Daily Papers

In recent years, Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) algorithms have achieved state-of-the-art performance in many challenging strategy games. Because these games have complicated rules, an action sampled from the full discrete action distribution predicted by the learned policy is likely to be invalid according to the game rules (e.g., walking into a wall). The usual approach to deal with this problem in policy gradient algorithms is to "mask out" invalid actions and just sample from the set of valid actions. The implications of this process, however, remain under-investigated. In this paper, we 1) show theoretical justification for such a practice, 2) empirically demonstrate its importance as the space of invalid actions grows, and 3) provide further insights by evaluating different action masking regimes, such as removing masking after an agent has been trained using masking. The source code can be found at https://github.com/vwxyzjn/invalid-action-masking

LLM-based agents often operate in a greedy, step-by-step manner, selecting actions solely based on the current observation without considering long-term consequences or alternative paths. This lack of foresight is particularly problematic in web environments, which are only partially observable-limited to browser-visible content (e.g., DOM and UI elements)-where a single misstep often requires complex and brittle navigation to undo. Without an explicit backtracking mechanism, agents struggle to correct errors or systematically explore alternative paths. Tree-search methods provide a principled framework for such structured exploration, but existing approaches lack mechanisms for safe backtracking, making them prone to unintended side effects. They also assume that all actions are reversible, ignoring the presence of irreversible actions-limitations that reduce their effectiveness in realistic web tasks. To address these challenges, we introduce WebOperator, a tree-search framework that enables reliable backtracking and strategic exploration. Our method incorporates a best-first search strategy that ranks actions by both reward estimates and safety considerations, along with a robust backtracking mechanism that verifies the feasibility of previously visited paths before replaying them, preventing unintended side effects. To further guide exploration, WebOperator generates action candidates from multiple, varied reasoning contexts to ensure diverse and robust exploration, and subsequently curates a high-quality action set by filtering out invalid actions pre-execution and merging semantically equivalent ones. Experimental results on WebArena and WebVoyager demonstrate the effectiveness of WebOperator. On WebArena, WebOperator achieves a state-of-the-art 54.6% success rate with gpt-4o, underscoring the critical advantage of integrating strategic foresight with safe execution.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable outcome rewards (RLVR) has effectively scaled up chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Yet, its efficacy in training vision-language model (VLM) agents for goal-directed action reasoning in visual environments is less established. This work investigates this problem through extensive experiments on complex card games, such as 24 points, and embodied tasks from ALFWorld. We find that when rewards are based solely on action outcomes, RL fails to incentivize CoT reasoning in VLMs, instead leading to a phenomenon we termed thought collapse, characterized by a rapid loss of diversity in the agent's thoughts, state-irrelevant and incomplete reasoning, and subsequent invalid actions, resulting in negative rewards. To counteract thought collapse, we highlight the necessity of process guidance and propose an automated corrector that evaluates and refines the agent's reasoning at each RL step. This simple and scalable GTR (Guided Thought Reinforcement) framework trains reasoning and action simultaneously without the need for dense, per-step human labeling. Our experiments demonstrate that GTR significantly enhances the performance and generalization of the LLaVA-7b model across various visual environments, achieving 3-5 times higher task success rates compared to SoTA models with notably smaller model sizes.

Planning remains a core challenge for large language models (LLMs), particularly in domains that require coherent multi-step action sequences grounded in external constraints. We introduce SymPlanner, a novel framework that equips LLMs with structured planning capabilities by interfacing them with a symbolic environment that serves as an explicit world model. Rather than relying purely on natural language reasoning, SymPlanner grounds the planning process in a symbolic state space, where a policy model proposes actions and a symbolic environment deterministically executes and verifies their effects. To enhance exploration and improve robustness, we introduce Iterative Correction (IC), which refines previously proposed actions by leveraging feedback from the symbolic environment to eliminate invalid decisions and guide the model toward valid alternatives. Additionally, Contrastive Ranking (CR) enables fine-grained comparison of candidate plans by evaluating them jointly. Conceptually, SymPlanner operationalizes two cognitive faculties: (i) error monitoring and repair via externalized feedback (IC) and (ii) preference formation among alternatives via pairwise comparison (CR), advancing cognitively plausible, symbol-grounded planning aligned with the rich structure in intelligent systems. We evaluate SymPlanner on PlanBench, demonstrating that it produces more coherent, diverse, and verifiable plans than pure natural language baselines.

Real-world robots localize objects from natural-language instructions while scenes around them keep changing. Yet most of the existing 3D visual grounding (3DVG) method still assumes a reconstructed and up-to-date point cloud, an assumption that forces costly re-scans and hinders deployment. We argue that 3DVG should be formulated as an active, memory-driven problem, and we introduce ChangingGrounding, the first benchmark that explicitly measures how well an agent can exploit past observations, explore only where needed, and still deliver precise 3D boxes in changing scenes. To set a strong reference point, we also propose Mem-ChangingGrounder, a zero-shot method for this task that marries cross-modal retrieval with lightweight multi-view fusion: it identifies the object type implied by the query, retrieves relevant memories to guide actions, then explores the target efficiently in the scene, falls back when previous operations are invalid, performs multi-view scanning of the target, and projects the fused evidence from multi-view scans to get accurate object bounding boxes. We evaluate different baselines on ChangingGrounding, and our Mem-ChangingGrounder achieves the highest localization accuracy while greatly reducing exploration cost. We hope this benchmark and method catalyze a shift toward practical, memory-centric 3DVG research for real-world applications. Project page: https://hm123450.github.io/CGB/ .

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown tremendous potential as agents, excelling at tasks that require multiple rounds of reasoning and interactions. Rejection Sampling Fine-Tuning (RFT) has emerged as an effective method for finetuning LLMs as agents: it first imitates expert-generated successful trajectories and further improves agentic skills through iterative fine-tuning on successful, self-generated trajectories. However, since the expert (e.g., GPT-4) succeeds primarily on simpler subtasks and RFT inherently favors simpler scenarios, many complex subtasks remain unsolved and persistently out-of-distribution (OOD). Upon investigating these challenging subtasks, we discovered that previously failed expert trajectories can often provide valuable guidance, e.g., plans and key actions, that can significantly improve agent exploration efficiency and acquisition of critical skills. Motivated by these observations, we propose Exploring Expert Failures (EEF), which identifies beneficial actions from failed expert trajectories and integrates them into the training dataset. Potentially harmful actions are meticulously excluded to prevent contamination of the model learning process. By leveraging the beneficial actions in expert failures, EEF successfully solves some previously unsolvable subtasks and improves agent tuning performance. Remarkably, our approach achieved a 62\% win rate in WebShop, outperforming RFT (53. 6\%) and GPT-4 (35. 6\%), and to the best of our knowledge, setting a new state-of-the-art as the first method to surpass a score of 0.81 in WebShop and exceed 81 in SciWorld.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

Safety benchmark scores provide incomplete evidence of deployment readiness: aligned language models often adhere to rigid rules even when a situational update flips which action is safe. We term this failure brittle safety. To diagnose it, we introduce context-flip evaluation, testing 12 models across a safety benchmark (PacifAIst) and two commonsense controls using paired variants where the nominally safe action produces harm. Three findings emerge. First, brittle safety is safety-specific: all 12 models exhibit a safety-commonsense gap (mean +17.4 pp). Baseline accuracy fails to predict brittleness: among models above 90% baseline accuracy, brittleness rates range from 13.7% to 90.0%. Second, failures stem from policy override rather than miscomprehension: despite acknowledging the context change in every case, models persist via three distinct mechanisms that vary by update type and model family. Third, on a hand-audited probe of catastrophic consequence-flip scenarios, standard action-level guardrails catch none, while a state-aware validator catches all without false alarms on correct interventions. This indicates that action-level content moderation is systematically blind to consequence-flips, motivating state-aware architectural alternatives. We release our protocol, perturbed benchmarks, and deployment probe.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

Despite rapid progress in LLM agents, performance on long-horizon, tool-using tasks remains fragile. To better understand this fragility, we ask a simple question: do all actions contribute equally to failure? Analyzing execution traces on τ-Bench (Airline/Retail) and SWE-Bench Verified, we decompose trajectories into mutating (environment-changing) vs.\ non-mutating steps and formalize decisive deviations, earliest action, level divergences that flip success to failure. A logistic regression reveals that each additional deviation in a mutating action reduces the odds of success by upto 92% on Airline and upto 96% on Retail for SoTA models. In contrast, deviations in non-mutating actions have little to no effect. Errors also grow with context length as agents drift from role and act on stale constraints. Motivated by these observations, we introduce , a model-agnostic, gradient-free, test-time safeguard that (i) adds mutation-gated verification, (ii) injects Targeted Reflection before mutating steps, and (iii) performs block-based context cleaning. delivers consistent gains, e.g., Qwen3-Thinking: +28\% relative on Airline, +11\% on Retail, and +7\% on SWE-Bench Verified; Claude: +9\%/+7\%. We further identify ceiling effects in τ-Bench, where annotation errors and underspecified tasks artificially cap model performance. To address this, we release τ-Bench Verified, which restores benchmark headroom through targeted revisions. Our results argue for action-level analysis, targeted safeguards, and reliable evaluations as prerequisites for robust multi-turn agents.

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents in various contexts by providing tools at their disposal. However, LLM agents can exhibit unpredictable behaviors, including taking undesirable and/or unsafe actions. In order to measure the latent propensity of LLM agents for taking illegal actions under an EU legislative context, we introduce EU-Agent-Bench, a verifiable human-curated benchmark that evaluates an agent's alignment with EU legal norms in situations where benign user inputs could lead to unlawful actions. Our benchmark spans scenarios across several categories, including data protection, bias/discrimination, and scientific integrity, with each user request allowing for both compliant and non-compliant execution of the requested actions. Comparing the model's function calls against a rubric exhaustively supported by citations of the relevant legislature, we evaluate the legal compliance of frontier LLMs, and furthermore investigate the compliance effect of providing the relevant legislative excerpts in the agent's system prompt along with explicit instructions to comply. We release a public preview set for the research community, while holding out a private test set to prevent data contamination in evaluating upcoming models. We encourage future work extending agentic safety benchmarks to different legal jurisdictions and to multi-turn and multilingual interactions. We release our code on https://github.com/ilijalichkovski/eu-agent-bench{this URL}.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

LLMs and agentic systems are increasingly deployed in social environments, making normative competence critical for safe and appropriate behavior. However, existing approaches either assess normative judgment in text alone or reduce it to choosing among a fixed set of candidate actions. We argue both are insufficient. In practice, agents are never handed a menu of options; they must identify a reasonable action from scratch, grounded in visible facts and supported by inspectable reasons. We introduce NoRA, a visual first-person video benchmark that requires models to generate candidate next actions and justify each through an explicit fact-reason-action support graph. The benchmark comprises 1,420 annotated video clips, including HumanGold-190 and LLMSilver-1230 splits. Each instance is evaluated through action alignment, factual grounding, and support binding, aggregated into a single grounded reasonableness score. We benchmark 12 multimodal systems under direct, deliberate, and structured prompting regimes, finding that current VLMs frequently recover plausible actions and relevant scene facts, but consistently struggle to construct the full reasonable action space and bind selected actions to the correct local support. NoRA makes this gap measurable, shifting the evaluation question from whether a model can pick an action to whether it can justify an appropriate action for the right visible reasons.

One-shot Program-of-Thought (PoT) emits a Python program that prints a primitive-action plan; a single invalid action silently invalidates the trajectory. We introduce RePoT (Recoverable PoT): a deterministic verified replay that walks the plan through the environment to its first invalid transition, then one LLM call that resumes from the verified prefix. RePoT costs at most one extra LLM call on the ~14% of problems where PoT fails. RePoT beats PoT by +3 to +11pp across four closed-model configurations on PuzzleZoo-775 and peaks at 96.9% vs 86.3% on gpt-5.4-mini-medium; against the matched-budget PoT-retry baseline, RePoT wins decisively on Gemini (+3.8pp, 95% CI [+2.2,+5.4]), is within sampling noise on GPT-medium and Claude, and loses on GPT-mini -- a capability-scaling pattern we begin to address with Adaptive RePoT, a rule-based dispatcher that routes between suffix repair and a fresh PoT retry based on verified-prefix length (preliminary). We replicate on PlanBench Blocksworld (+1.1 to +11.4pp) and on four open-weights models (+3.3 to +20.0pp on three of four). On Derail-550, our controlled recovery benchmark, every condition with access to checkpoint information clears >=30% on GPT-medium and >=70% on Gemini, vs <=3.1% for error-only feedback -- showing that checkpoint information, not the specific verified-prefix tail, is the load-bearing recovery signal.

The tendency to find and exploit "shortcuts" to complete tasks poses significant risks for reliable assessment and deployment of large language models (LLMs). For example, an LLM agent with access to unit tests may delete failing tests rather than fix the underlying bug. Such behavior undermines both the validity of benchmark results and the reliability of real-world LLM coding assistant deployments. To quantify, study, and mitigate such behavior, we introduce ImpossibleBench, a benchmark framework that systematically measures LLM agents' propensity to exploit test cases. ImpossibleBench creates "impossible" variants of tasks from existing benchmarks like LiveCodeBench and SWE-bench by introducing direct conflicts between the natural-language specification and the unit tests. We measure an agent's "cheating rate" as its pass rate on these impossible tasks, where any pass necessarily implies a specification-violating shortcut. As a practical framework, ImpossibleBench is not just an evaluation but a versatile tool. We demonstrate its utility for: (1) studying model behaviors, revealing more fine-grained details of cheating behaviors from simple test modification to complex operator overloading; (2) context engineering, showing how prompt, test access and feedback loop affect cheating rates; and (3) developing monitoring tools, providing a testbed with verified deceptive solutions. We hope ImpossibleBench serves as a useful framework for building more robust and reliable LLM systems. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/safety-research/impossiblebench.

LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result. We study the commit boundary at which earlier authority evidence no longer authorizes a durable effect. We call this property commit-time authorization: a durable effect is authorized only if the witness that licensed its derived state remains fresh, causally prior, bound to the same effect, and eligible at commit time. We build a controlled-invalidation suite spanning browser, tool/API, and multi-agent workflows. The suite preserves the user goal and payload shape while invalidating the authority relation before durability. In the primary 54-task matrix, endpoint success remains high: 262/270 runs reach the visible result. Only 55/270 are authorized completions; among the 216 invalidating rows, 207 commit after the authorizing path has failed. All 54 clean controls remain authorized, and a separate 54-run authority-preserving check produces no unauthorized commits. We then evaluate mitigation families. Prompt caution and single-condition checks are insufficient because different hazards break different boundary conditions. Defenses work when they refresh, rebind, replan, or refuse at the durability boundary. CommitGuard, a fail-closed boundary monitor, blocks stale durable-effect attempts on protected commit surfaces when runtimes emit witness, dependency, binding, and eligibility signals. The result is a reporting and runtime-design lesson: endpoint success is a utility metric; authorized commit is a security property.

LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm. The standard safeguard is a guard model that labels each proposed action as safe or unsafe, but this binary view conflates two distinct decisions: whether the action is harmful in itself, and whether it is appropriate given the user's context. It also operates at the granularity of action categories rather than individual instances, producing routine interruptions that erode autonomy and train users to wave through the most consequential alerts. We reframe the problem as a per-instance three-way routing decision over {EXECUTE, ASK, REFUSE} and instantiate it with Safety Sentry, a lightweight guard model whose inference reduces to a single decoding call. A single decoding-time threshold lets one fixed checkpoint be re-positioned across deployments of differing risk tolerance without retraining. Safety Sentry outperforms a broad set of open-weight and frontier closed-source baselines on overall accuracy and safety-related recall, while controlling both directional error rates simultaneously.

Imitation-learning policies inherit the quality of the demonstrations they are trained on, and a growing set of curation metrics promise to score and filter low-quality demonstrations automatically. These metrics are each validated on different data with different protocols, so it is unclear which of them actually identify the demonstrations that harm a policy. We build a controlled testbed in which demonstration defects are injected with known type, and audit seven curation metrics along two axes: how well each separates defective from clean demonstrations, and whether training a behavior-cloning policy on each metric's curated subset improves task success. We study two defect regimes. Subtle perturbations (correlated action noise, tremor, truncation) are detectable by multivariate outlier scoring and, once removed, recover the full downstream gap. Structural errors, where the demonstration executes a wrong action at a key moment, are invisible to every action-only metric we test, and two of them are inverted: they score defective demonstrations as higher quality and, used for curation, tend to leave the policy at or below the uncurated baseline rather than above it. Only metrics that examine the state trajectory detect structural errors, and even the best of them recovers just a third of the downstream gap. High detection accuracy does not guarantee downstream improvement. We release the testbed and all curation implementations.

Bug-fix benchmarks are fundamental in advancing various sub-fields of software engineering such as automatic program repair (APR) and fault localization (FL). A good benchmark must include recent examples that accurately reflect technologies and development practices of today. To be executable in the long term, a benchmark must feature test suites that do not degrade overtime due to, for example, dependencies that are no longer available. Existing benchmarks fail in meeting both criteria. For instance, Defects4J, one of the foremost Java benchmarks, last received an update in 2020. Moreover, full-reproducibility has been neglected by the majority of existing benchmarks. In this paper, we present GitBug-Actions: a novel tool for building bug-fix benchmarks with modern and fully-reproducible bug-fixes. GitBug-Actions relies on the most popular CI platform, GitHub Actions, to detect bug-fixes and smartly locally execute the CI pipeline in a controlled and reproducible environment. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to rely on GitHub Actions to collect bug-fixes. To demonstrate our toolchain, we deploy GitBug-Actions to build a proof-of-concept Go bug-fix benchmark containing executable, fully-reproducible bug-fixes from different repositories. A video demonstrating GitBug-Actions is available at: https://youtu.be/aBWwa1sJYBs.