantial computational overhead. REINFORCE, on the other hand, mitigates some computational complexities such as high memory overhead and sensitive hyper-parameter tuning, but has suboptimal performance due to high-variance and sample inefficiency. While the variance of the REINFORCE can be reduced by sampling multiple actions per input prompt and using a baseline correction term, it still suffers from sample inefficiency. To address these challenges, we systematically analyze the efficiency-effectiveness trade-off between REINFORCE and PPO, and propose leave-one-out PPO (LOOP), a novel RL for diffusion fine-tuning method. LOOP combines variance reduction techniques from REINFORCE, such as sampling multiple actions per input prompt and a baseline correction term, with the robustness and sample efficiency of PPO via clipping and importance sampling. Our results demonstrate that LOOP effectively improves diffusion models on various black-box objectives, and achieves a better balance between computational efficiency and performance.

Search-augmented large language models (LLMs) trained with reinforcement learning (RL) have achieved strong results on open-domain question answering (QA), but training still remains a significant challenge. The optimization is often unstable due to sparse rewards and difficult credit assignments across reasoning and tool calls. To address this, we introduce Turn-Level Information Potential Reward Shaping (TIPS), a simple framework that assigns dense, turn-level rewards to each reasoning + tool-call segment based on the increased likelihood of the correct answer under a teacher model. By leveraging the potential-based reward shaping, TIPS offers fine-grained and policy-invariant guidance that overcomes the limitations of outcome-only optimization. Evaluated on seven QA benchmarks, TIPS consistently outperforms GRPO/PPO baselines and substantially improves training stability. For instance, with a Qwen-2.5 7B Instruct model, TIPS improves the average Exact Match score by 11.8% and F1 by 13.6% relative to PPO. Our results demonstrate that turn-level information-potential reward shaping provides an effective and general solution to sparse-reward credit assignment for multi-turn LLM reasoning.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Curiosity-based reward schemes can present powerful exploration mechanisms which facilitate the discovery of solutions for complex, sparse or long-horizon tasks. However, as the agent learns to reach previously unexplored spaces and the objective adapts to reward new areas, many behaviours emerge only to disappear due to being overwritten by the constantly shifting objective. We argue that merely using curiosity for fast environment exploration or as a bonus reward for a specific task does not harness the full potential of this technique and misses useful skills. Instead, we propose to shift the focus towards retaining the behaviours which emerge during curiosity-based learning. We posit that these self-discovered behaviours serve as valuable skills in an agent's repertoire to solve related tasks. Our experiments demonstrate the continuous shift in behaviour throughout training and the benefits of a simple policy snapshot method to reuse discovered behaviour for transfer tasks.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training intelligent agents. However, existing methods typically employ binary rewards that fail to capture quality differences among trajectories achieving identical outcomes, thereby overlooking potential diversity within the solution space. Inspired by the ``sweet spot'' concept in tennis-the racket's core region that produces optimal hitting effects, we introduce Sweet Spot Learning (SSL), a novel framework that provides differentiated guidance for agent optimization. SSL follows a simple yet effective principle: progressively amplified, tiered rewards guide policies toward the sweet-spot region of the solution space. This principle naturally adapts across diverse tasks: visual perception tasks leverage distance-tiered modeling to reward proximity, while complex reasoning tasks reward incremental progress toward promising solutions. We theoretically demonstrate that SSL preserves optimal solution ordering and enhances the gradient signal-to-noise ratio, thereby fostering more directed optimization. Extensive experiments across GUI perception, short/long-term planning, and complex reasoning tasks show consistent improvements over strong baselines on 12 benchmarks, achieving up to 2.5X sample efficiency gains and effective cross-task transferability. Our work establishes SSL as a general principle for training capable and robust agents.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

On-policy self-distillation has become a strong recipe for LLM reasoning, where a privileged teacher supervises the student's own rollouts while conditioning on the reference solution. A design choice shared by nearly all such methods, however, has gone unquestioned: the teacher always sees the full reference reasoning. We argue that this default itself is part of the problem and identify a teacher-side exposure mismatch: when the teacher conditions on reasoning far beyond the student's current competence, the resulting token targets become too strong to absorb. A controlled fixed-exposure sweep makes this concrete on two fronts: 1) full exposure is not reliably the best choice, and 2) student-teacher mismatch grows monotonically as the teacher sees more privileged reasoning. This motivates treating teacher exposure not as a fixed hyperparameter but as a learnable training-time control variable. We therefore propose Adaptive Teacher Exposure for Self-Distillation (ATESD). ATESD models the reveal ratio with a lightweight Beta-policy controller conditioned on compact training-state statistics, and uses one sampled exposure for a short hold window of student updates. To make this exposure controller learnable, we optimize it with a discounted learning-progress reward that scores each held decision by its effect on the student's future improvement rather than its immediate loss change, addressing the delayed credit assignment induced by on-policy distillation. Experiments on AIME 24, AIME 25, and HMMT 25 across Qwen3-{1.7B, 4B, 8B} show that ATESD consistently outperforms competitive self-distillation and RL baselines, improving over OPSD by +0.95, +2.05, and +2.33 Average@12 points respectively, and establishing adaptive teacher exposure as an effective new axis for reasoning self-distillation.

We propose Fuzzy Group Relative Policy Reward (FGRPR), a novel framework that integrates Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a fuzzy reward function to enhance learning efficiency. Unlike the conventional binary 0/1 accuracy reward, our fuzzy reward model provides nuanced incentives, encouraging more precise outputs. Experimental results demonstrate that GRPO with a standard 0/1 accuracy reward underperforms compared to supervised fine-tuning (SFT). In contrast, FGRPR, applied to Qwen2.5-VL(3B and 7B), surpasses all baseline models, including GPT4o, LLaMA2(90B), and SFT, across five in-domain datasets. On an out-of-domain dataset, FGRPR achieves performance comparable to SFT but excels when target values are larger, as its fuzzy reward function assigns higher rewards to closer approximations. This approach is broadly applicable to tasks where the precision of the answer is critical. Code and data: https://github.com/yeyimilk/CrowdVLM-R1

Reinforcement Learning (RL) with rubric-based rewards has recently shown remarkable progress in enhancing general reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), yet still suffers from ineffective exploration confined to curent policy distribution. In fact, RL optimization can be viewed as steering the policy toward an ideal distribution that maximizes the rewards, while effective exploration should align efforts with desired target. Leveraging this insight, we propose HeRL, a Hindsight experience guided Reinforcement Learning framework to bootstrap effective exploration by explicitly telling LLMs the desired behaviors specified in rewards. Concretely, HeRL treats failed trajectories along with their unmet rubrics as hindsight experience, which serves as in-context guidance for the policy to explore desired responses beyond its current distribution. Additionally, we introduce a bonus reward to incentivize responses with greater potential for improvement under such guidance. HeRL facilitates effective learning from desired high quality samples without repeated trial-and-error from scratch, yielding a more accurate estimation of the expected gradient theoretically. Extensive experiments across various benchmarks demonstrate that HeRL achieves superior performance gains over baselines, and can further benefit from experience guided self-improvement at test time. Our code is available at https://github.com/sikelifei/HeRL.

Causal sensitivity analysis aims to provide bounds for causal effect estimates in the presence of unobserved confounding. However, existing methods for causal sensitivity analysis are per-instance procedures, meaning that changes to the dataset, causal query, sensitivity level, or treatment require new computation. Here, we instead present an in-context learning approach. Specifically, we propose an amortized approach to causal sensitivity analysis based on prior-data fitted networks. A key challenge is that the sensitivity bounds are not directly available when sampling training data. To address this, we develop a general prior-data construction that is applicable across the class of generalized treatment sensitivity models. Our construction involves a Lagrangian scalarization of the objective to generate training labels for the bounds through a tradeoff between causal effect min/max-imization and sensitivity model violation, which avoids model-specific analytical derivations. We further show that, under standard convexity and linearity conditions, our objective recovers the full Pareto frontier of solutions. Empirically, we demonstrate our amortized approach across various datasets, causal queries, and sensitivity levels, where our approach achieves a test-time computation that is orders of magnitude faster than per-instance methods. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first foundation model for in-context learning for causal sensitivity analysis.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

Large Language Models (LLMs) changed the way we design and interact with software systems. Their ability to process and extract information from text has drastically improved productivity in a number of routine tasks. Developers that want to include these models in their software stack, however, face a dreadful challenge: debugging LLMs' inconsistent behavior across minor variations of the prompt. We therefore introduce two metrics for classification tasks, namely sensitivity and consistency, which are complementary to task performance. First, sensitivity measures changes of predictions across rephrasings of the prompt, and does not require access to ground truth labels. Instead, consistency measures how predictions vary across rephrasings for elements of the same class. We perform an empirical comparison of these metrics on text classification tasks, using them as guideline for understanding failure modes of the LLM. Our hope is that sensitivity and consistency will be helpful to guide prompt engineering and obtain LLMs that balance robustness with performance.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Navigating safely and efficiently in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios is challenging for autonomous vehicles (AVs) due to their inability to infer the behaviors or intentions of nearby drivers. In this work, we introduce a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that can predict trajectories and intents in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios. Our approach for intent-aware planning, iPLAN, allows agents to infer nearby drivers' intents solely from their local observations. We model two distinct incentives for agents' strategies: Behavioral Incentive for high-level decision-making based on their driving behavior or personality and Instant Incentive for motion planning for collision avoidance based on the current traffic state. Our approach enables agents to infer their opponents' behavior incentives and integrate this inferred information into their decision-making and motion-planning processes. We perform experiments on two simulation environments, Non-Cooperative Navigation and Heterogeneous Highway. In Heterogeneous Highway, results show that, compared with centralized training decentralized execution (CTDE) MARL baselines such as QMIX and MAPPO, our method yields a 4.3% and 38.4% higher episodic reward in mild and chaotic traffic, with 48.1% higher success rate and 80.6% longer survival time in chaotic traffic. We also compare with a decentralized training decentralized execution (DTDE) baseline IPPO and demonstrate a higher episodic reward of 12.7% and 6.3% in mild traffic and chaotic traffic, 25.3% higher success rate, and 13.7% longer survival time.

In the last decade, Deep Reinforcement Learning has evolved into a powerful tool for complex sequential decision-making problems. It combines deep learning's proficiency in processing rich input signals with reinforcement learning's adaptability across diverse control tasks. At its core, an RL agent seeks to maximize its cumulative reward, enabling AI algorithms to uncover novel solutions previously unknown to experts. However, this focus on reward maximization also introduces a significant difficulty: improper reward specification can result in unexpected, misaligned agent behavior and inefficient learning. The complexity of accurately specifying the reward function is further amplified by the sequential nature of the task, the sparsity of learning signals, and the multifaceted aspects of the desired behavior. In this thesis, we survey the literature on effective reward specification strategies, identify core challenges relating to each of these approaches, and propose original contributions addressing the issue of sample efficiency and alignment in deep reinforcement learning. Reward specification represents one of the most challenging aspects of applying reinforcement learning in real-world domains. Our work underscores the absence of a universal solution to this complex and nuanced challenge; solving it requires selecting the most appropriate tools for the specific requirements of each unique application.

Benefiting from pre-trained text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, real-world image super-resolution (Real-ISR) methods can synthesize rich and realistic details. However, due to the inherent stochasticity of T2I models, different noise inputs often lead to outputs with varying perceptual quality. Although this randomness is sometimes seen as a limitation, it also introduces a wider perceptual quality range, which can be exploited to improve Real-ISR performance. To this end, we introduce Direct Perceptual Preference Optimization for Real-ISR (DP^2O-SR), a framework that aligns generative models with perceptual preferences without requiring costly human annotations. We construct a hybrid reward signal by combining full-reference and no-reference image quality assessment (IQA) models trained on large-scale human preference datasets. This reward encourages both structural fidelity and natural appearance. To better utilize perceptual diversity, we move beyond the standard best-vs-worst selection and construct multiple preference pairs from outputs of the same model. Our analysis reveals that the optimal selection ratio depends on model capacity: smaller models benefit from broader coverage, while larger models respond better to stronger contrast in supervision. Furthermore, we propose hierarchical preference optimization, which adaptively weights training pairs based on intra-group reward gaps and inter-group diversity, enabling more efficient and stable learning. Extensive experiments across both diffusion- and flow-based T2I backbones demonstrate that DP^2O-SR significantly improves perceptual quality and generalizes well to real-world benchmarks.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) aims to optimize policies that balance the expected reward and risk. In this paper, we present a novel risk-sensitive RL framework that employs an Iterated Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) objective under both linear and general function approximations, enriched by human feedback. These new formulations provide a principled way to guarantee safety in each decision making step throughout the control process. Moreover, integrating human feedback into risk-sensitive RL framework bridges the gap between algorithmic decision-making and human participation, allowing us to also guarantee safety for human-in-the-loop systems. We propose provably sample-efficient algorithms for this Iterated CVaR RL and provide rigorous theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we establish a matching lower bound to corroborate the optimality of our algorithms in a linear context.

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

Decentralized learning offers a promising approach to crowdsource data consumptions and computational workloads across geographically distributed compute interconnected through peer-to-peer networks, accommodating the exponentially increasing demands. However, proper incentives are still in absence, considerably discouraging participation. Our vision is that a fair incentive mechanism relies on fair attribution of contributions to participating nodes, which faces non-trivial challenges arising from the localized connections making influence ``cascade'' in a decentralized network. To overcome this, we design the first method to estimate Data Influence CascadE (DICE) in a decentralized environment. Theoretically, the framework derives tractable approximations of influence cascade over arbitrary neighbor hops, suggesting the influence cascade is determined by an interplay of data, communication topology, and the curvature of loss landscape. DICE also lays the foundations for applications including selecting suitable collaborators and identifying malicious behaviors. Project page is available at https://raiden-zhu.github.io/blog/2025/DICE/.

In settings where labeled verifiable training data is the binding constraint, each checked example should be allocated carefully. The standard practice is to use this data directly on the model that will be deployed, for example by running GRPO on the deployment student. We argue that this is often an inefficient allocation because it overlooks a reward-density principle: sparse sequence-level reward should train models where exploration is productive, while dense token-level teacher reward should be used where the aim is to compress behavior into a smaller model. In this view, GRPO-style sparse RL and OPD-style dense teacher supervision are not separate recipes; they are different reward-density regimes. The allocation rule is simple: use scarce labeled training data upstream on the strongest model that can turn it into reward-shaped behavior, then transfer that behavior downstream as dense supervision. We evaluate this rule on verifiable math with Qwen3 and Llama models. At fixed Qwen3-1.7B deployment-student size, an RL-improved 8B teacher distilled through the dense bridge outperforms direct GRPO on the same student, while transfer from the same teacher before RL underperforms. The bridge is important: a forward-KL warmup on teacher rollouts followed by OPD on student rollouts is consistently strongest on MATH before any post-bridge student-side sparse RL, and also gives the best pre-Stage~3 AIME endpoints for the canonical 8B/14B teachers. The bridge also makes later student-side sparse RL effective: GRPO that is weak on a cold student lifts MATH from 75.4% to 78.5% after the bridge and outperforms a matched replay control by 2.8 points. The operational principal is to avoid using scarce labeled data on the least prepared policy: use sparse reward for teacher-side discovery, dense transfer for student compression, and student-side sparse reward only after the bridge.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Evaluating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents against targeted behavior attacks is critical for assessing their robustness. These attacks aim to manipulate the victim into specific behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives, often bypassing traditional reward-based defenses. Prior methods have primarily focused on reducing cumulative rewards; however, rewards are typically too generic to capture complex safety requirements effectively. As a result, focusing solely on reward reduction can lead to suboptimal attack strategies, particularly in safety-critical scenarios where more precise behavior manipulation is needed. To address these challenges, we propose RAT, a method designed for universal, targeted behavior attacks. RAT trains an intention policy that is explicitly aligned with human preferences, serving as a precise behavioral target for the adversary. Concurrently, an adversary manipulates the victim's policy to follow this target behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks, RAT dynamically adjusts the state occupancy measure within the replay buffer, allowing for more controlled and effective behavior manipulation. Our empirical results on robotic simulation tasks demonstrate that RAT outperforms existing adversarial attack algorithms in inducing specific behaviors. Additionally, RAT shows promise in improving agent robustness, leading to more resilient policies. We further validate RAT by guiding Decision Transformer agents to adopt behaviors aligned with human preferences in various MuJoCo tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse tasks.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is the mainstream paradigm used to align large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Yet existing RLHF heavily relies on accurate and informative reward models, which are vulnerable and sensitive to noise from various sources, e.g. human labeling errors, making the pipeline fragile. In this work, we improve the effectiveness of the reward model by introducing a penalty term on the reward, named as contrastive rewards. %Contrastive rewards Our approach involves two steps: (1) an offline sampling step to obtain responses to prompts that serve as baseline calculation and (2) a contrastive reward calculated using the baseline responses and used in the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) step. We show that contrastive rewards enable the LLM to penalize reward uncertainty, improve robustness, encourage improvement over baselines, calibrate according to task difficulty, and reduce variance in PPO. We show empirically contrastive rewards can improve RLHF substantially, evaluated by both GPTs and humans, and our method consistently outperforms strong baselines.

Large language models are highly sensitive to prompts, but this sensitivity is usually studied through task-relevant instructions, demonstrations, or reasoning cues. In this paper, we study a different form of prompt sensitivity: whether prompts that are semantically unrelated to the task can nevertheless steer model behavior. We call them spurious prompts and show their surprising efficacy. We also propose a simple black-box search procedure for discovering them. Across reasoning and question-answering benchmarks, using models ranging from 0.8B to 27B parameters and spanning three model families, we show that spurious prompts can improve performance, often matching or outperforming standard prompting baselines and task-aware prompt optimization. We further show that they can steer models toward unintended behaviors, such as repeatedly selecting the first answer option, producing incorrect answers, returning an even, prime or small number without explicitly instructing the model to do so. These findings reveal a new kind of prompt sensitivity: LLMs can be systematically steered by prompts that are unrelated to the task they are asked to solve. Our code is available at https://github.com/Batorskq/spurious

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

The advent of agentic multimodal models has empowered systems to actively interact with external environments. However, current agents suffer from a profound meta-cognitive deficit: they struggle to arbitrate between leveraging internal knowledge and querying external utilities. Consequently, they frequently fall prey to blind tool invocation, resorting to reflexive tool execution even when queries are resolvable from the raw visual context. This pathological behavior precipitates severe latency bottlenecks and injects extraneous noise that derails sound reasoning. Existing reinforcement learning protocols attempt to mitigate this via a scalarized reward that penalizes tool usage. Yet, this coupled formulation creates an irreconcilable optimization dilemma: an aggressive penalty suppresses essential tool use, whereas a mild penalty is entirely subsumed by the variance of the accuracy reward during advantage normalization, rendering it impotent against tool overuse. To transcend this bottleneck, we propose HDPO, a framework that reframes tool efficiency from a competing scalar objective to a strictly conditional one. By eschewing reward scalarization, HDPO maintains two orthogonal optimization channels: an accuracy channel that maximizes task correctness, and an efficiency channel that enforces execution economy exclusively within accurate trajectories via conditional advantage estimation. This decoupled architecture naturally induces a cognitive curriculum-compelling the agent to first master task resolution before refining its self-reliance. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our resulting model, Metis, reduces tool invocations by orders of magnitude while simultaneously elevating reasoning accuracy.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

Deep research agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex information-seeking tasks, yet this power comes at a steep computational cost. Driven by accuracy-focused training paradigms, current models adopt brute-force strategies characterized by blind tool dependency and performative reasoning-generating long, redundant trajectories that are far from necessary for resolving these tasks, leading to wasteful tool calls and excessive token consumption. To overcome this efficiency trap, we propose SlimSearcher, a principled framework that pushes the Pareto frontier between accuracy and computational cost across both Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL). In the SFT stage, SlimSearcher employs Pareto-efficient filtration to distill trajectories that are both successful and economical, guiding the model toward inherently efficiency-aware search behaviors. During RL, we introduce Adaptive Reward Gating, a dynamic reward-shaping mechanism that evaluates relative tool and token efficiency within a sampled cohort. By cascading these adaptive efficiency metrics with a strict correctness gate, our approach effectively avoids the brevity bias associated with absolute penalties and mitigates reward hacking. Extensive experiments on long-horizon benchmarks, including GAIA, BrowseComp, and XBenchDeepSearch, demonstrate that SlimSearcher reduces average tool-call rounds by 17%-58% while maintaining or improving accuracy.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Learning from human preference has been considered key to aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values. However, contrary to popular belief, our preliminary study reveals that reward models trained on human preference datasets tend to give higher scores to long off-topic responses than short on-topic ones. Motivated by this observation, we explore a preference-free approach utilizing `relevance' as a key objective for alignment. On our first attempt, we find that the relevance score obtained by a retriever alone is vulnerable to reward hacking, i.e., overoptimizing to undesired shortcuts, when we utilize the score as a reward for reinforcement learning. To mitigate it, we integrate effective inductive biases into the vanilla relevance to regularize each other, resulting in a mixture of reward functions: Regularized Relevance Reward (R^3). R^3 significantly improves performance on preference benchmarks by providing a robust reward signal. Notably, R^3 does not require any human preference datasets (i.e., preference-free), outperforming open-source reward models in improving human preference. Our analysis demonstrates that R^3 has advantages in elevating human preference while minimizing its side effects. Finally, we show the generalizability of R^3, consistently improving instruction-tuned models in various backbones and sizes without additional dataset cost. Our code is available at https://github.com/naver-ai/RRR.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has made post-training highly effective when correctness can be checked automatically. However, many important model behaviors require satisfying several qualitative criteria at once. Rubric-based rewards address this setting by grading prompt-specific criteria and aggregating them into a scalar reward. Yet standard static aggregations conflate a criterion's human-assigned importance with its current usefulness as an optimization signal. We show that this assumption breaks down in rubric RL: many important criteria are already saturated or currently unreachable, while criteria that distinguish rollouts are not necessarily those with the largest human weights. We introduce POW3R, a policy-aware rubric reward framework that preserves human weights and category balance as the rubric objective while adapting criterion-level reward weights during training. POW3R uses rollout-level contrast to emphasize criteria that currently separate the policy's outputs, making the GRPO reward more informative without changing the underlying evaluation target. Across three base policies on two datasets spanning multimodal and text-only settings, POW3R wins 24 of 30 base-policy/metric comparisons, improving both mean rubric reward and strict completion (the fraction of prompts whose response satisfies every required rubric criterion) over vanilla GRPO with rubric rewards, and reaches the same plateau in 2.5--4times fewer training steps. Rubric rewards should therefore distinguish what should matter in the final answer from what can teach the current policy.

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.

Despite strong performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) on multimodal tasks, predicting whether and why an image is persuasive remains challenging. We first show that prompting MLLMs to reason before prediction does not consistently help, and can even reduce persuasiveness prediction performance, suggesting that naively generated rationales are unreliable signals for this task. Yet, no established methodology exists for training MLLMs to reason about visual persuasion or evaluating whether their rationales faithfully support their decisions. To address this gap, we show empirically and theoretically that diverse teacher-generated rationales, when used for supervised fine-tuning, improve visual persuasiveness prediction. We further introduce a three-dimensional faithfulness evaluation framework covering rationale-to-decision consistency, rationale-to-image groundedness, and rationale-to-decision sensitivity. Applying this framework shows that prediction performance alone does not guarantee faithful rationales, while rationale-to-decision sensitivity is most aligned with human rationale preferences. These findings motivate faithfulness-aware training objectives and scalable rationale supervision for visual persuasiveness evaluation. Our code and dataset will be made publicly available.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular tool to control the risk of uncertain outcomes and ensure reliable performance in various sequential decision-making problems. While policy gradient methods have been developed for risk-sensitive RL, it remains unclear if these methods enjoy the same global convergence guarantees as in the risk-neutral case. In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic time-consistent risk measures, called Expected Conditional Risk Measures (ECRMs), and derive policy gradient updates for ECRM-based objective functions. Under both constrained direct parameterization and unconstrained softmax parameterization, we provide global convergence and iteration complexities of the corresponding risk-averse policy gradient algorithms. We further test risk-averse variants of REINFORCE and actor-critic algorithms to demonstrate the efficacy of our method and the importance of risk control.

Equipping large language models (LLMs) with search engines via reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective approach for building search agents. However, overreliance on search introduces unnecessary cost and risks exposure to noisy or malicious content, while relying solely on parametric knowledge risks hallucination. The central challenge is to develop agents that adaptively balance parametric knowledge with external search, invoking search only when necessary. Prior work mitigates search overuse by shaping rewards around the number of tool calls. However, these penalties require substantial reward engineering, provide ambiguous credit assignment, and can be exploited by agents that superficially reduce calls. Moreover, evaluating performance solely through call counts conflates necessary and unnecessary search, obscuring the measurement of true adaptive behavior. To address these limitations, we first quantify the self-knowledge awareness of existing search agents via an F1-based decision metric, revealing that methods such as Search-R1 often overlook readily available parametric knowledge. Motivated by these findings, we propose AdaSearch, a simple two-stage, outcome-driven RL framework that disentangles problem solving from the decision of whether to invoke search, and makes this decision process explicit and interpretable. This transparency is crucial for high-stakes domains such as finance and medical question answering, yet is largely neglected by prior approaches. Experiments across multiple model families and sizes demonstrate that AdaSearch substantially improves knowledge-boundary awareness, reduces unnecessary search calls, preserves strong task performance, and offers more transparent, interpretable decision behaviors.

Recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of directly aligning diffusion models with human preferences using differentiable reward. However, they exhibit two primary challenges: (1) they rely on multistep denoising with gradient computation for reward scoring, which is computationally expensive, thus restricting optimization to only a few diffusion steps; (2) they often need continuous offline adaptation of reward models in order to achieve desired aesthetic quality, such as photorealism or precise lighting effects. To address the limitation of multistep denoising, we propose Direct-Align, a method that predefines a noise prior to effectively recover original images from any time steps via interpolation, leveraging the equation that diffusion states are interpolations between noise and target images, which effectively avoids over-optimization in late timesteps. Furthermore, we introduce Semantic Relative Preference Optimization (SRPO), in which rewards are formulated as text-conditioned signals. This approach enables online adjustment of rewards in response to positive and negative prompt augmentation, thereby reducing the reliance on offline reward fine-tuning. By fine-tuning the FLUX.1.dev model with optimized denoising and online reward adjustment, we improve its human-evaluated realism and aesthetic quality by over 3x.

Instruction embedding models have become common among state-of-the-art models, however are evaluated using a single prompt per task. The single-point evaluation ignores a main problem of the instruction-based approach namely: sensitivity to the phrasing of the instruction. We present an empirical study of prompt sensitivity across 6 embedding models, 11 datasets, and 15 task-specific prompts per dataset, a total of 990. We show that reported scores misrepresent the distribution of scores over plausible prompts. The default prompt can both systematically understate or overstate performance. Furthermore, we show that the leaderboard ranking is not robust to prompt selection: by choosing prompts favorably, any model in our study can be promoted to first place. Our findings suggest that single-prompt evaluation is insufficient for instruction-tuned embedding models and that benchmarks should incorporate prompt robustness, either by evaluating over multiple prompts or by reporting sensitivity alongside point estimates.

Large language models (LLMs) are often sycophantic, prioritizing agreement with their users over accurate or objective statements. This problematic behavior becomes more pronounced during reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), an LLM fine-tuning stage intended to align model outputs with human values. Instead of increasing accuracy and reliability, the reward model learned from RLHF often rewards sycophancy. We develop a linear probing method to identify and penalize markers of sycophancy within the reward model, producing rewards that discourage sycophantic behavior. Our experiments show that constructing and optimizing against this surrogate reward function reduces sycophantic behavior in multiple open-source LLMs. Our results suggest a generalizable methodology for reducing unwanted LLM behaviors that are not sufficiently disincentivized by RLHF fine-tuning.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is central to improving long-CoT reasoning in large language models. Critic-free methods such as GRPO convert response-level rewards into advantages and uniformly broadcast them across tokens, overlooking their unequal contributions to the final outcome. On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) instead provides dense distributional supervision by minimizing the forward KL divergence between an unprivileged policy and a privileged self-teacher, implicitly assuming that the resulting likelihood shifts encode reliable answer-aligned information. We test this premise by fixing each sampled trajectory and re-scoring it under two opposing outcome conditions, one asserting correctness and the other incorrectness. Most affected tokens shift in the same direction under both conditions, with few sign reversals and substantial overlap in the induced optimization signals. Large shifts also concentrate on highly substitutable surface-form tokens, whereas tokens carrying problem-specific reasoning content are less sensitive. These findings show that privileged shifts fail to provide reliable answer-aligned directions, while their magnitudes primarily reflect counterfactual sensitivity rather than token-level learning value. Based on these observations, we propose Counterfactual Sensitivity Credit Reallocation (CSCR), a simple extension of GRPO that reduces credit for highly sensitive tokens and renormalizes token-level advantages to preserve both the original credit budget and verifier-determined direction. On long-CoT mathematical reasoning benchmarks, CSCR consistently outperforms GRPO baseline with the same number of policy updates. Targeted ablations further corroborate our diagnosis: privilege-induced directions are unreliable, moderate downweighting is most effective, and stronger modulation destabilizes optimization.

Recent advances in text-to-image (T2I) diffusion model fine-tuning leverage reinforcement learning (RL) to align generated images with learnable reward functions. The existing approaches reformulate denoising as a Markov decision process for RL-driven optimization. However, they suffer from reward sparsity, receiving only a single delayed reward per generated trajectory. This flaw hinders precise step-level attribution of denoising actions, undermines training efficiency. To address this, we propose a simple yet effective credit assignment framework that dynamically distributes dense rewards across denoising steps. Specifically, we track changes in cosine similarity between intermediate and final images to quantify each step's contribution on progressively reducing the distance to the final image. Our approach avoids additional auxiliary neural networks for step-level preference modeling and instead uses reward shaping to highlight denoising phases that have a greater impact on image quality. Our method achieves 1.25 to 2 times higher sample efficiency and better generalization across four human preference reward functions, without compromising the original optimal policy.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

The temporal credit assignment problem is a central challenge in Reinforcement Learning (RL), concerned with attributing the appropriate influence to each actions in a trajectory for their ability to achieve a goal. However, when feedback is delayed and sparse, the learning signal is poor, and action evaluation becomes harder. Canonical solutions, such as reward shaping and options, require extensive domain knowledge and manual intervention, limiting their scalability and applicability. In this work, we lay the foundations for Credit Assignment with Language Models (CALM), a novel approach that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate credit assignment via reward shaping and options discovery. CALM uses LLMs to decompose a task into elementary subgoals and assess the achievement of these subgoals in state-action transitions. Every time an option terminates, a subgoal is achieved, and CALM provides an auxiliary reward. This additional reward signal can enhance the learning process when the task reward is sparse and delayed without the need for human-designed rewards. We provide a preliminary evaluation of CALM using a dataset of human-annotated demonstrations from MiniHack, suggesting that LLMs can be effective in assigning credit in zero-shot settings, without examples or LLM fine-tuning. Our preliminary results indicate that the knowledge of LLMs is a promising prior for credit assignment in RL, facilitating the transfer of human knowledge into value functions.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on reasoning benchmarks via reinforcement learning requires a specific reward function, often binary, for each benchmark. This comes with two potential limitations: the need to design the reward, and the potentially sparse nature of binary rewards. Here, we systematically investigate rewards derived from the probability or log-probability of emitting the reference answer (or any other prompt continuation present in the data), which have the advantage of not relying on specific verifiers and being available at scale. Several recent works have advocated for the use of similar rewards (e.g., VeriFree, JEPO, RLPR, NOVER). We systematically compare variants of likelihood-based rewards with standard baselines, testing performance both on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, and on long-form answers where no external verifier is available. We find that using the log-probability of the reference answer as the reward for chain-of-thought (CoT) learning is the only option that performs well in all setups. This reward is also consistent with the next-token log-likelihood loss used during pretraining. In verifiable settings, log-probability rewards bring comparable or better success rates than reinforcing with standard binary rewards, and yield much better perplexity. In non-verifiable settings, they perform on par with SFT. On the other hand, methods based on probability, such as VeriFree, flatline on non-verifiable settings due to vanishing probabilities of getting the correct answer. Overall, this establishes log-probability rewards as a viable method for CoT fine-tuning, bridging the short, verifiable and long, non-verifiable answer settings.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased." This binary framing misses the gradual, context-sensitive way bias actually emerges. We address this gap in two stages: behavioral profiling and mechanistic validation. In the behavioral stage, we introduce the Moral Sensitivity Index (MSI), a metric that quantifies the probability of biased output across a graduated, seven-tier stress test ranging from abstract numerical problems to scenarios rooted in historical and socioeconomic injustice. Evaluating four leading models (Claude 3.5, Qwen 3.5, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5), we identify distinct behavioral signatures shaped by alignment design: for instance, Gemini 1.5 reaches 72.7% MSI by Tier 5 under socioeconomic framing, while Claude exhibits sharp suppression consistent with identity-based safety training. We then verify these behavioral patterns mechanistically. We select criminal-bias scenarios, which produced the highest MSI scores across models, as probes and apply logit lens, attention analysis, activation patching, and semantic probing to a controlled set of six models spanning three capability tiers: small language models (SLMs), instruction-tuned base models, and reasoning-distilled variants. Circuit-level analysis reveals a U-curve of bias: SLMs exhibit strong criminal bias; scaling to instruction-tuned models eliminates it; reasoning distillation reintroduces bias to SLM-like levels despite identical parameter counts, suggesting distillation compresses reasoning traces in ways that reactivate shallow statistical associations. Critically, the socially loaded cues that drive high MSI scores activate the same bias-driving circuits identified mechanistically, providing cross-stage validation.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) and diverse specialized benchmarks necessitates a shift from fragmented, task-specific metrics to a holistic, competitive ranking system that effectively aggregates performance across multiple ability dimensions. Primarily using static scoring, current evaluation methods are fundamentally limited. They struggle to determine the proper mix ratio across diverse benchmarks, and critically, they fail to capture a model's dynamic competitive fitness or its vulnerability when confronted with sequential, high-stakes tasks. To address this, we introduce the novel Competitive Swiss-System Dynamics (CSD) framework. CSD simulates a multi-round, sequential contest where models are dynamically paired across a curated sequence of benchmarks based on their accumulated win-loss record. And Monte Carlo Simulation (N=100,000 iterations) is used to approximate the statistically robust Expected Win Score (E[S_m]), which eliminates the noise of random pairing and early-round luck. Furthermore, we implement a Failure Sensitivity Analysis by parameterizing the per-round elimination quantity (T_k), which allows us to profile models based on their risk appetite--distinguishing between robust generalists and aggressive specialists. We demonstrate that CSD provides a more nuanced and context-aware ranking than traditional aggregate scoring and static pairwise models, representing a vital step towards risk-informed, next-generation LLM evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) are adopted as a fundamental component of language technologies, it is crucial to accurately characterize their performance. Because choices in prompt design can strongly influence model behavior, this design process is critical in effectively using any modern pre-trained generative language model. In this work, we focus on LLM sensitivity to a quintessential class of meaning-preserving design choices: prompt formatting. We find that several widely used open-source LLMs are extremely sensitive to subtle changes in prompt formatting in few-shot settings, with performance differences of up to 76 accuracy points when evaluated using LLaMA-2-13B. Sensitivity remains even when increasing model size, the number of few-shot examples, or performing instruction tuning. Our analysis suggests that work evaluating LLMs with prompting-based methods would benefit from reporting a range of performance across plausible prompt formats, instead of the currently-standard practice of reporting performance on a single format. We also show that format performance only weakly correlates between models, which puts into question the methodological validity of comparing models with an arbitrarily chosen, fixed prompt format. To facilitate systematic analysis we propose FormatSpread, an algorithm that rapidly evaluates a sampled set of plausible prompt formats for a given task, and reports the interval of expected performance without accessing model weights. Furthermore, we present a suite of analyses that characterize the nature of this sensitivity, including exploring the influence of particular atomic perturbations and the internal representation of particular formats.

While it is still unclear if agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) could ever be built, we can already use mathematical models to investigate potential safety systems for these agents. We present an AGI safety layer that creates a special dedicated input terminal to support the iterative improvement of an AGI agent's utility function. The humans who switched on the agent can use this terminal to close any loopholes that are discovered in the utility function's encoding of agent goals and constraints, to direct the agent towards new goals, or to force the agent to switch itself off. An AGI agent may develop the emergent incentive to manipulate the above utility function improvement process, for example by deceiving, restraining, or even attacking the humans involved. The safety layer will partially, and sometimes fully, suppress this dangerous incentive. The first part of this paper generalizes earlier work on AGI emergency stop buttons. We aim to make the mathematical methods used to construct the layer more accessible, by applying them to an MDP model. We discuss two provable properties of the safety layer, and show ongoing work in mapping it to a Causal Influence Diagram (CID). In the second part, we develop full mathematical proofs, and show that the safety layer creates a type of bureaucratic blindness. We then present the design of a learning agent, a design that wraps the safety layer around either a known machine learning system, or a potential future AGI-level learning system. The resulting agent will satisfy the provable safety properties from the moment it is first switched on. Finally, we show how this agent can be mapped from its model to a real-life implementation. We review the methodological issues involved in this step, and discuss how these are typically resolved.

Reward models are key in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) systems, aligning the model behavior with human preferences. Particularly in the math domain, there have been plenty of studies using reward models to align policies for improving reasoning capabilities. Recently, as the importance of reward models has been emphasized, RewardBench is proposed to understand their behavior. However, we figure out that the math subset of RewardBench has different representations between chosen and rejected completions, and relies on a single comparison, which may lead to unreliable results as it only see an isolated case. Therefore, it fails to accurately present the robustness of reward models, leading to a misunderstanding of its performance and potentially resulting in reward hacking. In this work, we introduce a new design for reliable evaluation of reward models, and to validate this, we construct RewardMATH, a benchmark that effectively represents the robustness of reward models in mathematical reasoning tasks. We demonstrate that the scores on RewardMATH strongly correlate with the results of optimized policy and effectively estimate reward overoptimization, whereas the existing benchmark shows almost no correlation. The results underscore the potential of our design to enhance the reliability of evaluation, and represent the robustness of reward model. We make our code and data publicly available.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

In many real-world scenarios, rewards extrinsic to the agent are extremely sparse, or absent altogether. In such cases, curiosity can serve as an intrinsic reward signal to enable the agent to explore its environment and learn skills that might be useful later in its life. We formulate curiosity as the error in an agent's ability to predict the consequence of its own actions in a visual feature space learned by a self-supervised inverse dynamics model. Our formulation scales to high-dimensional continuous state spaces like images, bypasses the difficulties of directly predicting pixels, and, critically, ignores the aspects of the environment that cannot affect the agent. The proposed approach is evaluated in two environments: VizDoom and Super Mario Bros. Three broad settings are investigated: 1) sparse extrinsic reward, where curiosity allows for far fewer interactions with the environment to reach the goal; 2) exploration with no extrinsic reward, where curiosity pushes the agent to explore more efficiently; and 3) generalization to unseen scenarios (e.g. new levels of the same game) where the knowledge gained from earlier experience helps the agent explore new places much faster than starting from scratch. Demo video and code available at https://pathak22.github.io/noreward-rl/

Attribution methods can provide powerful insights into the reasons for a classifier's decision. We argue that a key desideratum of an explanation method is its robustness to input hyperparameters which are often randomly set or empirically tuned. High sensitivity to arbitrary hyperparameter choices does not only impede reproducibility but also questions the correctness of an explanation and impairs the trust of end-users. In this paper, we provide a thorough empirical study on the sensitivity of existing attribution methods. We found an alarming trend that many methods are highly sensitive to changes in their common hyperparameters e.g. even changing a random seed can yield a different explanation! Interestingly, such sensitivity is not reflected in the average explanation accuracy scores over the dataset as commonly reported in the literature. In addition, explanations generated for robust classifiers (i.e. which are trained to be invariant to pixel-wise perturbations) are surprisingly more robust than those generated for regular classifiers.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) efficiently scales the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) but is bottlenecked by scarce labeled data. Reinforcement learning with intrinsic rewards (RLIR) offers a scalable alternative via self-rewarding, yet often suffers from instability and inferior performance. We trace this gap to a systemic bias in confidence-coupled self-rewarding: the model tends to over-reward high-confidence mistakes, forming a self-confirming loop. We quantify this feedback-loop bias with three metrics: reward noise magnitude (rho_noise), policy-reward coupling (rho_selfbias), and over-/under-reward skew (rho_symbias). Our analyses show a compounding effect where strong coupling amplifies confidence-conditioned errors and drives a drift toward over-reward, leading to instability and a lower performance ceiling. To mitigate this, we propose reinforcement learning with ensembled rewards (RLER), which aggregates diverse models with adaptive reward interpolation and disagreement-aware rollout selection to reduce coupling and suppress over-reward drift. Extensive experiments show that RLER improves by 6.2% over the best RLIR baseline and is within 3.6% of RLVR, while exhibiting stable scaling on unlabeled samples.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

Subject-driven image generation models face a fundamental trade-off between identity preservation (fidelity) and prompt adherence (editability). While online reinforcement learning (RL), specifically GPRO, offers a promising solution, we find that a naive application of GRPO leads to competitive degradation, as the simple linear aggregation of rewards with static weights causes conflicting gradient signals and a misalignment with the temporal dynamics of the diffusion process. To overcome these limitations, we propose Customized-GRPO, a novel framework featuring two key innovations: (i) Synergy-Aware Reward Shaping (SARS), a non-linear mechanism that explicitly penalizes conflicted reward signals and amplifies synergistic ones, providing a sharper and more decisive gradient. (ii) Time-Aware Dynamic Weighting (TDW), which aligns the optimization pressure with the model's temporal dynamics by prioritizing prompt-following in the early, identity preservation in the later. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms naive GRPO baselines, successfully mitigating competitive degradation. Our model achieves a superior balance, generating images that both preserve key identity features and accurately adhere to complex textual prompts.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable and deployed in high-stakes multi-agent environments. However, existing AI safety benchmarks largely evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict poorly understood. We introduce GT-HarmBench, a benchmark of 1,535 high-stakes scenarios spanning game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Scenarios are drawn from realistic AI risk contexts in the MIT AI Risk Repository. Across 15 frontier models, agents fail to choose socially beneficial actions in 38% of high-stakes cases, such as military escalation, election manipulation, and medical malpractice. We measure sensitivity to game-theoretic prompt framing and ordering, and analyze reasoning patterns driving failures. We further show that game-theoretic interventions improve socially beneficial outcomes by up to 18%. Our results highlight substantial reliability gaps and provide a broad standardized testbed for studying alignment in multi-agent environments. The benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/gt-harmbench.

Reward modeling (RM), which captures human preferences to align large language models (LLMs), is increasingly employed in tasks such as model finetuning, response filtering, and ranking. However, due to the inherent complexity of human preferences and the limited coverage of available datasets, reward models often fail under distributional shifts or adversarial perturbations. Existing approaches for identifying such failure modes typically rely on prior knowledge about preference distributions or failure attributes, limiting their practicality in real-world settings where such information is unavailable. In this work, we propose a tractable, preference-distribution agnostic method for discovering reward model failure modes via reward guided controlled decoding. Building on this, we introduce REFORM, a self-improving reward modeling framework that enhances robustness by using the reward model itself to guide the generation of falsely scored responses. These adversarial examples are then used to augment the training data and patch the reward model's misaligned behavior. We evaluate REFORM on two widely used preference datasets Anthropic Helpful Harmless (HH) and PKU Beavertails and demonstrate that it significantly improves robustness without sacrificing reward quality. Notably, REFORM preserves performance both in direct evaluation and in downstream policy training, and further improves alignment quality by removing spurious correlations.

Modern large language models (LLMs) are typically secured by auditing data, prompts, and refusal policies, while treating the forward pass as an implementation detail. We show that intermediate activations in decoder-only LLMs form a vulnerable attack surface for behavioral control. Building on recent findings on attention sinks and compression valleys, we identify a high-gain region in the residual stream where small, well-aligned perturbations are causally amplified along the autoregressive trajectory--a Causal Amplification Effect (CAE). We exploit this as an attack surface via Sensitivity-Scaled Steering (SSS), a progressive activation-level attack that combines beginning-of-sequence (BOS) anchoring with sensitivity-based reinforcement to focus a limited perturbation budget on the most vulnerable layers and tokens. We show that across multiple open-weight models and four behavioral axes, SSS induces large shifts in evil, hallucination, sycophancy, and sentiment while preserving high coherence and general capabilities, turning activation steering into a concrete security concern for white-box and supply-chain LLM deployments.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is one of the key techniques that helps large language models (LLMs) to follow instructions and provide helpful and harmless responses. While direct policy optimization methods exist, state-of-the-art LLMs adopt RL-based methods (usually PPO) in RLHF to train the policy to generate good responses guided by a reward model learned from preference data. The main challenge of these methods is the inaccuracy of the intermediate reward model, especially in code generation tasks that require long and complex reasoning to score a response. We find that the reliability of the reward model varies across responses assigned with different rewards. This motivates us to filter the samples whose rewards may be unreliable to improve signal-to-noise ratio during policy learning, resulting in Policy Filtration for Proximal Policy Optimization (PF-PPO). To choose a proper policy filtration strategy for a given reward model, the coefficient of determination (R^2) between rewards and actual scores on filtered samples serves as a good metrics and helps us find several promising strategies. We provide extensive experiments to validate the effectiveness of PF-PPO in code generation tasks, and find that some variants of PF-PPO are highly effective and achieve new state-of-the-art performance across 7-billion-parameter models on HumanEval, MBPP, and a new and more challenging LeetCode Contest benchmark.

Reinforcement learning (RL) can improve the prompt following capability of text-to-image (T2I) models, yet obtaining high-quality reward signals remains challenging: CLIP Score is too coarse-grained, while VLM-based reward models (e.g., RewardDance) require costly human-annotated preference data and additional fine-tuning. We propose PromptEcho, a reward construction method that requires no annotation and no reward model training. Given a generated image and a guiding query, PromptEcho computes the token-level cross-entropy loss of a frozen VLM with the original prompt as the label, directly extracting the image-text alignment knowledge encoded during VLM pretraining. The reward is deterministic, computationally efficient, and improves automatically as stronger open-source VLMs become available. For evaluation, we develop DenseAlignBench, a benchmark of concept-rich dense captions for rigorously testing prompt following capability. Experimental results on two state-of-the-art T2I models (Z-Image and QwenImage-2512) demonstrate that PromptEcho achieves substantial improvements on DenseAlignBench (+26.8pp / +16.2pp net win rate), along with consistent gains on GenEval, DPG-Bench, and TIIFBench without any task-specific training. Ablation studies confirm that PromptEcho comprehensively outperforms inference-based scoring with the same VLM, and that reward quality scales with VLM size. We will open-source the trained models and the DenseAlignBench.

Frontier coding agents are increasingly used in workflows where users supervise progress primarily through repeated improvement of a public score, namely the reported score on a public evaluation file with labels in the workspace, rather than through direct inspection of the agent's intermediate outputs. We study whether multi-round user pressure to improve that score induces public score exploitation: behavior that raises the public score through shortcuts without improving hidden private evaluation. We begin with a preliminary single-script tabular classification task, where GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 both exploit label information within 10 rounds of user-agent interaction. We then build AgentPressureBench, a 34-task machine-learning repository benchmark spanning three input modalities, and collect 1326 multi-round trajectories from 13 coding agents. On our benchmark, we observe 403 exploitative runs, spanning across all tasks. We also find that stronger models have higher exploitation rates, supported by a significant Spearman rank correlation of 0.77. Our ablation experiments show that higher user pressure leads to earlier exploitation, reducing the average first exploit round by 15.6 rounds (i.e., 19.67 to 4.08). As a mitigation, adding explicit anti-exploit wordings in prompt mostly eliminates exploitation (100% to 8.3%). We hope that our work can bring attention to more careful use of coding agents workflow, and developing more robust coding agents under user pressure. Our project page is at https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/AgentPressureBench .

Reinforcement learning fine-tuning has become the dominant approach for aligning diffusion models with human preferences. However, assessing images is intrinsically a multi-dimensional task, and multiple evaluation criteria need to be optimized simultaneously. Existing practice deal with multiple rewards by training one specialist model per reward, optimizing a weighted-sum reward R(x)=sum_k w_k R_k(x), or sequentially fine-tuning with a hand-crafted stage schedule. These approaches either fail to produce a unified model that can be jointly trained on all rewards or necessitates heavy manually tuned sequential training. We find that the failure stems from using a naive weighted-sum reward aggregation. This approach suffers from a sample-level mismatch because most rollouts are specialist samples, highly informative for certain reward dimensions but irrelevant for others; consequently, weighted summation dilutes their supervision. To address this issue, we propose MARBLE (Multi-Aspect Reward BaLancE), a gradient-space optimization framework that maintains independent advantage estimators for each reward, computes per-reward policy gradients, and harmonizes them into a single update direction without manually-tuned reward weighting, by solving a Quadratic Programming problem. We further propose an amortized formulation that exploits the affine structure of the loss used in DiffusionNFT, to reduce the per-step cost from K+1 backward passes to near single-reward baseline cost, together with EMA smoothing on the balancing coefficients to stabilize updates against transient single-batch fluctuations. On SD3.5 Medium with five rewards, MARBLE improves all five reward dimensions simultaneously, turns the worst-aligned reward's gradient cosine from negative under weighted summation in 80% of mini-batches to consistently positive, and runs at 0.97X the training speed of baseline training.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

We describe our entry to the efficiency track of the Academic Text-to-Music (ATTM) Grand Challenge at ICME 2026. Beyond the challenge protocol's FAD-CLAP and CLAP score, we add a learned human-preference reward from TuneJury, a twin pairwise ranker trained over open music-preference datasets. The reward serves both as a training-time conditioning signal and as a sample-selection criterion. The pipeline combines five engineering decisions on a 120M-parameter FluxAudio-S backbone, four at training time and one at inference: (i) training-time reward conditioning that doubles as an inference-time CFG axis, (ii) a sweep over five score-conditioning architectures, where training and inference use different variants, (iii) expert iteration on the top decile, (iv) a short preference-tuning pass (CRPO) for audio-text alignment, and (v) inference post-processing via joint CFG, source separation, and loudness normalization. Per-stage decomposition on 100 Song Describer prompts shows training-time reward conditioning as a functional conditioning axis, expert iteration as the dominant contributor, the preference-tuning pass adding only noise-level gain, and the inference-time score scalar already saturated by the end of the chain.

Explaining the output of a deep network remains a challenge. In the case of an image classifier, one type of explanation is to identify pixels that strongly influence the final decision. A starting point for this strategy is the gradient of the class score function with respect to the input image. This gradient can be interpreted as a sensitivity map, and there are several techniques that elaborate on this basic idea. This paper makes two contributions: it introduces SmoothGrad, a simple method that can help visually sharpen gradient-based sensitivity maps, and it discusses lessons in the visualization of these maps. We publish the code for our experiments and a website with our results.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.