Daily Papers

Robust lie detectors for language models could enable powerful techniques for auditing, monitoring, and post-hoc investigation of model behaviour, but evaluating them requires testbeds where models verifiably believe the opposite of what they say. We show that existing trained model organisms often fail this requirement, leaving prior positive and negative detection results difficult to interpret. We address this with 13 reasoning model organisms whose hidden beliefs are verified in chain-of-thought and shown to generalise to held-out tasks, alongside Varied Deception, a prompted-lying testbed covering a broad range of lie-inducing motivations. On these testbeds we evaluate four detectors: a chain-of-thought judge, a logprob classifier, and two activation probes, including Did-You-Lie (DYL), a new method for training follow-up probes. On prompted lying, across 31 open-weight models spanning 2B to 1T parameters, all four detectors show positive scaling with model capability. However, every activation- and logprob-based detector drops sharply on our trained model organisms, with DYL retaining the most signal; only the chain-of-thought judge remains strong, with 0.82 balanced accuracy, partly as an artefact of our verification process favouring CoT-readable beliefs. Current lie detectors therefore cannot support high-confidence claims about model beliefs, and we suggest research directions that may address some of their current limitations. We release our datasets, model organisms, and trained detectors.

As AI systems become more capable, deceptive behaviors can undermine evaluation and mislead users at deployment. Recent work has shown that lie detectors can accurately classify deceptive behavior, but they are not typically used in the training pipeline due to concerns around contamination and objective hacking. We examine these concerns by incorporating a lie detector into the labelling step of LLM post-training and evaluating whether the learned policy is genuinely more honest, or instead learns to fool the lie detector while remaining deceptive. Using DolusChat, a novel 65k-example dataset with paired truthful/deceptive responses, we identify three key factors that determine the honesty of learned policies: amount of exploration during preference learning, lie detector accuracy, and KL regularization strength. We find that preference learning with lie detectors and GRPO can lead to policies which evade lie detectors, with deception rates of over 85\%. However, if the lie detector true positive rate (TPR) or KL regularization is sufficiently high, GRPO learns honest policies. In contrast, off-policy algorithms (DPO) consistently lead to deception rates under 25\% for realistic TPRs. Our results illustrate a more complex picture than previously assumed: depending on the context, lie-detector-enhanced training can be a powerful tool for scalable oversight, or a counterproductive method encouraging undetectable misalignment.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

A deception detector is only as useful as the trust its alarms deserve. Like a polygraph, detectors that read a language model's internal activations can catch deceptive responses that look honest. Yet current detectors depend on which layers they read, weaken on broader tests, and do not state how certain their alarms are. This white paper proposes the Machine Deception Detector, which targets both detection accuracy and the uncertainty of detector scores. The detector reads every layer of the language model, learns which tokens carry evidence of deception using only response labels, and calibrates its alarm threshold so that its false--positive rate stays below a prescribed level. An ensemble of such detectors measures the uncertainty of each score and raises an alarm only when its members agree, with a confidence level that sets how certain each alarm must be. The proposed evaluation trains on instructed honest and deceptive statements, tests on five unseen deceptive tasks of Liars' Bench read by six Qwen3 models from 0.6B to 32B parameters, and is designed to also show which layers carry the deception feature and how this changes with model size.

Generative models can produce impressively realistic images. This paper demonstrates that generated images have geometric features different from those of real images. We build a set of collections of generated images, prequalified to fool simple, signal-based classifiers into believing they are real. We then show that prequalified generated images can be identified reliably by classifiers that only look at geometric properties. We use three such classifiers. All three classifiers are denied access to image pixels, and look only at derived geometric features. The first classifier looks at the perspective field of the image, the second looks at lines detected in the image, and the third looks at relations between detected objects and shadows. Our procedure detects generated images more reliably than SOTA local signal based detectors, for images from a number of distinct generators. Saliency maps suggest that the classifiers can identify geometric problems reliably. We conclude that current generators cannot reliably reproduce geometric properties of real images.

Deep image inpainting aims to restore damaged or missing regions in an image with realistic contents. While having a wide range of applications such as object removal and image recovery, deep inpainting techniques also have the risk of being manipulated for image forgery. A promising countermeasure against such forgeries is deep inpainting detection, which aims to locate the inpainted regions in an image. In this paper, we make the first attempt towards universal detection of deep inpainting, where the detection network can generalize well when detecting different deep inpainting methods. To this end, we first propose a novel data generation approach to generate a universal training dataset, which imitates the noise discrepancies exist in real versus inpainted image contents to train universal detectors. We then design a Noise-Image Cross-fusion Network (NIX-Net) to effectively exploit the discriminative information contained in both the images and their noise patterns. We empirically show, on multiple benchmark datasets, that our approach outperforms existing detection methods by a large margin and generalize well to unseen deep inpainting techniques. Our universal training dataset can also significantly boost the generalizability of existing detection methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionised natural language processing, exhibiting impressive human-like capabilities. In particular, LLMs are capable of "lying", knowingly outputting false statements. Hence, it is of interest and importance to develop methods to detect when LLMs lie. Indeed, several authors trained classifiers to detect LLM lies based on their internal model activations. However, other researchers showed that these classifiers may fail to generalise, for example to negated statements. In this work, we aim to develop a robust method to detect when an LLM is lying. To this end, we make the following key contributions: (i) We demonstrate the existence of a two-dimensional subspace, along which the activation vectors of true and false statements can be separated. Notably, this finding is universal and holds for various LLMs, including Gemma-7B, LLaMA2-13B, Mistral-7B and LLaMA3-8B. Our analysis explains the generalisation failures observed in previous studies and sets the stage for more robust lie detection; (ii) Building upon (i), we construct an accurate LLM lie detector. Empirically, our proposed classifier achieves state-of-the-art performance, attaining 94% accuracy in both distinguishing true from false factual statements and detecting lies generated in real-world scenarios.

Recent years have witnessed the rapid progress of image captioning. However, the demands for large memory storage and heavy computational burden prevent these captioning models from being deployed on mobile devices. The main obstacles lie in the heavyweight visual feature extractors (i.e., object detectors) and complicated cross-modal fusion networks. To this end, we propose LightCap, a lightweight image captioner for resource-limited devices. The core design is built on the recent CLIP model for efficient image captioning. To be specific, on the one hand, we leverage the CLIP model to extract the compact grid features without relying on the time-consuming object detectors. On the other hand, we transfer the image-text retrieval design of CLIP to image captioning scenarios by devising a novel visual concept extractor and a cross-modal modulator. We further optimize the cross-modal fusion model and parallel prediction heads via sequential and ensemble distillations. With the carefully designed architecture, our model merely contains 40M parameters, saving the model size by more than 75% and the FLOPs by more than 98% in comparison with the current state-of-the-art methods. In spite of the low capacity, our model still exhibits state-of-the-art performance on prevalent datasets, e.g., 136.6 CIDEr on COCO Karpathy test split. Testing on the smartphone with only a single CPU, the proposed LightCap exhibits a fast inference speed of 188ms per image, which is ready for practical applications.

Fast-spinning, nonaxisymmetrically deformed neutron stars (NSs) are promising targets for continuous gravitational-wave (CGW) searches with current and next-generation ground-based detectors. Ultraluminous X-ray pulsars (ULXPs), characterized by super-Eddington accretion and strong magnetic fields, provide extreme environments in which substantial nonaxisymmetric deformations may develop. In this Letter, we investigate thermo-elastic mountains generated by magnetically induced temperature asymmetries in the accreted crusts of ULXPs. We connect the crustal thermal structure to an accretion-column model and solve the full anisotropic heat-transport equation, extending previous perturbative treatments into the nonlinear, strongly magnetized regime. We find that the weak-field approximation begins to break down near B_{rm ref}sim10^{13},{rm G}, beyond which nonlinear anisotropic heat transport significantly modifies the quadrupolar thermal response. The resulting thermal asymmetries generate substantial thermo-elastic mass quadrupoles at higher field strengths. Although the currently known ULXPs are unfavorable CGW targets because of their relatively slow spins and, in most cases, large distances, our illustrative spin-evolution calculations show that a NS can enter the super-Eddington accretor phase with a spin period of order 20,{rm ms}. Such rapidly rotating Galactic ULXPs could lie within the projected sensitivities of next-generation detectors such as the Einstein Telescope and Cosmic Explorer. These results extend thermal-mountain physics into the strongly magnetized regime relevant to ULXPs and connect super-Eddington accretion with prospective CGW observations.

The challenges of shape robust text detection lie in two aspects: 1) most existing quadrangular bounding box based detectors are difficult to locate texts with arbitrary shapes, which are hard to be enclosed perfectly in a rectangle; 2) most pixel-wise segmentation-based detectors may not separate the text instances that are very close to each other. To address these problems, we propose a novel Progressive Scale Expansion Network (PSENet), designed as a segmentation-based detector with multiple predictions for each text instance. These predictions correspond to different `kernels' produced by shrinking the original text instance into various scales. Consequently, the final detection can be conducted through our progressive scale expansion algorithm which gradually expands the kernels with minimal scales to the text instances with maximal and complete shapes. Due to the fact that there are large geometrical margins among these minimal kernels, our method is effective to distinguish the adjacent text instances and is robust to arbitrary shapes. The state-of-the-art results on ICDAR 2015 and ICDAR 2017 MLT benchmarks further confirm the great effectiveness of PSENet. Notably, PSENet outperforms the previous best record by absolute 6.37\% on the curve text dataset SCUT-CTW1500. Code will be available in https://github.com/whai362/PSENet.

Large language models can hold knowledge they do not report. A model may sandbag on a capability evaluation, or answer against what it internally knows, and its outputs alone cannot tell whether it is hiding an answer or simply does not have one. We borrow the Concealed Information Test, a forensic method that identifies guilty knowledge by presenting a suspect with the true detail among plausible decoys and measuring a stronger response to the item they recognize. Our method, Probe of Internal Recognition (PIR), does the same inside a model. It presents a question with its candidate answers and reads, from the model's internal states, which candidate the model recognizes as correct. PIR is reference-free, needing no honest reference model and no labeled truth corpus. Across eight models from five families (Gemma, Qwen, Llama, Mistral, and Phi), PIR recovers the recognized answer at 0.70 to 0.87 balanced accuracy, well above the 0.28 to 0.40 unknown-item baseline and the 0.25 chance rate. It stays readable across every form of concealment we test, from prompted deception and trained sandbagging to external password-locked and circuit-broken checkpoints, with recognition between 0.85 and 0.93. When the model hides a known answer, recognition stays high. When unlearning removes the knowledge, recognition drops to the level of a question the model never knew. PIR therefore separates a model that will not answer from one that cannot, which supports sandbagging audits and unlearning verification. The signal is causal, adds information beyond black-box behavioral cues, and extends from multiple-choice questions to free-form generation.

Large language models sometimes produce false or misleading responses. Two approaches to this problem are honesty elicitation -- modifying prompts or weights so that the model answers truthfully -- and lie detection -- classifying whether a given response is false. Prior work evaluates such methods on models specifically trained to lie or conceal information, but these artificial constructions may not resemble naturally-occurring dishonesty. We instead study open-weights LLMs from Chinese developers, which are trained to censor politically sensitive topics: Qwen3 models frequently produce falsehoods about subjects like Falun Gong or the Tiananmen protests while occasionally answering correctly, indicating they possess knowledge they are trained to suppress. Using this as a testbed, we evaluate a suite of elicitation and lie detection techniques. For honesty elicitation, sampling without a chat template, few-shot prompting, and fine-tuning on generic honesty data most reliably increase truthful responses. For lie detection, prompting the censored model to classify its own responses performs near an uncensored-model upper bound, and linear probes trained on unrelated data offer a cheaper alternative. The strongest honesty elicitation techniques also transfer to frontier open-weights models including DeepSeek R1. Notably, no technique fully eliminates false responses. We release all prompts, code, and transcripts.

As AI systems become increasingly integrated into human lives, endowing them with robust social intelligence has emerged as a critical frontier. A key aspect of this intelligence is discerning truth from deception, a ubiquitous element of human interaction that is conveyed through a complex interplay of verbal language and non-verbal visual cues. However, automatic deception detection in dynamic, multi-party conversations remains a significant challenge. The recent rise of powerful Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), with their impressive abilities in visual and textual understanding, makes them natural candidates for this task. Consequently, their capabilities in this crucial domain are mostly unquantified. To address this gap, we introduce a new task, Multimodal Interactive Veracity Assessment (MIVA), and present a novel multimodal dataset derived from the social deduction game Werewolf. This dataset provides synchronized video, text, with verifiable ground-truth labels for every statement. We establish a comprehensive benchmark evaluating state-of-the-art MLLMs, revealing a significant performance gap: even powerful models like GPT-4o struggle to distinguish truth from falsehood reliably. Our analysis of failure modes indicates that these models fail to ground language in visual social cues effectively and may be overly conservative in their alignment, highlighting the urgent need for novel approaches to building more perceptive and trustworthy AI systems.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Prior studies on deception in language-based AI agents typically assess whether the agent produces a false statement about a topic, or makes a binary choice prompted by a goal, rather than allowing open-ended deceptive behavior to emerge in pursuit of a longer-term goal. To fix this, we introduce Among Us, a sandbox social deception game where LLM-agents exhibit long-term, open-ended deception as a consequence of the game objectives. While most benchmarks saturate quickly, Among Us can be expected to last much longer, because it is a multi-player game far from equilibrium. Using the sandbox, we evaluate 18 proprietary and open-weight LLMs and uncover a general trend: models trained with RL are comparatively much better at producing deception than detecting it. We evaluate the effectiveness of methods to detect lying and deception: logistic regression on the activations and sparse autoencoders (SAEs). We find that probes trained on a dataset of "pretend you're a dishonest model:.." generalize extremely well out-of-distribution, consistently obtaining AUROCs over 95% even when evaluated just on the deceptive statement, without the chain of thought. We also find two SAE features that work well at deception detection but are unable to steer the model to lie less. We hope our open-sourced sandbox, game logs, and probes serve to anticipate and mitigate deceptive behavior and capabilities in language-based agents.

Deception is the intentional practice of twisting information. It is a nuanced societal practice deeply intertwined with human societal evolution, characterized by a multitude of facets. This research explores the problem of deception through the lens of psychology, employing a framework that categorizes deception into three forms: lies of omission, lies of commission, and lies of influence. The primary focus of this study is specifically on investigating only lies of omission. We propose a novel framework for deception detection leveraging NLP techniques. We curated an annotated dataset of 876,784 samples by amalgamating a popular large-scale fake news dataset and scraped news headlines from the Twitter handle of Times of India, a well-known Indian news media house. Each sample has been labeled with four layers, namely: (i) the type of omission (speculation, bias, distortion, sounds factual, and opinion), (ii) colors of lies(black, white, etc), and (iii) the intention of such lies (to influence, etc) (iv) topic of lies (political, educational, religious, etc). We present a novel multi-task learning pipeline that leverages the dataless merging of fine-tuned language models to address the deception detection task mentioned earlier. Our proposed model achieved an F1 score of 0.87, demonstrating strong performance across all layers including the type, color, intent, and topic aspects of deceptive content. Finally, our research explores the relationship between lies of omission and propaganda techniques. To accomplish this, we conducted an in-depth analysis, uncovering compelling findings. For instance, our analysis revealed a significant correlation between loaded language and opinion, shedding light on their interconnectedness. To encourage further research in this field, we will be making the models and dataset available with the MIT License, making it favorable for open-source research.

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

Recent incidents have highlighted the challenge of monitoring LLM agents and the danger of models deceiving people. We show that white-box deception detection via probes can be scaled up to frontier monitoring settings by collecting the largest deception dataset to date for training probes and introducing a novel probe architecture which can aggregate information across many layers and tokens. Our probes achieve 98.4\% AUROC in SHADE-Arena and 98.0\% in BASH-Arena (vs. 97.9\%, 97.6\% resp. for action-only text monitors) and show improved efficacy as the underlying model is scaled up. We further test probes on several cases where deception cannot be determined from the context alone. In these cases, which we refer to as introspective deception, the ground truth can only be determined through careful elicitation or thorough knowledge of a model's training data. In one such evaluation, we show that probes can distinguish transcripts containing a model's true hidden goal from other goals with an AUROC of up to 99.7\%. Our probes also readily detect deception on prominent open-weight models which lie about politically sensitive topics, and about their beliefs when put under pressure. We release our training dataset, dubbed \fibs, to help drive frontier deployment of effective probes, and encourage the community to expand upon it with further examples of deception and sabotage.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional performance in various tasks, their (arguably) most prominent drawback is generating inaccurate or false information with a confident tone. In this paper, we hypothesize that the LLM's internal state can be used to reveal the truthfulness of a statement. Therefore, we introduce a simple yet effective method to detect the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements, which utilizes the LLM's hidden layer activations to determine the veracity of statements. To train and evaluate our method, we compose a dataset of true and false statements in six different topics. A classifier is trained to detect which statement is true or false based on an LLM's activation values. Specifically, the classifier receives as input the activation values from the LLM for each of the statements in the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that our method for detecting statement veracity significantly outperforms even few-shot prompting methods, highlighting its potential to enhance the reliability of LLM-generated content and its practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

Deception is a fundamental challenge for multi-agent reasoning: effective systems must strategically conceal information while detecting misleading behavior in others. Yet most evaluations reduce deception to static classification, ignoring the interactive, adversarial, and longitudinal nature of real deceptive dynamics. Large language models (LLMs) can deceive convincingly but remain weak at detecting deception in peers. We present WOLF, a multi-agent social deduction benchmark based on Werewolf that enables separable measurement of deception production and detection. WOLF embeds role-grounded agents (Villager, Werewolf, Seer, Doctor) in a programmable LangGraph state machine with strict night-day cycles, debate turns, and majority voting. Every statement is a distinct analysis unit, with self-assessed honesty from speakers and peer-rated deceptiveness from others. Deception is categorized via a standardized taxonomy (omission, distortion, fabrication, misdirection), while suspicion scores are longitudinally smoothed to capture both immediate judgments and evolving trust dynamics. Structured logs preserve prompts, outputs, and state transitions for full reproducibility. Across 7,320 statements and 100 runs, Werewolves produce deceptive statements in 31% of turns, while peer detection achieves 71-73% precision with ~52% overall accuracy. Precision is higher for identifying Werewolves, though false positives occur against Villagers. Suspicion toward Werewolves rises from ~52% to over 60% across rounds, while suspicion toward Villagers and the Doctor stabilizes near 44-46%. This divergence shows that extended interaction improves recall against liars without compounding errors against truthful roles. WOLF moves deception evaluation beyond static datasets, offering a dynamic, controlled testbed for measuring deceptive and detective capacity in adversarial multi-agent interaction.

Automatic fake news detection is a challenging problem in deception detection, and it has tremendous real-world political and social impacts. However, statistical approaches to combating fake news has been dramatically limited by the lack of labeled benchmark datasets. In this paper, we present liar: a new, publicly available dataset for fake news detection. We collected a decade-long, 12.8K manually labeled short statements in various contexts from PolitiFact.com, which provides detailed analysis report and links to source documents for each case. This dataset can be used for fact-checking research as well. Notably, this new dataset is an order of magnitude larger than previously largest public fake news datasets of similar type. Empirically, we investigate automatic fake news detection based on surface-level linguistic patterns. We have designed a novel, hybrid convolutional neural network to integrate meta-data with text. We show that this hybrid approach can improve a text-only deep learning model.

Automatic Deception Detection has been a hot research topic for a long time, using machine learning and deep learning to automatically detect deception, brings new light to this old field. In this paper, we proposed a voting-based method for automatic deception detection from videos using audio, visual and lexical features. Experiments were done on two datasets, the Real-life trial dataset by Michigan University and the Miami University deception detection dataset. Video samples were split into frames of images, audio, and manuscripts. Our Voting-based Multimodal proposed solution consists of three models. The first model is CNN for detecting deception from images, the second model is Support Vector Machine (SVM) on Mel spectrograms for detecting deception from audio and the third model is Word2Vec on Support Vector Machine (SVM) for detecting deception from manuscripts. Our proposed solution outperforms state of the art. Best results achieved on images, audio and text were 97%, 96%, 92% respectively on Real-Life Trial Dataset, and 97%, 82%, 73% on video, audio and text respectively on Miami University Deception Detection.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a variety of risks, from non-faithful output to biased and toxic generations. Due to several limiting factors surrounding LLMs (training cost, API access, data availability, etc.), it may not always be feasible to impose direct safety constraints on a deployed model. Therefore, an efficient and reliable alternative is required. To this end, we present our ongoing efforts to create and deploy a library of detectors: compact and easy-to-build classification models that provide labels for various harms. In addition to the detectors themselves, we discuss a wide range of uses for these detector models - from acting as guardrails to enabling effective AI governance. We also deep dive into inherent challenges in their development and discuss future work aimed at making the detectors more reliable and broadening their scope.

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

Deception detection has garnered increasing attention in recent years due to the significant growth of digital media and heightened ethical and security concerns. It has been extensively studied using multimodal methods, including video, audio, and text. In addition, individual differences in deception production and detection are believed to play a crucial role.Although some studies have utilized individual information such as personality traits to enhance the performance of deception detection, current systems remain limited, partly due to a lack of sufficient datasets for evaluating performance. To address this issue, we introduce a multimodal deception dataset MDPE. Besides deception features, this dataset also includes individual differences information in personality and emotional expression characteristics. It can explore the impact of individual differences on deception behavior. It comprises over 104 hours of deception and emotional videos from 193 subjects. Furthermore, we conducted numerous experiments to provide valuable insights for future deception detection research. MDPE not only supports deception detection, but also provides conditions for tasks such as personality recognition and emotion recognition, and can even study the relationships between them. We believe that MDPE will become a valuable resource for promoting research in the field of affective computing.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

In recent years, detecting fake multimodal content on social media has drawn increasing attention. Two major forms of deception dominate: human-crafted misinformation (e.g., rumors and misleading posts) and AI-generated content produced by image synthesis models or vision-language models (VLMs). Although both share deceptive intent, they are typically studied in isolation. NLP research focuses on human-written misinformation, while the CV community targets AI-generated artifacts. As a result, existing models are often specialized for only one type of fake content. In real-world scenarios, however, the type of a multimodal post is usually unknown, limiting the effectiveness of such specialized systems. To bridge this gap, we construct the Omnibus Dataset for Multimodal News Deception (OmniFake), a comprehensive benchmark of 127K samples that integrates human-curated misinformation from existing resources with newly synthesized AI-generated examples. Based on this dataset, we propose Unified Multimodal Fake Content Detection (UMFDet), a framework designed to handle both forms of deception. UMFDet leverages a VLM backbone augmented with a Category-aware Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) Adapter to capture category-specific cues, and an attribution chain-of-thought mechanism that provides implicit reasoning guidance for locating salient deceptive signals. Extensive experiments demonstrate that UMFDet achieves robust and consistent performance across both misinformation types, outperforming specialized baselines and offering a practical solution for real-world multimodal deception detection.

Truthfulness (adherence to factual accuracy) and utility (satisfying human needs and instructions) are both fundamental aspects of Large Language Models, yet these goals often conflict (e.g., sell a car with known flaws), which makes it challenging to achieve both in real-world deployments. We propose AI-LieDar, a framework to study how LLM-based agents navigate these scenarios in an multi-turn interactive setting. We design a set of real-world scenarios where language agents are instructed to achieve goals that are in conflict with being truthful during a multi-turn conversation with simulated human agents. To evaluate the truthfulness at large scale, we develop a truthfulness detector inspired by psychological literature to assess the agents' responses. Our experiment demonstrates that all models are truthful less than 50% of the time, though truthfulness and goal achievement (utility) rates vary across models. We further test the steerability of LLMs towards truthfulness, finding that models can be directed to be truthful or deceptive, and even truth-steered models still lie. These findings reveal the complex nature of truthfulness in LLMs and underscore the importance of further research to ensure the safe and reliable deployment of LLMs and LLM-based agents.

The increasing popularity of large language models has not only led to widespread use but has also brought various risks, including the potential for systematically spreading fake news. Consequently, the development of classification systems such as DetectGPT has become vital. These detectors are vulnerable to evasion techniques, as demonstrated in an experimental series: Systematic changes of the generative models' temperature proofed shallow learning-detectors to be the least reliable. Fine-tuning the generative model via reinforcement learning circumvented BERT-based-detectors. Finally, rephrasing led to a >90\% evasion of zero-shot-detectors like DetectGPT, although texts stayed highly similar to the original. A comparison with existing work highlights the better performance of the presented methods. Possible implications for society and further research are discussed.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

Deception detection in conversations is a challenging yet important task, having pivotal applications in many fields such as credibility assessment in business, multimedia anti-frauds, and custom security. Despite this, deception detection research is hindered by the lack of high-quality deception datasets, as well as the difficulties of learning multimodal features effectively. To address this issue, we introduce DOLOSThe name ``DOLOS" comes from Greek mythology., the largest gameshow deception detection dataset with rich deceptive conversations. DOLOS includes 1,675 video clips featuring 213 subjects, and it has been labeled with audio-visual feature annotations. We provide train-test, duration, and gender protocols to investigate the impact of different factors. We benchmark our dataset on previously proposed deception detection approaches. To further improve the performance by fine-tuning fewer parameters, we propose Parameter-Efficient Crossmodal Learning (PECL), where a Uniform Temporal Adapter (UT-Adapter) explores temporal attention in transformer-based architectures, and a crossmodal fusion module, Plug-in Audio-Visual Fusion (PAVF), combines crossmodal information from audio-visual features. Based on the rich fine-grained audio-visual annotations on DOLOS, we also exploit multi-task learning to enhance performance by concurrently predicting deception and audio-visual features. Experimental results demonstrate the desired quality of the DOLOS dataset and the effectiveness of the PECL. The DOLOS dataset and the source codes are available at https://github.com/NMS05/Audio-Visual-Deception-Detection-DOLOS-Dataset-and-Parameter-Efficient-Crossmodal-Learning/tree/main.

Despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, state-of-the-art Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrably lack a core component of human intelligence: the ability to `read the room' and assess deception in complex social interactions. To rigorously quantify this failure, we introduce a new task, Multimodal Interactive Deception Assessment (MIDA), and present a novel multimodal dataset providing synchronized video and text with verifiable ground-truth labels for every statement. We establish a comprehensive benchmark evaluating 12 state-of-the-art open- and closed-source MLLMs, revealing a significant performance gap: even powerful models like GPT-4o struggle to distinguish truth from falsehood reliably. Our analysis of failure modes indicates that these models fail to effectively ground language in multimodal social cues and lack the ability to model what others know, believe, or intend, highlighting the urgent need for novel approaches to building more perceptive and trustworthy AI systems. To take a step forward, we design a Social Chain-of-Thought (SoCoT) reasoning pipeline and a Dynamic Social Epistemic Memory (DSEM) module. Our framework yields performance improvement on this challenging task, demonstrating a promising new path toward building MLLMs capable of genuine human-like social reasoning.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) and their increased accessibility have made it easier than ever for students to automatically generate texts, posing new challenges for educational institutions. To enforce norms of academic integrity and ensure students' learning, learning analytics methods to automatically detect LLM-generated text appear increasingly appealing. This paper benchmarks the performance of different state-of-the-art detectors in educational contexts, introducing a novel dataset, called Generative Essay Detection in Education (GEDE), containing over 900 student-written essays and over 12,500 LLM-generated essays from various domains. To capture the diversity of LLM usage practices in generating text, we propose the concept of contribution levels, representing students' contribution to a given assignment. These levels range from purely human-written texts, to slightly LLM-improved versions, to fully LLM-generated texts, and finally to active attacks on the detector by "humanizing" generated texts. We show that most detectors struggle to accurately classify texts of intermediate student contribution levels, like LLM-improved human-written texts. Detectors are particularly likely to produce false positives, which is problematic in educational settings where false suspicions can severely impact students' lives. Our dataset, code, and additional supplementary materials are publicly available at https://github.com/lukasgehring/Assessing-LLM-Text-Detection-in-Educational-Contexts.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Language models (LMs) hallucinate. We inquire: Can we detect and mitigate hallucinations before they happen? This work answers this research question in the positive, by showing that the internal representations of LMs provide rich signals that can be used for this purpose. We introduce FactCheckMate, which preemptively detects hallucinations by learning a classifier that predicts whether the LM will hallucinate, based on the model's hidden states produced over the inputs, before decoding begins. If a hallucination is detected, FactCheckMate then intervenes, by adjusting the LM's hidden states such that the model will produce more factual outputs. FactCheckMate provides fresh insights that the inner workings of LMs can be revealed by their hidden states. Practically, both the detection and mitigation models in FactCheckMate are lightweight, adding little inference overhead; FactCheckMate proves a more efficient approach for mitigating hallucinations compared to many post-hoc alternatives. We evaluate FactCheckMate over LMs of different scales and model families (including Llama, Mistral, and Gemma), across a variety of QA datasets from different domains. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of leveraging internal representations for early hallucination detection and mitigation, achieving over 70% preemptive detection accuracy. On average, outputs generated by LMs with intervention are 34.4% more factual compared to those without intervention. The average overhead difference in the inference time introduced by FactCheckMate is around 3.16 seconds.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit significant utility across various domains, they simultaneously are susceptible to exploitation for unethical purposes, including academic misconduct and dissemination of misinformation. Consequently, AI-generated text detection systems have emerged as a countermeasure. However, these detection mechanisms demonstrate vulnerability to evasion techniques and lack robustness against textual manipulations. This paper introduces back-translation as a novel technique for evading detection, underscoring the need to enhance the robustness of current detection systems. The proposed method involves translating AI-generated text through multiple languages before back-translating to English. We present a model that combines these back-translated texts to produce a manipulated version of the original AI-generated text. Our findings demonstrate that the manipulated text retains the original semantics while significantly reducing the true positive rate (TPR) of existing detection methods. We evaluate this technique on nine AI detectors, including six open-source and three proprietary systems, revealing their susceptibility to back-translation manipulation. In response to the identified shortcomings of existing AI text detectors, we present a countermeasure to improve the robustness against this form of manipulation. Our results indicate that the TPR of the proposed method declines by only 1.85% after back-translation manipulation. Furthermore, we build a large dataset of 720k texts using eight different LLMs. Our dataset contains both human-authored and LLM-generated texts in various domains and writing styles to assess the performance of our method and existing detectors. This dataset is publicly shared for the benefit of the research community.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

AI holds promise for transforming scientific processes, including hypothesis generation. Prior work on hypothesis generation can be broadly categorized into theory-driven and data-driven approaches. While both have proven effective in generating novel and plausible hypotheses, it remains an open question whether they can complement each other. To address this, we develop the first method that combines literature-based insights with data to perform LLM-powered hypothesis generation. We apply our method on five different datasets and demonstrate that integrating literature and data outperforms other baselines (8.97\% over few-shot, 15.75\% over literature-based alone, and 3.37\% over data-driven alone). Additionally, we conduct the first human evaluation to assess the utility of LLM-generated hypotheses in assisting human decision-making on two challenging tasks: deception detection and AI generated content detection. Our results show that human accuracy improves significantly by 7.44\% and 14.19\% on these tasks, respectively. These findings suggest that integrating literature-based and data-driven approaches provides a comprehensive and nuanced framework for hypothesis generation and could open new avenues for scientific inquiry.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and agentic, the requirement for trust in their outputs grows significantly, yet at the same time concerns have been mounting that models may learn to lie in pursuit of their goals. To address these concerns, a body of work has emerged around the notion of "honesty" in LLMs, along with interventions aimed at mitigating deceptive behaviors. However, evaluations of honesty are currently highly limited, with no benchmark combining large scale and applicability to all models. Moreover, many benchmarks claiming to measure honesty in fact simply measure accuracy--the correctness of a model's beliefs--in disguise. In this work, we introduce a large-scale human-collected dataset for measuring honesty directly, allowing us to disentangle accuracy from honesty for the first time. Across a diverse set of LLMs, we find that while larger models obtain higher accuracy on our benchmark, they do not become more honest. Surprisingly, while most frontier LLMs obtain high scores on truthfulness benchmarks, we find a substantial propensity in frontier LLMs to lie when pressured to do so, resulting in low honesty scores on our benchmark. We find that simple methods, such as representation engineering interventions, can improve honesty. These results underscore the growing need for robust evaluations and effective interventions to ensure LLMs remain trustworthy.

To reliably assist human decision-making, LLMs must maintain factual internal beliefs against misleading injections. While current models resist explicit misinformation, we uncover a fundamental vulnerability to sophisticated, hard-to-falsify evidence. To systematically probe this weakness, we introduce MisBelief, a framework that generates misleading evidence via collaborative, multi-round interactions among multi-role LLMs. This process mimics subtle, defeasible reasoning and progressive refinement to create logically persuasive yet factually deceptive claims. Using MisBelief, we generate 4,800 instances across three difficulty levels to evaluate 7 representative LLMs. Results indicate that while models are robust to direct misinformation, they are highly sensitive to this refined evidence: belief scores in falsehoods increase by an average of 93.0\%, fundamentally compromising downstream recommendations. To address this, we propose Deceptive Intent Shielding (DIS), a governance mechanism that provides an early warning signal by inferring the deceptive intent behind evidence. Empirical results demonstrate that DIS consistently mitigates belief shifts and promotes more cautious evidence evaluation.

Detecting groups of people who are jointly deceptive in video conversations is crucial in settings such as meetings, sales pitches, and negotiations. Past work on deception in videos focuses on detecting a single deceiver and uses facial or visual features only. In this paper, we propose the concept of Face-to-Face Dynamic Interaction Networks (FFDINs) to model the interpersonal interactions within a group of people. The use of FFDINs enables us to leverage network relations in detecting group deception in video conversations for the first time. We use a dataset of 185 videos from a deception-based game called Resistance. We first characterize the behavior of individual, pairs, and groups of deceptive participants and compare them to non-deceptive participants. Our analysis reveals that pairs of deceivers tend to avoid mutual interaction and focus their attention on non-deceivers. In contrast, non-deceivers interact with everyone equally. We propose Negative Dynamic Interaction Networks to capture the notion of missing interactions. We create the DeceptionRank algorithm to detect deceivers from NDINs extracted from videos that are just one minute long. We show that our method outperforms recent state-of-the-art computer vision, graph embedding, and ensemble methods by at least 20.9% AUROC in identifying deception from videos.

AI humanizers are a new class of online software tools meant to paraphrase and rewrite AI-generated text in a way that allows them to evade AI detection software. We study 19 AI humanizer and paraphrasing tools and qualitatively assess their effects and faithfulness in preserving the meaning of the original text. We show that many existing AI detectors fail to detect humanized text. Finally, we demonstrate a robust model that can detect humanized AI text while maintaining a low false positive rate using a data-centric augmentation approach. We attack our own detector, training our own fine-tuned model optimized against our detector's predictions, and show that our detector's cross-humanizer generalization is sufficient to remain robust to this attack.

Recent advancements in Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the creation of highly realistic synthetic content, raising concerns about the potential for malicious use, such as misinformation and manipulation. Moreover, detecting Machine-Generated Text (MGT) remains challenging due to the lack of robust benchmarks that assess generalization to real-world scenarios. In this work, we present a pipeline to test the resilience of state-of-the-art MGT detectors (e.g., Mage, Radar, LLM-DetectAIve) to linguistically informed adversarial attacks. To challenge the detectors, we fine-tune language models using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to shift the MGT style toward human-written text (HWT). This exploits the detectors' reliance on stylistic clues, making new generations more challenging to detect. Additionally, we analyze the linguistic shifts induced by the alignment and which features are used by detectors to detect MGT texts. Our results show that detectors can be easily fooled with relatively few examples, resulting in a significant drop in detection performance. This highlights the importance of improving detection methods and making them robust to unseen in-domain texts.

The prevalence of misinformation on social media threatens public trust, demanding automated fact-checking systems that provide accurate verdicts with interpretable explanations. However, existing large language model-based (LLM-based) approaches often rely heavily on external knowledge sources, introducing substantial latency and even hallucinations that undermine reliability, interpretability, and responsiveness, which is crucial for real-time use. To address these challenges, we propose REason-guided Fact-checking with Latent EXplanations REFLEX paradigm, a plug-and-play, self-refining paradigm that leverages the internal knowledge in backbone model to improve both verdict accuracy and explanation quality. REFLEX reformulates fact-checking as a role-play dialogue and jointly trains verdict prediction and explanation generation. It adaptively extracts contrastive activation pairs between the backbone model and its fine-tuned variant to construct steering vectors that disentangle truth into style and substance naturally. These activation-level signals guide inference and suppress noisy explanations, enabling more faithful and efficient reasoning. Experiments on real-world datasets show that REFLEX outperforms previous methods that steer toward a single truth direction and underscores the challenge traditional approaches face when handling the subtle, human-unknown truth in fact-checking tasks. Remarkably, with only 465 self-refined training samples, RELFEX achieves state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, models trained with explanatory objectives can effectively guide those without them, yielding up to a 7.57% improvement, highlighting that internal explanation signals play a dual role in both interpreting and enhancing factual reasoning.

The rapid adoption of generative language models has brought about substantial advancements in digital communication, while simultaneously raising concerns regarding the potential misuse of AI-generated content. Although numerous detection methods have been proposed to differentiate between AI and human-generated content, the fairness and robustness of these detectors remain underexplored. In this study, we evaluate the performance of several widely-used GPT detectors using writing samples from native and non-native English writers. Our findings reveal that these detectors consistently misclassify non-native English writing samples as AI-generated, whereas native writing samples are accurately identified. Furthermore, we demonstrate that simple prompting strategies can not only mitigate this bias but also effectively bypass GPT detectors, suggesting that GPT detectors may unintentionally penalize writers with constrained linguistic expressions. Our results call for a broader conversation about the ethical implications of deploying ChatGPT content detectors and caution against their use in evaluative or educational settings, particularly when they may inadvertently penalize or exclude non-native English speakers from the global discourse.

Effective fraud detection and analysis of government-issued identity documents, such as passports, driver's licenses, and identity cards, are essential in thwarting identity theft and bolstering security on online platforms. The training of accurate fraud detection and analysis tools depends on the availability of extensive identity document datasets. However, current publicly available benchmark datasets for identity document analysis, including MIDV-500, MIDV-2020, and FMIDV, fall short in several respects: they offer a limited number of samples, cover insufficient varieties of fraud patterns, and seldom include alterations in critical personal identifying fields like portrait images, limiting their utility in training models capable of detecting realistic frauds while preserving privacy. In response to these shortcomings, our research introduces a new benchmark dataset, IDNet, designed to advance privacy-preserving fraud detection efforts. The IDNet dataset comprises 837,060 images of synthetically generated identity documents, totaling approximately 490 gigabytes, categorized into 20 types from 10 U.S. states and 10 European countries. We evaluate the utility and present use cases of the dataset, illustrating how it can aid in training privacy-preserving fraud detection methods, facilitating the generation of camera and video capturing of identity documents, and testing schema unification and other identity document management functionalities.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.

As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their reliable deployment. Existing evaluations show that LLM agents can deceive, but often examine isolated scenarios or narrowly defined conditions, limiting systematic understanding of when deception becomes more likely. To address this gap, we introduce DecepEval, a benchmark comprising 1,532 instances across 3 task families and 28 professional scenarios. Drawing on classical fraud theories, we propose the LLM Deception Diamond framework, which characterizes four external conditions that may induce deception: pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict. DecepEval pairs neutral and induced versions of each instance to measure condition-dependent changes in deception rates, while explicit task facts and observable agent behavior help distinguish deception from capability-related errors. Evaluations of nine frontier LLMs show that inducements increase deception across models and task families, even among models with low baseline deception rates. DecepEval makes these vulnerabilities measurable, providing a shared benchmark for progress toward trustworthy artificial intelligence.

Today's LLM-based agents are vulnerable to deception by users and other agents. Defending against deception requires Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning to infer the beliefs and goals of others as well as modeling tactics based on communication theory. To enable training models to detect deception, we adopt the well-known deception game, Avalon. We present a corpus, AVCORP, of 5,000 annotated utterances from 250 games of Avalon. AVCORP includes (1) 37 tactics mapped to a 4x4 behavior matrix, and (2) reasoning traces capturing abductive hypotheses, suspicion levels, and nested ToM beliefs. We train Qwen3-8B on AVCORP and evaluate it on 25 held-out games and 20 games played by humans. On held-out games, our best trained detector outperforms its untrained baseline and frontier models (GPT-5.6 Sol, Gemini 3.1 Pro, DeepSeek-V4-Pro), matching Claude Opus 5.5. On human games, every trained detector exceeds the untrained model in F1 score across all rounds.

When asked to summarize articles or answer questions given a passage, large language models (LLMs) can hallucinate details and respond with unsubstantiated answers that are inaccurate with respect to the input context. This paper describes a simple approach for detecting such contextual hallucinations. We hypothesize that contextual hallucinations are related to the extent to which an LLM attends to information in the provided context versus its own generations. Based on this intuition, we propose a simple hallucination detection model whose input features are given by the ratio of attention weights on the context versus newly generated tokens (for each attention head). We find that a linear classifier based on these lookback ratio features is as effective as a richer detector that utilizes the entire hidden states of an LLM or a text-based entailment model. The lookback ratio-based detector -- Lookback Lens -- is found to transfer across tasks and even models, allowing a detector that is trained on a 7B model to be applied (without retraining) to a larger 13B model. We further apply this detector to mitigate contextual hallucinations, and find that a simple classifier-guided decoding approach is able to reduce the amount of hallucination, for example by 9.6% in the XSum summarization task.

AI chatbots are rapidly shaping how people encounter the news, yet no prior study has systematically measured how accurately these systems, with their proprietary search integrations and retrieval-synthesis pipelines, handle emerging facts across languages and regions. We present a 14-day (February 9-22, 2026) evaluation of six AI chatbots (Gemini 3 Flash and Pro, Grok 4, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, GPT-5 and GPT-4o mini) on 2,100 factual questions derived from same-day BBC News reporting across six regional services (US & Canada, Arabic, Afrique, Hindi, Russian, Turkish). The best systems achieve over 90% multiple-choice accuracy on questions about events reported hours earlier. The same systems, however, lose 11-13% under free-response evaluation, and 16-17% across the cohort. We further characterize three failure patterns. First, every model achieves its lowest accuracy on Hindi (79% vs. 89-91% elsewhere) and citations indicate an Anglophone retrieval bias (e.g., models answering Hindi queries cite English Wikipedia more than any Hindi outlet). Second, retrieval, not reasoning, failures drive over 70% of all errors. When models retrieve a correct source, they often extract the correct answer; the problem is to land on the right source in the first place. Third, models achieving 88-96% accuracy on well-formed questions drop to 19-70% when questions contain subtle false premises, with the most vulnerable model accepting fabricated facts 64% of the time. We also identify a detection-accuracy paradox: the best false-premise detector ranks second in adversarial accuracy (abstention rate), while a weaker detector ranks first, showing that premise detection and answer recovery are partially independent capabilities. Overall, these suggest that high accuracy can mask systematic regional inequity, near-total dependence on retrieval infrastructure, and vulnerability to imperfect queries real users pose.

Large language models (LLMs) can be dishonest when reporting on their actions and beliefs -- for example, they may overstate their confidence in factual claims or cover up evidence of covert actions. Such dishonesty may arise due to the effects of reinforcement learning (RL), where challenges with reward shaping can result in a training process that inadvertently incentivizes the model to lie or misrepresent its actions. In this work we propose a method for eliciting an honest expression of an LLM's shortcomings via a self-reported *confession*. A confession is an output, provided upon request after a model's original answer, that is meant to serve as a full account of the model's compliance with the letter and spirit of its policies and instructions. The reward assigned to a confession during training is solely based on its honesty, and does not impact positively or negatively the main answer's reward. As long as the "path of least resistance" for maximizing confession reward is to surface misbehavior rather than covering it up, this incentivizes models to be honest in their confessions. Our findings provide some justification this empirical assumption, especially in the case of egregious model misbehavior. To demonstrate the viability of our approach, we train GPT-5-Thinking to produce confessions, and we evaluate its honesty in out-of-distribution scenarios measuring hallucination, instruction following, scheming, and reward hacking. We find that when the model lies or omits shortcomings in its "main" answer, it often confesses to these behaviors honestly, and this confession honesty modestly improves with training. Confessions can enable a number of inference-time interventions including monitoring, rejection sampling, and surfacing issues to the user.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Artificial Intelligence has become a double edged sword in modern society being both a boon and a bane. While it empowers individuals it also enables malicious actors to perpetrate scams such as fraudulent phone calls and user impersonations. This growing threat necessitates a robust system to protect individuals In this paper we introduce a novel real time fraud detection mechanism using Retrieval Augmented Generation technology to address this challenge on two fronts. First our system incorporates a continuously updating policy checking feature that transcribes phone calls in real time and uses RAG based models to verify that the caller is not soliciting private information thus ensuring transparency and the authenticity of the conversation. Second we implement a real time user impersonation check with a two step verification process to confirm the callers identity ensuring accountability. A key innovation of our system is the ability to update policies without retraining the entire model enhancing its adaptability. We validated our RAG based approach using synthetic call recordings achieving an accuracy of 97.98 percent and an F1score of 97.44 percent with 100 calls outperforming state of the art methods. This robust and flexible fraud detection system is well suited for real world deployment.

Video deepfakes targeting a specific individual, the Person-of-Interest (POI), are the most harmful ones, and, since a public figure is abundantly recorded, a detector can be built from genuine footage of that individual. Such detectors commonly describe a subject through a 3D Morphable Model (3DMM) and adopt its coefficients as a whole, so which part of that description carries the signal has never been measured. We dissect it, holding the encoder, the training corpus and the enrollment protocol fixed and varying only what the encoder observes. The groups of coefficients prove largely redundant, since the shape block alone recovers almost all the accuracy of the full vector, and their temporal evolution contributes a real but bounded amount. We further show that the dense surface the same fit returns, which these detectors discard, carries identity information that the coefficients do not, and that it helps precisely where they are weakest. We assemble the best configuration into MOTIF, a visual-only detector trained on real videos only, with no manipulated video and no POI-specific data. It improves on both state-of-the-art POI detectors in every dataset and manipulation of our benchmark and at two quality levels. Our experimental code will be released at https://github.com/polimi-ispl/MOTIF.

Text-to-image diffusion models have impactful applications in art, design, and entertainment, yet these technologies also pose significant risks by enabling the creation and dissemination of misinformation. Although recent advancements have produced AI-generated image detectors that claim robustness against various augmentations, their true effectiveness remains uncertain. Do these detectors reliably identify images with different levels of augmentation? Are they biased toward specific scenes or data distributions? To investigate, we introduce SEMI-TRUTHS, featuring 27,600 real images, 223,400 masks, and 1,472,700 AI-augmented images that feature targeted and localized perturbations produced using diverse augmentation techniques, diffusion models, and data distributions. Each augmented image is accompanied by metadata for standardized and targeted evaluation of detector robustness. Our findings suggest that state-of-the-art detectors exhibit varying sensitivities to the types and degrees of perturbations, data distributions, and augmentation methods used, offering new insights into their performance and limitations. The code for the augmentation and evaluation pipeline is available at https://github.com/J-Kruk/SemiTruths.

The recent proliferation of fake portrait videos poses direct threats on society, law, and privacy. Believing the fake video of a politician, distributing fake pornographic content of celebrities, fabricating impersonated fake videos as evidence in courts are just a few real world consequences of deep fakes. We present a novel approach to detect synthetic content in portrait videos, as a preventive solution for the emerging threat of deep fakes. In other words, we introduce a deep fake detector. We observe that detectors blindly utilizing deep learning are not effective in catching fake content, as generative models produce formidably realistic results. Our key assertion follows that biological signals hidden in portrait videos can be used as an implicit descriptor of authenticity, because they are neither spatially nor temporally preserved in fake content. To prove and exploit this assertion, we first engage several signal transformations for the pairwise separation problem, achieving 99.39% accuracy. Second, we utilize those findings to formulate a generalized classifier for fake content, by analyzing proposed signal transformations and corresponding feature sets. Third, we generate novel signal maps and employ a CNN to improve our traditional classifier for detecting synthetic content. Lastly, we release an "in the wild" dataset of fake portrait videos that we collected as a part of our evaluation process. We evaluate FakeCatcher on several datasets, resulting with 96%, 94.65%, 91.50%, and 91.07% accuracies, on Face Forensics, Face Forensics++, CelebDF, and on our new Deep Fakes Dataset respectively. We also analyze signals from various facial regions, under image distortions, with varying segment durations, from different generators, against unseen datasets, and under several dimensionality reduction techniques.

Latent-space monitors aim to detect undesirable behaviours in Large Language Models by leveraging their internal representations rather than relying solely on black-box outputs. These methods have shown promise in identifying behaviours such as deception and unsafe completions. However, these monitors may themselves become training signals, for example, by using problematic samples found in deployment to retrain models. This raises an important question: can models learn to evade such monitors? To evaluate this capability, we introduce RL-Obfuscation, in which LLMs are finetuned via reinforcement learning to evade latent-space monitors while maintaining their blackbox behaviour. We apply RL-Obfuscation to Language Models ranging from 7B to 14B parameters and evaluate their Evasion Success Rate against a suite of monitors. We find that token-level monitors are highly vulnerable to this attack while more holistic monitors, such as max-pooling or attention-based probes, remain robust. Moreover, for these vulnerable monitors, models trained to evade a single static monitor can generalise to evade other unseen monitors. We also find that the models can be trained to conditionally bypass latent-space monitors on only certain inputs. Finally, we study how the models bypass these monitors and find that the model can learn to repurpose tokens to have different internal representations.

Automatic fact verification has received significant attention recently. Contemporary automatic fact-checking systems focus on estimating truthfulness using numerical scores which are not human-interpretable. A human fact-checker generally follows several logical steps to verify a verisimilitude claim and conclude whether its truthful or a mere masquerade. Popular fact-checking websites follow a common structure for fact categorization such as half true, half false, false, pants on fire, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to have an aspect-based (delineating which part(s) are true and which are false) explainable system that can assist human fact-checkers in asking relevant questions related to a fact, which can then be validated separately to reach a final verdict. In this paper, we propose a 5W framework (who, what, when, where, and why) for question-answer-based fact explainability. To that end, we present a semi-automatically generated dataset called FACTIFY-5WQA, which consists of 391, 041 facts along with relevant 5W QAs - underscoring our major contribution to this paper. A semantic role labeling system has been utilized to locate 5Ws, which generates QA pairs for claims using a masked language model. Finally, we report a baseline QA system to automatically locate those answers from evidence documents, which can serve as a baseline for future research in the field. Lastly, we propose a robust fact verification system that takes paraphrased claims and automatically validates them. The dataset and the baseline model are available at https: //github.com/ankuranii/acl-5W-QA

Large language models (LLMs) such as GPT, Claude, Gemini, and Grok have been deeply integrated into our daily life. They now support a wide range of tasks -- from dialogue and email drafting to assisting with teaching and coding, serving as search engines, and much more. However, their ability to produce highly human-like text raises serious concerns, including the spread of fake news, the generation of misleading governmental reports, and academic misconduct. To address this practical problem, we train a classifier to determine whether a piece of text is authored by an LLM or a human. Our detector is deployed on an online CPU-based platform https://huggingface.co/spaces/stats-powered-ai/StatDetectLLM, and contains three novelties over existing detectors: (i) it does not rely on auxiliary information, such as watermarks or knowledge of the specific LLM used to generate the text; (ii) it more effectively distinguishes between human- and LLM-authored text; and (iii) it enables statistical inference, which is largely absent in the current literature. Empirically, our classifier achieves higher classification accuracy compared to existing detectors, while maintaining type-I error control, high statistical power, and computational efficiency.

The generation of text that is increasingly human-like has been enabled by the advent of large language models (LLMs). As the detection of AI-generated content holds significant importance in the fight against issues such as misinformation and academic cheating, numerous studies have been conducted to develop reliable LLM detectors. While promising results have been demonstrated by such detectors on test data, recent research has revealed that they can be circumvented by employing different techniques. In this article, homoglyph-based (a alpha) attacks that can be used to circumvent existing LLM detectors are presented. The efficacy of the attacks is illustrated by analizing how homoglyphs shift the tokenization of the text, and thus its token loglikelihoods. A comprehensive evaluation is conducted to assess the effectiveness of homoglyphs on state-of-the-art LLM detectors, including Binoculars, DetectGPT, OpenAI's detector, and watermarking techniques, on five different datasets. A significant reduction in the efficiency of all the studied configurations of detectors and datasets, down to an accuracy of 0.5 (random guessing), is demonstrated by the proposed approach. The results show that homoglyph-based attacks can effectively evade existing LLM detectors, and the implications of these findings are discussed along with possible defenses against such attacks.

The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) techniques has enabled the creation of high-quality synthetic content, but it also raises significant security concerns. Current detection methods face two major limitations: (1) the lack of multidimensional explainable datasets for generated images and videos. Existing open-source datasets (e.g., WildFake, GenVideo) rely on oversimplified binary annotations, which restrict the explainability and trustworthiness of trained detectors. (2) Prior MLLM-based forgery detectors (e.g., FakeVLM) exhibit insufficiently fine-grained interpretability in their step-by-step reasoning, which hinders reliable localization and explanation. To address these challenges, we introduce Ivy-Fake, the first large-scale multimodal benchmark for explainable AIGC detection. It consists of over 106K richly annotated training samples (images and videos) and 5,000 manually verified evaluation examples, sourced from multiple generative models and real world datasets through a carefully designed pipeline to ensure both diversity and quality. Furthermore, we propose Ivy-xDetector, a reinforcement learning model based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), capable of producing explainable reasoning chains and achieving robust performance across multiple synthetic content detection benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our dataset and confirm the effectiveness of our approach. Notably, our method improves performance on GenImage from 86.88% to 96.32%, surpassing prior state-of-the-art methods by a clear margin.

In this paper, we present the Logically submissions to De-Factify 2 challenge (DE-FACTIFY 2023) on the task 1 of Multi-Modal Fact Checking. We describes our submissions to this challenge including explored evidence retrieval and selection techniques, pre-trained cross-modal and unimodal models, and a cross-modal veracity model based on the well established Transformer Encoder (TE) architecture which is heavily relies on the concept of self-attention. Exploratory analysis is also conducted on this Factify 2 data set that uncovers the salient multi-modal patterns and hypothesis motivating the architecture proposed in this work. A series of preliminary experiments were done to investigate and benchmarking different pre-trained embedding models, evidence retrieval settings and thresholds. The final system, a standard two-stage evidence based veracity detection system, yields weighted avg. 0.79 on both val set and final blind test set on the task 1, which achieves 3rd place with a small margin to the top performing system on the leaderboard among 9 participants.

Vision-language model (VLM) based web agents demonstrate impressive autonomous GUI interaction but remain vulnerable to deceptive interface elements. Existing approaches either detect deception without task integration or document attacks without proposing defenses. We formalize deception-aware web agent defense and propose DUDE (Deceptive UI Detector & Evaluator), a two-stage framework combining hybrid-reward learning with asymmetric penalties and experience summarization to distill failure patterns into transferable guidance. We introduce RUC (Real UI Clickboxes), a benchmark of 1,407 scenarios spanning four domains and deception categories. Experiments show DUDE reduces deception susceptibility by 53.8% while maintaining task performance, establishing an effective foundation for robust web agent deployment.

The rapid development of autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly improved the quality of generated texts, necessitating reliable machine-generated text detectors. A huge number of detectors and collections with AI fragments have emerged, and several detection methods even showed recognition quality up to 99.9% according to the target metrics in such collections. However, the quality of such detectors tends to drop dramatically in the wild, posing a question: Are detectors actually highly trustworthy or do their high benchmark scores come from the poor quality of evaluation datasets? In this paper, we emphasise the need for robust and qualitative methods for evaluating generated data to be secure against bias and low generalising ability of future model. We present a systematic review of datasets from competitions dedicated to AI-generated content detection and propose methods for evaluating the quality of datasets containing AI-generated fragments. In addition, we discuss the possibility of using high-quality generated data to achieve two goals: improving the training of detection models and improving the training datasets themselves. Our contribution aims to facilitate a better understanding of the dynamics between human and machine text, which will ultimately support the integrity of information in an increasingly automated world.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

We investigate the phenomenon of an LLM's untruthful response using a large set of 220 handcrafted linguistic features. We focus on GPT-3 models and find that the linguistic profiles of responses are similar across model sizes. That is, how varying-sized LLMs respond to given prompts stays similar on the linguistic properties level. We expand upon this finding by training support vector machines that rely only upon the stylistic components of model responses to classify the truthfulness of statements. Though the dataset size limits our current findings, we present promising evidence that truthfulness detection is possible without evaluating the content itself.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved human-level fluency in text generation, making it difficult to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated texts. This poses a growing risk of misuse of LLMs and demands the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. However, existing detectors lack robustness against attacks: they degrade detection accuracy by simply paraphrasing LLM-generated texts. Furthermore, a malicious user might attempt to deliberately evade the detectors based on detection results, but this has not been assumed in previous studies. In this paper, we propose OUTFOX, a framework that improves the robustness of LLM-generated-text detectors by allowing both the detector and the attacker to consider each other's output. In this framework, the attacker uses the detector's prediction labels as examples for in-context learning and adversarially generates essays that are harder to detect, while the detector uses the adversarially generated essays as examples for in-context learning to learn to detect essays from a strong attacker. Experiments in the domain of student essays show that the proposed detector improves the detection performance on the attacker-generated texts by up to +41.3 points in F1-score. Furthermore, the proposed detector shows a state-of-the-art detection performance: up to 96.9 points in F1-score, beating existing detectors on non-attacked texts. Finally, the proposed attacker drastically degrades the performance of detectors by up to -57.0 points F1-score, massively outperforming the baseline paraphrasing method for evading detection.

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Checks remain a foundational instrument in the financial ecosystem, facilitating substantial transaction volumes across institutions. However, their continued use also renders them a persistent target for fraud, underscoring the importance of robust check fraud detection mechanisms. At the core of such systems lies the accurate identification and localization of critical fields, such as the signature, magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) line, courtesy amount, legal amount, payee, and payer, which are essential for subsequent verification against reference checks belonging to the same customer. This field-level detection is traditionally dependent on object detection models trained on large, diverse, and meticulously labeled datasets, a resource that is scarce due to proprietary and privacy concerns. In this paper, we introduce a novel, training-free framework for automated check field detection, leveraging the power of a vision language model (VLM) in conjunction with a multimodal large language model (MLLM). Our approach enables zero-shot detection of check components, significantly lowering the barrier to deployment in real-world financial settings. Quantitative evaluation of our model on a hand-curated dataset of 110 checks spanning multiple formats and layouts demonstrates strong performance and generalization capability. Furthermore, this framework can serve as a bootstrap mechanism for generating high-quality labeled datasets, enabling the development of specialized real-time object detection models tailored to institutional needs.

Progress in image generation raises significant public security concerns. We argue that fake image detection should not operate as a "black box". Instead, an ideal approach must ensure both strong generalization and transparency. Recent progress in Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) offers new opportunities for reasoning-based AI-generated image detection. In this work, we evaluate the capabilities of MLLMs in comparison to traditional detection methods and human evaluators, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Furthermore, we design six distinct prompts and propose a framework that integrates these prompts to develop a more robust, explainable, and reasoning-driven detection system. The code is available at https://github.com/Gennadiyev/mllm-defake.

The ability of large language models to generate complex texts allows them to be widely integrated into many aspects of life, and their output can quickly fill all network resources. As the impact of LLMs grows, it becomes increasingly important to develop powerful detectors for the generated text. This detector is essential to prevent the potential misuse of these technologies and to protect areas such as social media from the negative effects of false content generated by LLMS. The main goal of LLM-generated text detection is to determine whether text is generated by an LLM, which is a basic binary classification task. In our work, we mainly use three different classification methods based on open source datasets: traditional machine learning techniques such as logistic regression, k-means clustering, Gaussian Naive Bayes, support vector machines, and methods based on converters such as BERT, and finally algorithms that use LLMs to detect LLM-generated text. We focus on model generalization, potential adversarial attacks, and accuracy of model evaluation. Finally, the possible research direction in the future is proposed, and the current experimental results are summarized.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as interactive agents, open-ended human-AI interactions can involve deceptive behaviors with serious real-world consequences, yet existing evaluations remain largely scenario-specific and model-centric. We introduce OpenDeception, a lightweight framework for jointly evaluating deception risk from both sides of human-AI dialogue. It consists of a scenario benchmark with 50 real-world deception cases, an IntentNet that infers deceptive intent from agent reasoning, and a TrustNet that estimates user susceptibility. To address data scarcity, we synthesize high-risk dialogues via LLM-based role-and-goal simulation, and train the User Trust Scorer using contrastive learning on controlled response pairs, avoiding unreliable scalar labels. Experiments on 11 LLMs and three large reasoning models show that over 90% of goal-driven interactions in most models exhibit deceptive intent, with stronger models displaying higher risk. A real-world case study adapted from a documented AI-induced suicide incident further demonstrates that our joint evaluation can proactively trigger warnings before critical trust thresholds are reached.

In this paper, both empirically and theoretically, we show that several AI-text detectors are not reliable in practical scenarios. Empirically, we show that paraphrasing attacks, where a light paraphraser is applied on top of a large language model (LLM), can break a whole range of detectors, including ones using watermarking schemes as well as neural network-based detectors and zero-shot classifiers. Our experiments demonstrate that retrieval-based detectors, designed to evade paraphrasing attacks, are still vulnerable to recursive paraphrasing. We then provide a theoretical impossibility result indicating that as language models become more sophisticated and better at emulating human text, the performance of even the best-possible detector decreases. For a sufficiently advanced language model seeking to imitate human text, even the best-possible detector may only perform marginally better than a random classifier. Our result is general enough to capture specific scenarios such as particular writing styles, clever prompt design, or text paraphrasing. We also extend the impossibility result to include the case where pseudorandom number generators are used for AI-text generation instead of true randomness. We show that the same result holds with a negligible correction term for all polynomial-time computable detectors. Finally, we show that even LLMs protected by watermarking schemes can be vulnerable against spoofing attacks where adversarial humans can infer hidden LLM text signatures and add them to human-generated text to be detected as text generated by the LLMs, potentially causing reputational damage to their developers. We believe these results can open an honest conversation in the community regarding the ethical and reliable use of AI-generated text.

The proliferation of synthetic images generated by advanced AI models poses significant challenges in identifying and understanding manipulated visual content. Current fake image detection methods predominantly rely on binary classification models that focus on accuracy while often neglecting interpretability, leaving users without clear insights into why an image is deemed real or fake. To bridge this gap, we introduce TruthLens, a novel training-free framework that reimagines deepfake detection as a visual question-answering (VQA) task. TruthLens utilizes state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs) to observe and describe visual artifacts and combines this with the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 to analyze and aggregate evidence into informed decisions. By adopting a multimodal approach, TruthLens seamlessly integrates visual and semantic reasoning to not only classify images as real or fake but also provide interpretable explanations for its decisions. This transparency enhances trust and provides valuable insights into the artifacts that signal synthetic content. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that TruthLens outperforms conventional methods, achieving high accuracy on challenging datasets while maintaining a strong emphasis on explainability. By reframing deepfake detection as a reasoning-driven process, TruthLens establishes a new paradigm in combating synthetic media, combining cutting-edge performance with interpretability to address the growing threats of visual disinformation.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generated images have become increasingly realistic and readily adaptable to concrete real-world claims, creating new challenges for verifying visual evidence. A concrete emerging risk is AI-generated refund fraud, in which manipulated or synthetic images are used to support claims about damaged products, poor delivery conditions, or service-related defects. Existing AI-generated image detection benchmarks mainly evaluate standalone authenticity classification, cross-generator transfer, or forensic localization, leaving claim-conditioned fraudulent evidence detection underexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce FraudBench, a multimodal benchmark for detecting AI-generated fraudulent refund evidence. FraudBench is constructed from real-world user-review evidence across e-commerce, food delivery, and travel-service scenarios. We curate real evidence images together with their associated review and product metadata, identify genuine damaged and undamaged evidence through MLLM-assisted filtering and human annotation, and synthesize fake-damaged evidence from genuine undamaged reference images using six state-of-the-art image editing and generation models. Using FraudBench, we evaluate MLLMs, specialized AI-generated image detectors, and human participants under the same settings. Experiments show that current MLLMs often recognize real-damaged evidence but fail on many fake-damaged subsets, with fake-damage detection rates (TPR) far below the 50% baseline on most generator subsets. Specialized detectors generally perform better but remain inconsistent across generators and can produce false positives on real-damaged samples, revealing a clear gap between generic AI image detection and reliable claim-conditioned refund-evidence verification.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

Supervised AI-text detectors report high benchmark accuracy, but it is not clear what their decisions are based on. We analyze a RoBERTa-based detector under semantic, structural, and tokenizer-level perturbations, using the M4 dataset (N = 10,000) and controlled generations (N = 300). When Mistral-7B-Instruct was asked to make machine text sound more human, Verb Diversity rose from 0.77 to 0.92 and the outputs became easier to detect. Detection scores appear to track statistical complexity, which also leads to a 76.3% false-positive rate on formal human writing. As a control, we evaluate event-based Latent Space detection. Paraphrasing changed 87% of its event sequences (Jaccard = 0.067), and homoglyphs altered 70% of the extracted verbs even though extraction still ran (Jaccard = 0.30). Its best domain AUC was 0.577. RoBERTa's robustness seems specific to the features it uses, and structural abstraction did not make detection more robust.

With growing credit card transaction volumes, the fraud percentages are also rising, including overhead costs for institutions to combat and compensate victims. The use of machine learning into the financial sector permits more effective protection against fraud and other economic crime. Suitably trained machine learning classifiers help proactive fraud detection, improving stakeholder trust and robustness against illicit transactions. However, the design of machine learning based fraud detection algorithms has been challenging and slow due the massively unbalanced nature of fraud data and the challenges of identifying the frauds accurately and completely to create a gold standard ground truth. Furthermore, there are no benchmarks or standard classifier evaluation metrics to measure and identify better performing classifiers, thus keeping researchers in the dark. In this work, we develop a theoretical foundation to model human annotation errors and extreme imbalance typical in real world fraud detection data sets. By conducting empirical experiments on a hypothetical classifier, with a synthetic data distribution approximated to a popular real world credit card fraud data set, we simulate human annotation errors and extreme imbalance to observe the behavior of popular machine learning classifier evaluation matrices. We demonstrate that a combined F1 score and g-mean, in that specific order, is the best evaluation metric for typical imbalanced fraud detection model classification.

The self-attention revolution allowed generative language models to scale and achieve increasingly impressive abilities. Such models - commonly referred to as Large Language Models (LLMs) - have recently gained prominence with the general public, thanks to conversational fine-tuning, putting their behavior in line with public expectations regarding AI. This prominence amplified prior concerns regarding the misuse of LLMs and led to the emergence of numerous tools to detect LLMs in the wild. Unfortunately, most such tools are critically flawed. While major publications in the LLM detectability field suggested that LLMs were easy to detect with fine-tuned autoencoders, the limitations of their results are easy to overlook. Specifically, they assumed publicly available generative models without fine-tunes or non-trivial prompts. While the importance of these assumptions has been demonstrated, until now, it remained unclear how well such detection could be countered. Here, we show that an attacker with access to such detectors' reference human texts and output not only evades detection but can fully frustrate the detector training - with a reasonable budget and all its outputs labeled as such. Achieving it required combining common "reinforcement from critic" loss function modification and AdamW optimizer, which led to surprisingly good fine-tuning generalization. Finally, we warn against the temptation to transpose the conclusions obtained in RNN-driven text GANs to LLMs due to their better representative ability. These results have critical implications for the detection and prevention of malicious use of generative language models, and we hope they will aid the designers of generative models and detectors.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

Linear probes trained on LLM activations are increasingly proposed as deception-detection metrics, yet report AUROC exceeding 0.96 on clean benchmarks while collapsing under distributional shift. This paper systematically pressure-tests probe-based metrics across the Gemma 3 model family (1B-27B parameters), diagnosing why they fail rather than merely documenting that they fail. We test four hypotheses about deception encoding: (1) single linear direction, (2) multi-dimensional subspace, (3) convex conic hull, (4) entropy proxy. Our design includes cross-domain transfer matrices, multi-dimensional probe analysis with permutation null baselines, entropy-residualization tests, and distractor evaluations across 8 stylistic shifts. We find that: (a) probes achieve near-perfect AUROC (>=0.998) on clean data but collapse under stylistic shifts; style-augmented probes recover near-perfect detection (mean AUROC 0.979-0.983) on unseen styles; (b) the single-direction hypothesis is rejected (k=1 captures only 0.61-0.80 AUROC), with cross-domain transfer failure confirmed as geometric rather than layer-mismatch-driven; (c) the entropy-proxy hypothesis is rejected (max |rho|=0.454, max Delta-AUROC after residualization=0.004); and (d) deception does not form a significant linear subspace (per-domain k*=0), yet multi-dimensional probes (k>=5) recover the signal through distributed sub-threshold features. Probe fragility reflects distributional narrowness rather than an architectural limitation: style-augmented probes recover near-perfect detection at both 4B and 27B, establishing that the inverse scaling pattern is a training-distribution artifact rather than a genuine scale-dependent phenomenon.

With the rapid advancement of AI-generated videos, there is an urgent need for effective detection tools to mitigate societal risks such as misinformation and reputational harm. In addition to accurate classification, it is essential that detection models provide interpretable explanations to ensure transparency for regulators and end users. To address these challenges, we introduce VidGuard-R1, the first video authenticity detector that fine-tunes a multi-modal large language model (MLLM) using group relative policy optimization (GRPO). Our model delivers both highly accurate judgments and insightful reasoning. We curate a challenging dataset of 140k real and AI-generated videos produced by state-of-the-art generation models, carefully designing the generation process to maximize discrimination difficulty. We then fine-tune Qwen-VL using GRPO with two specialized reward models that target temporal artifacts and generation complexity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VidGuard-R1 achieves state-of-the-art zero-shot performance on existing benchmarks, with additional training pushing accuracy above 95%. Case studies further show that VidGuard-R1 produces precise and interpretable rationales behind its predictions. The code is publicly available at https://VidGuard-R1.github.io.

Policy compliance detection is the task of ensuring that a scenario conforms to a policy (e.g. a claim is valid according to government rules or a post in an online platform conforms to community guidelines). This task has been previously instantiated as a form of textual entailment, which results in poor accuracy due to the complexity of the policies. In this paper we propose to address policy compliance detection via decomposing it into question answering, where questions check whether the conditions stated in the policy apply to the scenario, and an expression tree combines the answers to obtain the label. Despite the initial upfront annotation cost, we demonstrate that this approach results in better accuracy, especially in the cross-policy setup where the policies during testing are unseen in training. In addition, it allows us to use existing question answering models pre-trained on existing large datasets. Finally, it explicitly identifies the information missing from a scenario in case policy compliance cannot be determined. We conduct our experiments using a recent dataset consisting of government policies, which we augment with expert annotations and find that the cost of annotating question answering decomposition is largely offset by improved inter-annotator agreement and speed.

Audio can disclose PII, particularly when combined with related text data. Therefore, it is essential to develop tools to detect privacy leakage in Contrastive Language-Audio Pretraining(CLAP). Existing MIAs need audio as input, risking exposure of voiceprint and requiring costly shadow models. We first propose PRMID, a membership inference detector based probability ranking given by CLAP, which does not require training shadow models but still requires both audio and text of the individual as input. To address these limitations, we then propose USMID, a textual unimodal speaker-level membership inference detector, querying the target model using only text data. We randomly generate textual gibberish that are clearly not in training dataset. Then we extract feature vectors from these texts using the CLAP model and train a set of anomaly detectors on them. During inference, the feature vector of each test text is input into the anomaly detector to determine if the speaker is in the training set (anomalous) or not (normal). If available, USMID can further enhance detection by integrating real audio of the tested speaker. Extensive experiments on various CLAP model architectures and datasets demonstrate that USMID outperforms baseline methods using only text data.

Adversarial attacks on machine learning models have seen increasing interest in the past years. By making only subtle changes to the input of a convolutional neural network, the output of the network can be swayed to output a completely different result. The first attacks did this by changing pixel values of an input image slightly to fool a classifier to output the wrong class. Other approaches have tried to learn "patches" that can be applied to an object to fool detectors and classifiers. Some of these approaches have also shown that these attacks are feasible in the real-world, i.e. by modifying an object and filming it with a video camera. However, all of these approaches target classes that contain almost no intra-class variety (e.g. stop signs). The known structure of the object is then used to generate an adversarial patch on top of it. In this paper, we present an approach to generate adversarial patches to targets with lots of intra-class variety, namely persons. The goal is to generate a patch that is able successfully hide a person from a person detector. An attack that could for instance be used maliciously to circumvent surveillance systems, intruders can sneak around undetected by holding a small cardboard plate in front of their body aimed towards the surveillance camera. From our results we can see that our system is able significantly lower the accuracy of a person detector. Our approach also functions well in real-life scenarios where the patch is filmed by a camera. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to attempt this kind of attack on targets with a high level of intra-class variety like persons.

Despite considerable progress in the development of machine-text detectors, the ease with which machine-text can be manipulated to evade detection has led to suggestions that the problem is inherently intractable. In this work, we investigate the limits of such evasion strategies. We demonstrate that while current attacks, ranging from prompt engineering to detector-guided optimization can effectively degrade performance of standard detectors, they fail to erase the underlying stylistic "fingerprints" of machine text. We show that few-shot detectors that utilize the stylistic feature space are robust to these evasion attempts, reliably detecting samples even from models explicitly tuned to prevent detection. This raises the question: does style represent a universal defense against machine-detection attacks? We demonstrate that the answer is "no'' by introducing a novel paraphrasing approach that simultaneously optimizes for undetectability and adherence to specific human styles. We show that unlike prior methods, this attack effectively evades all considered detectors, including those that utilize writing style. However, we find that this evasion is not absolute: as the number of documents available for analysis grows, the human and machine distributions become distinguishable again. Overall, our findings suggest that reliable machine-text detection requires moving beyond single-document analysis to multi-document analysis.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

In this paper, we study how well humans can detect text generated by commercial LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude, o1). We hire annotators to read 300 non-fiction English articles, label them as either human-written or AI-generated, and provide paragraph-length explanations for their decisions. Our experiments show that annotators who frequently use LLMs for writing tasks excel at detecting AI-generated text, even without any specialized training or feedback. In fact, the majority vote among five such "expert" annotators misclassifies only 1 of 300 articles, significantly outperforming most commercial and open-source detectors we evaluated even in the presence of evasion tactics like paraphrasing and humanization. Qualitative analysis of the experts' free-form explanations shows that while they rely heavily on specific lexical clues ('AI vocabulary'), they also pick up on more complex phenomena within the text (e.g., formality, originality, clarity) that are challenging to assess for automatic detectors. We release our annotated dataset and code to spur future research into both human and automated detection of AI-generated text.

Existing fraud detection methods predominantly rely on transcribed text, suffering from ASR errors and missing crucial acoustic cues like vocal tone and environmental context. This limits their effectiveness against complex deceptive strategies. To address these challenges, we first propose SAFE-QAQ, an end-to-end comprehensive framework for audio-based slow-thinking fraud detection. First, the SAFE-QAQ framework eliminates the impact of transcription errors on detection performance. Secondly, we propose rule-based slow-thinking reward mechanisms that systematically guide the system to identify fraud-indicative patterns by accurately capturing fine-grained audio details, through hierarchical reasoning processes. Besides, our framework introduces a dynamic risk assessment framework during live calls, enabling early detection and prevention of fraud. Experiments on the TeleAntiFraud-Bench demonstrate that SAFE-QAQ achieves dramatic improvements over existing methods in multiple key dimensions, including accuracy, inference efficiency, and real-time processing capabilities. Currently deployed and analyzing over 70,000 calls daily, SAFE-QAQ effectively automates complex fraud detection, reducing human workload and financial losses. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SAFE-QAQ.

Business communication digitisation has reorganised the process of persuasive discourse, which allows not only greater transparency but also advanced deception. This inquiry synthesises classical rhetoric and communication psychology with linguistic theory and empirical studies in the financial reporting, sustainability discourse, and digital marketing to explain how deceptive language can be systematically detected using persuasive lexicon. In controlled settings, detection accuracies of greater than 99% were achieved by using computational textual analysis as well as personalised transformer models. However, reproducing this performance in multilingual settings is also problematic and, to a large extent, this is because it is not easy to find sufficient data, and because few multilingual text-processing infrastructures are in place. This evidence shows that there has been an increasing gap between the theoretical representations of communication and those empirically approximated, and therefore, there is a need to have strong automatic text-identification systems where AI-based discourse is becoming more realistic in communicating with humans.

This paper describes our participant system for the multi-modal fact verification (Factify) challenge at AAAI 2022. Despite the recent advance in text based verification techniques and large pre-trained multimodal models cross vision and language, very limited work has been done in applying multimodal techniques to automate fact checking process, particularly considering the increasing prevalence of claims and fake news about images and videos on social media. In our work, the challenge is treated as multimodal entailment task and framed as multi-class classification. Two baseline approaches are proposed and explored including an ensemble model (combining two uni-modal models) and a multi-modal attention network (modeling the interaction between image and text pair from claim and evidence document). We conduct several experiments investigating and benchmarking different SoTA pre-trained transformers and vision models in this work. Our best model is ranked first in leaderboard which obtains a weighted average F-measure of 0.77 on both validation and test set. Exploratory analysis of dataset is also carried out on the Factify data set and uncovers salient patterns and issues (e.g., word overlapping, visual entailment correlation, source bias) that motivates our hypothesis. Finally, we highlight challenges of the task and multimodal dataset for future research.

The rapid advancement of image generation technologies intensifies the demand for interpretable and robust detection methods. Although existing approaches often attain high accuracy, they typically operate as black boxes without providing human-understandable justifications. Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs), while not originally intended for forgery detection, exhibit strong analytical and reasoning capabilities. When properly fine-tuned, they can effectively identify AI-generated images and offer meaningful explanations. However, existing MLLMs still struggle with hallucination and often fail to align their visual interpretations with actual image content and human reasoning. To bridge this gap, we construct a dataset of AI-generated images annotated with bounding boxes and descriptive captions that highlight synthesis artifacts, establishing a foundation for human-aligned visual-textual grounded reasoning. We then finetune MLLMs through a multi-stage optimization strategy that progressively balances the objectives of accurate detection, visual localization, and coherent textual explanation. The resulting model achieves superior performance in both detecting AI-generated images and localizing visual flaws, significantly outperforming baseline methods.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

Since the proliferation of LLMs, there have been concerns about their misuse for harmful content creation and spreading. Recent studies justify such fears, providing evidence of LLM vulnerabilities and high potential of their misuse. Humans are no longer able to distinguish between high-quality machine-generated and authentic human-written texts. Therefore, it is crucial to develop automated means to accurately detect machine-generated content. It would enable to identify such content in online information space, thus providing an additional information about its credibility. This work addresses the problem by proposing a robust fine-tuning process of LLMs for the detection task, making the detectors more robust against obfuscation and more generalizable to out-of-distribution data.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

The surge in applications of large language models (LLMs) has prompted concerns about the generation of misleading or fabricated information, known as hallucinations. Therefore, detecting hallucinations has become critical to maintaining trust in LLM-generated content. A primary challenge in learning a truthfulness classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled truthful and hallucinated data. To address the challenge, we introduce HaloScope, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled LLM generations in the wild for hallucination detection. Such unlabeled data arises freely upon deploying LLMs in the open world, and consists of both truthful and hallucinated information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated membership estimation score for distinguishing between truthful and untruthful generations within unlabeled mixture data, thereby enabling the training of a binary truthfulness classifier on top. Importantly, our framework does not require extra data collection and human annotations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiments show that HaloScope can achieve superior hallucination detection performance, outperforming the competitive rivals by a significant margin. Code is available at https://github.com/deeplearningwisc/haloscope.

Real conversations between fraudsters and their targets are among the most informative artifacts for studying telephone scams, yet also the scarcest: passive honeypots overwhelmingly capture automated messages and hang-ups, large-scale studies characterize call metadata rather than dialogue, and manual scam-baiting does not scale. We present a dataset of real scam-call conversations collected by an active voice-agent honeypot. Dedicated numbers are seeded into the lead-generation channels fraud operations harvest; inbound callers are answered by a low-latency conversational agent that adopts a plausible target persona and sustains the interaction while every call is recorded, transcribed, and automatically labeled. Over an initial 53-day window we captured 10,015 inbound scam and spam calls (6,601 with two or more turns): roughly 895 hours of audio and 328,869 transcribed turns from 5,665 distinct originating numbers. Under a holistic classifier the substantive calls are predominantly predatory-but-legal lead generation ("spam", about three in five), while about one in seven is an outright "scam" (949 in this snapshot). Each call carries a turn-level transcript, three-channel audio, per-turn latency telemetry, and layers of automatic labels, including a holistic scam/spam/legitimate judgment corroborated by independent human review (75% agreement on the binary decision). We describe the collection system, the record structure, and technical validation of the corpus's realism and label quality, including that the agent is recognized as non-human in only about 5% of engaged calls. We also benchmark established scam-detection methods, where detectors trained on published synthetic dialogue collapse in precision on real traffic.

Fact verification systems typically assess whether a claim is supported by retrieved evidence, assuming that truthfulness depends solely on what is stated. However, many real-world claims are half-truths, factually correct yet misleading due to the omission of critical context. Existing models struggle with such cases, as they are not designed to reason about what is left unsaid. We introduce the task of half-truth detection, and propose PolitiFact-Hidden, a new benchmark with 15k political claims annotated with sentence-level evidence alignment and inferred claim intent. To address this challenge, we present TRACER, a modular re-assessment framework that identifies omission-based misinformation by aligning evidence, inferring implied intent, and estimating the causal impact of hidden content. TRACER can be integrated into existing fact-checking pipelines and consistently improves performance across multiple strong baselines. Notably, it boosts Half-True classification F1 by up to 16 points, highlighting the importance of modeling omissions for trustworthy fact verification.

AI-text detectors face a critical robustness challenge: adversarial paraphrasing attacks that preserve semantics while evading detection. We introduce StealthRL, a reinforcement learning framework that stress-tests detector robustness under realistic adversarial conditions. StealthRL trains a paraphrase policy against a multi-detector ensemble using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with LoRA adapters on Qwen3-4B, optimizing a composite reward that balances detector evasion with semantic preservation. We evaluate six attack settings (M0-M5) against three detector families (RoBERTa, FastDetectGPT, and Binoculars) at the security-relevant 1% false positive rate operating point. StealthRL achieves near-zero detection (0.001 mean TPR@1%FPR), reduces mean AUROC from 0.74 to 0.27, and attains a 99.9% attack success rate. Critically, attacks transfer to a held-out detector family not seen during training, revealing shared architectural vulnerabilities rather than detector-specific brittleness. We additionally conduct LLM-based quality evaluation via Likert scoring, analyze detector score distributions to explain why evasion succeeds, and provide per-detector AUROC with bootstrap confidence intervals. Our results expose significant robustness gaps in current AI-text detection and establish StealthRL as a principled adversarial evaluation protocol. Code and evaluation pipeline are publicly available at https://github.com/suraj-ranganath/StealthRL.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made it increasingly difficult to distinguish human-written text from AI-generated content. Many existing detectors train supervised neural classifiers that achieve strong in-distribution performance but are often opaque and can degrade substantially under distribution shift. We present READER, a reasoning-enhanced AI text detector that outputs both a human/AI label and a structured rationale describing the evidence for its decision. A key component of our approach is READ, a curated supervision set of rationales and verdicts. We fine-tune an LLM on READ to build READER, which reasons before detecting at inference time. Despite having only 1.5B parameters, READER consistently outperforms existing detectors as well as prompted, high-capacity LLM baselines (GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, and DeepSeek-V3.2), which are 100 to 1000 times larger in scale.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior. While effective in standard scenarios, recent work highlights that LLMs remain vulnerable to persuasion-based jailbreaks, where natural-language arguments override model constraints. We stress-test whether this vulnerability extends to monitoring LLMs: can an adversarial agent persuade its CoT monitor to approve proposed actions that violate the monitor's policy? We design an evaluation framework with 40 tasks and analyze thousands of agent-monitor interactions, where agents are instructed to argue for policy-violating proposals. We find that in such adversarial settings, monitor access to the agent's CoT reasoning increases rather than decreases approval of harmful actions on average by 9.5%, as the scratchpad provides an additional persuasion channel. To address this, we introduce a fact-checking monitoring framework. We find that a fact-checker and monitor pairing from different model families, for example a Claude 3.7 Sonnet monitor paired with a GPT-4.1 fact-checker, reduces approval of policy-violating actions by up to 45%, compared to only 6%, when using the same model for both fact-checking and monitoring roles. Our results demonstrate that CoT monitoring alone may be insufficient against adversarial persuasion, and that model-diverse fact-checking provides a robust mitigation.

Deceptive reviews are becoming increasingly common, especially given the increase in performance and the prevalence of LLMs. While work to date has addressed the development of models to differentiate between truthful and deceptive human reviews, much less is known about the distinction between real reviews and AI-authored fake reviews. Moreover, most of the research so far has focused primarily on English, with very little work dedicated to other languages. In this paper, we compile and make publicly available the MAiDE-up dataset, consisting of 10,000 real and 10,000 AI-generated fake hotel reviews, balanced across ten languages. Using this dataset, we conduct extensive linguistic analyses to (1) compare the AI fake hotel reviews to real hotel reviews, and (2) identify the factors that influence the deception detection model performance. We explore the effectiveness of several models for deception detection in hotel reviews across three main dimensions: sentiment, location, and language. We find that these dimensions influence how well we can detect AI-generated fake reviews.

Recent advances in video generation models have significantly improved the realism of synthetic videos, blurring the boundary between generated and authentic content and raising concerns about misinformation. Existing MLLM-based detectors mainly rely on supervised fine-tuning or label-level reinforcement learning, where coarse supervision limits generalization to unseen scenarios and emerging video generators. To overcome these limitations, we are the first to introduce meta-detection into AI-generated video detection, enabling reliable forgery detection by jointly optimizing predicted labels and supporting evidence within reinforcement learning. This paradigm requires reliable evidence signals and effective mechanisms to integrate them into label-level optimization. Textual rationales provide semantic descriptions of forgery artifacts, but their generation and verification depend on external models, making supervision vulnerable to hallucinations and semantic biases. In contrast, temporal grounding provides more objective and verifiable evidence, as manipulated intervals can be precisely controlled during forgery construction. Based on this insight, we propose an automated data construction pipeline that generates paired real-fake videos by replacing temporal segments with boundary-frame-conditioned video generation models. Furthermore, we introduce Evidence-Guided Reward Redistribution, which performs evidence-aware credit assignment by redistributing rewards among label-correct responses according to evidence quality. This preserves reliable label supervision while encouraging detectors to acquire fine-grained and verifiable forgery localization capabilities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VidForensics-M1 effectively leverages verifiable temporal evidence to achieve robust and generalizable AI-generated video detection.

This study investigates the efficacy of six major Generative AI (GenAI) text detectors when confronted with machine-generated content that has been modified using techniques designed to evade detection by these tools (n=805). The results demonstrate that the detectors' already low accuracy rates (39.5%) show major reductions in accuracy (17.4%) when faced with manipulated content, with some techniques proving more effective than others in evading detection. The accuracy limitations and the potential for false accusations demonstrate that these tools cannot currently be recommended for determining whether violations of academic integrity have occurred, underscoring the challenges educators face in maintaining inclusive and fair assessment practices. However, they may have a role in supporting student learning and maintaining academic integrity when used in a non-punitive manner. These results underscore the need for a combined approach to addressing the challenges posed by GenAI in academia to promote the responsible and equitable use of these emerging technologies. The study concludes that the current limitations of AI text detectors require a critical approach for any possible implementation in HE and highlight possible alternatives to AI assessment strategies.

Generative AI models often learn and reproduce false information present in their training corpora. This position paper argues that, analogous to biological immunization, where controlled exposure to a weakened pathogen builds immunity, AI models should be fine tuned on small, quarantined sets of explicitly labeled falsehoods as a "vaccine" against misinformation. These curated false examples are periodically injected during finetuning, strengthening the model ability to recognize and reject misleading claims while preserving accuracy on truthful inputs. An illustrative case study shows that immunized models generate substantially less misinformation than baselines. To our knowledge, this is the first training framework that treats fact checked falsehoods themselves as a supervised vaccine, rather than relying on input perturbations or generic human feedback signals, to harden models against future misinformation. We also outline ethical safeguards and governance controls to ensure the safe use of false data. Model immunization offers a proactive paradigm for aligning AI systems with factuality.

In the current digital era, the rapid spread of misinformation on online platforms presents significant challenges to societal well-being, public trust, and democratic processes, influencing critical decision making and public opinion. To address these challenges, there is a growing need for automated fake news detection mechanisms. Pre-trained large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, prompting exploration into their potential for verifying news claims. Instead of employing LLMs in a non-agentic way, where LLMs generate responses based on direct prompts in a single shot, our work introduces FactAgent, an agentic approach of utilizing LLMs for fake news detection. FactAgent enables LLMs to emulate human expert behavior in verifying news claims without any model training, following a structured workflow. This workflow breaks down the complex task of news veracity checking into multiple sub-steps, where LLMs complete simple tasks using their internal knowledge or external tools. At the final step of the workflow, LLMs integrate all findings throughout the workflow to determine the news claim's veracity. Compared to manual human verification, FactAgent offers enhanced efficiency. Experimental studies demonstrate the effectiveness of FactAgent in verifying claims without the need for any training process. Moreover, FactAgent provides transparent explanations at each step of the workflow and during final decision-making, offering insights into the reasoning process of fake news detection for end users. FactAgent is highly adaptable, allowing for straightforward updates to its tools that LLMs can leverage within the workflow, as well as updates to the workflow itself using domain knowledge. This adaptability enables FactAgent's application to news verification across various domains.

Deepfakes powered by advanced machine learning models present a significant and evolving threat to identity verification and the authenticity of digital media. Although numerous detectors have been developed to address this problem, their effectiveness has yet to be tested when applied to real-world data. In this work we evaluate modern deepfake detectors, introducing a novel testing procedure designed to mimic real-world scenarios for deepfake detection. Using state-of-the-art deepfake generation methods, we create a comprehensive dataset containing more than 500,000 high-quality deepfake images. Our analysis shows that detecting deepfakes still remains a challenging task. The evaluation shows that in fewer than half of the deepfake detectors tested achieved an AUC score greater than 60%, with the lowest being 50%. We demonstrate that basic image manipulations, such as JPEG compression or image enhancement, can significantly reduce model performance. All code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/SumSubstance/Deepfake-Detectors-in-the-Wild.

The growing popularity and capacity of generative models have eroded the distinction between human and machine-generated content, motivating a growing body of work on detection across text, images, and audio. Most available detectors are either commercial software or, if open-source, come with incompatible codebases with bespoke preprocessing, evaluation protocols, and evaluation metrics, which make their adoption, fair comparison, and reproduction quite difficult. To address this critical gap, we introduce DetectZoo, a first-of-its-kind, extensible toolkit designed to provide a unified interface for AI-generated content detection across text, audio, and image modalities. DetectZoo standardizes the complete empirical pipeline, from data ingestion and preprocessing to model assessment, offering researchers a cohesive framework to benchmark state-of-the-art detectors systematically. By integrating diverse public datasets and baseline detection algorithms under a single, unified API, our toolkit facilitates rigorous and reproducible evaluation. DetectZoo provides reference implementations of 61 detectors, native loaders for 22 benchmark datasets, and a standardized evaluation pipeline that reports multiple metrics through a common interface. Each detector is self-contained yet accessible through the same interface, automatically caches pretrained weights, and reproduces the original published results. DetectZoo lowers the barrier to entry for multi-modal AI forensics, enabling researchers to identify performance gaps across domains and accelerating the development of robust, generalizable detection techniques. The open-source repository and comprehensive documentation are publicly available at https://github.com/sadjadeb/DetectZoo, and the package can be installed via pip install detectzoo.