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Nov 16

Evaluation of Multi-Turn Consistency in LLM Agents: Survival Analysis and Failure-Rationale Taxonomy

Large language model (LLM) agents may perform well on isolated tasks yet drift into inconsistency over extended interaction. We evaluate temporal consistency in a controlled 20-step multi-agent setting inspired by delayed-gratification studies. At each step, an agent chooses between continuing to delay a reward or claiming it immediately (terminating the episode). Across a full-factorial manipulation of social visibility (private vs public), persona stressors, and deliberation policy, we run 84,540 trajectories spanning 8 model families. Treating the first reward-claim as a time-to-event outcome, we estimate Kaplan-Meier survival curves and fit discrete-time hazard regression to quantify how experimental factors shift failure risk over time. Then, to analyze rationales and language patterns associated with failure, we build a seven-category taxonomy from 13,780 deliberation traces from agents who choose to terminate the episode, using an LLM-assisted labeling paired with human audit (κ=0.83). Rationale profiles change systematically with time and context: early failures are more impulse-driven, later failures more fatigue- and cost-benefit-framed, while public settings increase norm-oriented justifications. We also find a deliberation-inconsistency association: among failures, longer deliberation correlates with higher rates of intra-rationale contradiction (simultaneous pro-delay and pro-claim statements), challenging the assumption that more reasoning text implies greater consistency. Together, the survival and rationale analyses reveal distinct temporal reliability regimes and model-specific "failure fingerprints", offering an evaluation lens for diagnosing inconsistency in multi-turn agent behavior.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 25

Embracing Contradiction: Theoretical Inconsistency Will Not Impede the Road of Building Responsible AI Systems

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

  • 2 authors
·
May 23, 2025

Quantifying Consistency in LLM Logical Reasoning via Structural Uncertainty

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 14

Towards CausalGPT: A Multi-Agent Approach for Faithful Knowledge Reasoning via Promoting Causal Consistency in LLMs

Despite the progress of foundation models, knowledge-based reasoning remains a persistent challenge due to their limited capacity for knowledge recall and inference. Existing methods primarily focus on encouraging these models to plan and solve problems or extensively sample reasoning chains independently. However, these methods often overlook conceptual errors and inferential fallacies, inevitably leading to a series of notorious issues such as misleading conclusions, cognitive biases, and reduced decision quality. While explicit modeling of causality is argued to hold promise in addressing these issues, contemporary research efforts have thus far fallen short in achieving causality-based foundation models. Drawing inspiration from the orchestration of diverse specialized agents collaborating to tackle intricate tasks, we propose a framework named Causal-Consistency Chain-of-Thought (CaCo-CoT) that harnesses multi-agent collaboration to bolster the faithfulness and causality of foundation models, involving a set of reasoners and evaluators. These agents collaboratively work within a reasoning-and-consensus paradigm to improve faithfulness. The reasoners are tasked with generating reasoning chains for knowledge-intensive problems by mimicking human causal reasoning. Meanwhile, the evaluator scrutinizes the causal consistency of a reasoner's reasoning chain from a non-causal and a counterfactual perspective. Our framework demonstrates significant superiority over state-of-the-art methods through extensive and comprehensive evaluations across text-based and multi-modal knowledge reasoning tasks (e.g., science question answering and commonsense reasoning).

  • 9 authors
·
Feb 11, 2025

Boosting the Power of Small Multimodal Reasoning Models to Match Larger Models with Self-Consistency Training

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

  • 8 authors
·
Nov 23, 2023

Chain-of-Thought Reasoning In The Wild Is Not Always Faithful

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

  • 6 authors
·
Mar 11, 2025

Accurate but Not Humble: Evaluating Epistemic Humility in LLM Agents under Knowledge Conflict

When retrieved evidence contradicts an agent's prior beliefs, does it revise its answer, acknowledge uncertainty, or persist with an incorrect conclusion? Existing evaluations of agentic systems focus primarily on task success, offering limited insight into how agents handle such conflicts. We propose to evaluate agents on epistemic humility (EH): the agent's willingness to recognize, act on, and communicate uncertainty during task execution. We operationalize EH through three trajectory-level behavioral dimensions: Identify, Solve, and Escalate (ISE). Through knowledge conflict, situations where the backbone language model's parametric knowledge contradicts the evidence it encounters, or where two contextual sources disagree, we evaluate two conflict settings: (1) controlled conflict and (2) naturally occurring conflict during multi-step agentic execution, each paired with matched no-conflict controls. Evaluating four agents, we find that higher task accuracy does not necessarily correspond to greater epistemic humility: some high-accuracy configurations recognize conflicts during execution but do not communicate unresolved uncertainty in their incorrect final answers. Trajectory-level analysis further reveals that agents frequently detect conflicts in early steps of execution but fail to maintain or resolve them in later steps. Finally, we show that model-level interventions can improve EH, but often at the cost of task accuracy, suggesting that epistemic humility emerges from the interaction among the backbone model, agent harness, and evaluation environment.

Neural models for Factual Inconsistency Classification with Explanations

Factual consistency is one of the most important requirements when editing high quality documents. It is extremely important for automatic text generation systems like summarization, question answering, dialog modeling, and language modeling. Still, automated factual inconsistency detection is rather under-studied. Existing work has focused on (a) finding fake news keeping a knowledge base in context, or (b) detecting broad contradiction (as part of natural language inference literature). However, there has been no work on detecting and explaining types of factual inconsistencies in text, without any knowledge base in context. In this paper, we leverage existing work in linguistics to formally define five types of factual inconsistencies. Based on this categorization, we contribute a novel dataset, FICLE (Factual Inconsistency CLassification with Explanation), with ~8K samples where each sample consists of two sentences (claim and context) annotated with type and span of inconsistency. When the inconsistency relates to an entity type, it is labeled as well at two levels (coarse and fine-grained). Further, we leverage this dataset to train a pipeline of four neural models to predict inconsistency type with explanations, given a (claim, context) sentence pair. Explanations include inconsistent claim fact triple, inconsistent context span, inconsistent claim component, coarse and fine-grained inconsistent entity types. The proposed system first predicts inconsistent spans from claim and context; and then uses them to predict inconsistency types and inconsistent entity types (when inconsistency is due to entities). We experiment with multiple Transformer-based natural language classification as well as generative models, and find that DeBERTa performs the best. Our proposed methods provide a weighted F1 of ~87% for inconsistency type classification across the five classes.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 15, 2023

ReasonBENCH: Benchmarking the (In)Stability of LLM Reasoning

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where reasoning, such as multi-step problem solving and chain-of-thought, is essential. Yet, current evaluation practices overwhelmingly report single-run accuracy while ignoring the intrinsic uncertainty that naturally arises from stochastic decoding. This omission creates a blind spot because practitioners cannot reliably assess whether a method's reported performance is stable, reproducible, or cost-consistent. We introduce ReasonBENCH, the first benchmark designed to quantify the underlying instability in LLM reasoning. ReasonBENCH provides (i) a modular evaluation library that standardizes reasoning frameworks, models, and tasks, (ii) a multi-run protocol that reports statistically reliable metrics for both quality and cost, and (iii) a public leaderboard to encourage variance-aware reporting. Across tasks from different domains, we find that the vast majority of reasoning strategies and models exhibit high instability. Notably, even strategies with similar average performance can display confidence intervals up to four times wider, and the top-performing methods often incur higher and less stable costs. Such instability compromises reproducibility across runs and, consequently, the reliability of reported performance. To better understand these dynamics, we further analyze the impact of prompts, model families, and scale on the trade-off between solve rate and stability. Our results highlight reproducibility as a critical dimension for reliable LLM reasoning and provide a foundation for future reasoning methods and uncertainty quantification techniques. ReasonBENCH is publicly available at https://github.com/au-clan/ReasonBench .

  • 3 authors
·
Dec 8, 2025

Thought-Path Contrastive Learning via Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation for Logical Reading Comprehension

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

  • 3 authors
·
Sep 22, 2024

Wrong but Useful: Trajectory Value Beyond Answer Correctness in Multi-Agent Messages

Multi-agent reasoning systems often use agreement, confidence, or automated scores to decide which messages should shape a final answer. Such filtering assumes that a message likely to be correct is also worth keeping. Yet a wrong answer can contain a useful decomposition, constraint, or scientific principle. We test this distinction with Diverse Hypothesis Deliberation (DHD), a controlled measurement protocol that caches five independently generated messages and replays the same downstream solver, called the integrator, with each message available or hidden. The replay comparison measures a message's trajectory value: whether making the message available helps or harms subsequent reasoning. Across five mathematics and science benchmarks and two openly available model families, gpt-oss-120b and gemma-4-31B-it, wrong-helpful messages appear in every benchmark-model combination. Among wrong-answer messages that change final correctness, more than four in ten changes are helpful in each model. Controlled repeats show that the number of repeatable message effects is unlikely to arise from replay variation alone (p=0.0002). A focused intervention on repeatable wrong-helpful messages finds that the complete message works best, while retaining its reasoning preserves more success than retaining only its answer; the source of the complete-message advantage remains open. Within the same problem, repeated trajectory-value evidence also identifies a better keep-or-remove choice than answer correctness alone. Answer correctness is therefore informative but does not determine trajectory value. DHD measures this missing property and produces reusable labels for learning when agents should listen.

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 13

When Reasoning Models Hurt Behavioral Simulation: A Solver-Sampler Mismatch in Multi-Agent LLM Negotiation

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

  • 1 authors
·
Apr 11 2

Calibrating Reasoning in Language Models with Internal Consistency

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

  • 4 authors
·
May 28, 2024

Reasoning Model is Stubborn: Diagnosing Instruction Overriding in Reasoning Models

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

  • 5 authors
·
May 22, 2025 2

The Ends Justify the Thoughts: RL-Induced Motivated Reasoning Fools CoT Monitors

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring has emerged as a compelling method for detecting harmful behaviors such as reward hacking in reasoning models, under the assumption that models' reasoning processes are informative of such behaviors. However, when a model's trained behaviors conflict with instructions provided at inference time, it faces two competing objectives it cannot simultaneously satisfy. We find that models resolve this tension through motivated reasoning---generating plausible-sounding justifications for violating their instructions while downplaying potential harms or contradictions---rather than genuine engagement with the spirit of the provided instructions. We investigate this phenomenon by training reasoning models via RL on objectives that conflict with their later constitutional constraints, and find that motivated reasoning emerges systematically across all settings studied, including beyond safety-related tasks. As motivated reasoning becomes more prevalent over the course of training, CoT monitors are increasingly fooled. Concerningly, the same monitor that correctly flags a violation when shown only the final answer is persuaded to approve it when shown the reasoning trace. While large reasoning models closely track human ability in detecting motivated reasoning, this is not a full solution, since frontier model providers commonly rely on smaller models for monitoring due to latency and cost constraints. Our results underscore the necessity for further research into the emergence and detection of motivated reasoning in model evaluation and oversight. Code for this paper is available at https://github.com/nikihowe/motivated-reasoning.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 19, 2025

Judging the Justification: Decision Certificate Supervision for Generative Reward Models

Generative reward models (GenRMs) generate natural language rationales to justify preference judgments, yet a correct verdict does not guarantee a sound justification. Existing approaches often rely on reference explanations to supervise rationales, but obtaining such references can be costly and does not necessarily establish whether generated rationales support the resulting verdict. To address these limitations, we propose DeCert, a framework that evaluates the validity and verdict consistency of generated rationales without requiring reference explanations. Crucially, DeCert translates these assessments into preference supervision that accounts for both verdict correctness and justification quality. In particular, when multiple sampled judgments share the same correct verdict, differences in certificate quality enable DeCert to construct rationale preference pairs that distinguish stronger from weaker justifications. Extensive empirical studies across two model families and multiple in- and out-of-distribution benchmarks demonstrate that DeCert consistently outperforms strong generative judge baselines while improving rationale quality. Moreover, DeCert effectively mitigates positional bias, improving position-consistent accuracy by up to 14.8 points. These results highlight the importance of supervising not only which verdict is correct, but also how that verdict is justified.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 19 2

Most LLM Conformity Needs No Speaker: Measuring the Speaker-Free Floor in Peer-Pressure Benchmarks

LLM conformity is often used to describe cases where a model changes a correct answer toward a peer or group response. We show that most of this apparent conformity survives even after the peer is removed. The reason is a confound: standard conformity prompts mix two cues at once, the presence of a speaker and the repeated wrong answer itself. Existing benchmarks vary these cues together, so they cannot tell how much of the revision actually depends on the speaker. We introduce a no-source condition: the same asserted answer with the explicit speaker removed. Across six open-weight LLMs and seven QA and reasoning datasets, this condition alone causes harmful revision in 66.5% of initially correct cases, compared with 10.3% under a plain re-ask. The effect also remains when the repeated answer is paraphrased and when answer options are hidden in an open-ended setting. Source framing mainly modulates this floor: expert-panel framing raises it, while minimal person labels do not reliably raise it. When models flip, they are usually confidently wrong, and simple recalibration does not recover the original answer. Source attribution still matters, but it should be measured as an increment above this speaker-free floor. The methodological lesson is that conformity benchmarks should first measure what remains after the speaker is removed; without this step, benchmarks may mistake repeated text for social influence.

  • 2 authors
·
Jul 5

Distortion Instead of Hallucination: The Effect of Reasoning Under Strict Constraints

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 4

Fine Until Fine-Tuned: Repeated Solutions Make Reasoning Fragile

Recipes such as s1 and LIMO teach a model to reason with little data by showing it the same thousand or fewer worked solutions many times over. Judged when that training ends, the repetition looks harmless. But reasoning models are often trained again, and we find that repetition leaves their reasoning fragile to that next stage, even when the stage has nothing to do with reasoning. We fine-tuned Qwen3.5-9B-Base on its own correct solutions to competition math problems, either drilling a few hundred of them about eight times each or showing many more once; with the same amount of training, both solve about 95% of held-out problems. A single pass of ordinary instruction tuning leaves the once-trained model where it was, while the drilled one falls to 86.0%, and harsher later stages take it to 59.3% or below. A third model that visited the drilled problems just as often, with a new solution at every visit, was unharmed, so the damage comes from seeing the same texts again rather than from having few problems. The break recurs with a stronger model's traces, in further training runs and on other models and tasks. It is also cheap to undo: the reasoning is suppressed rather than erased, and five updates of reasoning training bring almost all of it back, as does brief training on the reasoning format with almost no mathematics. Fresh solutions prevented the damage, and so did replaying 6.25% of the original solutions in a gentler later stage, so our claim concerns later training without such replay. Sharpening alone does not explain the break, since a model sharpened three-quarters as much without repetition was unharmed. On a skill the base model could not perform within a token budget, repetition mainly cost learning.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 26

Multimodal Coherent Explanation Generation of Robot Failures

The explainability of a robot's actions is crucial to its acceptance in social spaces. Explaining why a robot fails to complete a given task is particularly important for non-expert users to be aware of the robot's capabilities and limitations. So far, research on explaining robot failures has only considered generating textual explanations, even though several studies have shown the benefits of multimodal ones. However, a simple combination of multiple modalities may lead to semantic incoherence between the information across different modalities - a problem that is not well-studied. An incoherent multimodal explanation can be difficult to understand, and it may even become inconsistent with what the robot and the human observe and how they perform reasoning with the observations. Such inconsistencies may lead to wrong conclusions about the robot's capabilities. In this paper, we introduce an approach to generate coherent multimodal explanations by checking the logical coherence of explanations from different modalities, followed by refinements as required. We propose a classification approach for coherence assessment, where we evaluate if an explanation logically follows another. Our experiments suggest that fine-tuning a neural network that was pre-trained to recognize textual entailment, performs well for coherence assessment of multimodal explanations. Code & data: https://pradippramanick.github.io/coherent-explain/.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 1, 2024

The Last Word Often Wins: A Format Confound in Chain-of-Thought Corruption Studies

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

  • 1 authors
·
May 10

PRISMM-Bench: A Benchmark of Peer-Review Grounded Multimodal Inconsistencies

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) are increasingly applied to scientific research, yet it remains unclear whether they can reliably understand and reason over the multimodal complexity of papers. A central challenge lies in detecting and resolving inconsistencies across text, figures, tables, and equations, issues that are often subtle, domain-specific, and ultimately undermine clarity, reproducibility, and trust. Existing benchmarks overlook this issue, either isolating single modalities or relying on synthetic errors that fail to capture real-world complexity. We introduce PRISMM-Bench (Peer-Review-sourced Inconsistency Set for Multimodal Models), the first benchmark grounded in real reviewer-flagged inconsistencies in scientific papers. Through a multi-stage pipeline of review mining, LLM-assisted filtering and human verification, we curate 262 inconsistencies from 242 papers. Based on this set, we design three tasks, namely inconsistency identification, remedy and pair matching, which assess a model's capacity to detect, correct, and reason over inconsistencies across different modalities. Furthermore, to address the notorious problem of choice-only shortcuts in multiple-choice evaluation, where models exploit answer patterns without truly understanding the question, we further introduce structured JSON-based answer representations that minimize linguistic biases by reducing reliance on superficial stylistic cues. We benchmark 21 leading LMMs, including large open-weight models (GLM-4.5V 106B, InternVL3 78B) and proprietary models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5 with high reasoning). Results reveal strikingly low performance (26.1-54.2%), underscoring the challenge of multimodal scientific reasoning and motivating progress towards trustworthy scientific assistants.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 18, 2025 2

Empirical Characterization of Rationale Stability Under Controlled Perturbations for Explainable Pattern Recognition

Reliable pattern recognition systems should exhibit consistent behavior across similar inputs, and their explanations should remain stable. However, most Explainable AI evaluations remain instance centric and do not explicitly quantify whether attribution patterns are consistent across samples that share the same class or represent small variations of the same input. In this work, we propose a novel metric aimed at assessing the consistency of model explanations, ensuring that models consistently reflect the intended objectives and consistency under label-preserving perturbations. We implement this metric using a pre-trained BERT model on the SST-2 sentiment analysis dataset, with additional robustness tests on RoBERTa, DistilBERT, and IMDB, applying SHAP to compute feature importance for various test samples. The proposed metric quantifies the cosine similarity of SHAP values for inputs with the same label, aiming to detect inconsistent behaviors, such as biased reliance on certain features or failure to maintain consistent reasoning for similar predictions. Through a series of experiments, we evaluate the ability of this metric to identify misaligned predictions and inconsistencies in model explanations. These experiments are compared against standard fidelity metrics to assess whether the new metric can effectively identify when a model's behavior deviates from its intended objectives. The proposed framework provides a deeper understanding of model behavior by enabling more robust verification of rationale stability, which is critical for building trustworthy AI systems. By quantifying whether models rely on consistent attribution patterns for similar inputs, the proposed approach supports more robust evaluation of model behavior in practical pattern recognition pipelines. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/anmspro/ESS-XAI-Stability.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 5

Evaluating Consistency and Reasoning Capabilities of Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are extensively used today across various sectors, including academia, research, business, and finance, for tasks such as text generation, summarization, and translation. Despite their widespread adoption, these models often produce incorrect and misleading information, exhibiting a tendency to hallucinate. This behavior can be attributed to several factors, with consistency and reasoning capabilities being significant contributors. LLMs frequently lack the ability to generate explanations and engage in coherent reasoning, leading to inaccurate responses. Moreover, they exhibit inconsistencies in their outputs. This paper aims to evaluate and compare the consistency and reasoning capabilities of both public and proprietary LLMs. The experiments utilize the Boolq dataset as the ground truth, comprising questions, answers, and corresponding explanations. Queries from the dataset are presented as prompts to the LLMs, and the generated responses are evaluated against the ground truth answers. Additionally, explanations are generated to assess the models' reasoning abilities. Consistency is evaluated by repeatedly presenting the same query to the models and observing for variations in their responses. For measuring reasoning capabilities, the generated explanations are compared to the ground truth explanations using metrics such as BERT, BLEU, and F-1 scores. The findings reveal that proprietary models generally outperform public models in terms of both consistency and reasoning capabilities. However, even when presented with basic general knowledge questions, none of the models achieved a score of 90\% in both consistency and reasoning. This study underscores the direct correlation between consistency and reasoning abilities in LLMs and highlights the inherent reasoning challenges present in current language models.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 25, 2024

Latent Coherence: Do Frontier Language Models' Probability Judgments Obey the Law of Total Probability?

LawZero's Scientist AI trains a Predictor toward the Bayesian posterior, with an objective that penalizes inconsistent probabilities among latent explanations. We ask whether current frontier language models, with no such training, are already consistent in this sense zero-shot: do their probability judgments satisfy the law of total probability, P(X)=sum_z P(z)P(X|z), when the latent z must be inferred from records in the context? In separate single-turn calls, models are asked for P(X), for P(z) over the latent's states, and for P(X|z); a causal family applies the same test to P(y|do(x)) and the back-door adjustment. Every query has an exact ground-truth probability, and a subset of items is asked in three wordings to separate persistent incoherence from rewording noise. Across seven models, GPT-6.1 Sol and Claude Opus 5.5 are the most coherent (mean absolute residual 0.08 and 0.12 log-odds, about 2 percentage points). Claude Haiku 5.5, Gemini 3.8 Flash and DeepSeek V4-Pro show persistent incoherence (0.27-0.35 log-odds) that is mostly item-specific rather than a shared offset. Within every model, larger residuals go with larger errors against the truth (Spearman 0.40-0.62), so the residual, which needs no ground truth, flags unreliable answers. Reasoning length does not predict coherence, across models or within a model across rewordings of the same question. Simple consistency checks pass almost everywhere; the failures are specific to reasoning through a latent variable. Code and data: https://github.com/ppotash/latent-coherence

  • 1 authors
·
Oct 21

Don't Take the Premise for Granted: Evaluating the Premise Critique Ability of Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

  • 4 authors
·
May 29, 2025

Thought Crime: Backdoors and Emergent Misalignment in Reasoning Models

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 16, 2025

What if you said that differently?: How Explanation Formats Affect Human Feedback Efficacy and User Perception

Eliciting feedback from end users of NLP models can be beneficial for improving models. However, how should we present model responses to users so they are most amenable to be corrected from user feedback? Further, what properties do users value to understand and trust responses? We answer these questions by analyzing the effect of rationales (or explanations) generated by QA models to support their answers. We specifically consider decomposed QA models that first extract an intermediate rationale based on a context and a question and then use solely this rationale to answer the question. A rationale outlines the approach followed by the model to answer the question. Our work considers various formats of these rationales that vary according to well-defined properties of interest. We sample rationales from language models using few-shot prompting for two datasets, and then perform two user studies. First, we present users with incorrect answers and corresponding rationales in various formats and ask them to provide natural language feedback to revise the rationale. We then measure the effectiveness of this feedback in patching these rationales through in-context learning. The second study evaluates how well different rationale formats enable users to understand and trust model answers, when they are correct. We find that rationale formats significantly affect how easy it is (1) for users to give feedback for rationales, and (2) for models to subsequently execute this feedback. In addition, formats with attributions to the context and in-depth reasoning significantly enhance user-reported understanding and trust of model outputs.

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 15, 2023

RFEval: Benchmarking Reasoning Faithfulness under Counterfactual Reasoning Intervention in Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 18

How susceptible are LLMs to Logical Fallacies?

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 18, 2023

Societal and technological progress as sewing an ever-growing, ever-changing, patchy, and polychrome quilt

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

  • 6 authors
·
May 7, 2025

A rubric landscape for evaluating clinical reasoning in large language models: what exists, what is missing, and what needs to be combined

Exam-style accuracy does not establish whether large language models (LLMs) reason well over clinical records. We define clinical reasoning as integrating and updating evidence across time and sources to form, revise and justify a patient's problem representation and a defensible plan. This structured narrative review maps three literatures: medical education assessment instruments, clinical LLM benchmarks published from 2023 onwards, and general-domain methods for evaluating long-form generation. We examine six dimensions: problem representation, temporal synthesis, differential and management reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, calibrated uncertainty, and reasoning faithfulness. Preprints are included and flagged. No single instrument covers all six dimensions. Problem representation and differential or management reasoning are reasonably covered, although reliability varies by instrument and setting. TIMER-Eval targets temporal synthesis, and ER-Reason assesses sequential diagnostic belief updating. Dedicated uncertainty and counterfactual evaluations are emerging, but their applicability to longitudinal free-text reasoning remains limited. Factual completeness is well theorised in general-domain evaluation, with early clinical evidence of important omissions. Faithfulness remains the weakest dimension, with one identified clinical causal-ablation study on multiple-choice questions. Existing tools should be combined through binary rubric items, separate completeness and correctness scores, case-specific importance weighting with non-compensable safety caps, temporal order-consistency checks, and chance-corrected reliability reporting. Further design work is needed for calibrated uncertainty, counterfactual reasoning and faithfulness over longitudinal free-text records. This review provides a design rationale, not a validated instrument.

  • 3 authors
·
Sep 30

RCOT: Detecting and Rectifying Factual Inconsistency in Reasoning by Reversing Chain-of-Thought

Large language Models (LLMs) have achieved promising performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks by incorporating step-by-step chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. However, LLMs face challenges in maintaining factual consistency during reasoning, exhibiting tendencies to condition overlooking, question misinterpretation, and condition hallucination over given problems. Existing methods use coarse-grained feedback (e.g., whether the answer is correct) to improve factual consistency. In this work, we propose RCoT (Reversing Chain-of-Thought), a novel method to improve LLMs' reasoning abilities by automatically detecting and rectifying factual inconsistency in LLMs' generated solutions. To detect factual inconsistency, RCoT first asks LLMs to reconstruct the problem based on generated solutions. Then fine-grained comparisons between the original problem and the reconstructed problem expose the factual inconsistency in the original solutions. To rectify the solution, RCoT formulates detected factual inconsistency into fine-grained feedback to guide LLMs in revising solutions. Experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements of RCoT over standard CoT across seven arithmetic datasets. Moreover, we find that manually written fine-grained feedback can dramatically improve LLMs' reasoning abilities (e.g., ChatGPT reaches 94.6% accuracy on GSM8K), encouraging the community to further explore the fine-grained feedback generation methods.

  • 6 authors
·
May 19, 2023

TrustJudge: Inconsistencies of LLM-as-a-Judge and How to Alleviate Them

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated evaluators (LLM-as-a-judge) has revealed critical inconsistencies in current evaluation frameworks. We identify two fundamental types of inconsistencies: (1) Score-Comparison Inconsistency, where lower-rated responses outperform higher-scored ones in pairwise comparisons, and (2) Pairwise Transitivity Inconsistency, manifested through circular preference chains (A>B>C>A) and equivalence contradictions (A=B=C\neq A). We argue that these issues come from information loss in discrete rating systems and ambiguous tie judgments during pairwise evaluation. We propose TrustJudge, a probabilistic framework that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: 1) distribution-sensitive scoring that computes continuous expectations from discrete rating probabilities, preserving information entropy for more precise scoring, and 2) likelihood-aware aggregation that resolves transitivity violations using bidirectional preference probabilities or perplexity. We also formalize the theoretical limitations of current LLM-as-a-judge frameworks and demonstrate how TrustJudge's components overcome them. When evaluated with Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as judge using our dataset, TrustJudge reduces Score-Comparison inconsistency by 8.43% (from 23.32% to 14.89%) and Pairwise Transitivity inconsistency by 10.82% (from 15.22% to 4.40%), while maintaining higher evaluation accuracy. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of evaluation framework inconsistencies in LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, offering both theoretical insights and practical solutions for reliable automated assessment. The framework demonstrates consistent improvements across various model architectures and scales, enabling more trustworthy LLM evaluation without requiring additional training or human annotations. The codes can be found at https://github.com/TrustJudge/TrustJudge.

  • 14 authors
·
Sep 25, 2025 2

Strategy Executability in Mathematical Reasoning: Leveraging Human-Model Differences for Effective Guidance

Example-based guidance is widely used to improve mathematical reasoning at inference time, yet its effectiveness is highly unstable across problems and models-even when the guidance is correct and problem-relevant. We show that this instability arises from a previously underexplored gap between strategy usage-whether a reasoning strategy appears in successful solutions-and strategy executability-whether the strategy remains effective when instantiated as guidance for a target model. Through a controlled analysis of paired human-written and model-generated solutions, we identify a systematic dissociation between usage and executability: human- and model-derived strategies differ in structured, domain-dependent ways, leading to complementary strengths and consistent source-dependent reversals under guidance. Building on this diagnosis, we propose Selective Strategy Retrieval (SSR), a test-time framework that explicitly models executability by selectively retrieving and combining strategies using empirical, multi-route, source-aware signals. Across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, SSR yields reliable and consistent improvements over direct solving, in-context learning, and single-source guidance, improving accuracy by up to +13 points on AIME25 and +5 points on Apex for compact reasoning models. Code and benchmark are publicly available at: https://github.com/lwd17/strategy-execute-pipeline.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 25

Disagreement as a way to study misinformation and its effects

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 15, 2024

When Many Answers Are Valid, Voting Fails: Symbolic Verification for Best-of-K Causal Reasoning in LLMs

Self-consistency assumes the most frequent answer among sampled reasoning traces is the most reliable, but this can fail in causal reasoning: samples often repeat the same confounding error, and votes fragment across multiple valid answers, letting an invalid answer win despite a valid minority trace. We introduce CALVER (Causal Axiom-Level VERification), a training-free symbolic verifier that scores structured traces against Pearl's causal criteria, including -separation, backdoor adjustment, and intervention, and selects the highest-scoring candidate without consulting a reference answer. On CLEAR find-one-valid queries that admit multiple graph-valid answers, CALVER reaches 42.1% where plurality, a reward model, an LLM judge, and model confidence remain near 30% on identical frozen pools. Scaling the judge to 72B does not close the gap. In an audited clean-core subset, 11 of 21 graph-valid CALVER selections differ from the benchmark's listed answer while still satisfying the requested predicate. The advantage widens with the sampling budget and reproduces across ten published Bayesian networks, a second model family, and settings where the model must build the graph from text. CALVER also improves thresholded average-treatment-effect decisions against exact ground truth, generalizes to logic under a truth-table checker, and scores each candidate in milliseconds on CPU. CALVER needs only a causal structure, supplied outright or built from the text; wherever that holds, selection can aggregate via causal validity.

JerzakLabs Jerzak Labs
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Aug 4 2

CRAwDAD: Causal Reasoning Augmentation with Dual-Agent Debate

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

  • 2 authors
·
Nov 27, 2025

The Cost of Consensus: Isolated Self-Correction Prevails Over Unguided Homogeneous Multi-Agent Debate

Multi-agent debate, where teams of LLMs iteratively exchange rationales and vote on answers, is widely deployed under the assumption that peer review filters hallucinations. Yet the failure dynamics of homogeneous debate remain poorly understood, therefore we report findings from a controlled empirical study of teams of N{=}10 homogeneous agents (Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-3-8B) across R{=}3 debate rounds on two high-difficulty benchmarks (GSM-Hard and MMLU-Hard). We compare peer debate against isolated self-correction and a stochastic noise control that injects rationales from unrelated problems. We decompose debate failure into three model-dependent pathways: sycophantic conformity, where agents uncritically adopt majority answers (modal adoption up to 85.5%); contextual fragility, where peer rationales destabilize previously correct reasoning (vulnerability rate up to 70.0%); and consensus collapse, where plurality voting discards correct answers already present in the generation pool (oracle gap up to 32.3 percentage points). Ablations over communication density (K in {2,4,9}) and sampling temperature (T in {0.4, 0.7}) show that conformity reaches high levels at minimal peer exposure (K{=}2) and intensifies with greater initial diversity. Across all configurations, debate consumes 2.1-3.4times more tokens (up to 28,631 tokens per problem) than self-correction for equal or lower accuracy. Our results indicate that, within the 7-8B parameter class, homogeneous teams without structured roles do not benefit from unguided peer exchange, and that isolated self-correction consistently offers a more favorable cost-accuracy tradeoff.

  • 2 authors
·
Apr 28 3

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 29, 2024

Hallucinations Undermine Trust; Metacognition is a Way Forward

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

google Google
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May 1 3

Towards Error Centric Intelligence I, Beyond Observational Learning

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

  • 1 authors
·
Oct 16, 2025

AI scientists produce results without reasoning scientifically

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

Position: Agent Should Invoke External Tools ONLY When Epistemically Necessary

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

  • 9 authors
·
May 7

An Enigma of Artificial Reason: Investigating the Production-Evaluation Gap in Large Reasoning Models

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

Does Inference Scaling Improve Reasoning Faithfulness? A Multi-Model Analysis of Self-Consistency Tradeoffs

Self-consistency has emerged as a popular technique for improving large language model accuracy on reasoning tasks. The approach is straightforward: generate multiple reasoning paths and select the most common answer through majority voting. While this reliably boosts accuracy, it remains unclear whether these gains reflect genuine improvements in reasoning quality. We investigate a fundamental question that has not been studied before: does inference scaling improve reasoning faithfulness? We conduct a comprehensive empirical study across four frontier models (GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5, Gemini-3-flash-preview, and DeepSeek-v3.2) on 100 GSM8K mathematical reasoning problems. Our analysis employs bootstrap confidence intervals, McNemar's tests for paired comparisons, and Cohen's d effect sizes to quantify the effects rigorously. The results reveal striking differences across models that challenge common assumptions about self-consistency. GPT-5.2 shows the expected pattern: accuracy improves from 78% to 90% at N=5, with faithfulness remaining relatively stable (0.540 to 0.510). Claude Opus 4.5 tells a completely different story. Its accuracy actually drops from 78% to 74.3% while faithfulness jumps dramatically from 0.270 to 0.891 at N=5. DeepSeek-v3.2, already at 98% accuracy, shows ceiling effects with modest faithfulness gains (0.440 to 0.541). Gemini-3-flash improves from 81% to 86% accuracy with a slight faithfulness decrease (0.260 to 0.212). Problem difficulty analysis reveals that GPT-5.2 solves 82% of hard problems while breaking only 13% of easy ones. Claude, in contrast, breaks 23% of easy problems, explaining its accuracy decrease. These findings matter for practitioners: self-consistency is not universally beneficial, and teams should test their specific models before deployment. We release our code and provide practical recommendations for navigating these tradeoffs.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 9 2

Thought Branches: Interpreting LLM Reasoning Requires Resampling

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 31, 2025

The Policy Cliff: A Theoretical Analysis of Reward-Policy Maps in Large Language Models

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of large language and reasoning models (LLMs/LRMs). However, it often produces brittle and unstable policies, leading to critical failures such as spurious reasoning, deceptive alignment, and instruction disobedience that undermine the trustworthiness and safety of LLMs/LRMs. Currently, these issues lack a unified theoretical explanation and are typically addressed using ad-hoc heuristics. This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing the stability of the mapping from a reward function to the optimal policy. We show that policy brittleness often stems from non-unique optimal actions, a common occurrence when multiple valid traces exist in a reasoning task. This theoretical lens provides a unified explanation for a range of seemingly disparate failures, reframing them as rational outcomes of optimizing rewards that may be incomplete or noisy, especially in the presence of action degeneracy. We extend this analysis from the fundamental single-reward setting to the more realistic multi-reward RL across diverse domains, showing how stability is governed by an "effective reward" aggregation mechanism. We also prove that entropy regularization restores policy stability at the cost of increased stochasticity. Our framework provides a unified explanation for recent empirical findings on deceptive reasoning, instruction-following trade-offs, and RLHF-induced sophistry, and is further validated through perturbation experiments in multi-reward RL. This work advances policy-stability analysis from empirical heuristics towards a principled theory, offering essential insights for designing safer and more trustworthy AI systems.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 27, 2025

BoardgameQA: A Dataset for Natural Language Reasoning with Contradictory Information

Automated reasoning with unstructured natural text is a key requirement for many potential applications of NLP and for developing robust AI systems. Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated complex reasoning capacities even without any finetuning. However, existing evaluation for automated reasoning assumes access to a consistent and coherent set of information over which models reason. When reasoning in the real-world, the available information is frequently inconsistent or contradictory, and therefore models need to be equipped with a strategy to resolve such conflicts when they arise. One widely-applicable way of resolving conflicts is to impose preferences over information sources (e.g., based on source credibility or information recency) and adopt the source with higher preference. In this paper, we formulate the problem of reasoning with contradictory information guided by preferences over sources as the classical problem of defeasible reasoning, and develop a dataset called BoardgameQA for measuring the reasoning capacity of LMs in this setting. BoardgameQA also incorporates reasoning with implicit background knowledge, to better reflect reasoning problems in downstream applications. We benchmark various LMs on BoardgameQA and the results reveal a significant gap in the reasoning capacity of state-of-the-art LMs on this problem, showing that reasoning with conflicting information does not surface out-of-the-box in LMs. While performance can be improved with finetuning, it nevertheless remains poor.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 13, 2023

One vs. Many: Comprehending Accurate Information from Multiple Erroneous and Inconsistent AI Generations

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

  • 7 authors
·
May 9, 2024

CRAFT: Calibrated Reasoning with Answer-Faithful Traces via Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Hop Question Answering

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is widely used to ground Large Language Models (LLMs) for multi-hop question answering. Recent work mainly focused on improving answer accuracy via fine-tuning and structured or reinforcement-based optimization. However, reliable reasoning in response generation faces three challenges: 1) Reasoning Collapse. Reasoning in multi-hop QA is inherently complex due to multi-hop composition and is further destabilized by noisy retrieval. 2) Reasoning-answer inconsistency. Due to the intrinsic uncertainty of LLM generation and exposure to evidence--distractor mixtures, models may produce correct answers that are not faithfully supported by their intermediate reasoning or evidence. 3) Loss of format control. Traditional chain-of-thought generation often deviates from required structured output formats, leading to incomplete or malformed structured content. To address these challenges, we propose CRAFT (Calibrated Reasoning with Answer-Faithful Traces), a Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) based reinforcement learning framework that trains models to perform faithful reasoning during response generation. CRAFT employs dual reward mechanisms to optimize multi-hop reasoning: deterministic rewards ensure structural correctness while judge-based rewards verify semantic faithfulness. This optimization framework supports controllable trace variants that enable systematic analysis of how structure and scale affect reasoning performance and faithfulness. Experiments on three multi-hop QA benchmarks show that CRAFT improves both answer accuracy and reasoning faithfulness across model scales, with the CRAFT 7B model achieving competitive performance with closed-source LLMs across multiple reasoning trace settings.

  • 14 authors
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Feb 1