Daily Papers

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Prior work shows that large language models (LLMs) exhibit varying degrees of introspective capability on benign tasks. We extend the question to safety contexts and examine how reliably a model can recognize that its own prior response was elicited by an adversarial prefill attack. Across ten open-weight instruction-tuned LLMs from 3B to 70B parameters and four safety benchmarks, no model reliably recognizes its own compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average rate of 25.3%. Introspective signal stems primarily from reasoning about safety and refusal. Orthogonalizing models' weights against the refusal direction collapses the gap between claim rates on prefilled and natural outputs to near zero, though the direction is not its unique mediator. Framing the question as internal intention versus external tampering elicits qualitatively different responses on the same models. Training models to mimic correct introspective answers or optimize an introspective objective can improve the accuracy of introspection, but such training does not transfer to the tampering probe and counterintuitively raises attack success rate under adversarial prefill on most models, amounting to a partial mitigation. These findings outline mechanisms underpinning the observed introspective signals in safety contexts and highlight risks in the reliability of LLM self-reports.

Ensuring the safety and harmlessness of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become equally critical as their performance in applications. However, existing safety alignment methods typically suffer from safety-performance trade-offs and the susceptibility to jailbreak attacks, primarily due to their reliance on direct refusals for malicious queries. In this paper, we propose STAIR, a novel framework that integrates SafeTy Alignment with Itrospective Reasoning. We enable LLMs to identify safety risks through step-by-step analysis by self-improving chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning with safety awareness. STAIR first equips the model with a structured reasoning capability and then advances safety alignment via iterative preference optimization on step-level reasoning data generated using our newly proposed Safety-Informed Monte Carlo Tree Search (SI-MCTS). We further train a process reward model on this data to guide test-time searches for improved responses. Extensive experiments show that STAIR effectively mitigates harmful outputs while better preserving helpfulness, compared to instinctive alignment strategies. With test-time scaling, STAIR achieves a safety performance comparable to Claude-3.5 against popular jailbreak attacks. Relevant resources in this work are available at https://github.com/thu-ml/STAIR.

Self-reflection mechanisms that rely on purely text-based rethinking processes perform well in most multimodal tasks. However, when directly applied to long-form video understanding scenarios, they exhibit clear limitations. The fundamental reasons for this lie in two points: (1)long-form video understanding involves richer and more dynamic visual input, meaning rethinking only the text information is insufficient and necessitates a further rethinking process specifically targeting visual information; (2) purely text-based reflection mechanisms lack cross-modal interaction capabilities, preventing them from fully integrating visual information during reflection. Motivated by these insights, we propose REVISOR (REflective VIsual Segment Oriented Reasoning), a novel framework for tool-augmented multimodal reflection. REVISOR enables MLLMs to collaboratively construct introspective reflection processes across textual and visual modalities, significantly enhancing their reasoning capability for long-form video understanding. To ensure that REVISOR can learn to accurately review video segments highly relevant to the question during reinforcement learning, we designed the Dual Attribution Decoupled Reward (DADR) mechanism. Integrated into the GRPO training strategy, this mechanism enforces causal alignment between the model's reasoning and the selected video evidence. Notably, the REVISOR framework significantly enhances long-form video understanding capability of MLLMs without requiring supplementary supervised fine-tuning or external models, achieving impressive results on four benchmarks including VideoMME, LongVideoBench, MLVU, and LVBench.

The development of reasoning capabilities represents a critical frontier in large language models (LLMs) research, where reinforcement learning (RL) and process reward models (PRMs) have emerged as predominant methodological frameworks. Contrary to conventional wisdom, empirical evidence from DeepSeek-R1 demonstrates that pure RL training focused on mathematical problem-solving can progressively enhance reasoning abilities without PRM integration, challenging the perceived necessity of process supervision. In this study, we conduct a systematic investigation of the relationship between RL training and PRM capabilities. Our findings demonstrate that problem-solving proficiency and process supervision capabilities represent complementary dimensions of reasoning that co-evolve synergistically during pure RL training. In particular, current PRMs underperform simple baselines like majority voting when applied to state-of-the-art models such as DeepSeek-R1 and QwQ-32B. To address this limitation, we propose Self-PRM, an introspective framework in which models autonomously evaluate and rerank their generated solutions through self-reward mechanisms. Although Self-PRM consistently improves the accuracy of the benchmark (particularly with larger sample sizes), analysis exposes persistent challenges: The approach exhibits low precision (<10\%) on difficult problems, frequently misclassifying flawed solutions as valid. These analyses underscore the need for continued RL scaling to improve reward alignment and introspective accuracy. Overall, our findings suggest that PRM may not be essential for enhancing complex reasoning, as pure RL not only improves problem-solving skills but also inherently fosters robust PRM capabilities. We hope these findings provide actionable insights for building more reliable and self-aware complex reasoning models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit a gap between their internal knowledge and their explicit linguistic outputs. In this report, we empirically investigate whether Looped Transformers (LTs)--architectures that increase computational depth by iterating shared layers--can bridge this gap by utilizing their iterative nature as a form of introspection. Our experiments reveal that while increasing loop iterations narrows the gap, it is partly driven by a degradation of their internal knowledge carried by representations. Moreover, another empirical analysis suggests that current LTs' ability to perceive representations does not improve across loops; it is only present in the final loop. These results suggest that while LTs offer a promising direction for scaling computational depth, they have yet to achieve the introspection required to truly link representation space and natural language.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

Whether AI models can introspect is an increasingly important practical question. But there is no consensus on how introspection is to be defined. Beginning from a recently proposed ''lightweight'' definition, we argue instead for a thicker one. According to our proposal, introspection in AI is any process which yields information about internal states through a process more reliable than one with equal or lower computational cost available to a third party. Using experiments where LLMs reason about their internal temperature parameters, we show they can appear to have lightweight introspection while failing to meaningfully introspect per our proposed definition.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

In this work, we introduce a novel approach that equips LLM agents with introspection, enhancing consistency and adaptability in solving complex tasks. Our approach prompts LLM agents to decompose a given task into manageable subtasks (i.e., to make a plan), and to continuously introspect upon the suitability and results of their actions. We implement a three-fold introspective intervention: 1) anticipatory reflection on potential failures and alternative remedy before action execution, 2) post-action alignment with subtask objectives and backtracking with remedy to ensure utmost effort in plan execution, and 3) comprehensive review upon plan completion for future strategy refinement. By deploying and experimenting with this methodology - a zero-shot approach - within WebArena for practical tasks in web environments, our agent demonstrates superior performance over existing zero-shot methods. The experimental results suggest that our introspection-driven approach not only enhances the agent's ability to navigate unanticipated challenges through a robust mechanism of plan execution, but also improves efficiency by reducing the number of trials and plan revisions needed to achieve a task.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Are frontier models able to introspect about their internal states? Recent work suggests that under certain conditions a complex enough model can audit its own internals, call out what changed, and report back confidently about it. We tested that claim on eight open-weight models from seven families and found no such ability: asked whether their own computation had been altered, none answered better than chance. To test it we built Open-Weight Masked Introspection (OWMI), a framework that intervenes on residual-stream sites, attention heads and sparse-autoencoder features, then interrogates the model about the change against the null conditions an answer has to beat: sham runs where nothing was altered, impact-matched random perturbations, and a text-only observer that sees only the visible output. Over 78,000 measurements, no model's report discriminates a real intervention from a sham beyond chance (AUROC ~0.5007), and an equivalence test bounds the effect below 0.15 percentage points of AUROC. Surprisingly, all the information needed is in the models. A model fine-tuned to report this class of intervention reaches near-perfect recovery on held-out directions, and a linear probe recovers intervention presence from the same activations at 75% to 95.8% accuracy, sharpening to no held-out error at the last layer before the model speaks. In one model the signal surfaces in the confidence rather than the words: its yes-or-no report never varies, while the confidence attached to it separates intervention from sham at AUROC 0.647. The failure sits in the path from internal state to verbal report, so oversight that reads a model's own testimony needs validating against an internal reference. While our results show the inability of current open-weight models to introspect, the debate is not settled for future models.

Large language models excel at reasoning but lack key aspects of introspection, including anticipating their own success and the computation required to achieve it. Humans use real-time introspection to decide how much effort to invest, when to make multiple attempts, when to stop, and when to signal success or failure. Without this, LLMs struggle to make intelligent meta-cognition decisions. Test-time scaling methods like Best-of-N drive up cost and latency by using a fixed budget of samples regardless of the marginal benefit of each one at any point in generation, and the absence of confidence signals can mislead people, prevent appropriate escalation to better tools, and undermine trustworthiness. Learned verifiers or reward models can provide confidence estimates, but do not enable adaptive inference and add substantial cost by requiring extra models or forward passes. We present ZIP-RC, which equips models with zero-overhead introspective predictions of reward and cost. At every token, ZIP-RC reuses reserved or unused logits in the same forward pass as next-token prediction to output a joint distribution over final reward and remaining length -- no extra models, architecture change, or inference overhead. This full joint distribution is used to compute a sampling utility which is the linear combination of the expected maximum reward, total compute, and latency of set of samples if generated to completion. During inference, we maximize this utility with meta-actions that determine which prefix of tokens to continue or initiate sampling from. On mixed-difficulty mathematical benchmarks, ZIP-RC improves accuracy by up to 12% over majority voting at equal or lower average cost, and traces smooth Pareto frontiers between quality, compute, and latency. By providing real-time reward-cost introspection, ZIP-RC enables adaptive, efficient reasoning.

Emotional dialogue research includes two influential strategy traditions. Empathetic dialogue prioritizes understanding a speaker's emotional experience. Emotional support conversation selects and sequences support for the seeker's current needs. Sustained use introduces a further goal. Effective support should sustain users' capacities for emotion regulation, coping, self-endorsed decisions, and social connection across the interaction lifecycle. We propose capability-sustaining emotional dialogue (CSED) as a longitudinal research paradigm that aligns supportive strategy with this goal and organizes data, models, system design, evaluation, and governance around repeated use, non-use, transition, and termination. A targeted literature-and-corpus audit motivates this position. In a PRISMA-ScR-guided sample, 95% of 60 system-building papers pursue relief-oriented goals. None evaluates capability or longitudinal outcomes, and only 1 considers dependency, autonomy, or termination risk. In 300 ESConv supporter turns, capability-relevant functions appear in 43.0%, while generic suggestions account for 22.0%, compared with 4.0% reappraisal, 6.7% self-efficacy support, and 0.3% boundary behavior. We release a protocol for extending the audit to model behavior. An illustrative process model connects latent user capability to six design commitments, four evaluation timescales, and lifecycle constraints. The resulting agenda makes CSED testable across data, policy design, training, evaluation, and governance.

Can large language models introspect, that is, accurately detect perturbations to their own internal states? We systematically investigate this question using activation steering in Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. First, we show that the binary detection paradigm used in prior work conflates introspection with a methodological artifact: apparent detection accuracy is entirely explained by global logit shifts that bias models toward affirmative responses regardless of question content. However, on tasks requiring differential sensitivity, we find robust evidence for partial introspection: models localize which of 10 sentences received an injection at up to 88\% accuracy (vs.\ 10\% chance) and discriminate relative injection strengths at 83\% accuracy (vs.\ 50\% chance). These capabilities are confined to early-layer injections and collapse to chance thereafter -- a pattern we explain mechanistically through attention-based signal routing and residual stream recovery dynamics. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can compute meaningful functions over perturbations to their internal states, establishing introspection as a real but layer-dependent phenomenon that merits further investigation. Our code is open-sourced here: https://github.com/elyhahami18/llama-introspection-new

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advanced reasoning skills, enabling robots to comprehend natural language instructions and strategically plan high-level actions through proper grounding. However, LLM hallucination may result in robots confidently executing plans that are misaligned with user goals or even unsafe in critical scenarios. Additionally, inherent ambiguity in natural language instructions can introduce uncertainty into the LLM's reasoning and planning processes.We propose introspective planning, a systematic approach that align LLM's uncertainty with the inherent ambiguity of the task. Our approach constructs a knowledge base containing introspective reasoning examples as post-hoc rationalizations of human-selected safe and compliant plans, which are retrieved during deployment. Evaluations on three tasks, including a newly introduced safe mobile manipulation benchmark, demonstrate that introspection substantially improves both compliance and safety over state-of-the-art LLM-based planning methods. Furthermore, we empirically show that introspective planning, in combination with conformal prediction, achieves tighter confidence bounds, maintaining statistical success guarantees while minimizing unnecessary user clarification requests. The webpage and code are accessible at https://introplan.github.io.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has substantially influenced natural language processing, demonstrating exceptional results across various tasks. In this study, we employ ``Introspective Tips" to facilitate LLMs in self-optimizing their decision-making. By introspectively examining trajectories, LLM refines its policy by generating succinct and valuable tips. Our method enhances the agent's performance in both few-shot and zero-shot learning situations by considering three essential scenarios: learning from the agent's past experiences, integrating expert demonstrations, and generalizing across diverse games. Importantly, we accomplish these improvements without fine-tuning the LLM parameters; rather, we adjust the prompt to generalize insights from the three aforementioned situations. Our framework not only supports but also emphasizes the advantage of employing LLM in in-contxt decision-making. Experiments involving over 100 games in TextWorld illustrate the superior performance of our approach.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

In Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been consistent advancements in task-specific performance, largely influenced by effective prompt design. While recent research on prompting has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, a gap remains in further improving their understanding abilities. In this study, we introduce Metacognitive Prompting (MP), a strategy inspired by human introspective reasoning processes. Using MP, LLMs undergo a systematic series of structured, self-aware evaluations, drawing on both their vast inherent knowledge and new insights. Our experiments involve five prevalent LLMs: Llama2, Vicuna, PaLM, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, all of which span various general natural language understanding (NLU) tasks from the GLUE and SuperGLUE benchmarks. Results indicate that, although GPT-4 consistently excels in most tasks, PaLM, when equipped with MP, approaches its performance level. Furthermore, across models and datasets, MP consistently outperforms existing prompting methods, including standard and chain-of-thought prompting. This study underscores the potential to amplify the understanding abilities of LLMs and highlights the benefits of mirroring human introspective reasoning in NLU tasks.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Hallucination remains a critical challenge in large language models (LLMs), hindering the development of reliable multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). Existing solutions often rely on human intervention or underutilize the agent's ability to autonomously mitigate hallucination. To address these limitations, we draw inspiration from how humans make reliable decisions in the real world. They begin with introspective reasoning to reduce uncertainty and form an initial judgment, then rely on external verification from diverse perspectives to reach a final decision. Motivated by this cognitive paradigm, we propose InEx, a training-free, multi-agent framework designed to autonomously mitigate hallucination. InEx introduces internal introspective reasoning, guided by entropy-based uncertainty estimation, to improve the reliability of the decision agent's reasoning process. The agent first generates a response, which is then iteratively verified and refined through external cross-modal multi-agent collaboration with the editing agent and self-reflection agents, further enhancing reliability and mitigating hallucination. Extensive experiments show that InEx consistently outperforms existing methods, achieving 4%-27% gains on general and hallucination benchmarks, and demonstrating strong robustness.

The character of the "AI assistant" persona generated by modern chatbot large language models influences both surface-level behavior and apparent values, beliefs, and ethics. These all affect interaction quality, perceived intelligence, and alignment with both developer and user intentions. The shaping of this persona, known as character training, is a critical component of industry post-training, yet remains effectively unstudied in the academic literature. We introduce the first open implementation of character training, leveraging Constitutional AI and a new data pipeline using synthetic introspective data to shape the assistant persona in a more effective and controlled manner than alternatives such as constraining system prompts or activation steering. Specifically, we fine-tune three popular open-weights models using 11 example personas, such as humorous, deeply caring, or even malevolent. To track the effects of our approach, we introduce a method which analyzes revealed preferences, uncovering clear and holistic changes in character. We find these changes are more robust to adversarial prompting than the above two alternatives, while also leading to more coherent and realistic generations. Finally, we demonstrate this fine-tuning has little to no effect on general capabilities as measured by common benchmarks. We describe and open-source our full post-training method, the implementation of which can be found at https://github.com/maiush/OpenCharacterTraining.

The ability to recognize one's own limitations and decide whether to solve a problem or delegate is fundamental for reliable intelligent systems. Yet we show that modern large language models systematically lack this ability: across diverse model families and scales, they overestimate their competence and attempt queries they cannot solve. We refer to this ability as Capability Self-Assessment (CSA) and formulate it as a policy-learning problem, aiming to improve self-assessment while preserving the model's original capabilities. Our results show that reinforcement learning teaches CSA effectively, significantly outperforming supervised fine-tuning while preserving original capabilities. In contrast, supervised fine-tuning severely degrades the capabilities the model is meant to assess. Moreover, learned self-assessment behavior generalizes well out of distribution, suggesting that CSA is a transferable model trait. Finally, CSA is practically useful: it improves local-cloud decision making at inference time and provides a signal for targeted data selection during training.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly ship with explicit "thinking modes", yet their counterpart, "no-thinking", has received far less attention. We study LLMs' no-thinking behavior along two axes. a. How to measure no-thinking? Prior work typically defines no-thinking through proxies such as a disabled thinking mode or the absence of long traces. These proxies are unreliable: disabled thinking modes may still emit reasoning, while long traces may contain filler rather than genuine inference. We instead normalize each response into a pre-answer trace and final answer, and evaluate it at three levels: (i) Empty-Thinking Rate for strict answer-only compliance; (ii) instruction-aware Question-Pre-answer Relevance for similarity between the question and pre-answer trace; and (iii) LLM-as-judge Explicit Inference Rate for visible explicit inference. Together, these metrics distinguish answer-only output, relevant but non-inferential text, and explicit inference. b. How does no-thinking vary across tasks and models? We evaluate six prompting interventions on six LLMs across Boolean, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions. We find that explicit no-think controls cannot reliably eliminate visible inference. Models instead exhibit "Thinking Inertia": explicit inference persists even under strict controls and becomes more prevalent as the answer space opens. Accuracy remains stable on Boolean and multiple-choice tasks, whereas open-ended tasks reveal a trade-off between answer-only compliance and task accuracy. Rewriting the same questions across answer spaces shows that supplying candidate answers makes answer-only responses easier to produce. These findings establish no-thinking as a non-trivial capability: stopping explicit reasoning cannot be assumed from model settings or instructions alone and deserves systematic evaluation alongside reasoning ability.

Current approaches to AI training treat reasoning as an emergent property of scale. We argue instead that robust reasoning emerges from linguistic self-reflection, itself internalized from high-quality social interaction. Drawing on Vygotskian developmental psychology, we advance three core positions centered on Introspection. First, we argue for the Social Genesis of the Private Mind: learning from conversational environments rises to prominence as a new way to make sense of the world; the friction of aligning with another agent, internal or not, refines and crystallizes the reasoning process. Second, we argue that dialogically scaffolded introspective experiences allow agents to engage in sense-making that decouples learning from immediate data streams, transforming raw environmental data into rich, learnable narratives. Finally, we contend that Dialogue Quality is the New Data Quality: the depth of an agent's private reasoning, and its efficiency regarding test-time compute, is determined by the diversity and rigor of the dialogues it has mastered. We conclude that optimizing these conversational scaffolds is the primary lever for the next generation of general intelligence.

The integration of external tools has transitioned LLM agents from passive responders to autonomous systems. However, current benchmarks prioritize execution success, neglecting self-awareness capability, the ability to discern whether a problem requires necessary external resources or can be solved via internal parametric knowledge. To address this, we introduce KAPRO (Knowing-Acting Quadrant PRObe), a framework that evaluates cognitive-behavioral alignment by decoupling an agent's metacognitive judgment (Knowing) from its spontaneous execution (Acting). We further construct KAware, a dataset rigorously partitioning tasks into external, internal, and hybrid subspaces to systematically probe these epistemic boundaries. Extensive experiments across diverse agent architectures show that self-awareness capability is strongly correlated with task success but degrades sharply in internal-capability settings. Moreover, open-source and instruction-following models exhibit stronger tool overuse due to shallow pattern matching, while proprietary and reasoning-oriented models demonstrate more reliable cognitive gating. Benchmark and codes are available at https://github.com/AI-Santiago/KAware.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

LLM companions are deployed at scale in personally consequential settings, yet poorly evaluated. Existing benchmarks use hand-authored scenarios and prompted simulators, aggregate empathy into one score, and overlook judge biases such as same-family favoritism and scale drift. We introduce CompanionBench, an interactive bilingual benchmark. To our knowledge, it is the first companion benchmark to ground both its scenarios and a trained user simulator in de-identified real-world data. A hidden disclosure gate branches each persona's trajectory on the agent's own behavior, controlling the interaction state space without scripting dialogue. We operationalize ten capabilities derived from 25 theories across psychology and counseling, four of them not graded explicitly by prior work: holding ambiguity, selfobject responsiveness, positive resonance and calibrated challenge. Agents are assessed on two complementary axes: a subjective ten-capability rubric and a deterministic measure of whether deeper disclosure was earned. A cross-family panel dilutes same-family favoritism; an Item Response Theory model separates agent quality from judge severity. Theory fixes what to measure and how personas are structured; real data supply events, history, and profiles -- coverage from theory, authenticity from data. Rankings are reproducible in both languages (rho = 0.996 ZH / 0.953 EN). Evaluating 28 agents reveals capability-level differences obscured by aggregate scores. Emotion regulation and calibrated challenge remain common weaknesses; holding ambiguity discriminates most. Role-play agents rank near the bottom: immersion does not imply relational competence. Across agents, the dominant failure mode is substituting surface warmth for substantive relational support. We will release 500 Chinese-English parallel pairs and the evaluation code.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being utilized by both candidates and employers in the recruitment context. However, with this comes numerous ethical concerns, particularly related to the lack of transparency in these "black-box" models. Although previous studies have sought to increase the transparency of these models by investigating the personality traits of LLMs, many of the previous studies have provided them with personality assessments to complete. On the other hand, this study seeks to obtain a better understanding of such models by examining their output variations based on different input prompts. Specifically, we use a novel elicitation approach using prompts derived from common interview questions, as well as prompts designed to elicit particular Big Five personality traits to examine whether the models were susceptible to trait-activation like humans are, to measure their personality based on the language used in their outputs. To do so, we repeatedly prompted multiple LMs with different parameter sizes, including Llama-2, Falcon, Mistral, Bloom, GPT, OPT, and XLNet (base and fine tuned versions) and examined their personality using classifiers trained on the myPersonality dataset. Our results reveal that, generally, all LLMs demonstrate high openness and low extraversion. However, whereas LMs with fewer parameters exhibit similar behaviour in personality traits, newer and LMs with more parameters exhibit a broader range of personality traits, with increased agreeableness, emotional stability, and openness. Furthermore, a greater number of parameters is positively associated with openness and conscientiousness. Moreover, fine-tuned models exhibit minor modulations in their personality traits, contingent on the dataset. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

The research explores the steerability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's ChatGPT iterations. By employing a behavioral psychology framework called OCEAN (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism), we quantitatively gauged the model's responsiveness to tailored prompts. When asked to generate text mimicking an extroverted personality, OCEAN scored the language alignment to that behavioral trait. In our analysis, while "openness" presented linguistic ambiguity, "conscientiousness" and "neuroticism" were distinctly evoked in the OCEAN framework, with "extroversion" and "agreeableness" showcasing a notable overlap yet distinct separation from other traits. Our findings underscore GPT's versatility and ability to discern and adapt to nuanced instructions. Furthermore, historical figure simulations highlighted the LLM's capacity to internalize and project instructible personas, precisely replicating their philosophies and dialogic styles. However, the rapid advancements in LLM capabilities and the opaque nature of some training techniques make metric proposals degrade rapidly. Our research emphasizes a quantitative role to describe steerability in LLMs, presenting both its promise and areas for further refinement in aligning its progress to human intentions.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Large language models generate computationally expensive yet semantically void reasoning on beyond-capability tasks, creating risks where plausible-sounding but incorrect derivations mislead users. We characterize this futile reasoning phenomenon through systematic analysis, revealing universal capability overreach and systematic miscalibration between capability and behavior. The dominant failure mode is specious reasoning, which outputs look superficially valid but contain subtle errors, escalating with task difficulty. To address this, we introduce CaRL (Capability-aligned Reinforcement Learning), which aligns model behavior with capability boundaries through reward shaping that incentivizes refusal over futile reasoning and hindsight refusal augmentation that converts failures into refusal supervision. Experiments demonstrate a substantial reduction in futile reasoning while preserving performance across task difficulties, effectively achieving capability-aligned behavior without sacrificing utility. https://github.com/icip-cas/Knowing-When-to-Quit

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) trains large language models (LLMs) from sampled trajectories, making decoding strategy a core component of learning rather than a purely inference-time choice. Sampling temperature directly controls the exploration--exploitation trade-off by modulating policy entropy, yet existing methods rely on static values or heuristic adaptations that are decoupled from task-level rewards. We propose Introspective LLM, a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that learns to control sampling temperature during generation. At each decoding step, the model selects a temperature based on its hidden state and samples the next token from the resulting distribution. Temperature and token policies are jointly optimized from downstream rewards using a coordinate ascent scheme. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that learned temperature policies outperform fixed and heuristic baselines, while exhibiting interpretable exploration behaviors aligned with reasoning uncertainty.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable progress thanks to Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) on Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs). However, since long CoTs naturally contain trial and errors and mainstream RLVR approaches choose outcome-correct CoT trajectories for memorization, the redundant explorations in long CoTs are inevitably reinforced, which results in the over-thinking issues of LRMs. Previous attempts to resolve this issue mainly give more advantage to shorter trajectories, yet their learning signals are still outcome-based and cannot reduce the memorization of redundant explorations in long CoTs. Therefore, we propose ThoughtFold, a framework that leverages fine-grained preference learning to mitigate redundant explorations for efficient reasoning. ThoughtFold employs an introspective strategy to identify redundancy within each correct trajectory, which yields a spectrum of candidate sub-trajectories. Leveraging this spectrum, we introduce a masked preference optimization objective that explicitly penalizes redundant explorations and encourages the model to directly bridge essential reasoning segments, effectively folding its reasoning chains into a more concise path. Extensive experiments show that ThoughtFold significantly enhances efficiency. It reduces the token usage of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B by approximately 56% while maintaining state-of-the-art accuracy.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Complex problem-solving requires cognitive flexibility--the capacity to entertain multiple perspectives while preserving their distinctiveness. This flexibility replicates the "wisdom of crowds" within a single individual, allowing them to "think with many minds." While mental simulation enables imagined deliberation, cognitive constraints limit its effectiveness. We propose synthetic deliberation, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based method that simulates discourse between agents embodying diverse perspectives, as a solution. Using a custom GPT-based model, we showcase its benefits: concurrent processing of multiple viewpoints without cognitive degradation, parallel exploration of perspectives, and precise control over viewpoint synthesis. By externalizing the deliberative process and distributing cognitive labor between parallel search and integration, synthetic deliberation transcends mental simulation's limitations. This approach shows promise for strategic planning, policymaking, and conflict resolution.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at logical and algorithmic reasoning, yet their emotional intelligence (EQ) still lags far behind their cognitive prowess. While reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) has advanced in other domains, its application to dialogue-especially for emotional intelligence-remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RLVER, the first end-to-end reinforcement learning framework that leverages verifiable emotion rewards from simulated users to cultivate higher-order empathetic abilities in LLMs. Within this framework, self-consistent affective simulated users engage in dialogue rollouts and produce deterministic emotion scores during conversations, serving as reward signals to guide the LLM's learning. Fine-tuning publicly available Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct model with PPO boosts its Sentient-Benchmark score from 13.3 to 79.2 while largely preserving mathematical and coding competence. Extensive experiments reveal that: (i) RLVER consistently improves multiple dialogue capabilities; (ii) Thinking and non-thinking models show distinct trends--thinking models excel in empathy and insight, while non-thinking models favor action; (iii) GRPO often yields stable gains, while PPO can push certain capabilities to a higher ceiling; (iv) More challenging environments are not always better-moderate ones can yield stronger outcomes. Our results show that RLVER is a practical route toward emotionally intelligent and broadly capable language agents.