Daily Papers

Graph retrieval-augmented generation (GraphRAG) has effectively enhanced large language models in complex reasoning by organizing fragmented knowledge into explicitly structured graphs. Prior efforts have been made to improve either graph construction or graph retrieval in isolation, yielding suboptimal performance, especially when domain shifts occur. In this paper, we propose a vertically unified agentic paradigm, Youtu-GraphRAG, to jointly connect the entire framework as an intricate integration. Specifically, (i) a seed graph schema is introduced to bound the automatic extraction agent with targeted entity types, relations and attribute types, also continuously expanded for scalability over unseen domains; (ii) To obtain higher-level knowledge upon the schema, we develop novel dually-perceived community detection, fusing structural topology with subgraph semantics for comprehensive knowledge organization. This naturally yields a hierarchical knowledge tree that supports both top-down filtering and bottom-up reasoning with community summaries; (iii) An agentic retriever is designed to interpret the same graph schema to transform complex queries into tractable and parallel sub-queries. It iteratively performs reflection for more advanced reasoning; (iv) To alleviate the knowledge leaking problem in pre-trained LLM, we propose a tailored anonymous dataset and a novel 'Anonymity Reversion' task that deeply measures the real performance of the GraphRAG frameworks. Extensive experiments across six challenging benchmarks demonstrate the robustness of Youtu-GraphRAG, remarkably moving the Pareto frontier with up to 90.71% saving of token costs and 16.62% higher accuracy over state-of-the-art baselines. The results indicate our adaptability, allowing seamless domain transfer with minimal intervention on schema.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is critical for regulatory compliance and for building ethical generative AI systems that avoid producing private, toxic, illegal, or copyrighted content. Despite rapid progress, in this work we show that almost all existing unlearning methods fail to achieve true forgetting in practice. Specifically, while evaluations of these `unlearned' models under deterministic (greedy) decoding often suggest successful knowledge removal using standard benchmarks (as has been done in the literature), we show that sensitive information reliably resurfaces when models are sampled with standard probabilistic decoding. To rigorously capture this vulnerability, we introduce leak@k, a new meta-evaluation metric that quantifies the likelihood of forgotten knowledge reappearing when generating k samples from the model under realistic decoding strategies. Using three widely adopted benchmarks, TOFU, MUSE, and WMDP, we conduct the first large-scale, systematic study of unlearning reliability using our newly defined leak@k metric. Our findings demonstrate that knowledge leakage persists across methods and tasks, underscoring that current state-of-the-art unlearning techniques provide only limited forgetting and highlighting the urgent need for more robust approaches to LLM unlearning.

Knowledge distillation (KD) has been widely used for model compression and knowledge transfer. Typically, a big teacher model trained on sufficient data transfers knowledge to a small student model. However, despite the success of KD, little effort has been made to study whether KD leaks the training data of the teacher model. In this paper, we experimentally reveal that KD suffers from the risk of privacy leakage. To alleviate this issue, we propose a novel knowledge distillation method, swing distillation, which can effectively protect the private information of the teacher model from flowing to the student model. In our framework, the temperature coefficient is dynamically and adaptively adjusted according to the degree of private information contained in the data, rather than a predefined constant hyperparameter. It assigns different temperatures to tokens according to the likelihood that a token in a position contains private information. In addition, we inject noise into soft targets provided to the student model, in order to avoid unshielded knowledge transfer. Experiments on multiple datasets and tasks demonstrate that the proposed swing distillation can significantly reduce (by over 80% in terms of canary exposure) the risk of privacy leakage in comparison to KD with competitive or better performance. Furthermore, swing distillation is robust against the increasing privacy budget.

The need for machine unlearning is critical for data privacy, yet existing methods often cause Knowledge Contamination by unintentionally damaging related knowledge. Such a degraded model performance after unlearning has been recently leveraged for new inference and backdoor attacks. Most studies design adversarial unlearning requests that require poisoning or duplicating training data. In this study, we introduce a new unlearning-induced attack model, namely indirect unlearning attack, which does not require data manipulation but exploits the consequence of knowledge contamination to perturb the model accuracy on security-critical predictions. To mitigate this attack, we introduce a theoretical framework that models neural networks as Neural Knowledge Systems. Based on this, we propose ROKA, a robust unlearning strategy centered on Neural Healing. Unlike conventional unlearning methods that only destroy information, ROKA constructively rebalances the model by nullifying the influence of forgotten data while strengthening its conceptual neighbors. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a theoretical guarantee for knowledge preservation during unlearning. Evaluations on various large models, including vision transformers, multi-modal models, and large language models, show that ROKA effectively unlearns targets while preserving, or even enhancing, the accuracy of retained data, thereby mitigating the indirect unlearning attacks.

Recent advancements in biological research leverage the integration of molecules, proteins, and natural language to enhance drug discovery. However, current models exhibit several limitations, such as the generation of invalid molecular SMILES, underutilization of contextual information, and equal treatment of structured and unstructured knowledge. To address these issues, we propose BioT5, a comprehensive pre-training framework that enriches cross-modal integration in biology with chemical knowledge and natural language associations. BioT5 utilizes SELFIES for 100% robust molecular representations and extracts knowledge from the surrounding context of bio-entities in unstructured biological literature. Furthermore, BioT5 distinguishes between structured and unstructured knowledge, leading to more effective utilization of information. After fine-tuning, BioT5 shows superior performance across a wide range of tasks, demonstrating its strong capability of capturing underlying relations and properties of bio-entities. Our code is available at https://github.com/QizhiPei/BioT5{Github}.

Knowledge erasure in large language models (LLMs) is important for ensuring compliance with data and AI regulations, safeguarding user privacy, mitigating bias, and misinformation. Existing unlearning methods aim to make the process of knowledge erasure more efficient and effective by removing specific knowledge while preserving overall model performance, especially for retained information. However, it has been observed that the unlearning techniques tend to suppress and leave the knowledge beneath the surface, thus making it retrievable with the right prompts. In this work, we demonstrate that step-by-step reasoning can serve as a backdoor to recover this hidden information. We introduce a step-by-step reasoning-based black-box attack, Sleek, that systematically exposes unlearning failures. We employ a structured attack framework with three core components: (1) an adversarial prompt generation strategy leveraging step-by-step reasoning built from LLM-generated queries, (2) an attack mechanism that successfully recalls erased content, and exposes unfair suppression of knowledge intended for retention and (3) a categorization of prompts as direct, indirect, and implied, to identify which query types most effectively exploit unlearning weaknesses. Through extensive evaluations on four state-of-the-art unlearning techniques and two widely used LLMs, we show that existing approaches fail to ensure reliable knowledge removal. Of the generated adversarial prompts, 62.5% successfully retrieved forgotten Harry Potter facts from WHP-unlearned Llama, while 50% exposed unfair suppression of retained knowledge. Our work highlights the persistent risks of information leakage, emphasizing the need for more robust unlearning strategies for erasure.

Machine unlearning has emerged as a prevalent technical solution for selectively removing unwanted knowledge absorbed during pre-training, without requiring full retraining. While recent unlearning techniques can effectively remove undesirable content without severely compromising performance on standard benchmarks, we find that they may inadvertently create ``knowledge holes'' -- unintended losses of benign knowledge that standard benchmarks fail to capture. To probe where unlearned models reveal knowledge holes, we propose a test case generation framework that explores both immediate neighbors of unlearned content and broader areas of potential failures. Our evaluation demonstrates significant hidden costs of unlearning: up to 98.7\% of the test cases yield irrelevant or nonsensical responses from unlearned models, despite being answerable by the pretrained model. These findings necessitate rethinking the conventional approach to evaluating knowledge preservation in unlearning, moving beyond standard, static benchmarks.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a cornerstone of knowledge-intensive applications, including enterprise chatbots, healthcare assistants, and agentic memory management. However, recent studies show that knowledge-extraction attacks can recover sensitive knowledge-base content through maliciously crafted queries, raising serious concerns about intellectual property theft and privacy leakage. While prior work has explored individual attack and defense techniques, the research landscape remains fragmented, spanning heterogeneous retrieval embeddings, diverse generation models, and evaluations based on non-standardized metrics and inconsistent datasets. To address this gap, we introduce the first systematic benchmark for knowledge-extraction attacks on RAG systems. Our benchmark covers a broad spectrum of attack and defense strategies, representative retrieval embedding models, and both open- and closed-source generators, all evaluated under a unified experimental framework with standardized protocols across multiple datasets. By consolidating the experimental landscape and enabling reproducible, comparable evaluation, this benchmark provides actionable insights and a practical foundation for developing privacy-preserving RAG systems in the face of emerging knowledge extraction threats. Our code is available here.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are limited by their parametric knowledge, leading to hallucinations in knowledge-extensive tasks. To address this, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) incorporates external document chunks to expand LLM knowledge. Furthermore, compressing information from document chunks through extraction or summarization can improve LLM performance. Nonetheless, LLMs still struggle to notice and utilize scattered key information, a problem known as the "lost-in-the-middle" syndrome. Therefore, we typically need to restructure the content for LLM to recognize the key information. We propose Refiner, an end-to-end extract-and-restructure paradigm that operates in the post-retrieval process of RAG. Refiner leverages a single decoder-only LLM to adaptively extract query-relevant contents verbatim along with the necessary context, and section them based on their interconnectedness, thereby highlights information distinction, and aligns downstream LLMs with the original context effectively. Experiments show that a trained Refiner (with 7B parameters) exhibits significant gain to downstream LLM in improving answer accuracy, and outperforms other state-of-the-art advanced RAG and concurrent compressing approaches in various single-hop and multi-hop QA tasks. Notably, Refiner achieves a 80.5% tokens reduction and a 1.6-7.0% improvement margin in multi-hop tasks compared to the next best solution. Refiner is a plug-and-play solution that can be seamlessly integrated with RAG systems, facilitating its application across diverse open-source frameworks.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success due to their exceptional generative capabilities. Despite their success, they also have inherent limitations such as a lack of up-to-date knowledge and hallucination. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a state-of-the-art technique to mitigate these limitations. The key idea of RAG is to ground the answer generation of an LLM on external knowledge retrieved from a knowledge database. Existing studies mainly focus on improving the accuracy or efficiency of RAG, leaving its security largely unexplored. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. We find that the knowledge database in a RAG system introduces a new and practical attack surface. Based on this attack surface, we propose PoisonedRAG, the first knowledge corruption attack to RAG, where an attacker could inject a few malicious texts into the knowledge database of a RAG system to induce an LLM to generate an attacker-chosen target answer for an attacker-chosen target question. We formulate knowledge corruption attacks as an optimization problem, whose solution is a set of malicious texts. Depending on the background knowledge (e.g., black-box and white-box settings) of an attacker on a RAG system, we propose two solutions to solve the optimization problem, respectively. Our results show PoisonedRAG could achieve a 90% attack success rate when injecting five malicious texts for each target question into a knowledge database with millions of texts. We also evaluate several defenses and our results show they are insufficient to defend against PoisonedRAG, highlighting the need for new defenses.

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on third-party skills that operate within privileged execution environments and routinely handle sensitive credentials, yet how these credentials are leaked remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we present the first large-scale empirical study on credential leakage in agent skills. From 170,226 artifacts on SkillsMP, the largest open-source skill marketplace, we sampled 17,022 skills via stratified random sampling and analyzed each through static secret extraction (regex and AST parsing), dynamic sandbox testing with mock credentials, and cross-referencing developer intent against runtime behavior. Our analysis identifies 520 affected skills containing 1,708 security issues, and yields a taxonomy of 10 leakage patterns. Three findings stand out. First, 76.3% of cases require jointly analyzing natural-language descriptions and programming logic, showing that credential exposure in skills is fundamentally cross-modal. Second, debug logging accounts for 73.5% of vulnerabilities because agent frameworks feed stdout into the LLM context window, turning routine debugging into a credential exposure vector. Third, 89.6% of leaked credentials are immediately exploitable -- 92.5% during routine execution without elevated privileges -- and the fork-based distribution model defeats remediation, as secrets removed from 107 upstream repositories persist across 50+ independent forks. Following responsible disclosure, all malicious skills have been removed and 91.6% of hardcoded cases remediated. We release our dataset, taxonomy, and detection pipeline to support future agent security research.

Post-training of language models (LMs) increasingly relies on the following two stages: (i) knowledge distillation, where the LM is trained to imitate a larger teacher LM, and (ii) reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), where the LM is aligned by optimizing a reward model. In the second RLHF stage, a well-known challenge is reward hacking, where the LM over-optimizes the reward model. Such phenomenon is in line with Goodhart's law and can lead to degraded performance on the true objective. In this paper, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon, that we call teacher hacking, can occur during knowledge distillation. This could arise because the teacher LM is itself an imperfect approximation of the true distribution. To study this, we propose a controlled experimental setup involving: (i) an oracle LM representing the ground-truth distribution, (ii) a teacher LM distilled from the oracle, and (iii) a student LM distilled from the teacher. Our experiments reveal the following insights. When using a fixed offline dataset for distillation, teacher hacking occurs; moreover, we can detect it by observing when the optimization process deviates from polynomial convergence laws. In contrast, employing online data generation techniques effectively mitigates teacher hacking. More precisely, we identify data diversity as the key factor in preventing hacking. Overall, our findings provide a deeper understanding of the benefits and limitations of distillation for building robust and efficient LMs.

Large language models show impressive abilities in memorizing world knowledge, which leads to concerns regarding memorization of private information, toxic or sensitive knowledge, and copyrighted content. We introduce the problem of Large Scale Knowledge Washing, focusing on unlearning an extensive amount of factual knowledge. Previous unlearning methods usually define the reverse loss and update the model via backpropagation, which may affect the model's fluency and reasoning ability or even destroy the model due to extensive training with the reverse loss. Existing works introduce additional data from downstream tasks to prevent the model from losing capabilities, which requires downstream task awareness. Controlling the tradeoff of unlearning and maintaining existing capabilities is also challenging. To this end, we propose LAW (Large Scale Washing) to update the MLP layers in decoder-only large language models to perform knowledge washing, as inspired by model editing methods and based on the hypothesis that knowledge and reasoning are disentanglable. We derive a new objective with the knowledge to be unlearned to update the weights of certain MLP layers. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LAW in forgetting target knowledge while maintaining reasoning ability. The code will be open-sourced at https://github.com/wangyu-ustc/LargeScaleWashing.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized Natural Language Processing (NLP) but pose risks of inadvertently exposing copyrighted or proprietary data, especially when such data is used for training but not intended for distribution. Traditional methods address these leaks only after content is generated, which can lead to the exposure of sensitive information. This study introduces a proactive approach: examining LLMs' internal states before text generation to detect potential leaks. By using a curated dataset of copyrighted materials, we trained a neural network classifier to identify risks, allowing for early intervention by stopping the generation process or altering outputs to prevent disclosure. Integrated with a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system, this framework ensures adherence to copyright and licensing requirements while enhancing data privacy and ethical standards. Our results show that analyzing internal states effectively mitigates the risk of copyrighted data leakage, offering a scalable solution that fits smoothly into AI workflows, ensuring compliance with copyright regulations while maintaining high-quality text generation. The implementation is available on GitHub.https://github.com/changhu73/Internal_states_leakage

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

Unlearning has emerged as a critical capability for large language models (LLMs) to support data privacy, regulatory compliance, and ethical AI deployment. Recent techniques often rely on obfuscation by injecting incorrect or irrelevant information to suppress knowledge. Such methods effectively constitute knowledge addition rather than true removal, often leaving models vulnerable to probing. In this paper, we formally distinguish unlearning from obfuscation and introduce a probing-based evaluation framework to assess whether existing approaches genuinely remove targeted information. Moreover, we propose DF-MCQ, a novel unlearning method that flattens the model predictive distribution over automatically generated multiple-choice questions using KL-divergence, effectively removing knowledge about target individuals and triggering appropriate refusal behaviour. Experimental results demonstrate that DF-MCQ achieves unlearning with over 90% refusal rate and a random choice-level uncertainty that is much higher than obfuscation on probing questions.

This work presents LURK (Latent UnleaRned Knowledge), a novel framework that probes for hidden retained knowledge in unlearned LLMs through adversarial suffix prompting. LURK automatically generates adversarial prompt suffixes designed to elicit residual knowledge about the Harry Potter domain, a commonly used benchmark for unlearning. Our experiments reveal that even models deemed successfully unlearned can leak idiosyncratic information under targeted adversarial conditions, highlighting critical limitations of current unlearning evaluation standards. By uncovering latent knowledge through indirect probing, LURK offers a more rigorous and diagnostic tool for assessing the robustness of unlearning algorithms. All code will be publicly available.

Various studies have attempted to remove sensitive or private knowledge from a language model to prevent its unauthorized exposure. However, prior studies have overlooked the complex and interconnected nature of knowledge, where related knowledge must be carefully examined. Specifically, they have failed to evaluate whether an unlearning method faithfully erases interconnected knowledge that should be removed, retaining knowledge that appears relevant but exists in a completely different context. To resolve this problem, we first define a new concept called superficial unlearning, which refers to the phenomenon where an unlearning method either fails to erase the interconnected knowledge it should remove or unintentionally erases irrelevant knowledge. Based on the definition, we introduce a new benchmark, FaithUn, to analyze and evaluate the faithfulness of unlearning in real-world knowledge QA settings. Furthermore, we propose a novel unlearning method, KLUE, which updates only knowledge-related neurons to achieve faithful unlearning. KLUE identifies knowledge neurons using an explainability method and updates only those neurons using selected unforgotten samples. Experimental results demonstrate that widely-used unlearning methods fail to ensure faithful unlearning, while our method shows significant effectiveness in real-world QA unlearning.

The interactive use of large language models (LLMs) in AI assistants (at work, home, etc.) introduces a new set of inference-time privacy risks: LLMs are fed different types of information from multiple sources in their inputs and are expected to reason about what to share in their outputs, for what purpose and with whom, within a given context. In this work, we draw attention to the highly critical yet overlooked notion of contextual privacy by proposing ConfAIde, a benchmark designed to identify critical weaknesses in the privacy reasoning capabilities of instruction-tuned LLMs. Our experiments show that even the most capable models such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT reveal private information in contexts that humans would not, 39% and 57% of the time, respectively. This leakage persists even when we employ privacy-inducing prompts or chain-of-thought reasoning. Our work underscores the immediate need to explore novel inference-time privacy-preserving approaches, based on reasoning and theory of mind.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Transfer learning is widely used for training deep neural networks (DNN) for building a powerful representation. Even after the pre-trained model is adapted for the target task, the representation performance of the feature extractor is retained to some extent. As the performance of the pre-trained model can be considered the private property of the owner, it is natural to seek the exclusive right of the generalized performance of the pre-trained weight. To address this issue, we suggest a new paradigm of transfer learning called disposable transfer learning (DTL), which disposes of only the source task without degrading the performance of the target task. To achieve knowledge disposal, we propose a novel loss named Gradient Collision loss (GC loss). GC loss selectively unlearns the source knowledge by leading the gradient vectors of mini-batches in different directions. Whether the model successfully unlearns the source task is measured by piggyback learning accuracy (PL accuracy). PL accuracy estimates the vulnerability of knowledge leakage by retraining the scrubbed model on a subset of source data or new downstream data. We demonstrate that GC loss is an effective approach to the DTL problem by showing that the model trained with GC loss retains the performance on the target task with a significantly reduced PL accuracy.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.

Machine learning models that are overfitted/overtrained are more vulnerable to knowledge leakage, which poses a risk to privacy. Suppose we download or receive a model from a third-party collaborator without knowing its training accuracy. How can we determine if it has been overfitted or overtrained on its training data? It's possible that the model was intentionally over-trained to make it vulnerable during testing. While an overfitted or overtrained model may perform well on testing data and even some generalization tests, we can't be sure it's not over-fitted. Conducting a comprehensive generalization test is also expensive. The goal of this paper is to address these issues and ensure the privacy and generalization of our method using only testing data. To achieve this, we analyze the null space in the last layer of neural networks, which enables us to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowledge of the accuracy of those data. We evaluated our approach on various architectures and datasets and observed a distinct pattern in the angle of null space when models are overfitted. Furthermore, we show that models with poor generalization exhibit specific characteristics in this space. Our work represents the first attempt to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowing any knowledge about the training samples.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

In this paper, we show that knowledge distillation can be subverted to manipulate language model benchmark scores, revealing a critical vulnerability in current evaluation practices. We introduce "Data Laundering," a three-phase process analogous to financial money laundering, that enables the covert transfer of benchmark-specific knowledge through seemingly legitimate intermediate training steps. Through extensive experiments with a 2-layer BERT student model, we show how this approach can achieve substantial improvements in benchmark accuracy (up to 75\% on GPQA) without developing genuine reasoning capabilities. Notably, this method can be exploited intentionally or even unintentionally, as researchers may inadvertently adopt this method that inflates scores using knowledge distillation without realizing the implications. While our findings demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique, we present them as a cautionary tale highlighting the urgent need for more robust evaluation methods in AI. This work aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about evaluation integrity in AI development and the need for benchmarks that more accurately reflect true model capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/data_laundering.

Machine unlearning, which selectively removes harmful knowledge from a pre-trained model without retraining from scratch, is crucial for addressing privacy, regulatory compliance, and ethical concerns in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing unlearning methods often struggle to thoroughly remove harmful knowledge, leaving residual harmful knowledge that can be easily recovered. To address these limitations, we propose Knowledge Density-Guided Unlearning via Blocks Reinsertion (KUnBR), a novel approach that first identifies layers with rich harmful knowledge and then thoroughly eliminates the harmful knowledge via re-insertion strategy. Our method introduces knowledge density estimation to quantify and locate layers containing the most harmful knowledge, enabling precise unlearning. Additionally, we design a layer re-insertion strategy that extracts and re-inserts harmful knowledge-rich layers into the original LLM, bypassing gradient obstruction caused by cover layers and ensuring effective gradient propagation during unlearning. Extensive experiments conducted on several unlearning and general capability benchmarks demonstrate that KUnBR achieves state-of-the-art forgetting performance while maintaining model utility.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have spurred a new research paradigm in natural language processing. Despite their excellent capability in knowledge-based question answering and reasoning, their potential to retain faulty or even harmful knowledge poses risks of malicious application. The challenge of mitigating this issue and transforming these models into purer assistants is crucial for their widespread applicability. Unfortunately, Retraining LLMs repeatedly to eliminate undesirable knowledge is impractical due to their immense parameters. Knowledge unlearning, derived from analogous studies on machine unlearning, presents a promising avenue to address this concern and is notably advantageous in the context of LLMs. It allows for the removal of harmful knowledge in an efficient manner, without affecting unrelated knowledge in the model. To this end, we provide a survey of knowledge unlearning in the era of LLMs. Firstly, we formally define the knowledge unlearning problem and distinguish it from related works. Subsequently, we categorize existing knowledge unlearning methods into three classes: those based on parameter optimization, parameter merging, and in-context learning, and introduce details of these unlearning methods. We further present evaluation datasets used in existing methods, and finally conclude this survey by presenting the ongoing challenges and future directions.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is increasingly adopted to transfer capabilities from large language models to smaller ones, offering significant improvements in efficiency and utility while often surpassing standard fine-tuning. Beyond performance, KD is also explored as a privacy-preserving mechanism to mitigate the risk of training data leakage. While training data memorization has been extensively studied in standard pre-training and fine-tuning settings, its dynamics in a knowledge distillation setup remain poorly understood. In this work, we study memorization across the KD pipeline using three large language model (LLM) families (Pythia, OLMo-2, Qwen-3) and three datasets (FineWeb, Wikitext, Nemotron-CC-v2). We find: (1) distilled models memorize significantly less training data than standard fine-tuning (reducing memorization by more than 50%); (2) some examples are inherently easier to memorize and account for a large fraction of memorization during distillation (over ~95%); (3) student memorization is predictable prior to distillation using features based on zlib entropy, KL divergence, and perplexity; and (4) while soft and hard distillation have similar overall memorization rates, hard distillation poses a greater risk: it inherits 2.7times more teacher-specific examples than soft distillation. Overall, we demonstrate that distillation can provide both improved generalization and reduced memorization risks compared to standard fine-tuning.

Despite their wide adoption, the biases and unintended behaviors of language models remain poorly understood. In this paper, we identify and characterize a phenomenon never discussed before, which we call semantic leakage, where models leak irrelevant information from the prompt into the generation in unexpected ways. We propose an evaluation setting to detect semantic leakage both by humans and automatically, curate a diverse test suite for diagnosing this behavior, and measure significant semantic leakage in 13 flagship models. We also show that models exhibit semantic leakage in languages besides English and across different settings and generation scenarios. This discovery highlights yet another type of bias in language models that affects their generation patterns and behavior.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have a privacy concern because they memorize training data (including personally identifiable information (PII) like emails and phone numbers) and leak it during inference. A company can train an LLM on its domain-customized data which can potentially also include their users' PII. In order to comply with privacy laws such as the "right to be forgotten", the data points of users that are most vulnerable to extraction could be deleted. We find that once the most vulnerable points are deleted, a new set of points become vulnerable to extraction. So far, little attention has been given to understanding memorization for fine-tuned models. In this work, we also show that not only do fine-tuned models leak their training data but they also leak the pre-training data (and PII) memorized during the pre-training phase. The property of new data points becoming vulnerable to extraction after unlearning and leakage of pre-training data through fine-tuned models can pose significant privacy and legal concerns for companies that use LLMs to offer services. We hope this work will start an interdisciplinary discussion within AI and law communities regarding the need for policies to tackle these issues.

We introduce a new analytical framework to quantify the changes in a machine learning algorithm's output distribution following the inclusion of a few data points in its training set, a notion we define as leave-one-out distinguishability (LOOD). This problem is key to measuring data **memorization** and **information leakage** in machine learning, and the **influence** of training data points on model predictions. We illustrate how our method broadens and refines existing empirical measures of memorization and privacy risks associated with training data. We use Gaussian processes to model the randomness of machine learning algorithms, and validate LOOD with extensive empirical analysis of information leakage using membership inference attacks. Our theoretical framework enables us to investigate the causes of information leakage and where the leakage is high. For example, we analyze the influence of activation functions, on data memorization. Additionally, our method allows us to optimize queries that disclose the most significant information about the training data in the leave-one-out setting. We illustrate how optimal queries can be used for accurate **reconstruction** of training data.

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence- or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10times more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

Knowledge distillation is a widely adopted technique for transferring capabilities from LLMs to smaller, more efficient student models. However, unauthorized use of knowledge distillation takes unfair advantage of the considerable effort and cost put into developing frontier models. We investigate methods for modifying teacher-generated reasoning traces to achieve two objectives that deter unauthorized distillation: (1) anti-distillation, or degrading the training usefulness of query responses, and (2) API watermarking, which embeds verifiable signatures in student models. We introduce several approaches for dynamically rewriting a teacher's reasoning outputs while preserving answer correctness and semantic coherence. Two of these leverage the rewriting capabilities of LLMs, while others use gradient-based techniques. Our experiments show that a simple instruction-based rewriting approach achieves a strong anti-distillation effect while maintaining or even improving teacher performance. Furthermore, we show that our rewriting approach also enables embedding watermarks that can be reliably detected with essentially no false alarms. Our code is available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/trace-rewriting.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Backdoor Attacks have been a serious vulnerability against Large Language Models (LLMs). However, previous methods only reveal such risk in specific models, or present tasks transferability after attacking the pre-trained phase. So, how risky is the model transferability of a backdoor attack? In this paper, we focus on whether existing mini-LLMs may be unconsciously instructed in backdoor knowledge by poisoned teacher LLMs through knowledge distillation (KD). Specifically, we propose ATBA, an adaptive transferable backdoor attack, which can effectively distill the backdoor of teacher LLMs into small models when only executing clean-tuning. We first propose the Target Trigger Generation (TTG) module that filters out a set of indicative trigger candidates from the token list based on cosine similarity distribution. Then, we exploit a shadow model to imitate the distilling process and introduce an Adaptive Trigger Optimization (ATO) module to realize a gradient-based greedy feedback to search optimal triggers. Extensive experiments show that ATBA generates not only positive guidance for student models but also implicitly transfers backdoor knowledge. Our attack is robust and stealthy, with over 80% backdoor transferability, and hopes the attention of security.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

An unintended consequence of the vast pretraining of Large Language Models (LLMs) is the verbatim memorization of fragments of their training data, which may contain sensitive or copyrighted information. In recent years, unlearning has emerged as a solution to effectively remove sensitive knowledge from models after training. Yet, recent work has shown that supposedly deleted information can still be extracted by malicious actors through various attacks. Still, current attacks retrieve sets of possible candidate generations and are unable to pinpoint the output that contains the actual target information. We propose activation steering as a method for exact information retrieval from unlearned LLMs. We introduce a novel approach to generating steering vectors, named Anonymized Activation Steering. Additionally, we develop a simple word frequency method to pinpoint the correct answer among a set of candidates when retrieving unlearned information. Our evaluation across multiple unlearning techniques and datasets demonstrates that activation steering successfully recovers general knowledge (e.g., widely known fictional characters) while revealing limitations in retrieving specific information (e.g., details about non-public individuals). Overall, our results demonstrate that exact information retrieval from unlearned models is possible, highlighting a severe vulnerability of current unlearning techniques.

Large language models trained on web-scale data can memorize private or sensitive knowledge, raising significant privacy risks. Although some unlearning methods mitigate these risks, they remain vulnerable to "relearning" during subsequent training, allowing a substantial portion of forgotten knowledge to resurface. In this paper, we show that widely used unlearning methods cause shallow alignment: instead of faithfully erasing target knowledge, they generate spurious unlearning neurons that amplify negative influence to hide it. To overcome this limitation, we introduce Ssiuu, a new class of unlearning methods that employs attribution-guided regularization to prevent spurious negative influence and faithfully remove target knowledge. Experimental results confirm that our method reliably erases target knowledge and outperforms strong baselines across two practical retraining scenarios: (1) adversarial injection of private data, and (2) benign attack using an instruction-following benchmark. Our findings highlight the necessity of robust and faithful unlearning methods for safe deployment of language models.

Exchanging gradients is a widely used method in modern multi-node machine learning system (e.g., distributed training, collaborative learning). For a long time, people believed that gradients are safe to share: i.e., the training data will not be leaked by gradient exchange. However, we show that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly shared gradients. We name this leakage as Deep Leakage from Gradient and empirically validate the effectiveness on both computer vision and natural language processing tasks. Experimental results show that our attack is much stronger than previous approaches: the recovery is pixel-wise accurate for images and token-wise matching for texts. We want to raise people's awareness to rethink the gradient's safety. Finally, we discuss several possible strategies to prevent such deep leakage. The most effective defense method is gradient pruning.

We expose a critical limitation in current approaches to machine unlearning in language models: despite the apparent success of unlearning algorithms, information about the forgotten data remains linearly decodable from internal representations. To systematically assess this discrepancy, we introduce an interpretable, information-theoretic framework for auditing unlearning using Partial Information Decomposition (PID). By comparing model representations before and after unlearning, we decompose the mutual information with the forgotten data into distinct components, formalizing the notions of unlearned and residual knowledge. Our analysis reveals that redundant information, shared across both models, constitutes residual knowledge that persists post-unlearning and correlates with susceptibility to known adversarial reconstruction attacks. Leveraging these insights, we propose a representation-based risk score that can guide abstention on sensitive inputs at inference time, providing a practical mechanism to mitigate privacy leakage. Our work introduces a principled, representation-level audit for unlearning, offering theoretical insight and actionable tools for safer deployment of language models.

Recent advances in machine learning, particularly in Natural Language Processing (NLP), have produced powerful models trained on vast datasets. However, these models risk leaking sensitive information, raising privacy concerns. In response, regulatory measures such as the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) have driven increasing interest in Machine Unlearning techniques, which enable models to selectively forget specific data entries. Early unlearning approaches primarily relied on pre-processing methods, while more recent research has shifted towards training-based solutions. Despite their effectiveness, a key limitation persists: most methods require access to original training data, which is often unavailable. Additionally, directly applying unlearning techniques bears the cost of undermining the model's expressive capabilities. To address these challenges, we introduce the Iterative Contrastive Unlearning (ICU) framework, which consists of three core components: A Knowledge Unlearning Induction module designed to target specific knowledge for removal using an unlearning loss; A Contrastive Learning Enhancement module to preserve the model's expressive capabilities against the pure unlearning goal; And an Iterative Unlearning Refinement module that dynamically adjusts the unlearning process through ongoing evaluation and updates. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our ICU method in unlearning sensitive information while maintaining the model's overall performance, offering a promising solution for privacy-conscious machine learning applications.

Many recent breakthroughs in machine learning have been enabled by the pre-trained foundation models. By scaling up model parameters, training data, and computation resources, foundation models have significantly advanced the state-of-the-art in many applications. However, it is still an open question of how to use these models to perform downstream tasks efficiently. Knowledge distillation (KD) has been explored to tackle this challenge. KD transfers knowledge from a large teacher model to a smaller student model. While KD has been successful in improving student model performance, recent research has discovered that a powerful teacher does not necessarily lead to a powerful student, due to their huge capacity gap. In addition, the potential distribution shifts between the pre-training data and downstream tasks can make knowledge transfer in KD sub-optimal for improving downstream task performance. In this paper, we extend KD with an interactive communication process to help students of downstream tasks learn effectively from pre-trained foundation models. Our design is inspired by the way humans learn from teachers who can explain knowledge in a way that meets the students' needs. Specifically, we let each model (i.e., student and teacher) train two components: (1) an encoder encoding the model's hidden states to a message and (2) a decoder decoding any messages to its own hidden states. With encoder and decoder, not only can the teacher transfer rich information by encoding its hidden states, but also the student can send messages with information of downstream tasks to the teacher. Therefore, knowledge passing from teacher to student can be tailored to the student's capacity and downstream tasks' distributions. We conducted experiments on benchmark datasets to show that our communication mechanism outperforms state-of-the-art distillation techniques.

Data-free knowledge distillation (KD) helps transfer knowledge from a pre-trained model (known as the teacher model) to a smaller model (known as the student model) without access to the original training data used for training the teacher model. However, the security of the synthetic or out-of-distribution (OOD) data required in data-free KD is largely unknown and under-explored. In this work, we make the first effort to uncover the security risk of data-free KD w.r.t. untrusted pre-trained models. We then propose Anti-Backdoor Data-Free KD (ABD), the first plug-in defensive method for data-free KD methods to mitigate the chance of potential backdoors being transferred. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed ABD in diminishing transferred backdoor knowledge while maintaining compatible downstream performances as the vanilla KD. We envision this work as a milestone for alarming and mitigating the potential backdoors in data-free KD. Codes are released at https://github.com/illidanlab/ABD.

We present a text-reconstruction attack on mixture-of-experts (MoE) language models that recovers tokens from expert selections alone. In MoE models, each token is routed to a subset of expert subnetworks; we show these routing decisions leak substantially more information than previously understood. Prior work using logistic regression achieves limited reconstruction; we show that a 3-layer MLP improves this to 63.1% top-1 accuracy, and that a transformer-based sequence decoder recovers 91.2% of tokens top-1 (94.8% top-10) on 32-token sequences from OpenWebText after training on 100M tokens. These results connect MoE routing to the broader literature on embedding inversion. We outline practical leakage scenarios (e.g., distributed inference and side channels) and show that adding noise reduces but does not eliminate reconstruction. Our findings suggest that expert selections in MoE deployments should be treated as sensitive as the underlying text.

Despite significant progress in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Existing defense mechanisms have not fully deleted harmful knowledge in LLMs, which allows such attacks to bypass safeguards and produce harmful outputs. To address this challenge, we propose a novel safety alignment strategy, Constrained Knowledge Unlearning (CKU), which focuses on two primary objectives: knowledge localization and retention, and unlearning harmful knowledge. CKU works by scoring neurons in specific multilayer perceptron (MLP) layers to identify a subset U of neurons associated with useful knowledge. During the unlearning process, CKU prunes the gradients of neurons in U to preserve valuable knowledge while effectively mitigating harmful content. Experimental results demonstrate that CKU significantly enhances model safety without compromising overall performance, offering a superior balance between safety and utility compared to existing methods. Additionally, our analysis of neuron knowledge sensitivity across various MLP layers provides valuable insights into the mechanics of safety alignment and model knowledge editing.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) acquire vast knowledge during pre-training, they often lack domain-specific, new, or niche information. Continual pre-training (CPT) attempts to address this gap but suffers from catastrophic forgetting and inefficiencies in low-data regimes. We introduce Knowledge-Instruct, a novel approach to efficiently inject knowledge from limited corpora through pure instruction-tuning. By generating information-dense synthetic instruction data, it effectively integrates new knowledge while preserving general reasoning and instruction-following abilities. Knowledge-Instruct demonstrates superior factual memorization, minimizes catastrophic forgetting, and remains scalable by leveraging synthetic data from relatively small language models. Additionally, it enhances contextual understanding, including complex multi-hop reasoning, facilitating integration with retrieval systems. We validate its effectiveness across diverse benchmarks, including Companies, a new dataset that we release to measure knowledge injection capabilities.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in the real world, the ability to ``unlearn'', or remove specific pieces of knowledge post hoc, has become essential for a variety of reasons ranging from privacy regulations to correcting outdated or harmful content. Prior work has proposed unlearning benchmarks and algorithms, and has typically assumed that the training process and the target model are fixed. In this work, we empirically investigate how learning-time choices in knowledge encoding impact the effectiveness of unlearning factual knowledge. Our experiments reveal two key findings: (1) learning with paraphrased descriptions improves unlearning performance and (2) unlearning individual piece of knowledge from a chunk of text is challenging. Our results suggest that learning-time knowledge encoding may play a central role in enabling reliable post-hoc unlearning.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Language models trained on web-scale corpora risk memorizing and exposing sensitive information, prompting the need for effective machine unlearning. Prior methods mainly focus on input queries to suppress sensitive outputs, yet this often fails to eliminate the underlying knowledge and limits scalability. To address this, we propose Corrective Unlearning with Retrieved Exclusions (CURE), a novel unlearning framework that verifies model outputs for leakage and revises them into safe responses. Specifically, CURE employs a lightweight corrector that is applied to the original model to verify whether outputs contain target knowledge and to rewrite them if any leakage is detected. To efficiently handle large-scale unlearning requests, CURE retrieves unlearning targets that are relevant to the initial response and provides them as in-context references to the corrector for detection and conditional revision. By leveraging this retrieval augmentation, the corrector can adapt to new unlearning requests without additional training. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that CURE substantially reduces information leakage, even from indirect queries where prior works fall short, while maintaining response quality and general utility. Moreover, it demonstrates robustness under continual unlearning scenarios, making it practical for real-world applications.

Pretrained Language Models (LMs) memorize a vast amount of knowledge during initial pretraining, including information that may violate the privacy of personal lives and identities. Previous work addressing privacy issues for language models has mostly focused on data preprocessing and differential privacy methods, both requiring re-training the underlying LM. We propose knowledge unlearning as an alternative method to reduce privacy risks for LMs post hoc. We show that simply performing gradient ascent on target token sequences is effective at forgetting them with little to no degradation of general language modeling performances for larger LMs; it sometimes even substantially improves the underlying LM with just a few iterations. We also find that sequential unlearning is better than trying to unlearn all the data at once and that unlearning is highly dependent on which kind of data (domain) is forgotten. By showing comparisons with a previous data preprocessing method and a decoding method known to mitigate privacy risks for LMs, we show that unlearning can give a stronger empirical privacy guarantee in scenarios where the data vulnerable to extraction attacks are known a priori while being much more efficient and robust. We release the code and dataset needed to replicate our results at https://github.com/joeljang/knowledge-unlearning.

With increasingly more data and computation involved in their training, machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property. This has spurred interest in model stealing, which is made more practical by advances in learning with partial, little, or no supervision. Existing defenses focus on inserting unique watermarks in a model's decision surface, but this is insufficient: the watermarks are not sampled from the training distribution and thus are not always preserved during model stealing. In this paper, we make the key observation that knowledge contained in the stolen model's training set is what is common to all stolen copies. The adversary's goal, irrespective of the attack employed, is always to extract this knowledge or its by-products. This gives the original model's owner a strong advantage over the adversary: model owners have access to the original training data. We thus introduce dataset inference, the process of identifying whether a suspected model copy has private knowledge from the original model's dataset, as a defense against model stealing. We develop an approach for dataset inference that combines statistical testing with the ability to estimate the distance of multiple data points to the decision boundary. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100 and ImageNet show that model owners can claim with confidence greater than 99% that their model (or dataset as a matter of fact) was stolen, despite only exposing 50 of the stolen model's training points. Dataset inference defends against state-of-the-art attacks even when the adversary is adaptive. Unlike prior work, it does not require retraining or overfitting the defended model.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is a model-agnostic technique to improve model quality while having a fixed capacity budget. It is a commonly used technique for model compression, where a larger capacity teacher model with better quality is used to train a more compact student model with better inference efficiency. Through distillation, one hopes to benefit from student's compactness, without sacrificing too much on model quality. Despite the large success of knowledge distillation, better understanding of how it benefits student model's training dynamics remains under-explored. In this paper, we categorize teacher's knowledge into three hierarchical levels and study its effects on knowledge distillation: (1) knowledge of the `universe', where KD brings a regularization effect through label smoothing; (2) domain knowledge, where teacher injects class relationships prior to student's logit layer geometry; and (3) instance specific knowledge, where teacher rescales student model's per-instance gradients based on its measurement on the event difficulty. Using systematic analyses and extensive empirical studies on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we confirm that the aforementioned three factors play a major role in knowledge distillation. Furthermore, based on our findings, we diagnose some of the failure cases of applying KD from recent studies.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained on extensive corpora inevitably retain sensitive data, such as personal privacy information and copyrighted material. Recent advancements in knowledge unlearning involve updating LLM parameters to erase specific knowledge. However, current unlearning paradigms are mired in vague forgetting boundaries, often erasing knowledge indiscriminately. In this work, we introduce KnowUnDo, a benchmark containing copyrighted content and user privacy domains to evaluate if the unlearning process inadvertently erases essential knowledge. Our findings indicate that existing unlearning methods often suffer from excessive unlearning. To address this, we propose a simple yet effective method, MemFlex, which utilizes gradient information to precisely target and unlearn sensitive parameters. Experimental results show that MemFlex is superior to existing methods in both precise knowledge unlearning and general knowledge retaining of LLMs. Code and dataset will be released at https://github.com/zjunlp/KnowUnDo.

During pretraining, LLMs inadvertently memorize sensitive or copyrighted data, posing significant compliance challenges under legal frameworks like the GDPR and the EU AI Act. Fulfilling these mandates demands techniques that can remove information from a deployed model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning approaches attempt to address this need, but often leak the very data they aim to erase, sacrifice fluency and robustness, or depend on costly external reward models. We introduce PURGE (Policy Unlearning through Relative Group Erasure), a novel method grounded in the Group Relative Policy Optimization framework that formulates unlearning as a verifiable problem. PURGE uses an intrinsic reward signal that penalizes any mention of forbidden concepts, allowing safe and consistent unlearning. Our approach achieves up to x46 lower token usage per target than state-of-the-art methods, while improving fluency by +5.48% and adversarial robustness by +12.02% over the base model. Extensive evaluation on the Real World Knowledge Unlearning (RWKU) benchmark shows that PURGE reaches 11% unlearning effectiveness while preserving 98% of original utility. PURGE shows that framing LLM unlearning as a verifiable task enables more reliable, efficient, and scalable forgetting, suggesting a promising new direction for unlearning research that combines theoretical guarantees, improved safety, and practical deployment efficiency.

LLMs have been found to memorize training textual sequences and regurgitate verbatim said sequences during text generation time. This fact is known to be the cause of privacy and related (e.g., copyright) problems. Unlearning in LLMs then takes the form of devising new algorithms that will properly deal with these side-effects of memorized data, while not hurting the model's utility. We offer a fresh perspective towards this goal, namely, that each textual sequence to be forgotten should be treated differently when being unlearned based on its degree of memorization within the LLM. We contribute a new metric for measuring unlearning quality, an adversarial attack showing that SOTA algorithms lacking this perspective fail for privacy, and two new unlearning methods based on Gradient Ascent and Task Arithmetic, respectively. A comprehensive performance evaluation across an extensive suite of NLP tasks then mapped the solution space, identifying the best solutions under different scales in model capacities and forget set sizes and quantified the gains of the new approaches.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) empowers Large Language Models (LLMs) to dynamically integrate external knowledge during inference, improving their factual accuracy and adaptability. However, adversaries can inject poisoned external knowledge to override the model's internal memory. While existing attacks iteratively manipulate retrieval content or prompt structure of RAG, they largely ignore the model's internal representation dynamics and neuron-level sensitivities. The underlying mechanism of RAG poisoning has not been fully studied and the effect of knowledge conflict with strong parametric knowledge in RAG is not considered. In this work, we propose NeuroGenPoisoning, a novel attack framework that generates adversarial external knowledge in RAG guided by LLM internal neuron attribution and genetic optimization. Our method first identifies a set of Poison-Responsive Neurons whose activation strongly correlates with contextual poisoning knowledge. We then employ a genetic algorithm to evolve adversarial passages that maximally activate these neurons. Crucially, our framework enables massive-scale generation of effective poisoned RAG knowledge by identifying and reusing promising but initially unsuccessful external knowledge variants via observed attribution signals. At the same time, Poison-Responsive Neurons guided poisoning can effectively resolves knowledge conflict. Experimental results across models and datasets demonstrate consistently achieving high Population Overwrite Success Rate (POSR) of over 90% while preserving fluency. Empirical evidence shows that our method effectively resolves knowledge conflict.

Language models (LMs) are trained on vast amounts of text data, which may include private and copyrighted content. Data owners may request the removal of their data from a trained model due to privacy or copyright concerns. However, exactly unlearning only these datapoints (i.e., retraining with the data removed) is intractable in modern-day models. This has led to the development of many approximate unlearning algorithms. The evaluation of the efficacy of these algorithms has traditionally been narrow in scope, failing to precisely quantify the success and practicality of the algorithm from the perspectives of both the model deployers and the data owners. We address this issue by proposing MUSE, a comprehensive machine unlearning evaluation benchmark that enumerates six diverse desirable properties for unlearned models: (1) no verbatim memorization, (2) no knowledge memorization, (3) no privacy leakage, (4) utility preservation on data not intended for removal, (5) scalability with respect to the size of removal requests, and (6) sustainability over sequential unlearning requests. Using these criteria, we benchmark how effectively eight popular unlearning algorithms on 7B-parameter LMs can unlearn Harry Potter books and news articles. Our results demonstrate that most algorithms can prevent verbatim memorization and knowledge memorization to varying degrees, but only one algorithm does not lead to severe privacy leakage. Furthermore, existing algorithms fail to meet deployer's expectations because they often degrade general model utility and also cannot sustainably accommodate successive unlearning requests or large-scale content removal. Our findings identify key issues with the practicality of existing unlearning algorithms on language models, and we release our benchmark to facilitate further evaluations: muse-bench.github.io

As the cost associated with fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) continues to rise, recent research efforts have pivoted towards developing methodologies to edit implicit knowledge embedded within LLMs. Yet, there's still a dark cloud lingering overhead -- will knowledge editing trigger butterfly effect? since it is still unclear whether knowledge editing might introduce side effects that pose potential risks or not. This paper pioneers the investigation into the potential pitfalls associated with knowledge editing for LLMs. To achieve this, we introduce new benchmark datasets and propose innovative evaluation metrics. Our results underline two pivotal concerns: (1) Knowledge Conflict: Editing groups of facts that logically clash can magnify the inherent inconsistencies in LLMs-a facet neglected by previous methods. (2) Knowledge Distortion: Altering parameters with the aim of editing factual knowledge can irrevocably warp the innate knowledge structure of LLMs. Experimental results vividly demonstrate that knowledge editing might inadvertently cast a shadow of unintended consequences on LLMs, which warrant attention and efforts for future works. Code and data are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/PitfallsKnowledgeEditing.

Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific training data from a model without requiring full retraining. This capability is crucial for ensuring privacy, safety, and regulatory compliance. Therefore, verifying whether a model has truly forgotten target data is essential for maintaining reliability and trustworthiness. However, existing evaluation methods often assess forgetting at the level of individual inputs. This approach may overlook residual influence present in semantically similar examples. Such influence can compromise privacy and lead to indirect information leakage. We propose REMIND (Residual Memorization In Neighborhood Dynamics), a novel evaluation method aiming to detect the subtle remaining influence of unlearned data and classify whether the data has been effectively forgotten. REMIND analyzes the model's loss over small input variations and reveals patterns unnoticed by single-point evaluations. We show that unlearned data yield flatter, less steep loss landscapes, while retained or unrelated data exhibit sharper, more volatile patterns. REMIND requires only query-based access, outperforms existing methods under similar constraints, and demonstrates robustness across different models, datasets, and paraphrased inputs, making it practical for real-world deployment. By providing a more sensitive and interpretable measure of unlearning effectiveness, REMIND provides a reliable framework to assess unlearning in language models. As a result, REMIND offers a novel perspective on memorization and unlearning.

Fine-tuning large language models on private data for downstream applications poses significant privacy risks in potentially exposing sensitive information. Several popular community platforms now offer convenient distribution of a large variety of pre-trained models, allowing anyone to publish without rigorous verification. This scenario creates a privacy threat, as pre-trained models can be intentionally crafted to compromise the privacy of fine-tuning datasets. In this study, we introduce a novel poisoning technique that uses model-unlearning as an attack tool. This approach manipulates a pre-trained language model to increase the leakage of private data during the fine-tuning process. Our method enhances both membership inference and data extraction attacks while preserving model utility. Experimental results across different models, datasets, and fine-tuning setups demonstrate that our attacks significantly surpass baseline performance. This work serves as a cautionary note for users who download pre-trained models from unverified sources, highlighting the potential risks involved.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) trained on massive data may memorize sensitive personal information and photos, posing serious privacy risks. To mitigate this, MLLM unlearning methods are proposed, which fine-tune MLLMs to reduce the ``forget'' sensitive information. However, it remains unclear whether the knowledge has been truly forgotten or just hidden in the model. Therefore, we propose to study a novel problem of LLM unlearning attack, which aims to recover the unlearned knowledge of an unlearned LLM. To achieve the goal, we propose a novel framework Stealthy Unlearning Attack (SUA) framework that learns a universal noise pattern. When applied to input images, this noise can trigger the model to reveal unlearned content. While pixel-level perturbations may be visually subtle, they can be detected in the semantic embedding space, making such attacks vulnerable to potential defenses. To improve stealthiness, we introduce an embedding alignment loss that minimizes the difference between the perturbed and denoised image embeddings, ensuring the attack is semantically unnoticeable. Experimental results show that SUA can effectively recover unlearned information from MLLMs. Furthermore, the learned noise generalizes well: a single perturbation trained on a subset of samples can reveal forgotten content in unseen images. This indicates that knowledge reappearance is not an occasional failure, but a consistent behavior.

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) relies heavily on the huge amount of pre-training data learned in the pre-training phase. The opacity of the pre-training process and the training data causes the results of many benchmark tests to become unreliable. If any model has been trained on a benchmark test set, it can seriously hinder the health of the field. In order to automate and efficiently test the capabilities of large language models, numerous mainstream benchmarks adopt a multiple-choice format. As the swapping of the contents of multiple-choice options does not affect the meaning of the question itself, we propose a simple and effective data leakage detection method based on this property. Specifically, we shuffle the contents of the options in the data to generate the corresponding derived data sets, and then detect data leakage based on the model's log probability distribution over the derived data sets. If there is a maximum and outlier in the set of log probabilities, it indicates that the data is leaked. Our method is able to work under black-box conditions without access to model training data or weights, effectively identifying data leakage from benchmark test sets in model pre-training data, including both normal scenarios and complex scenarios where options may have been shuffled intentionally or unintentionally. Through experiments based on two LLMs and benchmark designs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. In addition, we evaluate the degree of data leakage of 31 mainstream open-source LLMs on four benchmark datasets and give a ranking of the leaked LLMs for each benchmark, and we find that the Qwen family of LLMs has the highest degree of data leakage.

Fine-tuning is a widespread technique that allows practitioners to transfer pre-trained capabilities, as recently showcased by the successful applications of foundation models. However, fine-tuning reinforcement learning (RL) models remains a challenge. This work conceptualizes one specific cause of poor transfer, accentuated in the RL setting by the interplay between actions and observations: forgetting of pre-trained capabilities. Namely, a model deteriorates on the state subspace of the downstream task not visited in the initial phase of fine-tuning, on which the model behaved well due to pre-training. This way, we lose the anticipated transfer benefits. We identify conditions when this problem occurs, showing that it is common and, in many cases, catastrophic. Through a detailed empirical analysis of the challenging NetHack and Montezuma's Revenge environments, we show that standard knowledge retention techniques mitigate the problem and thus allow us to take full advantage of the pre-trained capabilities. In particular, in NetHack, we achieve a new state-of-the-art for neural models, improving the previous best score from 5K to over 10K points in the Human Monk scenario.

Stealing attacks pose a persistent threat to the intellectual property of deployed machine-learning systems. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) intensifies this risk by extending the attack surface beyond model weights to knowledge base that often contains IP-bearing assets such as proprietary runbooks, curated domain collections, or licensed documents. Recent work shows that multi-turn questioning can gradually steal corpus content from RAG systems, yet existing attacks are largely heuristic and often plateau early. We address this gap by formulating RAG knowledge-base stealing as an adaptive stochastic coverage problem (ASCP), where each query is a stochastic action and the goal is to maximize the conditional expected marginal gain (CMG) in corpus coverage under a query budget. Bridging ASCP to real-world black-box RAG knowledge-base stealing raises three challenges: CMG is unobservable, the natural-language action space is intractably large, and feasibility constraints require stealthy queries that remain effective under diverse architectures. We introduce RAGCrawler, a knowledge graph-guided attacker that maintains a global attacker-side state to estimate coverage gains, schedule high-value semantic anchors, and generate non-redundant natural queries. Across four corpora and four generators with BGE retriever, RAGCrawler achieves 66.8% average coverage (up to 84.4%) within 1,000 queries, improving coverage by 44.90% relative to the strongest baseline. It also reduces the queries needed to reach 70% coverage by at least 4.03x on average and enables surrogate reconstruction with answer similarity up to 0.699. Our attack is also scalable to retriever switching and newer RAG techniques like query rewriting and multi-query retrieval. These results highlight urgent needs to protect RAG knowledge assets.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Large Language Models (LLM) are typically trained on vast amounts of data from various sources. Even when designed modularly (e.g., Mixture-of-Experts), LLMs can leak privacy on their sources. Conversely, training such models in isolation arguably prohibits generalization. To this end, we propose a framework, NoEsis, which builds upon the desired properties of modularity, privacy, and knowledge transfer. NoEsis integrates differential privacy with a hybrid two-staged parameter-efficient fine-tuning that combines domain-specific low-rank adapters, acting as experts, with common prompt tokens, acting as a knowledge-sharing backbone. Results from our evaluation on CodeXGLUE showcase that NoEsis can achieve provable privacy guarantees with tangible knowledge transfer across domains, and empirically show protection against Membership Inference Attacks. Finally, on code completion tasks, NoEsis bridges at least 77% of the accuracy gap between the non-shared and the non-private baseline.

In financial Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, models frequently rely on retrieved documents to generate accurate responses due to the time-sensitive nature of the financial domain. While retrieved documents help address knowledge gaps, model-generated responses still suffer from hallucinations that contradict the retrieved information. To mitigate this inconsistency, we propose a Reinforcement Learning framework enhanced with Fine-grained Knowledge Verification (RLFKV). Our method decomposes financial responses into atomic knowledge units and assesses the correctness of each unit to compute the fine-grained faithful reward. This reward offers more precise optimization signals, thereby improving alignment with the retrieved documents. Additionally, to prevent reward hacking (e.g., overly concise replies), we incorporate an informativeness reward that encourages the policy model to retain at least as many knowledge units as the base model. Experiments conducted on the public Financial Data Description (FDD) task and our newly proposed FDD-ANT dataset demonstrate consistent improvements, confirming the effectiveness of our approach.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) consists of transferring “knowledge” from one machine learning model (the teacher) to another (the student). Commonly, the teacher is a high-capacity model with formidable performance, while the student is more compact. By transferring knowledge, one hopes to benefit from the student’s compactness, without sacrificing too much performance. We study KD from a new perspective: rather than compressing models, we train students parameterized identically to their teachers. Surprisingly, these Born-Again Networks (BANs), outperform their teachers significantly, both on computer vision and language modeling tasks. Our experiments with BANs based on DenseNets demonstrate state-of-the-art performance on the CIFAR-10 (3.5%) and CIFAR-100 (15.5%) datasets, by validation error. Additional experiments explore two distillation objectives: (i) Confidence-Weighted by Teacher Max (CWTM) and (ii) Dark Knowledge with Permuted Predictions (DKPP). Both methods elucidate the essential components of KD, demonstrating the effect of the teacher outputs on both predicted and non-predicted classes.

As language models become more powerful and sophisticated, it is crucial that they remain trustworthy and reliable. There is concerning preliminary evidence that models may attempt to deceive or keep secrets from their operators. To explore the ability of current techniques to elicit such hidden knowledge, we train a Taboo model: a language model that describes a specific secret word without explicitly stating it. Importantly, the secret word is not presented to the model in its training data or prompt. We then investigate methods to uncover this secret. First, we evaluate non-interpretability (black-box) approaches. Subsequently, we develop largely automated strategies based on mechanistic interpretability techniques, including logit lens and sparse autoencoders. Evaluation shows that both approaches are effective in eliciting the secret word in our proof-of-concept setting. Our findings highlight the promise of these approaches for eliciting hidden knowledge and suggest several promising avenues for future work, including testing and refining these methods on more complex model organisms. This work aims to be a step towards addressing the crucial problem of eliciting secret knowledge from language models, thereby contributing to their safe and reliable deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained increasing prominence in artificial intelligence, making a profound impact on society and various industries like business and science. However, the presence of false information on the internet and in text corpus poses a significant risk to the reliability and safety of LLMs, underscoring the urgent need to understand the mechanisms of how false information influences the behaviors of LLMs. In this paper, we dive into this problem and investigate how false information spreads in LLMs and affects related responses. Specifically, in our series of experiments, we investigate different factors that can influence the spread of information in LLMs by comparing three degrees of information relevance (direct, indirect, and peripheral), four information source styles (Twitter, web blogs, news reports, and research papers) and two common knowledge injection paradigms (in-context injection and learning-based injection). The experimental results show that (1)False information will spread and contaminate related memories in LLMs via a semantic diffusion process, i.e., false information has global detrimental effects beyond its direct impact. (2)Current LLMs are susceptible to authority bias, i.e., LLMs are more likely to follow false information presented in trustworthy styles such as news reports and research papers, which usually cause deeper and wider pollution of information. (3)Current LLMs are more sensitive to false information through in-context injection than through learning-based injection, which severely challenges the reliability and safety of LLMs even when all training data are trusty and correct. The above findings raise the need for new false information defense algorithms to address the global impact of false information, and new alignment algorithms to unbiasedly lead LLMs to follow essential human values rather than superficial patterns.

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails to elicit harmful outputs. Existing approaches overwhelmingly operate within the prompt-optimization paradigm: whether through traditional algorithmic search or recent agent-based workflows, the resulting prompts typically retain malicious semantic signals that modern guardrails are primed to detect. In contrast, we identify a deeper, largely overlooked vulnerability stemming from the highly interconnected nature of an LLM's internal knowledge. This structure allows harmful objectives to be realized by weaving together sequences of benign sub-queries, each of which individually evades detection. To exploit this loophole, we introduce the Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent (CKA-Agent), a dynamic framework that reframes jailbreaking as an adaptive, tree-structured exploration of the target model's knowledge base. The CKA-Agent issues locally innocuous queries, uses model responses to guide exploration across multiple paths, and ultimately assembles the aggregated information to achieve the original harmful objective. Evaluated across state-of-the-art commercial LLMs (Gemini2.5-Flash/Pro, GPT-oss-120B, Claude-Haiku-4.5), CKA-Agent consistently achieves over 95% success rates even against strong guardrails, underscoring the severity of this vulnerability and the urgent need for defenses against such knowledge-decomposition attacks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/CKA-Agent.

The growing use of large language models in sensitive domains has exposed a critical weakness: the inability to ensure that private information can be permanently forgotten. Yet these systems still lack reliable mechanisms to guarantee that sensitive information can be permanently removed once it has been used. Retraining from the beginning is prohibitively costly, and existing unlearning methods remain fragmented, difficult to verify, and often vulnerable to recovery. This paper surveys recent research on machine unlearning for LLMs and considers how far current approaches can address these challenges. We review methods for evaluating whether forgetting has occurred, the resilience of unlearned models against adversarial attacks, and mechanisms that can support user trust when model complexity or proprietary limits restrict transparency. Technical solutions such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, federated learning, and ephemeral memory are examined alongside institutional safeguards including auditing practices and regulatory frameworks. The review finds steady progress, but robust and verifiable unlearning is still unresolved. Efficient techniques that avoid costly retraining, stronger defenses against adversarial recovery, and governance structures that reinforce accountability are needed if LLMs are to be deployed safely in sensitive applications. By integrating technical and organizational perspectives, this study outlines a pathway toward AI systems that can be required to forget, while maintaining both privacy and public trust.

Due to the widespread use of LLMs and the rising critical ethical and safety concerns, LLM unlearning methods have been developed to remove harmful knowledge and undesirable capabilities. In this context, evaluations are mostly based on single-value metrics such as QA accuracy. However, these metrics often fail to capture the nuanced retention of harmful knowledge components, making it difficult to assess the true effectiveness of unlearning. To address this issue, we propose UNCD (UNlearning evaluation via Cognitive Diagnosis), a novel framework that leverages Cognitive Diagnosis Modeling for fine-grained evaluation of LLM unlearning. Our dedicated benchmark, UNCD-Cyber, provides a detailed assessment of the removal of dangerous capabilities. Moreover, we introduce UNCD-Agent, which refines unlearning by diagnosing knowledge remnants and generating targeted unlearning data. Extensive experiments across eight unlearning methods and two base models demonstrate that UNCD not only enhances evaluation but also effectively facilitates the removal of harmful LLM abilities.

As backdoor attacks become more stealthy and robust, they reveal critical weaknesses in current defense strategies: detection methods often rely on coarse-grained feature statistics, and purification methods typically require full retraining or additional clean models. To address these challenges, we propose DUP (Detection-guided Unlearning for Purification), a unified framework that integrates backdoor detection with unlearning-based purification. The detector captures feature-level anomalies by jointly leveraging class-agnostic distances and inter-layer transitions. These deviations are integrated through a weighted scheme to identify poisoned inputs, enabling more fine-grained analysis. Based on the detection results, we purify the model through a parameter-efficient unlearning mechanism that avoids full retraining and does not require any external clean model. Specifically, we innovatively repurpose knowledge distillation to guide the student model toward increasing its output divergence from the teacher on detected poisoned samples, effectively forcing it to unlearn the backdoor behavior. Extensive experiments across diverse attack methods and language model architectures demonstrate that DUP achieves superior defense performance in detection accuracy and purification efficacy. Our code is available at https://github.com/ManHu2025/DUP.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

Data-free Knowledge Distillation (DFKD) has gained popularity recently, with the fundamental idea of carrying out knowledge transfer from a Teacher neural network to a Student neural network in the absence of training data. However, in the Adversarial DFKD framework, the student network's accuracy, suffers due to the non-stationary distribution of the pseudo-samples under multiple generator updates. To this end, at every generator update, we aim to maintain the student's performance on previously encountered examples while acquiring knowledge from samples of the current distribution. Thus, we propose a meta-learning inspired framework by treating the task of Knowledge-Acquisition (learning from newly generated samples) and Knowledge-Retention (retaining knowledge on previously met samples) as meta-train and meta-test, respectively. Hence, we dub our method as Learning to Retain while Acquiring. Moreover, we identify an implicit aligning factor between the Knowledge-Retention and Knowledge-Acquisition tasks indicating that the proposed student update strategy enforces a common gradient direction for both tasks, alleviating interference between the two objectives. Finally, we support our hypothesis by exhibiting extensive evaluation and comparison of our method with prior arts on multiple datasets.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming commodity components of larger software systems. This poses natural security and privacy problems: poisoned data retrieved from one component can change the model's behavior and compromise the entire system, including coercing the model to spread confidential data to untrusted components. One promising approach is to tackle this problem at the system level via dynamic information flow (aka taint) tracking. Unfortunately, the traditional approach of propagating the most restrictive input label to the output is too conservative for applications where LLMs operate on inputs retrieved from diverse sources. In this paper, we propose a novel, more permissive approach to propagate information flow labels through LLM queries. The key idea behind our approach is to propagate only the labels of the samples that were influential in generating the model output and to eliminate the labels of unnecessary input. We implement and investigate the effectiveness of two variations of this approach, based on (i) prompt-based retrieval augmentation, and (ii) a k-nearest-neighbors language model. We compare these with the baseline of an introspection-based influence estimator that directly asks the language model to predict the output label. The results obtained highlight the superiority of our prompt-based label propagator, which improves the label in more than 85% of the cases in an LLM agent setting. These findings underscore the practicality of permissive label propagation for retrieval augmentation.

Recent advances in knowledge distillation (KD) have enabled smaller student models to approach the performance of larger teacher models. However, popular methods such as supervised KD and on-policy KD, are adversely impacted by the knowledge gaps between teacher-student in practical scenarios. Supervised KD suffers from a distribution mismatch between training with a static dataset and inference over final student-generated outputs. Conversely, on-policy KD, which uses student-generated samples for training, can suffer from low-quality training examples with which teacher models are not familiar, resulting in inaccurate teacher feedback. To address these limitations, we introduce Speculative Knowledge Distillation (SKD), a novel approach that leverages cooperation between student and teacher models to generate high-quality training data on-the-fly while aligning with the student's inference-time distribution. In SKD, the student proposes tokens, and the teacher replaces poorly ranked ones based on its own distribution, transferring high-quality knowledge adaptively. We evaluate SKD on various text generation tasks, including translation, summarization, math, and instruction following, and show that SKD consistently outperforms existing KD methods across different domains, data sizes, and model initialization strategies.

Selective knowledge erasure from LLMs is critical for GDPR compliance and model safety, yet current unlearning methods conflate behavioral suppression with true knowledge removal, allowing latent capabilities to persist beneath surface-level refusals. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing Knowledge Immunization Framework (KIF), a representation-aware architecture that distinguishes genuine erasure from obfuscation by targeting internal activation signatures rather than surface outputs. Our approach combines dynamic suppression of subject-specific representations with parameter-efficient adaptation, enabling durable unlearning without full model retraining. KIF achieves near-oracle erasure (FQ approx 0.99 vs. 1.00) while preserving utility at oracle levels (MU = 0.62), effectively breaking the stability-erasure tradeoff that has constrained all prior work. We evaluate both standard foundation models (Llama and Mistral) and reasoning-prior models (Qwen and DeepSeek) across 3B to 14B parameters. Our observation shows that standard models exhibit scale-independent true erasure (<3% utility drift), while reasoning-prior models reveal fundamental architectural divergence. Our comprehensive dual-metric evaluation protocol, combining surface-level leakage with latent trace persistence, operationalizes the obfuscation - erasure distinction and enables the first systematic diagnosis of mechanism-level forgetting behavior across model families and scales.

While LLMs are increasingly used in commercial services, they pose privacy risks such as leakage of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII). For LLMs trained on multilingual corpora, Multilingual Machine Unlearning (MMU) aims to remove information across multiple languages. However, prior MMU evaluations fail to capture such cross-linguistic distribution of information, being largely limited to direct extensions of per-language evaluation protocols. To this end, we propose two metrics to evaluate the information spread across languages: the Knowledge Separability Score (KSS) and the Knowledge Persistence Score (KPS). KSS measures the overall unlearning quality across multiple languages, while KPS more specifically aims to assess consistent removal of information among different language pairs. We evaluated various unlearning methods in the multilingual setting with these metrics and conducted comprehensive analyses. Through our investigation, we provide insights into unique phenomena exclusive to MMU and offer a new perspective on MMU evaluation.

To continuously improve quality and reflect changes in data, machine learning applications have to regularly retrain and update their core models. We show that a differential analysis of language model snapshots before and after an update can reveal a surprising amount of detailed information about changes in the training data. We propose two new metrics---differential score and differential rank---for analyzing the leakage due to updates of natural language models. We perform leakage analysis using these metrics across models trained on several different datasets using different methods and configurations. We discuss the privacy implications of our findings, propose mitigation strategies and evaluate their effect.

Knowledge distillation aims at transferring knowledge acquired in one model (a teacher) to another model (a student) that is typically smaller. Previous approaches can be expressed as a form of training the student to mimic output activations of individual data examples represented by the teacher. We introduce a novel approach, dubbed relational knowledge distillation (RKD), that transfers mutual relations of data examples instead. For concrete realizations of RKD, we propose distance-wise and angle-wise distillation losses that penalize structural differences in relations. Experiments conducted on different tasks show that the proposed method improves educated student models with a significant margin. In particular for metric learning, it allows students to outperform their teachers' performance, achieving the state of the arts on standard benchmark datasets.

Knowledge graphs have shown promise for several cybersecurity tasks, such as vulnerability assessment and threat analysis. In this work, we present a new method for constructing a vulnerability knowledge graph from information in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Our approach combines named entity recognition (NER), relation extraction (RE), and entity prediction using a combination of neural models, heuristic rules, and knowledge graph embeddings. We demonstrate how our method helps to fix missing entities in knowledge graphs used for cybersecurity and evaluate the performance.

Are LLM-based search agents genuinely searching, or using the web to verify what they already know? We study this question on BrowseComp with three diagnostics. Our analysis reveals Intrinsic Knowledge Dependence (IKD): even with tool access, agents often rely on intrinsic knowledge -- information encoded in the model before retrieval -- rather than on external evidence. Agents answer up to 44.5% of BrowseComp questions without tools, generate more than half of their search queries from internally produced hypotheses rather than retrieved leads, and perform worse than closed-book baselines when answer-supporting evidence is removed. These results suggest that static search benchmarks can reward memory-backed verification rather than evidence-driven discovery, conflating what agents already know with what they can find. We then introduce LiveBrowseComp, a deep-search benchmark designed to evaluate agents beyond intrinsic coverage. It contains 335 human-authored questions whose answers depend on facts published within the 90 days preceding benchmark construction, drawn from six updated sources and filtered to exclude globally salient events. On LiveBrowseComp, all evaluated agents fall below 2% closed-book accuracy, search-augmented scores drop by 25-40 points relative to BrowseComp, and prior model rankings no longer reliably predict performance. LiveBrowseComp is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Forival/LiveBrowseComp.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious security threat for training neural networks as they surreptitiously introduce hidden functionalities into a model. Such backdoors remain silent during inference on clean inputs, evading detection due to inconspicuous behavior. However, once a specific trigger pattern appears in the input data, the backdoor activates, causing the model to execute its concealed function. Detecting such poisoned samples within vast datasets is virtually impossible through manual inspection. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach that enables model training on potentially poisoned datasets by utilizing the power of recent diffusion models. Specifically, we create synthetic variations of all training samples, leveraging the inherent resilience of diffusion models to potential trigger patterns in the data. By combining this generative approach with knowledge distillation, we produce student models that maintain their general performance on the task while exhibiting robust resistance to backdoor triggers.

Unlearning knowledge is a pressing and challenging task in Large Language Models (LLMs) because of their unprecedented capability to memorize and digest training data at scale, raising more significant issues regarding safety, privacy, and intellectual property. However, existing works, including parameter editing, fine-tuning, and distillation-based methods, are all focused on flat sentence-level data but overlook the relational, multi-hop, and reasoned knowledge in naturally structured data. In response to this gap, this paper introduces Graph Oblivion and Node Erasure (GONE), a benchmark for evaluating knowledge unlearning over structured knowledge graph (KG) facts in LLMs. This KG-based benchmark enables the disentanglement of three effects of unlearning: direct fact removal, reasoning-based leakage, and catastrophic forgetting. In addition, Neighborhood-Expanded Distribution Shaping (NEDS), a novel unlearning framework, is designed to leverage graph connectivity and identify anchor correlated neighbors, enforcing a precise decision boundary between the forgotten fact and its semantic neighborhood. Evaluations on LLaMA-3-8B and Mistral-7B across multiple knowledge editing and unlearning methods showcase NEDS's superior performance (1.000 on unlearning efficacy and 0.839 on locality) on GONE and other benchmarks. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/GONE-4679/.

Knowledge distillation in neural networks refers to compressing a large model or dataset into a smaller version of itself. We introduce Privacy Distillation, a framework that allows a text-to-image generative model to teach another model without exposing it to identifiable data. Here, we are interested in the privacy issue faced by a data provider who wishes to share their data via a multimodal generative model. A question that immediately arises is ``How can a data provider ensure that the generative model is not leaking identifiable information about a patient?''. Our solution consists of (1) training a first diffusion model on real data (2) generating a synthetic dataset using this model and filtering it to exclude images with a re-identifiability risk (3) training a second diffusion model on the filtered synthetic data only. We showcase that datasets sampled from models trained with privacy distillation can effectively reduce re-identification risk whilst maintaining downstream performance.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge bases, but this may expose them to extraction attacks, leading to potential copyright and privacy risks. However, existing extraction methods typically rely on malicious inputs such as prompt injection or jailbreaking, making them easily detectable via input- or output-level detection. In this paper, we introduce Implicit Knowledge Extraction Attack (IKEA), which conducts Knowledge Extraction on RAG systems through benign queries. Specifically, IKEA first leverages anchor concepts-keywords related to internal knowledge-to generate queries with a natural appearance, and then designs two mechanisms that lead anchor concepts to thoroughly "explore" the RAG's knowledge: (1) Experience Reflection Sampling, which samples anchor concepts based on past query-response histories, ensuring their relevance to the topic; (2) Trust Region Directed Mutation, which iteratively mutates anchor concepts under similarity constraints to further exploit the embedding space. Extensive experiments demonstrate IKEA's effectiveness under various defenses, surpassing baselines by over 80% in extraction efficiency and 90% in attack success rate. Moreover, the substitute RAG system built from IKEA's extractions shows comparable performance to the original RAG and outperforms those based on baselines across multiple evaluation tasks, underscoring the stealthy copyright infringement risk in RAG systems.

In recent years, Large Language Models (LLMs) have faced increasing demands to selectively remove sensitive information, protect privacy, and comply with copyright regulations through unlearning, by Machine Unlearning. While evaluating unlearning effectiveness is crucial, existing benchmarks are limited in scale and comprehensiveness, typically containing only a few hundred test cases. We identify two critical challenges in generating holistic audit datasets: ensuring audit adequacy and handling knowledge redundancy between forget and retain dataset. To address these challenges, we propose HANKER, an automated framework for holistic audit dataset generation leveraging knowledge graphs to achieve fine-grained coverage and eliminate redundant knowledge. Applying HANKER to the popular MUSE benchmark, we successfully generated over 69,000 and 111,000 audit cases for the News and Books datasets respectively, identifying thousands of knowledge memorization instances that the previous benchmark failed to detect. Our empirical analysis uncovers how knowledge redundancy significantly skews unlearning effectiveness metrics, with redundant instances artificially inflating the observed memorization measurements ROUGE from 19.7% to 26.1% and Entailment Scores from 32.4% to 35.2%, highlighting the necessity of systematic deduplication for accurate assessment.

Knowledge distillation has emerged as a pivotal technique for transferring knowledge from stronger large language models (LLMs) to smaller, more efficient models. However, traditional distillation approaches face challenges related to knowledge conflicts and high resource demands, particularly when leveraging multiple teacher models. In this paper, we introduce the concept of Knowledge Purification, which consolidates the rationales from multiple teacher LLMs into a single rationale, thereby mitigating conflicts and enhancing efficiency. To investigate the effectiveness of knowledge purification, we further propose five purification methods from various perspectives. Our experiments demonstrate that these methods not only improve the performance of the distilled model but also effectively alleviate knowledge conflicts. Moreover, router-based methods exhibit robust generalization capabilities, underscoring the potential of innovative purification techniques in optimizing multi-teacher distillation and facilitating the practical deployment of powerful yet lightweight models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a broad spectrum of tasks. They have attracted significant attention and been deployed in numerous downstream applications. Nevertheless, akin to a double-edged sword, LLMs also present potential risks. They could suffer from private data leaks or yield inappropriate, harmful, or misleading content. Additionally, the rapid progress of LLMs raises concerns about the potential emergence of superintelligent systems without adequate safeguards. To effectively capitalize on LLM capacities as well as ensure their safe and beneficial development, it is critical to conduct a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation of LLMs. This survey endeavors to offer a panoramic perspective on the evaluation of LLMs. We categorize the evaluation of LLMs into three major groups: knowledge and capability evaluation, alignment evaluation and safety evaluation. In addition to the comprehensive review on the evaluation methodologies and benchmarks on these three aspects, we collate a compendium of evaluations pertaining to LLMs' performance in specialized domains, and discuss the construction of comprehensive evaluation platforms that cover LLM evaluations on capabilities, alignment, safety, and applicability. We hope that this comprehensive overview will stimulate further research interests in the evaluation of LLMs, with the ultimate goal of making evaluation serve as a cornerstone in guiding the responsible development of LLMs. We envision that this will channel their evolution into a direction that maximizes societal benefit while minimizing potential risks. A curated list of related papers has been publicly available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/Awesome-LLMs-Evaluation-Papers.

Machine unlearning is a promising approach to mitigate undesirable memorization of training data in ML models. However, in this work we show that existing approaches for unlearning in LLMs are surprisingly susceptible to a simple set of benign relearning attacks. With access to only a small and potentially loosely related set of data, we find that we can ''jog'' the memory of unlearned models to reverse the effects of unlearning. For example, we show that relearning on public medical articles can lead an unlearned LLM to output harmful knowledge about bioweapons, and relearning general wiki information about the book series Harry Potter can force the model to output verbatim memorized text. We formalize this unlearning-relearning pipeline, explore the attack across three popular unlearning benchmarks, and discuss future directions and guidelines that result from our study. Our work indicates that current approximate unlearning methods simply suppress the model outputs and fail to robustly forget target knowledge in the LLMs.

Current LLM unlearning methods face a critical security vulnerability that undermines their fundamental purpose: while they appear to successfully remove sensitive or harmful knowledge, this ``forgotten" information remains precariously recoverable through relearning attacks. We identify that the root cause is that conventional methods optimizing the forgetting loss at individual data points will drive model parameters toward sharp minima in the loss landscape. In these unstable regions, even minimal parameter perturbations can drastically alter the model's behaviors. Consequently, relearning attacks exploit this vulnerability by using just a few fine-tuning samples to navigate the steep gradients surrounding these unstable regions, thereby rapidly recovering knowledge that was supposedly erased. This exposes a critical robustness gap between apparent unlearning and actual knowledge removal. To address this issue, we propose StableUN, a bi-level feedback-guided optimization framework that explicitly seeks more stable parameter regions via neighborhood-aware optimization. It integrates forgetting feedback, which uses adversarial perturbations to probe parameter neighborhoods, with remembering feedback to preserve model utility, aligning the two objectives through gradient projection. Experiments on WMDP and MUSE benchmarks demonstrate that our method is significantly more robust against both relearning and jailbreaking attacks while maintaining competitive utility performance.

We argue that modern generative models create structural risks for knowledge and cultural production at current, sub-AGI capability levels. We define Human Temporal Learning (HTL) as path-dependent knowledge accumulation through sustained engagement with problems over time. Generative outputs increasingly resemble HTL-intensive work in surface features, so verifying whether a given output reflects genuine human learning grows costly relative to its expected benefit. Once verification loses economic justification, evaluators reward outputs regardless of production mode, and producers who invested years of learning compete on price against outputs that cost almost nothing to generate. We call this pathway value collapse and formalize it through a costly-inspection framework. Cross-domain evidence from academic publishing, legal practice, content platforms, and software security maps onto four stages of verification erosion. Alignment success is orthogonal. Better-aligned models narrow observable gaps between human and AI outputs, making source verification harder and intensifying competitive pressure against HTL-intensive work even when individual AI outputs improve.

Knowledge distillation is a powerful technique for transferring knowledge from a pre-trained teacher model to a student model. However, the true potential of knowledge transfer has not been fully explored. Existing approaches primarily focus on distilling individual information or instance-level relationships, overlooking the valuable information embedded in token-level relationships, which may be particularly affected by the long-tail effects. To address the above limitations, we propose a novel method called Knowledge Distillation with Token-level Relationship Graph (TRG) that leverages the token-wise relational knowledge to enhance the performance of knowledge distillation. By employing TRG, the student model can effectively emulate higher-level semantic information from the teacher model, resulting in improved distillation results. To further enhance the learning process, we introduce a token-wise contextual loss called contextual loss, which encourages the student model to capture the inner-instance semantic contextual of the teacher model. We conduct experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method against several state-of-the-art approaches. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of TRG across various visual classification tasks, including those involving imbalanced data. Our method consistently outperforms the existing baselines, establishing a new state-of-the-art performance in the field of knowledge distillation.

Unlearning algorithms aim to remove deleted data's influence from trained models at a cost lower than full retraining. However, prior guarantees of unlearning in literature are flawed and don't protect the privacy of deleted records. We show that when users delete their data as a function of published models, records in a database become interdependent. So, even retraining a fresh model after deletion of a record doesn't ensure its privacy. Secondly, unlearning algorithms that cache partial computations to speed up the processing can leak deleted information over a series of releases, violating the privacy of deleted records in the long run. To address these, we propose a sound deletion guarantee and show that the privacy of existing records is necessary for the privacy of deleted records. Under this notion, we propose an accurate, computationally efficient, and secure machine unlearning algorithm based on noisy gradient descent.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Federated Learning is a promising paradigm for privacy-preserving collaborative model training. In practice, it is essential not only to continuously train the model to acquire new knowledge but also to guarantee old knowledge the right to be forgotten (i.e., federated unlearning), especially for privacy-sensitive information or harmful knowledge. However, current federated unlearning methods face several challenges, including indiscriminate unlearning of cross-client knowledge, irreversibility of unlearning, and significant unlearning costs. To this end, we propose a method named FUSED, which first identifies critical layers by analyzing each layer's sensitivity to knowledge and constructs sparse unlearning adapters for sensitive ones. Then, the adapters are trained without altering the original parameters, overwriting the unlearning knowledge with the remaining knowledge. This knowledge overwriting process enables FUSED to mitigate the effects of indiscriminate unlearning. Moreover, the introduction of independent adapters makes unlearning reversible and significantly reduces the unlearning costs. Finally, extensive experiments on three datasets across various unlearning scenarios demonstrate that FUSED's effectiveness is comparable to Retraining, surpassing all other baselines while greatly reducing unlearning costs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

Large Language Models for Code (LLMs4Code) have achieved strong performance in code generation, but recent studies reveal that they may memorize and leak sensitive information contained in training data, posing serious privacy risks. To address this gap, this work presents the first comprehensive empirical study on applying machine unlearning to mitigate sensitive information leakage in LLMs4Code. We first construct a dedicated benchmark that includes: (i) a synthetic forget set containing diverse forms of personal information, and (ii) a retain set designed to evaluate whether code-generation capability is preserved after unlearning. Using this benchmark, we systematically assess three representative unlearning algorithms (GA, GA+GD, GA+KL) across three widely used open-source LLMs4Code models (AIXCoder-7B, CodeLlama-7B, CodeQwen-7B). Experimental results demonstrate that machine unlearning can substantially reduce direct memorization-based leakage: on average, the direct leak rate drops by more than 50% while retaining about over 91% of the original code-generation performance. Moreover, by analyzing post-unlearning outputs, we uncover a consistent shift from direct to indirect leakage, revealing an underexplored vulnerability that persists even when the target data has been successfully forgotten. Our findings show that machine unlearning is a feasible and effective solution for enhancing privacy protection in LLMs4Code, while also highlighting the need for future techniques capable of mitigating both direct and indirect leakage simultaneously.

Large language models (LLMs) can store a vast amount of world knowledge, often extractable via question-answering (e.g., "What is Abraham Lincoln's birthday?"). However, do they answer such questions based on exposure to similar questions during training (i.e., cheating), or by genuinely learning to extract knowledge from sources like Wikipedia? In this paper, we investigate this issue using a controlled biography dataset. We find a strong correlation between the model's ability to extract knowledge and various diversity measures of the training data. Essentially, for knowledge to be reliably extracted, it must be sufficiently augmented (e.g., through paraphrasing, sentence shuffling) during pretraining. Without such augmentation, knowledge may be memorized but not extractable, leading to 0% accuracy, regardless of subsequent instruction fine-tuning. To understand why this occurs, we employ (nearly) linear probing to demonstrate a strong connection between the observed correlation and how the model internally encodes knowledge -- whether it is linearly encoded in the hidden embeddings of entity names or distributed across other token embeddings in the training text. This paper provides several key recommendations for LLM pretraining in the industry: (1) rewrite the pretraining data -- using small, auxiliary models -- to provide knowledge augmentation, and (2) incorporate more instruction-finetuning data into the pretraining stage before it becomes too late.

We study the problem of injecting knowledge into large pre-trained models like BERT and RoBERTa. Existing methods typically update the original parameters of pre-trained models when injecting knowledge. However, when multiple kinds of knowledge are injected, the historically injected knowledge would be flushed away. To address this, we propose K-Adapter, a framework that retains the original parameters of the pre-trained model fixed and supports the development of versatile knowledge-infused model. Taking RoBERTa as the backbone model, K-Adapter has a neural adapter for each kind of infused knowledge, like a plug-in connected to RoBERTa. There is no information flow between different adapters, thus multiple adapters can be efficiently trained in a distributed way. As a case study, we inject two kinds of knowledge in this work, including (1) factual knowledge obtained from automatically aligned text-triplets on Wikipedia and Wikidata and (2) linguistic knowledge obtained via dependency parsing. Results on three knowledge-driven tasks, including relation classification, entity typing, and question answering, demonstrate that each adapter improves the performance and the combination of both adapters brings further improvements. Further analysis indicates that K-Adapter captures versatile knowledge than RoBERTa.

The increasing complexity of large language models (LLMs) raises concerns about their ability to "cheat" on standard Question Answering (QA) benchmarks by memorizing task-specific data. This undermines the validity of benchmark evaluations, as they no longer reflect genuine model capabilities but instead the effects of data leakage. While prior work has focused on detecting such leakage, little attention has been given to mitigating its impact and preserving the long-term utility of benchmarks. In this paper, we introduce LastingBench, a novel framework designed to continuously reinforce and safeguard existing benchmarks against knowledge leakage. LastingBench identifies leakage points in the context through perturbation, then rewrites the leakage points to counterfactual ones-disrupting memorization while preserving the benchmark's original evaluative intent. Evaluations of state-of-the-art QA benchmarks show significant performance gaps, highlighting the efficacy of LastingBench in reducing memorization effects. LastingBench offers a practical and scalable solution to ensure benchmark robustness over time, promoting fairer and more interpretable evaluations of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) acquire a large amount of knowledge through pre-training on vast and diverse corpora. While this endows LLMs with strong capabilities in generation and reasoning, it amplifies risks associated with sensitive, copyrighted, or harmful content in training data. LLM unlearning, which aims to remove specific knowledge encoded within models, is a promising technique to reduce these risks. However, existing LLM unlearning methods often force LLMs to generate random or incoherent answers due to their inability to alter the encoded knowledge precisely. To achieve effective unlearning at the knowledge level of LLMs, we propose Knowledge Unlearning by Deviating representAtion (KUDA). We first utilize causal tracing to locate specific layers for target knowledge storage. We then design a new unlearning objective that induces the model's representations to deviate from its original position in the phase of knowledge removal, thus disrupting the ability to associate with the target knowledge. To resolve the optimization conflicts between forgetting and retention, we employ a relaxation null-space projection mechanism to mitigate the disruption to the representation space of retaining knowledge. Extensive experiments on representative benchmarks, WMDP and MUSE, demonstrate that KUDA outperforms most existing baselines by effectively balancing knowledge removal and model utility retention.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.

Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models' structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role. This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set membership inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks.

Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information? In this paper, we analyze whether Pre-Trained Language Models (PLMs) are prone to leaking personal information. Specifically, we query PLMs for email addresses with contexts of the email address or prompts containing the owner's name. We find that PLMs do leak personal information due to memorization. However, since the models are weak at association, the risk of specific personal information being extracted by attackers is low. We hope this work could help the community to better understand the privacy risk of PLMs and bring new insights to make PLMs safe.

Large language models trained on web-scale corpora can memorize undesirable data containing misinformation, copyrighted material, or private or sensitive information. Recently, several machine unlearning algorithms have been proposed to eliminate the effect of such datapoints from trained models -- that is, to approximate a model that had never been trained on these datapoints in the first place. However, evaluating the effectiveness of unlearning algorithms remains an open challenge. Previous work has relied on heuristics -- such as verifying that the model can no longer reproduce the specific information targeted for removal while maintaining accuracy on unrelated test data. These approaches inadequately capture the complete effect of reversing the influence of datapoints on a trained model. In this work, we propose the RESTOR framework for machine unlearning evaluation, which assesses the ability of unlearning algorithms for targeted data erasure, by evaluating the ability of models to forget the knowledge introduced in these datapoints, while simultaneously recovering the model's knowledge state had it never encountered these datapoints. RESTOR helps uncover several novel insights about popular unlearning algorithms, and the mechanisms through which they operate -- for instance, identifying that some algorithms merely emphasize forgetting but not recovering knowledge, and that localizing unlearning targets can enhance unlearning performance.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

Knowledge distillation (KD) is a widely adopted approach for compressing large neural networks by transferring knowledge from a large teacher model to a smaller student model. In the context of large language models, token level KD, typically minimizing the KL divergence between student output distribution and teacher output distribution, has shown strong empirical performance. However, prior work assumes student output distribution and teacher output distribution share the same optimal representation space, a premise that may not hold in many cases. To solve this problem, we propose Delta Knowledge Distillation (Delta-KD), a novel extension of token level KD that encourages the student to approximate an optimal representation space by explicitly preserving the distributional shift Delta introduced during the teacher's supervised finetuning (SFT). Empirical results on ROUGE metrics demonstrate that Delta KD substantially improves student performance while preserving more of the teacher's knowledge.