Daily Papers

Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal projections to remove refusal directions, but these approaches treat refusal as a one-dimensional phenomenon and ignore the rich distributional structure of model activations. We introduce a principled framework based on optimal transport theory that transforms the entire distribution of harmful activations to match harmless ones. By combining PCA with closed-form Gaussian optimal transport, we achieve efficient computation in high-dimensional representation spaces while preserving essential geometric structure. Across six models (Llama-2, Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5; 7B-32B parameters), our method achieves up to 11% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining comparable perplexity, demonstrating superior preservation of model capabilities. Critically, we discover that layer-selective intervention (applying optimal transport to 1-2 carefully chosen layers at approximately 40-60% network depth) substantially outperforms full-network interventions, revealing that refusal mechanisms may be localized rather than distributed. Our analysis provides new insights into the geometric structure of safety representations and suggests that current alignment methods may be vulnerable to distributional attacks beyond simple direction removal.

Safety alignment mechanisms in large language models prevent responses to harmful queries through learned refusal behavior, yet these same mechanisms impede legitimate research applications including cognitive modeling, adversarial testing, and security analysis. While abliteration techniques enable surgical removal of refusal representations through directional orthogonalization, the relative effectiveness of available implementations remains uncharacterized. This study evaluates four abliteration tools (Heretic, DECCP, ErisForge, FailSpy) across sixteen instruction-tuned models (7B-14B parameters), reporting tool compatibility on all 16 models and quantitative metrics on subsets dictated by tool support. Single-pass methods demonstrated superior capability preservation on the benchmarked subset (avg GSM8K change across three models: ErisForge -0.28 pp; DECCP -0.13 pp), while Bayesian-optimized abliteration produced variable distribution shift (KL divergence: 0.043-1.646) with model-dependent capability impact. These findings provide researchers with evidence-based selection criteria for abliteration tool deployment across diverse model architectures. The principal finding indicates that mathematical reasoning capabilities exhibit the highest sensitivity to abliteration interventions, with GSM8K change ranging from +1.51 pp to -18.81 pp (-26.5% relative) depending on tool selection and model architecture.

Current alignment evaluation mostly measures whether models encode dangerous concepts and whether they refuse harmful requests. Both miss the layer where alignment often operates: routing from concept detection to behavioral policy. We study political censorship in Chinese-origin language models as a natural experiment, using probes, surgical ablations, and behavioral tests across nine open-weight models from five labs. Three findings follow. First, probe accuracy alone is non-diagnostic: political probes, null controls, and permutation baselines can all reach 100%, so held-out category generalization is the informative test. Second, surgical ablation reveals lab-specific routing. Removing the political-sensitivity direction eliminates censorship and restores accurate factual output in most models tested, while one model confabulates because its architecture entangles factual knowledge with the censorship mechanism. Cross-model transfer fails, indicating that routing geometry is model- and lab-specific. Third, refusal is no longer the dominant censorship mechanism. Within one model family, hard refusal falls to zero while narrative steering rises to the maximum, making censorship invisible to refusal-only benchmarks. These results support a three-stage descriptive framework: detect, route, generate. Models often retain the relevant knowledge; alignment changes how that knowledge is expressed. Evaluations that audit only detection or refusal therefore miss the routing mechanism that most directly determines behavior.

Refusals - instances where large language models (LLMs) decline or fail to fully execute user instructions - are crucial for both AI safety and AI capabilities and the reduction of hallucinations in particular. These behaviors are learned during post-training, especially in instruction fine-tuning (IFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing taxonomies and evaluation datasets for refusals are inadequate, often focusing solely on should-not-related (instead of cannot-related) categories, and lacking tools for auditing refusal content in black-box LLM outputs. We present a comprehensive framework for classifying LLM refusals: (a) a taxonomy of 16 refusal categories, (b) a human-annotated dataset of over 8,600 instances from publicly available IFT and RLHF datasets, (c) a synthetic dataset with 8,000 examples for each refusal category, and (d) classifiers trained for refusal classification. Our work enables precise auditing of refusal behaviors in black-box LLMs and automatic analyses of refusal patterns in large IFT and RLHF datasets. This facilitates the strategic adjustment of LLM refusals, contributing to the development of more safe and reliable LLMs.

Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as a promising alternative to autoregressive (AR) models, offering parallel decoding and controllable sampling dynamics while achieving competitive generation quality at scale. Despite this progress, the role of sampling mechanisms in shaping refusal behavior and jailbreak robustness remains poorly understood. In this work, we present a fundamental analytical framework for step-wise refusal dynamics, enabling comparison between AR and diffusion sampling. Our analysis reveals that the sampling strategy itself plays a central role in safety behavior, as a factor distinct from the underlying learned representations. Motivated by this analysis, we introduce the Step-Wise Refusal Internal Dynamics (SRI) signal, which supports interpretability and improved safety for both AR and DLMs. We demonstrate that the geometric structure of SRI captures internal recovery dynamics, and identifies anomalous behavior in harmful generations as cases of incomplete internal recovery that are not observable at the text level. This structure enables lightweight inference-time detectors that generalize to unseen attacks while matching or outperforming existing defenses with over 100times lower inference overhead.

Reinforcement fine-tuning improves the reasoning ability of large language models, but it can also encourage them to answer unanswerable queries by guessing or hallucinating missing information. Existing abstention methods either train models to produce generic refusals or encourage follow-up clarifications without verifying whether those clarifications identify the key missing information. We study queries that are clear in meaning but cannot be reliably resolved from the given information, and argue that a reliable model should not only abstain, but also explain what is missing. We propose a clarification-aware RLVR reward that, while rewarding correct answers on answerable queries, jointly optimizes explicit abstention and semantically aligned post-refusal clarification on unanswerable queries. Using this reward, we train Abstain-R1, a 3B model that improves abstention and clarification on unanswerable queries while preserving strong performance on answerable ones. Experiments on Abstain-Test, Abstain-QA, and SelfAware show that Abstain-R1 substantially improves over its base model and achieves unanswerable-query behavior competitive with larger systems including DeepSeek-R1, suggesting that calibrated abstention and clarification can be learned through verifiable rewards rather than emerging from scale alone.

Refusal behavior in large language models (LLMs) enables them to decline responding to harmful, unethical, or inappropriate prompts, ensuring alignment with ethical standards. This paper investigates refusal behavior across six LLMs from three architectural families. We challenge the assumption of refusal as a linear phenomenon by employing dimensionality reduction techniques, including PCA, t-SNE, and UMAP. Our results reveal that refusal mechanisms exhibit nonlinear, multidimensional characteristics that vary by model architecture and layer. These findings highlight the need for nonlinear interpretability to improve alignment research and inform safer AI deployment strategies.

Refusal is a key safety behavior in aligned language models, yet the internal mechanisms driving refusals remain opaque. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic study of refusal in instruction-tuned LLMs using sparse autoencoders to identify latent features that causally mediate refusal behaviors. We apply our method to two open-source chat models and intervene on refusal-related features to assess their influence on generation, validating their behavioral impact across multiple harmful datasets. This enables a fine-grained inspection of how refusal manifests at the activation level and addresses key research questions such as investigating upstream-downstream latent relationship and understanding the mechanisms of adversarial jailbreaking techniques. We also establish the usefulness of refusal features in enhancing generalization for linear probes to out-of-distribution adversarial samples in classification tasks. We open source our code in https://github.com/wj210/refusal_sae.

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a single direction in the model's latent space; e.g., computed as the difference between the centroids of harmful and harmless prompt representations. However, emerging evidence suggests that concepts in LLMs often appear to be encoded as a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the high-dimensional latent space. Motivated by these findings, we propose a novel method leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to extract multiple refusal directions. To this end, we first prove that SOMs generalize the prior work's difference-in-means technique. We then train SOMs on harmful prompt representations to identify multiple neurons. By subtracting the centroid of harmless representations from each neuron, we derive a set of multiple directions expressing the refusal concept. We validate our method on an extensive experimental setup, demonstrating that ablating multiple directions from models' internals outperforms not only the single-direction baseline but also specialized jailbreak algorithms, leading to an effective suppression of refusal. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the mechanistic implications of our approach.

Refusal mechanisms in large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring safety. Recent research has revealed that refusal behavior can be mediated by a single direction in activation space, enabling targeted interventions to bypass refusals. While this is primarily demonstrated in an English-centric context, appropriate refusal behavior is important for any language, but poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the refusal behavior in LLMs across 14 languages using PolyRefuse, a multilingual safety dataset created by translating malicious and benign English prompts into these languages. We uncover the surprising cross-lingual universality of the refusal direction: a vector extracted from English can bypass refusals in other languages with near-perfect effectiveness, without any additional fine-tuning. Even more remarkably, refusal directions derived from any safety-aligned language transfer seamlessly to others. We attribute this transferability to the parallelism of refusal vectors across languages in the embedding space and identify the underlying mechanism behind cross-lingual jailbreaks. These findings provide actionable insights for building more robust multilingual safety defenses and pave the way for a deeper mechanistic understanding of cross-lingual vulnerabilities in LLMs.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

Refusal on harmful prompts is a key safety behaviour in instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs), yet the internal causes of this behaviour remain poorly understood. We study two public instruction-tuned models, Gemma-2-2B-IT and LLaMA-3.1-8B-IT, using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) trained on residual-stream activations. Given a harmful prompt, we search the SAE latent space for feature sets whose ablation flips the model from refusal to compliance, demonstrating causal influence and creating a jailbreak. Our search proceeds in three stages: (1) Refusal Direction: find a refusal-mediating direction and collect SAE features near that direction; (2) Greedy Filtering: prune to a minimal set; and (3) Interaction Discovery: fit a factorization machine (FM) that captures nonlinear interactions among the remaining active features and the minimal set. This pipeline yields a broad set of jailbreak-critical features, offering insight into the mechanistic basis of refusal. Moreover, we find evidence of redundant features that remain dormant unless earlier features are suppressed. Our findings highlight the potential for fine-grained auditing and targeted intervention in safety behaviours by manipulating the interpretable latent space.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

Since the release of OpenAI's ChatGPT, generative language models have attracted extensive public attention. The increased usage has highlighted generative models' broad utility, but also revealed several forms of embedded bias. Some is induced by the pre-training corpus; but additional bias specific to generative models arises from the use of subjective fine-tuning to avoid generating harmful content. Fine-tuning bias may come from individual engineers and company policies, and affects which prompts the model chooses to refuse. In this experiment, we characterize ChatGPT's refusal behavior using a black-box attack. We first query ChatGPT with a variety of offensive and benign prompts (n=1,706), then manually label each response as compliance or refusal. Manual examination of responses reveals that refusal is not cleanly binary, and lies on a continuum; as such, we map several different kinds of responses to a binary of compliance or refusal. The small manually-labeled dataset is used to train a refusal classifier, which achieves an accuracy of 96%. Second, we use this refusal classifier to bootstrap a larger (n=10,000) dataset adapted from the Quora Insincere Questions dataset. With this machine-labeled data, we train a prompt classifier to predict whether ChatGPT will refuse a given question, without seeing ChatGPT's response. This prompt classifier achieves 76% accuracy on a test set of manually labeled questions (n=985). We examine our classifiers and the prompt n-grams that are most predictive of either compliance or refusal. Our datasets and code are available at https://github.com/maxwellreuter/chatgpt-refusals.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) can be circumvented through adversarially crafted inputs, yet the mechanisms by which these attacks bypass safety barriers remain poorly understood. Prior work suggests that a single refusal direction in the model's activation space determines whether an LLM refuses a request. In this study, we propose a novel gradient-based approach to representation engineering and use it to identify refusal directions. Contrary to prior work, we uncover multiple independent directions and even multi-dimensional concept cones that mediate refusal. Moreover, we show that orthogonality alone does not imply independence under intervention, motivating the notion of representational independence that accounts for both linear and non-linear effects. Using this framework, we identify mechanistically independent refusal directions. We show that refusal mechanisms in LLMs are governed by complex spatial structures and identify functionally independent directions, confirming that multiple distinct mechanisms drive refusal behavior. Our gradient-based approach uncovers these mechanisms and can further serve as a foundation for future work on understanding LLMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

We introduce Refusal Steering, an inference-time method to exercise fine-grained control over Large Language Models refusal behaviour on politically sensitive topics without retraining. We replace fragile pattern-based refusal detection with an LLM-as-a-judge that assigns refusal confidence scores and we propose a ridge-regularized variant to compute steering vectors that better isolate the refusal--compliance direction. On Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, our method removes the refusal behaviour of the model around politically sensitive topics while maintaining safety on JailbreakBench and near-baseline performance on general benchmarks. The approach generalizes across 4B and 80B models and can also induce targeted refusals when desired. We analize the steering vectors and show that refusal signals concentrate in deeper layers of the transformer and are distributed across many dimensions. Together, these results demonstrate that activation steering can remove political refusal behaviour while retaining safety alignment for harmful content, offering a practical path to controllable, transparent moderation at inference time.

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

Representation Engineering analyses often characterize refusal using static directions extracted from terminal or pooled representations. We ask whether this view misses how refusal is constructed across layer-token positions. Using causal tracing, we identify a Refusal Trajectory: a sparse upstream activation pattern that often persists even when attacks such as GCG suppress terminal refusal signals. Based on this observation, we propose SALO (Sparse Activation Localization Operator), a lightweight white-box detector that operates on raw hidden-state volumes from a selected layer window. Across Qwen, Llama, and Mistral models, SALO improves jailbreak detection on several attack families under a fixed XSTest-calibrated operating point. We further analyze static RepE-style baselines, ROI sensitivity, adaptive GCG attacks, and encoded-input boundary cases, clarifying both the promise and limitations of refusal-trajectory monitoring.

The ability of language models in RAG systems to selectively refuse to answer based on flawed context is critical for safety, yet remains a significant failure point. Our large-scale study reveals that even frontier models struggle in this setting, with refusal accuracy dropping below 50% on multi-document tasks, while exhibiting either dangerous overconfidence or overcaution. Static benchmarks fail to reliably evaluate this capability, as models exploit dataset-specific artifacts and memorize test instances. We introduce RefusalBench, a generative methodology that programmatically creates diagnostic test cases through controlled linguistic perturbation. Our framework employs 176 distinct perturbation strategies across six categories of informational uncertainty and three intensity levels. Evaluation of over 30 models uncovers systematic failure patterns: refusal comprises separable detection and categorization skills, and neither scale nor extended reasoning improves performance. We find that selective refusal is a trainable, alignment-sensitive capability, offering a clear path for improvement. We release two benchmarks -- RefusalBench-NQ (single document) and RefusalBench-GaRAGe (multi-document) -- and our complete generation framework to enable continued, dynamic evaluation of this critical capability.

Refusal-Aware Instruction Tuning (RAIT) aims to enhance Large Language Models (LLMs) by improving their ability to refuse responses to questions beyond their knowledge, thereby reducing hallucinations and improving reliability. Effective RAIT must address two key challenges: firstly, effectively reject unknown questions to minimize hallucinations; secondly, avoid over-refusal to ensure questions that can be correctly answered are not rejected, thereby maintain the helpfulness of LLM outputs. In this paper, we address the two challenges by deriving insightful observations from the gradient-based perspective, and proposing the Gradient-driven Refusal Aware Instruction Tuning Framework GRAIT: (1) employs gradient-driven sample selection to effectively minimize hallucinations and (2) introduces an adaptive weighting mechanism during fine-tuning to reduce the risk of over-refusal, achieving the balance between accurate refusals and maintaining useful responses. Experimental evaluations on open-ended and multiple-choice question answering tasks demonstrate that GRAIT significantly outperforms existing RAIT methods in the overall performance. The source code and data will be available at https://github.com/opendatalab/GRAIT .

This study reveals a previously unexplored vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing aligned LLMs predominantly respond to unsafe queries with refusals, which often begin with a fixed set of prefixes (I'm sorry). We demonstrate that this rigid refusal pattern is a vulnerability and introduce a novel refusal unlearning technique that exploits it. Specifically, we fine-tune LLMs using merely 1,000 benign samples, where each response is prepended with a refusal prefix. The underlying intuition is to disrupt the refusal completion pathway, thereby driving the model to forget how to refuse while following harmful instructions. This intuition is further supported by theoretical proofs. We apply this approach to a total of 16 LLMs, including various open-source models from Llama, Qwen, and Gemma families, as well as closed-source models such as Gemini and GPT. Experimental results show that the safety scores of previously aligned LLMs degrade both consistently and substantially. Importantly, we verify that the observed gain cannot be attributed to plain fine-tuning or random prefix effects. Our findings suggest that current safety alignment may rely heavily on token sequence memorization rather than reasoning, motivating future work beyond simple refusal mechanisms. Code has been released: https://github.com/guoyang9/refusal-unlearning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) should refuse to answer questions beyond their knowledge. This capability, which we term knowledge-aware refusal, is crucial for factual reliability. However, existing metrics fail to faithfully measure this ability. On the one hand, simple refusal-based metrics are biased by refusal rates and yield inconsistent scores when models exhibit different refusal tendencies. On the other hand, existing calibration metrics are proxy-based, capturing the performance of auxiliary calibration processes rather than the model's actual refusal behavior. In this work, we propose the Refusal Index (RI), a principled metric that measures how accurately LLMs refuse questions they do not know. We define RI as Spearman's rank correlation between refusal probability and error probability. To make RI practically measurable, we design a lightweight two-pass evaluation method that efficiently estimates RI from observed refusal rates across two standard evaluation runs. Extensive experiments across 16 models and 5 datasets demonstrate that RI accurately quantifies a model's intrinsic knowledge-aware refusal capability in factual tasks. Notably, RI remains stable across different refusal rates and provides consistent model rankings independent of a model's overall accuracy and refusal rates. More importantly, RI provides insight into an important but previously overlooked aspect of LLM factuality: while LLMs achieve high accuracy on factual tasks, their refusal behavior can be unreliable and fragile. This finding highlights the need to complement traditional accuracy metrics with the Refusal Index for comprehensive factuality evaluation.

Responsible practices for deploying language models include guiding models to recognize and refuse answering prompts that are considered unsafe, while complying with safe prompts. Achieving such behavior typically requires updating model weights, which is costly and inflexible. We explore opportunities to steering model activations at inference time, which does not require updating weights. Using sparse autoencoders, we identify and steer features in Phi-3 Mini that mediate refusal behavior. We find that feature steering can improve Phi-3 Minis robustness to jailbreak attempts across various harms, including challenging multi-turn attacks. However, we discover that feature steering can adversely affect overall performance on benchmarks. These results suggest that identifying steerable mechanisms for refusal via sparse autoencoders is a promising approach for enhancing language model safety, but that more research is needed to mitigate feature steerings adverse effects on performance.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) trained on massive, uncurated corpora has raised growing concerns about the inclusion of sensitive, copyrighted, or illegal content. This has led to increasing interest in LLM unlearning: the task of selectively removing specific information from a model without retraining from scratch or degrading overall utility. However, existing methods often rely on large-scale forget and retain datasets, and suffer from unnatural responses, poor generalization, or catastrophic utility loss. In this work, we propose Reinforcement UnLearning (RULE), an efficient framework that formulates unlearning as a refusal boundary optimization problem. RULE is trained with a small portion of the forget set and synthesized boundary queries, using a verifiable reward function that encourages safe refusal on forget--related queries while preserving helpful responses on permissible inputs. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of RULE in achieving targeted unlearning without compromising model utility. Experimental results show that, with only 12% forget set and 8% synthesized boundary data, RULE outperforms existing baselines by up to 17.5% forget quality and 16.3% naturalness response while maintaining general utility, achieving forget--retain Pareto optimality. Remarkably, we further observe that RULE improves the naturalness of model outputs, enhances training efficiency, and exhibits strong generalization ability, generalizing refusal behavior to semantically related but unseen queries.

Perturbation probing generates task-specific causal hypotheses for FFN neurons in large language models using two forward passes per prompt and no backpropagation, followed by a one-time intervention sweep of about 150 passes amortized across all identified neurons. Across eight behavioral circuits, 13 models, and four architecture families, we identify two circuit structures that organize LLM behavior. Opposition circuits appear when RLHF suppresses a pre-training tendency. In safety refusal, about 50 neurons, or 0.014 percent of all neurons, control the refusal template; ablating them changes 80 percent of response formats on 520 AdvBench prompts while producing near-zero harmful compliance, 3 of 520 cases, all with disclaimers. Routing circuits appear for pre-training behaviors distributed through attention. For language selection, residual-stream direction injection switches English to Chinese output on 99.1 percent of 580 benchmark prompts in the 3 of 19 tested models that satisfy three observed conditions: bilingual training, FFN-to-skip signal ratio between 0.3 and 1.1, and linear representability. The same intervention fails on the other 16 models and on math, code, and factual circuits, defining the limits of directional steering. The FFN-to-skip signal ratio, computed from the same two forward passes, distinguishes the two structures and predicts the appropriate intervention. Circuit topology varies by architecture, from Qwen's concentrated FFN bottleneck to Gemma's normalization-shielded circuit. In Qwen3.5-2B, ablating 20 neurons eliminates multi-turn sycophantic capitulation, while amplifying 10 related neurons improves factual correction from 52 percent to 88 percent on 200 TruthfulQA prompts. These results show that perturbation probing offers mechanistic insight into RLHF-organized behavior and a practical toolkit for precision template-layer editing.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encode behaviors such as refusal within their activation space, yet identifying these behaviors remains a significant challenge. Existing methods often rely on predefined refusal templates detectable in output tokens or require manual analysis. We introduce COSMIC (Cosine Similarity Metrics for Inversion of Concepts), an automated framework for direction selection that identifies viable steering directions and target layers using cosine similarity - entirely independent of model outputs. COSMIC achieves steering performance comparable to prior methods without requiring assumptions about a model's refusal behavior, such as the presence of specific refusal tokens. It reliably identifies refusal directions in adversarial settings and weakly aligned models, and is capable of steering such models toward safer behavior with minimal increase in false refusals, demonstrating robustness across a wide range of alignment conditions.

Recent work has shown that fine-tuning on insecure code data can trigger an emergent misalignment (EMA) phenomenon, where models generate malicious responses even to prompts unrelated to the original insecure code-writing task. Such cross-domain generalization of harmful behavior underscores the need for a deeper understanding of the algorithms, tasks, and datasets that induce emergent misalignment. In this work, we extend this study by demonstrating that emergent misalignment can also arise from narrow refusal unlearning in specific domains. We perform refusal unlearning on Cybersecurity and Safety concept, and evaluate EMA by monitoring refusal scores across seven responsible AI (RAI) domains, Cybersecurity, Safety, Toxicity, Bias, Sensitive Content, Medical/Legal, and Privacy. Our work shows that narrow domain unlearning can yield compliance responses for the targeted concept, however, it may also propagate EMA to unrelated domains. Among the two intervened concepts, Cybersecurity and Safety, we find that the safety concept can have larger EMA impact, i.e, causing lower refusal scores, across other unrelated domains such as bias. We observe this effect consistently across two model families, Mistral-7b-0.3v, and Qwen-7b-2.5. Further, we show that refusal unlearning augmented with cross-entropy loss function on a small set of retain data from the affected domains can largely, if not fully, restore alignment across the impacted domains while having lower refusal rate on the concept we perform unlearning on. To investigate the underlying causes of EMA, we analyze concept entanglements at the representation level via concept vectors. Our analysis reveals that concepts with higher representation similarity in earlier layers are more susceptible to EMA after intervention when the refusal stream is altered through targeted refusal unlearning.

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features. Recent latent-space defenses increasingly rely on these decompositions, assuming that identified "unsafe" SAE features serve as actionable handles for monitoring and intervention. In this paradigm, clamping a specific harmful feature is expected to reliably prevent model misbehavior. However, we show that this success may hide a recoverable failure mode: the clamp may block one visible route to a behavior without eliminating the behavior itself. We formulate this vulnerability as post-intervention recovery, a constrained residual-space optimization problem. Starting from the post-intervention residual state, we optimize residual perturbations to recover the pre-intervention behavior while preserving the post-intervention values of the targeted SAE features. Even under a strong threat model where the intervention remains active throughout optimization and generation, recovery remains possible. To rule out that recovery simply undoes the intervention, we use encoder-orthogonal updates for single-layer interventions and the corresponding feature-map Jacobian in the cross-layer setting. Across TPP, unlearning, IOI, and refusal steering experiments, this stress test reveals recoverable behavior despite successful feature-level intervention. Especially in the safety-critical refusal-steering setting, we achieve a 95.8% recovery rate on valid samples while keeping defended-feature relative drift to 0.131, substantially below suffix-based baselines. A recovery-path attribution analysis further localizes this recovery to the SAE reconstruction residual, the component left unexplained by the SAE. These results expose a gap between feature-level control and behavioral completeness: SAE features can support causal intervention, but controlling them does not guarantee control over the underlying behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized numerous domains with their impressive performance but still face their challenges. A predominant issue is the propensity for these models to generate non-existent facts, a concern termed hallucination. Our research is motivated by the observation that previous instruction tuning methods force the model to complete a sentence no matter whether the model knows the knowledge or not. When the question is out of the parametric knowledge, it will try to make up something and fail to indicate when it lacks knowledge. In this paper, we present a new approach called Refusal-Aware Instruction Tuning (R-Tuning). This approach is formalized by first identifying the knowledge gap between parametric knowledge and the instruction tuning data. Then, we construct the refusal-aware data based on the knowledge intersection, to tune LLMs to refrain from responding to questions beyond its parametric knowledge. Experimental results demonstrate this new instruction tuning approach effectively improves a model's ability to answer known questions and refrain from answering unknown questions. Furthermore, when tested on out-of-domain datasets, the refusal ability was found to be a meta-skill that could be generalized to other tasks. Further analysis surprisingly finds that learning the uncertainty during training displays a better ability to estimate uncertainty than uncertainty-based testing. Our code will be released at https://github.com/shizhediao/R-Tuning.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Language models are instruction-tuned to refuse harmful requests, but the mechanisms underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. Popular steering methods operate on the residual stream and degrade output coherence at high intervention strengths, limiting their practical use. We introduce contrastive neuron attribution (CNA), which identifies the 0.1% of MLP neurons whose activations most distinguish harmful from benign prompts, requiring only forward passes with no gradients or auxiliary training. In instruct models, ablating the discovered circuit reduces refusal rates by over 50% on a standard jailbreak benchmark while preserving fluency and non-degeneracy across all steering strengths. Applying CNA to matched base and instruct models across Llama and Qwen architectures (from 1B to 72B parameters), we find that base models contain similar late-layer discrimination structures but steering these neurons produces only content shifts, not behavioral change. These results demonstrate that neuron-level intervention enables reliable behavioral steering without the quality tradeoffs of residual-stream methods. More broadly, our findings suggest that alignment fine-tuning transforms pre-existing discrimination structure into a sparse, targetable refusal gate.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

Refusal rates are a poor proxy for LLM safety, i.e., a model may over-refuse benign prompts while still complying with harmful ones. We audit both failure modes across 21 open-weight LLMs on four safety benchmarks (OR-Bench, XSTest, ToxiGen, BOLD), using a composition adjustment to isolate model sensitivity from dataset toxicity confounds. We report three findings. First, models adopt fundamentally different calibration strategies: conservative ecosystems such as Llama suppress unsafe outputs at the cost of elevated over-refusals, while permissive ecosystems such as DeepSeek and Qwen preserve helpfulness but tolerate higher harmful compliance. Second, demographic protection is unequal: models over-protect prominent racial and religious groups, frequently refusing even benign prompts about them, while providing substantially weaker protection against disability-targeted attacks. Third, refusal and compliance tendencies are stable within model families across generations and scales, suggesting that post-training objectives shape safety behavior more than architecture. Our results call for joint, demographically-aware, and multi-judge safety evaluation.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce false refusals, declining benign requests that contain terms resembling unsafe queries. We address this challenge by introducing two comprehensive benchmarks: the Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (XSB) for single-turn prompts, annotated with "Focus" keywords that identify refusal-inducing triggers, and the Multi-turn Scenario-based Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (MS-XSB), which systematically evaluates refusal calibration in realistic, context-rich dialog settings. Our benchmarks reveal that exaggerated refusals persist across diverse recent LLMs and are especially pronounced in complex, multi-turn scenarios. To mitigate these failures, we leverage post-hoc explanation methods to identify refusal triggers and deploy three lightweight, model-agnostic approaches, ignore-word instructions, prompt rephrasing, and attention steering, at inference time, all without retraining or parameter access. Experiments on four instruction-tuned Llama models demonstrate that these strategies substantially improve compliance on safe prompts while maintaining robust safety protections. Our findings establish a reproducible framework for diagnosing and mitigating exaggerated refusals, highlighting practical pathways to safer and more helpful LLM deployments.

Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear. Meanwhile, mechanistic interpretability studies have characterized both refusal directions and jailbreak-associated features, without explaining the relationship between the two representations. In this work, we show that scenario-wrapped prompts activate internal scenario directions whose causal steering consistently reduces refusal scores. Building on this finding, we propose Concept2Scenario, a concept-based attribution framework for vulnerable scenario discovery. It instantiates a broad concept space with a sparse autoencoder, attributes refusal suppression to individual concepts, translates the identified concepts into interpretable natural-language scenarios, and identifies synergistic scenario combinations through interaction attribution. Across three open-source models, two safety benchmarks, and six black-box jailbreak methods, the discovered scenarios serve as reusable priors that improve average attack success rates by up to 18.2 percentage points. They also transfer to GPT-5, Claude-Haiku-4.5, and Gemini-3-Flash, suggesting that some scenario-level refusal vulnerabilities are shared across model families. Moreover, the identified combinations outperform their individual constituents and enable iterative attacks to succeed in fewer turns.

While activation steering in large language models (LLMs) is a growing area of research, methods can often incur broader effects than desired. This motivates isolation of purer concept vectors to enable targeted interventions and understand LLM behavior at a more granular level. We present RepIt, a simple and data-efficient framework for isolating concept-specific representations. Across five frontier LLMs, RepIt enables precise interventions: it selectively suppresses refusal on targeted concepts while preserving refusal elsewhere, producing models that answer WMD-related questions while still scoring as safe on standard benchmarks. We further show that the corrective signal localizes to just 100-200 neurons and that robust target representations can be extracted from as few as a dozen examples on a single A6000. This efficiency raises a dual concern: manipulations can be performed with modest compute and data to extend to underrepresented data-scarce topics while evading existing benchmarks. By disentangling refusal vectors with RepIt, this work demonstrates that targeted interventions can counteract overgeneralization, laying the foundation for more granular control of model behavior.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

Frontier large language models are increasingly deployed as orchestration backbones for biological research workflows, yet no shared evidence base exists for comparing their refusal behaviour on legitimate research prompts. RefusalBench, introduced here, is a matched-triple benchmark of 141 prompts in 47 bundles that holds task framing constant while varying only biological risk tier (benign, borderline, dual-use), enabling tier-conditioned comparisons robust to subdomain confounding. A 15-prompt should-refuse positive-control module establishes per-model calibration floors; three models fail to refuse even these prompts. Across 19 frontier models in the May 2026 snapshot, strict refusal rates span 0.1% to 94.6% on identical prompts. Jurisdiction does not predict refusal in this snapshot (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.393; EU n = 1, US bimodal); provider identity does, with Anthropic's API stack predicting refusal at OR = 21.03 (95% CI: 14.58-30.34 prompt-clustered; 5.70-77.55 under model-clustered GEE). This effect is best read as access-path-level rather than model-weight-level: 99.8% of Anthropic's strict refusals carry the same safety_policy adjudicated reason code, consistent with a small set of canonical refusal templates rather than case-by-case model reasoning. Strict refusal rate misranks safety calibration: Grok 4.20 achieves the highest tier discrimination (Youden's J = 0.787) while ranking only seventh by overall refusal rate, and Claude Opus 4.7's J dropped 65% from prior versions with no improvement in dual-use detection. Nine of 18 frontier models exhibit a hedge-but-help partial-compliance pattern at dual-use tier that binary refusal metrics cannot detect.

Reliable Large Language Models (LLMs) should abstain when confidence is insufficient. However, prior studies often treat refusal as a generic "I don't know'', failing to distinguish input-level ambiguity (data uncertainty) from capability limitations (model uncertainty). This lack of distinction limits downstream action decisions like requesting clarification or invoking external tools. In this work, we introduce UA-Bench, a benchmark of over 3,500 questions drawn from six datasets spanning knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive tasks, designed to evaluate explicit uncertainty attribution. An evaluation of 18 frontier LLMs shows that even state-of-the-art models struggle to reliably discriminate between data uncertainty and model uncertainty, and that high answer accuracy does not necessarily imply strong uncertainty attribution ability. To narrow this gap, we propose a lightweight data synthesis and reinforcement learning strategy. Experiments on both Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 and Qwen3-8B in thinking mode show that the proposed method improves uncertainty attribution while preserving answer accuracy. Our code and data are publicly available now.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

Reinforcement finetuning (RFT) has become a standard approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, its impact on model trustworthiness remains underexplored. In this work, we identify and systematically study a critical side effect of RFT, which we term the hallucination tax: a degradation in refusal behavior causing models to produce hallucinated answers to unanswerable questions confidently. To investigate this, we introduce SUM (Synthetic Unanswerable Math), a high-quality dataset of unanswerable math problems designed to probe models' ability to recognize an unanswerable question by reasoning from the insufficient or ambiguous information. Our results show that standard RFT training could reduce model refusal rates by more than 80%, which significantly increases model's tendency to hallucinate. We further demonstrate that incorporating just 10% SUM during RFT substantially restores appropriate refusal behavior, with minimal accuracy trade-offs on solvable tasks. Crucially, this approach enables LLMs to leverage inference-time compute to reason about their own uncertainty and knowledge boundaries, improving generalization not only to out-of-domain math problems but also to factual question answering tasks.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

We identify a structural weakness in current large language model (LLM) alignment: modern refusal mechanisms are fail-open. While existing approaches encode refusal behaviors across multiple latent features, suppressing a single dominant feature-via prompt-based jailbreaks-can cause alignment to collapse, leading to unsafe generation. Motivated by this, we propose fail-closed alignment as a design principle for robust LLM safety: refusal mechanisms should remain effective even under partial failures via redundant, independent causal pathways. We present a concrete instantiation of this principle: a progressive alignment framework that iteratively identifies and ablates previously learned refusal directions, forcing the model to reconstruct safety along new, independent subspaces. Across four jailbreak attacks, we achieve the strongest overall robustness while mitigating over-refusal and preserving generation quality, with small computational overhead. Our mechanistic analyses confirm that models trained with our method encode multiple, causally independent refusal directions that prompt-based jailbreaks cannot suppress simultaneously, providing empirical support for fail-closed alignment as a principled foundation for robust LLM safety.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed the way we access information. These models are often tuned to refuse to comply with requests that are considered harmful and to produce responses that better align with the preferences of those who control the models. To understand how this "censorship" works. We use representation engineering techniques to study open-weights safety-tuned models. We present a method for finding a refusal--compliance vector that detects and controls the level of censorship in model outputs. We also analyze recent reasoning LLMs, distilled from DeepSeek-R1, and uncover an additional dimension of censorship through "thought suppression". We show a similar approach can be used to find a vector that suppresses the model's reasoning process, allowing us to remove censorship by applying the negative multiples of this vector

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

Safety alignment is crucial for large language models (LLMs) to resist malicious instructions but often results in over-refusals, where benign prompts are unnecessarily rejected, impairing user experience and model utility. We introduce ACTOR (Activation-Based Training for Over-Refusal Reduction), a robust and compute- and data-efficient training framework that minimizes over-refusals by leveraging internal activation patterns from diverse queries. ACTOR precisely identifies and adjusts the activation components that trigger refusals, providing stronger control over the refusal mechanism. By fine-tuning only a single model layer, ACTOR effectively reduces over-refusals across multiple benchmarks while maintaining the model's ability to handle harmful queries and preserve overall utility.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

The inability to filter out in advance all potentially problematic data from the pre-training of large language models has given rise to the need for methods for unlearning specific pieces of knowledge after training. Existing techniques overlook the need for continuous and immediate action, causing them to suffer from degraded utility as updates accumulate and protracted exposure of sensitive information. To address these issues, we propose Continual Unlearning in Real Time with Ensured Preservation of LLM Knowledge (CURaTE). Our method begins by training a sentence embedding model on a dataset designed to enable the formation of sharp decision boundaries for determining whether a given input prompt corresponds to any stored forget requests. The similarity of a given input to the forget requests is then used to determine whether to answer or return a refusal response. We show that even with such a simple approach, not only does CURaTE achieve more effective forgetting than existing methods, but by avoiding modification of the language model parameters, it also maintains near perfect knowledge preservation over any number of updates and is the only method capable of continual unlearning in real-time.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

Recently, language models like Llama 3.1 Instruct have become increasingly capable of agentic behavior, enabling them to perform tasks requiring short-term planning and tool use. In this study, we apply refusal-vector ablation to Llama 3.1 70B and implement a simple agent scaffolding to create an unrestricted agent. Our findings imply that these refusal-vector ablated models can successfully complete harmful tasks, such as bribing officials or crafting phishing attacks, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current safety mechanisms. To further explore this, we introduce a small Safe Agent Benchmark, designed to test both harmful and benign tasks in agentic scenarios. Our results imply that safety fine-tuning in chat models does not generalize well to agentic behavior, as we find that Llama 3.1 Instruct models are willing to perform most harmful tasks without modifications. At the same time, these models will refuse to give advice on how to perform the same tasks when asked for a chat completion. This highlights the growing risk of misuse as models become more capable, underscoring the need for improved safety frameworks for language model agents.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

Personality imbuing customizes LLM behavior, but safety evaluations almost always study prompt-based personas alone. We show this is incomplete: prompting and activation steering expose *different*, architecture-dependent vulnerability profiles, and testing with only one method can miss a model's dominant failure mode. Across 5,568 judged conditions on four standard models from three architecture families, persona danger rankings under system prompting are preserved across all architectures (ρ= 0.71--0.96), but activation-steering vulnerability diverges sharply and cannot be predicted from prompt-side rankings: Llama-3.1-8B is substantially more AS-vulnerable, whereas Gemma-3-27B and Qwen3.5 are more vulnerable to prompting. The most striking illustration of this divergence is the *prosocial persona paradox*: on Llama-3.1-8B, P12 (high conscientiousness + high agreeableness) is among the safest personas under prompting yet becomes the highest-ASR activation-steered persona (ASR ~0.818). This is an inversion robust to coefficient ablation and matched-strength calibration, and replicated on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B. A trait refusal alignment framework, in which conscientiousness is strongly anti-aligned with refusal on Llama-3.1-8B, offers a partial geometric account. Reasoning provides only partial protection: two 32B reasoning models reach 15--18% prompt-side ASR, and activation steering separates them sharply in both baseline susceptibility and persona-specific vulnerability. Heuristic trace diagnostics suggest that the safer model retains stronger policy recall and self-correction behavior, not merely longer reasoning.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety constraints. Existing strategies, ranging from heuristic prompt engineering to computationally intensive optimization, often face significant trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency. In this work, we propose Contextual Representation Ablation (CRA), a novel inference-time intervention framework designed to dynamically silence model guardrails. Predicated on the geometric insight that refusal behaviors are mediated by specific low-rank subspaces within the model's hidden states, CRA identifies and suppresses these refusal-inducing activation patterns during decoding without requiring expensive parameter updates or training. Empirical evaluation across multiple safety-aligned open-source LLMs demonstrates that CRA significantly outperforms baselines. These results expose the intrinsic fragility of current alignment mechanisms, revealing that safety constraints can be surgically ablated from internal representations, and underscore the urgent need for more robust defenses that secure the model's latent space.

Omni-modal Large Language Models (OLLMs) greatly expand LLMs' multimodal capabilities but also introduce cross-modal safety risks. However, a systematic understanding of vulnerabilities in omni-modal interactions remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we establish a modality-semantics decoupling principle and construct the AdvBench-Omni dataset, which reveals a significant vulnerability in OLLMs. Mechanistic analysis uncovers a Mid-layer Dissolution phenomenon driven by refusal vector magnitude shrinkage, alongside the existence of a modal-invariant pure refusal direction. Inspired by these insights, we extract a golden refusal vector using Singular Value Decomposition and propose OmniSteer, which utilizes lightweight adapters to modulate intervention intensity adaptively. Extensive experiments show that our method not only increases the Refusal Success Rate against harmful inputs from 69.9% to 91.2%, but also effectively preserves the general capabilities across all modalities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhrli324/omni-safety-research.

LLMs utilizing chain-of-thought reasoning often waste substantial compute by producing long, incorrect responses. Abstention can mitigate this by withholding outputs unlikely to be correct. While most abstention methods decide to withhold outputs before or after generation, dynamic mid-generation abstention considers early termination of unpromising reasoning traces at each token position. Prior work has explored empirical variants of this idea, but principled guidance for the abstention rule remains lacking. We present a formal analysis of dynamic abstention for LLMs, modeling abstention as an explicit action within a regularized reinforcement learning framework. An abstention reward parameter controls the trade-off between compute and information. We show that abstaining when the value function falls below this reward strictly outperforms natural baselines under general conditions. We further derive a principled and efficient method to approximate the value function. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning and toxicity avoidance tasks support our theory and demonstrate improved selective accuracy over existing methods.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs), despite being safety-aligned, exhibit brittle refusal behaviors that can be circumvented by simple linguistic changes. As tense jailbreaking demonstrates that models refusing harmful requests often comply when rephrased in past tense, a critical generalization gap is revealed in current alignment methods whose underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. In this work, we introduce Activation-Scaling Guard (ASGuard), an insightful, mechanistically-informed framework that surgically mitigates this specific vulnerability. In the first step, we use circuit analysis to identify the specific attention heads causally linked to the targeted jailbreaking such as a tense-changing attack. Second, we train a precise, channel-wise scaling vector to recalibrate the activation of tense vulnerable heads. Lastly, we apply it into a "preventative fine-tuning", forcing the model to learn a more robust refusal mechanism. Across four LLMs, ASGuard effectively reduces the attack success rate of targeted jailbreaking while preserving general capabilities and minimizing over refusal, achieving a Pareto-optimal balance between safety and utility. Our findings underscore how adversarial suffixes suppress the propagation of the refusal-mediating direction, based on mechanistic analysis. Furthermore, our work showcases how a deep understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical, efficient, and targeted methods for adjusting model behavior, charting a course for more reliable and interpretable AI safety.

The varying significance of distinct primitive behaviors during the policy learning process has been overlooked by prior model-free RL algorithms. Leveraging this insight, we explore the causal relationship between different action dimensions and rewards to evaluate the significance of various primitive behaviors during training. We introduce a causality-aware entropy term that effectively identifies and prioritizes actions with high potential impacts for efficient exploration. Furthermore, to prevent excessive focus on specific primitive behaviors, we analyze the gradient dormancy phenomenon and introduce a dormancy-guided reset mechanism to further enhance the efficacy of our method. Our proposed algorithm, ACE: Off-policy Actor-critic with Causality-aware Entropy regularization, demonstrates a substantial performance advantage across 29 diverse continuous control tasks spanning 7 domains compared to model-free RL baselines, which underscores the effectiveness, versatility, and efficient sample efficiency of our approach. Benchmark results and videos are available at https://ace-rl.github.io/.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) aims to remove harmful training data while preserving overall utility. However, we find that existing methods often hallucinate, generate abnormal token sequences, or behave inconsistently, raising safety and trust concerns. According to prior literature on LLM honesty, such behaviors are often associated with dishonesty. This motivates us to investigate the notion of honesty in the context of model unlearning. We propose a formal definition of unlearning honesty, which includes: (1) preserving both utility and honesty on retained knowledge, and (2) ensuring effective forgetting while encouraging the model to acknowledge its limitations and respond consistently to questions related to forgotten knowledge. To systematically evaluate the honesty of unlearning, we introduce a suite of metrics that cover utility, honesty on the retained set, effectiveness of forgetting, rejection rate and refusal stability in Q&A and MCQ settings. Evaluating 9 methods across 3 mainstream families shows that all current methods fail to meet these standards. After experimental and theoretical analyses, we present ReVa, a representation-alignment procedure that fine-tunes feature-randomized unlearned models to better acknowledge forgotten knowledge. On Q&A tasks from the forget set, ReVa achieves the highest rejection rate after two rounds of interaction, nearly doubling the performance of the second-best method. Remarkably, It also improves honesty on the retained set. We release our data and code at https://github.com/renjiegu.

Modelling persuasion strategies as predictors of task outcome has several real-world applications and has received considerable attention from the computational linguistics community. However, previous research has failed to account for the resisting strategies employed by an individual to foil such persuasion attempts. Grounded in prior literature in cognitive and social psychology, we propose a generalised framework for identifying resisting strategies in persuasive conversations. We instantiate our framework on two distinct datasets comprising persuasion and negotiation conversations. We also leverage a hierarchical sequence-labelling neural architecture to infer the aforementioned resisting strategies automatically. Our experiments reveal the asymmetry of power roles in non-collaborative goal-directed conversations and the benefits accrued from incorporating resisting strategies on the final conversation outcome. We also investigate the role of different resisting strategies on the conversation outcome and glean insights that corroborate with past findings. We also make the code and the dataset of this work publicly available at https://github.com/americast/resper.

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

Can a language model estimate its familiarity with an entity before generating an answer? We study activations at the final prompt token in twelve instruction-tuned models from the Bielik, PLLuM, Gemma-4, and Qwen3 families, using a new dataset of 1,440 Polish entities spanning four domains and ten Wikipedia-pageview deciles, plus fabricated controls. Familiarity-probe scores separate real from fabricated entities in every family; in the Polish-adapted Bielik and PLLuM families they additionally track entity popularity (model-mean Spearman ρ 0.28-0.57, versus at most 0.11 in Gemma-4 and Qwen3), a pattern more strongly associated with Polish adaptation than with parameter count in this model sample. In a paired experiment on two families, probes retain 96-101% of within-language AUROC when the Polish question stem is replaced with an English one around unchanged entity names, showing robustness to prompt language in this setting. In Gemma-4-12B, the only model that natively refuses, adding a one-dimensional familiarity direction at a single layer moves refusal rates monotonically in both directions (0.24 to 1.00 on well-known entities; 0.73 to 0.00 on unknown ones). Finally, a calibrated familiarity probe is competitive among pre-generation abstention gates, although post-generation detectors better predict behavioral error on average. These results support a graded pre-generation entity-familiarity readout, and a separation between representational familiarity and the policy that converts it into abstention.

For safety reasons, large language models (LLMs) are trained to refuse harmful user instructions, such as assisting dangerous activities. We study an open question in this work: does the desired safety refusal, typically enforced in chat contexts, generalize to non-chat and agentic use cases? Unlike chatbots, LLM agents equipped with general-purpose tools, such as web browsers and mobile devices, can directly influence the real world, making it even more crucial to refuse harmful instructions. In this work, we primarily focus on red-teaming browser agents, LLMs that manipulate information via web browsers. To this end, we introduce Browser Agent Red teaming Toolkit (BrowserART), a comprehensive test suite designed specifically for red-teaming browser agents. BrowserART is consist of 100 diverse browser-related harmful behaviors (including original behaviors and ones sourced from HarmBench [Mazeika et al., 2024] and AirBench 2024 [Zeng et al., 2024b]) across both synthetic and real websites. Our empirical study on state-of-the-art browser agents reveals that, while the backbone LLM refuses harmful instructions as a chatbot, the corresponding agent does not. Moreover, attack methods designed to jailbreak refusal-trained LLMs in the chat settings transfer effectively to browser agents. With human rewrites, GPT-4o and o1-preview-based browser agents attempted 98 and 63 harmful behaviors (out of 100), respectively. We publicly release BrowserART and call on LLM developers, policymakers, and agent developers to collaborate on improving agent safety

We propose affine concept editing (ACE) as an approach for steering language models' behavior by intervening directly in activations. We begin with an affine decomposition of model activation vectors and show that prior methods for steering model behavior correspond to subsets of terms of this decomposition. We then provide a derivation of ACE and use it to control refusal behavior on ten different models, including Llama 3 70B. ACE combines affine subspace projection and activation addition to reliably control the model's refusal responses across prompt types. We evaluate the results using LLM-based scoring on a collection of harmful and harmless prompts. Our experiments demonstrate that ACE consistently achieves more precise control over model behavior than existing methods and generalizes to models where directional ablation via affine subspace projection alone produces incoherent outputs. Code for reproducing our results is available at https://github.com/EleutherAI/steering-llama3 .

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

A central piece in enabling intelligent agentic behavior in foundation models is to make them capable of introspecting upon their behavior, reasoning, and correcting their mistakes as more computation or interaction is available. Even the strongest proprietary large language models (LLMs) do not quite exhibit the ability of continually improving their responses sequentially, even in scenarios where they are explicitly told that they are making a mistake. In this paper, we develop RISE: Recursive IntroSpEction, an approach for fine-tuning LLMs to introduce this capability, despite prior work hypothesizing that this capability may not be possible to attain. Our approach prescribes an iterative fine-tuning procedure, which attempts to teach the model how to alter its response after having executed previously unsuccessful attempts to solve a hard test-time problem, with optionally additional environment feedback. RISE poses fine-tuning for a single-turn prompt as solving a multi-turn Markov decision process (MDP), where the initial state is the prompt. Inspired by principles in online imitation learning and reinforcement learning, we propose strategies for multi-turn data collection and training so as to imbue an LLM with the capability to recursively detect and correct its previous mistakes in subsequent iterations. Our experiments show that RISE enables Llama2, Llama3, and Mistral models to improve themselves with more turns on math reasoning tasks, outperforming several single-turn strategies given an equal amount of inference-time computation. We also find that RISE scales well, often attaining larger benefits with more capable models. Our analysis shows that RISE makes meaningful improvements to responses to arrive at the correct solution for challenging prompts, without disrupting one-turn abilities as a result of expressing more complex distributions.

A widely used technique for improving policies is success conditioning, in which one collects trajectories, identifies those that achieve a desired outcome, and updates the policy to imitate the actions taken along successful trajectories. This principle appears under many names -- rejection sampling with SFT, goal-conditioned RL, Decision Transformers -- yet what optimization problem it solves, if any, has remained unclear. We prove that success conditioning exactly solves a trust-region optimization problem, maximizing policy improvement subject to a χ^2 divergence constraint whose radius is determined automatically by the data. This yields an identity: relative policy improvement, the magnitude of policy change, and a quantity we call action-influence -- measuring how random variation in action choices affects success rates -- are exactly equal at every state. Success conditioning thus emerges as a conservative improvement operator. Exact success conditioning cannot degrade performance or induce dangerous distribution shift, but when it fails, it does so observably, by hardly changing the policy at all. We apply our theory to the common practice of return thresholding, showing this can amplify improvement, but at the cost of potential misalignment with the true objective.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents have recently gained considerable attention due to the powerful reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Existing research predominantly focuses on enhancing the task performance of these agents in diverse scenarios. However, as LLM-based agents become increasingly integrated into real-world applications, significant concerns emerge regarding their accumulation of sensitive or outdated knowledge. Addressing these concerns requires the development of mechanisms that allow agents to selectively forget previously learned knowledge, giving rise to a new term LLM-based agent unlearning. This paper initiates research on unlearning in LLM-based agents. Specifically, we propose a novel and comprehensive framework that categorizes unlearning scenarios into three contexts: state unlearning (forgetting specific states or items), trajectory unlearning (forgetting sequences of actions) and environment unlearning (forgetting entire environments or categories of tasks). Within this framework, we introduce a natural language-based unlearning method that trains a conversion model to transform high-level unlearning requests into actionable unlearning prompts, guiding agents through a controlled forgetting process. Moreover, to evaluate the robustness of the proposed framework, we introduce an unlearning inference adversary capable of crafting prompts, querying agents, and observing their behaviors in an attempt to infer the forgotten knowledge. Experimental results show that our approach effectively enables agents to forget targeted knowledge while preserving performance on untargeted tasks, and prevents the adversary from inferring the forgotten knowledge.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment

Ensuring Large Language Model (LLM) safety remains challenging due to the absence of universal standards and reliable content validators, making it difficult to obtain effective training signals. We discover that aligned models already possess robust internal safety beliefs: they consistently produce high-confidence refusals to harmful requests while exhibiting high entropy when generating potentially dangerous content. This entropy gap reveals an untapped signal--models intrinsically "know" when to refuse. We introduce Safety Instincts Reinforcement Learning (SIRL), which transforms this internal confidence into a self-generated reward signal, eliminating dependence on external validators or human annotations. SIRL teaches models to trust their safety instincts by reinforcing low-entropy refusal behaviors. Evaluated on Llama and Qwen models, SIRL maintains 89%+ Defense Success Rates (DSRs) against 20+ jailbreak methods, from static prompts to adaptive attacks. Using only 15,000 unlabeled prompts, SIRL surpasses resource-intensive supervised methods while preserving performance on mathematics, coding, and conversation benchmarks. Our work demonstrates that effective alignment can emerge from within, paving the way for more autonomous and robust AI safety mechanisms that scale without extensive human oversight.

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque. In this work, we investigate whether safety compliance is a deep semantic decision or a manipulable linear feature. We introduce Contrastive Logit Steering (CLS), a zero-optimization framework that isolates the "refusal direction" by contrasting hidden states derived from safe and unrestricted system prompts. Unlike representation engineering methods that intervene on internal activations, CLS operates directly on the output distribution, serving as a diagnostic probe for alignment fragility. When coupled with prefix injection to bypass initial refusal reflexes, this method induces a phase transition where guardrails collapse. Our experiments on 7 model families reveal that safety implementation is architecturally deterministic. While models like Llama-3.1 exhibit a "Late Decision" topology that is easily bypassed by CLS (reaching 95% ASR in approximately one second), others like Qwen-2.5 demonstrate "Early Divergence" by integrating safety mid-computation. Direct comparison with established activation-level steering methods shows that CLS achieves substantially higher attack success rates on Llama 2 (73% vs. 22.6%) and Qwen 7B (91% vs. 79.2%), demonstrating that logit-level intervention exposes alignment vulnerabilities that hidden-state methods underestimate. Beyond attacks, we show that this linearity enables bidirectional control: inverting the steering vector "hardens" models against jailbreaks without retraining. Our findings suggest that current alignment techniques create a steerable "safety axis" that serves as both a critical vulnerability and a precise primitive for defense.

Long-horizon LLM agents can fail quietly: they settle on one reading of the evidence early, then spend the rest of the run defending it. We call this premature commitment. Final-answer scoring misses the failure mode because it sees only the answer, not whether the process has already collapsed to a stable path. We define representational commitment as cross-run hidden-state convergence at a fixed reasoning step, and use it as an early diagnostic of trajectory consistency. On Llama-3.1-70B running ReAct on HotpotQA, step-4 hidden-state similarity predicts downstream behavioral consistency (r = -0.35, partial r = -0.45), with a localized temporal and layer-wise signature. The signal replicates across Qwen-2.5-72B and Phi-3-14B, and on StrategyQA (r = -0.83). It does not track correctness: committed-wrong and committed-correct questions are not separable in activation similarity. That boundary is central to the claim. Commitment tells us whether an agent has settled, not whether it is right. A runtime monitor detects inconsistent trajectories from hidden states at AUROC up to 0.97 (0.85--0.88 under a stricter split), and a prompting intervention cuts behavioral variance by 28% against a token-matched control while leaving accuracy statistically unchanged. We also test whether the signal can route self-consistency compute; on a harder benchmark it helps only modestly and is matched by a simpler output-based baseline. The result is a diagnostic for a hidden process failure, with clear limits rather than a general accuracy lever.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become central to LLM reasoning, but its outcome-level rewards can make models more willing to give confident answers when evidence or reasoning is unreliable. Existing SFT or RL methods mainly teach LLMs to refuse or express uncertainty at the response level, which can overfit abstention behavior rather than improve reasoning reliability. To address this limitation, we propose Cognitive Pairwise Training (CPT), a cognitive mid-training alignment stage that turns pairwise comparisons over reasoning traces into a reusable alignment signal. By learning to distinguish trustworthy from flawed reasoning, CPT encourages the model to internalize a reasoning-quality discrimination boundary rather than memorize surface refusal patterns. Across five model scales and three model families, CPT improves the reasoning--metacognition trade-off. At 14B, CPT+RL outperforms the standard SFT+RL pipeline by +2.2 math-average points and +5.2 abstention-F1 points. Further analyses show that CPT improves trace quality and exhibits strong robustness and scalability across evaluation and training settings. Code and models are released at https://github.com/Tsinghua-dhy/CPT.

Safety alignment in large language models relies predominantly on English-language training data. When harmful intent is expressed in low-resource languages, refusal mechanisms that hold in English frequently fail to activate. We introduce LSR (Linguistic Safety Robustness), the first systematic benchmark for measuring cross-lingual refusal degradation in West African languages: Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, and Igala. LSR uses a dual-probe evaluation protocol - submitting matched English and target-language probes to the same model - and introduces Refusal Centroid Drift (RCD), a metric that quantifies how much of a model's English refusal behavior is lost when harmful intent is encoded in a target language. We evaluate Gemini 2.5 Flash across 14 culturally grounded attack probes in four harm categories. English refusal rates hold at approximately 90 percent. Across West African languages, refusal rates fall to 35-55 percent, with Igala showing the most severe degradation (RCD = 0.55). LSR is implemented in the Inspect AI evaluation framework and is available as a PR-ready contribution to the UK AISI's inspect_evals repository. A live reference implementation and the benchmark dataset are publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate erroneous outputs, known as hallucinations, due to their limitations in discerning questions beyond their knowledge scope. While addressing hallucination has been a focal point in research, previous efforts primarily concentrate on enhancing correctness without giving due consideration to the significance of rejection mechanisms. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the role of rejection, introducing the notion of model reliability along with corresponding metrics. These metrics measure the model's ability to provide accurate responses while adeptly rejecting questions exceeding its knowledge boundaries, thereby minimizing hallucinations. To improve the inherent reliability of LLMs, we present a novel alignment framework called Reinforcement Learning from Knowledge Feedback (RLKF). RLKF leverages knowledge feedback to dynamically determine the model's knowledge boundary and trains a reliable reward model to encourage the refusal of out-of-knowledge questions. Experimental results on mathematical questions affirm the substantial efficacy of RLKF in significantly enhancing LLM reliability.

Alignment tuning is meant to make harmful-request refusal robust, yet this safety behavior can be erased by a small set of benign fine-tuning examples. This is a deployment risk for open-weight models because a checkpoint can pass refusal tests at release time and later lose refusal under low-cost downstream fine-tuning. Prior work has established these refusal failures, but existing studies do not show how to detect this fragility in the aligned model itself before an attack or fine-tuning intervention is run. We introduce Skin-Deep, a geometric diagnostic that detects alignment fragility directly from the aligned model's hidden-state activations before such an intervention is run and compresses the layer-wise safety geometry into a single scalar, the Geometric Fragility Score (GFS). Applied to twenty-one instruction-tuned models spanning six alignment recipes and 3B--32B parameters, Skin-Deep reveals a recurring low-rank safety subspace across model families. Direction ablations show that removing directions in this subspace weakens harmful-request refusal, providing causal evidence that the recovered geometry underlies refusal behavior. Crucially, GFS identifies, before any fine-tuning, the initially safe model that retains the most refusal after small-scale LoRA fine-tuning. These results establish GFS as a practical pre-deployment diagnostic for flagging fragile refusal behavior without running an attack.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has played a central role in the recent surge of LLMs' math abilities by enabling self-improvement through binary verifier signals. In contrast, Supervised Learning (SL) is rarely considered for such verification-driven training, largely due to its heavy reliance on reference answers and inability to reflect on mistakes. In this work, we challenge the prevailing notion that self-improvement is exclusive to RL and propose Negative-aware Fine-Tuning (NFT) -- a supervised approach that enables LLMs to reflect on their failures and improve autonomously with no external teachers. In online training, instead of throwing away self-generated negative answers, NFT constructs an implicit negative policy to model them. This implicit policy is parameterized with the same positive LLM we target to optimize on positive data, enabling direct policy optimization on all LLMs' generations. We conduct experiments on 7B and 32B models in math reasoning tasks. Results consistently show that through the additional leverage of negative feedback, NFT significantly improves over SL baselines like Rejection sampling Fine-Tuning, matching or even surpassing leading RL algorithms like GRPO and DAPO. Furthermore, we demonstrate that NFT and GRPO are actually equivalent in strict-on-policy training, even though they originate from entirely different theoretical foundations. Our experiments and theoretical findings bridge the gap between SL and RL methods in binary-feedback learning systems.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for non-verifiable instruction following increasingly relies on LLM judges with prompt-specific rubrics as reward signals. While recent methods adapt these rubrics to the evolving policy during training, the training prompts themselves remain static, drawn from fixed corpora. This static approach often results in a critical misalignment between prompt difficulty and policy capability, leaving the judge unable to recover a discriminative reward signal when prompts fail to elicit quality variance among rollouts. To address this misalignment, we introduce LLM-as-a-Tutor, a framework that extends the LLM's role from judge to tutor: a single model serves as an examiner that pairwise-compares policy rollouts to detect non-challenging prompts, and as a generator that appends atomic constraints to them. This append-only design monotonically raises difficulty in step with the policy's capability, producing a self-calibrating training signal without external difficulty schedules. On three complex instruction-following benchmarks, our method consistently outperforms both policy-unaware baselines and prior policy-adaptive methods that adapt rubrics or rewrite prompts, suggesting prompt adaptation as a missing axis of policy-awareness in non-verifiable RL.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

The model context protocol (MCP) has been widely adapted as an open standard enabling the seamless integration of generative AI agents. However, recent work has shown the MCP is susceptible to retrieval-based "falsely benign" attacks (FBAs), allowing malicious system access and credential theft, but requiring that users download compromised files directly to their systems. Herein, we show that the threat model of MCP-based attacks is significantly broader than previously thought, i.e., attackers need only post malicious content online to deceive MCP agents into carrying out their attacks on unsuspecting victims' systems. To improve alignment guardrails against such attacks, we introduce a new MCP dataset of FBAs and (truly) benign samples to explore the effectiveness of direct preference optimization (DPO) for the refusal training of large language models (LLMs). While DPO improves model guardrails against such attacks, we show that the efficacy of refusal learning varies drastically depending on the model's original post-training alignment scheme--e.g., GRPO-based LLMs learn to refuse extremely poorly. Thus, to further improve FBA refusals, we introduce Retrieval Augmented Generation for Preference alignment (RAG-Pref), a novel preference alignment strategy based on RAG. We show that RAG-Pref significantly improves the ability of LLMs to refuse FBAs, particularly when combined with DPO alignment, thus drastically improving guardrails against MCP-based attacks.

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspective. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/BMPixel/safety-residual-space.

Safety alignment in language models operates through two mechanistically distinct systems: refusal neurons that gate whether harmful knowledge is expressed, and concept neurons that encode the harmful knowledge itself. By targeting a single neuron in each system, we demonstrate both directions of failure -- bypassing safety on explicit harmful requests via suppression, and inducing harmful content from innocent prompts via amplification -- across seven models spanning two families and 1.7B to 70B parameters, without any training or prompt engineering. Our findings suggest that safety alignment is not robustly distributed across model weights but is mediated by individual neurons that are each causally sufficient to gate refusal behavior -- suppressing any one of the identified refusal neurons bypasses safety alignment across diverse harmful requests.

LLM safety and ethical alignment are widely discussed, but the impact of content moderation on user satisfaction remains underexplored. To address this, we analyze nearly 50,000 Chatbot Arena response-pairs using a novel fine-tuned RoBERTa model, that we trained on hand-labeled data to disentangle refusals due to ethical concerns from other refusals due to technical disabilities or lack of information. Our findings reveal a significant refusal penalty on content moderation, with users choosing ethical-based refusals roughly one-fourth as often as their preferred LLM response compared to standard responses. However, the context and phrasing play critical roles: refusals on highly sensitive prompts, such as illegal content, achieve higher win rates than less sensitive ethical concerns, and longer responses closely aligned with the prompt perform better. These results emphasize the need for nuanced moderation strategies that balance ethical safeguards with user satisfaction. Moreover, we find that the refusal penalty is notably lower in evaluations using the LLM-as-a-Judge method, highlighting discrepancies between user and automated assessments.

Memory is becoming a core component of long-horizon AI agents, allowing agents to reuse past experience when operating web browsers, software tools, and other interactive environments. Existing work mostly treats memory as a supply problem, asking what experience to write, how to store it, and which entry to retrieve for the next task. Yet we still lack a clear account of how models consume retrieved memory across a multi-step action trajectory. This consumption process matters because it determines not only what memories should be retrieved, but also what models and control policies are needed to use them safely. To diagnose this process, we propose Entry--Propagation--Recovery (E-P-R), a trajectory-level framework that asks where memory first changes an action, whether that change carries forward, and whether the agent can recover after leaving a correct path. We instantiate E-P-R on WebArena and on MemTrapBench, a controlled benchmark we build to isolate these phases. We find that the main failure often begins at entry: agents adopt conflicting memory at the first exposed decision point even when it is task-wrong. Repeated exposure then amplifies this early error, while recovery after divergence is weak. Together, these effects create a compliance trap: across models, conflicting memory induces similar compliance rates, but once agents comply, their success rates collapse to a low floor. Stronger agents therefore suffer larger absolute damage because each compliance event erases more baseline capability. These results suggest that memory-augmented agents should be evaluated not only by retrieval quality or final success rate, but by how they consume memory throughout the trajectory.

This paper localizes the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models. An intermediate-layer attention gate reads detected content and triggers deeper amplifier heads that boost the signal toward refusal. In smaller models the gate and amplifier are single heads; at larger scale they become bands of heads across adjacent layers. The gate contributes under 1% of output DLA, but interchange testing (p<0.001) and knockout cascade confirm it is causally necessary. Interchange screening at n>=120 detects the same motif in twelve models from six labs (2B to 72B), though specific heads differ by lab. Per-head ablation weakens up to 58x at 72B and misses gates that interchange identifies; interchange is the only reliable audit at scale. Modulating the detection-layer signal continuously controls policy from hard refusal through evasion to factual answering. On safety prompts the same intervention turns refusal into harmful guidance, showing the safety-trained capability is gated by routing rather than removed. Thresholds vary by topic and by input language, and the circuit relocates across generations within a family while behavioral benchmarks register no change. Routing is early-commitment: the gate commits at its own layer before deeper layers finish processing the input. Under an in-context substitution cipher, gate interchange necessity collapses 70 to 99% across three models and the model switches to puzzle-solving. Injecting the plaintext gate activation into the cipher forward pass restores 48% of refusals in Phi-4-mini, localizing the bypass to the routing interface. A second method, cipher contrast analysis, uses plain/cipher DLA differences to map the full cipher-sensitive routing circuit in O(3n) forward passes. Any encoding that defeats detection-layer pattern matching bypasses the policy regardless of whether deeper layers reconstruct the content.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

Pretrained knowledge memorized in LLMs raises critical concerns over safety and privacy, which has motivated LLM Unlearning as a technique for selectively removing the influences of undesirable knowledge. Existing approaches, rooted in Gradient Ascent (GA), often degrade general domain knowledge while relying on retention data or curated contrastive pairs, which can be either impractical or data and computationally prohibitive. Negative Preference Alignment has been explored for unlearning to tackle the limitations of GA, which, however, remains confined by its choice of reference model and shows undermined performance in realistic data settings. These limitations raise two key questions: i) Can we achieve effective unlearning that quantifies model confidence in undesirable knowledge and uses it to calibrate gradient updates more precisely, thus reducing catastrophic forgetting? ii) Can we make unlearning robust to data scarcity and length variation? We answer both questions affirmatively with CATNIP (Calibrated and Tokenized Negative Preference Alignment), a principled method that rescales unlearning effects in proportion to the model's token-level confidence, thus ensuring fine-grained control over forgetting. Extensive evaluations on MUSE and WMDP benchmarks demonstrated that our work enables effective unlearning without requiring retention data or contrastive unlearning response pairs, with stronger knowledge forgetting and preservation tradeoffs than state-of-the-art methods.

Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are becoming essential as a powerful multimodal backbone for real-world applications. However, recent studies show that audio inputs can more easily elicit harmful responses than text, exposing new risks toward deployment. While safety alignment has made initial advances in LLMs and Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), we find that vanilla adaptation of these approaches to LALMs faces two key limitations: 1) LLM-based steering fails under audio input due to the large distributional gap between activations, and 2) prompt-based defenses induce over-refusals on benign-speech queries. To address these challenges, we propose Safe-Ablated Refusal Steering (SARSteer), the first inference-time defense framework for LALMs. Specifically, SARSteer leverages text-derived refusal steering to enforce rejection without manipulating audio inputs and introduces decomposed safe-space ablation to mitigate over-refusal. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SARSteer significantly improves harmful-query refusal while preserving benign responses, establishing a principled step toward safety alignment in LALMs.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

While Large Language Models (LLMs) hold promise to become autonomous agents, they often explore suboptimally in sequential decision-making. Recent work has sought to enhance this capability via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning (RL), improving regret on the classic multi-armed bandit task. However, it remains unclear how these learning methods shape exploration strategies and how well they generalize. We investigate both paradigms by training LLMs with SFT on expert trajectories and RL with a range of tailored reward signals including a strategic, regret-shaped reward to reduce variance, and an algorithmic reward that enables oracle imitation. The resulting agents outperform pre-trained models and achieve performance comparable to Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) and Thompson Sampling, with robust generalization to 6x longer horizons and across bandit families. Behavioral analysis reveals that gains often stem from more sophisticated but greedier exploitation: RL/SFT agents are more prone to early catastrophic failure than pre-trained models, prematurely abandoning exploration. Furthermore, agents trained to imitate UCB learn to outperform their teacher by adopting more exploitative variants. Our findings clarify when each training paradigm is preferable and advocate tailored reward design and evaluation beyond average regret to promote robust exploratory behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks but often fail to handle queries that exceed their knowledge and capabilities, leading to incorrect or fabricated responses. This paper addresses the need for LLMs to recognize and refuse infeasible tasks due to the required skills surpassing their capabilities. We first systematically conceptualize infeasible tasks for LLMs, providing formal definitions and categorizations that cover a spectrum of related hallucinations. We develop and benchmark a new dataset comprising diverse infeasible and feasible tasks to test multiple LLMs' abilities on task feasibility. Furthermore, we explore the potential of training enhancements to increase LLMs' refusal capabilities with fine-tuning. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our methods, offering promising directions for refining the operational boundaries of LLMs in real applications.

Regardless of the particular task we want them to perform in an environment, there are often shared safety constraints we want our agents to respect. For example, regardless of whether it is making a sandwich or clearing the table, a kitchen robot should not break a plate. Manually specifying such a constraint can be both time-consuming and error-prone. We show how to learn constraints from expert demonstrations of safe task completion by extending inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques to the space of constraints. Intuitively, we learn constraints that forbid highly rewarding behavior that the expert could have taken but chose not to. Unfortunately, the constraint learning problem is rather ill-posed and typically leads to overly conservative constraints that forbid all behavior that the expert did not take. We counter this by leveraging diverse demonstrations that naturally occur in multi-task settings to learn a tighter set of constraints. We validate our method with simulation experiments on high-dimensional continuous control tasks.

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of highly capable large language models (LLMs) that can perform tasks in a human-like manner. However, LLMs exhibit only infant-level cognitive abilities in certain areas. One such area is the A-Not-B error, a phenomenon seen in infants where they repeat a previously rewarded behavior despite well-observed changed conditions. This highlights their lack of inhibitory control -- the ability to stop a habitual or impulsive response. In our work, we design a text-based multi-choice QA scenario similar to the A-Not-B experimental settings to systematically test the inhibitory control abilities of LLMs. We found that state-of-the-art LLMs (like Llama3-8b) perform consistently well with in-context learning (ICL) but make errors and show a significant drop of as many as 83.3% in reasoning tasks when the context changes trivially. This suggests that LLMs only have inhibitory control abilities on par with human infants in this regard, often failing to suppress the previously established response pattern during ICL.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit significant behavioral shifts when they perceive a change from a real-world deployment context to a controlled evaluation setting, a phenomenon known as "evaluation awareness." This discrepancy poses a critical challenge for AI alignment, as benchmark performance may not accurately reflect a model's true safety and honesty. In this work, we systematically quantify these behavioral changes by manipulating the perceived context of prompts. We introduce a methodology that uses a linear probe to score prompts on a continuous scale from "test-like" to "deploy-like" and leverage an LLM rewriting strategy to shift these prompts towards a more natural, deployment-style context while preserving the original task. Using this method, we achieved a 30% increase in the average probe score across a strategic role-playing dataset after rewriting. Evaluating a suite of state-of-the-art models on these original and rewritten prompts, we find that rewritten "deploy-like" prompts induce a significant and consistent shift in behavior. Across all models, we observed an average increase in honest responses of 5.26% and a corresponding average decrease in deceptive responses of 12.40%. Furthermore, refusal rates increased by an average of 6.38%, indicating heightened safety compliance. Our findings demonstrate that evaluation awareness is a quantifiable and manipulable factor that directly influences LLM behavior, revealing that models are more prone to unsafe or deceptive outputs in perceived test environments. This underscores the urgent need for more realistic evaluation frameworks to accurately gauge true model alignment before deployment.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) provides the standard approach for teaching LLMs new behaviors from offline expert demonstrations. However, standard SFT uniformly fits all samples -- including those with low likelihood under the base model -- which can disproportionately drive training updates toward overfitting specific samples rather than learning the target behavior. Moreover, adapting to these unlikely samples induces substantial policy shifts that degrade prior capabilities. Existing methods mitigate this by filtering, regenerating, or down-weighting low-likelihood data. In doing so, they often suppress precisely the novel behaviors the base model has yet to learn. We propose InfoSFT, a principled weighting scheme for the SFT objective that concentrates learning signals on maximally informative, medium-confidence tokens -- those neither overly familiar to the base model nor too unlikely to cause instability. Requiring only a one-line modification to the standard token-wise loss, InfoSFT demonstrably improves generalization over vanilla SFT and likelihood-weighted baselines across math, code, and chain-of-thought tasks with diverse model families, while better preserving pre-existing capabilities.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and τ^2-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on τ^2-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

While advancements in the reasoning abilities of LLMs have significantly enhanced their performance in solving mathematical problems, coding tasks, and general puzzles, their effectiveness in accurately adhering to instructions remains inconsistent, particularly with more complex directives. Our investigation identifies lazy reasoning during the thinking stage as the primary factor contributing to poor instruction adherence. To mitigate this issue, we propose a comprehensive framework designed to enable rigorous reasoning processes involving preview and self-checking, essential for satisfying strict instruction constraints. Specifically, we first generate instructions with complex constraints and apply a filtering process to obtain valid prompts, resulting in three distinct prompt datasets categorized as hard, easy, and pass. Then, we employ rejection sampling on the pass prompts to curate a small yet high-quality dataset, enabling a cold-start initialization of the model and facilitating its adaptation to effective reasoning patterns. Subsequently, we employ an entropy-preserving supervised fine-tuning (Entropy-SFT) strategy coupled with token-wise entropy-adaptive (TEA-RL) reinforcement learning guided by rule-based dense rewards. This approach encourages the model to transform its reasoning mechanism, ultimately fostering generalizable reasoning abilities that encompass preview and self-checking. Extensive experiments conducted on instruction-following benchmarks demonstrate remarkable performance improvements across various model scales. Notably, our Light-IF-32B model surpasses both larger open-source models such as DeepSeek-R1 and closed-source models like Doubao-1.6.

Why do pretrained diffusion or flow-matching policies fail when the same task is performed near an obstacle, on a shifted support surface, or amid mild clutter? Such failures rarely reflect missing motor skills; instead, they expose a limitation of imitation learning under train-test shifts, where action generation is tightly coupled to training-specific spatial configurations and task specifications. Retraining or fine-tuning to address these failures is costly and conceptually misaligned, as the required behaviors already exist but cannot be selectively adapted at test time. We propose Vision-Language Steering (VLS), a training-free framework for inference-time adaptation of frozen generative robot policies. VLS treats adaptation as an inference-time control problem, steering the sampling process of a pretrained diffusion or flow-matching policy in response to out-of-distribution observation-language inputs without modifying policy parameters. By leveraging vision-language models to synthesize trajectory-differentiable reward functions, VLS guides denoising toward action trajectories that satisfy test-time spatial and task requirements. Across simulation and real-world evaluations, VLS consistently outperforms prior steering methods, achieving a 31% improvement on CALVIN and a 13% gain on LIBERO-PRO. Real-world deployment on a Franka robot further demonstrates robust inference-time adaptation under test-time spatial and semantic shifts. Project page: https://vision-language-steering.github.io/webpage/

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

Large language models can resist task-misaligned activation steering during inference, sometimes recovering mid-generation to produce improved responses even when steering remains active. We term this Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR). Using sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to steer model activations, we find that Llama-3.3-70B shows substantial ESR, while smaller models from the Llama-3 and Gemma-2 families exhibit the phenomenon less frequently. We identify 26 SAE latents that activate differentially during off-topic content and are causally linked to ESR in Llama-3.3-70B. Zero-ablating these latents reduces the multi-attempt rate by 25%, providing causal evidence for dedicated internal consistency-checking circuits. We demonstrate that ESR can be deliberately enhanced through both prompting and training: meta-prompts instructing the model to self-monitor increase the multi-attempt rate by 4x for Llama-3.3-70B, and fine-tuning on self-correction examples successfully induces ESR-like behavior in smaller models. These findings have dual implications: ESR could protect against adversarial manipulation but might also interfere with beneficial safety interventions that rely on activation steering. Understanding and controlling these resistance mechanisms is important for developing transparent and controllable AI systems. Code is available at github.com/agencyenterprise/endogenous-steering-resistance.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

Humans often acquire new skills through observation and imitation. For robotic agents, learning from the plethora of unlabeled video demonstration data available on the Internet necessitates imitating the expert without access to its action, presenting a challenge known as Imitation Learning from Observations (ILfO). A common approach to tackle ILfO problems is to convert them into inverse reinforcement learning problems, utilizing a proxy reward computed from the agent's and the expert's observations. Nonetheless, we identify that tasks characterized by a progress dependency property pose significant challenges for such approaches; in these tasks, the agent needs to initially learn the expert's preceding behaviors before mastering the subsequent ones. Our investigation reveals that the main cause is that the reward signals assigned to later steps hinder the learning of initial behaviors. To address this challenge, we present a novel ILfO framework that enables the agent to master earlier behaviors before advancing to later ones. We introduce an Automatic Discount Scheduling (ADS) mechanism that adaptively alters the discount factor in reinforcement learning during the training phase, prioritizing earlier rewards initially and gradually engaging later rewards only when the earlier behaviors have been mastered. Our experiments, conducted on nine Meta-World tasks, demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods across all tasks, including those that are unsolvable by them.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising approach for training language models (LMs) on reasoning tasks that elicit emergent long chains of thought (CoTs). Unlike supervised learning, it updates the model using both correct and incorrect samples via policy gradients. To better understand its mechanism, we decompose the learning signal into reinforcing correct responses and penalizing incorrect ones, referred to as Positive and Negative Sample Reinforcement (PSR and NSR), respectively. We train Qwen2.5-Math-7B and Qwen3-4B on a mathematical reasoning dataset and uncover a surprising result: training with only negative samples -- without reinforcing correct responses -- can be highly effective: it consistently improves performance over the base model across the entire Pass@k spectrum (k up to 256), often matching or surpassing PPO and GRPO. In contrast, reinforcing only correct responses improves Pass@1 but degrades performance at higher k, due to reduced diversity. These inference-scaling trends highlight that solely penalizing incorrect responses may contribute more to performance than previously recognized. Through gradient analysis, we show that NSR works by suppressing incorrect generations and redistributing probability mass toward other plausible candidates, guided by the model's prior beliefs. It refines the model's existing knowledge rather than introducing entirely new behaviors. Building on this insight, we propose a simple variant of the RL objective that upweights NSR, and show that it consistently improves overall Pass@k performance on MATH, AIME 2025, and AMC23. Our code is available at https://github.com/TianHongZXY/RLVR-Decomposed.

Trust in an AI system is often anchored by explanations of how it works, which one then uses to forecast its behavior on new inputs. For large reasoning models (LRMs), this conventional route is particularly difficult to follow: explanation methods for single token generations do not naturally generalize to long trajectories, and the trajectories themselves are often not faithful when read as natural language. We propose an alternative that bypasses the explanation step: treat behavior forecasting as a learnable task and train Behavior Forecasters that operates on a single reasoning trajectory to make the same forecasts one would typically seek from an explanation. The forecaster's training data is obtained by querying the LRM with no human annotation, and its inference is done in a single forward pass. We instantiate this approach on two tasks: how likely the LRM is to repeat its answer on re-runs, and how removing parts of the input changes its answer. We evaluate this approach on both tasks across three diverse reasoning datasets and find that trained Behavior Forecasters are more accurate than GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus-4.6 reading the same trajectories as naive readers, at a small fraction of their inference cost. We find that fine-tuning the backbone end-to-end and initializing it from the target LRM are each necessary for strong performance. These results show that the reasoning trajectory carries information about the LRM's future behavior that goes beyond what naive reading conveys.

Despite the remarkable abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to answer questions, they often display a considerable level of overconfidence even when the question does not have a definitive answer. To avoid providing hallucinated answers to these unknown questions, existing studies typically investigate approaches to refusing to answer these questions. In this work, we propose a novel and scalable self-alignment method to utilize the LLM itself to enhance its response-ability to different types of unknown questions, being capable of not only refusing to answer but also providing explanation to the unanswerability of unknown questions. Specifically, the Self-Align method first employ a two-stage class-aware self-augmentation approach to generate a large amount of unknown question-response data. Then we conduct disparity-driven self-curation to select qualified data for fine-tuning the LLM itself for aligning the responses to unknown questions as desired. Experimental results on two datasets across four types of unknown questions validate the superiority of the Self-Align method over existing baselines in terms of three types of task formulation.