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Nov 17

Finding Biological Plausibility for Adversarially Robust Features via Metameric Tasks

Recent work suggests that representations learned by adversarially robust networks are more human perceptually-aligned than non-robust networks via image manipulations. Despite appearing closer to human visual perception, it is unclear if the constraints in robust DNN representations match biological constraints found in human vision. Human vision seems to rely on texture-based/summary statistic representations in the periphery, which have been shown to explain phenomena such as crowding and performance on visual search tasks. To understand how adversarially robust optimizations/representations compare to human vision, we performed a psychophysics experiment using a set of metameric discrimination tasks where we evaluated how well human observers could distinguish between images synthesized to match adversarially robust representations compared to non-robust representations and a texture synthesis model of peripheral vision (Texforms). We found that the discriminability of robust representation and texture model images decreased to near chance performance as stimuli were presented farther in the periphery. Moreover, performance on robust and texture-model images showed similar trends within participants, while performance on non-robust representations changed minimally across the visual field. These results together suggest that (1) adversarially robust representations capture peripheral computation better than non-robust representations and (2) robust representations capture peripheral computation similar to current state-of-the-art texture peripheral vision models. More broadly, our findings support the idea that localized texture summary statistic representations may drive human invariance to adversarial perturbations and that the incorporation of such representations in DNNs could give rise to useful properties like adversarial robustness.

  • 2 authors
·
Feb 1, 2022

Unified Motion Retargeting for Humanoids with Learned Point Cloud Correspondence

Humanoid learning increasingly relies on transforming vast and diverse human motion data into high-quality robot reference trajectories. However, retargeting human motion to humanoid robots is challenging due to substantial differences in morphology, degrees of freedom, joint ranges, and kinematic constraints between humans and robots. Existing retargeting methods typically address these differences by defining human-robot correspondence through hand-crafted sparse keypoints or body-part pairs. As a result, retargeting quality depends heavily on manual semantic design, limiting scalability across motion sources and robot morphologies and providing only sparse guidance for reproducing detailed poses and interactions. In this paper, we present Unified Motion Retargeting (UMR), a framework that learns dense point cloud correspondence without requiring manually designed human-robot mappings. By treating exterior point clouds as a unified interface between human motion and humanoid robots, UMR decouples retargeting from source-specific skeletal semantics and robot-specific topology. The learned dense correspondence provides fine-grained geometric anchors for constrained point cloud matching optimization, enabling surface-level pose alignment and direct transfer of interaction contacts. Experiments demonstrate that UMR unifies retargeting across heterogeneous motion sources, robot embodiments, and downstream scenarios ranging from locomotion to interaction, while achieving higher motion fidelity and plausibility than state-of-the-art methods. UMR therefore provides a scalable foundation for transforming large-scale human motion references into robot-ready training data.

  • 13 authors
·
Sep 6

RoomLight: A 2.5D Illumination Prior for Indoor Environments

Ill-posed inverse problems require priors to constrain the solution space toward plausible outcomes. In inverse rendering, learned priors modeling the distribution of natural illumination improve the recovery of scene properties. However, existing models rely on the distant-illumination assumption, representing lighting as a far-field environment map. This limits their applicability to indoor scenes, where illumination is highly spatially varying due to finite-distance emitters, visibility changes, and parallax, all of which are poorly approximated by a single environment map. To address this, we introduce a spatially-aware illumination prior trained on real-world indoor panoramas and their estimated depth. Our variational autoencoder model learns a compact, optimizable latent space that decodes into HDR radiance and depth, parameterizing an area light emitter for direct integration into standard differentiable rendering pipelines. This design bridges the plausibility guarantees of a learned prior with the gradient flow required for downstream optimization. Crucially, by jointly modeling radiance and depth, our prior captures the spatial structure of indoor illumination, instead of treating the light sources as infinitely distant. We demonstrate that this formulation enables spatially-varying illumination modeling and achieves higher-fidelity recovery of indoor lighting compared to existing approaches. Project page: https://andreead-a.github.io/RoomLight

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 22

Pair2Scene: Learning Local Object Relations for Procedural Scene Generation

Generating high-fidelity 3D indoor scenes remains a significant challenge due to data scarcity and the complexity of modeling intricate spatial relations. Current methods often struggle to scale beyond training distribution to dense scenes or rely on LLMs/VLMs that lack the ability for precise spatial reasoning. Building on top of the observation that object placement relies mainly on local dependencies instead of information-redundant global distributions, in this paper, we propose Pair2Scene, a novel procedural generation framework that integrates learned local rules with scene hierarchies and physics-based algorithms. These rules mainly capture two types of inter-object relations, namely support relations that follow physical hierarchies, and functional relations that reflect semantic links. We model these rules through a network, which estimates spatial position distributions of dependent objects conditioned on position and geometry of the anchor ones. Accordingly, we curate a dataset 3D-Pairs from existing scene data to train the model. During inference, our framework can generate scenes by recursively applying our model within a hierarchical structure, leveraging collision-aware rejection sampling to align local rules into coherent global layouts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework outperforms existing methods in generating complex environments that go beyond training data while maintaining physical and semantic plausibility.

  • 5 authors
·
May 9

Think Before You Move: Latent Motion Reasoning for Text-to-Motion Generation

Current state-of-the-art paradigms predominantly treat Text-to-Motion (T2M) generation as a direct translation problem, mapping symbolic language directly to continuous poses. While effective for simple actions, this System 1 approach faces a fundamental theoretical bottleneck we identify as the Semantic-Kinematic Impedance Mismatch: the inherent difficulty of grounding semantically dense, discrete linguistic intent into kinematically dense, high-frequency motion data in a single shot. In this paper, we argue that the solution lies in an architectural shift towards Latent System 2 Reasoning. Drawing inspiration from Hierarchical Motor Control in cognitive science, we propose Latent Motion Reasoning (LMR) that reformulates generation as a two-stage Think-then-Act decision process. Central to LMR is a novel Dual-Granularity Tokenizer that disentangles motion into two distinct manifolds: a compressed, semantically rich Reasoning Latent for planning global topology, and a high-frequency Execution Latent for preserving physical fidelity. By forcing the model to autoregressively reason (plan the coarse trajectory) before it moves (instantiates the frames), we effectively bridge the ineffability gap between language and physics. We demonstrate LMR's versatility by implementing it for two representative baselines: T2M-GPT (discrete) and MotionStreamer (continuous). Extensive experiments show that LMR yields non-trivial improvements in both semantic alignment and physical plausibility, validating that the optimal substrate for motion planning is not natural language, but a learned, motion-aligned concept space. Codes and demos can be found in https://chenhaoqcdyq.github.io/LMR/{https://chenhaoqcdyq.github.io/LMR/}

  • 10 authors
·
Dec 30, 2025

SPARK: Jailbreaking T2V Models by Synergistically Prompting Auditory and Recontextualized Knowledge

Jailbreak attacks can circumvent model safety guardrails and reveal critical blind spots. Prior attacks on text-to-video (T2V) models typically add adversarial perturbations to obviously unsafe prompts, which are often easy to detect and defend. In contrast, we show that benign-looking prompts containing rich, implicit cues can induce T2V models to generate semantically unsafe videos that both violate policy and preserve the original (blocked) intent. To realize this, we propose SPARK, a jailbreak framework that leverages T2V models cross-modal associative patterns via a modular prompt design. Specifically, our prompts combine three components: neutral scene anchors, which provide the surface-level scene description extracted from the blocked intent to maintain plausibility; latent auditory triggers, textual descriptions of innocuous-sounding audio events (e.g., creaking, muffled noises) that exploit learned audio-visual co-occurrence priors to bias the model toward particular unsafe visual concepts; and stylistic modulators, cinematic directives (e.g., camera framing, atmosphere) that amplify and stabilize the latent trigger's effect. We formalize attack generation as a constrained optimization over the above modular prompt space and solve it with a guided search procedure that balances stealth and effectiveness. Extensive experiments over 7 T2V models demonstrate the efficacy of our attack, achieving a +23% improvement in average attack success rate in commercial models.

  • 9 authors
·
Mar 5

Shades of Zero: Distinguishing Impossibility from Inconceivability

Some things are impossible, but some things may be even more impossible than impossible. Levitating a feather using one's mind is impossible in our world, but fits into our intuitive theories of possible worlds, whereas levitating a feather using the number five cannot be conceived in any possible world ("inconceivable"). While prior work has examined the distinction between improbable and impossible events, there has been little empirical research on inconceivability. Here, we investigate whether people maintain a distinction between impossibility and inconceivability, and how such distinctions might be made. We find that people can readily distinguish the impossible from the inconceivable, using categorization studies similar to those used to investigate the differences between impossible and improbable (Experiment 1). However, this distinction is not explained by people's subjective ratings of event likelihood, which are near zero and indistinguishable between impossible and inconceivable event descriptions (Experiment 2). Finally, we ask whether the probabilities assigned to event descriptions by statistical language models (LMs) can be used to separate modal categories, and whether these probabilities align with people's ratings (Experiment 3). We find high-level similarities between people and LMs: both distinguish among impossible and inconceivable event descriptions, and LM-derived string probabilities predict people's ratings of event likelihood across modal categories. Our findings suggest that fine-grained knowledge about exceedingly rare events (i.e., the impossible and inconceivable) may be learned via statistical learning over linguistic forms, yet leave open the question of whether people represent the distinction between impossible and inconceivable as a difference not of degree, but of kind.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 26, 2025

Hallucinations Undermine Trust; Metacognition is a Way Forward

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

google Google
·
May 1 3

Can't make an Omelette without Breaking some Eggs: Plausible Action Anticipation using Large Video-Language Models

We introduce PlausiVL, a large video-language model for anticipating action sequences that are plausible in the real-world. While significant efforts have been made towards anticipating future actions, prior approaches do not take into account the aspect of plausibility in an action sequence. To address this limitation, we explore the generative capability of a large video-language model in our work and further, develop the understanding of plausibility in an action sequence by introducing two objective functions, a counterfactual-based plausible action sequence learning loss and a long-horizon action repetition loss. We utilize temporal logical constraints as well as verb-noun action pair logical constraints to create implausible/counterfactual action sequences and use them to train the model with plausible action sequence learning loss. This loss helps the model to differentiate between plausible and not plausible action sequences and also helps the model to learn implicit temporal cues crucial for the task of action anticipation. The long-horizon action repetition loss puts a higher penalty on the actions that are more prone to repetition over a longer temporal window. With this penalization, the model is able to generate diverse, plausible action sequences. We evaluate our approach on two large-scale datasets, Ego4D and EPIC-Kitchens-100, and show improvements on the task of action anticipation.

  • 4 authors
·
May 30, 2024

Formalizing Neurath's Ship: Approximate Algorithms for Online Causal Learning

Higher-level cognition depends on the ability to learn models of the world. We can characterize this at the computational level as a structure-learning problem with the goal of best identifying the prevailing causal relationships among a set of relata. However, the computational cost of performing exact Bayesian inference over causal models grows rapidly as the number of relata increases. This implies that the cognitive processes underlying causal learning must be substantially approximate. A powerful class of approximations that focuses on the sequential absorption of successive inputs is captured by the Neurath's ship metaphor in philosophy of science, where theory change is cast as a stochastic and gradual process shaped as much by people's limited willingness to abandon their current theory when considering alternatives as by the ground truth they hope to approach. Inspired by this metaphor and by algorithms for approximating Bayesian inference in machine learning, we propose an algorithmic-level model of causal structure learning under which learners represent only a single global hypothesis that they update locally as they gather evidence. We propose a related scheme for understanding how, under these limitations, learners choose informative interventions that manipulate the causal system to help elucidate its workings. We find support for our approach in the analysis of four experiments.

  • 4 authors
·
May 25, 2017

Thinking to Recall: How Reasoning Unlocks Parametric Knowledge in LLMs

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

google Google
·
Mar 10 4

TRAVL: A Recipe for Making Video-Language Models Better Judges of Physics Implausibility

Despite impressive visual fidelity, modern video generative models frequently produce sequences that violate intuitive physical laws, such as objects floating, teleporting, or morphing in ways that defy causality. While humans can easily detect such implausibilities, there remains no robust method for quantitatively assessing physical realism in video. In this work, we explore whether Video-Language Models (VLMs) can be trained to serve as reliable judges of physical plausibility. We find that existing VLMs struggle to identify physics violations, exposing fundamental limitations in their temporal and causal reasoning. To address this, we introduce TRAVL, a fine-tuning recipe that combines a balanced training dataset with a trajectory-aware attention module to improve motion encoding and discrimination in VLMs. To evaluate physical reasoning more rigorously, we propose ImplausiBench, a benchmark of 300 videos (150 real, 150 generated) that removes linguistic biases and isolates visual-temporal understanding. Performance is reported both with gold-standard human judgments and stricter LLM-as-judge metrics. Together, TRAVL and ImplausiBench offer a unified framework for probing and improving physical plausibility in multimodal models, shedding light on a challenging and underexplored aspect of visual-temporal understanding.

Language Models (Mostly) Know What They Know

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

  • 36 authors
·
Jul 11, 2022

Enhancing Physical Plausibility in Video Generation by Reasoning the Implausibility

Diffusion models can generate realistic videos, but existing methods rely on implicitly learning physical reasoning from large-scale text-video datasets, which is costly, difficult to scale, and still prone to producing implausible motions that violate fundamental physical laws. We introduce a training-free framework that improves physical plausibility at inference time by explicitly reasoning about implausibility and guiding the generation away from it. Specifically, we employ a lightweight physics-aware reasoning pipeline to construct counterfactual prompts that deliberately encode physics-violating behaviors. Then, we propose a novel Synchronized Decoupled Guidance (SDG) strategy, which leverages these prompts through synchronized directional normalization to counteract lagged suppression and trajectory-decoupled denoising to mitigate cumulative trajectory bias, ensuring that implausible content is suppressed immediately and consistently throughout denoising. Experiments across different physical domains show that our approach substantially enhances physical fidelity while maintaining photorealism, despite requiring no additional training. Ablation studies confirm the complementary effectiveness of both the physics-aware reasoning component and SDG. In particular, the aforementioned two designs of SDG are also individually validated to contribute critically to the suppression of implausible content and the overall gains in physical plausibility. This establishes a new and plug-and-play physics-aware paradigm for video generation.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 29, 2025

Towards Error Centric Intelligence I, Beyond Observational Learning

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

  • 1 authors
·
Oct 16, 2025

Calibrated Language Models Must Hallucinate

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

  • 2 authors
·
Nov 24, 2023

Consistency-based Abductive Reasoning over Perceptual Errors of Multiple Pre-trained Models in Novel Environments

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

leibnitz-lab Leibnitz Lab
·
May 25, 2025

How Humans Learn Unfamiliar Worlds: A Think-Aloud Dataset on ARC-AGI-3

Learning through exploration and using newly acquired knowledge to achieve goals are central capabilities of general intelligence. Understanding these capabilities requires tracing how learners build, use, and revise world models during interaction. We construct the first dataset that records how humans discover and use the mechanisms of novel environments, using ARC-AGI-3 as a testbed: 144 trajectories from 64 participants across 25 public games, each pairing time-synchronized actions with think-aloud audio, plus 250 trajectories from large language model (LLM) agents with and without harnesses on the same games. We annotate mechanism triggers and recognition, action purposes, and errors and recovery, linking changes in understanding to the observations and actions that support them. We analyze characteristics of human cognition and compare them with those of LLM agents. Both groups anticipate mechanisms and use familiar analogies. Qualitative representations are more common in successful human trajectories than in successful LLM trajectories (50.0% versus 14.3%). Humans more often explore unfamiliar situations without a concrete hypothesis, while hypothesis testing is common in both groups. We also trace how learners recover through belief revision, replanning, and execution correction. As LLMs with well-designed harnesses reach saturated performance on public ARC-AGI-3 games, our cognitive analyses motivate next-generation benchmarks that challenge familiar priors, require accumulated evidence and abstraction, and test planning through subgoals, experimentation, and recovery. Our dataset is available at [https://arc3-human-think-aloud.github.io/](https://arc3-human-think-aloud.github.io/).

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 24

Modeling Open-World Cognition as On-Demand Synthesis of Probabilistic Models

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

  • 11 authors
·
Jul 16, 2025

Experts Don't Cheat: Learning What You Don't Know By Predicting Pairs

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 13, 2024

The Dog the Cat Chased Stumped the Model: Measuring When Language Models Abandon Structure for Shortcuts

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 23, 2025

Whether LLMs Can Navigate Beliefs and Facts Depends on How You Phrase It

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 31

Are Reasoning Models More Prone to Hallucination?

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

  • 8 authors
·
May 29, 2025 2

DEUP: Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

  • 8 authors
·
Feb 16, 2021

Training, learning and inference: unified dynamics of neural systems

We define an atomic generation fact f=(u,tau,omega,z;rho), recording the origin, realized transformation, concrete occurrence, generated result and relation role. Compiled into a Generation-Fact Graph (GFG), these facts provide an AI-native, compilable scientific fact substrate preserving generation histories. We establish a GFG-based recursive scientific process in which analysis, intervention, replay and validation form facts for later cycles. Using nanoGPT, we establish unified training-learning dynamics. Training is the evolution of a parameter-optimizer system with state and memory: each actual training action enters the receiving state and produces a finite-amplitude nonlinear functional response conditioned by that state and target-specific update geometry. Learning is the persistent reorganization of distributed functional support by these responses; capability formation, maintenance, decline or recovery becomes observable when target-specific states are evaluated against their readout boundaries. Three primary coordinates - target-boundary state, target-specific update geometry and parameter-Adam receiving state - yield a second-order predictor operating before post-update outputs are read. On held-out runs, it achieved 91.43% accuracy and 91.49% macro-averaged recall across four transitions. We further establish inference as a frozen projection of training-learning dynamics. Component gating and rollback show causal recruitment and non-additive combination of query-conditioned support formed during training, deriving organizational conditions realized by Attention. Controlled feedback indicates possible double-edged reinforcement effects. ResNet/CIFAR-100 and diffusion/CIFAR-10 experiments confirm receiving-state-conditioned responses, persistent support reorganization and frozen inference projection beyond nanoGPT.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 20 2

PRobELM: Plausibility Ranking Evaluation for Language Models

This paper introduces PRobELM (Plausibility Ranking Evaluation for Language Models), a benchmark designed to assess language models' ability to discern more plausible from less plausible scenarios through their parametric knowledge. While benchmarks such as TruthfulQA emphasise factual accuracy or truthfulness, and others such as COPA explore plausible scenarios without explicitly incorporating world knowledge, PRobELM seeks to bridge this gap by evaluating models' capabilities to prioritise plausible scenarios that leverage world knowledge over less plausible alternatives. This design allows us to assess the potential of language models for downstream use cases such as literature-based discovery where the focus is on identifying information that is likely but not yet known. Our benchmark is constructed from a dataset curated from Wikidata edit histories, tailored to align the temporal bounds of the training data for the evaluated models. PRobELM facilitates the evaluation of language models across multiple prompting types, including statement, text completion, and question-answering. Experiments with 10 models of various sizes and architectures on the relationship between model scales, training recency, and plausibility performance, reveal that factual accuracy does not directly correlate with plausibility performance and that up-to-date training data enhances plausibility assessment across different model architectures.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 4, 2024

From Atomic to Composite: Reinforcement Learning Enables Generalization in Complementary Reasoning

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

  • 8 authors
·
Dec 1, 2025

Knowing Is Not Choosing: What Explicit Verification Adds Beyond Generative Preference

Generating a correct answer does not mean that a language model will select it. We separate factual recall into three steps: generating a correct candidate, ranking the available candidates, and selecting the final answer. Pre-generation readouts predict factual recall and which questions sampling will cover across three model families, but say little about whether an available correct answer will ultimately be selected. Explicit verification with P(True) improves within-question ranking over mean log-likelihood in Gemma, Qwen3, and Llama, with AUROC gains of 0.08--0.12. In a prospectively defined Gemma cohort, verification raises plurality accuracy by about 5 points, and still gains about 2 points over chat-template likelihood, a stronger generative baseline. The advantage is strongest for relations with common-answer priors and depends on access to the entity; masking the entity removes the ranking advantage in larger Qwen models. Finally, the measured benefit depends on how correctness is defined: recall-oriented reference matching can credit option lists favored by likelihood and substantially understate the improvement seen under human semantic judgments. Prior work shows that models can carry latent factual knowledge and judge candidate answers; we show that these capabilities do not collapse into a single notion of ``knowing,'' and trace where information is gained, lost, or mismeasured between availability, ranking, and final choice.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 28

Generalization or Hallucination? Understanding Out-of-Context Reasoning in Transformers

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 12, 2025

The Consciousness Prior

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 25, 2017

MMLA: Memory-Mediated Learning Architecture for Predictive Dual-State Adaptation

Memory-Mediated Learning Architecture (MMLA) separates slow base parameters theta, a bounded numerical policy carrier Phi, and a bounded authoritative memory M. Predictive Dual-State Adaptation (PDSA) lets feedback update Phi while one problem remains active and lets a trusted lifecycle atomically commit one typed row or exact NULL. Later reasoning may read both states, but their writers, resets, rollback domains, and ledgers remain distinct. Realized futures supervise values only during training; deployment is causal and future-blind. We give conditional theory and falsifiable contracts for reasoning-time updates, completed-segment consolidation, predictive admission, authoritative memory, and dual-state attribution. Assumptions, counterexamples, capacity and cost ledgers, recovery duties, and identifying experiments are explicit; these are not implementation guarantees. Controlled studies show exact lifecycle execution on 300/300 held-out records for each of three seeds, calibrated retrieval gains over frozen-hidden dense and BM25 baselines, and exact typed anchor-filler transport on 240/240 held-out records per seed. These validate restricted components, not natural-language memory management or complete PDSA. Post-training studies retain positive and negative evidence. Later protocols obtain restricted readout progress, but a nine-trajectory comparison finds that matched latent readout, a full-width bridge, and bridge plus frozen text-teacher alignment all fail continuous-event qualification across both task families. A separately adapted text reference and restoration checks pass. At the September 13, 2026 evidence cutoff, no strict policy-only reasoning-time-training effect, predictive-admission oracle margin, learned future-blind admission policy, or policy-by-memory factorial advantage is established.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 13

Thinking Out Loud: Do Reasoning Models Know When They're Right?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

  • 4 authors
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Apr 8, 2025

Do Thinking Tokens Help with Safety?

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

Fact-Checking with Large Language Models via Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

  • 5 authors
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Jan 5

Wrong Answers Can Also Be Useful: PlausibleQA -- A Large-Scale QA Dataset with Answer Plausibility Scores

Large Language Models (LLMs) are revolutionizing information retrieval, with chatbots becoming an important source for answering user queries. As by their design, LLMs prioritize generating correct answers, the value of highly plausible yet incorrect answers (candidate answers) tends to be overlooked. However, such answers can still prove useful, for example, they can play a crucial role in tasks like Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) and QA Robustness Assessment (QARA). Existing QA datasets primarily focus on correct answers without explicit consideration of the plausibility of other candidate answers, limiting opportunity for more nuanced evaluations of models. To address this gap, we introduce PlausibleQA, a large-scale dataset comprising 10,000 questions and 100,000 candidate answers, each annotated with plausibility scores and justifications for their selection. Additionally, the dataset includes 900,000 justifications for pairwise comparisons between candidate answers, further refining plausibility assessments. We evaluate PlausibleQA through human assessments and empirical experiments, demonstrating its utility in MCQA and QARA analysis. Our findings show that plausibility-aware approaches are effective for MCQA distractor generation and QARA. We release PlausibleQA as a resource for advancing QA research and enhancing LLM performance in distinguishing plausible distractors from correct answers.

  • 4 authors
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Feb 22, 2025

Can LLMs Learn from Previous Mistakes? Investigating LLMs' Errors to Boost for Reasoning

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

  • 6 authors
·
Mar 29, 2024

LLMs can implicitly learn from mistakes in-context

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 12, 2025

Learning While Staying Curious: Entropy-Preserving Supervised Fine-Tuning via Adaptive Self-Distillation for Large Reasoning Models

The standard post-training recipe for large reasoning models, supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning (SFT-then-RL), may limit the benefits of the RL stage: while SFT imitates expert demonstrations, it often causes overconfidence and reduces generation diversity, leaving RL with a narrowed solution space to explore. Adding entropy regularization during SFT is not a cure-all; it tends to flatten token distributions toward uniformity, increasing entropy without improving meaningful exploration capability. In this paper, we propose CurioSFT, an entropy-preserving SFT method designed to enhance exploration capabilities through intrinsic curiosity. It consists of (a) Self-Exploratory Distillation, which distills the model toward a self-generated, temperature-scaled teacher to encourage exploration within its capability; and (b) Entropy-Guided Temperature Selection, which adaptively adjusts distillation strength to mitigate knowledge forgetting by amplifying exploration at reasoning tokens while stabilizing factual tokens. Extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that, in SFT stage, CurioSFT outperforms the vanilla SFT by 2.5 points on in-distribution tasks and 2.9 points on out-of-distribution tasks. We also verify that exploration capabilities preserved during SFT successfully translate into concrete gains in RL stage, yielding an average improvement of 5.0 points.

  • 9 authors
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Feb 2

Thinking in Video: Can Video Generators Really Reason About the Real World?

Recent advances in world models and video generation have given rise to an emerging reasoning paradigm that leverages video generative models to simulate, predict, and reason about real-world dynamics. We redefine this paradigm as Thinking in Video, where video is not merely an output artifact but a medium for constructing, extending, and verifying causal thought. However, this promise remains unverified: convincing rollouts may reflect memorized appearances rather than causal understanding, while existing metrics separate perceptual fidelity from semantic logic. To evaluate whether video generators support such reasoning, we introduce the Causal-Generative Dual-Judge (CGDJ), auditing World Model Consistency from two perspectives. Explicit Causal Perception tests whether a generator reads a video scenario as a reasoning problem through spatio-temporal flattened visual question answering, while Implicit Generative Perception-Prediction Gap evaluates whether it renders the causal consequence as a consistent future video. Applying CGDJ to representative open- and closed-source generators reveals a clear Perception-Prediction Gap: open-source models produce plausible dynamics despite near-zero explicit causal perception, whereas advanced closed-source systems show stronger but still limited alignment between reasoning and generation. Further analysis exposes audio-visual misalignment, where models verbalize correct causal logic more reliably than they render it, challenging the "world simulator" narrative.

  • 15 authors
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Jul 19

Evidence-Informed LLM Beliefs for Continual Scientific Discovery

Open-ended scientific discovery with large language models (LLMs) increasingly operates as a long-horizon loop of hypothesis search and verification, where a reward signal guides which hypotheses to test next. A notable recent example is AutoDiscovery, which uses "Bayesian surprise" - the belief shift an LLM undergoes after observing evidence for a hypothesis - as both a discovery metric and a reward for search. We first observe that AutoDiscovery treats surprisal as a static quantity, while surprisal in human reasoning is non-stationary - it is defined relative to beliefs that evolve with experience, a prerequisite for continual scientific discovery. We address this mismatch with evidence-informed LLM beliefs: priors updated with evidence from previous hypotheses to compute non-stationary surprisal for new hypotheses. We compare in-context belief-updating mechanisms and find that embedding-based retrieval-augmented generation over prior discoveries best anticipates eventual posteriors, identifying 37.5% of static surprisals as spurious. We then modify search to avoid these spurious rewards and prioritize hypotheses that remain surprising under non-stationary beliefs. Concretely, we introduce two complementary changes to the original search procedure: belief-update filtering and diversity maximization. Across five discovery domains, our method increases accumulated non-stationary surprisal by 30.62% on average compared to the original search procedure, demonstrating that continual scientific discovery with LLMs requires not only better belief measurement but also search procedures that avoid redundancy and encourage diversity.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 27

Unforgettable Generalization in Language Models

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

  • 3 authors
·
Sep 3, 2024

Are Text-to-Image Models Inductivist Turkeys? A Counterfactual Benchmark for Causal Reasoning

Text-to-image (T2I) generation models have achieved remarkable progress in producing visually realistic images from natural language prompts. Yet it remains unclear whether their success reflects genuine causal understanding or sophisticated pattern matching over visual-textual correlations. Inspired by Russell's inductivist turkey, we introduce Counterfactual-World (CF-World), a counterfactual benchmark designed to investigate whether text-to-image models can generate images under rules that systematically contradict real-world priors. CF-World organizes each scenario into three progressive levels: factual generation under ordinary world knowledge, explicit counterfactual generation with direct visual instructions, and implicit counterfactual generation requiring causal deduction from altered rules. We evaluate both open-source and closed-source T2I models using a Vision Language Model (VLM)-based evaluator (CF-Eval). Furthermore, we introduce two metrics: Prior Resistance Rate (PRR), which measures a model's ability to overcome entrenched real-world priors, and Reasoning Retention Rate (RRR), which assesses whether models can maintain reasoning-dependent counterfactual generation without explicit visual cues. Experiments show that all models exhibit sharp degradation from factual to counterfactual settings. Further analyses suggest that these failures arise because current T2I models encode world knowledge and visual appearances as tightly coupled patterns. Consequently, their heavy reliance on frequent visual co-occurrences within the training data forces them to default to familiar commonsense priors when tasked with rendering counterfactual worlds.

  • 11 authors
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Jun 22 1

SimpleToM: Exposing the Gap between Explicit ToM Inference and Implicit ToM Application in LLMs

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 17, 2024

MemoReason: Evaluating the Effect of Parametric Memory on Contextual Reasoning in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform well on reasoning benchmarks, but it remains unclear whether this reflects genuine contextual reasoning or reliance on facts memorized in their parameters. We investigate this by distinguishing two possibilities: a broad memorization bias, where familiar content improves reasoning performance, and the Strong Parametric Shortcut Hypothesis, where models skip reasoning entirely and recall stored answers. To test these effects, we introduce MemoReason, a human-curated benchmark that pairs factual reasoning tasks with structurally identical versions where real entities like people, companies, or dates are systematically replaced by ones of the same type. This preserves task structure and specified reasoning operations while varying the familiarity of the context, allowing controlled measurement of how the parametric memory affects reasoning. Our evaluation of recent LLMs reveals consistent and statistically significant performance drops of up to 15.7\% in the fictitious setting, demonstrating a clear memorization bias. However, a targeted analysis of questions failed in the fictitious setting shows that models rarely respond with the corresponding factual answer, indicating that direct parametric shortcuts are not the dominant failure mode. These findings suggest that parametric memory influences reasoning through mechanisms more complex than simple factual recall. MemoReason provides a controlled framework for studying these mechanisms and for extending paired factual-fictitious{} evaluation to broader reasoning settings.

  • 5 authors
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Sep 27

The Dead Salmons of AI Interpretability

In a striking neuroscience study, the authors placed a dead salmon in an MRI scanner and showed it images of humans in social situations. Astonishingly, standard analyses of the time reported brain regions predictive of social emotions. The explanation, of course, was not supernatural cognition but a cautionary tale about misapplied statistical inference. In AI interpretability, reports of similar ''dead salmon'' artifacts abound: feature attribution, probing, sparse auto-encoding, and even causal analyses can produce plausible-looking explanations for randomly initialized neural networks. In this work, we examine this phenomenon and argue for a pragmatic statistical-causal reframing: explanations of computational systems should be treated as parameters of a (statistical) model, inferred from computational traces. This perspective goes beyond simply measuring statistical variability of explanations due to finite sampling of input data; interpretability methods become statistical estimators, and findings should be tested against explicit and meaningful alternative computational hypotheses, with uncertainty quantified with respect to the postulated statistical model. It also highlights important theoretical issues, such as the identifiability of common interpretability queries, which we argue is critical to understand the field's susceptibility to false discoveries, poor generalizability, and high variance. More broadly, situating interpretability within the standard toolkit of statistical inference opens promising avenues for future work aimed at turning AI interpretability into a pragmatic and rigorous science.

  • 4 authors
·
Dec 21, 2025

Coherent Without Grounding, Grounded Without Success: Observability and Epistemic Failure

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

  • 1 authors
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Mar 29

Connecting the Dots: LLMs can Infer and Verbalize Latent Structure from Disparate Training Data

One way to address safety risks from large language models (LLMs) is to censor dangerous knowledge from their training data. While this removes the explicit information, implicit information can remain scattered across various training documents. Could an LLM infer the censored knowledge by piecing together these implicit hints? As a step towards answering this question, we study inductive out-of-context reasoning (OOCR), a type of generalization in which LLMs infer latent information from evidence distributed across training documents and apply it to downstream tasks without in-context learning. Using a suite of five tasks, we demonstrate that frontier LLMs can perform inductive OOCR. In one experiment we finetune an LLM on a corpus consisting only of distances between an unknown city and other known cities. Remarkably, without in-context examples or Chain of Thought, the LLM can verbalize that the unknown city is Paris and use this fact to answer downstream questions. Further experiments show that LLMs trained only on individual coin flip outcomes can verbalize whether the coin is biased, and those trained only on pairs (x,f(x)) can articulate a definition of f and compute inverses. While OOCR succeeds in a range of cases, we also show that it is unreliable, particularly for smaller LLMs learning complex structures. Overall, the ability of LLMs to "connect the dots" without explicit in-context learning poses a potential obstacle to monitoring and controlling the knowledge acquired by LLMs.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 20, 2024

CounterBench: A Benchmark for Counterfactuals Reasoning in Large Language Models

Counterfactual reasoning is widely recognized as one of the most challenging and intricate aspects of causality in artificial intelligence. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of large language models (LLMs) in counterfactual reasoning. In contrast to previous studies that primarily focus on commonsense causal reasoning, where LLMs often rely on prior knowledge for inference, we specifically assess their ability to perform counterfactual inference using a set of formal rules. To support this evaluation, we introduce a new benchmark dataset, CounterBench, comprising 1K counterfactual reasoning questions. The dataset is designed with varying levels of difficulty, diverse causal graph structures, distinct types of counterfactual questions, and multiple nonsensical name variants. Our experiments demonstrate that counterfactual reasoning poses a significant challenge for LLMs, with most models performing at levels comparable to random guessing. To enhance LLM's counterfactual reasoning ability, we propose a novel reasoning paradigm, CoIn, which guides LLMs through iterative reasoning and backtracking to systematically explore counterfactual solutions. Experimental results show that our method significantly improves LLM performance on counterfactual reasoning tasks and consistently enhances performance across different LLMs.Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CounterBench/CounterBench.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 16, 2025

Intelligence from Learnable Novelty

Intelligence appears under different names in different fields: as data compression in statistics and machine learning, as universal computation in dynamical systems, and as adaptive behavior in agents. Each field carries its own objective, and the two most influential drives often fail in mirror image: novelty search, which seeks surprise, is transfixed by a noisy television screen, while the free-energy principle, which avoids surprise, is most content in a dark room. Both failures have a single cause: each objective treats as one quantity the surprise a learner can convert into knowledge and the surprise it never can. Here we show that the learnable part of that information, which we call learnable novelty, yields the seemingly disparate projections of intelligence, and we give a closed-form estimator of it built on a cheap and differentiable reservoir computer. Used as a measure, with no supervision of any kind, the estimator recovers decades of complexity classification, ranking the Turing-complete rule~110 highest among the elementary cellular automata. Used as an objective, its gradient carries a neural cellular automaton from simple dynamics into a regime of solitons, the traveling, colliding structures by which rule~110 computes, as well as organizes the representation of an image encoder around the ten digit classes of MNIST, fully unsupervised: no label ever enters training. Handed to a reinforcement-learning agent as an intrinsic reward, it supplies the exploration that task rewards lack, improving on the task baseline in nine of ten environments and collapsing in none. Complexity generation, abstraction, and exploration, ordinarily pursued with unrelated objectives in separate fields, thus emerge from ascent on one differentiable quantity, and the projections of intelligence gain a common quantitative footing.

  • 2 authors
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Jul 19

Measuring Reasoning Utility in LLMs via Conditional Entropy Reduction

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 27, 2025

Learning and Unlearning of Fabricated Knowledge in Language Models

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 28, 2024

A2RBench: An Automatic Paradigm for Formally Verifiable Abstract Reasoning Benchmark Generation

Abstract reasoning ability reflects the intelligence and generalization capacity of LLMs to extract and apply abstract rules. However, accurately measuring this ability remains challenging: existing benchmarks either rely on expensive manual annotation, limiting their scale, or risk measuring memorization rather than genuine reasoning. To address this, we introduce an automated pipeline named A2RBench, encompassing generation, expansion, evaluation, and analysis. Specifically, in the generation stage, LLMs create diverse tasks demanding genuine reasoning; in the expansion stage, LLMs reuse validated rules and expand new input spaces to generate task variations, achieving scaling. However, such a process may cause hallucinations. To eliminate it, we further establish a theoretical framework and prove that programmatic verification--testing whether the inverse operation perfectly reverses the forward operation (cycle consistency)--guarantees a unique solution. Through extensive evaluations on mainstream LLMs, we find: (1) Current LLMs exhibit fundamental deficiencies in abstract reasoning, with top models significantly underperforming humans on a representative subset (39.8% vs. 68.5%). (2) Current LLMs fall far short of 2D and 1D in the complexity of generated 3D tasks, revealing their lack of understanding of high-dimensional tasks. (3) Counterintuitively, inputs with higher information complexity can simplify the reasoning process.

MAC-AutoML MAC-AutoML
·
May 16 1

Why think step by step? Reasoning emerges from the locality of experience

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 7, 2023