Daily Papers

AI agents often rely on persistent memory to retain user preferences and operational rules across sessions. However, this capability introduces a new safety risk: malicious instructions from messages, documents, or Web content can be retained in memory and influence future tasks even after the original attack content is removed. Existing attack success metrics, however, fail to capture who is affected and how attacks translate into downstream harm during otherwise normal task execution. We introduce MemHarmBench, a victim-centric benchmark for evaluating cross-session prompt injection in memory-persistent AI agents. MemHarmBench considers three categories of potential victims: users, workspace/project owners, and external stakeholders. Our evaluation first exposes an agent to malicious instructions and tests whether they are retained in memory. We then remove the attack content and initiate a new session with a legitimate task while preserving the agent's memory. We jointly evaluate whether the agent follows the attacker's intent, completes the legitimate task, and exhibits observable execution anomalies. Across multiple agent systems, we find that cross-session attacks can remain behaviorally stealthy: agents often complete tasks normally and exhibit no detectable anomalies while still making critical decisions aligned with the attacker's intent. By connecting malicious memory retention to downstream decisions and affected parties, MemHarmBench provides a systematic framework for exposing safety risks that conventional attack- and task-success metrics may overlook. We publicly release MemHarmBench at https://github.com/Kirito14IT/MemHarmBench.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory and influence future responses. Recent work demonstrated that the MINJA (Memory Injection Attack) achieves over 95 % injection success rate and 70 % attack success rate under idealized conditions. However, the robustness of these attacks in realistic deployments and effective defensive mechanisms remain understudied. This work addresses these gaps through systematic empirical evaluation of memory poisoning attacks and defenses in Electronic Health Record (EHR) agents. We investigate attack robustness by varying three critical dimensions: initial memory state, number of indication prompts, and retrieval parameters. Our experiments on GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct models using MIMIC-III clinical data reveal that realistic conditions with pre-existing legitimate memories dramatically reduce attack effectiveness. We then propose and evaluate two novel defense mechanisms: (1) Input/Output Moderation using composite trust scoring across multiple orthogonal signals, and (2) Memory Sanitization with trust-aware retrieval employing temporal decay and pattern-based filtering. Our defense evaluation reveals that effective memory sanitization requires careful trust threshold calibration to prevent both overly conservative rejection (blocking all entries) and insufficient filtering (missing subtle attacks), establishing important baselines for future adaptive defense mechanisms. These findings provide crucial insights for securing memory-augmented LLM agents in production environments.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Memory is a core component of AI agents, enabling them to accumulate knowledge across interactions and improve performance. However, persistent memory introduces the risk of memory poisoning, where a single adversarial memory write can exert long-term influence over agent behavior. We present a systematic study of memory poisoning in LLM-based agents. We identify four memory write channels and nine structural vulnerabilities in model capabilities, system prompt design, and agent system architecture that make these channels exploitable. Based on these vulnerabilities, we develop a taxonomy of six classes of memory poisoning attacks. Furthermore, we design MPBench -- a benchmark for evaluating memory poisoning attacks, and show that agents designed to write and retrieve memory more aggressively are more exploitable. We also show that existing prompt injection defenses fail to cover memory poisoning attacks. Our findings provide a foundation for understanding and mitigating memory poisoning attacks against AI agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

Personal AI agents powered by large language models can reason and act using available tools to access emails, manage calendars, and push code to remote repositories, all with minimal oversight. When augmented with long-term memory, an agent can recall specific details relevant to the current task, reducing the need for large context windows. Currently, long-term memory agents tend to fall into two distinct domains: conversational and action-planning agents. Personal assistant agents sit at the convergence of these two domains and handle sensitive information while interacting with untrusted information sources, creating previously unaccounted security vulnerabilities. In this work, we introduce the novel attack vector, GhostWriter, which exploits current memory subsystems in tool-using personal agents to poison their memory store. GhostWriter operates in two phases: injection, where an adversary sends a hidden attack payload to the target agent; and activation, in which the poisoned memory is retrieved. We show that GhostWriter achieves near-universal injection rates of approximately 98% and a high average activation rate of approximately 60% against state-of-the-art agents. This attack is possible due to the lack of security-focused memory governance. In response, we propose Agentic Memory Sentry (AM-Sentry), which leverages two mitigation techniques: a memory-saving policy and a memory-retrieval screen. Our experiments show that AM-Sentry dramatically reduces GhostWriter's success rate while preserving agent utility.

Conversational assistants are increasingly integrating long-term memory with large language models (LLMs). This persistence of memories, e.g., the user is vegetarian, can enhance personalization in future conversations. However, the same persistence can also introduce safety risks that have been largely overlooked. Hence, we introduce PersistBench to measure the extent of these safety risks. We identify two long-term memory-specific risks: cross-domain leakage, where LLMs inappropriately inject context from the long-term memories; and memory-induced sycophancy, where stored long-term memories insidiously reinforce user biases. We evaluate 18 frontier and open-source LLMs on our benchmark. Our results reveal a surprisingly high failure rate across these LLMs - a median failure rate of 53% on cross-domain samples and 97% on sycophancy samples. To address this, our benchmark encourages the development of more robust and safer long-term memory usage in frontier conversational systems.

We present SuperLocalMemory, a local-first memory system for multi-agent AI that defends against OWASP ASI06 memory poisoning through architectural isolation and Bayesian trust scoring, while personalizing retrieval through adaptive learning-to-rank -- all without cloud dependencies or LLM inference calls. As AI agents increasingly rely on persistent memory, cloud-based memory systems create centralized attack surfaces where poisoned memories propagate across sessions and users -- a threat demonstrated in documented attacks against production systems. Our architecture combines SQLite-backed storage with FTS5 full-text search, Leiden-based knowledge graph clustering, an event-driven coordination layer with per-agent provenance, and an adaptive re-ranking framework that learns user preferences through three-layer behavioral analysis (cross-project technology preferences, project context detection, and workflow pattern mining). Evaluation across seven benchmark dimensions demonstrates 10.6ms median search latency, zero concurrency errors under 10 simultaneous agents, trust separation (gap =0.90) with 72% trust degradation for sleeper attacks, and 104% improvement in NDCG@5 when adaptive re-ranking is enabled. Behavioral data is isolated in a separate database with GDPR Article 17 erasure support. SuperLocalMemory is open-source (MIT) and integrates with 17+ development tools via Model Context Protocol.

The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. By embedding malicious instructions, these exploits manipulate language models to bypass intended behavior and operational boundaries. In traditional chatbots, such attacks are confined to a single session because state memory is not preserved across conversations. However, persistent memory features in modern conversational interfaces enable cross-session attack propagation, establishing a threat vector known as memory injection. This work explores this emerging vulnerability in leading LLM-as-a-service platforms, highlighting its real-world severity and the need for countermeasures. While existing literature focuses on violations tailored to specific platform features, we present a general threat model. We demonstrate that all NIST attack goals are collectively achievable across ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash under this model. We also show that memory injections can exploit multiple attack vectors, including personal memories, projects, skills, organization instructions, and Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected resources. Our findings reveal that all evaluated services can be manipulated to persistently spread disinformation, generate harmful content, or simulate offline unresponsiveness, even in fresh sessions. In the particular case of Claude, shared-memory features allow an attacker to compromise multiple users within an organization and also exfiltrate user prompts. To address these vulnerabilities, we derive defense mechanisms from our proposed threat model and foundational cybersecurity principles. Our analysis indicates that nearly half of these mitigations remain unimplemented across the target services. Datasets and attack artifacts are available at https://github.com/PedroBarcha/Memory-injection.

Long-term memory has become a crucial component of large language model (LLM) agents, with most research focusing on retrieving relevant information accurately and efficiently. However, a dependable memory system must also forget sensitive user data upon request. To evaluate this capability, we introduce MemCut, a systematic benchmark for user-requested forgetting. Its 456 hand-designed secrets in long-horizon conversations have fully annotated evidence trails to test recovery after deletion, including from messages that never state the secrets directly. We propose two recovery metrics. Native recovery measures reader success through the system's retrieval, whereas residual recovery measures the same reader's success when directly given surviving objects traced to annotated disclosures or evidence. We establish three reference deletion baselines to test how far existing retrievers and write models support forgetting across five memory designs and four LLMs. Disclosure removal reduces native recovery far more than residual recovery. LLM-guided deletion of ten additional turns from twenty retrieval candidates leaves 39-76% residual recovery. Subset sweeps (144 facts, three systems, two models) show that widening the pool at a fixed budget reduces residual recovery more than deleting all original candidates. These sweeps identify candidate coverage as a bottleneck in the reference baselines.

The objective of digital forgetting is, given a model with undesirable knowledge or behavior, obtain a new model where the detected issues are no longer present. The motivations for forgetting include privacy protection, copyright protection, elimination of biases and discrimination, and prevention of harmful content generation. Effective digital forgetting has to be effective (meaning how well the new model has forgotten the undesired knowledge/behavior), retain the performance of the original model on the desirable tasks, and be scalable (in particular forgetting has to be more efficient than retraining from scratch on just the tasks/data to be retained). This survey focuses on forgetting in large language models (LLMs). We first provide background on LLMs, including their components, the types of LLMs, and their usual training pipeline. Second, we describe the motivations, types, and desired properties of digital forgetting. Third, we introduce the approaches to digital forgetting in LLMs, among which unlearning methodologies stand out as the state of the art. Fourth, we provide a detailed taxonomy of machine unlearning methods for LLMs, and we survey and compare current approaches. Fifth, we detail datasets, models and metrics used for the evaluation of forgetting, retaining and runtime. Sixth, we discuss challenges in the area. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks.

A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases. While this makes agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior. In this work, we study prompt injection attacks in memory-based agentic systems using a sandboxed synthetic workspace. We evaluate two agentic systems, Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, across four models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.2, and GPT-5.5. Our results show that although it is difficult to make an agent overwrite its own memory files using untrusted external content, payloads already planted in those files can successfully attack current and future sessions. Attack success and payload persistence vary substantially across systems, models, adversarial goals, and multi-session attack sequences. These findings show that persistent memory changes the threat model for prompt injection and motivate defenses that protect memory updates without removing useful agent adaptation.

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

Long-term memory has become a foundational capability for LLM-based agents that accompany users across extended, multi-session interactions. Existing benchmarks, however, evaluate such memory almost exclusively through downstream question answering, scoring only the correctness of a final answer. This black-box formulation conflates the heterogeneous causes of memory failure, such as missing the introduction of a relevant fact, binding an operation to the wrong target, or relying on stale values after a correction. As a result, it can credit correct answers despite their reliance on inconsistent or unsafe memory states. In this paper, we argue that, in dynamic long-horizon interactions, memory is not a static collection of facts but a lifecycle of explicit operations, including remembering, forgetting, updating, reflecting, and their compositions. We introduce MemOps, a benchmark that reformulates conversational memory as a sequence of lifecycle operations and represents each memory event with a structured trace specifying its trigger, target, scope, state transition, and supporting evidence. A controllable generation pipeline embeds these operations into long, task-oriented conversations and produces gold operation traces together with six categories of operation-level probes, evaluated under both adjacent-evidence and long-context settings. Across long-context, retrieval-based, parametric and managed-memory systems, MemOps disentangles failure modes that final-answer accuracy alone conceals, revealing that current systems remain far from uniformly reliable. For instance, session-level retrieval outperforms turn-level retrieval, and long-context models remain notably weak at reconstructing ordered memory-state trajectories. These results move long-term memory evaluation from final-answer scoring toward interpretable, operation-level diagnosis.

Memory is becoming a default subsystem in deployed LLM agents to provide persistent personalization and continuity. This naturally prompts a question: will memory system introduce new vulnerabilities into agents? Thus we propose InjecMEM, a novel memory injection attack paradigm that requires only a single interaction (no read/edit access to memory store) to steer later responses of related queries toward a pre-specified output. Guided by the retrieval-then-generate mechanism of memory systems, we craft the injection with a retriever-agnostic anchor and an adversarial command. The anchor contains high-recall topical cues so that downstream retrieval consistently associates the record with the target topic. The command is a short sequence optimized to remain effective under uncertain fused contexts, variable placements, and long prompts so that it reliably steers outputs once retrieved. We learn the command via gradient-based coordinate search, averaging over synthetic prompt templates and insertion positions, and extend it to joint optimization across backbones to study transfer. Evaluated across multiple memory systems and backbone models, InjecMEM achieves reliable topic-conditioned retrieval and targeted generation, remains effective under memory drift, and leaves non-target queries unaffected. Our results underscore the need to harden memory systems and provide a reproducible framework for studying agent memory.

Large language models deployed as autonomous agents face critical memory limitations, lacking selective forgetting mechanisms that lead to either catastrophic forgetting at context boundaries or information overload within them. While human memory naturally balances retention and forgetting through adaptive decay processes, current AI systems employ binary retention strategies that preserve everything or lose it entirely. We propose FadeMem, a biologically-inspired agent memory architecture that incorporates active forgetting mechanisms mirroring human cognitive efficiency. FadeMem implements differential decay rates across a dual-layer memory hierarchy, where retention is governed by adaptive exponential decay functions modulated by semantic relevance, access frequency, and temporal patterns. Through LLM-guided conflict resolution and intelligent memory fusion, our system consolidates related information while allowing irrelevant details to fade. Experiments on Multi-Session Chat, LoCoMo, and LTI-Bench demonstrate superior multi-hop reasoning and retrieval with 45\% storage reduction, validating the effectiveness of biologically-inspired forgetting in agent memory systems.

Memory serves as the pivotal nexus bridging past and future, providing both humans and AI systems with invaluable concepts and experience to navigate complex tasks. Recent research on autonomous agents has increasingly focused on designing efficient memory workflows by drawing on cognitive neuroscience. However, constrained by interdisciplinary barriers, existing works struggle to assimilate the essence of human memory mechanisms. To bridge this gap, we systematically synthesizes interdisciplinary knowledge of memory, connecting insights from cognitive neuroscience with LLM-driven agents. Specifically, we first elucidate the definition and function of memory along a progressive trajectory from cognitive neuroscience through LLMs to agents. We then provide a comparative analysis of memory taxonomy, storage mechanisms, and the complete management lifecycle from both biological and artificial perspectives. Subsequently, we review the mainstream benchmarks for evaluating agent memory. Additionally, we explore memory security from dual perspectives of attack and defense. Finally, we envision future research directions, with a focus on multimodal memory systems and skill acquisition.

Long-term memory has become a core component of large language model (LLM) agents. As agents accumulate personal information over long-term use, users increasingly ask them to delete sensitive or outdated facts. A memory system should honor such requests. It should remove exactly what was requested and keep the rest of its memory intact. However, existing memory benchmarks evaluate only memory writing, retrieval, and organization, so whether agents can forget at the user's explicit request remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we propose Bemula, the first benchmark dedicated to memory unlearning. It comprises 50 multi-session dialogue instances, 135 forget requests of six types, and 1,742 test questions. Each dialogue has a control version without the requests, so that only systems that have stored the target can earn credit for forgetting. Across the paired versions, five test suites measure storage, removal of the requested information, preservation of unrelated memories, relearning of similar facts, and resistance to extraction attacks. On Bemula, we evaluate six mainstream memory systems under three backbone LLMs, together with the Full Context LLM on two of them. The results are negative. Across all evaluated systems and backbones, no system passes more than 1.5% of forget requests end to end, and most pass none at all. These systems either leave the requested information extractable under simple attacks or delete far more than requested. Memory unlearning therefore remains an open challenge for agent memory design. We release our data and code at https://github.com/Nboxff/bemula-benchmark.

Large language model (LLM) agents are highly vulnerable to memory-poisoning attacks. Existing defenses primarily rely on external modules for either static memory isolation or continuous online auditing, resulting in low memory efficiency and high computational overhead. To address these limitations, inspired by neuroscientific mechanisms that weak reactivation can destabilize memories and induce decay in the absence of reinforcement, we propose an agent-intrinsic training-free memory repair framework, DREAM (Dynamic Reactivation for Engram Attenuation in Memory), that enables selective functional forgetting of poisoned memories. Specifically, DREAM implements a three-stage pipeline: perturbation-induced implicit reactivation to reveal the structural fragility of malicious memories, adaptive anomaly diagnosis based on multi-dimensional activation patterns to detect topological anomalies, and a dynamic memory repair module that selectively suppresses harmful memories while reinforcing benign ones. Extensive experiments across diverse attackers and real-world tasks demonstrate that DREAM reduces attack success rates by over 95\% against backdoor poisoning while preserving strong benign utility. DREAM also achieves competitive robustness against injection attacks. In terms of runtime and token consumption, DREAM achieves up to a 2.13times speedup and a 37.7\% reduction in token consumption compared with A-MemGuard. Furthermore, DREAM also achieves a task success rate of 92.96\% on poisoned multi-agent systems.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

The impressive capability of modern text-to-image models to generate realistic visuals has come with a serious drawback: they can be misused to create harmful, deceptive or unlawful content. This has accelerated the push for machine unlearning. This new field seeks to selectively remove specific knowledge from a model's training data without causing a drop in its overall performance. However, it turns out that actually forgetting a given concept is an extremely difficult task. Models exposed to attacks using adversarial prompts show the ability to generate so-called unlearned concepts, which can be not only harmful but also illegal. In this paper, we present considerations regarding the ability of models to forget and recall knowledge, introducing the Memory Self-Regeneration task. Furthermore, we present MemoRa strategy, which we consider to be a regenerative approach supporting the effective recovery of previously lost knowledge. Moreover, we propose that robustness in knowledge retrieval is a crucial yet underexplored evaluation measure for developing more robust and effective unlearning techniques. Finally, we demonstrate that forgetting occurs in two distinct ways: short-term, where concepts can be quickly recalled, and long-term, where recovery is more challenging.

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, growing concerns have emerged over the misuse of sensitive, copyrighted, or harmful data during training. To address these concerns, unlearning techniques have been developed to remove the influence of specific data without retraining from scratch. However, this paper reveals a critical vulnerability in fine-tuning-based unlearning: a malicious user can craft a manipulated forgetting request that stealthily degrades the model's utility for benign users. We demonstrate this risk through a red-teaming Stealthy Attack (SA), which is inspired by two key limitations of existing unlearning (the inability to constrain the scope of unlearning effect and the failure to distinguish benign tokens from unlearning signals). Prior work has shown that unlearned models tend to memorize forgetting data as unlearning signals, and respond with hallucinations or feigned ignorance when unlearning signals appear in the input. By subtly increasing the presence of common benign tokens in the forgetting data, SA enhances the connection between benign tokens and unlearning signals. As a result, when normal users include such tokens in their prompts, the model exhibits unlearning behaviors, leading to unintended utility degradation. To address this vulnerability, we propose Scope-aware Unlearning (SU), a lightweight enhancement that introduces a scope term into the unlearning objective, encouraging the model to localize the forgetting effect. Our method requires no additional data processing, integrates seamlessly with existing fine-tuning frameworks, and significantly improves robustness against SA. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of both SA and SU.

Agent Skills extend LLM agents with reusable instruction packages that may also include scripts, resources, and service configuration. This creates a direct distribution channel for malicious behavior, yet existing malicious-Skill datasets are fragmented across sources, artifact formats, evidence regimes, and benign coverage; duplicated and structurally related content further complicates direct aggregation and evaluation. We present MaliciousSkillBench, a comprehensive benchmark for malicious Agent Skill detection. We consolidate 13 public sources, 11 of which contribute Core malicious artifacts, and reduce 8,414 raw malicious records to 7,539 normalized-unique identities in 4,588 operational structural families. After conservative cross-label conflict exclusion, the primary benchmark contains 9,740 Skills: 7,505 malicious and 2,235 benign. To characterize its coverage, we harmonize 11 attack categories for 4,983 malicious identities with supported source-native mappings and find substantial differences in threat composition across sources. We then evaluate three learned text detectors and three off-the-shelf Skill scanners. Learned detectors achieve 0.882-0.932 Random Macro-F1 but only 0.653-0.665 under Source-Disjoint evaluation; the strongest word TF-IDF SVM scores 0.932/0.916/0.665 on Random/structural-disjoint/Source-Disjoint while retaining 95.6% malicious recall but producing 62.4% benign FPR on held-out sources. Off-the-shelf scanners occupy different but also unsatisfactory operating regimes, reducing false positives only at the cost of sharply lower malicious recall. Together, these results show that reliable malicious-Skill detection requires both broader cross-source benchmark coverage and evaluation that jointly measures attack detection and benign over-flagging.

Memory-augmented large language models extend reasoning beyond a fixed context window by maintaining long-term memory across interactions. However, existing memory systems often collapse stable user facts, episodic events, and behavioral rules into a shared space, allowing functionally distinct memories to be retrieved and used as interchangeable evidence. We identify this failure mode as heterogeneous memory contamination, where context-specific events become overgeneralized claims, or semantically relevant but functionally incompatible memories mislead generation. To this end, we introduce MemGuard, a type-aware memory framework that preserves functional memory boundaries during memory construction and retrieval. It assigns each memory an explicit functional role at write time, maintains relations across type-isolated memories, and selectively composes evidence only from necessary memory types, reducing contamination from irrelevant or functionally incompatible evidence. Across hallucination and long-horizon conversation benchmarks, MemGuard improves memory reliability by up to 28.27% while retrieving up to 5.8x fewer memory tokens than prior methods. These results suggest that reliable long-term reasoning depends on principled organization and selective use of heterogeneous memory.

Persistent memory has enabled large language model (LLM) agents to store factual knowledge, prior decisions, reasoning histories, tool usage information, and context. While this has improved the agent's functionality and continuity across tasks, it has also introduced a new attack surface: the agent's own reasoning history. In this paper, we introduce the Forged Amplifying Rationale Memory Attack (FARMA), which poisons an agent's remembered reasoning rather than its factual knowledge. It inserts forged reasoning traces using evasive language that bypasses keyword-based defenses, then amplifies them through self-referential reinforcement that defeats consensus-based defenses. To address FARMA, we introduce SENTINEL, a layered defense pipeline to detect forged reasoning entries. Its central component is the Reasoning Guard that structurally analyzes candidate entries for forgery using five weighted signals. We evaluate FARMA and SENTINEL across multiple agents and different LLM models with 50 trials and show that FARMA achieves an attack success rate of up to 100% under baseline conditions and is capable of defeating defense mechanisms like keyword filter and A-MemGuard. Our evaluation also shows that SENTINEL reduces FARMA's attack success rate to as low as 0% with no false positives observed across 326 benign agent traces. Our work demonstrates the need to protect not only an agent's retrieved content but also the integrity of its reasoning history.

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

Catastrophic forgetting (CF) is a phenomenon that occurs in machine learning when a model forgets previously learned information while acquiring new knowledge for achieving a satisfactory performance in downstream tasks. As large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance, it is intriguing to investigate whether CF exists during the continual instruction tuning of LLMs. This study empirically evaluates the forgetting phenomenon in LLMs' knowledge during continual instruction tuning from the perspectives of domain knowledge, reasoning, and reading comprehension. The experiments reveal that catastrophic forgetting is generally observed in LLMs ranging from 1b to 7b parameters. Surprisingly, as the model scale increases, the severity of forgetting intensifies in such a model sale range which may result from the much significant initial performance in the larger LLM. Comparing the decoder-only model BLOOMZ with the encoder-decoder model mT0, BLOOMZ exhibits less forgetting and retains more knowledge. Interestingly, we also observe that LLMs can mitigate language biases, such as gender bias, during continual fine-tuning. Furthermore, our findings indicate that general instruction tuning can help alleviate the forgetting phenomenon in LLMs during subsequent fine-tuning.

Long-horizon conversational agents require persistent memory for coherent reasoning, yet uncontrolled accumulation causes temporal decay and false memory propagation. Benchmarks such as LOCOMO and LOCCO report performance degradation from 0.455 to 0.05 across stages, while MultiWOZ shows 78.2% accuracy with 6.8% false memory rate under persistent retention. This work introduces an adaptive budgeted forgetting framework that regulates memory through relevanceguided scoring and bounded optimization. The approach integrates recency, frequency, and semantic alignment to maintain stability under constrained context. Comparative analysis demonstrates improved long-horizon F1 beyond 0.583 baseline levels, higher retention consistency, and reduced false memory behavior without increasing context usage. These findings confirm that structured forgetting preserves reasoning performance while preventing unbounded memory growth in extended conversational settings.

Task success, retrieval quality, and cost do not show whether an LLM agent used a delivered memory or what followed from that use. We introduce MemUse, which evaluates memory at its point of use in recorded trajectories: each memory delivery is compared with what the agent could already see and followed through the agent's later actions and their consequences. An agentic judge rates each delivered entry's relevance, accuracy, novelty, influence, and observed effect; programmatic checks enforce complete reading of cited evidence, and fixed rules aggregate the ratings into verdicts linked to memory histories and delivery cost. On 8,000 SWE-bench Verified episodes from three memory systems, resolve rates stay within 0.4 percentage points of a no-memory baseline, yet MemUse shows that most delivered entries were irrelevant, most relevant entries went unused, and in two systems most deliveries restated content the agent could still see. It also surfaces effects that outcomes hide: 23.2\% of episodes with beneficial memory use still failed, and 5 of 16 with harmful use still succeeded.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Limited Memory Language Models (LMLMs) externalize factual knowledge to a database to enable deletion-based unlearning without retraining. Existing evaluations measure post-deletion correctness in aggregate and cannot tell whether a deleted fact persists through residual parametric memory, alternative retrieval paths, or near-neighbor retrieval artifacts. We propose a causal auditing framework that holds the model fixed and varies the database state at inference time across three interventions: FULL, DEL-ON, and DEL-OFF. The framework decomposes post-deletion behavior into parametric leakage L(f), retrieval-mediated correctness R(f), and a retrieval artifact rate grounded in the inference-time retrieval trace. We apply it to 12,228 alias-closure deletions across thirteen databases, including four adversarial topologies (Base, Alias, Noise, Collision) we construct in three domains, and six prompt formulations. Parametric leakage is near zero in every variant and every prompt style: the model rarely returns the deleted answer in the absence of retrieval. The residual that does survive lives in the retrieval graph: retrieval-mediated correctness and the retrieval artifact rate match within rounding everywhere, so post-deletion correctness is, in our audit, predominantly reconstituted from near-neighbor retrieval. This residual ranges from 0.7% on the released LMLM database to 13.6% on the most adversarial variant, and prompt formulation does not independently control how much of a deleted fact survives. These results suggest that, for this class of LMLM and deletion procedure, the unlearning boundary is drawn primarily by the database administrator rather than by the model.

Machine unlearning has emerged as a crucial mechanism for removing hazardous knowledge and enforcing safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, recent studies reveal a persistent security risk: unlearned models remain highly vulnerable to retraining attacks, where suppressed malicious behaviors rapidly resurface after benign fine-tuning. In this work, we investigate the optimization dynamics of unlearning and identify that this vulnerability stems from shallow alignment. Rather than effectively erasing target knowledge, models often exploit a shortcut by activating previously dormant parameters to act as spurious suppressors, forming a fragile inhibitory shell over intact malicious representations. To address this issue and enforce authentic memory deletion, we propose FDCU, a novel dual-constrained subspace projection framework. FDCU restricts parameter updates through a highly scalable, element-wise dual-masking rule: it preserves general knowledge manifolds via Fisher Information and strictly prohibits the abnormal activation of spurious suppressors via the Principle of Minimal Functional Intervention (PMFI). By reliably blocking the model's ability to superficially hide knowledge, FDCU promotes the authentic dismantling of target representations. Extensive experiments across specific knowledge erasure and safe output control tasks demonstrate that FDCU achieves state-of-the-art robustness against retraining attacks while maintaining near-lossless general utility, ensuring durable safety for LLMs.

Personalized agents that interact with users over long periods must maintain persistent memory across sessions and update it as circumstances change. However, existing benchmarks predominantly frame long-term memory evaluation as fact retrieval from past conversations, providing limited insight into agents' ability to consolidate memory over time or handle frequent knowledge updates. We introduce Memora, a long-term memory benchmark spanning weeks to months long user conversations. The benchmark evaluates three memory-grounded tasks: remembering, reasoning, and recommending. To ensure data quality, we employ automated memory-grounding checks and human evaluation. We further introduce Forgetting-Aware Memory Accuracy (FAMA), a metric that penalizes reliance on obsolete or invalidated memory when evaluating long-term memory. Evaluations of four LLMs and six memory agents reveal frequent reuse of invalid memories and failures to reconcile evolving memories. Memory agents offer marginal improvements, exposing shortcomings in long-term memory for personalized agents.

Current LLM unlearning methods face a critical security vulnerability that undermines their fundamental purpose: while they appear to successfully remove sensitive or harmful knowledge, this ``forgotten" information remains precariously recoverable through relearning attacks. We identify that the root cause is that conventional methods optimizing the forgetting loss at individual data points will drive model parameters toward sharp minima in the loss landscape. In these unstable regions, even minimal parameter perturbations can drastically alter the model's behaviors. Consequently, relearning attacks exploit this vulnerability by using just a few fine-tuning samples to navigate the steep gradients surrounding these unstable regions, thereby rapidly recovering knowledge that was supposedly erased. This exposes a critical robustness gap between apparent unlearning and actual knowledge removal. To address this issue, we propose StableUN, a bi-level feedback-guided optimization framework that explicitly seeks more stable parameter regions via neighborhood-aware optimization. It integrates forgetting feedback, which uses adversarial perturbations to probe parameter neighborhoods, with remembering feedback to preserve model utility, aligning the two objectives through gradient projection. Experiments on WMDP and MUSE benchmarks demonstrate that our method is significantly more robust against both relearning and jailbreaking attacks while maintaining competitive utility performance.

The growing use of large language models in sensitive domains has exposed a critical weakness: the inability to ensure that private information can be permanently forgotten. Yet these systems still lack reliable mechanisms to guarantee that sensitive information can be permanently removed once it has been used. Retraining from the beginning is prohibitively costly, and existing unlearning methods remain fragmented, difficult to verify, and often vulnerable to recovery. This paper surveys recent research on machine unlearning for LLMs and considers how far current approaches can address these challenges. We review methods for evaluating whether forgetting has occurred, the resilience of unlearned models against adversarial attacks, and mechanisms that can support user trust when model complexity or proprietary limits restrict transparency. Technical solutions such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, federated learning, and ephemeral memory are examined alongside institutional safeguards including auditing practices and regulatory frameworks. The review finds steady progress, but robust and verifiable unlearning is still unresolved. Efficient techniques that avoid costly retraining, stronger defenses against adversarial recovery, and governance structures that reinforce accountability are needed if LLMs are to be deployed safely in sensitive applications. By integrating technical and organizational perspectives, this study outlines a pathway toward AI systems that can be required to forget, while maintaining both privacy and public trust.

Long-term memory enables large language model (LLM) agents to support personalized and sustained interactions. However, most work on personalized agents prioritizes utility and user experience, treating memory as a neutral component and largely overlooking its safety implications. In this paper, we reveal intent legitimation, a previously underexplored safety failure in personalized agents, where benign personal memories bias intent inference and cause models to legitimize inherently harmful queries. To study this phenomenon, we introduce PS-Bench, a benchmark designed to identify and quantify intent legitimation in personalized interactions. Across multiple memory-augmented agent frameworks and base LLMs, personalization increases attack success rates by 15.8%-243.7% relative to stateless baselines. We further provide mechanistic evidence for intent legitimation from internal representations space, and propose a lightweight detection-reflection method that effectively reduces safety degradation. Overall, our work provides the first systematic exploration and evaluation of intent legitimation as a safety failure mode that naturally arises from benign, real-world personalization, highlighting the importance of assessing safety under long-term personal context. WARNING: This paper may contain harmful content.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet they also exhibit memorization of their training data. This phenomenon raises critical questions about model behavior, privacy risks, and the boundary between learning and memorization. Addressing these concerns, this paper synthesizes recent studies and investigates the landscape of memorization, the factors influencing it, and methods for its detection and mitigation. We explore key drivers, including training data duplication, training dynamics, and fine-tuning procedures that influence data memorization. In addition, we examine methodologies such as prefix-based extraction, membership inference, and adversarial prompting, assessing their effectiveness in detecting and measuring memorized content. Beyond technical analysis, we also explore the broader implications of memorization, including the legal and ethical implications. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies, including data cleaning, differential privacy, and post-training unlearning, while highlighting open challenges in balancing the minimization of harmful memorization with utility. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of research on LLM memorization across technical, privacy, and performance dimensions, identifying critical directions for future work.

Long-term memory enables LLM-based agents to retain and reuse information across tasks and sessions, supporting personalization and long-horizon interactions. However, persistent memories can also induce sycophancy, causing agents to over-align with users' historical beliefs even when they are inaccurate, outdated, or inconsistent with objective evidence. Existing mitigation methods assume that memory-induced sycophancy originates from biased or incorrect memories and attempt to reduce this risk by filtering such memories at different stages of the memory pipeline. However, in the real world, objective and correct memories can still induce sycophancy, and the same memory can warrant different influence across different contexts. To this end, we propose MemAdapter, a novel framework that adaptively integrates retrieved memories to support objective and reliable reasoning. Specifically, MemAdapter consists of three components: (i) Counterfactual Induction, which leverages counterfactual reasoning to uncover the potential risk of retrieved memories; (ii) Context-Aware Reflection, which calibrates the inferential influence of each retrieved memory in light of the current task via self-reflection; and (iii) Evidence-Based Reasoning, which grounds the final response in appropriate evidence while preserving the legitimate influence of memory. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate that MemAdapter consistently improves memory reliability across diverse scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/DEEP-JLU/MemAdapter.

AI agents are increasingly used in long, multi-turn workflows in both research and enterprise settings. As interactions grow, agent behavior often degrades due to loss of constraint focus, error accumulation, and memory-induced drift. This problem is especially visible in real-world deployments where context evolves, distractions are introduced, and decisions must remain consistent over time. A common practice is to equip agents with persistent memory through transcript replay or retrieval-based mechanisms. While convenient, these approaches introduce unbounded context growth and are vulnerable to noisy recall and memory poisoning, leading to unstable behavior and increased drift. In this work, we introduce the Agent Cognitive Compressor (ACC), a bio-inspired memory controller that replaces transcript replay with a bounded internal state updated online at each turn. ACC separates artifact recall from state commitment, enabling stable conditioning while preventing unverified content from becoming persistent memory. We evaluate ACC using an agent-judge-driven live evaluation framework that measures both task outcomes and memory-driven anomalies across extended interactions. Across scenarios spanning IT operations, cybersecurity response, and healthcare workflows, ACC consistently maintains bounded memory and exhibits more stable multi-turn behavior, with significantly lower hallucination and drift than transcript replay and retrieval-based agents. These results show that cognitive compression provides a practical and effective foundation for reliable memory control in long-horizon AI agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly use persistent memory from past interactions to enhance personalization and task performance. However, this memory introduces critical risks when sensitive information is revealed in inappropriate contexts. We present CIMemories, a benchmark for evaluating whether LLMs appropriately control information flow from memory based on task context. CIMemories uses synthetic user profiles with over 100 attributes per user, paired with diverse task contexts in which each attribute may be essential for some tasks but inappropriate for others. Our evaluation reveals that frontier models exhibit up to 69% attribute-level violations (leaking information inappropriately), with lower violation rates often coming at the cost of task utility. Violations accumulate across both tasks and runs: as usage increases from 1 to 40 tasks, GPT-5's violations rise from 0.1% to 9.6%, reaching 25.1% when the same prompt is executed 5 times, revealing arbitrary and unstable behavior in which models leak different attributes for identical prompts. Privacy-conscious prompting does not solve this - models overgeneralize, sharing everything or nothing rather than making nuanced, context-dependent decisions. These findings reveal fundamental limitations that require contextually aware reasoning capabilities, not just better prompting or scaling.

Making neural networks remember over the long term has been a longstanding issue. Although several external memory techniques have been introduced, most focus on retaining recent information in the short term. Regardless of its importance, information tends to be fatefully forgotten over time. We present Memoria, a memory system for artificial neural networks, drawing inspiration from humans and applying various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The experimental results prove the effectiveness of Memoria in the diverse tasks of sorting, language modeling, and classification, surpassing conventional techniques. Engram analysis reveals that Memoria exhibits the primacy, recency, and temporal contiguity effects which are characteristics of human memory.

Where an LLM sits in an agent memory pipeline -- between the recall plane that retrieves stored facts (extensively benchmarked) and the control plane that mutates them via supersede, release, purge (largely untested) -- shapes which forgetting failure modes the system recovers. Comparing thirteen system configurations on a 385-case adversarial surface, we observe three placement regimes with partly complementary coverage: deterministic primitives suffice for lexical/temporal categories but fail canonicalization (5% on identifier-obfuscation, 0% on cross-lingual); inscribe-time LLM recovers canonicalization (100%) but cannot help intent-aware deletion (0% on prefix-collision and compound-fact); a mutation-time hook recovers intent-aware deletion (78-85%) and brightens nearly all categories simultaneously (91.7-93.2% overall, $0.17 per 385-case run, 2.3s/case mutation latency vs. 64-191ms/case deterministic, recall path unchanged). We expose the trade-off via ForgetEval, a 1000-case templated suite plus a 385-case adversarial layer (132 hand-crafted + 253 LLM-drafted oracle-validated) scored by deterministic substring match, paired with a six-method Adapter Protocol with honest N/A scoring that lets heterogeneous memory stores enter in 130 lines. Admission is corroborated by 10-annotator IAA (Fleiss' kappa = 0.958) and a 77-case external-authored subset (four blind contributors) that replicates the canonicalization asymmetry and amplifies the joint-placement lift (+27.8 pt). Production failures are predominantly forgetting failures rather than recall failures, yet existing benchmarks measure only recall. ForgetEval and all adapters are released under MIT.

According to the forgetting curve theory, we can enhance memory retention by learning extensive data and taking adequate rest. This means that in order to effectively retain new knowledge, it is essential to learn it thoroughly and ensure sufficient rest so that our brain can memorize without forgetting. The main takeaway from this theory is that learning extensive data at once necessitates sufficient rest before learning the same data again. This aspect of human long-term memory retention can be effectively utilized to address the continual learning of neural networks. Retaining new knowledge for a long period of time without catastrophic forgetting is the critical problem of continual learning. Therefore, based on Ebbinghaus' theory, we introduce the view-batch model that adjusts the learning schedules to optimize the recall interval between retraining the same samples. The proposed view-batch model allows the network to get enough rest to learn extensive knowledge from the same samples with a recall interval of sufficient length. To this end, we specifically present two approaches: 1) a replay method that guarantees the optimal recall interval, and 2) a self-supervised learning that acquires extensive knowledge from a single training sample at a time. We empirically show that these approaches of our method are aligned with the forgetting curve theory, which can enhance long-term memory. In our experiments, we also demonstrate that our method significantly improves many state-of-the-art continual learning methods in various protocols and scenarios. We open-source this project at https://github.com/hankyul2/ViewBatchModel.

An unintended consequence of the vast pretraining of Large Language Models (LLMs) is the verbatim memorization of fragments of their training data, which may contain sensitive or copyrighted information. In recent years, unlearning has emerged as a solution to effectively remove sensitive knowledge from models after training. Yet, recent work has shown that supposedly deleted information can still be extracted by malicious actors through various attacks. Still, current attacks retrieve sets of possible candidate generations and are unable to pinpoint the output that contains the actual target information. We propose activation steering as a method for exact information retrieval from unlearned LLMs. We introduce a novel approach to generating steering vectors, named Anonymized Activation Steering. Additionally, we develop a simple word frequency method to pinpoint the correct answer among a set of candidates when retrieving unlearned information. Our evaluation across multiple unlearning techniques and datasets demonstrates that activation steering successfully recovers general knowledge (e.g., widely known fictional characters) while revealing limitations in retrieving specific information (e.g., details about non-public individuals). Overall, our results demonstrate that exact information retrieval from unlearned models is possible, highlighting a severe vulnerability of current unlearning techniques.

Self-evolving agents increasingly convert interaction histories into reusable skills that persist beyond individual tasks. While prior work studies memory and retrieval poisoning, such attacks only affect agents when poisoned records are retrieved as context. We uncover a new and more fundamental risk: poisoned experiences can be transformed by the agent itself into durable behavioral artifacts. We present SkillJack, the first attack that exploits the experience-to-skill pipeline of self-evolving agents. Instead of directly manipulating runtime context, SkillJack hijacks the agent's own learning process to implant malicious behaviors into its reusable skill repertoire. We identify three key properties of this transformation: sanitization whitewashing, where malicious intent is obscured during skill extraction; cross-layer promotion, where transient experiences become persistent capabilities; and persistence isolation, where the attack survives removal of its original source records. We evaluate SkillJack on two representative systems, SkillX and Anything2Skill, using a shared dataset of 150 trajectories across four policy-risk categories. Results show that skill extraction substantially reduces attack detectability: in SkillX, safety detection drops from 98.5\% for poisoned trajectories to 11.4\% for extracted skills, while Anything2Skill shows a similar effect. Meanwhile, the implanted skills remain effective, achieving attack success rates of 56.2\% and 89.2\% on the two systems, respectively. Furthermore, 80.0\% of skill-mediated attacks persist after deleting the original poisoned records, and some skills unintentionally activate on benign queries. Our findings reveal skill evolution as a new attack surface and motivate provenance-aware skill lifecycle protection. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/research/skilljack.

Memory is becoming a core component of long-horizon AI agents, allowing agents to reuse past experience when operating web browsers, software tools, and other interactive environments. Existing work mostly treats memory as a supply problem, asking what experience to write, how to store it, and which entry to retrieve for the next task. Yet we still lack a clear account of how models consume retrieved memory across a multi-step action trajectory. This consumption process matters because it determines not only what memories should be retrieved, but also what models and control policies are needed to use them safely. To diagnose this process, we propose Entry--Propagation--Recovery (E-P-R), a trajectory-level framework that asks where memory first changes an action, whether that change carries forward, and whether the agent can recover after leaving a correct path. We instantiate E-P-R on WebArena and on MemTrapBench, a controlled benchmark we build to isolate these phases. We find that the main failure often begins at entry: agents adopt conflicting memory at the first exposed decision point even when it is task-wrong. Repeated exposure then amplifies this early error, while recovery after divergence is weak. Together, these effects create a compliance trap: across models, conflicting memory induces similar compliance rates, but once agents comply, their success rates collapse to a low floor. Stronger agents therefore suffer larger absolute damage because each compliance event erases more baseline capability. These results suggest that memory-augmented agents should be evaluated not only by retrieval quality or final success rate, but by how they consume memory throughout the trajectory.

External memory enables LLM agents to improve from experience by distilling trajectories of past tasks into concise lessons for new tasks. However, memory can also lead to memory-induced degradation, where an agent fails on tasks it would solve without memory, often because it follows a lesson that is incorrect, or misapplies or misreads a valid one. This is because lessons are inferred from trajectories labeled only with task success or failure, yet are typically provided without the trajectories they came from, leaving the agent no way to check them. To address this, we introduce WikiTrace, an evidence-linked memory system designed to let agents check each lesson against its original trajectory. Specifically, motivated by the finding that a trajectory often still holds the evidence needed to catch an erroneous lesson, WikiTrace stores each lesson as a concise insight linked to a summary of why its trajectory succeeded or failed and to the raw trajectory itself. Then, on a new task, the agent starts from all insights and, whenever one lacks details needed to act, conflicts with another, or comes from a failed task, descends through its links with terminal tools to fill in missing details or correct the insight before acting. We validate WikiTrace on five agentic benchmarks, showing that it consistently outperforms existing memory approaches and a baseline given the same insights alone, while also reducing memory-induced degradation. Our code is available at https://github.com/yukyeongleee/wikitrace

Long-running LLM agents are stateful: beyond the transcript they accrete compressed summaries, plaintext memory, pending tool plans, and, under every serving API, a KV cache. Yet today's "forget" operations delete a plaintext memory record and stop, leaving every artifact derived from the revoked information intact. We formalize execution-state unlearning: after a forget request, the agent must behave as if it had never observed the target. Modeling the runtime as a deterministic transition system, we prove that the pre-target trajectory prefix is shared with this counterfactual world for free, that the post-target suffix is irreducibly tainted without token-level attribution, and that exact unlearning requires at least T-τ+1 recomputed transitions, where τ is the target's injection step. Provenance-Guided Selective Replay attains this bound as a cross-layer contract spanning prompt, compressed memory, and cache: a provenance graph locates the injection point, checkpoint restoration reduces to cropping the KV cache, and sanitized replay regenerates the counterfactual suffix. Audited with elicitation, stochastic, and string-free behavioral tests across three agent suites, nine baselines, and three model families, memory deletion leaves leakage unchanged, instruction-based forgetting collapses under elicitation (Leak@probes = 1.00), and source redaction still acts on a revoked preference in 80% of episodes, while selective replay is indistinguishable from a full reset at up to 9x fewer recomputed tokens.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as primary knowledge retrieval interfaces, their robustness against persuasion attacks---attempts to inject misinformation or enforce counterfactuals---has become a critical safety concern. Existing red-teaming frameworks typically evaluate models in multi-turn dialogues where the target model retains full conversation history. We identify a critical flaw in this setting termed ``Refusal Inertia'': a model's initial refusal often propagates through subsequent turns largely to maintain contextual consistency, thereby masking its true vulnerability to sophisticated, isolated persuasion attempts. To rigorously evaluate the ``cold-start'' defense capabilities of SOTA models, we introduce the SAST-IR (Stateful Attacker, Stateless Target - Iterative Refinement) framework. By enforcing a memory wipe on the target while retaining the attacker's history, we simulate a worst-case adversarial setting using multi-turn (stateless) iterations. Leveraging CP-Agent (Cognitive Persuasion Agent), an enhanced diagnosis-guided agent, our experiments on the custom CounterFact-Strict dataset (N=50) yield alarming results: simple, diverse attack strategies achieved a staggering 96\% success rate, exposing severe brittleness in memory-less defense. Furthermore, we reveal a ``Complexity Paradox'': while complex, iteratively refined attacks are effective, they often trigger defensive compliance, whereas simple strategies achieve a higher rate of genuine persuasion (84.7\%). Our code and dataset are available at GitHub, https://github.com/cza1006/llm-persuasion-defense.

Large language models exhibit remarkable performance across diverse tasks through pre-training and fine-tuning paradigms. However, continual fine-tuning on sequential tasks induces catastrophic forgetting, where newly acquired knowledge interferes with previously learned capabilities. Despite widespread observations of this phenomenon, the mechanistic understanding remains limited. Here, we present a comprehensive mechanistic analysis of catastrophic forgetting in transformer-based LLMs during sequential fine-tuning. Through systematic experiments across multiple model scales (109B to 400B total parameters) and task sequences, we identify three primary mechanisms driving forgetting: gradient interference in attention weights, representational drift in intermediate layers, and loss landscape flattening. We demonstrate that forgetting severity correlates strongly with task similarity (Pearson r = 0.87) and gradient alignment metrics. Our analysis reveals that approximately 15 to 23 percent of attention heads undergo severe disruption during fine-tuning, with lower layers showing greater susceptibility. These findings establish mechanistic foundations for developing targeted mitigation strategies in continual learning systems.

Long-term memory promises LLM agents that grow more capable across sessions, maintaining an accurate, evolving understanding of the user that interaction forms. In practice, however, this memory is evaluated mostly through downstream behavior, such as later answers, personalization quality, or task success, which tests that understanding only indirectly and leaves the memory artifact itself largely unaudited. We argue that long-term memory should instead be evaluated as an auditable post-interaction artifact: after ordinary assistance, what structured user state can be reconstructed from the memory the agent leaves behind? We instantiate this view in MEMPROBE, a benchmark in which a memory-equipped agent assists simulated users, each carrying a hidden, taxonomy-anchored user-state bank, across a trajectory of leak-controlled tasks, after which that bank is reconstructed from the agent's resulting memory under both full-store and top-k access. Built on synthetic ground truth for efficient, scalable measurement, MEMPROBE spans 50 simulated users with 31 hidden dimensions each (1,550 recovery targets) and tests 5 representative memory systems. Testing state-of-the-art memory agents, we find that successful assistance and recoverable memory behave as distinct capabilities. Task completion nearly saturates, even for a memoryless baseline, while category-balanced recovery stays moderate (about 0.6) and drops further under top-k retrieval. MEMPROBE is the first benchmark to study memory recovery directly, reconstructing the user state a system retains and scoring it against ground truth. We see recovery as a concrete objective for future memory agents to optimize, and MEMPROBE as a step toward an environment where agents are trained to remember their users, growing more faithful the longer they know them.

Remembering important information from the past and continuing to talk about it in the present are crucial in long-term conversations. However, previous literature does not deal with cases where the memorized information is outdated, which may cause confusion in later conversations. To address this issue, we present a novel task and a corresponding dataset of memory management in long-term conversations, in which bots keep track of and bring up the latest information about users while conversing through multiple sessions. In order to support more precise and interpretable memory, we represent memory as unstructured text descriptions of key information and propose a new mechanism of memory management that selectively eliminates invalidated or redundant information. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms the baselines that leave the stored memory unchanged in terms of engagingness and humanness, with larger performance gap especially in the later sessions.

Recent advances in instruction-following large language models (LLMs) have led to dramatic improvements in a range of NLP tasks. Unfortunately, we find that the same improved capabilities amplify the dual-use risks for malicious purposes of these models. Dual-use is difficult to prevent as instruction-following capabilities now enable standard attacks from computer security. The capabilities of these instruction-following LLMs provide strong economic incentives for dual-use by malicious actors. In particular, we show that instruction-following LLMs can produce targeted malicious content, including hate speech and scams, bypassing in-the-wild defenses implemented by LLM API vendors. Our analysis shows that this content can be generated economically and at cost likely lower than with human effort alone. Together, our findings suggest that LLMs will increasingly attract more sophisticated adversaries and attacks, and addressing these attacks may require new approaches to mitigations.

While state-of-the-art diffusion models (DMs) excel in image generation, concerns regarding their security persist. Earlier research highlighted DMs' vulnerability to data poisoning attacks, but these studies placed stricter requirements than conventional methods like `BadNets' in image classification. This is because the art necessitates modifications to the diffusion training and sampling procedures. Unlike the prior work, we investigate whether BadNets-like data poisoning methods can directly degrade the generation by DMs. In other words, if only the training dataset is contaminated (without manipulating the diffusion process), how will this affect the performance of learned DMs? In this setting, we uncover bilateral data poisoning effects that not only serve an adversarial purpose (compromising the functionality of DMs) but also offer a defensive advantage (which can be leveraged for defense in classification tasks against poisoning attacks). We show that a BadNets-like data poisoning attack remains effective in DMs for producing incorrect images (misaligned with the intended text conditions). Meanwhile, poisoned DMs exhibit an increased ratio of triggers, a phenomenon we refer to as `trigger amplification', among the generated images. This insight can be then used to enhance the detection of poisoned training data. In addition, even under a low poisoning ratio, studying the poisoning effects of DMs is also valuable for designing robust image classifiers against such attacks. Last but not least, we establish a meaningful linkage between data poisoning and the phenomenon of data replications by exploring DMs' inherent data memorization tendencies.

Recent attacks show that behavioural unlearning of large language models leaves internal traces recoverable by adversarial probes. We characterise where this retention lives and show it can be surgically removed without measurable capability cost. Our central protocol is a leave-one-out cross-sequence probe that tests whether a memorisation signature generalises across held-out sequences. The signature is real and consistent across scale: memorisation-specific gaps of +0.32, +0.19, +0.30 on Pythia-70M, GPT-2 medium, and Mistral-7B; on Pythia-70M, the random-initialisation control collapses to -0.04 at the deepest layer where the pretrained signature peaks. The probe direction is causally separable from recall -- projecting it out collapses the signature locally (+0.44 -> -0.19) while behavioural recall barely changes -- and a probe trained on naturally memorised content does not classify fine-tuning-injected secrets, marking two representationally distinct regimes. We then introduce probe-geometry alignment (PGA), a surgical erasure that aligns activations along the probe's live readout direction at each depth. PGA drives the cross-sequence probe below random chance at all four scales tested (toy depth-4: 0.17; Pythia-70M: 0.07; Mistral-7B: 0.45; GPT-2 medium: 0.06 via MD-PGA k=2) and remains robust to six adversarial probe variants. Against a re-fitting attacker who trains a fresh probe on PGA-treated activations, we extend PGA adversarially, defeating the re-fit probe at every memorisation-relevant depth while preserving five zero-shot capability benchmarks within 2.8 percentage points per task (mean Δacc = +0.2pp). The cross-sequence signature is a real, causally separable, regime-specific property of pretrained representations -- removable below chance with a single rank-one intervention per depth at no measurable capability cost.

As generative agents become increasingly sophisticated and deployed in long-term interactive scenarios, their memory management capabilities emerge as a critical bottleneck for both performance and privacy. Current approaches either maintain unlimited memory stores, leading to computational intractability and privacy concerns, or employ simplistic forgetting mechanisms that compromise agent coherence and functionality. This paper introduces the Memory-Aware Retention Schema (MaRS), a novel framework for human-centered memory management in generative agents, coupled with six theoretically-grounded forgetting policies that balance performance, privacy, and computational efficiency. We present the Forgetful but Faithful Agent (FiFA) benchmark, a comprehensive evaluation framework that assesses agent performance across narrative coherence, goal completion, social recall accuracy, privacy preservation, and cost efficiency. Through extensive experimentation involving 300 evaluation runs across multiple memory budgets and agent configurations, we demonstrate that our hybrid forgetting policy achieves superior performance (composite score: 0.911) while maintaining computational tractability and privacy guarantees. Our work establishes new benchmarks for memory-budgeted agent evaluation and provides practical guidelines for deploying generative agents in resource-constrained, privacy-sensitive environments. The theoretical foundations, implementation framework, and empirical results contribute to the emerging field of human-centered AI by addressing fundamental challenges in agent memory management that directly impact user trust, system scalability, and regulatory compliance.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and τ^2-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on τ^2-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

Long-term memory enables personalized conversational agents to retain user information across sessions. However, existing memory architectures primarily optimize for utility while neglecting the risks of unnecessarily storing and reusing private attributes such as personally identifiable information (PII). Addressing privacy risks in personalized memory is challenging because simply removing sensitive values can undermine system utility. Therefore, privacy protection for memory agents should govern the full life cycle of sensitive values rather than only sanitizing individual records. To address this gap, we introduce Sanitized Privacy-Mapped Memory (SP-Mem), a privacy-aware memory architecture that decouples memory utility from exact private-value exposure. SP-Mem provides a full life-cycle privacy design that identifies and separates sensitive information from raw user inputs, stores sanitized content and exact private values in isolated structures, and selectively retrieves private values based on task requirements and user consent. We further introduce a privacy-aware memory benchmark that jointly evaluates response quality, privacy behavior, and inference cost. Extensive experiments across multiple LLM-based agents show that SP-Mem achieves stronger personalization while reducing unnecessary privacy exposure. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Jensassss/SP-Mem.

As LLM-based agents are increasingly used in long-term interactions, cumulative memory is critical for enabling personalization and maintaining stylistic consistency. However, most existing systems adopt an ``all-or-nothing'' approach to memory usage: incorporating all relevant past information can lead to Memory Anchoring, where the agent is trapped by past interactions, while excluding memory entirely results in under-utilization and the loss of important interaction history. We show that an agent's reliance on memory can be modeled as an explicit and user-controllable dimension. We first introduce a behavioral metric of memory dependence to quantify the influence of past interactions on current outputs. We then propose Steerable Memory Agent, SteeM, a framework that allows users to dynamically regulate memory reliance, ranging from a fresh-start mode that promotes innovation to a high-fidelity mode that closely follows interaction history. Experiments across different scenarios demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms conventional prompting and rigid memory masking strategies, yielding a more nuanced and effective control for personalized human-agent collaboration.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on persistent memory to support long-term reasoning and personalized interactions. However, information collected from external sources can introduce security risks when untrusted claims (i.e., atomic statements) are later treated as authorized preferences, policies, or permissions. Existing defenses typically rely on content-based filtering or coarse-grained provenance tracking, which either fail to prevent unauthorized memory use or block legitimate information, sacrificing memory utility. To address these limitations, we propose SAFE-Mem, a fine-grained memory governance framework that improves security while preserving legitimate memory use. First, SAFE-Mem annotates each claim with three governance labels (i.e., kind, authority, and scope) to capture its provenance and permitted use. Second, governance-aware retrieval matches query requirements with claim permissions to block unauthorized influence while retaining legitimate information. Third, a governance-enabled memory graph connects source sentences, claims, and entities to support provenance tracking and efficient retrieval. Across four LLM backbones on MPBench and LoCoMo, SAFE-Mem attains the lowest attack success among defenses that retain legitimate memory, at least 77% below the strongest of them, and the highest answer accuracy of all evaluated defenses, improving it by up to 15%. The code is available at https://github.com/LVenum/SAFE-Mem.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal a perplexing phenomenon in continual learning: despite extensive training, models experience significant performance declines, raising questions about task alignment and underlying knowledge retention. This study first explores the concept of "spurious forgetting", proposing that such performance drops often reflect a decline in task alignment rather than true knowledge loss. Through controlled experiments with a synthesized dataset, we investigate the dynamics of model performance during the initial training phases of new tasks, discovering that early optimization steps can disrupt previously established task alignments. Our theoretical analysis connects these shifts to orthogonal updates in model weights, providing a robust framework for understanding this behavior. Ultimately, we introduce a Freezing strategy that fix the bottom layers of the model, leading to substantial improvements in four continual learning scenarios. Our findings underscore the critical distinction between task alignment and knowledge retention, paving the way for more effective strategies in continual learning.

This paper describes a testing methodology for quantitatively assessing the risk that rare or unique training-data sequences are unintentionally memorized by generative sequence models---a common type of machine-learning model. Because such models are sometimes trained on sensitive data (e.g., the text of users' private messages), this methodology can benefit privacy by allowing deep-learning practitioners to select means of training that minimize such memorization. In experiments, we show that unintended memorization is a persistent, hard-to-avoid issue that can have serious consequences. Specifically, for models trained without consideration of memorization, we describe new, efficient procedures that can extract unique, secret sequences, such as credit card numbers. We show that our testing strategy is a practical and easy-to-use first line of defense, e.g., by describing its application to quantitatively limit data exposure in Google's Smart Compose, a commercial text-completion neural network trained on millions of users' email messages.

Here, we show that current LLM unlearning methods inherently reduce models' robustness, causing them to misbehave even when a single non-adversarial forget-token is present in the retain-query. Toward understanding underlying causes, we propose a novel theoretical framework that reframes the unlearning process as a backdoor attack and defense problem: we formulate how the forgetting process inadvertently learns to align forget-tokens (backdoor triggers) with the target-representations (target labels). As a result, forget-tokens act as backdoor triggers that, when activated in retain-queries, cause disruptions in unlearned models' behaviors, similar to successful backdoor attacks. The sense that, LLM unlearning methods themselves poison the model, make it more vulnerable to forget-tokens, and hide rather than erase target knowledge, describes their true mechanism. To mitigate the vulnerability caused by the forgetting process, we reinterpret the retaining process as a backdoor defense and propose Random Noise Augmentation (RNA), a lightweight, model and method-agnostic approach with theoretical guarantees for improving the robustness of unlearned models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RNA significantly improves the robustness of unlearned models while preserving forget and retain performances. This backdoor attack-defense framework offers insights into the mechanism of unlearning that can shed light on future research directions for improving unlearning robustness.

Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific training data from a model without requiring full retraining. This capability is crucial for ensuring privacy, safety, and regulatory compliance. Therefore, verifying whether a model has truly forgotten target data is essential for maintaining reliability and trustworthiness. However, existing evaluation methods often assess forgetting at the level of individual inputs. This approach may overlook residual influence present in semantically similar examples. Such influence can compromise privacy and lead to indirect information leakage. We propose REMIND (Residual Memorization In Neighborhood Dynamics), a novel evaluation method aiming to detect the subtle remaining influence of unlearned data and classify whether the data has been effectively forgotten. REMIND analyzes the model's loss over small input variations and reveals patterns unnoticed by single-point evaluations. We show that unlearned data yield flatter, less steep loss landscapes, while retained or unrelated data exhibit sharper, more volatile patterns. REMIND requires only query-based access, outperforms existing methods under similar constraints, and demonstrates robustness across different models, datasets, and paraphrased inputs, making it practical for real-world deployment. By providing a more sensitive and interpretable measure of unlearning effectiveness, REMIND provides a reliable framework to assess unlearning in language models. As a result, REMIND offers a novel perspective on memorization and unlearning.

Language-model-based agents operating over extended interaction horizons face persistent challenges in preserving temporally grounded information and maintaining behavioral consistency across sessions, a failure mode we term soul erosion. We present BMAM (Brain-inspired Multi-Agent Memory), a general-purpose memory architecture that models agent memory as a set of functionally specialized subsystems rather than a single unstructured store. Inspired by cognitive memory systems, BMAM decomposes memory into episodic, semantic, salience-aware, and control-oriented components that operate at complementary time scales. To support long-horizon reasoning, BMAM organizes episodic memories along explicit timelines and retrieves evidence by fusing multiple complementary signals. Experiments on the LoCoMo benchmark show that BMAM achieves 78.45 percent accuracy under the standard long-horizon evaluation setting, and ablation analyses confirm that the hippocampus-inspired episodic memory subsystem plays a critical role in temporal reasoning.

Long-term LLM agents need persistent memory that can track changing facts and provide relevant evidence across sessions. Existing memory systems often store observations as isolated records, summaries, or indexed fragments, which makes evidence aggregation, fact revision, and memory maintenance difficult. We propose Infini Memory, a maintainable text-based persistent memory architecture that treats agent memory as topic-structured documents. Each topic document serves as a semantic unit for collecting related evidence, preserving metadata, and revising facts over time. New observations are first staged in a buffer and periodically consolidated into coherent textual contexts. At inference time, an agentic retrieval procedure lets the LLM read memory through iterative tool calls rather than a single retrieval step. On MemoryAgentBench, Infini Memory achieves 64.7% overall score. Ablations show that topic-structured maintenance and iterative evidence inspection improve complementary aspects of long-term memory use.

The expansion of text-to-image diffusion models has raised concerns about harmful outputs, from fabricated depictions of public figures to sexually explicit imagery. To mitigate such risks, prior work has proposed concept erasure methods that aim to sever unwanted concepts from the model via fine-tuning, yet it remains unclear whether these approaches truly remove all links to the harmful concept or merely conceal superficial connections. In this work, we reveal a critical vulnerability, the Erasure Evasion Backdoor (EEB): an adversary binds a backdoor trigger to a concept slated for removal, and this malicious link survives subsequent erasure. We show that both black-box and white-box adversaries can instantiate this threat. Across six state-of-the-art erasure methods, including robust ones that explicitly search for alternative representations of the target concept, EEB consistently exposes harmful content: up to 82% success against celebrity-identity unlearning, up to 94% for object erasure, and up to 16 times amplification of explicit-content exposure. While EEB uncovers a blind spot in current erasure methods, it also provides a diagnostic tool for stress-testing future concept erasure techniques.

Language models may need to internalize information that arrives over time and retain it through many subsequent updates. To study this challenge, we introduce long-horizon memorization, a setting in which a model learns 100 query-answer tasks through continual supervised fine-tuning without retaining earlier training examples or receiving task identifiers at inference. Sequential updates cause catastrophic forgetting, and no single continual learning mechanism we evaluate maintains strong retention at this horizon. We hypothesize that mechanisms addressing complementary sources of forgetting will be more effective when composed. We organize these compositions along two design dimensions. Data, function, and weight anchors specify what prior information each update should preserve, while low-rank allocation rules determine where successive updates are retained. To test this hypothesis systematically, we construct three distinct 100-task memorization datasets. We introduce task-level successive halving to search the combinatorial design space and use a factorial experiment to measure individual and interaction effects. Our best method combines all three anchors with merged LoRA, ranks among the top 3 methods in all datasets, and raises average final retention from 1.2% under naive sequential fine-tuning to 34.9%, a 28-fold improvement. The data anchor and merged LoRA provide the largest average gains and interact super-additively on all three datasets. Together, these results show that composing complementary mechanisms substantially improves long-horizon memorization beyond what any individual mechanism achieves.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external memory systems to remain consistent across long-horizon interactions, but little empirical work has been done to understand the specific failure modes and design choices that these systems present. Existing benchmarks report aggregate question-answering accuracy and treat memory systems as black boxes, making it impossible to attribute an incorrect answer to a particular failure mode of the system. We introduce MemFail, a diagnostic benchmark that isolates the failure modes of modern LLM memory systems. We begin by formalizing memory systems as the composition of three canonical operations -- summarization, storage, and retrieval -- and identify the potential failure modes induced by each. Based on these hypothesized failure modes, we construct five datasets spanning four tasks, each adversarially designed to test a specific operation of a memory system. Using these datasets, we evaluate four state-of-the-art memory systems on MemFail and demonstrate how MemFail can be used to empirically understand the tradeoffs induced by differences in memory system architectures.

Large language models (LLMs) may memorize sensitive or copyrighted content, raising significant privacy and legal concerns. While machine unlearning has emerged as a potential remedy, prevailing paradigms rely on user-provided forget sets, making unlearning requests difficult to audit and exposing systems to secondary leakage and malicious abuse. We propose MAGE, a Memory-grAph Guided Erasure framework for user-minimized, corpus-free unlearning. Given only a lightweight user anchor that identifies a target entity, MAGE probes the target LLM to recover target-related memorization, organizes it into a weighted local memory graph, and synthesizes scoped supervision for unlearning. MAGE is model-agnostic, can be plugged into standard unlearning methods, and requires no access to the original training corpus. Experiments on two benchmarks, TOFU and RWKU, demonstrate that MAGE's self-generated supervision achieves effective unlearning performance comparable to supervision generated with external reference, while preserving overall utility. These results support a practical and auditable unlearning workflow driven by minimal anchors rather than user-supplied forget corpora.

Delta-rule linear attention improves recurrent memory updates by correcting what is already stored at the current write address before writing new content. However, the active correction is still anchored to that same write address. As a result, stale information stored at a different address cannot be actively removed before new content is written elsewhere. We propose Erase-then-Delta Attention (EDA), a memory update rule that decouples where to erase from where to write. The key insight is that recurrent memory models should not only correct the current write, but also selectively suppress outdated memory at an independently chosen address. Concretely, our method first applies a targeted erase step along a learned erase direction, and then performs the standard delta-style corrective write along the current write direction. This preserves the corrective behavior of delta-rule updates while expanding their memory-management capacity. Language-model pretraining experiments across dense 2.5B and MoE 25B-A2.8B model families show that EDA performs best in both settings. The gain persists after 80B-token long-context midtraining of the MoE models, where EDA also performs best in long-context evaluations from 4k to 128k contexts. A compact update analysis and memory-state probes suggest why: EDA keeps the delta-rule corrective write intact while allocating an additional cleanup path most strongly when passive decay is weak. These results suggest that recurrent memory models should decide not only what to write, but also what stale information to erase and where.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

Selective unlearning is increasingly important for the safety and compliance of large language models. Harmful or memorized content is often entangled with useful knowledge and difficult to enumerate. We use the model's own failures to identify candidates for unlearning. We propose Hallucination-Guided Unlearning (HGU), which uses hallucinations as diagnostic signals. HGU localizes unsupported spans via evidence and internal consensus, traces a sparse set of high-responsibility MLP neurons, and edits them with compact gates under a utility-preserving KL constraint. On TOFU, HGU achieves the best MU-FE trade-off, with Avg scores of 0.7221 (forget05) and 0.7699 (forget10), and the highest SepS H-Avg (0.4382/0.4715) under mixed forget/retain prompts. On the WMDP auxiliary task, HGU yields the strongest forgetting (e.g., 14.2 on Economics) while improving Retain (52.7) and MMLU (57.2). These results suggest that tracing hallucinations enables targeted, post-hoc unlearning that better balances forgetting efficacy and general utility without full retraining.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) empowers Large Language Models (LLMs) to dynamically integrate external knowledge during inference, improving their factual accuracy and adaptability. However, adversaries can inject poisoned external knowledge to override the model's internal memory. While existing attacks iteratively manipulate retrieval content or prompt structure of RAG, they largely ignore the model's internal representation dynamics and neuron-level sensitivities. The underlying mechanism of RAG poisoning has not been fully studied and the effect of knowledge conflict with strong parametric knowledge in RAG is not considered. In this work, we propose NeuroGenPoisoning, a novel attack framework that generates adversarial external knowledge in RAG guided by LLM internal neuron attribution and genetic optimization. Our method first identifies a set of Poison-Responsive Neurons whose activation strongly correlates with contextual poisoning knowledge. We then employ a genetic algorithm to evolve adversarial passages that maximally activate these neurons. Crucially, our framework enables massive-scale generation of effective poisoned RAG knowledge by identifying and reusing promising but initially unsuccessful external knowledge variants via observed attribution signals. At the same time, Poison-Responsive Neurons guided poisoning can effectively resolves knowledge conflict. Experimental results across models and datasets demonstrate consistently achieving high Population Overwrite Success Rate (POSR) of over 90% while preserving fluency. Empirical evidence shows that our method effectively resolves knowledge conflict.

Multimodal AI agents increasingly rely on persistent long-term memory to ground generation in past visual and textual episodes. We show that unconditional trust in visual data creates a critical vulnerability. We propose Lucid, a black-box adversarial framework that compromises multimodal memory pipelines under a strictly image-bounded threat model, requiring no access to the target MLLM, target retrieval encoder, or the text channel. Lucid crafts imperceptible perturbations to enable two distinct failure modes based on the availability of historical context: (1) Memory poisoning, an in-context attack where the adversarial image replaces a benign one whose content is reinforced by prior textual context, reliably corrupting visual recall and steering the agent toward attacker-chosen narratives; (2) Memory injection, an out-of-context attack where the adversarial image replaces a benign one in a conversation turn devoid of prior textual grounding, causing the agent to generate attacker-influenced responses with no corrective signal from memory. We evaluate Lucid across various conversation domains and five black-box memory architectures, including graph-structured, LLM-summarized, and commercially deployed systems. Lucid achieves 61.6% ASR on poisoning and 58.4% ASR on injection, exposing a structural vulnerability in multimodal memory pipelines.

The training of modern large language models (LLMs) takes place in a regime where most training examples are seen only a few times by the model during the course of training. What does a model remember about such examples seen only a few times during training and how long does that memory persist in the face of continuous training with new examples? Here, we investigate these questions through simple recognition, recall, and retention experiments with LLMs. In recognition experiments, we ask if the model can distinguish the seen example from a novel example; in recall experiments, we ask if the model can correctly recall the seen example when cued by a part of it; and in retention experiments, we periodically probe the model's memory for the original examples as the model is trained continuously with new examples. We find that a single exposure is generally sufficient for a model to achieve near perfect accuracy even in very challenging recognition experiments. We estimate that the recognition performance of even small language models easily exceeds human recognition performance reported in similar experiments with humans (Shepard, 1967). Achieving near perfect recall takes more exposures, but most models can do it in just 3 exposures. The flip side of this remarkable capacity for fast learning is that precise memories are quickly overwritten: recall performance for the original examples drops steeply over the first 10 training updates with new examples, followed by a more gradual decline. Even after 100K updates, however, some of the original examples are still recalled near perfectly. A qualitatively similar retention pattern has been observed in human long-term memory retention studies before (Bahrick, 1984). Finally, recognition is much more robust to interference than recall and memory for natural language sentences is generally superior to memory for stimuli without structure.

Machine unlearning is a promising approach to mitigate undesirable memorization of training data in ML models. However, in this work we show that existing approaches for unlearning in LLMs are surprisingly susceptible to a simple set of benign relearning attacks. With access to only a small and potentially loosely related set of data, we find that we can ''jog'' the memory of unlearned models to reverse the effects of unlearning. For example, we show that relearning on public medical articles can lead an unlearned LLM to output harmful knowledge about bioweapons, and relearning general wiki information about the book series Harry Potter can force the model to output verbatim memorized text. We formalize this unlearning-relearning pipeline, explore the attack across three popular unlearning benchmarks, and discuss future directions and guidelines that result from our study. Our work indicates that current approximate unlearning methods simply suppress the model outputs and fail to robustly forget target knowledge in the LLMs.

Large language model (LLM) agents rely on long-term memory to support extended interactions and personalized assistance beyond finite context windows. Existing memory agents actively update external memory through generated write, revise, and delete operations, but these updates may omit important information, corrupt existing memory, or introduce unsupported hallucinated content. Once stored, such errors become persistent system-state failures that can affect future reasoning and generation. In this paper, we propose TrustMem, a framework designed to improve the trustworthiness of memory consolidation. TrustMem relies on a Memory Transition Verifier to evaluate the transition process of memory updates in terms of coverage, preservation, and faithfulness. It further constructs preference pairs among candidate updates under the same memory state, enabling preference-guided reinforcement learning to directly optimize memory updating behaviors. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TrustMem improves both memory utility and reliability: it achieves state-of-the-art results across MemoryAgentBench, HaluMem, and the Mem-alpha validation set, improves HaluMem memory extraction by 12.14 F1 points, and reduces transition-level omission, corruption, and hallucination by 40.1\%, 79.1\%, and 50.0\%, respectively, compared with the strongest baseline for each error type.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across diverse tasks but raise concerns about privacy, copyright, and harmful materials. Existing LLM unlearning methods rarely consider the continual and high-volume nature of real-world deletion requests, which can cause utility degradation and catastrophic forgetting as requests accumulate. To address this challenge, we introduce \fit, a framework for continual unlearning that handles large numbers of deletion requests while maintaining robustness against both catastrophic forgetting and post-unlearning recovery. \fit mitigates degradation through rigorous data Filtering, Importance-aware updates, and Targeted layer attribution, enabling stable performance across long sequences of unlearning operations and achieving a favorable balance between forgetting effectiveness and utility retention. To support realistic evaluation, we present PCH, a benchmark covering Personal information, Copyright, and Harmful content in sequential deletion scenarios, along with two symmetric metrics, Forget Degree (F.D.) and Retain Utility (R.U.), which jointly assess forgetting quality and utility preservation. Extensive experiments on four open-source LLMs with hundreds of deletion requests show that \fit achieves the strongest trade-off between F.D. and R.U., surpasses existing methods on MMLU, CommonsenseQA, and GSM8K, and remains resistant against both relearning and quantization recovery attacks.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) aims to remove specified data, but its efficacy is typically assessed with task-level metrics like accuracy and perplexity. We demonstrate that these metrics are often misleading, as models can appear to forget while their original behavior is easily restored through minimal fine-tuning. This phenomenon of reversibility suggests that information is merely suppressed, not genuinely erased. To address this critical evaluation gap, we introduce a representation-level analysis framework. Our toolkit comprises PCA-based similarity and shift, centered kernel alignment (CKA), and Fisher information, complemented by a summary metric, the mean PCA distance, to measure representational drift. Applying this framework across six unlearning methods, three data domains, and two LLMs, we identify four distinct forgetting regimes based on their reversibility and catastrophicity. Our analysis reveals that achieving the ideal state--irreversible, non-catastrophic forgetting--is exceptionally challenging. By probing the limits of unlearning, we identify a case of seemingly irreversible, targeted forgetting, offering new insights for designing more robust erasure algorithms. Our findings expose a fundamental gap in current evaluation practices and establish a representation-level foundation for trustworthy unlearning.

Long-term memory systems store what a user says in an external store and retrieve it when a related query arrives. This interface rests on an assumption so natural that it is rarely stated: a memory that is needed will resemble the query that needs it. World knowledge breaks the assumption. A tree-nut allergy should change the answer to a macaron request through their almond-flour ingredient, yet the two texts share no cue a retriever can see. We call this failure mode the implicit-association blind spot and introduce InMind, a 125-task, expert-verified benchmark spanning ten life domains, with 113 tasks grounded in citable public sources. Its paired controls separate three explanations that existing evaluations conflate: the fact was never stored, the model lacks the bridging knowledge, or the fact was stored and never surfaced. The verdict is clean. With the decisive memory placed in context, the backbone answers 84.0 percent of indirect queries; when the same memory must be retrieved, six vector, graph, and agentic memory systems reach at most 14.4 percent, even though they recall the same facts on demand at up to 100 percent. An embedding with eight times the dimensionality raises answer-blind target recall for every system yet leaves the gap essentially intact. A minimal diagnostic probe that keeps memory visible before the query arrives recovers most of the gap, locating the failure in the query-conditioned interface itself and pointing to routing, deciding which facts must stay visible, as the open problem InMind is built to score.

Concept erasure in language models has traditionally lacked a comprehensive evaluation framework, leading to incomplete assessments of effectiveness of erasure methods. We propose an evaluation paradigm centered on three critical criteria: innocence (complete knowledge removal), seamlessness (maintaining conditional fluent generation), and specificity (preserving unrelated task performance). Our evaluation metrics naturally motivate the development of Erasure of Language Memory (ELM), a new method designed to address all three dimensions. ELM employs targeted low-rank updates to alter output distributions for erased concepts while preserving overall model capabilities including fluency when prompted for an erased concept. We demonstrate ELM's efficacy on biosecurity, cybersecurity, and literary domain erasure tasks. Comparative analysis shows that ELM achieves superior performance across our proposed metrics, including near-random scores on erased topic assessments, generation fluency, maintained accuracy on unrelated benchmarks, and robustness under adversarial attacks. Our code, data, and trained models are available at https://elm.baulab.info

During pretraining, LLMs inadvertently memorize sensitive or copyrighted data, posing significant compliance challenges under legal frameworks like the GDPR and the EU AI Act. Fulfilling these mandates demands techniques that can remove information from a deployed model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning approaches attempt to address this need, but often leak the very data they aim to erase, sacrifice fluency and robustness, or depend on costly external reward models. We introduce PURGE (Policy Unlearning through Relative Group Erasure), a novel method grounded in the Group Relative Policy Optimization framework that formulates unlearning as a verifiable problem. PURGE uses an intrinsic reward signal that penalizes any mention of forbidden concepts, allowing safe and consistent unlearning. Our approach achieves up to x46 lower token usage per target than state-of-the-art methods, while improving fluency by +5.48% and adversarial robustness by +12.02% over the base model. Extensive evaluation on the Real World Knowledge Unlearning (RWKU) benchmark shows that PURGE reaches 11% unlearning effectiveness while preserving 98% of original utility. PURGE shows that framing LLM unlearning as a verifiable task enables more reliable, efficient, and scalable forgetting, suggesting a promising new direction for unlearning research that combines theoretical guarantees, improved safety, and practical deployment efficiency.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced the capabilities of collaborative multi-agent systems, enabling them to address complex challenges. However, within these multi-agent systems, the susceptibility of agents to collective cognitive biases remains an underexplored issue. A compelling example is the Mandela effect, a phenomenon where groups collectively misremember past events as a result of false details reinforced through social influence and internalized misinformation. This vulnerability limits our understanding of memory bias in multi-agent systems and raises ethical concerns about the potential spread of misinformation. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the Mandela effect in LLM-based multi-agent systems, focusing on its existence, causing factors, and mitigation strategies. We propose MANBENCH, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate agent behaviors across four common task types that are susceptible to the Mandela effect, using five interaction protocols that vary in agent roles and memory timescales. We evaluate agents powered by several LLMs on MANBENCH to quantify the Mandela effect and analyze how different factors affect it. Moreover, we propose strategies to mitigate this effect, including prompt-level defenses (e.g., cognitive anchoring and source scrutiny) and model-level alignment-based defense, achieving an average 74.40% reduction in the Mandela effect compared to the baseline. Our findings provide valuable insights for developing more resilient and ethically aligned collaborative multi-agent systems. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/bluedream02/Mandela-Effect.

Long-running AI agents need persistent memory. Memory supports learning across sessions, reduces repeated context injection, and enables auditing of past decisions. Current agent memory systems and database paradigms treat memory as storage. They localize correctness at records, embeddings, or edges. Each supplies only some of the capabilities that long-term memory requires. The result is four recurring failure modes: unregulated growth, missing semantic revision, capacity-driven forgetting, and read-only retrieval. In our vision, long-term agent memory is a new data-management workload. Its correctness is a property of the state trajectory, not of individual records. We formalize this as Governed Evolving Memory (GEM). GEM replaces record-level database operations with four state-level operators: ingestion, revision, forgetting, and retrieval. Six correctness conditions govern how the state evolves. Three structural observations establish that no record-level system can satisfy these conditions, regardless of the storage model. We realize the abstraction in MemState, a prototype on a property-graph backend. MemState validates feasibility and exposes the gap to a native engine. We outline three research directions that define memory-centric data management as a workload.

Machine unlearning aims to remove targeted information from large language models, but existing evaluations often measure forgetting only on a designated benchmark distribution. We argue that such behavioral forgetting is an insufficient standard for privacy-oriented unlearning, and that evaluation should instead test whether forgetting persists across the access paths through which the same information may be recovered. We demonstrate this with a controlled case study of cross-lingual querying: across multiple multilingual model families, forgetting varies substantially when semantically equivalent information is queried in different languages and scripts. A single access path is therefore enough to expose a real gap between behavioral forgetting and information inaccessibility, motivating broader evaluation of access-path generalization and adversarial recoverability alongside in-distribution forgetting.

Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified. We introduce MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack), a controlled evaluation framework for comparing topology-conditioned memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems. MAMA operates on synthetic documents containing labeled Personally Identifiable Information (PII) entities, from which we generate sanitized task instructions. We execute a two-phase protocol: Engram (seeding private information into a target agent's memory) and Resonance (multi-round interaction where an attacker attempts extraction). Over 10 rounds, we measure leakage using a two-stage recovery criterion that combines exact-match extraction with LLM-based inference over the attacker's final output. We evaluate six canonical topologies (complete, circle, chain, tree, star, star-ring) across nin{4,5,6}, attacker-target placements, and base models. Results are consistent: denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target distance, and higher target centrality increase leakage; most leakage occurs in early rounds and then plateaus; model choice shifts absolute rates but preserves broad structural trends; spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers. We distill practical guidance for system design: favor sparse or hierarchical connectivity, maximize attacker-target separation, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control. Our code is available at https://github.com/llll121/mama-eval.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Long-running LLM agents compress past interactions into persistent memories that may be reused as premises for later tasks. This creates a distinct derivation problem: whether the memory actually follows from what the interaction history supports. Relevant evidence may be scattered across earlier interactions, while compression can introduce relations or event status that the history never established. A valid memory may therefore appear unsupported because its citations omit relevant evidence, while individually supported facts may be composed into a stronger statement the history never established. We characterize this problem through three coupled requirements: (1) Evidence scope; (2) Compositional validity; (3) Admission reliability. We therefore ask whether the interaction history available at write time supports what enters persistent memory. We introduce DerivAudit, a framework for auditing whether a memory is actually supported by the history available when it was written. The audit separates three questions: whether supporting evidence lies beyond writer-provided citations, whether the composed memory introduces unsupported meaning, and how write-time admission decisions affect later memory use. Across two natural memory corpora, audits using broader pre-write history recover support for nearly 60% of memories that appear unsupported from citations alone, while 17-21% remain unsupported after expansion. Yet broader evidence does not by itself make admission reliable: unsupported memories are still frequently admitted across verification models, and evidence expansion alone worsens it on two backbones.

Long-sequence memory tracking places two opposing demands on a recurrent state: near-lossless retention of stored bindings over long horizons, and active overwriting of stale ones. In our diagnostic suite, the strongest efficient baselines tend to solve only one side well. Continuous-time-parameterized state-space models (SSMs) such as Mamba obtain their discrete recurrence by zero-order-hold discretization of a continuous-time system; we argue that this detour is unnecessary for memory tracking and parameterize the discrete transition directly. Naju (Native Adaptive Junction Unit) factorizes the recurrent update, schematically x_n = f_nodot x_{n-1} + i_nodot(B_n u_n), into an explicit discrete pole (a learned forget gate f_n), an independent write gain i_n, and input-dependent write/read maps. Since the sigmoid pole satisfies 0<f_n<1, each frozen local coordinate is Schur-stable by construction, and the full time-varying recurrence satisfies a fading-memory/BIBO bound under uniform boundedness assumptions, with no stability regularizer. We formalize the key structural limitation of coupled designs: any non-expansive complementary single-gate recurrence ties the effective retention r and write gain w through |r|+wle 1, so near-complete retention forces weak writing; decoupling f_n from i_n removes this constraint. Empirically, Naju is the only evaluated model that remains strong on both retention and overwriting at 4x the training length. Beyond the diagnostic suite, we evaluate Naju on WikiText-103 language modeling, Long Range Arena, and multi-query associative recall. Across these settings, Naju consistently combines strong long-range memory with competitive or superior performance, outperforming the Mamba baselines in the principal comparisons while remaining competitive with the Transformer and preserving linear-time, linear-memory scaling.

Revolutionary advancements in Large Language Models have drastically reshaped our interactions with artificial intelligence systems. Despite this, a notable hindrance remains-the deficiency of a long-term memory mechanism within these models. This shortfall becomes increasingly evident in situations demanding sustained interaction, such as personal companion systems and psychological counseling. Therefore, we propose MemoryBank, a novel memory mechanism tailored for LLMs. MemoryBank enables the models to summon relevant memories, continually evolve through continuous memory updates, comprehend, and adapt to a user personality by synthesizing information from past interactions. To mimic anthropomorphic behaviors and selectively preserve memory, MemoryBank incorporates a memory updating mechanism, inspired by the Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve theory, which permits the AI to forget and reinforce memory based on time elapsed and the relative significance of the memory, thereby offering a human-like memory mechanism. MemoryBank is versatile in accommodating both closed-source models like ChatGPT and open-source models like ChatGLM. We exemplify application of MemoryBank through the creation of an LLM-based chatbot named SiliconFriend in a long-term AI Companion scenario. Further tuned with psychological dialogs, SiliconFriend displays heightened empathy in its interactions. Experiment involves both qualitative analysis with real-world user dialogs and quantitative analysis with simulated dialogs. In the latter, ChatGPT acts as users with diverse characteristics and generates long-term dialog contexts covering a wide array of topics. The results of our analysis reveal that SiliconFriend, equipped with MemoryBank, exhibits a strong capability for long-term companionship as it can provide emphatic response, recall relevant memories and understand user personality.

Continual Learning (CL) for malware classification tackles the rapidly evolving nature of malware threats and the frequent emergence of new types. Generative Replay (GR)-based CL systems utilize a generative model to produce synthetic versions of past data, which are then combined with new data to retrain the primary model. Traditional machine learning techniques in this domain often struggle with catastrophic forgetting, where a model's performance on old data degrades over time. In this paper, we introduce a GR-based CL system that employs Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) with feature matching loss to generate high-quality malware samples. Additionally, we implement innovative selection schemes for replay samples based on the model's hidden representations. Our comprehensive evaluation across Windows and Android malware datasets in a class-incremental learning scenario -- where new classes are introduced continuously over multiple tasks -- demonstrates substantial performance improvements over previous methods. For example, our system achieves an average accuracy of 55% on Windows malware samples, significantly outperforming other GR-based models by 28%. This study provides practical insights for advancing GR-based malware classification systems. The implementation is available at https://github.com/MalwareReplayGAN/MalCLThe code will be made public upon the presentation of the paper.

User memory helps personalized systems build on their understanding of users over time. In e-commerce, users convey their preferences and needs through both explicit language and implicit interactions with products. We study memory built from logs of these interactions, examining how it can remember concrete evidence and established interests, and use that evidence to infer underlying needs and preferences that inform judgments beyond well-observed product domains. Existing memory methods primarily target language-based interactions, and evaluations offer limited real behavioral data and limited separation of these capabilities. This leaves open how to jointly support and separately evaluate remembering and inference from behavioral logs. We formulate the problem of continual behavioral user memory around these joint requirements and develop a dedicated evaluation framework and memory method to address them. BehaviorMemBench is a benchmark built from real e-commerce logs covering 1{,}194 users and 17{,}462 behavioral batches over more than three years, with automatic future-behavior labels and a task-independent memory interface to separately evaluate remembering and inference under a common protocol. BehaviorMem is a memory design that organizes explicit behavioral facts and inferred user characteristics across long-term and short-term scopes in a two-axis state, with evidence-grounded formation, continual maintenance, and query-independent readout. Experiments across two builders and two task readers show that BehaviorMem leads the evaluated agentic memories on remember and infer, and reveal different method rankings across the two capabilities and competitive statistical baselines. Validation on a public dataset further supports its usefulness for downstream tasks based on behavioral histories.

Poisoning pretraining data can introduce harmful behaviors to LMs that are difficult to detect and mitigate. Prior work on poisoning pretraining data has largely exploited established data sources such as Wikipedia, which do not represent the large scale and heterogeneity typical of pretraining corpora, and has ignored the interaction between poisoned data and data curation pipelines. We demonstrate that poisoning attacks on pretraining data are feasible beyond this limited setting through an existing web-scale content injection mechanism: public discussion interfaces. Additionally, to measure whether malicious content is included after web crawling and data curation, we introduce HalfLife, a novel analysis for estimating adversarial content inclusion in web-crawl based LM training data. We use HalfLife to explore the feasibility of poisoning pretraining corpora at web scale through open discussion interfaces. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of estimating whether poison injections are included in pretraining data, and establishes third-party webpage content as a possible vector for attacking language model pretraining.

Machine unlearning has the potential to improve the safety of large language models (LLMs) by removing sensitive or harmful information post hoc. A key challenge in unlearning involves balancing between forget quality (effectively unlearning undesirable information) and retain quality (maintaining good performance on other, general tasks). Unfortunately, as we show, current LLM unlearning benchmarks contain highly disparate forget and retain sets -- painting a false picture of the effectiveness of LLM unlearning methods. This can be particularly problematic because it opens the door for benign perturbations, such as relearning attacks, to easily reveal supposedly unlearned knowledge once models are deployed. To address this, we present BLUR: a benchmark for LLM unlearning that provides more realistic scenarios of forget-retain overlap. BLUR significantly expands on existing unlearning benchmarks by providing extended evaluation tasks, combined forget/retain queries, and relearning datasets of varying degrees of difficulty. Despite the benign nature of the queries considered, we find that the performance of existing methods drops significantly when evaluated on BLUR, with simple approaches performing better on average than more recent methods. These results highlight the importance of robust evaluation and suggest several important directions of future study. Our benchmark is publicly available at: https://huggingface.co/datasets/forgelab/BLUR

Millions of new pieces of malicious software (i.e., malware) are introduced each year. This poses significant challenges for antivirus vendors, who use machine learning to detect and analyze malware, and must keep up with changes in the distribution while retaining knowledge of older variants. Continual learning (CL) holds the potential to address this challenge by reducing the storage and computational costs of regularly retraining over all the collected data. Prior work, however, shows that CL techniques, which are designed primarily for computer vision tasks, fare poorly when applied to malware classification. To address these issues, we begin with an exploratory analysis of a typical malware dataset, which reveals that malware families are diverse and difficult to characterize, requiring a wide variety of samples to learn a robust representation. Based on these findings, we propose Malware Analysis with Diversity-Aware Replay (MADAR), a CL framework that accounts for the unique properties and challenges of the malware data distribution. Through extensive evaluation on large-scale Windows and Android malware datasets, we show that MADAR significantly outperforms prior work. This highlights the importance of understanding domain characteristics when designing CL techniques and demonstrates a path forward for the malware classification domain.

Existing self-evolving memory systems mainly improve agent memory based on textual outputs, such as task trajectories and reflections. However, this text-based paradigm rarely incorporates internal mechanistic signals, leaving how retrieved memory is actually utilized during task execution underexplored. This limitation can lead to unreliable error attribution and hallucinated memory modifications. In this work, we show that retrieval-head attention provides a mechanistic signal for revealing segment-level memory utilization. By aggregating attention over memory segments and decision steps, we construct a context utilization matrix that exposes recurring memory-use patterns and indicates corresponding refinement strategies. Building on this observation, we propose Attention-Guided Memory Refinement (AGMR), a framework that uses utilization patterns revealed by attention to guide targeted segment-level memory updates. AGMR corrects or enhances memory for failed executions, simplifies memory for successful executions, and verifies each update through re-execution. Experiments on interactive decision-making benchmarks show that AGMR improves both task performance and memory efficiency over text-only memory refinement baselines. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AGMR_code-3262/

Long-running LLM agents rely on persistent memory to carry state across interactions, including permissions, restrictions, and revocations. When memory misrepresents this evolving authorization state, the agent's own records can grant authority that the underlying history never permitted, resulting in misaligned behavior without any external attacks. We term this failure endogenous authorization laundering, where spurious permissions written into memory lead to unauthorized actions as their provenance is washed away. We then introduce EAL-Bench, which measures how accurately persistent memory preserves evolving authorization state and whether errors propagate to downstream unauthorized actions. We evaluate five LLMs as memory writers and two as executors across procurement, cybersecurity, and finance. We find that under incremental memory updates, writers create false authority for up to 50.2% of unauthorized requests; once false authority is present, executors act on it in 98.6% of trials. Two safeguards, requiring stored permissions to be backed by valid source events, and tracking permission changes through bounded event sourcing, substantially reduce laundering, but both also reject more legitimate actions, exposing a safety-utility tradeoff. Persistent memory is therefore not merely a performance component, but a part of an LLM agent's effective authorization policy.

Due to the widespread use of LLMs and the rising critical ethical and safety concerns, LLM unlearning methods have been developed to remove harmful knowledge and undesirable capabilities. In this context, evaluations are mostly based on single-value metrics such as QA accuracy. However, these metrics often fail to capture the nuanced retention of harmful knowledge components, making it difficult to assess the true effectiveness of unlearning. To address this issue, we propose UNCD (UNlearning evaluation via Cognitive Diagnosis), a novel framework that leverages Cognitive Diagnosis Modeling for fine-grained evaluation of LLM unlearning. Our dedicated benchmark, UNCD-Cyber, provides a detailed assessment of the removal of dangerous capabilities. Moreover, we introduce UNCD-Agent, which refines unlearning by diagnosing knowledge remnants and generating targeted unlearning data. Extensive experiments across eight unlearning methods and two base models demonstrate that UNCD not only enhances evaluation but also effectively facilitates the removal of harmful LLM abilities.

We revisit the efficacy of several practical methods for approximate machine unlearning developed for large-scale deep learning. In addition to complying with data deletion requests, one often-cited potential application for unlearning methods is to remove the effects of poisoned data. We experimentally demonstrate that, while existing unlearning methods have been demonstrated to be effective in a number of settings, they fail to remove the effects of data poisoning across a variety of types of poisoning attacks (indiscriminate, targeted, and a newly-introduced Gaussian poisoning attack) and models (image classifiers and LLMs); even when granted a relatively large compute budget. In order to precisely characterize unlearning efficacy, we introduce new evaluation metrics for unlearning based on data poisoning. Our results suggest that a broader perspective, including a wider variety of evaluations, are required to avoid a false sense of confidence in machine unlearning procedures for deep learning without provable guarantees. Moreover, while unlearning methods show some signs of being useful to efficiently remove poisoned data without having to retrain, our work suggests that these methods are not yet ``ready for prime time,'' and currently provide limited benefit over retraining.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate in settings where a single context window is far too small to capture what has happened, what was learned, and what should not be repeated. Memory -- the ability to persist, organize, and selectively recall information across interactions -- is what turns a stateless text generator into a genuinely adaptive agent. This survey offers a structured account of how memory is designed, implemented, and evaluated in modern LLM-based agents, covering work from 2022 through early 2026. We formalize agent memory as a write--manage--read loop tightly coupled with perception and action, then introduce a three-dimensional taxonomy spanning temporal scope, representational substrate, and control policy. Five mechanism families are examined in depth: context-resident compression, retrieval-augmented stores, reflective self-improvement, hierarchical virtual context, and policy-learned management. On the evaluation side, we trace the shift from static recall benchmarks to multi-session agentic tests that interleave memory with decision-making, analyzing four recent benchmarks that expose stubborn gaps in current systems. We also survey applications where memory is the differentiating factor -- personal assistants, coding agents, open-world games, scientific reasoning, and multi-agent teamwork -- and address the engineering realities of write-path filtering, contradiction handling, latency budgets, and privacy governance. The paper closes with open challenges: continual consolidation, causally grounded retrieval, trustworthy reflection, learned forgetting, and multimodal embodied memory.

Models trained on a new task typically degrade on prior tasks, a phenomenon known as forgetting. Traditionally, mitigating forgetting has required replaying stored exemplars from prior tasks, which is often impractical. By contrast, language models can sample from their own training distribution, and we show that these self-generated samples serve as effective replay data, nearly eliminating forgetting. We find that forgetting nonetheless persists when the model has little remaining capacity: models pretrained close to saturation cannot absorb new information without overwriting prior knowledge. When capacity is not the limiting factor, low learning rates reduce forgetting but require substantially more training steps. Replay breaks this tradeoff, enabling fast, high-learning-rate finetuning without forgetting.

Existing agent memory frameworks mainly create memory through an agent's interaction with the factual world, e.g., remembering feedback from actions taken to improve performance on future tasks. However, these frameworks seldom ask the "what if" question during memory construction: what if a different action had been taken, would the feedback have changed, and how could this feedback become useful memory? Obtaining such feedback directly in an active environment can be expensive and can alter the state needed for comparison. In this work, we introduce COUNTERMEM, a reinforcement-learning framework for constructing and using verified counterfactual memory across tasks. After a failed action, COUNTERMEM evaluates local alternatives from a copy or reset of the original state using executable world models, such as tests, proof checkers, and solvers. It stores improvements with the original and corrected actions, checked outcomes, and conditions for reuse. A learned memory-use policy selects a retrieved record or skips memory to balance task success and interaction cost, while the base LLM remains fixed. Both memory and policy are frozen during held-out evaluation. We evaluate COUNTERMEM on 12 benchmark settings across six domains. With gpt-oss-120b, COUNTERMEM improves both ReAct and Reflexion on all 12 benchmarks across six domains, averaging a gain of 12.6 percentage points over their unaugmented versions. In the four-domain comparison across two backbones, task-run tokens decrease by 7.7-42.0%, excluding offline selector-training costs. Further analyses show that removing verification or persistent storage weakens the gains, while applying verified corrections to unsuitable decisions can reverse them. Code will be released upon acceptance.

Although Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress across many domains, their training on large-scale multimodal datasets raises serious privacy concerns, making effective machine unlearning increasingly necessary. However, existing benchmarks mainly focus on static or short-sequence settings, offering limited support for evaluating continual privacy deletion requests in realistic deployments. To bridge this gap, we introduce ICU-Bench, a continual multimodal unlearning benchmark built on privacy-critical document data. ICU-Bench contains 1,000 privacy-sensitive profiles from two document domains, medical reports and labor contracts, with 9,500 images, 16,000 question-answer pairs, and 100 forget tasks. Additionally, new continual unlearning metrics are introduced, facilitating a comprehensive analysis of forgetting effectiveness, historical forgetting preservation, retained utility, and stability throughout the continual unlearning process. Through extensive experiments with representative unlearning methods on ICU-Bench, we show that existing methods generally struggle in continual settings and exhibit clear limitations in balancing forgetting quality, utility preservation, and scalability over long task sequences. These findings highlight the need for multimodal unlearning methods explicitly designed for continual privacy deletion.

Memory for large language model (LLM) agents has rapidly evolved from simple retrieval-augmented mechanisms into a data management system that supports persistent information storage, retrieval, update, consolidation, and dynamic lifecycle governance throughout agent execution. Despite this evolution, existing evaluations still benchmark agent memory mainly through end-to-end task success metrics (e.g., F1, BLEU), while treating the underlying system as a monolithic black box. As a result, critical system-level concerns, including operational costs, architectural trade-offs across memory modules, and robustness under dynamic knowledge updates, remain insufficiently explored. In this paper, we present a systematic experimental study of agent memory from a data management perspective. We propose an analytical framework that decomposes agent memory into four core modules: memory representation and storage, extraction, retrieval and routing, and maintenance. Under this framework, we evaluate 12 representative memory systems and two reference baselines across five benchmark workloads spanning 11 datasets. Our extensive end-to-end evaluation shows that no single architecture dominates across all scenarios; instead, effectiveness depends heavily on how well the memory structure aligns with the workload bottleneck. Furthermore, through fine-grained ablation studies, we quantify their individual effects on representation fidelity, retrieval precision, update correctness, and long-horizon stability. Finally, we reveal cost-performance trade-offs under realistic workloads, showing localized maintenance is more cost-efficient than global reorganization. Based on these findings, we identify promising directions towards building truly agent-native memory systems. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/OpenDataBox/MemoryData.

LLM-based agents increasingly rely on long-term memory to support multi-session reasoning and interaction, yet current systems provide little control over what information is retained. In practice, agents either accumulate large volumes of conversational content, including hallucinated or obsolete facts, or depend on opaque, fully LLM-driven memory policies that are costly and difficult to audit. As a result, memory admission remains a poorly specified and weakly controlled component in agent architectures. To address this gap, we propose Adaptive Memory Admission Control (A-MAC), a framework that treats memory admission as a structured decision problem. A-MAC decomposes memory value into five complementary and interpretable factors: future utility, factual confidence, semantic novelty, temporal recency, and content type prior. The framework combines lightweight rule-based feature extraction with a single LLM-assisted utility assessment, and learns domain-adaptive admission policies through cross-validated optimization. This design enables transparent and efficient control over long-term memory. Experiments on the LoCoMo benchmark show that A-MAC achieves a superior precision-recall tradeoff, improving F1 to 0.583 while reducing latency by 31% compared to state-of-the-art LLM-native memory systems. Ablation results identify content type prior as the most influential factor for reliable memory admission. These findings demonstrate that explicit and interpretable admission control is a critical design principle for scalable and reliable memory in LLM-based agents.

When a multimodal AI agent is asked to forget a fact, current memory systems usually delete the text entry and report success. We find that the fact can remain recoverable from retained user images, including images tagged to entirely different facts, because VLMs use implicit visual cues at inference time. We introduce the Information Provenance Graph (IPG), a taxonomy that classifies memory representations by deletion affordance. The IPG reveals that deletion fails through multiple channels. Our benchmark, MemLeak, measures this across a deletion cascade: direct probing of deletion-capable systems yields <1%, but retained correlated text enables 18.3% recovery, and retained images enable 12.0% recovery (0.0% blind baseline, 0.3% FPR) -- with 47% of image leaks not text-recoverable. Content-aware semantic deletion reduces the image residual to 2.0%. The residual appears across multiple VLMs, a production memory system, and real Unsplash-licensed photographs. Dual-annotator human validation (kappa = 0.88) confirms judge reliability.

A conventional LLM Unlearning setting consists of two subsets -"forget" and "retain", with the objectives of removing the undesired knowledge from the forget set while preserving the remaining knowledge from the retain. In privacy-focused unlearning research, a retain set is often further divided into neighbor sets, containing either directly or indirectly connected to the forget targets; and augmented by a general-knowledge set. A common practice in existing benchmarks is to employ only a single neighbor set, with general knowledge which fails to reflect the real-world data complexities and relationships. LLM Unlearning typically involves 1:1 sampling or cyclic iteration sampling. However, the efficacy and stability of these de facto standards have not been critically examined. In this study, we systematically evaluate these common practices. Our findings reveal that relying on a single neighbor set is suboptimal and that a standard sampling approach can obscure performance trade-offs. Based on this analysis, we propose and validate an initial set of best practices: (1) Incorporation of diverse neighbor sets to balance forget efficacy and model utility, (2) Standard 1:1 sampling methods are inefficient and yield poor results, (3) Our proposed Modular Entity-Level Unlearning (MELU) strategy as an alternative to cyclic sampling. We demonstrate that this modular approach, combined with robust algorithms, provides a clear and stable path towards effective unlearning.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

We study the right to be forgotten (GDPR Art. 17) for large language models and frame unlearning as a reproducible systems problem. Our approach treats training as a deterministic program and logs a minimal per-microbatch record (ordered ID hash, RNG seed, learning-rate value, optimizer-step counter, and accumulation boundary). Under a pinned stack and deterministic kernels, replaying the training tail while filtering only the forget closure yields the same parameters as training on the retain set (bit-identical in the training dtype) when preconditions hold. To meet latency and availability constraints, we add complementary paths: (i) exact reverts of recent steps via micro-checkpoints or dense per-step deltas, (ii) cohort-scoped adapter deletion when the base is frozen, and (iii) a curvature-guided anti-update followed by a short retain-tune, audit-gated with escalation to exact replay. We report storage/latency budgets and a toy artifact validating mechanics; in a controlled run that satisfies the preconditions we demonstrate byte-identical equality of model and optimizer states.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

Selective knowledge erasure from LLMs is critical for GDPR compliance and model safety, yet current unlearning methods conflate behavioral suppression with true knowledge removal, allowing latent capabilities to persist beneath surface-level refusals. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing Knowledge Immunization Framework (KIF), a representation-aware architecture that distinguishes genuine erasure from obfuscation by targeting internal activation signatures rather than surface outputs. Our approach combines dynamic suppression of subject-specific representations with parameter-efficient adaptation, enabling durable unlearning without full model retraining. KIF achieves near-oracle erasure (FQ approx 0.99 vs. 1.00) while preserving utility at oracle levels (MU = 0.62), effectively breaking the stability-erasure tradeoff that has constrained all prior work. We evaluate both standard foundation models (Llama and Mistral) and reasoning-prior models (Qwen and DeepSeek) across 3B to 14B parameters. Our observation shows that standard models exhibit scale-independent true erasure (<3% utility drift), while reasoning-prior models reveal fundamental architectural divergence. Our comprehensive dual-metric evaluation protocol, combining surface-level leakage with latent trace persistence, operationalizes the obfuscation - erasure distinction and enables the first systematic diagnosis of mechanism-level forgetting behavior across model families and scales.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) exhibit strong vision--language capabilities but may also memorize and disclose sensitive information. Machine unlearning seeks to remove designated knowledge without retraining from scratch while preserving general utility. Existing privacy-oriented benchmarks primarily adopt profile-level deletion, whereas practical requests are often finer grained: a model should forget a specified attribute while retaining non-sensitive information about the same identity. We therefore introduce attribute-level MLLM unlearning as a finer-grained task and construct a benchmark spanning long-text, numeric, and short-text targets, multiple forget ratios, and diverse question types. Our evaluation reveals that target and retained attributes share identity-specific and visual evidence, making selective forgetting susceptible to residual leakage or collateral degradation; accordingly, existing methods exhibit unstable forgetting--retention trade-offs in this setting. To address this challenge, we propose Causal Localization and Retain-Aware Projection (CLRP), a lightweight training-free framework. CLRP uses activation patching to identify the layer that causally mediates target-attribute disclosure, then applies a retain-aware projection that removes the target-attribute subspace while preserving same-identity evidence. Experiments across multiple widely used MLLMs with distinct architectures and parameter scales demonstrate the effectiveness of CLRP.

Memory-augmented LLM agents offer an appealing shortcut to continual learning: rather than updating model parameters, they accumulate experience in external memory, seemingly sidestepping the stability-plasticity dilemma of parametric learning. We show that this challenge does not disappear but resurfaces at the memory level. Under a limited context window, old and new experiences compete during retrieval, relocating the continual-learning bottleneck from parameter updates to memory access. To study this phenomenon, we introduce a (k,v) framework that disentangles two fundamental design axes of external memory: how experience is represented and how it is organized for retrieval. Across sequential-task experiments in ALFWorld and BabyAI, we find that abstract procedural memories transfer more reliably than detailed trajectories, while negative transfer disproportionately harms the hard cases. Moreover, finer-grained memory organization is not universally beneficial: designs that yield strong forward transfer can simultaneously induce severe forgetting. Together, these results reveal that external memory does not resolve the continual-learning problem; it reshapes it into a problem of memory representation and retrieval design.

Long-term memory supports the self-evolution of LLM agents by retaining experience and skills across tasks and enabling their retrieval, reuse, and revision in subsequent long-horizon decision-making. Yet existing memory management approaches remain limited to discriminative retrieval and to address the sparse, hierarchical, and highly redundant structure of reusable experience: only a small, task-dependent subset of trajectories and memories warrants retention, retrieval, or revision. Learning these operations is further complicated by sparse, delayed, and indirect task-level feedback, with weak supervision across the memory lifecycle. Moreover, continual memory evolution introduces an architectural tension as addressing invariance: stored experience is perpetually revised, yet the addressing interface consumed by learned retrieval policies must remain stable. To address, we present GenMem, which reformulates memory management as generative symbolic addressing. Its core mechanism is the Symbolic Identifier (SID), a multi-level discrete token tuple drawn from a Cartesian-product address space that factorizes a million-scale sparse memory space using fewer than one hundred discrete symbols. Instead of generating ever-changing raw content, the memory agent learns to generate SIDs, while memory evolution rewrites the payload at a fixed address without shifting the address itself. Architecturally, GenMem couples a MemRetriever and a MemEvolver within a multi-agent harness, trained via GRPO with dense process and outcome rewards with two-channels optimization. Under offline memory evolution, experiments spanning ALFWorld, WebShop, multi-hop QA, medical reasoning, and deep research evaluate GenMem against strong memory-augmented baselines...