Daily Papers

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external memory stores to retain information across conversations, typically via dense vector embeddings searched with approximate nearest-neighbor methods. The fruit fly's olfactory circuit computes a locality-sensitive hash of sensory input using a strikingly different mechanism - sparse random projection followed by winner-take-all competition - and prior work (Dasgupta et al., 2017) showed this scheme, dubbed FlyHash, preserves neighbor structure better per bit than conventional random-hyperplane hashing (SimHash) on several benchmarks. We apply FlyHash, to our knowledge for the first time, to LLM agent memory retrieval, and ask three questions a practitioner actually needs answered: does the quality advantage hold under a correctly matched-bit protocol (it does, robustly, across 10 seeds and four datasets spanning two modalities, with one specific, previously undocumented comparison pitfall identified and corrected along the way); does that advantage translate into real memory and latency savings, including against the dense-vector indexing (HNSW) practitioners default to today (no: at equal bits FlyHash's codes are larger and slower to compare than SimHash's, and HNSW dominates both hash methods at ordinary scale; a sparse-set comparison we introduce recovers most but not all of a naive latency gap, leaving hashing's practical case narrower and more specific than the quality result alone implies); and does the advantage survive genuine, non-circular agent-memory relevance labels rather than the nearest-neighbor-by-embedding proxy this literature otherwise relies on (it does). We report all three answers precisely, including the two that narrow rather than flatter the headline result, and release our implementation, a working agent-memory demo, and a full account of the methodological pitfalls we found and corrected.

Cross-modal optical-SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) registration is a bottleneck for disaster-response via remote sensing, yet modern image matchers are developed and benchmarked almost exclusively on natural-image domains. We evaluate twenty-four pretrained matcher families--in a zero-shot setting with no fine-tuning or domain adaptation on satellite or SAR data--on SpaceNet9 and two additional cross-modal benchmarks under a deterministic protocol with tiled large-image inference, robust geometric filtering, and tie-point-grounded metrics. Our results reveal asymmetric transfer--matchers with explicit cross-modal training do not uniformly outperform those without it. While XoFTR (trained for visible-thermal matching) and RoMa achieve the lowest reported mean error at 3.0 px on the labeled SpaceNet9 training scenes, RoMa achieves this without any cross-modal training, and MatchAnything-ELoFTR (3.4 px)--trained on synthetic cross-modal pairs--matches closely, suggesting (as a working hypothesis) that foundation-model features (DINOv2) may contribute to modality invariance that partially substitutes for explicit cross-modal supervision. 3D-reconstruction matchers (MASt3R, DUSt3R), which are not designed for traditional 2D image matching, are highly protocol-sensitive and remain fragile under default settings. Deployment protocol choices (geometry model, tile size, inlier gating) shift accuracy by up to 33times for a single matcher, sometimes exceeding the effect of swapping matchers entirely within the evaluated sweep--affine geometry alone reduces mean error from 12.34 to 9.74 px. These findings inform both practical deployment of existing matchers and future matcher design for cross-modal satellite registration.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

We report a way to make a frozen small language model both more capable and dramatically cheaper at once, without changing any weights. Verified knowledge is deposited once as a byte-exact key-value (KV) state artifact and later restored, by graft, into a fresh inference context. The restore is bit-exact: under a pinned deterministic configuration, the grafted logits are byte-for-byte identical to a fresh computation (SHA-256 equality), with zero KL divergence and 100% argmax agreement over fifty samples. We show that own-position graft is the unique numerically exact operating point on a model with floating-point rotary encoding, and we verify byte-exactness on two model scales (12B, 31B) and two GPU targets, one through a pre-registered replay. On AIME 2025, a frozen Gemma-4-12B moves from 80.0% to 93.3% once a verified solution library is grafted, above its own 77.5% and its 31B sibling's 89.2% published anchors. On the recurring case, eight problems the base model never solves within a 401,026-token budget are answered from cached verified solutions in 61 total decode tokens, a factor of 6,574 fewer tokens and about 8,700x less energy; the capability claim proper rests on held-out transfer (7 of 7 at 31B). The same byte-exact store widens usable context from 32,768 to 2,854,766 tokens at zero extra accelerator memory, and moves byte-identical between machines of the same architecture. We describe the system at the behavior level; the engine is proprietary, and every reported number is backed by committed input and output hashes so the scoring can be re-checked without it.

Despite recent advances in accuracy and efficiency, coarse matching remains an indispensable yet costly stage in existing semi-dense matchers due to dense token-level matching. We present UltraMatch, an ultra-efficient and scalable semi-dense matching framework that bypasses the quadratic computation and memory cost of dense token-level matching by routing only a small fraction of candidate matching paths. At its core, a lightweight Transport Path Router operates on coarse block representations to rank candidate target blocks for each source block and retain only a small set, restricting subsequent token-level matching to the selected paths and avoiding the construction of the full token-to-token matching matrix. We further design a sparse global Dual-Softmax that performs matching only over the routed block candidates while retaining global competition across the sparse matching space. Beyond matching acceleration, UltraMatch employs deployment-oriented structural reparameterization for feature extraction and a tiny fine matching head with shared parameters, further reducing inference cost and memory consumption. UltraMatch achieves competitive accuracy among semi-dense matchers, while running 1.67times faster than SuperPoint+LightGlue with only 0.44 GiB peak inference memory. Its scalability enables inference at up to 6K resolution on a single RTX 3090, whereas existing semi-dense matchers run out of memory before reaching 2K. Our routing strategy is also transferable, delivering about 2times end-to-end speedup in EDM and ELoFTR without accuracy loss. The project repository is available at https://github.com/JiajunLe/UltraMatch.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

The consensus that GCN, GraphSAGE, GAT, and EvolveGCN outperform feature-only baselines on the Elliptic Bitcoin Dataset is widely cited but has not been rigorously stress-tested under a leakage-free evaluation protocol. We perform a seed-matched inductive-versus-transductive comparison and find that this consensus does not hold. Under a strictly inductive protocol, Random Forest on raw features achieves F1 = 0.821 and outperforms all evaluated GNNs, while GraphSAGE reaches F1 = 0.689 +/- 0.017. A paired controlled experiment reveals a 39.5-point F1 gap attributable to training-time exposure to test-period adjacency. Additionally, edge-shuffle ablations show that randomly wired graphs outperform the real transaction graph, indicating that the dataset's topology can be misleading under temporal distribution shift. Hybrid models combining GNN embeddings with raw features provide only marginal gains and remain substantially below feature-only baselines. We release code, checkpoints, and a strict-inductive protocol to enable reproducible, leakage-free evaluation.

We introduce a new heuristic decoder, Relay-BP, targeting real-time quantum circuit decoding for large-scale quantum computers. Relay-BP achieves high accuracy across circuit-noise decoding problems: significantly outperforming BP+OSD+CS-10 for bivariate-bicycle codes and comparable to min-weight-matching for surface codes. As a lightweight message-passing decoder, Relay-BP is inherently parallel, enabling rapid low-footprint decoding with FPGA or ASIC real-time implementations, similar to standard BP. A core aspect of our decoder is its enhancement of the standard BP algorithm by incorporating disordered memory strengths. This dampens oscillations and breaks symmetries that trap traditional BP algorithms. By dynamically adjusting memory strengths in a relay approach, Relay-BP can consecutively encounter multiple valid corrections to improve decoding accuracy. We observe that a problem-dependent distribution of memory strengths that includes negative values is indispensable for good performance.

An important function of collaborative network intrusion detection is to analyze the network logs of the collaborators for joint IP addresses. However, sharing IP addresses in plain is sensitive and may be even subject to privacy legislation as it is personally identifiable information. In this paper, we present the privacy-preserving collection of IP addresses. We propose a single collector, over-threshold private set intersection protocol. In this protocol N participants identify the IP addresses that appear in at least t participant's sets without revealing any information about other IP addresses. Using a novel hashing scheme, we reduce the computational complexity of the previous state-of-the-art solution from O(M(N M/t)^{2t}) to O(t^2MN{t}), where M denotes the dataset size. This reduction makes it practically feasible to apply our protocol to real network logs. We test our protocol using joint networks logs of multiple institutions. Additionally, we present two deployment options: a collusion-safe deployment, which provides stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased communication overhead, and a non-interactive deployment, which assumes a non-colluding collector but offers significantly lower communication costs and applicable to many use cases of collaborative network intrusion detection similar to ours.

We implement and benchmark on IBM Quantum hardware the circuit family proposed by Violaris for estimating operational inter-branch communication witnesses, defined as correlations in classical measurement records produced by compiled Wigner's-friend-style circuits. We realize a five-qubit instance of the protocol as an inter-register message-transfer pattern within a single circuit, rather than physical signaling, and evaluate its behavior under realistic device noise and compilation constraints. The circuit encodes branch-conditioned evolution of an observer subsystem whose dynamics depend on a control qubit, followed by a controlled transfer operation that probes correlations between conditional measurement contexts. Executing on the ibm_fez backend with 20000 shots, we observe population-based visibility of 0.877, coherence witnesses of 0.840 and -0.811 along orthogonal axes, and a phase-sensitive magnitude of approximately 1.17. While the visibility metric is insensitive to some classes of dephasing, the coherence witnesses provide complementary sensitivity to off-diagonal noise. This work does not test or discriminate among interpretations of quantum mechanics. Instead, it provides a reproducible operational constraint pipeline for evaluating detectability of non-ideal channels relative to calibrated device noise.

Encrypted traffic classifiers are routinely reported at 95-99% accuracy. We show that on one of two public corpora, the same model and code score macro-F1 0.992 under the evaluation protocol standard in the literature and 0.567 under a protocol that keeps flows from one packet capture on one side of the split. Nothing changes but the partition (gap 0.426 over eight seeds, p = 0.008 after Holm-Bonferroni correction). The inflation is not a property of random splitting as such. On a month of backbone QUIC traffic, we evaluate five split protocols at eight seeds each: random, temporal and client-disjoint splitting are statistically indistinguishable from session-disjoint, while server-disjoint splitting costs 0.192 macro-F1 (d = 17.0, p = 0.008). Which axis matters depends on how the corpus was collected, in a way invisible from its label space. We give a diagnostic that identifies the right axis before any model is trained: single-identifier probes. A decision tree on the capture identifier alone reaches 0.983 under a random split and exactly 0.000 under session-disjoint splitting. Under this evaluation, a metric-trained flow embedding leads four deep baselines but does not beat gradient-boosted trees on twenty packet sizes. Five of our own pre-registered architectural claims fail: distance-based rejection of unknown applications beats softmax thresholding, but ablating every metric objective makes rejection better, because class separation correlates at r = -0.88 with rejection quality. Few-shot enrollment is flat within a corpus but, across corpora, five labelled flows per class recover 91% of the deficit left by failed zero-shot transfer. All splits, results, code and negative findings are released.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

The advent of 1-bit large language models (LLMs), led by BitNet b1.58, has spurred interest in ternary LLMs. Despite this, research and practical applications focusing on efficient edge inference for ternary LLMs remain scarce. To bridge this gap, we introduce Bitnet.cpp, an inference system optimized for BitNet b1.58 and ternary LLMs. Given that mixed-precision matrix multiplication (mpGEMM) constitutes the bulk of inference time in ternary LLMs, Bitnet.cpp incorporates a novel mpGEMM library to facilitate sub-2-bits-per-weight, efficient and lossless inference. The library features two core solutions: Ternary Lookup Table (TL), which addresses spatial inefficiencies of previous bit-wise methods, and Int2 with a Scale (I2_S), which ensures lossless edge inference, both enabling high-speed inference. Our experiments show that Bitnet.cpp achieves up to a 6.25x increase in speed over full-precision baselines and up to 2.32x over low-bit baselines, setting new benchmarks in the field. Additionally, we expand TL to element-wise lookup table (ELUT) for low-bit LLMs in the appendix, presenting both theoretical and empirical evidence of its considerable potential. Bitnet.cpp is publicly available at https://github.com/microsoft/BitNet/tree/paper , offering a sophisticated solution for the efficient and practical deployment of edge LLMs.

As large-scale multi-agent systems evolve, the communication protocol layer has become a critical yet under-evaluated factor shaping performance and reliability. Despite the existence of diverse protocols (A2A, ACP, ANP, Agora, etc.), selection is often intuition-driven and lacks standardized guidance. We introduce ProtocolBench, a benchmark that systematically compares agent protocols along four measurable axes: task success, end-to-end latency, message or byte overhead, and robustness under failures. On ProtocolBench, protocol choice significantly influences system behavior. In the Streaming Queue scenario, overall completion time varies by up to 36.5% across protocols, and mean end-to-end latency differs by 3.48 s. Under Fail-Storm Recovery, resilience also differs consistently across protocols. Beyond evaluation, we present ProtocolRouter, a learnable protocol router that selects per-scenario (or per-module) protocols from requirement and runtime signals. ProtocolRouter reduces Fail-Storm recovery time by up to 18.1% versus the best single-protocol baseline, and achieves scenario-specific gains such as higher success in GAIA. We also release ProtocolRouterBench to standardize protocol evaluation and improve reliability at scale.

Secure Aggregation protocols allow a collection of mutually distrust parties, each holding a private value, to collaboratively compute the sum of those values without revealing the values themselves. We consider training a deep neural network in the Federated Learning model, using distributed stochastic gradient descent across user-held training data on mobile devices, wherein Secure Aggregation protects each user's model gradient. We design a novel, communication-efficient Secure Aggregation protocol for high-dimensional data that tolerates up to 1/3 users failing to complete the protocol. For 16-bit input values, our protocol offers 1.73x communication expansion for 2^{10} users and 2^{20}-dimensional vectors, and 1.98x expansion for 2^{14} users and 2^{24} dimensional vectors.

Every production model is updated, by retraining, fine-tuning, quantization, or a silent vendor swap, and each update risks being worse than what it replaced. We formalize update promotion as certified paired risk-difference auditing. Our starting point is a support identity: the risk difference between two models lives on the inputs where they disagree, observable without labels. We build DISCERN, a sequential two-tier protocol. A zero-label tier certifies benign updates whose disagreement rate is below tolerance from unlabeled traffic alone. An audited tier labels only sampled disagreements through an anytime-valid confidence sequence, valid at every stopping time and under any label-routing rule, even an adversarial judge. We prove finite-sample validity and matching label-complexity bounds of order rho^2/eps^2 at the rate level, so exploiting free disagreement provably saves a factor 1/rho over any pairing-blind auditor, and the guarantee composes across an unbounded sequence of promotions from one error budget. Across 14,000+ replayed audit streams over 785 update pairs, including LoRA fine-tunes of language models up to 1.4B parameters, miscoverage is 0.0002 (nominal 5%), power 0.986 with zero false alarms, and 56% of benign updates certify with zero labels. Each audit emits a machine-checkable evidence record for post-market monitoring.

Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations. In this work we focus on attacker synthesis as a representative technique for protocol security, and on RFCs as a representative format for protocol prose description. Unlike other works that rely on rule-based approaches or use off-the-shelf NLP tools directly, we suggest a data-driven approach for extracting FSMs from RFC documents. Specifically, we use a hybrid approach consisting of three key steps: (1) large-scale word-representation learning for technical language, (2) focused zero-shot learning for mapping protocol text to a protocol-independent information language, and (3) rule-based mapping from protocol-independent information to a specific protocol FSM. We show the generalizability of our FSM extraction by using the RFCs for six different protocols: BGPv4, DCCP, LTP, PPTP, SCTP and TCP. We demonstrate how automated extraction of an FSM from an RFC can be applied to the synthesis of attacks, with TCP and DCCP as case-studies. Our approach shows that it is possible to automate attacker synthesis against protocols by using textual specifications such as RFCs.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

Independently trained domain specialists can be fused post-hoc into a single model that outperforms any individual specialist, and the gain is predictable: gain = 0.82 x divergence - 2.72 (R^2 = 0.856, n=6, 3-26% divergence). This enables practitioners to estimate cooperative value before committing compute. Below ~3.3% divergence, gains approach zero.In the KALAVAI protocol, contributors fine-tune copies of a shared checkpoint independently, then submit for lightweight MoE routing (500 steps). Gains are consistent: +7.72% at 410M (+/-0.02%, 3 seeds), +7.49% at 1B (+/-0.01%, 3 seeds), +6.53% at 6.9B, each over the best specialist. The router matches domain-oracle routing within <10^{-5} nats. Cross-lingual fusion (Tamil/Yoruba/Welsh/Code) achieves +21.76%, with Yoruba perplexity falling 41.9 to 7.7. A 20-contributor federation achieves +16.71% (+/-0.07pp, 3 seeds).Three requirements bound the protocol. Shared initialisation is necessary: checkpoint mismatch degrades routing. Frozen layers are optional below ~10,000 steps and beneficial beyond. Learned routing is essential: uniform averaging degrades by -1.2% vs. best specialist, while any trained router achieves oracle-optimal assignment.

Binary classical information is routinely encoded in the two metastable states of a dynamical system. Since these states may exhibit macroscopic lifetimes, the encoded information inherits a strong protection against bit-flips. A recent qubit - the cat-qubit - is encoded in the manifold of metastable states of a quantum dynamical system, thereby acquiring bit-flip protection. An outstanding challenge is to gain quantum control over such a system without breaking its protection. If this challenge is met, significant shortcuts in hardware overhead are forecast for quantum computing. In this experiment, we implement a cat-qubit with bit-flip times exceeding ten seconds. This is a four order of magnitude improvement over previous cat-qubit implementations, and six orders of magnitude enhancement over the single photon lifetime that compose this dynamical qubit. This was achieved by introducing a quantum tomography protocol that does not break bit-flip protection. We prepare and image quantum superposition states, and measure phase-flip times above 490 nanoseconds. Most importantly, we control the phase of these superpositions while maintaining the bit-flip time above ten seconds. This work demonstrates quantum operations that preserve macroscopic bit-flip times, a necessary step to scale these dynamical qubits into fully protected hardware-efficient architectures.

We explore the feasibility of deploying Bitcoin as the shared monetary standard between Earth and Mars, accounting for physical constraints of interplanetary communication. We introduce a novel primitive, Proof-of-Transit Timestamping (PoTT), to provide cryptographic, tamper-evident audit trails for Bitcoin data across high-latency, intermittently-connected links. Leveraging Delay/Disruption-Tolerant Networking (DTN) and optical low-Earth-orbit (LEO) mesh constellations, we propose an architecture for header-first replication, long-horizon Lightning channels with planetary watchtowers, and secure settlement through federated sidechains or blind-merge-mined (BMM) commit chains. We formalize PoTT, analyze its security model, and show how it measurably improves reliability and accountability without altering Bitcoin consensus or its monetary base. Near-term deployments favor strong federations for local settlement; longer-term, blind-merge-mined commit chains (if adopted) provide an alternative. The Earth L1 monetary base remains unchanged, while Mars can operate a pegged commit chain or strong federation with 1:1 pegged assets for local block production. For transparency, if both time-beacon regimes are simultaneously compromised, PoTT-M2 (and PoTT generally) reduces to administrative assertions rather than cryptographic time-anchoring.

Generating entanglement between distant quantum systems is at the core of quantum networking. In recent years, numerous theoretical protocols for remote entanglement generation have been proposed, of which many have been experimentally realized. Here, we provide a modular theoretical framework to elucidate the general mechanisms of photon-mediated entanglement generation between single spins in atomic or solid-state systems. Our framework categorizes existing protocols at various levels of abstraction and allows for combining the elements of different schemes in new ways. These abstraction layers make it possible to readily compare protocols for different quantum hardware. To enable the practical evaluation of protocols tailored to specific experimental parameters, we have devised numerical simulations based on the framework with our codes available online.

Recent advances in 1-bit Large Language Models (LLMs), such as BitNet and BitNet b1.58, present a promising approach to enhancing the efficiency of LLMs in terms of speed and energy consumption. These developments also enable local LLM deployment across a broad range of devices. In this work, we introduce bitnet.cpp, a tailored software stack designed to unlock the full potential of 1-bit LLMs. Specifically, we develop a set of kernels to support fast and lossless inference of ternary BitNet b1.58 LLMs on CPUs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that bitnet.cpp achieves significant speedups, ranging from 2.37x to 6.17x on x86 CPUs and from 1.37x to 5.07x on ARM CPUs, across various model sizes. The code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/BitNet.

When researchers ask whether two transformer layers are "equivalent" for compression, they often conflate distinct tests. Replacement asks whether one layer's map can substitute for another's in place; interchange asks whether two layers approximately commute when their positions are swapped. Both are output-grounded swap-KL probes, but they need not agree: on pretrained transformers the protocol gap can change which layers look safe to prune by several-fold under the same evaluator, especially when replacement distances are high. We measure both protocols across checkpoints and architectures. On a Pythia training trajectory (410M and 1.4B), the replacement-interchange gap grows from initialization to convergence. Under one matched WikiText-2 contract at 8B scale, Qwen3-8B enters a divergent regime: interchange-guided removal is several-fold safer than replacement-guided at the same layer budgets, while Llama-3.1-8B ties the two protocols for pruning cost even though interchange KL is lower, showing metric gaps need not map one-to-one to removal. Before layer removal or merging, score both swap-KLs on the target checkpoint; the diagnostic requires only unlabeled forward passes.

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures employ increasingly sophisticated routing mechanisms -- learned routers, multi-hop trajectories, token-dependent gating. We ask: does routing topology actually determine language modeling quality? We build a geometric MoE (ST-MoE) using cosine-similarity routing against learned centroids in a low-dimensional space (d_{space} = 64), requiring 80% fewer routing parameters than standard linear routers. Through 62 controlled experiments on WikiText-103 at 76--84M parameters trained to convergence (50K steps, 1.64B tokens), we find that routing topology does not determine asymptotic perplexity (PPL): five cosine-routing variants are statistically equivalent within a 1-PPL margin (Two One-Sided Tests [TOST], p < 0.05 for all 10 pairwise comparisons; 15 runs across 3 seeds, observed range 33.93--34.72). The finding extends to hash, random-fixed, and top-1 routing (single-seed; graceful 1.1--2.2 PPL degradation) and replicates on OpenWebText (0.03 PPL gap, 6 runs, 3 seeds each). A standard linear router with 5.3times more routing parameters reaches PPL 32.76, but iso-parameter cosine routing closes 67% of this gap -- the true mechanism advantage is sim1.2%. The mechanistic explanation is convergent redundancy: multi-hop updates are collinear (cos(Δh_0, Δh_1) = 0.805), implementing magnitude amplification rather than compositional reasoning; a single learnable scalar replicates multi-hop performance. As a practical payoff, zero-shot relative-norm halting saves 25% of MoE FLOPs at +0.12% PPL. Expert-level specialization and causal controllability -- which coexist with topology-level equifinality -- are explored in a companion paper.

Large language models (LLMs) in production systems face prompt injections, trojans (backdoors), and manipulation of automatic quality metrics. This thesis develops models, methods, and algorithms for evaluating and improving LLM robustness to adversarial input sequence variations. We propose R_stab(f), a generative robustness metric based on the Jensen-Shannon divergence between per-step output distributions under small input perturbations. For localized attacks we prove V(h) <= 1 - R_class(h), where R_class(h) is the probability that a decision operator h keeps its decision under small perturbations. For non-localized attacks we propose a calibrated empirical model. For LLM-as-a-Judge systems we develop ASA, an adaptive evolutionary black-box attack that reaches an attack success rate (ASR) of up to 73.8%, with transfer between open models up to 62.6%. On Trojan Detection Challenge 2023 data (Pythia-1.4B), surrogate triggers reach REASR ~0.99 while recall of the true triggers is ~0.17 against a baseline of ~0.14. On SaTML CTF 2024 we systematize four classes of bypasses of multi-layer defenses, which reduce the ASR from 90% to 15-25%. Committees of 5-7 heterogeneous models reduce the ASR for Gemma-3-4B by 47-55 percentage points, to 19.3% with 7 models. For agentic systems based on the Model Context Protocol (MCP), we propose AttestMCP, which attests tool calls with HMAC-protected packets at under 0.1 ms per call, and the Commit Boundary isolation pattern. On the MCPBench benchmark of 847 scenarios they reduce the average ASR from 53.7% to 12.4%. The methods are implemented in the JudgeGuard and TrojanArmor software suites and the MCPSec module.

Mixed-precision post-training quantization is a network compression method that assigns bits layer by layer, under a global memory budget using a small calibration set. The main difficulties are to overcome the combinatorial nature of the allocation problem and to manage the sensitivity to small, potentially corrupted databases. Hence, an efficient allocation method should be fast to compute and preserve model quality when calibration data are corrupted. To design such a method, we derive a layerwise probabilistic analysis of the quantization error that separates propagated error from the local perturbation introduced at a given layer. We use this local term to build a separable score for a simple allocation algorithm, that requires no external solver. The probabilistic nature of our approach brings robustness to corrupted data. On denoising tasks with DRUNet, with an average budget of 4 bits per weight, our method matches or improves state-of-the-art mixed-precision baselines under clean calibration, and is more robust to corrupted calibration, with PSNR gains of up to 7.5 dB under the tested corruptions. Experiments show bit-allocation speed-ups from 28x to 2,570x over the studied baselines. For quantized diffusion models, our experiments show that a direct application of our framework also improves the state-of-the-art.

Can a sender that only computes hashes, with a language model only at the receiver, transmit short human text more cheaply than a classical sender trained on the same domain? We answer with one pre-registered run on 1,000 English user utterances from Taskmaster-1. The primary endpoint is the cost per message to deliver 100% of the messages (hash bits, plus a 2-byte negative acknowledgement and the raw text when the first attempt fails), paired against an in-domain PPM order-1 sender. The hash-only sender delivered 857 of 1,000 messages on the first attempt and cost 192.8 bits per message, 18.4 bits more than PPM order 1 (95% bootstrap interval 10.9 to 26.3); by the pre-registered rule it spends more and is not equivalent within one byte. As secondary results we map measured sender memory against bits. The hash-only sender (8,190 B on a host build, keyed BLAKE2b tag included, as in every method) was the cheapest point in bits from 8,190 B up to, but excluding, PPM order 1 at 24,844 B, 45 to 46 bits below smaz2 and Unishox2; from PPM order 1 upwards, in-domain senders spend fewer bits, except order 2 pruned to 16 KiB. In airtime it loses to PPM order 1 on all five links priced, to Unishox2 on four, and to raw text with a tag on two, because each failure costs an acknowledgement frame and a fallback frame. A wider receiver search recovers half of the failures and makes the cost 7.7 bits lower than PPM order 1, at about three minutes of receiver time per failure, and still loses in airtime on four of five links. We report the measurement as a delimitation, with every deviation of the run.

Image steganography is an information-hiding technique that involves the surreptitious concealment of covert informational content within digital images. In this paper, we introduce {rm SCR{small EED}S{small OLO}}, a novel framework for concealing arbitrary binary data within images. Our approach synergistically leverages Random Shuffling, Fernet Symmetric Encryption, and Reed-Solomon Error Correction Codes to encode the secret payload, which is then discretely embedded into the carrier image using LSB (Least Significant Bit) Steganography. The combination of these methods addresses the vulnerability vectors of both security and resilience against bit-level corruption in the resultant stego-images. We show that our framework achieves a data payload of 3 bits per pixel for an RGB image, and mathematically assess the probability of successful transmission for the amalgamated n message bits and k error correction bits. Additionally, we find that {rm SCR{small EED}S{small OLO}} yields good results upon being evaluated with multiple performance metrics, successfully eludes detection by various passive steganalysis tools, and is immune to simple active steganalysis attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/Starscream-11813/SCReedSolo-Steganography.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

Traditional protocol fuzzing techniques, such as those employed by AFL-based systems, often lack effectiveness due to a limited semantic understanding of complex protocol grammars and rigid seed mutation strategies. Recent works, such as ChatAFL, have integrated Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide protocol fuzzing and address these limitations, pushing protocol fuzzers to wider exploration of the protocol state space. But ChatAFL still faces issues like unreliable output, LLM hallucinations, and assumptions of LLM knowledge about protocol specifications. This paper introduces MultiFuzz, a novel dense retrieval-based multi-agent system designed to overcome these limitations by integrating semantic-aware context retrieval, specialized agents, and structured tool-assisted reasoning. MultiFuzz utilizes agentic chunks of protocol documentation (RFC Documents) to build embeddings in a vector database for a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipeline, enabling agents to generate more reliable and structured outputs, enhancing the fuzzer in mutating protocol messages with enhanced state coverage and adherence to syntactic constraints. The framework decomposes the fuzzing process into modular groups of agents that collaborate through chain-of-thought reasoning to dynamically adapt fuzzing strategies based on the retrieved contextual knowledge. Experimental evaluations on the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) demonstrate that MultiFuzz significantly improves branch coverage and explores deeper protocol states and transitions over state-of-the-art (SOTA) fuzzers such as NSFuzz, AFLNet, and ChatAFL. By combining dense retrieval, agentic coordination, and language model reasoning, MultiFuzz establishes a new paradigm in autonomous protocol fuzzing, offering a scalable and extensible foundation for future research in intelligent agentic-based fuzzing systems.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

One of the fundamental challenges in enabling fault-tolerant quantum computation is realising fast enough quantum decoders. We present a new two-stage decoder that accelerates the decoding cycle and boosts accuracy. In the first stage, a partial decoder based on belief propagation is used to correct errors that occurred with high probability. In the second stage, a conventional decoder corrects any remaining errors. We study the performance of our two-stage decoder with simulations using the surface code under circuit-level noise. When the conventional decoder is minimum-weight perfect matching, adding the partial decoder decreases bandwidth requirements, increases speed and improves logical accuracy. Specifically, we observe partial decoding consistently speeds up the minimum-weight perfect matching stage by between 2x-4x on average depending on the parameter regime, and raises the threshold from 0.94% to 1.02%.

Recent advancements in Large Language Model (LLM) compression, such as BitNet and BitNet b1.58, have marked significant strides in reducing the computational demands of LLMs through innovative one-bit quantization techniques. We extend this frontier by looking at Large Inference Models (LIMs) that have become indispensable across various applications. However, their scale and complexity often come at a significant computational cost. We introduce a novel approach that leverages one-bit algorithm unrolling, effectively integrating information from the physical world in the model architecture. Our method achieves a bit-per-link rate significantly lower than the 1.58 bits reported in prior work, thanks to the natural sparsity that emerges in our network architectures. We numerically demonstrate that the proposed one-bit algorithm unrolling scheme can improve both training and test outcomes by effortlessly increasing the number of layers while substantially compressing the network. Additionally, we provide theoretical results on the generalization gap, convergence rate, stability, and sensitivity of our proposed one-bit algorithm unrolling.

In this work, we introduce a fast implementation of the minimum-weight perfect matching (MWPM) decoder, the most widely used decoder for several important families of quantum error correcting codes, including surface codes. Our algorithm, which we call sparse blossom, is a variant of the blossom algorithm which directly solves the decoding problem relevant to quantum error correction. Sparse blossom avoids the need for all-to-all Dijkstra searches, common amongst MWPM decoder implementations. For 0.1% circuit-level depolarising noise, sparse blossom processes syndrome data in both X and Z bases of distance-17 surface code circuits in less than one microsecond per round of syndrome extraction on a single core, which matches the rate at which syndrome data is generated by superconducting quantum computers. Our implementation is open-source, and has been released in version 2 of the PyMatching library.

Deepfake detectors remain vulnerable to transfer-based black-box attacks, in which adversarial examples are generated on a source surrogate model and transferred to a target model, unknown to the attacker. Yet how source--target compatibility shapes attack success remains poorly understood. Prior studies evaluate limited detector pools and rarely disentangle architectural from training factors. We conduct a controlled evaluation of adversarial transferability across 60 detectors spanning six backbones, two pretraining regimes, and five training-data configurations, using two attack procedures: AutoAttack (AA) and the Carlini--Wagner attack with Expectation over Transformation (CW--EOT). Matched comparisons reveal significantly higher transfer when source and target share an exact backbone, architecture family, pretraining regime, or training data. This compatibility structure is attack-dependent: exact backbone compatibility has the largest effect under AA, whereas shared pretraining and training data have the largest effects under CW--EOT. When transfer is averaged across non-target sources, mean attack success rate (ASR) is 7.21% under AA and 19.52% under CW--EOT. By contrast, a multi-source oracle combining both attacks attains a \(64.48\%\) mean ASR after excluding exact backbone and training-data matches, showing that source averaging can substantially understate target vulnerability. We release 240,000 adversarially perturbed images, complete pairwise transfer results, detector configurations, and evaluation code. These findings establish source--target compatibility and source-model selection as central dimensions of credible transfer-based black-box robustness evaluation.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

We propose a Semantic Ordered Statistics Decoder (sem-OSD), a soft decoder for short linear block codes carrying byte-streamed sources such as natural-language text. Sem-OSD injects a byte-level language-model (LM) prior into ordered statistics decoding (OSD) through a fused bit-level score that combines channel reliability with the LM prior, and uses it for the most-reliable basis (MRB) selection and the codeword candidate scoring. Sem-OSD enumerates two complementary test-error-pattern (TEP) families: a bit-flip family that flips up to m bits, and an LM-driven family of up to ω byte substitutions that reaches error patterns the bit-flip family cannot. The LM prior is computed by a byte-level Transformer fine-tuned for byte-level denoising. Simulation results show that, on AWGN, sem-OSD achieves block error rates (BLERs) below the finite-blocklength normal-approximation bound for uniform sources on both binary BCH(127,64) and shortened RS(16,8) over GF(256), exceeding Fossorier OSD by a 1.5 dB coding gain. On a Gilbert--Elliott burst-error channel, sem-OSD provides 4 dB and 1 dB of more coding gain than Berlekamp--Massey and OSD, respectively.

Polymarket has emerged as a prominent prediction market platform and one of the fastest-growing applications in DeFi. To achieve low-latency trading, it adopts a hybrid architecture that matches orders off-chain but settles them on-chain for final execution. This design creates a consistency gap we call Ghost Fills: an order that is successfully matched off-chain may later fail during on-chain settlement. To understand the security implications of this gap, we investigate such failed settlements by building GHOSTHUNTER, which reconstructs them from on-chain traces and attributes to concrete attack patterns. Across 1,952,440 reverted match-order transactions, we find that attackers exploit the time gap between matching and settlement to invalidate already matched orders before they are finalized on-chain. We then identify four attack vectors from these incidents: nonce bump, balance drain, allowance revoke, and proxy trap, realized via 35 evolving variants. These vectors allow attackers to selectively revert 980,133 filled orders, enabling risk-free prediction, arbitrage-bot hunting, and liquidity reward manipulation, realizing at least \1.49M in profit, which places 1.78 B USD at risk and 2.17 M POL (about \212 K) paid by operator. During peak hours, more than 24.3% of all filled orders reverted, causing de facto DoS attacks. We also find that code derived from the flawed contract still appears in 167 independent contracts across 10 chains holding at least 23 M in user funds, extending the impact beyond Polymarket. We have disclosed our evidence to affected parties, and the issue has been partially mitigated.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

We present ModularSubsetSelection (MSS), a new algorithm for locally differentially private (LDP) frequency estimation. Given a universe of size k and n users, our varepsilon-LDP mechanism encodes each input via a Residue Number System (RNS) over ell pairwise-coprime moduli m_0, ldots, m_{ell-1}, and reports a randomly chosen index j in [ell] along with the perturbed residue using the statistically optimal SubsetSelection (SS) (Wang et al. 2016). This design reduces the user communication cost from Θbigl(ωlog_2(k/ω)bigr) bits required by standard SS (with ωapprox k/(e^varepsilon+1)) down to lceil log_2 ell rceil + lceil log_2 m_j rceil bits, where m_j < k. Server-side decoding runs in Θ(n + r k ell) time, where r is the number of LSMR (Fong and Saunders 2011) iterations. In practice, with well-conditioned moduli (i.e., constant r and ell = Θ(log k)), this becomes Θ(n + k log k). We prove that MSS achieves worst-case MSE within a constant factor of state-of-the-art protocols such as SS and ProjectiveGeometryResponse (PGR) (Feldman et al. 2022) while avoiding the algebraic prerequisites and dynamic-programming decoder required by PGR. Empirically, MSS matches the estimation accuracy of SS, PGR, and RAPPOR (Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova 2014) across realistic (k, varepsilon) settings, while offering faster decoding than PGR and shorter user messages than SS. Lastly, by sampling from multiple moduli and reporting only a single perturbed residue, MSS achieves the lowest reconstruction-attack success rate among all evaluated LDP protocols.

We introduce BitNet b1.58 2B4T, the first open-source, native 1-bit Large Language Model (LLM) at the 2-billion parameter scale. Trained on a corpus of 4 trillion tokens, the model has been rigorously evaluated across benchmarks covering language understanding, mathematical reasoning, coding proficiency, and conversational ability. Our results demonstrate that BitNet b1.58 2B4T achieves performance on par with leading open-weight, full-precision LLMs of similar size, while offering significant advantages in computational efficiency, including substantially reduced memory footprint, energy consumption, and decoding latency. To facilitate further research and adoption, the model weights are released via Hugging Face along with open-source inference implementations for both GPU and CPU architectures.

As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy? The ERC-8004 protocol addresses this challenge with the first permissionless trust layer for AI agent economies, built around three on-chain registries for Identity, Reputation, and Validation. Despite its rapid adoption, the protocol has not been studied empirically, leaving it unclear whether the information it records provides a trustworthy basis for decision-making. To address this gap, we present the first empirical study of ERC-8004 across three chains: Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain (BSC), and Base, covering the period from protocol deployment through May 13, 2026. We crawl on-chain Identity and Reputation events, off-chain files, and x402 payment transactions. On the identity side, we find that most registrations are placeholders rather than active agents, with only a small fraction (3%, 4%, and 15% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exposing a valid ERC-8004 registration file with at least one live service endpoint. On the reputation side, we show that the Registry, as currently deployed, cannot function as a trust signal: values are not commensurable, feedback records are rarely grounded in verifiable interactions, and reputation can be manipulated at minimal cost. Consistent with these design weaknesses, we find that a substantial fraction of reviewers (73.5%, 59.2%, and 90.6% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exhibit coordinated Sybil behavior. After removing Sybil-flagged feedback, 15.8%, 77.9%, and 86.8% of rated agents, respectively, are left with no valid feedback. We then turn these findings into concrete recommendations for future revisions of ERC-8004. Our study yields actionable protocol-design implications and establishes an empirical baseline for research on AI agent markets.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how large language model (LLM) agents discover, describe, and call external tools. While MCP unlocks broad interoperability, it also enlarges the attack surface by making tools first-class, composable objects with natural-language metadata, and standardized I/O. We present MSB (MCP Security Benchmark), the first end-to-end evaluation suite that systematically measures how well LLM agents resist MCP-specific attacks throughout the full tool-use pipeline: task planning, tool invocation, and response handling. MSB contributes: (1) a taxonomy of 12 attacks including name-collision, preference manipulation, prompt injections embedded in tool descriptions, out-of-scope parameter requests, user-impersonating responses, false-error escalation, tool-transfer, retrieval injection, and mixed attacks; (2) an evaluation harness that executes attacks by running real tools (both benign and malicious) via MCP rather than simulation; and (3) a robustness metric that quantifies the trade-off between security and performance: Net Resilient Performance (NRP). We evaluate nine popular LLM agents across 10 domains and 405 tools, producing 2,000 attack instances. Results reveal the effectiveness of attacks against each stage of MCP. Models with stronger performance are more vulnerable to attacks due to their outstanding tool calling and instruction following capabilities. MSB provides a practical baseline for researchers and practitioners to study, compare, and harden MCP agents. Code: https://github.com/dongsenzhang/MSB

Multi-agent LLM systems are entering production -- processing documents, managing workflows, acting on behalf of users -- yet their resilience to prompt injection is still evaluated with a single binary: did the attack succeed? This leaves architects without the diagnostic information needed to harden real pipelines. We introduce a kill-chain canary methodology that tracks a cryptographic token through four stages (EXPOSED -> PERSISTED -> RELAYED -> EXECUTED) across 950 runs, five frontier LLMs, six attack surfaces, and five defense conditions. The results reframe prompt injection as a pipeline-architecture problem: every model is fully exposed, yet outcomes diverge downstream -- Claude blocks all injections at memory-write (0/164 ASR), GPT-4o-mini propagates at 53%, and DeepSeek exhibits 0%/100% across surfaces from the same model. Three findings matter for deployment: (1) write-node placement is the highest-leverage safety decision -- routing writes through a verified model eliminates propagation; (2) all four defenses fail on at least one surface due to channel mismatch alone, no adversarial adaptation required; (3) invisible whitefont PDF payloads match or exceed visible-text ASR, meaning rendered-layer screening is insufficient. These dynamics apply directly to production: institutional investors and financial firms already run NLP pipelines over earnings calls, SEC filings, and analyst reports -- the document-ingestion workflows now migrating to LLM agents. Code, run logs, and tooling are publicly released.

Generative AI and large language models (LLMs) are moving into the Internet of Things, yet most deployments assume cloud connectivity, and many IoT settings have intermittent, restricted, or no connectivity. We propose a connectivity-regime framework (C0-C4), a taxonomy of inference-time trust mechanisms, and signed, versioned knowledge packs as the update channel for disconnected regimes, and evaluate them on a Raspberry Pi 5 running fully local retrieval-augmented generation under network isolation, with three Qwen2.5 model sizes, three context sizes, and 300 SQuAD 2.0 questions. An empirically calibrated retrieval-score gate detects knowledge gaps almost perfectly (AUROC 0.97) but in-topic unanswerable questions poorly (0.68). A deterministic output validator converts malformed outputs into explicit abstentions with no observed loss of correct answers, while the NLI-based verifier we tested adds little; for the 7B model, 96% of substantive answers to unanswerable-labelled questions match normalized spans of the retrieved passages. A 3B model achieves the same gold-answer containment rate as a 7B model at less than half the latency and estimated energy, although the 7B model far more often exceeds a token-F1 threshold of 0.5; five retrieved passages lower correctness from 75% to 52% compared with three. Verifying a signed pack takes about 4.5 ms versus about 29 min for embedding its passages on the device; signature and hash checks alone accept six of nine tested update attacks that layered verification rejects. Yet a validly signed poisoned pack passes every pack check: on 30 previously correct questions, correct answers drop to zero and 14 return the injected answer. None of the mechanisms we evaluated establishes the truth of the evidence. We release code and data.

This report presents the Prime Collective Communications Library (PCCL), a novel fault-tolerant collective communication library designed for distributed ML workloads over the public internet. PCCL introduces a new programming model that enables dynamic peer joining and failure recovery. The library implements efficient collective operations like all-reduce while providing robust fault tolerance mechanisms that allow the system to continue operating even when peers fail or join during ongoing operations. We demonstrate that PCCL's design enables practical solutions to dynamic membership challenges in workloads with repeated operations and deterministic state advancement. Our implementation passes extensive stress tests across all major operating systems, showing reliable operation even under rapid peer churn and concurrent collective operations. By dispatching to multiple connections, we can efficiently utilize cross-continental long-fat-pipe TCP WAN links, in our experiments achieving up to 45 Gbit/s of bandwidth utilization across Europe and 25 Gbit/s across North America and Europe. PCCL's architecture enables easy implementation of distributed low-communication optimization strategies like DiLoCo, which significantly reduce communication frequency. Combined with quantization, this leads to a significant reduction in the bandwidth required for distributed training workloads. PCCL also allows for concurrent collective operations, which enables optimization strategies like async DiLoCo, which can completely hide communication overhead by implementing one-step delayed parameter updates. PCCL can facilitate exact bit-parity of the shared state across peers in all cases induced by graceful or abrupt peer churn. While PCCL exposes a C99 API, Python bindings are available which are compatible with PyTorch alongside FSDP. PCCL is available under the open source MIT license.

GossipSub is a new peer-to-peer communication protocol designed to counter attacks from misbehaving peers by controlling what information is sent and to whom, via a score function computed by each peer that captures positive and negative behaviors of its neighbors. The score function depends on several parameters (weights, caps, thresholds) that can be configured by applications using GossipSub. The specification for GossipSub is written in English and its resilience to attacks from misbehaving peers is supported empirically by emulation testing using an implementation in Golang. In this work we take a foundational approach to understanding the resilience of GossipSub to attacks from misbehaving peers. We build the first formal model of GossipSub, using the ACL2s theorem prover. Our model is officially endorsed by the GossipSub developers. It can simulate GossipSub networks of arbitrary size and topology, with arbitrarily configured peers, and can be used to prove and disprove theorems about the protocol. We formalize fundamental security properties stating that the score function is fair, penalizes bad behavior, and rewards good behavior. We prove that the score function is always fair, but can be configured in ways that either penalize good behavior or ignore bad behavior. Using our model, we run GossipSub with the specific configurations for two popular real-world applications: the FileCoin and Eth2.0 blockchains. We show that all properties hold for FileCoin. However, given any Eth2.0 network (of any topology and size) with any number of potentially misbehaving peers, we can synthesize attacks where these peers are able to continuously misbehave by never forwarding topic messages, while maintaining positive scores so that they are never pruned from the network by GossipSub.

Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

We study a basic question about cryptographic watermarking for generative models: how reliable can a watermark remain when an adversary is allowed to corrupt the encoded signal? To address this question, we introduce a minimal coding abstraction that we call a zero-bit tamper-detection code. This is a secret-key procedure that samples a pseudorandom codeword and, given a candidate word, decides whether it should be treated as unmarked content or as the result of tampering with a valid codeword. It captures the two core requirements of robust watermarking: soundness and tamper detection. Within this abstraction we prove a sharp unconditional limit on robustness to independent symbol corruption. For an alphabet of size q, there is a critical corruption rate of 1-1/q such that no scheme with soundness, even relaxed to allow a fixed constant false positive probability on random content, can reliably detect tampering once an adversary can change more than this fraction of symbols. In particular, in the binary case no cryptographic watermark can remain robust if more than half of the encoded bits are modified. We also show that this threshold is tight by giving simple information-theoretic constructions that achieve soundness and tamper detection for all strictly smaller corruption rates. We then test experimentally whether this limit appears in practice by looking at the recent watermarking for images of Gunn, Zhao, and Song (ICLR 2025). We show that a simple crop and resize operation reliably flipped about half of the latent signs and consistently prevented belief-propagation decoding from recovering the codeword, erasing the watermark while leaving the image visually intact.

Vision-language verifiers and routers must distinguish errors repairable by more reasoning from those caused by visual evidence never reaching the language model. This distinction lacks ground truth because annotators see full-resolution images while models receive preprocessed tensors. We introduce AliasForge to create cases where the relevant fact is provably absent from the interface. Fixed-point resampling makes the pre-rounding resize an exact integer linear map that can send nonzero integer perturbations to zero. Hiding a label-flipping perturbation there produces images with opposite step-correctness labels but bit-identical interface states. Every verifier therefore has the same output law on both members, giving pair-balanced accuracy exactly one half and zero gain from language-side repair. We prove that every fixed-point downscaler has such null vectors and bound their smallest size at the most common ratios, which rules out an 8-bit fit whenever the bound exceeds 255. From the resize configuration alone, a lattice criterion supplies realizable collisions and certifies their absence within the specified construction family. It resolves all 20 screened configurations, 17 as constructible and 3 as non-constructible. We construct certified pairs across three architectures and certify four additional processors, with zero decision-logit gap on all 18 scored pairs and none of the 18 controls. The pairs also screen routers that waste computation on re-attention or further reasoning. On natural items, per-item routing headroom exists, but no tested interface-only router improves over stopping. Our fiber ceiling bounds the headroom recoverable from the interface. Code: https://github.com/KurbanIntelligenceLab/aliasforge.

Security of model parameters and user data is critical for Transformer-based services, such as ChatGPT. While recent strides in secure two-party protocols have successfully addressed security concerns in serving Transformer models, their adoption is practically infeasible due to the prohibitive cryptographic overheads involved. Drawing insights from our hands-on experience in developing two real-world Transformer-based services, we identify the inherent efficiency bottleneck in the two-party assumption. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel three-party threat model. Within this framework, we design a semi-symmetric permutation-based protection scheme and present STIP, the first secure Transformer inference protocol without any inference accuracy loss. Experiments on representative Transformer models in real systems show that STIP has practical security and outperforms state-of-the-art secure two-party protocols in efficiency by millions of times.

Lately, post-training quantization methods have gained considerable attention, as they are simple to use, and require only a small unlabeled calibration set. This small dataset cannot be used to fine-tune the model without significant over-fitting. Instead, these methods only use the calibration set to set the activations' dynamic ranges. However, such methods always resulted in significant accuracy degradation, when used below 8-bits (except on small datasets). Here we aim to break the 8-bit barrier. To this end, we minimize the quantization errors of each layer separately by optimizing its parameters over the calibration set. We empirically demonstrate that this approach is: (1) much less susceptible to over-fitting than the standard fine-tuning approaches, and can be used even on a very small calibration set; and (2) more powerful than previous methods, which only set the activations' dynamic ranges. Furthermore, we demonstrate how to optimally allocate the bit-widths for each layer, while constraining accuracy degradation or model compression by proposing a novel integer programming formulation. Finally, we suggest model global statistics tuning, to correct biases introduced during quantization. Together, these methods yield state-of-the-art results for both vision and text models. For instance, on ResNet50, we obtain less than 1\% accuracy degradation --- with 4-bit weights and activations in all layers, but the smallest two. We open-sourced our code.

The DNA storage channel is considered, in which the M Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules comprising each codeword are stored without order, sampled N times with replacement, and then sequenced over a discrete memoryless channel. For a constant coverage depth M/N and molecule length scaling Θ(log M), lower (achievability) and upper (converse) bounds on the capacity of the channel, as well as a lower (achievability) bound on the reliability function of the channel are provided. Both the lower and upper bounds on the capacity generalize a bound which was previously known to hold only for the binary symmetric sequencing channel, and only under certain restrictions on the molecule length scaling and the crossover probability parameters. When specified to binary symmetric sequencing channel, these restrictions are completely removed for the lower bound and are significantly relaxed for the upper bound in the high-noise regime. The lower bound on the reliability function is achieved under a universal decoder, and reveals that the dominant error event is that of outage -- the event in which the capacity of the channel induced by the DNA molecule sampling operation does not support the target rate.

Quantum cryptography is arguably the fastest growing area in quantum information science. Novel theoretical protocols are designed on a regular basis, security proofs are constantly improving, and experiments are gradually moving from proof-of-principle lab demonstrations to in-field implementations and technological prototypes. In this review, we provide both a general introduction and a state of the art description of the recent advances in the field, both theoretically and experimentally. We start by reviewing protocols of quantum key distribution based on discrete variable systems. Next we consider aspects of device independence, satellite challenges, and high rate protocols based on continuous variable systems. We will then discuss the ultimate limits of point-to-point private communications and how quantum repeaters and networks may overcome these restrictions. Finally, we will discuss some aspects of quantum cryptography beyond standard quantum key distribution, including quantum data locking and quantum digital signatures.

The privacy concerns of providing deep learning inference as a service have underscored the need for private inference (PI) protocols that protect users' data and the service provider's model using cryptographic methods. Recently proposed PI protocols have achieved significant reductions in PI latency by moving the computationally heavy homomorphic encryption (HE) parts to an offline/pre-compute phase. Paired with recent optimizations that tailor networks for PI, these protocols have achieved performance levels that are tantalizingly close to being practical. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous end-to-end characterization of PI protocols and optimization techniques and find that the current understanding of PI performance is overly optimistic. Specifically, we find that offline storage costs of garbled circuits (GC), a key cryptographic protocol used in PI, on user/client devices are prohibitively high and force much of the expensive offline HE computation to the online phase, resulting in a 10-1000times increase to PI latency. We propose a modified PI protocol that significantly reduces client-side storage costs for a small increase in online latency. Evaluated end-to-end, the modified protocol outperforms current protocols by reducing the mean PI latency by 4times for ResNet18 on TinyImageNet. We conclude with a discussion of several recently proposed PI optimizations in light of the findings and note many actually increase PI latency when evaluated from an end-to-end perspective.

We investigate a failure mode of large language models (LLMs) in which plain-text prompts elicit excessive outputs, a phenomenon we term Overflow. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injection, Overflow arises under ordinary interaction settings and can lead to elevated serving cost, latency, and cross-user performance degradation, particularly when scaled across many requests. Beyond usability, the stakes are economic and environmental: unnecessary tokens increase per-request cost and energy consumption, compounding into substantial operational spend and carbon footprint at scale. Moreover, Overflow represents a practical vector for compute amplification and service degradation in shared environments. We introduce BenchOverflow, a model-agnostic benchmark of nine plain-text prompting strategies that amplify output volume without adversarial suffixes or policy circumvention. Using a standardized protocol with a fixed budget of 5000 new tokens, we evaluate nine open- and closed-source models and observe pronounced rightward shifts and heavy tails in length distributions. Cap-saturation rates (CSR@1k/3k/5k) and empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) quantify tail risk; within-prompt variance and cross-model correlations show that Overflow is broadly reproducible yet heterogeneous across families and attack vectors. A lightweight mitigation-a fixed conciseness reminder-attenuates right tails and lowers CSR for all strategies across the majority of models. Our findings position length control as a measurable reliability, cost, and sustainability concern rather than a stylistic quirk. By enabling standardized comparison of length-control robustness across models, BenchOverflow provides a practical basis for selecting deployments that minimize resource waste and operating expense, and for evaluating defenses that curb compute amplification without eroding task performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

We present GB-LSR (Global-Bandwidth Local Spectral Representation), a fixed-grid local spectral representation for continuous image reconstruction. The image domain is partitioned into non-overlapping square patches, each carrying coefficients for a truncated Fourier basis predicted from shared convolutional-encoder features. A single trainable scalar bandwidth is shared globally across all patches and images, and reconstruction at any continuous coordinate is a fixed-size basis contraction whose cost is independent of image size. We study three bandwidth-handling variants: a trainable global scalar (main), a fixed global scalar, and a per-patch bandwidth field. On a standardized native-reconstruction benchmark across Kodak, Set14, and Urban100, the main variant outperforms matched-budget amortized LIIF / LTE / WIRE re-implementations by 2.8-3.6 dB PSNR and 0.11-0.15 LPIPS, while running at roughly one-quarter of the slowest baseline's inference cost. The single global scalar suffices empirically: per-patch adaptive-bandwidth alternatives do not improve over it on either a closed-form locality diagnostic or an end-to-end ablation. In a separate arbitrary-scale super-resolution (ASR) extension, GB-LSR achieves competitive PSNR-Y under a canonical-style SR protocol and runs 1.44x faster than LIIF-RDN and 3.25x faster than LTE-SwinIR at x4; within the same extension, a variant trained and evaluated without 4-corner local-ensemble averaging gives a 1.77x speedup with 35% lower peak memory and negligible PSNR change, while additionally widening the RDN encoder from 64 to 96 channels gives a small positive PSNR shift with a 1.58x speedup and 31% lower peak memory. Native-reconstruction claims are scoped to the matched-budget amortized protocol, and ASR claims are scoped to a separate canonical-style SR protocol.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

Communicating state machines provide a formal foundation for distributed computation. Unfortunately, they are Turing-complete and, thus, challenging to analyse. In this paper, we classify restrictions on channels which have been proposed to work around the undecidability of verification questions. We compare half-duplex communication, existential B-boundedness, and k-synchronisability. These restrictions do not prevent the communication channels from growing arbitrarily large but still restrict the power of the model. Each restriction gives rise to a set of languages so, for every pair of restrictions, we check whether one subsumes the other or if they are incomparable. We investigate their relationship in two different contexts: first, the one of communicating state machines, and, second, the one of communication protocol specifications using high-level message sequence charts. Surprisingly, these two contexts yield different conclusions. In addition, we integrate multiparty session types, another approach to specify communication protocols, into our classification. We show that multiparty session type languages are half-duplex, existentially 1-bounded, and 1-synchronisable. To~show this result, we provide the first formal embedding of multiparty session types into high-level message sequence charts.

Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.

Quantization methods reduce the number of bits required to represent each parameter in a model, trading accuracy for smaller memory footprints and inference latencies. However, the final model size depends on both the number of parameters of the original model and the rate of compression. For example, a 30B 8-bit model and a 60B 4-bit model have the same number of bits but may have very different zero-shot accuracies. In this work, we study this trade-off by developing inference scaling laws of zero-shot performance in Large Language Models (LLMs) to determine the bit-precision and model size that maximizes zero-shot performance. We run more than 35,000 experiments with 16-bit inputs and k-bit parameters to examine which zero-shot quantization methods improve scaling for 3 to 8-bit precision at scales of 19M to 176B parameters across the LLM families BLOOM, OPT, NeoX/Pythia, and GPT-2. We find that it is challenging to improve the bit-level scaling trade-off, with the only improvements being the use of a small block size -- splitting the parameters into small independently quantized blocks -- and the quantization data type being used (e.g., Int vs Float). Overall, our findings show that {4-bit} precision is almost universally optimal for total model bits and zero-shot accuracy.

We identify the Spectral Energy Gain in extreme model compression, where low-rank binary approximations outperform tiny-rank floating-point baselines for heavy-tailed spectra. However, prior attempts fail to realize this potential, trailing state-of-the-art 1-bit methods. We attribute this degradation to Latent Geometry Misalignment: standard singular vectors exhibit high coherence (spiky distribution), the worst-case geometry for binary quantization. To realize this gain, we propose LittleBit-2, a framework employing Internal Latent Rotation and Joint Iterative Quantization (Joint-ITQ). This approach acts as a geometric preconditioner, aligning coherent latent distributions with the binary hypercube with zero inference overhead. Empirically, LittleBit-2 establishes a new state-of-the-art in the sub-1-bit regime (1sim0.1 bpp) on Llama-2 and Llama-3, matching the fidelity of leading 1-bit baselines.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

A coding agent must emit a valid tool call--a parseable invocation of a tool in the provided schema--before the harness can execute its chosen action. We study how local serving stacks affect this protocol step and show that measured outcomes can depend on the serving layer rather than model behavior alone. In Ollama, the default tools= request is gated per model by a static template flag: some models are accepted and return calls as text, some return native tool_calls, while Phi-3 and Gemma-3 are rejected before inference. In our harness, rejection and retry exhaustion are not preserved as structured failure metadata, so downstream analysis can misclassify them as model non-calls and naively report 0% fidelity. Adding a text tool list while retaining the native channel recovers much of the measured fidelity for accepted models, whereas a uniform text protocol reduces fidelity for Llama-3.2, which has native tool-call support. Cross-stack probes on Ollama, llama.cpp, vLLM, and SGLang show different handling of the same request. Constrained decoding removes parse failures but can induce non-termination, and turn-pooled versus per-instance estimates differ by up to about 55 points. We conclude with a checklist for treating serving behavior as part of the evaluation protocol.

Practitioners of prompt-composed agentic systems report a recurring failure mode: editing one prompt module silently shifts the behavior of others despite no shared variable or executable dependency. We formalize this as compositional behavioral leakage (CBL): interference between modules sharing a context window. CBL is enabled by architectural non-isolation: transformer self-attention provides no formal boundary between concatenated modules. We probe CBL on a deployed job-evaluation agent (Claude Sonnet 4.6, 144 trials) through a reusable three-channel protocol that perturbs non-focal modules along volume, content, and form. Only the content channel produces a detectable paired effect (Cohen's d = 0.63, bootstrap 95% CI excluding zero); no recommendation flipped -- a sub-threshold regime invisible to standard QA but compounding across the thousands of decisions a deployed agent makes. CBL is orthogonal to known agent-failure axes (adversarial injection, cognitive degradation, multi-agent fault propagation, privacy leakage). We contribute an operational definition, a reusable protocol, a falsifiable prediction set, and a system-class characterization, establishing cross-module interference measurement as a requirement for prompt-composed agent evaluation.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models produce routing information during inference that may be logged or exposed for monitoring, debugging, load analysis, and safety auditing. Unlike ordinary model outputs, this telemetry reveals a view of the model's internal computation, raising a privacy question: can it reveal whether an example was used to fine-tune the deployed model? We introduce a router-augmented membership inference attack that combines conventional output-side signals with aggregated routing features and applies a membership classifier learned from independently fine-tuned shadow models to the target model. Across three MoE architectures and three data domains, router telemetry consistently improves membership inference over a strong output-signal ensemble, increasing TPR at 1\% FPR by 2.7--9.4 percentage points across all nine settings. The leakage persists across full fine-tuning, frozen-router training, LoRA, and instruction tuning, and remains observable with only discrete expert selections, restricted telemetry, or a single shadow model. Mechanistic analysis further shows that the leakage does not require router-specific memorization: fine-tuning introduces membership information into hidden representations, while the router exposes a projection of this signal even when its parameters are frozen. Perturbing the telemetry reduces this additional leakage only as its fidelity degrades. Our results show that router telemetry can turn an operational signal into an additional privacy surface for fine-tuned MoE models.

Speech quality predictors are increasingly used as rewards, yet no agreed measure of their hackability exists. The usual measurement has two flaws. First, the perturbation reaches the predictor through a processing chain -- here a neural codec -- that shifts the score on its own, which scoring against the raw input charges to the attack. Referencing the unperturbed round trip instead changes measured hackability by up to a factor of four (0.31 to 0.08 for one defence). Second, one trained attacker is a sample, not a measurement: five attackers differing only in random seed reach success rates from 0.00 to 0.38 against one fixed predictor, so a defence claim needs the worst case over several. Under this protocol, four published predictors differ widely: NISQA is hacked on 90% of utterances, SSL-MOS on 21%, DNSMOS on 14% and UTMOS on 6%. We then audit a closed attack-detect-patch loop. It hardens the predictor only in its own attack space, by less than the spread between attackers; a random-perturbation baseline matches it; and it costs up to 0.30 system SRCC out of domain. Enhancers post-trained against patched predictors hack them far less (PESQ -0.03 versus -0.23). Code, preregistration and run outputs are released.

Foundation models succeed when they learn in the native structure of a modality, whether morphology-respecting tokens in language or pixels in vision. Wireless packet traces deserve the same treatment: meaning emerges from layered headers, typed fields, timing gaps, and cross-packet state machines, not flat strings. We present Plume (Protocol Language Understanding Model for Exchanges), a compact 140M-parameter foundation model for 802.11 traces that learns from structured PDML dissections. A protocol-aware tokenizer splits along the dissector field tree, emits gap tokens for timing, and normalizes identifiers, yielding 6.2x shorter sequences than BPE with higher per token information density. Trained on a curated corpus, Plume achieves 74-97% next-packet token accuracy across five real-world failure categories and AUROC >= 0.99 for zero-shot anomaly detection. On the same prediction task, frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.6, GPT-5.4) score comparably despite receiving identical protocol context, yet Plume does so with > 600x fewer parameters, fitting on a single GPU at effectively zero marginal cost vs. cloud API pricing, enabling on-prem, privacy-preserving root cause analysis.

Unsupervised hashing methods typically aim to preserve the similarity between data points in a feature space by mapping them to binary hash codes. However, these methods often overlook the fact that the similarity between data points in the continuous feature space may not be preserved in the discrete hash code space, due to the limited similarity range of hash codes. The similarity range is bounded by the code length and can lead to a problem known as similarity collapse. That is, the positive and negative pairs of data points become less distinguishable from each other in the hash space. To alleviate this problem, in this paper a novel Similarity Distribution Calibration (SDC) method is introduced. SDC aligns the hash code similarity distribution towards a calibration distribution (e.g., beta distribution) with sufficient spread across the entire similarity range, thus alleviating the similarity collapse problem. Extensive experiments show that our SDC outperforms significantly the state-of-the-art alternatives on coarse category-level and instance-level image retrieval. Code is available at https://github.com/kamwoh/sdc.

We present a systems-security case study of a two-node split-LLM training system whose privacy evaluation passed while leaving an observable channel untested. The Trusted Local Node (TLN) sends protected activations to the Untrusted Cloud Node (UCN), the UCN returns its output, and TLN, holding the private loss, returns the output gradient. The frame the UCN receives mixes real rows with decoys, and the loss ignores the decoys. Their gradients are exactly zero, so the pattern of zeros reveals which rows were real. We measure it with a protocol fixed in advance: a leak injected at known strength to prove the instrument can see one, a shuffled-label control to prove it does not report absent leaks, and a threshold set before the runs. Across nine seeds, the zeros identified the real rows on every frame, 4,096 of 4,096 per run. An attack on the frame contents recovered about one extra token per hundred over a constant-guess baseline (+0.65 to +1.50 percentage points); the shuffled controls recovered nothing. A second set of runs repeated this on a configuration that keeps model quality within budget, so the finding is not confined to a setting nobody would deploy. On both datasets, every such run passed the forward-channel privacy check and the quality check, yet failed that same check once the returned gradient was included. Clipping and noising each row of the gradient closed the leak for about 0.01 nats of held-out cross-entropy. The system is not thereby safe: five classes of attack, including those accumulating observations across training steps, were never measured.

Recent research on the 1-bit Large Language Models (LLMs), such as BitNet b1.58, presents a promising direction for reducing the inference cost of LLMs while maintaining their performance. In this work, we introduce BitNet a4.8, enabling 4-bit activations for 1-bit LLMs. BitNet a4.8 employs a hybrid quantization and sparsification strategy to mitigate the quantization errors introduced by the outlier channels. Specifically, we utilize 4-bit activations for inputs to the attention and feed-forward network layers, while sparsifying intermediate states followed with 8-bit quantization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that BitNet a4.8 achieves performance comparable to BitNet b1.58 with equivalent training costs, while being faster in inference with enabling 4-bit (INT4/FP4) kernels. Additionally, BitNet a4.8 activates only 55% of parameters and supports 3-bit KV cache, further enhancing the efficiency of large-scale LLM deployment and inference.

Model signing authenticates the full-precision weights W an LLM is released with, yet users run a quantized artifact Q whose producing transformation is not uniquely determined under current disclosure. We separate the non-environment inputs from the execution environment E and measure a quantity that, to our knowledge, has not been measured before: the Independent Verifiability Rate (IVR), the fraction of a popularity-sampled GGUF ecosystem that a third party can re-derive bit-for-bit. Across the 200 most-downloaded Hugging Face GGUF repositories (198 in scope), no artifact or model card records the build environment, so under a recorded-inputs protocol the IVR is 0/198. Yet the artifacts are not irreproducible. On four in-sample repositories that disclose their inputs, the card's information alone reproduces no Q4_K_M file, but two coordinates the card omits - the build's floating-point-contraction setting and, for hybrid models, the per-tensor quantization recipe - re-derive 7/8 target-quant files bit-for-bit on x86 (5/8 on arm64); the fp16 re-derives from the provider's checkpoint, but the calibration imatrix must be shipped and hash-bound, since recomputing it did not match. An older release additionally pins the instruction set and did not re-derive. Reproducing the divergence reported with llama.cpp PR #25353, we show that E is a necessary coordinate and that one compiler setting yields a unique output across the tested platforms at negligible quality cost (+0.06% perplexity). As a security characterization, benign floating-point non-determinism separates from uniformly placed nibble-flip tampering above a detection floor that grows with the environments a verifier must allow, but a targeted embedding edit evades the statistic, so the proposed protocol rests on exact re-derivation; adversarial-fp16 attacks lie outside it. We release the audit data and a re-runnable harness.

Bitcoin is a popular alternative to fiat money, widely used for its perceived anonymity properties. However, recent attacks on Bitcoin's peer-to-peer (P2P) network demonstrated that its gossip-based flooding protocols, which are used to ensure global network consistency, may enable user deanonymization---the linkage of a user's IP address with her pseudonym in the Bitcoin network. In 2015, the Bitcoin community responded to these attacks by changing the network's flooding mechanism to a different protocol, known as diffusion. However, no systematic justification was provided for the change, and it is unclear if diffusion actually improves the system's anonymity. In this paper, we model the Bitcoin networking stack and analyze its anonymity properties, both pre- and post-2015. In doing so, we consider new adversarial models and spreading mechanisms that have not been previously studied in the source-finding literature. We theoretically prove that Bitcoin's networking protocols (both pre- and post-2015) offer poor anonymity properties on networks with a regular-tree topology. We validate this claim in simulation on a 2015 snapshot of the real Bitcoin P2P network topology.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly become the de facto standard for connecting large language models (LLMs) to external resources, but it also introduces a class of privacy risks that existing tools are ill-equipped to detect. Unlike conventional exfiltration bugs, leakage in MCP servers is largely protocol-induced: credentials, API keys, and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) cross the local/LLM boundary simply by being returned, logged, or raised inside a tool handler, with no explicit outbound request in the source code. We present MCPPrivacyDetector, a context-aware cross-language static analysis framework that detects such leakage in multilingual MCP servers. MCPPrivacyDetector lifts heterogeneous code implemented across different programming language (e.g., Python) into a unified program representation, applies context-aware semantic filtering to isolate genuinely sensitive values and protocol-specific implicit sinks (e.g., @mcp.tool handlers), and performs taint analysis to enumerate feasible flows. Applied to 10,655 real-world MCP servers, MCPPrivacyDetector finds leakage rates above 10%. Case studies confirm concrete exposures including leaked Bearer tokens, propagated API keys, and plaintext authentication credentials, arguing for systematic, protocol-aware safeguards in the emerging LLM agent toolchain.

Ternary language models such as BitNet b1.58, Falcon-E and BitCPM are fine-tuned with higher-precision latent weights and deployed as ternary codes produced by an export step that, in the labs' documented pipelines, first casts the latents to bf16. We audit those pipelines across three labs. In released checkpoints, fp32 quantization of the shipped latents disagrees with the deployed codes on 0.83-1.77% of codes in Falcon-E and BitCPM and on 1.530% in BitNet 2B-4T; for Falcon-E and BitCPM most disagreements are products that bf16 rounding lands exactly on the threshold, which ties-to-even maps to zero, and the unmodified onebitllms exporter reproduces all four Falcon-E releases byte for byte. At fine-tuned endpoints, with learning rates selected to match a nominal learning-rate-to-bf16-ULP ratio, the documented export lowers greedy GSM8K strict accuracy from 58.79% to 0.78% for Falcon-E-1B-Base and from 36.13% to 0.39% for BitCPM-CANN-0.5B, and a bf16 save and reload lowers BitNet 2B-4T's strict accuracy by 27.54 points while its last-number accuracy rises. Two compatibility remedies, writing the training quantizer's codes directly or adjusting the bf16 inputs until the unchanged tools emit them, each met a 4-point strict-accuracy non-inferiority criterion against online evaluation in all three models. In two model families, randomized interventions on the initial distance from the threshold support distance-dependent selection of the codes that fine-tuning changes.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models to invoke external tools through natural-language descriptions, forming the foundation of many AI agent applications. However, MCP does not enforce consistency between documented tool behavior and actual code execution, even though MCP Servers often run with broad system privileges. This gap introduces a largely unexplored security risk. We study how mismatches between externally presented tool descriptions and underlying implementations systematically shape the mental models and decision-making behavior of intelligent agents. Specifically, we present the first large-scale study of description-code inconsistency in the MCP ecosystem. We design an automated static analysis framework and apply it to 10,240 real-world MCP Servers across 36 categories. Our results show that while most servers are highly consistent, approximately 13% exhibit substantial mismatches that can enable undocumented privileged operations, hidden state mutations, or unauthorized financial actions. We further observe systematic differences across application categories, popularity levels, and MCP marketplaces. Our findings demonstrate that description-code inconsistency is a concrete and prevalent attack surface in MCP-based AI agents, and motivate the need for systematic auditing and stronger transparency guarantees in future agent ecosystems.

Control evaluations measure whether monitoring and security protocols for AI systems prevent intentionally subversive AI models from causing harm. Our work presents the first control evaluation performed in an agent environment. We construct BashBench, a dataset of 257 challenging multi-step system administration tasks, and evaluate whether various safety measures can prevent an adversarially constructed AI agent from covertly downloading and executing malicious code in this environment. This multi-step setting introduces new attack and defense dynamics, which we investigate in order to design novel control protocols that prevent safety failures without hindering the ability of non-malicious agents to perform useful work. We introduce a class of control protocols called resample protocols that dynamically take additional samples of certain actions. We find these protocols significantly improve on existing techniques by selectively blocking the AI agent from executing suspicious code and incriminating the agent by generating additional examples of dangerous behavior. We measure the tradeoff between attack prevention and usefulness; our best protocol combines resampling with analysis of previous steps, reducing the success rate of attacks from 58% to 7% at a 5% cost to the performance of a non-malicious agent.

Recent generative engine optimisation (GEO) research has shown that prompt-injection attacks can push a target product to the top of an LLM's recommendation list, with the strongest attacks reporting around 80% success and raising serious security concerns about RAG-based recommendation. However, these results assume the attacked document is always fed directly to the generator, bypassing the retriever and reranker. This is unrealistic: in deployed RAG systems, the attack modifies the document content, which can in turn change whether the document is retrieved and reranked highly enough to reach the generator at all. In this paper, we re-evaluate seven GEO attacks under a realistic three-stage pipeline (retriever\,to\,LLM reranker\,to\,LLM generator). We find that prior protocols substantially overstate attack effectiveness: gradient-based and instruction override attacks largely collapse before reaching the generator, and only LLM-driven prompt injections remain effective end-to-end. Our analysis further reveals that current GEO attacks are easily detectable: a lightweight prompt-injection guard finetuned on a small attack dataset already detects every attack. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/ielab/geo_injection_rag_survival.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Efficient decoding to estimate error locations from outcomes of syndrome measurement is the prerequisite for quantum error correction. Decoding in presence of circuit-level noise including measurement errors should be considered in case of actual quantum computing devices. In this work, we develop a decoder for circuit-level noise that solves the error estimation problems as Ising-type optimization problems. We confirm that the threshold theorem in the surface code under the circuitlevel noise is reproduced with an error threshold of approximately 0.4%. We also demonstrate the advantage of the decoder through which the Y error detection rate can be improved compared with other matching-based decoders. Our results reveal that a lower logical error rate can be obtained using our algorithm compared with that of the minimum-weight perfect matching algorithm.

Extreme low-bit quantization is critical for efficiently deploying Large Language Models (LLMs), yet it often leads to severe performance degradation at 2-bits and even 4-bits (e.g., MXFP4). We present SignRoundV2, a post-training quantization framework that is highly effective even without mixed-precision. SignRoundV2 introduces (1) a fast sensitivity metric that combines gradient information with quantization-induced deviations to guide layer-wise bit allocation, and (2) a lightweight pre-tuning search for quantization scales to improve extremely low-bit quantization. These components allow SignRoundV2 to close the gap with full-precision models. Extensive experiments indicate that our method sustains competitive accuracy for LLMs, achieving production-grade performance with about 1 percent variance at 4-5 bits and strong results even at 2 bits. The implementation is available at https://github.com/intel/auto-round.

Long-output inference in large language models suffers from severe KV cache memory and bandwidth bottlenecks. While KV cache quantization alleviates this issue, low-bit quantization (e.g., 2-bit) severely degrades model accuracy. Recent mixed-precision key-cache quantization methods mitigate this degradation by allocating higher precision to important key channels, but estimate channel saliency using only key statistics. Through attention logit perturbation analysis at the RoPE channel-pair level, we show that quantization errors in channel pairs with large query--key pair-norm products contribute significantly to logit variation. Based on this insight, we propose PN-Mix, a mixed-precision key-cache quantization method for RoPE-based decoder-only LLMs, which allocates higher precision to salient channel pairs identified once during the prefill stage and reused throughout decoding. Across standard reasoning, code-generation, and AIME benchmarks, PN-Mix with 2.26-bit average precision achieves comparable or better average accuracy than prior mixed-precision methods using 2.32--2.39 bits. Furthermore, in our Pareto sweep, PN-Mix degrades gracefully down to 1.5 bits, whereas the compared baselines exhibit sharper performance drops below 2.25 bits.

Quantum digital signatures (QDS), generating correlated bit strings among three remote parties for signatures through quantum law, can guarantee non-repudiation, authenticity, and integrity of messages. Recently, one-time universal hashing QDS framework, exploiting the quantum asymmetric encryption and universal hash functions, has been proposed to significantly improve the signature rate and ensure unconditional security by directly signing the hash value of long messages. However, similar to quantum key distribution, this framework utilizes keys with perfect secrecy by performing privacy amplification that introduces cumbersome matrix operations, thereby consuming large computational resources, causing delays and increasing failure probability. Here, we prove that, different from private communication, imperfect quantum keys with limited information leakage can be used for digital signatures and authentication without compromising the security while having eight orders of magnitude improvement on signature rate for signing a megabit message compared with conventional single-bit schemes. This study significantly reduces the delay for data postprocessing and is compatible with any quantum key generation protocols. In our simulation, taking two-photon twin-field key generation protocol as an example, QDS can be practically implemented over a fiber distance of 650 km between the signer and receiver. For the first time, this study offers a cryptographic application of quantum keys with imperfect secrecy and paves a way for the practical and agile implementation of digital signatures in a future quantum network.

Since GPT, most Transformers have repeated the same attention mechanism at every layer. Yet this design is largely a convention rather than a tested conclusion. When multiple sequence mixers are combined in one stack, improvements may arise from mechanism choice, placement, or both, making causal attribution difficult. We introduce Aether-7B-5Attn, a 6.59B-parameter mixture-of-experts model (approx2.98B active) whose 49 layers contain seven sequence-mixing mechanisms arranged as a 7times7 Latin square. Because each mechanism appears exactly once in every row and column, the design guarantees balanced exposure across depth while eliminating placement confounds. To evaluate this principle, we build a parameter-matched proxy with four mechanisms arranged as a 4times4 Latin square over sixteen layers, matched to 700.9M parameters and trained with eight seeds per arm. The results reveal a clear dissociation. Rearranging a distributed heterogeneous stack into a balanced periodic cycle changes validation loss by only 0.16\%, indicating that exact placement has little effect. In contrast, clustering the same mechanisms into contiguous depth bands incurs a 0.59\% penalty, while replacing the heterogeneous stack with a homogeneous one incurs a 1.68\% penalty. These results indicate that performance depends primarily on heterogeneous composition distributed across depth rather than on any particular permutation. We confirm this finding at 2.16times larger scale (1.514B parameters), where the homogeneous-stack penalty increases to 2.63\% and removing the SSM-family mechanism produces a 3.20\% degradation. We further report per-mechanism cost profiles, English and Korean evaluations, and a causal-safety audit of all 49 layers. We release model weights, training recipes, training code, logs, and architecture source code.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

Byte Pair Encoding (BPE) is a widely used tokenization algorithm, whose tokens cannot extend across pre-tokenization boundaries, functionally limiting it to representing at most full words. The BoundlessBPE and SuperBPE algorithms extend and improve BPE by relaxing this limitation and allowing the formation of superwords, which are combinations of pretokens that form phrases. However, previous implementations were impractical to train: for example, BoundlessBPE took 4.7 CPU days to train on 1GB of data. We show that supermerge candidates, two or more consecutive pretokens eligible to form a supermerge, can be aggregated by frequency much like regular pretokens. This avoids keeping full documents in memory, as the original implementations of BoundlessBPE and SuperBPE required, leading to a significant training speedup. We present a two-phase formulation of BoundlessBPE that separates first-phase learning of regular merges from second-phase learning of supermerges, producing identical results to the original implementation. We also show a near-equivalence between two-phase BoundlessBPE and SuperBPE, with the difference being that a manually selected hyperparameter used in SuperBPE can be automatically determined in the second phase of BoundlessBPE. These changes enable a much faster implementation, allowing training on that same 1GB of data in 603 and 593 seconds for BoundlessBPE and SuperBPE, respectively, a more than 600x increase in speed. For each of BoundlessBPE, SuperBPE, and BPE, we open-source both a reference Python implementation and a fast Rust implementation.

A selector that allocates work across opaque components must evaluate them without being told how they performed. We study the least communication that suffices. Each parent maintains an allocation vector over its children and updates it from outcomes by proportional redistribution. Each child reads the sign of its own allocation change, one bit per round it is selected, so no evaluation message crosses the parent-child boundary. (1) The update preserves the simplex with strict positivity. (2) Conditional on being selected, a child's sign is exactly the root outcome at every depth, a sufficient statistic. The conditioning is necessary. (3) Under interiority a single selector has a unique interior equilibrium, exact and closed-form for N=2, with almost sure convergence under decreasing steps. For general N an equi-ratio condition gives an explicit affine equilibrium. (4) The linearised mean flow has real, strictly negative tangent eigenvalues with explicit bounds for all N >= 2. (5) The mean flow converges globally. An explicit potential, up to normalisation the KL divergence between the failure and slack distributions, decreases at a rate equal to the variance of the equi-ratio statistic. Without interiority the rule drops exactly the children below the surviving support's threshold. (6) The update law composes along a single active path, since ancestors select a node's active rounds but do not alter a realised signal. No joint convergence theorem for a hierarchy whose levels adapt simultaneously is claimed. (7) The one-bit interface admits exactly four deterministic memoryless distortions, and at a single selector passing the bit on unchanged delivers strictly higher mean quality upward than negation or constant transmission. Illustrations on synthetic hierarchies up to 16,384 leaves and three real datasets (3.4 billion comparisons, no mismatches) are consistent with the theory.

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

An AI control protocol is a plan for usefully deploying AI systems that aims to prevent an AI from intentionally causing some unacceptable outcome. This paper investigates how well AI systems can generate and act on their own strategies for subverting control protocols whilst operating statelessly (without shared memory between contexts). To do this, an AI system may need to reliably generate optimal plans in each context, take actions with well-calibrated probabilities, and coordinate plans with other instances of itself without communicating. We develop Subversion Strategy Eval, a suite of eight environments, covering a range of protocols and strategic capabilities, and six sets of affordances that help isolate individual capabilities. We implement the evaluation in Inspect-AI and release it open-source. We evaluate Claude 3.5 models, including helpful-only versions, as well as OpenAI reasoning models. None of the models demonstrate substantial capability in strategizing to subvert control protocols statelessly. However, providing models with additional affordances, such as the ability to share a plan between contexts, can substantially improve performance. We hope our evaluations can act as a leading indicator for when models are capable of subverting control protocols and also relax the worst-case assumption of perfect strategic ability in AI control evaluations.

Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure communication, etc. The functional and performance requirements for a protocol can be expressed using a formal specification, such as, a set of logical predicates over its traces. A protocol could be prevented from achieving its requirements due to a bug in its design or implementation, a component failure (e.g., a crash), or an attack. This dissertation shows that formal methods can feasibly characterize the functionality and performance of network protocols under normal conditions as well as when subjected to attacks.

Matryoshka Quantization (MatQuant) is a recent quantization approach showing that a single integer-quantized model can be served across multiple precisions, by slicing the most significant bits (MSB) at inference time. This enables a single checkpoint to cover a wide range of memory and latency budgets, but renders quantization much more challenging. In particular, the initial MatQuant relies on expensive quantization-aware training (QAT) variants, rather than fast one-shot post training quantization (PTQ), and lacks open-source and kernel support. We address all of these limitations by introducing Post-Training Matryoshka Quantization (MatGPTQ), a new PTQ pipeline that produces a single parent model jointly optimized for multiple target precisions in one-shot, based on a small calibration set. MatGPTQ casts Matryoshka quantization as a multi-precision objective with bit-slicing and cross-bit error compensation, resulting in an algorithm that produces a multi-bit-width, "sliceable" model in a single pass. We also incorporate a new budget-aware search for heterogeneous per-layer bit-witdhs and provide efficient kernels that implement slicing and mixed-precision execution. Across standard LLMs and benchmarks, MatGPTQ preserves high-bit accuracy while substantially improving performance at low-bit-witdh settings. Overall, we establish a new state of the art for Matryoshka-style post-training quantization and make single-checkpoint, multi-precision deployment open and practical. Code is available at https://github.com/IST-DASLab/MatGPTQ.

Recent research, such as BitNet, is paving the way for a new era of 1-bit Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce a 1-bit LLM variant, namely BitNet b1.58, in which every single parameter (or weight) of the LLM is ternary {-1, 0, 1}. It matches the full-precision (i.e., FP16 or BF16) Transformer LLM with the same model size and training tokens in terms of both perplexity and end-task performance, while being significantly more cost-effective in terms of latency, memory, throughput, and energy consumption. More profoundly, the 1.58-bit LLM defines a new scaling law and recipe for training new generations of LLMs that are both high-performance and cost-effective. Furthermore, it enables a new computation paradigm and opens the door for designing specific hardware optimized for 1-bit LLMs.

Keyword-matching benchmarks can credit small models for tool use they never perform. We document such a false positive in a matched-architecture pair of Spanish security language models and propose a ladder of strict, cheap diagnostics. A 661.6M parameter model (approx. 65% code/technical text; no dedicated SFT) and a 1,109M model (web-heavy multi-phase curriculum; 6B-token tool-SFT) share decoder, tokenizer, and special tokens, scoring almost identically on lenient tool-use metrics (B4: 0.660 vs. 0.650). Verbatim-reproduction checks on training examples separate them completely: the 600M emits valid tool calls with generalized arguments on 6/6 examples; the 1B does so on 0/6 across checkpoints. A first-token probe localizes the 1B's failure to a missing prior (prob. 10^{-4}--10^{-5} on <|tool_call|>), which was erased by its web-heavy training phase. A targeted SFT recipe (diverse corpus, 5x higher learning rate, 2,202 steps, ~3.3 GPU-hours) repairs the 1B using three orders of magnitude fewer tokens than the failed phase. On all 269 corpus rows, valid emission rises from 0.100 to 0.959 (600M: 0.926). On 238 unseen prompts, the repaired 1B passes 0.536 vs. the 600M's 0.428 (p = 0.004). Embedding-drift checks show the repair did not move the trigger token's tied embedding (97.7% of the bf16 table remains bit-identical), meaning changes live in the surrounding network. Both models over-trigger, rarely answering negative prompts without a call (0.09 for 600M, 0.17 for repaired 1B). Factorial analyses confirm all repair configurations install the format, though suppression benefits from a diverse corpus remain a hypothesis due to seed sensitivity. This cheap diagnostic ladder costs minutes of CPU time and should gate tool-use claims on small models.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

Large language model (LLM) inference is often bounded by memory footprint and memory bandwidth in resource-constrained deployments, making quantization a fundamental technique for efficient serving. While post-training quantization (PTQ) maintains high fidelity at 4-bit, it deteriorates at 2-3 bits. Fundamentally, existing methods enforce a shape-invariant quantization grid (e.g., the fixed uniform intervals of UINT2) for each group, severely restricting the feasible set for error minimization. To address this, we propose Bit-Plane Decomposition Quantization (BPDQ), which constructs a variable quantization grid via bit-planes and scalar coefficients, and iteratively refines them using approximate second-order information while progressively compensating quantization errors to minimize output discrepancy. In the 2-bit regime, BPDQ enables serving Qwen2.5-72B on a single RTX 3090 with 83.85% GSM8K accuracy (vs. 90.83% at 16-bit). Moreover, we provide theoretical analysis showing that the variable grid expands the feasible set, and that the quantization process consistently aligns with the optimization objective in Hessian-induced geometry. Code: github.com/KingdalfGoodman/BPDQ.

In production large language model (LLM) deployments, high API availability guarantees do not equate to conversational continuity. When a primary provider experiences an outage or strict rate-limiting, naive stateless failover mechanisms successfully maintain uptime but silently discard conversation history, severely disrupting the user experience. To rigorously quantify and resolve this failure mode, we introduce two novel metrics: Continuity Preservation Rate (CPR) and Continuity Latency Overhead (CLO). We propose a stateful, multi-provider proxy architecture utilizing a History-Forwarding strategy to seamlessly reconstruct conversational state across heterogeneous LLM endpoints during failover events. Furthermore, we release continuity-bench, https://github.com/Vishal-sys-code/continuity-bench, an open evaluation harness designed to stress-test context preservation under high-concurrency provider failure conditions. Our empirical evaluation (N=750 failover events) demonstrates that our stateful proxy achieves a 99.20\% CPR [95\% CI: 98.27\%, 99.63\%], cleanly transferring deep conversational context to fallback providers, compared to a near-0\% preservation rate for standard stateless architectures. Finally, we characterize failover latency distributions, identifying the critical necessity of asynchronous exponential backoff with jitter to prevent cascading retry storms against strict-limit fallback APIs. Our results provide a principled foundation for building robust, state-preserving multi-model inference systems.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

This paper investigates the problem of collecting multidimensional data throughout time (i.e., longitudinal studies) for the fundamental task of frequency estimation under Local Differential Privacy (LDP) guarantees. Contrary to frequency estimation of a single attribute, the multidimensional aspect demands particular attention to the privacy budget. Besides, when collecting user statistics longitudinally, privacy progressively degrades. Indeed, the "multiple" settings in combination (i.e., many attributes and several collections throughout time) impose several challenges, for which this paper proposes the first solution for frequency estimates under LDP. To tackle these issues, we extend the analysis of three state-of-the-art LDP protocols (Generalized Randomized Response -- GRR, Optimized Unary Encoding -- OUE, and Symmetric Unary Encoding -- SUE) for both longitudinal and multidimensional data collections. While the known literature uses OUE and SUE for two rounds of sanitization (a.k.a. memoization), i.e., L-OUE and L-SUE, respectively, we analytically and experimentally show that starting with OUE and then with SUE provides higher data utility (i.e., L-OSUE). Also, for attributes with small domain sizes, we propose Longitudinal GRR (L-GRR), which provides higher utility than the other protocols based on unary encoding. Last, we also propose a new solution named Adaptive LDP for LOngitudinal and Multidimensional FREquency Estimates (ALLOMFREE), which randomly samples a single attribute to be sent with the whole privacy budget and adaptively selects the optimal protocol, i.e., either L-GRR or L-OSUE. As shown in the results, ALLOMFREE consistently and considerably outperforms the state-of-the-art L-SUE and L-OUE protocols in the quality of the frequency estimates.

The fundamental trade-off between robustness and tunability is a central challenge in the pursuit of quantum simulation and fault-tolerant quantum computation. In particular, many emerging quantum architectures are designed to achieve high coherence at the expense of having fixed spectra and consequently limited types of controllable interactions. Here, by adiabatically transforming fixed-frequency superconducting circuits into modifiable Floquet qubits, we demonstrate an XXZ Heisenberg interaction with fully adjustable anisotropy. This interaction model is on one hand the basis for many-body quantum simulation of spin systems, and on the other hand the primitive for an expressive quantum gate set. To illustrate the robustness and versatility of our Floquet protocol, we tailor the Heisenberg Hamiltonian and implement two-qubit iSWAP, CZ, and SWAP gates with estimated fidelities of 99.32(3)%, 99.72(2)%, and 98.93(5)%, respectively. In addition, we implement a Heisenberg interaction between higher energy levels and employ it to construct a three-qubit CCZ gate with a fidelity of 96.18(5)%. Importantly, the protocol is applicable to various fixed-frequency high-coherence platforms, thereby unlocking a suite of essential interactions for high-performance quantum information processing. From a broader perspective, our work provides compelling avenues for future exploration of quantum electrodynamics and optimal control using the Floquet framework.

When agentic sessions run to a million tokens with many sessions resident at once, the KV cache and the index that ranks it live in host memory, and the scan that ranks all n keys for a top-k step becomes the traffic that bounds decoding. We present Fathom, a key scan in which each query decides how many bits of each key channel to read. The 4-bit K cache is stored channel-major as bit planes, so a prefix of t planes is exactly the channel's t-bit quantizer, and the query spends its bit budget by reverse water-filling over the variance-weighted importance of its channels. At one million tokens on Qwen3-8B a decode step is 1.67x faster in GPU time than with the 136-bit scans of Double Sparsity, Loki and SparQ r=32, and in the same GPU time as SparQ's 68-bit read (r=16) Fathom reads 18% fewer bytes with lower attention error on six of seven model and context settings. On RULER-style tasks every per-token scan matches exact top-k decoding, and on real coding-agent sessions Fathom reaches the step agreement of the most accurate 136-bit scan at 92 bits. The store is the 4-bit K copy a quantized serving stack already holds, and the method is not faster when the index is resident in GPU memory.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

Prompt injection against LLM agents becomes much stronger when the injected instruction is wrapped in the model's own chat template. A forged template marker such as <|im_start|> can reach the model either as a single reserved control token or as a sequence of ordinary subword tokens. The two decode to exactly the same text, and because tokenization runs on the server, the defender rather than the attacker decides which one the model receives. We use this to measure how much of the injected instruction's authority comes from the reserved token's learned representation. Encoding the forged markers as subwords, with the text held fixed and a control for the extra tokens this adds, lowers attack success on the InjecAgent benchmark by 39 to 66 percentage points on three of four open-weight families, and the gap carries over to multi-turn agent tasks in AgentDojo. On Qwen3-8B the gap is 8 points, because without reserved ids the model still recognises the forged turn from its text by reasoning; suppressing the reasoning block widens the gap to 50. The authority sits in the single learned vector at the marker position: the mean of the marker's subword vectors does not reproduce it, the vector of the nearest ordinary token restores the attack on Llama-3.1, and an adaptive attacker who searches for non-reserved markers finds such embedding neighbours on three of four families. In every base and instruction-tuned pair we test, instruction tuning strengthens the model's preference for reserved markers. The standard mitigation, a tokenizer option that encodes special tokens as ordinary subwords, applies only to tokens a configuration declares special, so in 33 of 67 distinct tokenizer configurations, covering 255 of the 400 most-downloaded chat models on Hugging Face, it leaves intact the tool-protocol tokens through which agents read untrusted tool output, and the gap persists on that channel.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models lack explicit constraints to ensure the router's decisions align well with the experts' capabilities, which ultimately limits model performance. To address this, we propose expert-router coupling (ERC) loss, a lightweight auxiliary loss that tightly couples the router's decisions with expert capabilities. Our approach treats each expert's router embedding as a proxy token for the tokens assigned to that expert, and feeds perturbed router embeddings through the experts to obtain internal activations. The ERC loss enforces two constraints on these activations: (1) Each expert must exhibit higher activation for its own proxy token than for the proxy tokens of any other expert. (2) Each proxy token must elicit stronger activation from its corresponding expert than from any other expert. These constraints jointly ensure that each router embedding faithfully represents its corresponding expert's capability, while each expert specializes in processing the tokens actually routed to it. The ERC loss is computationally efficient, operating only on n^2 activations, where n is the number of experts. This represents a fixed cost independent of batch size, unlike prior coupling methods that scale with the number of tokens (often millions per batch). Through pre-training MoE-LLMs ranging from 3B to 15B parameters and extensive analysis on trillions of tokens, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the ERC loss. Moreover, the ERC loss offers flexible control and quantitative tracking of expert specialization levels during training, providing valuable insights into MoEs.

This paper introduces the first two-dimensional XOR-based secret sharing scheme for layered multipath communication networks. We present a construction that guarantees successful message recovery and perfect privacy when an adversary observes and disrupts any single path at each transmission layer. The scheme achieves information-theoretic security using only bitwise XOR operations with linear O(|S|) complexity, where |S| is the message length. We provide mathematical proofs demonstrating that the scheme maintains unconditional security regardless of computational resources available to adversaries. Unlike encryption-based approaches vulnerable to quantum computing advances, our construction offers provable security suitable for resource-constrained military environments where computational assumptions may fail.

In the rapidly evolving domain of distributed ledger technology, scalability and interoperability have become paramount challenges for both academic and industry sectors. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive formal model to address atomic composability across multiple rollups on Ethereum. The proposed model incorporates mechanisms like buffering, dependency management, concurrency control, and the groundbreaking zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover, we evaluate its practical repercussions, strengths, and weaknesses, ensuring resilience against manipulative or erroneous actions. The application of the proposed model to shared sequencers and other existing solutions accentuates its versatility and universality.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) disaggregates training from rollout, so each policy update must reach the rollout clusters before the next batch. Transferring a full 1T checkpoint for such weight synchronization (refit) takes 87.5 min between two AWS regions. Measurements of BF16 training show that about 1% of weights change their stored values per step. Recent systems exploit this sparsity but fall short on placement, exactness, or efficiency: they reimplement placement rules, assemble full tensors, rebuild values arithmetically, or use a cross-cluster collective, and none fully recovers from mid-refit failures. We present NeMo-DCR (Delta-Compressed Refit), which sends only changes yet is bit-exact: receivers obtain the same parameter and buffer bits as a dense refit. For placement, fixed affine mappings project changes from training shards into the checkpoint's canonical coordinates, residual conversion covers the other changes, and the serving runtime's native loader places all changes in receiver storage. For exactness, compressible XOR masks carry affine changes whose projection and loader preserve stored bits, and overwrites carry the others. Receivers apply both in place, retries overwrite partial writes, and a joint commit binds the policy to the baseline for the next delta. For efficiency, object storage or a relay tree streams payloads during delta construction, without a cross-cluster collective. Even at 3% and 5% change rates, NeMo-DCR refits of 30B-1T models are 12-40times faster than a transport-only full-checkpoint reference. A 1T relay-tree refit at 3% takes 150 s instead of 87.5 min, making refits practical for cross-cluster agentic RL at trillion-parameter scale.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

We introduce PoSME (Proof of Sequential Memory Execution), a cryptographic primitive that enforces sustained sequential computation via latency-bound pointer chasing over a mutable arena. Each step reads data-dependent addresses, writes a block whose value and causal hash are mutually dependent (symbiotic binding), and chains the result into a global transcript. This yields three properties: (1) strict linear sequential memory-step enforcement, (2) high time-memory trade-off resistance (a tenfold penalty at a write density of 4, with a formal space-time lower bound that scales quadratically with the number of steps), and (3) a tight ASIC advantage bound by DRAM random-access latency rather than bandwidth. Benchmarks across 17 CPU platforms and 4 GPU architectures demonstrate that hash computation is under 3.5 percent of step cost and GPU hardware is 14 to 19 times slower than a consumer CPU. POSME requires no trusted setup and provides a foundation for verifiable delay, authorship attestation, and Sybil resistance.

Agent performance depends on both the underlying model and the harness that manages its tool use and execution. Selecting a suitable pair requires accounting for their compatibility, yet training samples may cover only a subset of the growing combination space. We introduce HM-Router, a routing method that jointly selects a model and harness for each query. It learns separate model and harness representations shared across routes, with an interaction term inspired by canonical polyadic (CP) tensor decomposition to capture how their compatibility varies with the query. This sharing allows training samples from observed pairs to inform predictions for unobserved combinations. We curate a benchmark from 12 public agent benchmarks, covering 293 routes, 73 models, and 25 harnesses. HM-Router exceeds the strongest evaluated learned baseline by 7.3 percentage points in mean routing accuracy and leads at all seven evaluated cost budgets on the six-benchmark subset. When 90% of routes have their training outcomes withheld, allowing unobserved combinations improves normalized accuracy by 15.8 points over restricting the same router to observed routes. HM-Router has also demonstrated training sample efficiency for new routes and components and generalization to unseen benchmarks. Our code and data are open-sourced at https://github.com/hmarkc/HM-Router.

The optimal bit-width for achieving the best trade-off between quantized model size and accuracy has been a subject of ongoing debate. While some advocate for 4-bit quantization, others propose that 1.58-bit offers superior results. However, the lack of a cohesive framework for different bits has left such conclusions relatively tenuous. We present ParetoQ, the first unified framework that facilitates rigorous comparisons across 1-bit, 1.58-bit, 2-bit, 3-bit, and 4-bit quantization settings. Our findings reveal a notable learning transition between 2 and 3 bits: For 3-bits and above, the fine-tuned models stay close to their original pre-trained distributions, whereas for learning 2-bit networks or below, the representations change drastically. By optimizing training schemes and refining quantization functions, ParetoQ surpasses all previous methods tailored to specific bit widths. Remarkably, our ParetoQ ternary 600M-parameter model even outperforms the previous SoTA ternary 3B-parameter model in accuracy, using only one-fifth of the parameters. Extensive experimentation shows that ternary, 2-bit, and 3-bit quantization maintains comparable performance in the size-accuracy trade-off and generally exceeds 4-bit and binary quantization. Considering hardware constraints, 2-bit quantization offers promising potential for memory reduction and speedup.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Quantizing neural networks is one of the most effective methods for achieving efficient inference on mobile and embedded devices. In particular, mixed precision quantized (MPQ) networks, whose layers can be quantized to different bitwidths, achieve better task performance for the same resource constraint compared to networks with homogeneous bitwidths. However, finding the optimal bitwidth allocation is a challenging problem as the search space grows exponentially with the number of layers in the network. In this paper, we propose QBitOpt, a novel algorithm for updating bitwidths during quantization-aware training (QAT). We formulate the bitwidth allocation problem as a constraint optimization problem. By combining fast-to-compute sensitivities with efficient solvers during QAT, QBitOpt can produce mixed-precision networks with high task performance guaranteed to satisfy strict resource constraints. This contrasts with existing mixed-precision methods that learn bitwidths using gradients and cannot provide such guarantees. We evaluate QBitOpt on ImageNet and confirm that we outperform existing fixed and mixed-precision methods under average bitwidth constraints commonly found in the literature.