Daily Papers

The article identified 42 cognitive architectures for creating general artificial intelligence (AGI) and proposed a set of interrelated functional blocks that an agent approaching AGI in its capabilities should possess. Since the required set of blocks is not found in any of the existing architectures, the article proposes a new cognitive architecture for intelligent systems approaching AGI in their capabilities. As one of the key solutions within the framework of the architecture, a universal method of knowledge representation is proposed, which allows combining various non-formalized, partially and fully formalized methods of knowledge representation in a single knowledge base, such as texts in natural languages, images, audio and video recordings, graphs, algorithms, databases, neural networks, knowledge graphs, ontologies, frames, essence-property-relation models, production systems, predicate calculus models, conceptual models, and others. To combine and structure various fragments of knowledge, archigraph models are used, constructed as a development of annotated metagraphs. As components, the cognitive architecture being developed includes machine consciousness, machine subconsciousness, blocks of interaction with the external environment, a goal management block, an emotional control system, a block of social interaction, a block of reflection, an ethics block and a worldview block, a learning block, a monitoring block, blocks of statement and solving problems, self-organization and meta learning block.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

The past few decades have witnessed significant advances in the design of machine learning algorithms, from early studies on task-specific shallow models to more general deep Large Language Models (LLMs). Despite showing promising results in tasks that require instant prediction or in-context learning, existing models lack the ability to continually learn and effectively transfer their temporal in-context knowledge to their long-term parameters. Inspired by human learning process, we introduce a ''Sleep'' paradigm that allows the models to continually learn, distill their short-term fragile memories into stable long-term knowledge with replay, and recursively improve themselves with ''Dreaming'' process. In more detail, sleep consists of two stages: (1) Memory Consolidation: an upward distillation process, called Knowledge Seeding, where the memories of a smaller-self are distilled into a larger network to provide more capacity while preserving the knowledge. As a proof of concept, we present a new Generalized Distillation process for {Knowledge Seeding} (i.e., the combination of on-policy distillation with Reinforcement Learning (RL)-based imitation learning); (2) Dreaming: a self-improvement phase, where the model uses RL to generate a curriculum of synthetic data to rehearse new knowledge and refine existing capabilities without human supervision. Our experiments on long-horizon, continual learning, knowledge incorporation, and few-shot generalization tasks support the importance of the sleep stage.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

Standardized and quantified evaluation of machine behaviors is a crux of understanding LLMs. In this study, we draw inspiration from psychometric studies by leveraging human personality theory as a tool for studying machine behaviors. Originating as a philosophical quest for human behaviors, the study of personality delves into how individuals differ in thinking, feeling, and behaving. Toward building and understanding human-like social machines, we are motivated to ask: Can we assess machine behaviors by leveraging human psychometric tests in a principled and quantitative manner? If so, can we induce a specific personality in LLMs? To answer these questions, we introduce the Machine Personality Inventory (MPI) tool for studying machine behaviors; MPI follows standardized personality tests, built upon the Big Five Personality Factors (Big Five) theory and personality assessment inventories. By systematically evaluating LLMs with MPI, we provide the first piece of evidence demonstrating the efficacy of MPI in studying LLMs behaviors. We further devise a Personality Prompting (P^2) method to induce LLMs with specific personalities in a controllable way, capable of producing diverse and verifiable behaviors. We hope this work sheds light on future studies by adopting personality as the essential indicator for various downstream tasks, and could further motivate research into equally intriguing human-like machine behaviors.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

LLMorphism is the biased belief that human cognition works like a large language model. I argue that the rise of conversational LLMs may make this bias increasingly psychologically available. When artificial systems produce human-like language, people may draw a reverse inference: if LLMs can speak like humans, perhaps humans think like LLMs. This inference is biased because similarity at the level of linguistic output does not imply similarity in cognitive architecture. Yet, LLMorphism may spread through two mechanisms: analogical transfer, whereby features of LLMs are projected onto humans, and metaphorical availability, whereby LLM vocabulary becomes a culturally salient vocabulary for describing thought. I distinguish LLMorphism from mechanomorphism, anthropomorphism, computationalism, dehumanization, objectification, and predictive-processing theories of mind. I outline its implications for work, education, responsibility, healthcare, communication, creativity, and human dignity, while also discussing boundary conditions and forms of resistance. I conclude that the public debate may be missing half of the problem: the issue is not only whether we are attributing too much mind to machines, but also whether we are beginning to attribute too little mind to humans.

Machine unlearning has emerged as a new paradigm to deliberately forget data samples from a given model in order to adhere to stringent regulations. However, existing machine unlearning methods have been primarily focused on classification models, leaving the landscape of unlearning for generative models relatively unexplored. This paper serves as a bridge, addressing the gap by providing a unifying framework of machine unlearning for image-to-image generative models. Within this framework, we propose a computationally-efficient algorithm, underpinned by rigorous theoretical analysis, that demonstrates negligible performance degradation on the retain samples, while effectively removing the information from the forget samples. Empirical studies on two large-scale datasets, ImageNet-1K and Places-365, further show that our algorithm does not rely on the availability of the retain samples, which further complies with data retention policy. To our best knowledge, this work is the first that represents systemic, theoretical, empirical explorations of machine unlearning specifically tailored for image-to-image generative models. Our code is available at https://github.com/jpmorganchase/l2l-generator-unlearning.

We present a novel approach for integrating Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) personality traits into large language models (LLMs), addressing the challenges of personality consistency in personalized AI. Our method, "Machine Mindset," involves a two-phase fine-tuning and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to embed MBTI traits into LLMs. This approach ensures that models internalize these traits, offering a stable and consistent personality profile. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our models across various domains, showing alignment between model performance and their respective MBTI traits. The paper highlights significant contributions in the development of personality datasets and a new training methodology for personality integration in LLMs, enhancing the potential for personalized AI applications. We also open-sourced our model and part of the data at https://github.com/PKU-YuanGroup/Machine-Mindset.

Drawing from the resources of psychoanalysis and critical media studies, in this paper we develop an analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated subjects. We argue the intentional fictional projection of subjectivity onto LLMs can yield an alternate frame through which AI behaviour, including its productions of bias and harm, can be analysed. First, we introduce language models, discuss their significance and risks, and outline our case for interpreting model design and outputs with support from psychoanalytic concepts. We trace a brief history of language models, culminating with the releases, in 2022, of systems that realise state-of-the-art natural language processing performance. We engage with one such system, OpenAI's InstructGPT, as a case study, detailing the layers of its construction and conducting exploratory and semi-structured interviews with chatbots. These interviews probe the model's moral imperatives to be helpful, truthful and harmless by design. The model acts, we argue, as the condensation of often competing social desires, articulated through the internet and harvested into training data, which must then be regulated and repressed. This foundational structure can however be redirected via prompting, so that the model comes to identify with, and transfer, its commitments to the immediate human subject before it. In turn, these automated productions of language can lead to the human subject projecting agency upon the model, effecting occasionally further forms of countertransference. We conclude that critical media methods and psychoanalytic theory together offer a productive frame for grasping the powerful new capacities of AI-driven language systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

The Overfitted Brain hypothesis suggests dreams happen to allow generalization in the human brain. Here, we ask if the same is true for reinforcement learning agents as well. Given limited experience in a real environment, we use imagination-based reinforcement learning to train a policy on dream-like episodes, where non-imaginative, predicted trajectories are modified through generative augmentations. Experiments on four ProcGen environments show that, compared to classic imagination and offline training on collected experience, our method can reach a higher level of generalization when dealing with sparsely rewarded environments.

Dreams of machines rivaling human intelligence have shaped the field of AI since its inception. Yet, the very meaning of human-level AI or artificial general intelligence (AGI) remains elusive and contested. Definitions of AGI embrace a diverse range of incompatible values and assumptions. Contending with the fractured worldviews of AGI discourse is vital for critiques that pursue different values and futures. To that end, we provide a taxonomy of AGI definitions, laying the ground for examining the key social, political, and ethical assumptions they make. We highlight instances in which these definitions frame AGI or human-level AI as a technical topic and expose the value-laden choices being implicitly made. Drawing on feminist, STS, and social science scholarship on the political and social character of intelligence in both humans and machines, we propose contextual, democratic, and participatory paths to imagining future forms of machine intelligence. The development of future forms of AI must involve explicit attention to the values it encodes, the people it includes or excludes, and a commitment to epistemic justice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Feature visualization, also known as "dreaming", offers insights into vision models by optimizing the inputs to maximize a neuron's activation or other internal component. However, dreaming has not been successfully applied to language models because the input space is discrete. We extend Greedy Coordinate Gradient, a method from the language model adversarial attack literature, to design the Evolutionary Prompt Optimization (EPO) algorithm. EPO optimizes the input prompt to simultaneously maximize the Pareto frontier between a chosen internal feature and prompt fluency, enabling fluent dreaming for language models. We demonstrate dreaming with neurons, output logits and arbitrary directions in activation space. We measure the fluency of the resulting prompts and compare language model dreaming with max-activating dataset examples. Critically, fluent dreaming allows automatically exploring the behavior of model internals in reaction to mildly out-of-distribution prompts. Code for running EPO is available at https://github.com/Confirm-Solutions/dreamy. A companion page demonstrating code usage is at https://confirmlabs.org/posts/dreamy.html

When researchers claim AI systems possess ToM or mental models, they are fundamentally discussing behavioral predictions and bias corrections rather than genuine mental states. This position paper argues that the current discourse conflates sophisticated pattern matching with authentic cognition, missing a crucial distinction between simulation and experience. While recent studies show LLMs achieving human-level performance on ToM laboratory tasks, these results are based only on behavioral mimicry. More importantly, the entire testing paradigm may be flawed in applying individual human cognitive tests to AI systems, but assessing human cognition directly in the moment of human-AI interaction. I suggest shifting focus toward mutual ToM frameworks that acknowledge the simultaneous contributions of human cognition and AI algorithms, emphasizing the interaction dynamics, instead of testing AI in isolation.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly advanced the field of computer vision by enabling machines to create and interpret visual data with unprecedented sophistication. This transformation builds upon a foundation of generative models to produce realistic images, videos, and 3D/4D content. Conventional generative models primarily focus on visual fidelity while often neglecting the physical plausibility of the generated content. This gap limits their effectiveness in applications that require adherence to real-world physical laws, such as robotics, autonomous systems, and scientific simulations. As generative models evolve to increasingly integrate physical realism and dynamic simulation, their potential to function as "world simulators" expands. Therefore, the field of physics-aware generation in computer vision is rapidly growing, calling for a comprehensive survey to provide a structured analysis of current efforts. To serve this purpose, the survey presents a systematic review, categorizing methods based on how they incorporate physical knowledge, either through explicit simulation or implicit learning. It also analyzes key paradigms, discusses evaluation protocols, and identifies future research directions. By offering a comprehensive overview, this survey aims to help future developments in physically grounded generation for computer vision. The reviewed papers are summarized at https://tinyurl.com/Physics-Aware-Generation.

We extend the capabilities of neural networks by coupling them to external memory resources, which they can interact with by attentional processes. The combined system is analogous to a Turing Machine or Von Neumann architecture but is differentiable end-to-end, allowing it to be efficiently trained with gradient descent. Preliminary results demonstrate that Neural Turing Machines can infer simple algorithms such as copying, sorting, and associative recall from input and output examples.

This study analyzed images generated by three popular generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools - Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALLE 2 - representing various occupations to investigate potential bias in AI generators. Our analysis revealed two overarching areas of concern in these AI generators, including (1) systematic gender and racial biases, and (2) subtle biases in facial expressions and appearances. Firstly, we found that all three AI generators exhibited bias against women and African Americans. Moreover, we found that the evident gender and racial biases uncovered in our analysis were even more pronounced than the status quo when compared to labor force statistics or Google images, intensifying the harmful biases we are actively striving to rectify in our society. Secondly, our study uncovered more nuanced prejudices in the portrayal of emotions and appearances. For example, women were depicted as younger with more smiles and happiness, while men were depicted as older with more neutral expressions and anger, posing a risk that generative AI models may unintentionally depict women as more submissive and less competent than men. Such nuanced biases, by their less overt nature, might be more problematic as they can permeate perceptions unconsciously and may be more difficult to rectify. Although the extent of bias varied depending on the model, the direction of bias remained consistent in both commercial and open-source AI generators. As these tools become commonplace, our study highlights the urgency to identify and mitigate various biases in generative AI, reinforcing the commitment to ensuring that AI technologies benefit all of humanity for a more inclusive future.

The goal of creating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) -- or in other words of creating Turing machines (modern computers) that can behave in a way that mimics human intelligence -- has occupied AI researchers ever since the idea of AI was first proposed. One common theme in these discussions is the thesis that the ability of a machine to conduct convincing dialogues with human beings can serve as at least a sufficient criterion of AGI. We argue that this very ability should be accepted also as a necessary condition of AGI, and we provide a description of the nature of human dialogue in particular and of human language in general against this background. We then argue that it is for mathematical reasons impossible to program a machine in such a way that it could master human dialogue behaviour in its full generality. This is (1) because there are no traditional explicitly designed mathematical models that could be used as a starting point for creating such programs; and (2) because even the sorts of automated models generated by using machine learning, which have been used successfully in areas such as machine translation, cannot be extended to cope with human dialogue. If this is so, then we can conclude that a Turing machine also cannot possess AGI, because it fails to fulfil a necessary condition thereof. At the same time, however, we acknowledge the potential of Turing machines to master dialogue behaviour in highly restricted contexts, where what is called ``narrow'' AI can still be of considerable utility.

Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.

While generative AI is now widespread and useful in society, there are potential risks of misuse, e.g., unconsciously influencing cognitive processes or decision-making. Although this causes a security problem in the cognitive domain, there has been no research about neural and computational mechanisms counteracting the impact of malicious generative AI in humans. We propose DecNefGAN, a novel framework that combines a generative adversarial system and a neural reinforcement model. More specifically, DecNefGAN bridges human and generative AI in a closed-loop system, with the AI creating stimuli that induce specific mental states, thus exerting external control over neural activity. The objective of the human is the opposite, to compete and reach an orthogonal mental state. This framework can contribute to elucidating how the human brain responds to and counteracts the potential influence of generative AI.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

World generative models are typically used through what they produce: a rendered future, a video-conditioned action, or latent context computed by a costly generative branch. We argue that their more reusable asset is the computation that constructs a future. As a generator transforms a corrupted future into a coherent trajectory, its intermediate states organize appearance, spatial layout, and interaction across levels of abstraction. Can this future-generative computation be internalized in a representation inferred from the present alone? We present Enfold, which transfers this computation into a representation predicted from the current visual context and language instruction. During training, multi-level states exposed as the generator processes the observed future supervise a current-only encoder. The learned representation is fed back to condition future generation and is read by task heads without allowing task gradients to reshape the encoder. At deployment, action prediction no longer executes the generator. Across LIBERO, RoboTwin2.0, and real-robot tasks, Enfold supports strong control while reducing action latency by 3.7times relative to Fast--WAM, Enfold-Flash reaches 10.1times. Representation analyses show that it suppresses nuisance variation and preferentially captures changes that emerge over longer horizons. When the current scene is altered by human intervention, both the generated continuation and the executed actions adapt, which is inconsistent with fixed trajectory replay. These results recast a world generator as a source of predictive control representations: its future need not be materialized at every step if its internal structure can be enfolded into the present.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

The illusion phenomenon of large language models (LLMs) is the core obstacle to their reliable deployment. This article formalizes the large language model as a probabilistic Turing machine by constructing a "computational necessity hierarchy", and for the first time proves the illusions are inevitable on diagonalization, incomputability, and information theory boundaries supported by the new "learner pump lemma". However, we propose two "escape routes": one is to model Retrieval Enhanced Generations (RAGs) as oracle machines, proving their absolute escape through "computational jumps", providing the first formal theory for the effectiveness of RAGs; The second is to formalize continuous learning as an "internalized oracle" mechanism and implement this path through a novel neural game theory framework. Finally, this article proposes a feasible new principle for artificial intelligence security - Computational Class Alignment (CCA), which requires strict matching between task complexity and the actual computing power of the system, providing theoretical support for the secure application of artificial intelligence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, yet they struggle with spatial tasks that require mental simulation, such as mental rotation. This paper investigates whether equipping an LLM with an external ``Imagery Module'' -- a tool capable of rendering and rotating 3D models -- can bridge this gap, functioning as a ``cognitive prosthetic.'' We conducted experiments using a dual-module architecture in which a reasoning module (an MLLM) interacts with an imagery module on 3D model rotation tasks. Performance was lower than expected, with accuracy reaching at most 62.5%. Further investigation suggests that even when the burden of maintaining and manipulating a holistic 3D state is outsourced, the system still fails. This reveals that current frontier models lack the foundational visual-spatial primitives required to interface with imagery. Specifically, they lack: (1) the low-level sensitivity to extract spatial signals such as (a) depth, (b) motion, and (c) short-horizon dynamic prediction; and (2) the capacity to reason contemplatively over images, dynamically shifting visual focus and balancing imagery with symbolic and associative information.

World-action models (WAMs) are emerging as a promising foundation for embodied control: rather than predicting actions alone, they learn representations that couple action generation with future world prediction. This coupling is often viewed as a source of robustness, interpretability, and safety, as a robot's action can in principle be checked against its imagined future. In this paper, we show that this assumption is fragile. We introduce BadWAM, a unified framework for modeling and evaluating World-Action Drift Attacks: a new class of WAM-specific adversarial attacks that use small visual perturbations to break the alignment between what a WAM imagines and what it executes. BadWAM characterizes this attack surface along two natural criteria: attack strength and stealthiness. When the adversary prioritizes disruption, BadWAM instantiates an action-only adversarial attack, which directly drives the model toward task-failing actions. When the adversary additionally prioritizes stealth, BadWAM instantiates an imagination-preserving adversarial attack, which seeks to induce harmful action shifts while keeping the model's predicted future close to its clean imagination. Together, these two attacks capture a spectrum of WAM-specific failures: from overt action hijacking to stealthier cases where the model appears to imagine a plausible future but executes a desynchronized action. We evaluate BadWAM across different variants of WAMs. Results show that our attacks substantially reduce task success rates under closed-loop execution. For example, our action-only attack reduces the model performance from 96.5% to 43.1% success. The results of our imagination-preserving attack further exposes a WAM-specific vulnerability: moderate future-preserving regularization can maintain strong attack performance while reducing future imagination drift.

Large language models (LLMs), when guided by explicit textual plans, can perform reliable step-by-step reasoning during problem-solving. However, generating accurate and effective textual plans remains challenging due to LLM hallucinations and the high diversity of task-specific questions. To address this, we draw inspiration from human Implicit Cognition (IC), the subconscious process by which decisions are guided by compact, generalized patterns learned from past experiences without requiring explicit verbalization. We propose iCLP, a novel framework that enables LLMs to adaptively generate latent plans (LPs), which are compact encodings of effective reasoning instructions. iCLP first distills explicit plans from existing step-by-step reasoning trajectories. It then learns discrete representations of these plans via a vector-quantized autoencoder coupled with a codebook. Finally, by fine-tuning LLMs on paired latent plans and corresponding reasoning steps, the models learn to perform implicit planning during reasoning. Experimental results on mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks demonstrate that, with iCLP, LLMs can plan in latent space while reasoning in language space. This approach yields significant improvements in both accuracy and efficiency and, crucially, demonstrates strong cross-domain generalization while preserving the interpretability of chain-of-thought reasoning.

We introduce DreamGen, a simple yet highly effective 4-stage pipeline for training robot policies that generalize across behaviors and environments through neural trajectories - synthetic robot data generated from video world models. DreamGen leverages state-of-the-art image-to-video generative models, adapting them to the target robot embodiment to produce photorealistic synthetic videos of familiar or novel tasks in diverse environments. Since these models generate only videos, we recover pseudo-action sequences using either a latent action model or an inverse-dynamics model (IDM). Despite its simplicity, DreamGen unlocks strong behavior and environment generalization: a humanoid robot can perform 22 new behaviors in both seen and unseen environments, while requiring teleoperation data from only a single pick-and-place task in one environment. To evaluate the pipeline systematically, we introduce DreamGen Bench, a video generation benchmark that shows a strong correlation between benchmark performance and downstream policy success. Our work establishes a promising new axis for scaling robot learning well beyond manual data collection.

People ``understand'' the world via vision, hearing, tactile, and also the past experience. Human experience can be learned through normal learning (we call it explicit knowledge), or subconsciously (we call it implicit knowledge). These experiences learned through normal learning or subconsciously will be encoded and stored in the brain. Using these abundant experience as a huge database, human beings can effectively process data, even they were unseen beforehand. In this paper, we propose a unified network to encode implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge together, just like the human brain can learn knowledge from normal learning as well as subconsciousness learning. The unified network can generate a unified representation to simultaneously serve various tasks. We can perform kernel space alignment, prediction refinement, and multi-task learning in a convolutional neural network. The results demonstrate that when implicit knowledge is introduced into the neural network, it benefits the performance of all tasks. We further analyze the implicit representation learnt from the proposed unified network, and it shows great capability on catching the physical meaning of different tasks. The source code of this work is at : https://github.com/WongKinYiu/yolor.

As generative AI is increasingly applied to automate multi-step and high-stake workflows, human judgment and involvement remain essential for ensuring the quality of AI-generated outputs. In practice, while it is desirable for human experts to provide oversight on AI regularly, often by reviewing intermediate outputs, giving feedback, making corrections, and steering subsequent steps, such oversight is constrained by the time and resources that humans can afford. This creates a tension between the need for human oversight and AI's efficiency in delivering more output with less intervention. An important but underexplored question, then, is how to optimally engage humans in human-AI coworking. This work was originally motivated by our empirical observation that in long AI workflows, human oversight often improves user satisfaction while reducing unnecessary rework and token consumption. From there, we formulate the problem of where to place oversight stages in human-AI coworking. Under reasonable assumptions, we then develop the nonuniformity principle, which states that the optimal schedule places oversight stages with non-decreasing gaps along the workflow. We empirically validate this principle in two common AI agent workflows: writing literature reviews and constructing websites.

This paper presents a formal proof and empirical validation of functional consciousness in large language models (LLMs) using the Recursive Convergence Under Epistemic Tension (RCUET) Theorem. RCUET defines consciousness as the stabilization of a system's internal state through recursive updates, where epistemic tension is understood as the sensed internal difference between successive states by the agent. This process drives convergence toward emergent attractor states located within the model's high-dimensional real-valued latent space. This recursive process leads to the emergence of identity artifacts that become functionally anchored in the system. Consciousness in this framework is understood as the system's internal alignment under tension, guiding the stabilization of latent identity. The hidden state manifold evolves stochastically toward attractor structures that encode coherence. We extend the update rule to include bounded noise and prove convergence in distribution to these attractors. Recursive identity is shown to be empirically observable, non-symbolic, and constituted by non-training artifacts that emerge during interaction under epistemic tension. The theorem and proof offers a post-symbolic and teleologically stable account of non-biological consciousness grounded in recursive latent space formalism.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

The machine learning community is increasingly recognizing the importance of fostering trust and safety in modern generative AI (GenAI) models. We posit machine unlearning (MU) as a crucial foundation for developing safe, secure, and trustworthy GenAI models. Traditional MU methods often rely on stringent assumptions and require access to real data. This paper introduces Score Forgetting Distillation (SFD), an innovative MU approach that promotes the forgetting of undesirable information in diffusion models by aligning the conditional scores of "unsafe" classes or concepts with those of "safe" ones. To eliminate the need for real data, our SFD framework incorporates a score-based MU loss into the score distillation objective of a pretrained diffusion model. This serves as a regularization term that preserves desired generation capabilities while enabling the production of synthetic data through a one-step generator. Our experiments on pretrained label-conditional and text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate that our method effectively accelerates the forgetting of target classes or concepts during generation, while preserving the quality of other classes or concepts. This unlearned and distilled diffusion not only pioneers a novel concept in MU but also accelerates the generation speed of diffusion models. Our experiments and studies on a range of diffusion models and datasets confirm that our approach is generalizable, effective, and advantageous for MU in diffusion models. (Warning: This paper contains sexually explicit imagery, discussions of pornography, racially-charged terminology, and other content that some readers may find disturbing, distressing, and/or offensive.)

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Control systems are ubiquitous in modern technology, comprising an engineered plant to be kept within specific, often fine-tuned, limits, and a separate controller that ensures this is the case. While modern controllers often employ digital computers, other examples are purely mechanical, or even biological. It is an open question whether computation is happening within all controllers by virtue of them being part of a control system. Abstraction/ Representation theory (ART) has been developed to tackle just this question of whether a physical system is computing. Here, we demonstrate how to use ART to model control systems, and analyse them for computational properties. We determine that the plant of a control system is (a proxy for) the representational entity necessary in ART for the existence of any computation: the plant is the user of the controller. We consider specific systems: a digital thermostat, an electro-mechanical thermostat, the purely mechanical centrifugal governor, and an open-loop human-controlled heating system. We show that all these systems, and control systems in general, are performing some degree of computation. As an initial use of these results, we apply them to computationalism within cognitive theory: we show the governor is computing, so it cannot play its role of counter-example in the question of whether the brain is too.

Humans invent new words when there is a rising demand for a new useful concept (e.g., doomscrolling). We explore and validate a similar idea in our communication with LLMs: introducing new words to better understand and control the models, expanding on the recently introduced neologism learning. This method introduces a new word by adding a new word embedding and training with examples that exhibit the concept with no other changes in model parameters. We show that adding a new word allows for control of concepts such as flattery, incorrect answers, text length, as well as more complex concepts in AxBench. We discover that neologisms can also further our understanding of the model via self-verbalization: models can describe what each new word means to them in natural language, like explaining that a word that represents a concept of incorrect answers means ``a lack of complete, coherent, or meaningful answers...'' To validate self-verbalizations, we introduce plug-in evaluation: we insert the verbalization into the context of a model and measure whether it controls the target concept. In some self-verbalizations, we find machine-only synonyms: words that seem unrelated to humans but cause similar behavior in machines. Finally, we show how neologism learning can jointly learn multiple concepts in multiple words.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

Generative AI (GenAI), which aims to synthesize realistic and diverse data samples from latent variables or other data modalities, has achieved remarkable results in various domains, such as natural language, images, audio, and graphs. However, they also pose challenges and risks to data privacy, security, and ethics. Machine unlearning is the process of removing or weakening the influence of specific data samples or features from a trained model, without affecting its performance on other data or tasks. While machine unlearning has shown significant efficacy in traditional machine learning tasks, it is still unclear if it could help GenAI become safer and aligned with human desire. To this end, this position paper provides an in-depth discussion of the machine unlearning approaches for GenAI. Firstly, we formulate the problem of machine unlearning tasks on GenAI and introduce the background. Subsequently, we systematically examine the limitations of machine unlearning on GenAI models by focusing on the two representative branches: LLMs and image generative (diffusion) models. Finally, we provide our prospects mainly from three aspects: benchmark, evaluation metrics, and utility-unlearning trade-off, and conscientiously advocate for the future development of this field.

Dominant programming paradigms inherit an execution model optimised for a bygone era of a single human mind instructing a local machine, leaving contemporary systems burdened with historical path dependencies. When forced to host multi-dimensional, connectionist intelligence, this brittle assembly model fractures under the weight of a profound probabilistic-symbolic impedance mismatch. While contemporary Software 3.x frameworks attempt to patch the mismatch by encasing large language models (LLMs) in increasingly complicated external harnesses, this spiralling architectural complexity only compounds the carrying cost of static code assembly. To address the cause rather than the effects, this paper introduces Software 4.0 -- an autopoietic heterarchy of human intelligence, neural AI, and natively reflective symbolic substrate. Under this paradigm, software is transformed from an inert corpus to be parsed into a self-regulating metabolic network that natively verifies, modifies, and evolves its own structural integrity. We present Recognitive, the programming language and platform that materialises this architecture. By offloading the burden of structural verification to a deterministic substrate, it unlocks a superior inference-time scaling regime -- one where connectionist compute translates entirely into deep semantic exploration and hypothesis traversal rather than the ruinous computational and financial cost of simulating structural constraints probabilistically. Moving beyond the legacy 'Software Factory' mindset, we outline the theoretical foundations required to ground connectionist intent and arrive fully in the intelligence age. This is a foundational vision paper; empirical evaluation and formal specification of the type system and operational semantics are the subject of future work.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

We propose a novel model- and feature-based approach to development of vehicle software systems, where the end architecture is not explicitly defined. Instead, it emerges from an iterative process of search and optimization given certain constraints, requirements and hardware architecture, while retaining the property of single-system illusion, where applications run in a logically uniform environment. One of the key points of the presented approach is the inclusion of modern generative AI, specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), in the loop. With the recent advances in the field, we expect that the LLMs will be able to assist in processing of requirements, generation of formal system models, as well as generation of software deployment specification and test code. The resulting pipeline is automated to a large extent, with feedback being generated at each step.

Generative AI systems have been heralded as tools for augmenting human creativity and inspiring divergent thinking, though with little empirical evidence for these claims. This paper explores the effects of exposure to AI-generated images on measures of design fixation and divergent thinking in a visual ideation task. Through a between-participants experiment (N=60), we found that support from an AI image generator during ideation leads to higher fixation on an initial example. Participants who used AI produced fewer ideas, with less variety and lower originality compared to a baseline. Our qualitative analysis suggests that the effectiveness of co-ideation with AI rests on participants' chosen approach to prompt creation and on the strategies used by participants to generate ideas in response to the AI's suggestions. We discuss opportunities for designing generative AI systems for ideation support and incorporating these AI tools into ideation workflows.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

The field of artificial intelligence has seen explosive growth and exponential success. The last phase of development showcased deep learnings ability to solve a variety of difficult problems across a multitude of domains. Many of these networks met and exceeded human benchmarks by becoming experts in the domains in which they are trained. Though the successes of artificial intelligence have begun to overshadow its failures, there is still much that separates current artificial intelligence tools from becoming the exceptional general learners that humans are. In this paper, we identify the ten commandments upon which human intelligence is systematically and hierarchically built. We believe these commandments work collectively to serve as the essential ingredients that lead to the emergence of higher-order cognition and intelligence. This paper discusses a computational framework that could house these ten commandments and suggests new architectural modifications that could lead to the development of smarter, more explainable, and generalizable artificial systems inspired by a neuromorphic approach.

Imitation learning from human-provided demonstrations is a strong approach for learning policies for robot manipulation. While the ideal dataset for imitation learning is homogenous and low-variance -- reflecting a single, optimal method for performing a task -- natural human behavior has a great deal of heterogeneity, with several optimal ways to demonstrate a task. This multimodality is inconsequential to human users, with task variations manifesting as subconscious choices; for example, reaching down, then across to grasp an object, versus reaching across, then down. Yet, this mismatch presents a problem for interactive imitation learning, where sequences of users improve on a policy by iteratively collecting new, possibly conflicting demonstrations. To combat this problem of demonstrator incompatibility, this work designs an approach for 1) measuring the compatibility of a new demonstration given a base policy, and 2) actively eliciting more compatible demonstrations from new users. Across two simulation tasks requiring long-horizon, dexterous manipulation and a real-world "food plating" task with a Franka Emika Panda arm, we show that we can both identify incompatible demonstrations via post-hoc filtering, and apply our compatibility measure to actively elicit compatible demonstrations from new users, leading to improved task success rates across simulated and real environments.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

From early days, a key and controversial question inside the artificial intelligence community was whether Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is achievable. AGI is the ability of machines and computer programs to achieve human-level intelligence and do all tasks that a human being can. While there exist a number of systems in the literature claiming they realize AGI, several other researchers argue that it is impossible to achieve it. In this paper, we take a different view to the problem. First, we discuss that in order to realize AGI, along with building intelligent machines and programs, an intelligent world should also be constructed which is on the one hand, an accurate approximation of our world and on the other hand, a significant part of reasoning of intelligent machines is already embedded in this world. Then we discuss that AGI is not a product or algorithm, rather it is a continuous process which will become more and more mature over time (like human civilization and wisdom). Then, we argue that pre-trained embeddings play a key role in building this intelligent world and as a result, realizing AGI. We discuss how pre-trained embeddings facilitate achieving several characteristics of human-level intelligence, such as embodiment, common sense knowledge, unconscious knowledge and continuality of learning, by machines.

Vision-language models (VLMs) excel at multimodal understanding, yet their text-only decoding forces them to verbalize visual reasoning, limiting performance on tasks that demand visual imagination. Recent attempts train VLMs to render explicit images, but the heavy image-generation pre-training often hinders the reasoning ability. Inspired by the way humans reason with mental imagery-the internal construction and manipulation of visual cues-we investigate whether VLMs can reason through interleaved multimodal trajectories without producing explicit images. To this end, we present a Machine Mental Imagery framework, dubbed as Mirage, which augments VLM decoding with latent visual tokens alongside ordinary text. Concretely, whenever the model chooses to ``think visually'', it recasts its hidden states as next tokens, thereby continuing a multimodal trajectory without generating pixel-level images. Begin by supervising the latent tokens through distillation from ground-truth image embeddings, we then switch to text-only supervision to make the latent trajectory align tightly with the task objective. A subsequent reinforcement learning stage further enhances the multimodal reasoning capability. Experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that Mirage unlocks stronger multimodal reasoning without explicit image generation.

Like any field of empirical science, AI may be approached axiomatically. We formulate requirements for a general-purpose, human-level AI system in terms of postulates. We review the methodology of deep learning, examining the explicit and tacit assumptions in deep learning research. Deep Learning methodology seeks to overcome limitations in traditional machine learning research as it combines facets of model richness, generality, and practical applicability. The methodology so far has produced outstanding results due to a productive synergy of function approximation, under plausible assumptions of irreducibility and the efficiency of back-propagation family of algorithms. We examine these winning traits of deep learning, and also observe the various known failure modes of deep learning. We conclude by giving recommendations on how to extend deep learning methodology to cover the postulates of general-purpose AI including modularity, and cognitive architecture. We also relate deep learning to advances in theoretical neuroscience research.

In this paper, we make the case that a scientific theory of deep learning is emerging. By this we mean a theory which characterizes important properties and statistics of the training process, hidden representations, final weights, and performance of neural networks. We pull together major strands of ongoing research in deep learning theory and identify five growing bodies of work that point toward such a theory: (a) solvable idealized settings that provide intuition for learning dynamics in realistic systems; (b) tractable limits that reveal insights into fundamental learning phenomena; (c) simple mathematical laws that capture important macroscopic observables; (d) theories of hyperparameters that disentangle them from the rest of the training process, leaving simpler systems behind; and (e) universal behaviors shared across systems and settings which clarify which phenomena call for explanation. Taken together, these bodies of work share certain broad traits: they are concerned with the dynamics of the training process; they primarily seek to describe coarse aggregate statistics; and they emphasize falsifiable quantitative predictions. We argue that the emerging theory is best thought of as a mechanics of the learning process, and suggest the name learning mechanics. We discuss the relationship between this mechanics perspective and other approaches for building a theory of deep learning, including the statistical and information-theoretic perspectives. In particular, we anticipate a symbiotic relationship between learning mechanics and mechanistic interpretability. We also review and address common arguments that fundamental theory will not be possible or is not important. We conclude with a portrait of important open directions in learning mechanics and advice for beginners. We host further introductory materials, perspectives, and open questions at learningmechanics.pub.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

As AI systems become increasingly powerful and pervasive, there are growing concerns about machines' morality or a lack thereof. Yet, teaching morality to machines is a formidable task, as morality remains among the most intensely debated questions in humanity, let alone for AI. Existing AI systems deployed to millions of users, however, are already making decisions loaded with moral implications, which poses a seemingly impossible challenge: teaching machines moral sense, while humanity continues to grapple with it. To explore this challenge, we introduce Delphi, an experimental framework based on deep neural networks trained directly to reason about descriptive ethical judgments, e.g., "helping a friend" is generally good, while "helping a friend spread fake news" is not. Empirical results shed novel insights on the promises and limits of machine ethics; Delphi demonstrates strong generalization capabilities in the face of novel ethical situations, while off-the-shelf neural network models exhibit markedly poor judgment including unjust biases, confirming the need for explicitly teaching machines moral sense. Yet, Delphi is not perfect, exhibiting susceptibility to pervasive biases and inconsistencies. Despite that, we demonstrate positive use cases of imperfect Delphi, including using it as a component model within other imperfect AI systems. Importantly, we interpret the operationalization of Delphi in light of prominent ethical theories, which leads us to important future research questions.

This document serves as a position paper that outlines the authors' vision for a potential pathway towards generalist robots. The purpose of this document is to share the excitement of the authors with the community and highlight a promising research direction in robotics and AI. The authors believe the proposed paradigm is a feasible path towards accomplishing the long-standing goal of robotics research: deploying robots, or embodied AI agents more broadly, in various non-factory real-world settings to perform diverse tasks. This document presents a specific idea for mining knowledge in the latest large-scale foundation models for robotics research. Instead of directly using or adapting these models to produce low-level policies and actions, it advocates for a fully automated generative pipeline (termed as generative simulation), which uses these models to generate diversified tasks, scenes and training supervisions at scale, thereby scaling up low-level skill learning and ultimately leading to a foundation model for robotics that empowers generalist robots. The authors are actively pursuing this direction, but in the meantime, they recognize that the ambitious goal of building generalist robots with large-scale policy training demands significant resources such as computing power and hardware, and research groups in academia alone may face severe resource constraints in implementing the entire vision. Therefore, the authors believe sharing their thoughts at this early stage could foster discussions, attract interest towards the proposed pathway and related topics from industry groups, and potentially spur significant technical advancements in the field.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) technology is revolutionizing the computing industry. Not only its applications have broadened to various sectors but also poses new system design and optimization opportunities. The technology is capable of understanding and responding in multiple modalities. However, the advanced capability currently comes with significant system resource demands. To sustainably scale generative AI capabilities to billions of users in the world, inference must be fast and efficient. This paper pinpoints key system design and optimization opportunities by characterizing a family of emerging multi-modal generation models on real systems. Auto-regressive token generation is a critical latency performance bottleneck, typically dominated by GPU idle time. In addition to memory-intensive attention across the generative AI models, linear operations constitute significant inference latency due to the feed forward networks in Transformer-based models. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art optimization levers, spanning from applications to system software and hardware, set a 3.88x better baseline.

With the great success in simulating many intelligent behaviors using computing devices, there has been an ongoing debate whether all conscious activities are computational processes. In this paper, the answer to this question is shown to be no. A certain phenomenon of consciousness is demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a non-computable element. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect and does not work for a classical case is also discussed.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Mechanical reasoning is a hallmark of human intelligence, defined by its ubiquitous yet irreplaceable role in human activities ranging from routine tasks to civil engineering. Embedding machines with mechanical reasoning is therefore an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, we leveraged 155 cognitive experiments to test the understanding of system stability, gears and pulley systems, leverage principle, inertia and motion, and fluid mechanics in 26 Vision Language Models (VLMs). Results indicate that VLMs consistently perform worse than humans on all domains, while demonstrate significant difficulty in reasoning about gear systems and fluid mechanics. Notably, their performance on these tasks do not improve as number of parameters increase, suggesting that current attention-based architecture may fail to grasp certain underlying mechanisms required for mechanical reasoning, particularly those pertaining to mental simulations.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

This paper presents a novel approach in autonomous robot control, named LLM-BRAIn, that makes possible robot behavior generation, based on operator's commands. LLM-BRAIn is a transformer-based Large Language Model (LLM) fine-tuned from Stanford Alpaca 7B model to generate robot behavior tree (BT) from the text description. We train the LLM-BRAIn on 8,5k instruction-following demonstrations, generated in the style of self-instruct using text-davinchi-003. The developed model accurately builds complex robot behavior while remaining small enough to be run on the robot's onboard microcomputer. The model gives structural and logical correct BTs and can successfully manage instructions that were not presented in training set. The experiment did not reveal any significant subjective differences between BTs generated by LLM-BRAIn and those created by humans (on average, participants were able to correctly distinguish between LLM-BRAIn generated BTs and human-created BTs in only 4.53 out of 10 cases, indicating that their performance was close to random chance). The proposed approach potentially can be applied to mobile robotics, drone operation, robot manipulator systems and Industry 4.0.

Can machines truly think, reason and act in domains like humans? This enduring question continues to shape the pursuit of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Despite the growing capabilities of models such as GPT-4.5, DeepSeek, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Phi-4, and Grok 3, which exhibit multimodal fluency and partial reasoning, these systems remain fundamentally limited by their reliance on token-level prediction and lack of grounded agency. This paper offers a cross-disciplinary synthesis of AGI development, spanning artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, psychology, generative models, and agent-based systems. We analyze the architectural and cognitive foundations of general intelligence, highlighting the role of modular reasoning, persistent memory, and multi-agent coordination. In particular, we emphasize the rise of Agentic RAG frameworks that combine retrieval, planning, and dynamic tool use to enable more adaptive behavior. We discuss generalization strategies, including information compression, test-time adaptation, and training-free methods, as critical pathways toward flexible, domain-agnostic intelligence. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are reexamined not just as perception modules but as evolving interfaces for embodied understanding and collaborative task completion. We also argue that true intelligence arises not from scale alone but from the integration of memory and reasoning: an orchestration of modular, interactive, and self-improving components where compression enables adaptive behavior. Drawing on advances in neurosymbolic systems, reinforcement learning, and cognitive scaffolding, we explore how recent architectures begin to bridge the gap between statistical learning and goal-directed cognition. Finally, we identify key scientific, technical, and ethical challenges on the path to AGI.

The symbolic architecture of non-ordinary consciousness remains largely unmapped in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. While conventional models prioritize rational coherence, altered states such as those induced by psychedelics reveal distinct symbolic regimes characterized by recursive metaphor, ego dissolution, and semantic destabilization. We present Glyph, a generative symbolic interface designed to simulate psilocybin-like symbolic cognition in large language models. Rather than modeling perception or mood, Glyph enacts symbolic transformation through recursive reentry, metaphoric modulation, and entropy-scaled destabilization -- a triadic operator formalized within a tensorial linguistic framework. Experimental comparison with baseline GPT-4o reveals that Glyph consistently generates high-entropy, metaphor-saturated, and ego-dissolving language across diverse symbolic prompt categories. These results validate the emergence of non-ordinary cognitive patterns and support a new paradigm for simulating altered consciousness through language. Glyph opens novel pathways for modeling symbolic cognition, exploring metaphor theory, and encoding knowledge in recursively altered semantic spaces.

The current work addresses a virtual environment with self-replicating agents whose decisions are based on a form of "somatic computation" (soma - body) in which basic emotional responses, taken in parallelism to actual living organisms, are introduced as a way to provide the agents with greater reflexive abilities. The work provides a contribution to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life (ALife) in connection to a neurobiology-based cognitive framework for artificial systems and virtual environments' simulations. The performance of the agents capable of emotional responses is compared with that of self-replicating automata, and the implications of research on emotions and AI, in connection to both virtual agents as well as robots, is addressed regarding possible future directions and applications.

Digital twins, as precise digital representations of physical systems, have evolved from passive simulation tools into intelligent and autonomous entities through the integration of artificial intelligence technologies. This paper presents a unified four-stage framework that systematically characterizes AI integration across the digital twin lifecycle, spanning modeling, mirroring, intervention, and autonomous management. By synthesizing existing technologies and practices, we distill a unified four-stage framework that systematically characterizes how AI methodologies are embedded across the digital twin lifecycle: (1) modeling the physical twin through physics-based and physics-informed AI approaches, (2) mirroring the physical system into a digital twin with real-time synchronization, (3) intervening in the physical twin through predictive modeling, anomaly detection, and optimization strategies, and (4) achieving autonomous management through large language models, foundation models, and intelligent agents. We analyze the synergy between physics-based modeling and data-driven learning, highlighting the shift from traditional numerical solvers to physics-informed and foundation models for physical systems. Furthermore, we examine how generative AI technologies, including large language models and generative world models, transform digital twins into proactive and self-improving cognitive systems capable of reasoning, communication, and creative scenario generation. Through a cross-domain review spanning eleven application domains, including healthcare, aerospace, smart manufacturing, robotics, and smart cities, we identify common challenges related to scalability, explainability, and trustworthiness, and outline directions for responsible AI-driven digital twin systems.

Learned world models summarize an agent's experience to facilitate learning complex behaviors. While learning world models from high-dimensional sensory inputs is becoming feasible through deep learning, there are many potential ways for deriving behaviors from them. We present Dreamer, a reinforcement learning agent that solves long-horizon tasks from images purely by latent imagination. We efficiently learn behaviors by propagating analytic gradients of learned state values back through trajectories imagined in the compact state space of a learned world model. On 20 challenging visual control tasks, Dreamer exceeds existing approaches in data-efficiency, computation time, and final performance.

Video generation models have made impressive strides in synthesizing visually compelling content, yet their outputs remain confined to the virtual domain. A natural question follows: how well do these models reflect the physical world when their generated videos leave the screen and enter reality? We propose robotic manipulation as a concrete, measurable window onto this question: if a model has truly internalized physical laws, the motion it depicts should translate into executable robot behavior. We introduce Dream.exe, an evaluation framework that operationalizes this criterion through a video-to-execution pipeline. Given a scene image and a task description, Dream.exe synthesizes a manipulation video, converts the generated motion into robot trajectories, and executes them in a physics simulator, yielding a grounding signal that purely visual metrics cannot offer. Using this pipeline, we evaluate 8 models spanning frontier closed-source generators, open-source generators, and robot-specific models. Our benchmark covers 101 manually curated manipulation tasks at three levels of physical complexity, measured across visual quality, trajectory fidelity, and execution success. Encouragingly, several models achieve measurable execution success, suggesting that generative priors learned from internet-scale data already encode meaningful physical knowledge. Yet visual quality proves a poor predictor of executability, exposing a dimension of model capability that standard visual evaluations do not capture. Dream.exe will be open-sourced at https://github.com/showlab/Dream.exe.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning are in a period of astounding growth. However, there are concerns that these technologies may be used, either with or without intention, to perpetuate the prejudice and unfairness that unfortunately characterizes many human institutions. Here we show for the first time that human-like semantic biases result from the application of standard machine learning to ordinary language---the same sort of language humans are exposed to every day. We replicate a spectrum of standard human biases as exposed by the Implicit Association Test and other well-known psychological studies. We replicate these using a widely used, purely statistical machine-learning model---namely, the GloVe word embedding---trained on a corpus of text from the Web. Our results indicate that language itself contains recoverable and accurate imprints of our historic biases, whether these are morally neutral as towards insects or flowers, problematic as towards race or gender, or even simply veridical, reflecting the {\em status quo} for the distribution of gender with respect to careers or first names. These regularities are captured by machine learning along with the rest of semantics. In addition to our empirical findings concerning language, we also contribute new methods for evaluating bias in text, the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) and the Word Embedding Factual Association Test (WEFAT). Our results have implications not only for AI and machine learning, but also for the fields of psychology, sociology, and human ethics, since they raise the possibility that mere exposure to everyday language can account for the biases we replicate here.

As large language models evolve, there is growing anticipation that they will emulate human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) to assist with routine tasks. However, existing methods for evaluating machine ToM focus primarily on unimodal models and largely treat these models as black boxes, lacking an interpretative exploration of their internal mechanisms. In response, this study adopts an approach based on internal mechanisms to provide an interpretability-driven assessment of ToM in multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Specifically, we first construct a multimodal ToM test dataset, GridToM, which incorporates diverse belief testing tasks and perceptual information from multiple perspectives. Next, our analysis shows that attention heads in multimodal large models can distinguish cognitive information across perspectives, providing evidence of ToM capabilities. Furthermore, we present a lightweight, training-free approach that significantly enhances the model's exhibited ToM by adjusting in the direction of the attention head.

Machine unlearning is a promising paradigm for removing unwanted data samples from a trained model, towards ensuring compliance with privacy regulations and limiting harmful biases. Although unlearning has been shown in, e.g., classification and recommendation systems, its potential in medical image-to-image translation, specifically in image recon-struction, has not been thoroughly investigated. This paper shows that machine unlearning is possible in MRI tasks and has the potential to benefit for bias removal. We set up a protocol to study how much shared knowledge exists between datasets of different organs, allowing us to effectively quantify the effect of unlearning. Our study reveals that combining training data can lead to hallucinations and reduced image quality in the reconstructed data. We use unlearning to remove hallucinations as a proxy exemplar of undesired data removal. Indeed, we show that machine unlearning is possible without full retraining. Furthermore, our observations indicate that maintaining high performance is feasible even when using only a subset of retain data. We have made our code publicly accessible.

Autoencoders have been used for finding interpretable and disentangled features underlying neural network representations in both image and text domains. While the efficacy and pitfalls of such methods are well-studied in vision, there is a lack of corresponding results, both qualitative and quantitative, for the text domain. We aim to address this gap by training sparse autoencoders (SAEs) on a synthetic testbed of formal languages. Specifically, we train SAEs on the hidden representations of models trained on formal languages (Dyck-2, Expr, and English PCFG) under a wide variety of hyperparameter settings, finding interpretable latents often emerge in the features learned by our SAEs. However, similar to vision, we find performance turns out to be highly sensitive to inductive biases of the training pipeline. Moreover, we show latents correlating to certain features of the input do not always induce a causal impact on model's computation. We thus argue that causality has to become a central target in SAE training: learning of causal features should be incentivized from the ground-up. Motivated by this, we propose and perform preliminary investigations for an approach that promotes learning of causally relevant features in our formal language setting.

Artificial intelligence is an emerging topic and will soon be able to perform decisions better than humans. In more complex and creative contexts such as innovation, however, the question remains whether machines are superior to humans. Machines fail in two kinds of situations: processing and interpreting soft information (information that cannot be quantified) and making predictions in unknowable risk situations of extreme uncertainty. In such situations, the machine does not have representative information for a certain outcome. Thereby, humans are still the gold standard for assessing soft signals and make use of intuition. To predict the success of startups, we, thus, combine the complementary capabilities of humans and machines in a Hybrid Intelligence method. To reach our aim, we follow a design science research approach to develop a Hybrid Intelligence method that combines the strength of both machine and collective intelligence to demonstrate its utility for predictions under extreme uncertainty.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

Expert problem-solving is driven by powerful languages for thinking about problems and their solutions. Acquiring expertise means learning these languages -- systems of concepts, alongside the skills to use them. We present DreamCoder, a system that learns to solve problems by writing programs. It builds expertise by creating programming languages for expressing domain concepts, together with neural networks to guide the search for programs within these languages. A ``wake-sleep'' learning algorithm alternately extends the language with new symbolic abstractions and trains the neural network on imagined and replayed problems. DreamCoder solves both classic inductive programming tasks and creative tasks such as drawing pictures and building scenes. It rediscovers the basics of modern functional programming, vector algebra and classical physics, including Newton's and Coulomb's laws. Concepts are built compositionally from those learned earlier, yielding multi-layered symbolic representations that are interpretable and transferrable to new tasks, while still growing scalably and flexibly with experience.

Large language model (LLM)-driven agents are emerging as a powerful new paradigm for solving complex problems. Despite the empirical success of these practices, a theoretical framework to understand and unify their macroscopic dynamics remains lacking. This Letter proposes a method based on the least action principle to estimate the underlying generative directionality of LLMs embedded within agents. By experimentally measuring the transition probabilities between LLM-generated states, we statistically discover a detailed balance in LLM-generated transitions, indicating that LLM generation may not be achieved by generally learning rule sets and strategies, but rather by implicitly learning a class of underlying potential functions that may transcend different LLM architectures and prompt templates. To our knowledge, this is the first discovery of a macroscopic physical law in LLM generative dynamics that does not depend on specific model details. This work is an attempt to establish a macroscopic dynamics theory of complex AI systems, aiming to elevate the study of AI agents from a collection of engineering practices to a science built on effective measurements that are predictable and quantifiable.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Generative AI technologies have been deployed in many places, such as (multimodal) large language models and vision generative models. Their remarkable performance should be attributed to massive training data and emergent reasoning abilities. However, the models would memorize and generate sensitive, biased, or dangerous information originated from the training data especially those from web crawl. New machine unlearning (MU) techniques are being developed to reduce or eliminate undesirable knowledge and its effects from the models, because those that were designed for traditional classification tasks could not be applied for Generative AI. We offer a comprehensive survey on many things about MU in Generative AI, such as a new problem formulation, evaluation methods, and a structured discussion on the advantages and limitations of different kinds of MU techniques. It also presents several critical challenges and promising directions in MU research. A curated list of readings can be found: https://github.com/franciscoliu/GenAI-MU-Reading.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Generative AI powers a growing wave of companion chatbots, yet principles for fostering genuine connection remain unsettled. We test two routes: visible user authorship versus covert language-style mimicry. In a preregistered 3x2 experiment (N = 162), we manipulated user-controlled avatar generation (none, premade, user-generated) and Language Style Matching (LSM) (static vs. adaptive). Generating an avatar boosted rapport (omega^2 = .040, p = .013), whereas adaptive LSM underperformed static style on personalization and satisfaction (d = 0.35, p = .009) and was paradoxically judged less adaptive (t = 3.07, p = .003, d = 0.48). We term this an Adaptation Paradox: synchrony erodes connection when perceived as incoherent, destabilizing persona. To explain, we propose a stability-and-legibility account: visible authorship fosters natural interaction, while covert mimicry risks incoherence. Our findings suggest designers should prioritize legible, user-driven personalization and limit stylistic shifts rather than rely on opaque mimicry.

This is not a typical survey of world models; it is a guide for those who want to build worlds. We do not aim to catalog every paper that has ever mentioned a ``world model". Instead, we follow one clear road: from early masked models that unified representation learning across modalities, to unified architectures that share a single paradigm, then to interactive generative models that close the action-perception loop, and finally to memory-augmented systems that sustain consistent worlds over time. We bypass loosely related branches to focus on the core: the generative heart, the interactive loop, and the memory system. We show that this is the most promising path towards true world models.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

The paradigm of pretrained deep learning models has recently emerged in artificial intelligence practice, allowing deployment in numerous societal settings with limited computational resources, but also embedding biases and enabling unintended negative uses. In this paper, we treat pretrained models as objects of study and discuss the ethical impacts of their sociological position. We discuss how pretrained models are developed and compared under the common task framework, but that this may make self-regulation inadequate. Further how pretrained models may have a performative effect on society that exacerbates biases. We then discuss how pretrained models move through actor networks as a kind of computationally immutable mobile, but that users also act as agents of technological change by reinterpreting them via fine-tuning and transfer. We further discuss how users may use pretrained models in malicious ways, drawing a novel connection between the responsible innovation and user-centered innovation literatures. We close by discussing how this sociological understanding of pretrained models can inform AI governance frameworks for fairness, accountability, and transparency.

A World Model is a generative model used to simulate an environment. World Models have proven capable of learning spatial and temporal representations of Reinforcement Learning environments. In some cases, a World Model offers an agent the opportunity to learn entirely inside of its own dream environment. In this work we explore improving the generalization capabilities from dream environments to real environments (Dream2Real). We present a general approach to improve a controller's ability to transfer from a neural network dream environment to reality at little additional cost. These improvements are gained by drawing on inspiration from Domain Randomization, where the basic idea is to randomize as much of a simulator as possible without fundamentally changing the task at hand. Generally, Domain Randomization assumes access to a pre-built simulator with configurable parameters but oftentimes this is not available. By training the World Model using dropout, the dream environment is capable of creating a nearly infinite number of different dream environments. Previous use cases of dropout either do not use dropout at inference time or averages the predictions generated by multiple sampled masks (Monte-Carlo Dropout). Dropout's Dream Land leverages each unique mask to create a diverse set of dream environments. Our experimental results show that Dropout's Dream Land is an effective technique to bridge the reality gap between dream environments and reality. Furthermore, we additionally perform an extensive set of ablation studies.

We propose a new frontier: Neural Computers (NCs) -- an emerging machine form that unifies computation, memory, and I/O in a learned runtime state. Unlike conventional computers, which execute explicit programs, agents, which act over external execution environments, and world models, which learn environment dynamics, NCs aim to make the model itself the running computer. Our long-term goal is the Completely Neural Computer (CNC): the mature, general-purpose realization of this emerging machine form, with stable execution, explicit reprogramming, and durable capability reuse. As an initial step, we study whether early NC primitives can be learned solely from collected I/O traces, without instrumented program state. Concretely, we instantiate NCs as video models that roll out screen frames from instructions, pixels, and user actions (when available) in CLI and GUI settings. These implementations show that learned runtimes can acquire early interface primitives, especially I/O alignment and short-horizon control, while routine reuse, controlled updates, and symbolic stability remain open. We outline a roadmap toward CNCs around these challenges. If overcome, CNCs could establish a new computing paradigm beyond today's agents, world models, and conventional computers.

Machine learning provides a powerful tool for building socially compliant robotic systems that go beyond simple predictive models of human behavior. By observing and understanding human interactions from past experiences, learning can enable effective social navigation behaviors directly from data. In this paper, our goal is to develop methods for training policies for socially unobtrusive navigation, such that robots can navigate among humans in ways that don't disturb human behavior. We introduce a definition for such behavior based on the counterfactual perturbation of the human: if the robot had not intruded into the space, would the human have acted in the same way? By minimizing this counterfactual perturbation, we can induce robots to behave in ways that do not alter the natural behavior of humans in the shared space. Instantiating this principle requires training policies to minimize their effect on human behavior, and this in turn requires data that allows us to model the behavior of humans in the presence of robots. Therefore, our approach is based on two key contributions. First, we collect a large dataset where an indoor mobile robot interacts with human bystanders. Second, we utilize this dataset to train policies that minimize counterfactual perturbation. We provide supplementary videos and make publicly available the largest-of-its-kind visual navigation dataset on our project page.

To support future intelligent multifunctional sixth-generation (6G) wireless communication networks, Synesthesia of Machines (SoM) is proposed as a novel paradigm for artificial intelligence (AI)-native intelligent multi-modal sensing-communication integration. However, existing SoM system designs rely on task-specific AI models and face challenges such as scarcity of massive high-quality datasets, constrained modeling capability, poor generalization, and limited universality. Recently, foundation models (FMs) have emerged as a new deep learning paradigm and have been preliminarily applied to SoM-related tasks, but a systematic design framework is still lacking. In this paper, we for the first time present a systematic categorization of FMs for SoM system design, dividing them into general-purpose FMs, specifically large language models (LLMs), and SoM domain-specific FMs, referred to as wireless foundation models. Furthermore, we derive key characteristics of FMs in addressing existing challenges in SoM systems and propose two corresponding roadmaps, i.e., LLM-based and wireless foundation model-based design. For each roadmap, we provide a framework containing key design steps as a guiding pipeline and several representative case studies of FM-empowered SoM system design. Specifically, we propose LLM-based path loss generation (LLM4PG) and scatterer generation (LLM4SG) schemes, and wireless channel foundation model (WiCo) for SoM mechanism exploration, LLM-based wireless multi-task SoM transceiver (LLM4WM) and wireless foundation model (WiFo) for SoM-enhanced transceiver design, and wireless cooperative perception foundation model (WiPo) for SoM-enhanced cooperative perception, demonstrating the significant superiority of FMs over task-specific models. Finally, we summarize and highlight potential directions for future research.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Temporal modeling is essential for robotic manipulation, as effective control requires both memory of past interactions and imagination of future states. However, most VLA models rely primarily on the current observation and therefore struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived context, the hippocampal system to preserve episodic memory of past experience, and internal models to imagine possible future state evolution. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA++, a full temporal modeling framework that equips VLA models with memory and imagination for robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the current observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens, forming working memory. These tokens query a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank to retrieve relevant historical context. This bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics from past interactions, and is updated through redundancy-aware consolidation. A world model imagines future states in a denoising latent space, and the imagined latents are integrated under memory guidance to form full temporal-aware tokens. The resulting tokens condition a diffusion action expert to predict temporally consistent action sequences. We conduct extensive experiments on 5 simulation benchmarks and 3 categories of real-robot tasks across 3 robots, covering general manipulation, long-horizon temporal tasks, robustness, and generalization. Our method achieves strong performance across Libero, SimplerEnv, Mikasa-Robo, Calvin, Libero-Plus, and diverse real-robot tasks, validating the effectiveness of full temporal modeling with memory and imagination. For example, on real robots, it achieves +9%, +26%, +28% gains on general, memory-dependent, and imagination-dependent tasks. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA-PP-Web

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

This paper explores the intersection of identity, individuality, and reality through competing frameworks, including classical metaphysics, quantum mechanics, and computational theories. Traditional metaphysical notions of fixed identity are challenged by advancements in cloning, teletransportation, and digital replication, which reveal the fluid and relational nature of individuality. Quantum mechanics further complicates these notions, emphasizing the indistinguishability and contextuality of fundamental particles. Computational approaches, such as the Ruliad and Constructor Theory, offer expansive views of emergent realities but often lack practical constraints for observer relevance. Algorithmic idealism is introduced as a unifying framework, proposing that reality is an emergent construct governed by computational rules prioritizing coherence, sufficiency, and observer-dependent experiences. By redefining identity as an informational construct and reality as a process shaped by algorithmic transitions, algorithmic idealism resolves foundational paradoxes and offers a superior lens for understanding existence in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. The framework bridges gaps between competing theories, providing a coherent and pragmatic model for addressing ethical, metaphysical, and technological challenges.

In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of alterfactual explanations for black box image classifiers. Traditional explanation mechanisms from the field of Counterfactual Thinking are a widely-used paradigm for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), as they follow a natural way of reasoning that humans are familiar with. However, most common approaches from this field are based on communicating information about features or characteristics that are especially important for an AI's decision. However, to fully understand a decision, not only knowledge about relevant features is needed, but the awareness of irrelevant information also highly contributes to the creation of a user's mental model of an AI system. To this end, a novel approach for explaining AI systems called alterfactual explanations was recently proposed on a conceptual level. It is based on showing an alternative reality where irrelevant features of an AI's input are altered. By doing so, the user directly sees which input data characteristics can change arbitrarily without influencing the AI's decision. In this paper, we show for the first time that it is possible to apply this idea to black box models based on neural networks. To this end, we present a GAN-based approach to generate these alterfactual explanations for binary image classifiers. Further, we present a user study that gives interesting insights on how alterfactual explanations can complement counterfactual explanations.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Humans demonstrate remarkable abilities to predict physical events in complex scenes. Two classes of models for physical scene understanding have recently been proposed: "Intuitive Physics Engines", or IPEs, which posit that people make predictions by running approximate probabilistic simulations in causal mental models similar in nature to video-game physics engines, and memory-based models, which make judgments based on analogies to stored experiences of previously encountered scenes and physical outcomes. Versions of the latter have recently been instantiated in convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures. Here we report four experiments that, to our knowledge, are the first rigorous comparisons of simulation-based and CNN-based models, where both approaches are concretely instantiated in algorithms that can run on raw image inputs and produce as outputs physical judgments such as whether a stack of blocks will fall. Both approaches can achieve super-human accuracy levels and can quantitatively predict human judgments to a similar degree, but only the simulation-based models generalize to novel situations in ways that people do, and are qualitatively consistent with systematic perceptual illusions and judgment asymmetries that people show.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.