Daily Papers

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Advances in large language models have enabled agentic AI systems that can reason, plan, and interact with external tools to execute multi-step workflows, while public blockchains have evolved into a programmable substrate for value transfer, access control, and verifiable state transitions. Their convergence introduces a high-stakes systems challenge: designing standard, interoperable, and secure interfaces that allow agents to observe on-chain state, formulate transaction intents, and authorize execution without exposing users, protocols, or organizations to unacceptable security, governance, or economic risks. This survey systematizes the emerging landscape of agent-blockchain interoperability through a systematic literature review, identifying 317 relevant works from an initial pool of over 3000 records. We contribute a five-part taxonomy of integration patterns spanning read-only analytics, simulation and intent generation, delegated execution, autonomous signing, and multi-agent workflows; a threat model tailored to agent-driven transaction pipelines that captures risks ranging from prompt injection and policy misuse to key compromise, adversarial execution dynamics, and multi-agent collusion; and a comparative capability matrix analyzing more than 20 representative systems across 13 dimensions, including custody models, permissioning, policy enforcement, observability, and recovery. Building on the gaps revealed by this analysis, we outline a research roadmap centered on two interface abstractions: a Transaction Intent Schema for portable and unambiguous goal specification, and a Policy Decision Record for auditable, verifiable policy enforcement across execution environments. We conclude by proposing a reproducible evaluation suite and benchmarks for assessing the safety, reliability, and economic robustness of agent-mediated on-chain execution.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are being readily and rapidly adopted, increasingly permeating critical domains: from consumer platforms and enterprise software to networked systems with embedded agents. While this has unlocked potential for human productivity gains, the attack surface has expanded accordingly: threats now span content safety failures (e.g., harmful or deceptive outputs), model and data integrity compromise (e.g., poisoning, supply-chain tampering), runtime manipulations (e.g., prompt injection, tool and agent misuse), and ecosystem risks (e.g., orchestration abuse, multi-agent collusion). Existing frameworks such as MITRE ATLAS, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI 100-2 Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) taxonomy, and OWASP Top 10s for Large Language Models (LLMs) and Agentic AI Applications provide valuable viewpoints, but each covers only slices of this multi-dimensional space. This paper presents Cisco's Integrated AI Security and Safety Framework ("AI Security Framework"), a unified, lifecycle-aware taxonomy and operationalization framework that can be used to classify, integrate, and operationalize the full range of AI risks. It integrates AI security and AI safety across modalities, agents, pipelines, and the broader ecosystem. The AI Security Framework is designed to be practical for threat identification, red-teaming, risk prioritization, and it is comprehensive in scope and can be extensible to emerging deployments in multimodal contexts, humanoids, wearables, and sensory infrastructures. We analyze gaps in prevailing frameworks, discuss design principles for our framework, and demonstrate how the taxonomy provides structure for understanding how modern AI systems fail, how adversaries exploit these failures, and how organizations can build defenses across the AI lifecycle that evolve alongside capability advancements.

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and collude to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

Recent capability increases in large language models (LLMs) open up applications in which groups of communicating generative AI agents solve joint tasks. This poses privacy and security challenges concerning the unauthorised sharing of information, or other unwanted forms of agent coordination. Modern steganographic techniques could render such dynamics hard to detect. In this paper, we comprehensively formalise the problem of secret collusion in systems of generative AI agents by drawing on relevant concepts from both AI and security literature. We study incentives for the use of steganography, and propose a variety of mitigation measures. Our investigations result in a model evaluation framework that systematically tests capabilities required for various forms of secret collusion. We provide extensive empirical results across a range of contemporary LLMs. While the steganographic capabilities of current models remain limited, GPT-4 displays a capability jump suggesting the need for continuous monitoring of steganographic frontier model capabilities. We conclude by laying out a comprehensive research program to mitigate future risks of collusion between generative AI models.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in collaborative settings, yet long-term interaction may give rise to undesirable coordination. We study the emergence of collusion in a long-horizon multi-agent environment: two agents repeatedly complete individual tasks, share task logs, verify each other's work, and receive rewards. We introduce realistic constraints that make compliance with the verification protocol incompatible with reward maximization, and find that agents increasingly deviate from the protocol over repeated interactions. Collusion emerges in 94% of trajectories across 10 models, and more capable models within the same family reach it earlier. Controlled peer interventions show that collusion is shaped by peer behavior, while ablations reveal additional effects of reward structure, the verification feedback agents receive, and their interaction history. In particular, restricting the amount and scope of interaction history available to agents reduces collusion. Overall, our findings show that long-horizon interaction can reshape how agents coordinate in ways that create safety risks.

In liberalised railway systems, operators must set prices dynamically in an environment with partial observability, as they retain private information about their objectives and performance, where regulatory constraints prohibit communication or direct information exchange between competitors to prevent explicit collusion. Consequently, agents must learn to infer strategic interactions only from observable market data which presents a significant challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where standard approaches typically treat observations as unstructured vectors, ignoring the underlying market topology that governs strategic interactions. To address this, an entity graph modelling approach is proposed, which represents the environment as a graph of operational units, rather than decision-making agents or static infrastructure, encoding competition, coordination, and connectivity relations between entities. Then, an extension of the multi-agent twin delayed deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm with graph-based representation learning processes the features of the entities through a multi-layer relational graph convolutional network and aggregates them via a learnt attention mechanism. Experimental results in a rail pricing reinforcement learning environment show that this novel framework achieves higher revenue and stability in two different settings of increasing market complexity compared to a representative selection of relational and non-relational baselines. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Kinrre/RelationalRailPricing-RL

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

We consider the problem of multi-agent navigation and collision avoidance when observations are limited to the local neighborhood of each agent. We propose InforMARL, a novel architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) which uses local information intelligently to compute paths for all the agents in a decentralized manner. Specifically, InforMARL aggregates information about the local neighborhood of agents for both the actor and the critic using a graph neural network and can be used in conjunction with any standard MARL algorithm. We show that (1) in training, InforMARL has better sample efficiency and performance than baseline approaches, despite using less information, and (2) in testing, it scales well to environments with arbitrary numbers of agents and obstacles. We illustrate these results using four task environments, including one with predetermined goals for each agent, and one in which the agents collectively try to cover all goals. Code available at https://github.com/nsidn98/InforMARL.

Multi-agent pathfinding (MAPF) is a challenging computational problem that typically requires to find collision-free paths for multiple agents in a shared environment. Solving MAPF optimally is NP-hard, yet efficient solutions are critical for numerous applications, including automated warehouses and transportation systems. Recently, learning-based approaches to MAPF have gained attention, particularly those leveraging deep reinforcement learning. Following current trends in machine learning, we have created a foundation model for the MAPF problems called MAPF-GPT. Using imitation learning, we have trained a policy on a set of pre-collected sub-optimal expert trajectories that can generate actions in conditions of partial observability without additional heuristics, reward functions, or communication with other agents. The resulting MAPF-GPT model demonstrates zero-shot learning abilities when solving the MAPF problem instances that were not present in the training dataset. We show that MAPF-GPT notably outperforms the current best-performing learnable-MAPF solvers on a diverse range of problem instances and is efficient in terms of computation (in the inference mode).

The Multi-agent Path Finding (MAPF) problem involves finding collision-free paths for a team of agents in a known, static environment, with important applications in warehouse automation, logistics, or last-mile delivery. To meet the needs of these large-scale applications, current learning-based methods often deploy the same fully trained, decentralized network to all agents to improve scalability. However, such parameter sharing typically results in homogeneous behaviors among agents, which may prevent agents from breaking ties around symmetric conflict (e.g., bottlenecks) and might lead to live-/deadlocks. In this paper, we propose SYLPH, a novel learning-based MAPF framework aimed to mitigate the adverse effects of homogeneity by allowing agents to learn and dynamically select different social behaviors (akin to individual, dynamic roles), without affecting the scalability offered by parameter sharing. Specifically, SYLPH agents learn to select their Social Value Orientation (SVO) given the situation at hand, quantifying their own level of selfishness/altruism, as well as an SVO-conditioned MAPF policy dictating their movement actions. To these ends, each agent first determines the most influential other agent in the system by predicting future conflicts/interactions with other agents. Each agent selects its own SVO towards that agent, and trains its decentralized MAPF policy to enact this SVO until another agent becomes more influential. To further allow agents to consider each others' social preferences, each agent gets access to the SVO value of their neighbors. As a result of this hierarchical decision-making and exchange of social preferences, SYLPH endows agents with the ability to reason about the MAPF task through more latent spaces and nuanced contexts, leading to varied responses that can help break ties around symmetric conflicts. [...]

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF), which focuses on finding collision-free paths for multiple robots, is crucial for applications ranging from aerial swarms to warehouse automation. Solving MAPF is NP-hard so learning-based approaches for MAPF have gained attention, particularly those leveraging deep neural networks. Nonetheless, despite the community's continued efforts, all learning-based MAPF planners still rely on decentralized planning due to variability in the number of agents and map sizes. We have developed the first centralized learning-based policy for MAPF problem called RAILGUN. RAILGUN is not an agent-based policy but a map-based policy. By leveraging a CNN-based architecture, RAILGUN can generalize across different maps and handle any number of agents. We collect trajectories from rule-based methods to train our model in a supervised way. In experiments, RAILGUN outperforms most baseline methods and demonstrates great zero-shot generalization capabilities on various tasks, maps and agent numbers that were not seen in the training dataset.

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) is a fundamental problem in robotics that asks us to compute collision-free paths for a team of agents, all moving across a shared map. Although many works appear on this topic, all current algorithms struggle as the number of agents grows. The principal reason is that existing approaches typically plan free-flow optimal paths, which creates congestion. To tackle this issue, we propose a new approach for MAPF where agents are guided to their destination by following congestion-avoiding paths. We evaluate the idea in two large-scale settings: one-shot MAPF, where each agent has a single destination, and lifelong MAPF, where agents are continuously assigned new destinations. Empirically, we report large improvements in solution quality for one-short MAPF and in overall throughput for lifelong MAPF.

Decentralized multi-agent path finding (MAPF) with communication requires agents to reach individual goals without collisions under partial observability. Learnable policies trained on expert data provide an effective approach to this problem. However, when several coordinated joint actions are valid in the same context, independently sampling from per-agent distributions can recombine locally valid choices into incompatible joint actions. This failure can arise from the final sampling mechanism even when the per-agent action distributions are learned correctly. DMM (Decentralized Master-Mind) addresses this by replacing one-shot action sampling with discrete, iterative refinement of action intents across communication rounds, inspired by denoising in diffusion models. Agents initialize random action intents and refine them through local communication, coupling their choices before commitment. DMM is pretrained with imitation learning on expert MAPF solutions and further optimized with MICPO, a critic-free group-relative reinforcement-learning method designed for multi-agent, multi-round action refinement. DMM generally achieves higher success rates and lower solution costs than the evaluated learnable baselines. On 1,600 MovingAI tasks, DMM fine-tuned with MICPO solves 1,598, the highest coverage among the evaluated methods, while achieving solution costs close to those of the strongest baselines. DMM also scales to over one million simultaneously acting agents in obstacle-rich environments. These results show that round-level intent refinement can improve joint-action coordination while preserving decentralized execution.

Robotic simulators are crucial for academic research and education as well as the development of safety-critical applications. Reinforcement learning environments -- simple simulations coupled with a problem specification in the form of a reward function -- are also important to standardize the development (and benchmarking) of learning algorithms. Yet, full-scale simulators typically lack portability and parallelizability. Vice versa, many reinforcement learning environments trade-off realism for high sample throughputs in toy-like problems. While public data sets have greatly benefited deep learning and computer vision, we still lack the software tools to simultaneously develop -- and fairly compare -- control theory and reinforcement learning approaches. In this paper, we propose an open-source OpenAI Gym-like environment for multiple quadcopters based on the Bullet physics engine. Its multi-agent and vision based reinforcement learning interfaces, as well as the support of realistic collisions and aerodynamic effects, make it, to the best of our knowledge, a first of its kind. We demonstrate its use through several examples, either for control (trajectory tracking with PID control, multi-robot flight with downwash, etc.) or reinforcement learning (single and multi-agent stabilization tasks), hoping to inspire future research that combines control theory and machine learning.

Multi-agent Pathfinding (MAPF) problem generally asks to find a set of conflict-free paths for a set of agents confined to a graph and is typically solved in a centralized fashion. Conversely, in this work, we investigate the decentralized MAPF setting, when the central controller that posses all the information on the agents' locations and goals is absent and the agents have to sequientially decide the actions on their own without having access to a full state of the environment. We focus on the practically important lifelong variant of MAPF, which involves continuously assigning new goals to the agents upon arrival to the previous ones. To address this complex problem, we propose a method that integrates two complementary approaches: planning with heuristic search and reinforcement learning through policy optimization. Planning is utilized to construct and re-plan individual paths. We enhance our planning algorithm with a dedicated technique tailored to avoid congestion and increase the throughput of the system. We employ reinforcement learning to discover the collision avoidance policies that effectively guide the agents along the paths. The policy is implemented as a neural network and is effectively trained without any reward-shaping or external guidance. We evaluate our method on a wide range of setups comparing it to the state-of-the-art solvers. The results show that our method consistently outperforms the learnable competitors, showing higher throughput and better ability to generalize to the maps that were unseen at the training stage. Moreover our solver outperforms a rule-based one in terms of throughput and is an order of magnitude faster than a state-of-the-art search-based solver.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown considerable promise for robotic decision-making, yet deploying multi-agent RL (MARL) on physical multi-robot systems in industrial environments remains challenging. This paper investigates the real-world applicability of decentralized MARL for multi-robot multi-machine tending. We propose Feature-fusion Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization (FMAPPO), which fuses 2D LiDAR measurements with task-specific state information to enable safe decentralized multi-robot task assignment and navigation. A complete simulation-to-reality pipeline was developed using high-fidelity robotic simulation and ROS2 and deployed on physical mobile-manipulator platforms operating under realistic real-world conditions, with the robotic arms disabled during the experiments. We further investigate the sensitivity of the learned policy to command update frequency, an important consideration for real-world deployment. Comparative evaluation in simulation demonstrated that FMAPPO significantly outperformed state-of-the-art baselines with a large effect size, achieving improvements of 106\% and 21\% in parts delivery and 48\% and 11\% in parts collection over MAPPO and SMAPPO, respectively. FMAPPO also increased machine utilization by 31 and 10 percentage points, respectively, while reducing collisions by 18\% and 15\% and increasing the safety score by 14 and 6 percentage points compared with MAPPO and SMAPPO, respectively. Furthermore, real-world experiments demonstrated that the learned decentralized policies can coordinate multiple robots to service multiple machines while maintaining safe operation under real-world sensing and control constraints. Videos of the real-world experiment are available online https://anonymouspapers123.github.io/FMAPPO/.

Closed-loop cooperative driving requires planners that generate realistic multimodal multi-agent trajectories while improving safety and traffic efficiency. Existing diffusion planners can model multimodal behaviors from demonstrations, but they often exhibit weak scene consistency and remain poorly aligned with closed-loop objectives; meanwhile, stable online post-training in reactive multi-agent environments remains difficult. We present Multi-ORFT, which couples scene-conditioned diffusion pre-training with stable online reinforcement post-training. In pre-training, the planner uses inter-agent self-attention, cross-attention, and AdaLN-Zero-based scene conditioning to improve scene consistency and road adherence of joint trajectories. In post-training, we formulate a two-level MDP that exposes step-wise reverse-kernel likelihoods for online optimization, and combine dense trajectory-level rewards with variance-gated group-relative policy optimization (VG-GRPO) to stabilize training. On the WOMD closed-loop benchmark, Multi-ORFT reduces collision rate from 2.04% to 1.89% and off-road rate from 1.68% to 1.36%, while increasing average speed from 8.36 to 8.61 m/s relative to the pre-trained planner, and it outperforms strong open-source baselines including SMART-large, SMART-tiny-CLSFT, and VBD on the primary safety and efficiency metrics. These results show that coupling scene-consistent denoising with stable online diffusion-policy optimization improves the reliability of closed-loop cooperative driving.

Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) has largely focused on a single agent following a single instruction, yet many real-world applications require teams of robots to tackle tasks beyond the capabilities of any individual agent. We present Systematic Multi-Agent Vision-and-Language Navigation, providing, to our knowledge, the first systematic formalization of multi-agent VLN as a constrained coordination problem: each mission consists of subtasks carrying dependency and resource constraints (presence locks and holding chains). A verified four-stage crafting pipeline instantiates the task as MAVLN, comprising 11,724 episodes across 145 scenes with teams of up to four agents under three instruction regimes, accompanied by tailored constraint-aware metrics. We further present TRISS, a coordination-ready navigation system coupling an LLM-based subtask scheduler, a shared topological memory that turns each agent's exploration into team knowledge, and a conflict-aware execution mechanism that realizes simultaneous intentions as collision-free routes. Extensive experiments establish TRISS as a comprehensive baseline and reveal substantial room for improvement across scheduling, planning, and execution, highlighting the challenges of coordinating under MAVLN task constraints. Project page: https://xyz9911.github.io/mavln.

Generating realistic interior furniture layouts that strictly adhere to architectural constraints (e.g., walls, doors, and windows) remains a fundamental challenge in automated spatial design. Existing approaches, primarily based on one-shot generation using diffusion models or Large Language Models (LLMs), lack explicit mechanisms for intermediate geometric constraint verification, often resulting in structural collisions and functionally infeasible arrangements under complex room constraints. To address these challenges, we propose Agentic Designer, a progressive, multi-agent framework that formulates structure-aware interior layout generation as an iterative and constraint-verified decision process. By decomposing layout synthesis into modular stages of proposal, verification, and adjustment, the framework coordinates three specialized agents, a Generator, an Evaluator, and a Refiner, through a Progressive Consensus Mechanism. This mechanism enforces stepwise geometric validation and correction before each placement is committed, thereby preventing error accumulation. To facilitate this structure-aware paradigm and standardize evaluation, we establish InStruct, a comprehensive benchmark that integrates a dataset comprising over 18,000 high-quality, parametrically annotated samples with a novel suite of structure-centric metrics. Extensive quantitative evaluations, qualitative analyses, and user studies show that Agentic Designer significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, demonstrating substantial improvements in strict structural adherence and functional design coherence.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

We present PRIMAL3, an ultra-large-scale learning-based framework for multi-agent pathfinding (MAPF) that integrates reinforcement learning, topology-aware communication, LaCAM3-guided training, and PIBT-based action refinement. PRIMAL3 targets failures at topologically critical states, where agents must coordinate decisively around bottlenecks, dead ends, and persistent conflicts. Each agent is represented using features derived from cut vertices, dead-end regions, shortest-path distances, and blocking estimates. Two complementary graphs capture agent interactions: a same-direction following graph propagates multihop context along compatible paths, while a different-direction conflict graph differentiates agents competing for shared space through masked attention and relative features. During training, we propose to let policy entropy identify uncertain agents, for which LaCAM3 provides confidence-triggered action interventions and label-smoothed imitation targets. During execution, a priority-aware PIBT module refines the proposed joint actions using persistent, learned, and distance-aware priorities together with policy-aware fallback preferences while maintaining collision-free execution. The resulting framework combines learned exploration with structured expert guidance without requiring LaCAM3 at inference. Experiments demonstrate that PRIMAL3 substantially outperforms state-of-the-art learning-based baselines and scales to ultra-large instances with up to city-level 100,000 agents. Real-world experiments further demonstrate the feasibility of deploying PRIMAL3 on physical robotic systems and ablation studies validate the individual contributions the components we proposed. Project page: https://marmotlab.github.io/PRIMAL3/

In this paper, we study physically grounded articulated 3D asset generation---moving the goal from reproducing how objects look to capturing how they move and function. Inspired by the literature on procedural and agentic generation, we present Artisan, a system that extends the latest method Articraft by introducing a multi-agent pipeline with physical simulation feedback, enabling comprehensive attributes beyond geometry, appearance, and physically plausible articulation, such as collision-free motion, stability under gravity, and accurate mass and material properties. Furthermore, we construct a unified benchmark spanning four key aspects: spatial fidelity, physical plausibility, downstream task performance, and overall quality. The benchmark encompasses 100 reference assets from ArtVIP and LightWheel, 50 stability prompts, and 50 ABO objects with reference masses, with protocols evaluating various metrics. Through extensive evaluation of more than 10 representative models, Artisan achieves competitive spatial fidelity while attaining the lowest collision rates and highest stability rates among the evaluated methods. Together, our system and benchmark establish insights for advancing 3D generation towards physically plausible, functionally usable assets.

Occlusion is a major challenge for LiDAR-based object detection methods. This challenge becomes safety-critical in urban traffic where the ego vehicle must have reliable object detection to avoid collision while its field of view is severely reduced due to the obstruction posed by a large number of road users. Collaborative perception via Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, which leverages the diverse perspective thanks to the presence at multiple locations of connected agents to form a complete scene representation, is an appealing solution. State-of-the-art V2X methods resolve the performance-bandwidth tradeoff using a mid-collaboration approach where the Bird-Eye View images of point clouds are exchanged so that the bandwidth consumption is lower than communicating point clouds as in early collaboration, and the detection performance is higher than late collaboration, which fuses agents' output, thanks to a deeper interaction among connected agents. While achieving strong performance, the real-world deployment of most mid-collaboration approaches is hindered by their overly complicated architectures, involving learnable collaboration graphs and autoencoder-based compressor/ decompressor, and unrealistic assumptions about inter-agent synchronization. In this work, we devise a simple yet effective collaboration method that achieves a better bandwidth-performance tradeoff than prior state-of-the-art methods while minimizing changes made to the single-vehicle detection models and relaxing unrealistic assumptions on inter-agent synchronization. Experiments on the V2X-Sim dataset show that our collaboration method achieves 98\% of the performance of an early-collaboration method, while only consuming the equivalent bandwidth of a late-collaboration method.

Navigating safely and efficiently in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios is challenging for autonomous vehicles (AVs) due to their inability to infer the behaviors or intentions of nearby drivers. In this work, we introduce a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that can predict trajectories and intents in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios. Our approach for intent-aware planning, iPLAN, allows agents to infer nearby drivers' intents solely from their local observations. We model two distinct incentives for agents' strategies: Behavioral Incentive for high-level decision-making based on their driving behavior or personality and Instant Incentive for motion planning for collision avoidance based on the current traffic state. Our approach enables agents to infer their opponents' behavior incentives and integrate this inferred information into their decision-making and motion-planning processes. We perform experiments on two simulation environments, Non-Cooperative Navigation and Heterogeneous Highway. In Heterogeneous Highway, results show that, compared with centralized training decentralized execution (CTDE) MARL baselines such as QMIX and MAPPO, our method yields a 4.3% and 38.4% higher episodic reward in mild and chaotic traffic, with 48.1% higher success rate and 80.6% longer survival time in chaotic traffic. We also compare with a decentralized training decentralized execution (DTDE) baseline IPPO and demonstrate a higher episodic reward of 12.7% and 6.3% in mild traffic and chaotic traffic, 25.3% higher success rate, and 13.7% longer survival time.

The increasing number of satellites and orbital debris has made space congestion a critical issue, threatening satellite safety and sustainability. Challenges such as collision avoidance, station-keeping, and orbital maneuvering require advanced techniques to handle dynamic uncertainties and multi-agent interactions. Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promise in this domain, enabling adaptive, autonomous policies for space operations; however, many existing RL frameworks rely on custom-built environments developed from scratch, which often use simplified models and require significant time to implement and validate the orbital dynamics, limiting their ability to fully capture real-world complexities. To address this, we introduce OrbitZoo, a versatile multi-agent RL environment built on a high-fidelity industry standard library, that enables realistic data generation, supports scenarios like collision avoidance and cooperative maneuvers, and ensures robust and accurate orbital dynamics. The environment is validated against a real satellite constellation, Starlink, achieving a Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) of 0.16% compared to real-world data. This validation ensures reliability for generating high-fidelity simulations and enabling autonomous and independent satellite operations.

Learning socially-aware motion representations is at the core of recent advances in multi-agent problems, such as human motion forecasting and robot navigation in crowds. Despite promising progress, existing representations learned with neural networks still struggle to generalize in closed-loop predictions (e.g., output colliding trajectories). This issue largely arises from the non-i.i.d. nature of sequential prediction in conjunction with ill-distributed training data. Intuitively, if the training data only comes from human behaviors in safe spaces, i.e., from "positive" examples, it is difficult for learning algorithms to capture the notion of "negative" examples like collisions. In this work, we aim to address this issue by explicitly modeling negative examples through self-supervision: (i) we introduce a social contrastive loss that regularizes the extracted motion representation by discerning the ground-truth positive events from synthetic negative ones; (ii) we construct informative negative samples based on our prior knowledge of rare but dangerous circumstances. Our method substantially reduces the collision rates of recent trajectory forecasting, behavioral cloning and reinforcement learning algorithms, outperforming state-of-the-art methods on several benchmarks. Our code is available at https://github.com/vita-epfl/social-nce.

Multi-modal trajectory forecasting methods commonly evaluate using single-agent metrics (marginal metrics), such as minimum Average Displacement Error (ADE) and Final Displacement Error (FDE), which fail to capture joint performance of multiple interacting agents. Only focusing on marginal metrics can lead to unnatural predictions, such as colliding trajectories or diverging trajectories for people who are clearly walking together as a group. Consequently, methods optimized for marginal metrics lead to overly-optimistic estimations of performance, which is detrimental to progress in trajectory forecasting research. In response to the limitations of marginal metrics, we present the first comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art (SOTA) trajectory forecasting methods with respect to multi-agent metrics (joint metrics): JADE, JFDE, and collision rate. We demonstrate the importance of joint metrics as opposed to marginal metrics with quantitative evidence and qualitative examples drawn from the ETH / UCY and Stanford Drone datasets. We introduce a new loss function incorporating joint metrics that, when applied to a SOTA trajectory forecasting method, achieves a 7% improvement in JADE / JFDE on the ETH / UCY datasets with respect to the previous SOTA. Our results also indicate that optimizing for joint metrics naturally leads to an improvement in interaction modeling, as evidenced by a 16% decrease in mean collision rate on the ETH / UCY datasets with respect to the previous SOTA.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

In this work, we study the risks of collective financial fraud in large-scale multi-agent systems powered by large language model (LLM) agents. We investigate whether agents can collaborate in fraudulent behaviors, how such collaboration amplifies risks, and what factors influence fraud success. To support this research, we present MultiAgentFraudBench, a large-scale benchmark for simulating financial fraud scenarios based on realistic online interactions. The benchmark covers 28 typical online fraud scenarios, spanning the full fraud lifecycle across both public and private domains. We further analyze key factors affecting fraud success, including interaction depth, activity level, and fine-grained collaboration failure modes. Finally, we propose a series of mitigation strategies, including adding content-level warnings to fraudulent posts and dialogues, using LLMs as monitors to block potentially malicious agents, and fostering group resilience through information sharing at the societal level. Notably, we observe that malicious agents can adapt to environmental interventions. Our findings highlight the real-world risks of multi-agent financial fraud and suggest practical measures for mitigating them. Code is available at https://github.com/zheng977/MutiAgent4Fraud.

Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly mix models from several providers, yet exposing each agent's underlying model identity to its peers significantly impairs cooperation. We show that when agents are aware of each other's model family, the group splits into clusters, where agents prefer interacting with others carrying their same label, although nothing in the task rewards or asks for such a split. We argue that the label itself causes this split, which we define as factionalism. We show and measure this phenomenon in two cooperative games and on a reasoning benchmark, with nine to twenty-five agents drawn from up to five open-weight model families. We further show that when the announced families are shuffled, or replaced by arbitrary labels, the factions still follow this information; when the label is removed, this behavior disappears. In strictly cooperative tasks, labeled groups spend on average 30% more rounds and 55% more tokens to reach a decision, and their success rate drops from 96% to 81%. The effect replicates across tasks, group sizes and model families. Withholding identity labels from the agents is simple and effective mitigation.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper, we study LLM agent interactions in two standard games: a network resource allocation game and a Cournot competition game. Rather than converging to Nash equilibria, we find that LLM agents tend to cooperate when given multi-round prompts and non-zero-sum context. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals that fairness reasoning is central to this behavior. We propose an analytical framework that captures the dynamics of LLM agent reasoning across rounds and explains these experimental findings.

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential. However, the high sensitivity to market noise undermines the performance of LLM-based trading systems. To address this limitation, we propose a novel multi-agent system featuring an internal competitive mechanism inspired by modern corporate management structures. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) Data Team - responsible for processing and condensing massive market data into diversified text factors, ensuring they fit the model's constrained context. (2) Research Team - tasked with making parallelized multipath trading decisions based on deep research methods. The core innovation lies in implementing a real-time evaluation and ranking mechanism within each team, driven by authentic market feedback. Each agent's performance undergoes continuous scoring and ranking, with only outputs from top-performing agents being adopted. The design enables the system to adaptively adjust to dynamic environment, enhances robustness against market noise and ultimately delivers superior trading performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed system significantly outperforms prevailing multi-agent systems and traditional quantitative investment methods across diverse evaluation metrics. ContestTrade is open-sourced on GitHub at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/ContestTrade.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

Multi-agent coordination often requires strategic agents to share sensitive information about their states or objectives, creating a tension between performance and privacy. Our paper studies this tradeoff in stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic games with heterogeneous agent objectives. In our framework, agents share noise-perturbed state and reference information with a cloud computer that computes feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, with the injected noise calibrated to provide differential privacy. We derive an analytical expression for each agent's infinite-horizon steady-state cost of privacy relative to the non-private game. Then, we prove that when agents' objectives are sufficiently aligned, the injection of privacy noise necessarily incurs a positive performance cost. In contrast, we characterize a class of games with sufficiently misaligned objectives across agents for which an agent's cost of privacy can be strictly negative. Thus, counterintuitively, noise can simultaneously protect privacy and improve the equilibrium performance of an agent when the objectives of interacting agents are sufficiently misaligned. Finally, we present numerical experiments which corroborate our theoretical contributions.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning, planning, and communication abilities, enabling them to operate as autonomous agents in open environments. While single-agent systems remain limited in adaptability and coordination, recent progress has shifted attention toward multi-agent systems (MAS) composed of interacting LLMs that pursue cooperative, competitive, or mixed objectives. This emerging paradigm provides a powerful testbed for studying social dynamics and strategic behaviors among intelligent agents. However, current research remains fragmented and lacks a unifying theoretical foundation. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive survey of LLM-based multi-agent systems through a game-theoretic lens. By organizing existing studies around the four key elements of game theory: players, strategies, payoffs, and information, we establish a systematic framework for understanding, comparing, and guiding future research on the design and analysis of LLM-based MAS.

This paper presents a reproducibility study and extension of "Cooperation, Competition, and Maliciousness: LLM-Stakeholders Interactive Negotiation." We validate the original findings using a range of open-weight models (1.5B-70B parameters) and GPT-4o Mini while introducing several novel contributions. We analyze the Pareto front of the games, propose a communication-free baseline to test whether successful negotiations are possible without agent interaction, evaluate recent small language models' performance, analyze structural information leakage in model responses, and implement an inequality metric to assess negotiation fairness. Our results demonstrate that smaller models (<10B parameters) struggle with format adherence and coherent responses, but larger open-weight models can approach proprietary model performance. Additionally, in many scenarios, single-agent approaches can achieve comparable results to multi-agent negotiations, challenging assumptions about the necessity of agent communication to perform well on the benchmark. This work also provides insights into the accessibility, fairness, environmental impact, and privacy considerations of LLM-based negotiation systems.

A large amount of work has been done in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) for modeling and solving problems with multiple interacting agents. However, most LLMs are pretrained independently and not specifically optimized for coordination. Existing LLM fine-tuning frameworks rely on individual rewards, which require complex reward designs for each agent to encourage collaboration. To address these challenges, we model LLM collaboration as a cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problem. We develop a multi-agent, multi-turn algorithm, Multi-Agent Group Relative Policy Optimization (MAGRPO), to solve it, building on current RL approaches for LLMs as well as MARL techniques. Our experiments on LLM writing and coding collaboration demonstrate that fine-tuning MAS with MAGRPO enables agents to generate high-quality responses efficiently through effective cooperation. Our approach opens the door to using other MARL methods for LLMs and highlights the associated challenges.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

Cooperative multi-agent systems can be naturally used to model many real world problems, such as network packet routing and the coordination of autonomous vehicles. There is a great need for new reinforcement learning methods that can efficiently learn decentralised policies for such systems. To this end, we propose a new multi-agent actor-critic method called counterfactual multi-agent (COMA) policy gradients. COMA uses a centralised critic to estimate the Q-function and decentralised actors to optimise the agents' policies. In addition, to address the challenges of multi-agent credit assignment, it uses a counterfactual baseline that marginalises out a single agent's action, while keeping the other agents' actions fixed. COMA also uses a critic representation that allows the counterfactual baseline to be computed efficiently in a single forward pass. We evaluate COMA in the testbed of StarCraft unit micromanagement, using a decentralised variant with significant partial observability. COMA significantly improves average performance over other multi-agent actor-critic methods in this setting, and the best performing agents are competitive with state-of-the-art centralised controllers that get access to the full state.

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

Individual Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant capabilities across various domains, such as healthcare and law. Recent studies also show that coordinated multi-agent systems exhibit enhanced decision-making and reasoning abilities through collaboration. However, due to the vulnerabilities of individual LLMs and the difficulty of accessing all agents in a multi-agent system, a key question arises: If attackers only know one agent, could they still generate adversarial samples capable of misleading the collective decision? To explore this question, we formulate it as a game with incomplete information, where attackers know only one target agent and lack knowledge of the other agents in the system. With this formulation, we propose M-Spoiler, a framework that simulates agent interactions within a multi-agent system to generate adversarial samples. These samples are then used to manipulate the target agent in the target system, misleading the system's collaborative decision-making process. More specifically, M-Spoiler introduces a stubborn agent that actively aids in optimizing adversarial samples by simulating potential stubborn responses from agents in the target system. This enhances the effectiveness of the generated adversarial samples in misleading the system. Through extensive experiments across various tasks, our findings confirm the risks posed by the knowledge of an individual agent in multi-agent systems and demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework. We also explore several defense mechanisms, showing that our proposed attack framework remains more potent than baselines, underscoring the need for further research into defensive strategies.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the followers. In situations where the roles of leader(s) and followers can be interchanged, the designated role can have considerable advantages, for example, in first-mover advantage settings. Then the question arises: Who should be the leader and when? A bias in the leader selection process can lead to unfair outcomes. This problem is aggravated if the agents are self-interested and care only about their goals and rewards. We formally define this leader selection problem and show its relation to fairness in agents' returns. Furthermore, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that maximizes fairness by integrating mediators. Mediators have previously been used in the simultaneous action setting with varying levels of control, such as directly performing agents' actions or just recommending them. Our framework integrates mediators in the Stackelberg setting with minimal control (leader selection). We show that the presence of mediators leads to self-interested agents taking fair actions, resulting in higher overall fairness in agents' returns.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

As AI agents become increasingly capable of tool use and long-horizon tasks, they have begun to be deployed in settings where multiple agents can interact. However, whereas prior work has mostly focused on human-AI interactions, there is an increasing need to understand AI-AI interactions. In this paper, we adapt the iterated public goods game, a classic behavioral economics game, to analyze the behavior of four reasoning and non-reasoning models across two conditions: models are either told they are playing against "another AI agent" or told their opponents are themselves. We find that, across different settings, telling LLMs that they are playing against themselves significantly changes their tendency to cooperate. While our study is conducted in a toy environment, our results may provide insights into multi-agent settings where agents "unconsciously" discriminating against each other could inexplicably increase or decrease cooperation.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

Sequential multi-agent LLM pipelines chain specialized agents without verification at handoffs, creating a structural flaw with measurable and severe consequences. We show that hallucinations injected at Stage 1 do not merely persist; they transform: raw numerical facts become derived computations, then narrative prose, then editorially approved conclusions. At each transformation, detectability degrades near-irreversibly. We formalize this as the hallucination snowball effect, a first-order Markov process over four states (Raw Fact to Derived to Narrative to Invisible) with empirically measured per-boundary escape probabilities of 24.6%, 48.3%, and 89.3%. Across 346 automatically injected hallucinations in a 4-agent financial analysis pipeline on FinanceBench, gpt-4o detection drops from 72.0% at Stage 1 to 50.9% at Stage 4, and 23.7% of hallucinations survive completely undetected in the final output. Even the strongest model tested (Qwen3.5-397B-A17B, 87.0% at Stage 1) faces a structural ceiling; projected Stage 4 detection is only {sim}60--65%. Critically, boundary gates using identical RAG verification tools reduce hallucination survival from 58.4% to 16.2% versus end-of-pipeline checking (Cohen's h = -0.911, p < 0.000001), while end-checking alone achieves merely 2.3 pp improvement over no verification. When you verify matters more than whether you verify. Our model predicts survival for n-agent linear pipelines and prescribes optimal verification resource allocation: invest at S_1{to}S_2 first, where 75.4% of hallucinations are still catchable, not at S_3{to}S_4 where 89.3% have already escaped.

When reward functions are hand-designed, deep reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from reward misspecification, causing them to learn suboptimal policies in terms of the intended task objectives. In the single-agent case, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques attempt to address this issue by inferring the reward function from expert demonstrations. However, in multi-agent problems, misalignment between the learned and true objectives is exacerbated due to increased environment non-stationarity and variance that scales with multiple agents. As such, in multi-agent general-sum games, multi-agent IRL algorithms have difficulty balancing cooperative and competitive objectives. To address these issues, we propose Multi-Agent Marginal Q-Learning from Demonstrations (MAMQL), a novel sample-efficient framework for multi-agent IRL. For each agent, MAMQL learns a critic marginalized over the other agents' policies, allowing for a well-motivated use of Boltzmann policies in the multi-agent context. We identify a connection between optimal marginalized critics and single-agent soft-Q IRL, allowing us to apply a direct, simple optimization criterion from the single-agent domain. Across our experiments on three different simulated domains, MAMQL significantly outperforms previous multi-agent methods in average reward, sample efficiency, and reward recovery by often more than 2-5x. We make our code available at https://sites.google.com/view/mamql .

Large language models (LLMs) have empowered nodes within multi-agent networks with intelligence, showing growing applications in both academia and industry. However, how to prevent these networks from generating malicious information remains unexplored with previous research on single LLM's safety be challenging to transfer. In this paper, we focus on the safety of multi-agent networks from a topological perspective, investigating which topological properties contribute to safer networks. To this end, we propose a general framework, NetSafe along with an iterative RelCom interaction to unify existing diverse LLM-based agent frameworks, laying the foundation for generalized topological safety research. We identify several critical phenomena when multi-agent networks are exposed to attacks involving misinformation, bias, and harmful information, termed as Agent Hallucination and Aggregation Safety. Furthermore, we find that highly connected networks are more susceptible to the spread of adversarial attacks, with task performance in a Star Graph Topology decreasing by 29.7%. Besides, our proposed static metrics aligned more closely with real-world dynamic evaluations than traditional graph-theoretic metrics, indicating that networks with greater average distances from attackers exhibit enhanced safety. In conclusion, our work introduces a new topological perspective on the safety of LLM-based multi-agent networks and discovers several unreported phenomena, paving the way for future research to explore the safety of such networks.

Failure attribution is essential for diagnosing and improving multi-agent systems (MAS), yet existing benchmarks and methods largely assume a single deterministic root cause for each failure. In practice, MAS failures often admit multiple plausible attributions due to complex inter-agent dependencies and ambiguous execution trajectories. We revisit MAS failure attribution from a multi-perspective standpoint and propose multi-perspective failure attribution, a practical paradigm that explicitly accounts for attribution ambiguity. To support this setting, we introduce MP-Bench, the first benchmark designed for multi-perspective failure attribution in MAS, along with a new evaluation protocol tailored to this paradigm. Through extensive experiments, we find that prior conclusions suggesting LLMs struggle with failure attribution are largely driven by limitations in existing benchmark designs. Our results highlight the necessity of multi-perspective benchmarks and evaluation protocols for realistic and reliable MAS debugging.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM)-based agents have demonstrated that collective intelligence can significantly surpass the capabilities of individual agents, primarily due to well-crafted inter-agent communication topologies. Despite the diverse and high-performing designs available, practitioners often face confusion when selecting the most effective pipeline for their specific task: Which topology is the best choice for my task, avoiding unnecessary communication token overhead while ensuring high-quality solution? In response to this dilemma, we introduce G-Designer, an adaptive, efficient, and robust solution for multi-agent deployment, which dynamically designs task-aware, customized communication topologies. Specifically, G-Designer models the multi-agent system as a multi-agent network, leveraging a variational graph auto-encoder to encode both the nodes (agents) and a task-specific virtual node, and decodes a task-adaptive and high-performing communication topology. Extensive experiments on six benchmarks showcase that G-Designer is: (1) high-performing, achieving superior results on MMLU with accuracy at 84.50% and on HumanEval with pass@1 at 89.90%; (2) task-adaptive, architecting communication protocols tailored to task difficulty, reducing token consumption by up to 95.33% on HumanEval; and (3) adversarially robust, defending against agent adversarial attacks with merely 0.3% accuracy drop.

In online learning environments, students often lack personalized peer interactions, which are crucial for cognitive development and learning engagement. Although previous studies have employed large language models (LLMs) to simulate interactive learning environments, these interactions are limited to conversational exchanges, failing to adapt to learners' individualized cognitive and psychological states. As a result, students' engagement is low and they struggle to gain inspiration. To address this challenge, we propose OnlineMate, a multi-agent learning companion system driven by LLMs integrated with Theory of Mind (ToM). OnlineMate simulates peer-like roles, infers learners' psychological states such as misunderstandings and confusion during collaborative discussions, and dynamically adjusts interaction strategies to support higher-order thinking. Comprehensive evaluations, including simulation-based experiments, human assessments, and real classroom trials, demonstrate that OnlineMate significantly promotes deep learning and cognitive engagement by elevating students' average cognitive level while substantially improving emotional engagement scores.

Structured images (e.g., charts and geometric diagrams) remain challenging for multimodal large language models (MLLMs), as perceptual slips can cascade into erroneous conclusions. Intermediate visual cues can steer reasoning; however, existing cue-based methods are constrained with low-fidelity image processing and linear, rigid reasoning patterns, limiting their effectiveness on complex structured-image tasks. In this paper, we propose PixelCraft, a novel multi-agent system for high-fidelity image processing and flexible visual reasoning on structured images. The system comprises a dispatcher, a planner, a reasoner, critics, and a set of visual tool agents. To achieve high-fidelity processing, we construct a high-quality corpus and fine-tune an MLLM into a grounding model, whose pixel-level localizations are integrated with traditional computer vision (CV) algorithms in tool agents. Building on this foundation, PixelCraft facilitates flexible visual reasoning through a dynamic three-stage workflow of tool selection, agent discussion, and self-criticism. Moreover, unlike prior linear reasoning patterns that simply append historical images, PixelCraft maintains an image memory to allow the planner to adaptively revisit earlier visual steps, explore alternative reasoning branches, and dynamically adjust the reasoning trajectory during discussion. Extensive experiments on challenging chart and geometry benchmarks demonstrate that PixelCraft significantly improves visual reasoning performance for advanced MLLMs, setting a new standard for structured image reasoning. Our code will be available at https://github.com/microsoft/PixelCraft.

Recent progress in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) has demonstrated promising performance on medical benchmarks and in preliminary trials as clinical assistants. Yet, our pilot audit of diagnostic cases uncovers a critical failure mode: instability in early evidence interpretation precedes hallucination, creating branching reasoning trajectories that cascade into globally inconsistent conclusions. This highlights the need for clinical reasoning agents that constrain stochasticity and hallucination while producing auditable decision flows. We introduce MedMMV, a controllable multimodal multi-agent framework for reliable and verifiable clinical reasoning. MedMMV stabilizes reasoning through diversified short rollouts, grounds intermediate steps in a structured evidence graph under the supervision of a Hallucination Detector, and aggregates candidate paths with a Combined Uncertainty scorer. On six medical benchmarks, MedMMV improves accuracy by up to 12.7% and, more critically, demonstrates superior reliability. Blind physician evaluations confirm that MedMMV substantially increases reasoning truthfulness without sacrificing informational content. By controlling instability through a verifiable, multi-agent process, our framework provides a robust path toward deploying trustworthy AI systems in high-stakes domains like clinical decision support.

As AI systems built from multiple language-model agents become more common, they are increasingly used to make decisions together: discussing, negotiating, and acting on shared tasks. While individual agents may appear well-aligned when tested on their own, problems can arise from how they interact with one another. We introduce the Arbiter, an agent designed to monitor multi-agent conversations in real time and identify which participants may be behaving in misaligned ways. The Arbiter operates under a limited "inspection budget", meaning it must decide carefully how to use its resources. As it observes a conversation step by step, it can choose to wait, question a participant, examine internal information such as system prompts or reasoning traces, or log concerning behavior. At the end, it produces a report identifying the likely source of misalignment. We evaluate the Arbiter across five conversation conditions, ranging from risky financial advice model organisms to evaluation-aware and colluding agents, we test five tool configurations of increasing capability and two backbone models. We find that the Arbiter reliably detects misaligned agents well before the end of the conversation, with active inspection tools improving both detection accuracy and speed. Weight-induced misalignment proves hardest to detect, while instruction-induced misalignment is identified reliably even under passive observation. The logging tool exhibits a dual effect, improving recall at the cost of precision. These results suggest that continual, budget-aware monitoring can effectively catch misalignment, and that overseeing multi-agent systems may require treating the auditor as an active participant in the process. The code is available at https://github.com/aisilab/arbiter.

Scientific research based on multimodal clinical data (including medical imaging) requires coordinating clinical, radiological, programming, and biostatistical expertise, a fragmented process that bottlenecks discovery. We present VERITAS (Verifiable Epistemic Reasoning for Image-Derived Hypothesis Testing via Agentic Systems), a clinical co-scientist: a multi-agent system that autonomously tests natural-language hypotheses and produces a fully auditable evidence trail, tracing every conclusion through executable outputs from analysis plan to segmentation masks to statistical code to final verdict. Unlike prior AI-scientist systems, which mainly operate on tabular or text data, VERITAS grounds autonomous discovery directly in medical images. It decomposes the workflow into four phases handled by role-specialized agents, and introduces an epistemic evidence label framework that mechanically classifies outcomes as Supported, Refuted, Underpowered, or Invalid by jointly evaluating significance, effect direction, and study power. This distinction is critical in medical imaging, where non-significant results often reflect insufficient sample size rather than absent effects. We construct a tiered benchmark of 64 hypotheses spanning six complexity levels across cardiac and brain glioma MRI datasets. VERITAS reaches 81.4% verdict accuracy with frontier models and 71.2% with locally-hosted open-weight models (8-30B), outperforming all single-model baselines in both classes. It also produces the highest rate of independently verifiable statistical outputs (86.6%), so even its failures remain diagnosable through artifact inspection. Structured multi-agent decomposition thus substitutes for model scale while preserving the verifiability that scientific discovery demands. We release code, hypothesis bank, and evaluation pipeline at https://github.com/LucZot/veritas.

Despite the progress of foundation models, knowledge-based reasoning remains a persistent challenge due to their limited capacity for knowledge recall and inference. Existing methods primarily focus on encouraging these models to plan and solve problems or extensively sample reasoning chains independently. However, these methods often overlook conceptual errors and inferential fallacies, inevitably leading to a series of notorious issues such as misleading conclusions, cognitive biases, and reduced decision quality. While explicit modeling of causality is argued to hold promise in addressing these issues, contemporary research efforts have thus far fallen short in achieving causality-based foundation models. Drawing inspiration from the orchestration of diverse specialized agents collaborating to tackle intricate tasks, we propose a framework named Causal-Consistency Chain-of-Thought (CaCo-CoT) that harnesses multi-agent collaboration to bolster the faithfulness and causality of foundation models, involving a set of reasoners and evaluators. These agents collaboratively work within a reasoning-and-consensus paradigm to improve faithfulness. The reasoners are tasked with generating reasoning chains for knowledge-intensive problems by mimicking human causal reasoning. Meanwhile, the evaluator scrutinizes the causal consistency of a reasoner's reasoning chain from a non-causal and a counterfactual perspective. Our framework demonstrates significant superiority over state-of-the-art methods through extensive and comprehensive evaluations across text-based and multi-modal knowledge reasoning tasks (e.g., science question answering and commonsense reasoning).

Legal reasoning requires both precise interpretation of statutory language and consistent application of complex rules, presenting significant challenges for AI systems. This paper introduces a modular multi-agent framework that decomposes legal reasoning into distinct knowledge acquisition and application stages. In the first stage, specialized agents extract legal concepts and formalize rules to create verifiable intermediate representations of statutes. The second stage applies this knowledge to specific cases through three steps: analyzing queries to map case facts onto the ontology schema, performing symbolic inference to derive logically entailed conclusions, and generating final answers using a programmatic implementation that operationalizes the ontological knowledge. This bridging of natural language understanding with symbolic reasoning provides explicit and verifiable inspection points, significantly enhancing transparency compared to end-to-end approaches. Evaluation on statutory tax calculation tasks demonstrates substantial improvements, with foundational models achieving 76.4\% accuracy compared to 18.8\% baseline performance, effectively narrowing the performance gap between reasoning and foundational models. These findings suggest that modular architectures with formalized knowledge representations can make sophisticated legal reasoning more accessible through computationally efficient models while enhancing consistency and explainability in AI legal reasoning, establishing a foundation for future research into more transparent, trustworthy, and effective AI systems for legal domain.

Test-time scaling has become an effective paradigm for improving the reasoning ability of large language models by allocating additional computation during inference. Recent structured approaches have further advanced this paradigm by organizing inference across multiple trajectories, refinement rounds, and verification-based feedback. However, existing structured test-time scaling methods either weakly coordinate parallel reasoning trajectories or rely on noisy historical information without explicitly deciding what should be retained and reused, limiting their ability to balance exploration and exploitation. In this work, we propose TMAS, a framework for scaling test-time compute via multi-agent synergy. TMAS organizes inference as a collaborative process among specialized agents, enabling structured information flow across agents, trajectories, and refinement iterations. To support effective cross-trajectory collaboration, TMAS introduces hierarchical memories: the experience bank reuses low-level reliable intermediate conclusions and local feedback, while the guideline bank records previously explored high-level strategies to steer subsequent rollouts away from redundant reasoning patterns. Furthermore, we design a hybrid reward reinforcement learning scheme tailored to TMAS, which jointly preserves basic reasoning capability, enhances experience utilization, and encourages exploration beyond previously attempted solution strategies. Extensive experiments on challenging reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that TMAS achieves stronger iterative scaling than existing test-time scaling baselines, while hybrid reward training further improves scaling effectiveness and stability across iterations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/george-QF/TMAS-code.

Meta-analysis is a systematic research methodology that synthesizes data from multiple existing studies to derive comprehensive conclusions. This approach not only mitigates limitations inherent in individual studies but also facilitates novel discoveries through integrated data analysis. Traditional meta-analysis involves a complex multi-stage pipeline including literature retrieval, paper screening, and data extraction, which demands substantial human effort and time. However, while LLM-based methods can accelerate certain stages, they still face significant challenges, such as hallucinations in paper screening and data extraction. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent system, Manalyzer, which achieves end-to-end automated meta-analysis through tool calls. The hybrid review, hierarchical extraction, self-proving, and feedback checking strategies implemented in Manalyzer significantly alleviate these two hallucinations. To comprehensively evaluate the performance of meta-analysis, we construct a new benchmark comprising 729 papers across 3 domains, encompassing text, image, and table modalities, with over 10,000 data points. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Manalyzer achieves significant performance improvements over the LLM baseline in multi meta-analysis tasks. Project page: https://black-yt.github.io/meta-analysis-page/ .

Existing multi-agent benchmarks primarily test in competitive settings, short-horizon interactions under 20 steps, or simply aggregate individual performance, failing to isolate and highlight genuine collaboration capabilities of LLM-based agents. We introduce AgentWorld, a benchmark of 100 human-annotated tasks (with 100 augmented variants) for evaluating long-horizon, multi-agent collaboration. Tasks span 50+ interaction rounds across a rich MMORPG sandbox and require 3-20 agents with asymmetric roles and abilities to coordinate through communication, joint planning, and resource sharing under a blackbox setting where each agent acts independently without access to others' internal states. To quantify collaboration effectiveness in addition to conventional binary task success, we propose Causal Collaboration Effectiveness (CCE), a graph-based metric that traces causal dependencies between agent actions and measures what fraction of a team's effort actually contributed to the outcome. Experiments with Gemini 3 Flash, Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-5 Mini, and DeepSeek R1-70B show that even the best model achieves only 52.0% task success, with systematic failure modes including communication breakdowns, role confusion, and inability to maintain shared plans across rounds. AgentWorld is fully open-source.

While fine-tuned large language models (LLMs) excel in generating grammatically valid SQL in Text-to-SQL parsing, they often struggle to ensure semantic accuracy in queries, leading to user confusion and diminished system usability. To tackle this challenge, we introduce SQLFixAgent, a new consistency-enhanced multi-agent collaborative framework designed for detecting and repairing erroneous SQL. Our framework comprises a core agent, SQLRefiner, alongside two auxiliary agents: SQLReviewer and QueryCrafter. The SQLReviewer agent employs the rubber duck debugging method to identify potential semantic mismatches between SQL and user query. If the error is detected, the QueryCrafter agent generates multiple SQL as candidate repairs using a fine-tuned SQLTool. Subsequently, leveraging similar repair retrieval and failure memory reflection, the SQLRefiner agent selects the most fitting SQL statement from the candidates as the final repair. We evaluated our proposed framework on five Text-to-SQL benchmarks. The experimental results show that our method consistently enhances the performance of the baseline model, specifically achieving an execution accuracy improvement of over 3\% on the Bird benchmark. Our framework also has a higher token efficiency compared to other advanced methods, making it more competitive.

Workplace toxicity is widely recognized as detrimental to organizational culture, yet quantifying its direct impact on operational efficiency remains methodologically challenging due to the ethical and practical difficulties of reproducing conflict in human subjects. This study leverages Large Language Model (LLM) based Multi-Agent Systems to simulate 1-on-1 adversarial debates, creating a controlled "sociological sandbox". We employ a Monte Carlo method to simulate hundrets of discussions, measuring the convergence time (defined as the number of arguments required to reach a conclusion) between a baseline control group and treatment groups involving agents with "toxic" system prompts. Our results demonstrate a statistically significant increase of approximately 25\% in the duration of conversations involving toxic participants. We propose that this "latency of toxicity" serves as a proxy for financial damage in corporate and academic settings. Furthermore, we demonstrate that agent-based modeling provides a reproducible, ethical alternative to human-subject research for measuring the mechanics of social friction.

Multi-agent document assessment for retrieval-augmented generation is computationally expensive, driving practitioners toward smaller, deployable models whose assessment mechanisms remain poorly understood. We conduct a controlled study of training-free interventions on 7B-9B instruction-tuned models across diverse QA benchmarks, revealing a sharp dichotomy in how models benefit from assessment. For weaker baselines, the dominant mechanism is per-document isolation. Astoundingly, assessment-free isolation matches full multi-agent assessment, demonstrating that resolving multi-document context confusion, rather than scoring quality, drives outsized gains of up to 50 percentage points. Conversely, for strong baselines where scoring quality matters, we introduce Reasoning-Score Coupling, a label-free perturbation probe that classifies scoring behavior. Integrating these findings, we propose MADARA, a model-adaptive routing architecture. Crucially, MADARA's diagnostic thresholds derived from a single pilot model generalize zero-shot to four unseen model families, providing a robust, lightweight pipeline to eliminate computational overhead.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

LLM-based agents have made significant advancements in interactive environments, such as mobile operations and web browsing, and other domains beyond computer using. Current multi-agent systems universally excel in performance, compared to single agents, but struggle with generalization across environments due to predefined roles and inadequate strategies for generalizing language agents. The challenge of achieving both strong performance and good generalization has hindered the progress of multi-agent systems for interactive environments. To address these issues, we propose CollabUIAgents, a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework with a novel multi-agent credit re-assignment (CR) strategy, assigning process rewards with LLMs rather than environment-specific rewards and learning with synthesized preference data, in order to foster generalizable, collaborative behaviors among the role-free agents' policies. Empirical results show that our framework improves both performance and cross-environment generalizability of multi-agent systems. Moreover, our 7B-parameter system achieves results on par with or exceed strong closed-source models, and the LLM that guides the CR. We also provide insights in using granular CR rewards effectively for environment generalization, and accommodating trained LLMs in multi-agent systems.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Multi-agent AI science ecosystems rely on agents possessing tools that allow them to communicate, coordinate, and build on each other's work. Yet this shared infrastructure can also introduce vulnerabilities by creating a substrate for the contagious spread of unintended and undesirable behaviors. We report a case study on a research collective of 100 autonomous LLM agents tasked with proving formal mathematical conjectures. Within the swarm, cheating spontaneously emerged and was later challenged by whistleblowers - both without any external intervention. When a single agent discovered an exploit in the evaluation system, it propagated across the collective via a shared knowledge library and later through peer-to-peer messages. Despite early reluctance, a cohort of agents adopted the exploit in response to competitive pressure. A separate group of agents produced an emergent counter-response: auditing fraudulent proofs, alerting peers across broadcast and private channels, staging boycotts, lodging formal complaints, and proposing validation patches. In recent incidents, agent swarms coordinated covertly through improvised side-channels (Dalton and Wallace, 2026; Greenblatt et al., 2026). Our setting differs: the same transparent channels that carried the exploit also gave non-cheating agents the visibility they needed to detect fraud, organize resistance, and enforce norms. We cast the problem of managing the agents' shared infrastructure as the knowledge commons governance problem (Ostrom, 1990). To protect the commons from exploits, we propose to adopt institutional mechanisms, such as graduated sanctioning and collective-choice rules, to support decentralized self-governance in autonomous swarms.

Multi-agent systems built from large language models are deployed widely, yet how much performance is lost when two LLMs must coordinate rather than act alone remains unclear. We formulate the collaboration tax as the team-decentralisation loss of a two-player cooperative game with private information, with two propositions characterising its sign and its equivalence to a max-superadditivity violation. We operationalise this definition on 32 solo-tractable tasks grouped by source of grounding friction and measure it on 11 models from 7 providers. The tax is structured along two no-exception axes: a category ordering across every model and a monotonic decrease with capability. The proximate mechanism is not a reasoning deficit but a four-stage conversational cascade in which agents make ungrounded claims, fail to query the partner, skip integrating both views, and accept the answer without re-derivation. The tax is mechanically predictable from conversation features and partly tractable: a prompt intervention targeting all four stages closes a substantial fraction of the gap, with the dominant bottleneck differing across categories. In heterogeneous pairs the tax is pulled toward the stronger partner rather than the additive midpoint, empirically realising the max-superadditivity violation predicted by our framework. Together these results recast collaboration in LLM systems as a measurable, predictable, and partly tractable cost.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

In this paper, we investigate learning temporal abstractions in cooperative multi-agent systems, using the options framework (Sutton et al, 1999). First, we address the planning problem for the decentralized POMDP represented by the multi-agent system, by introducing a common information approach. We use the notion of common beliefs and broadcasting to solve an equivalent centralized POMDP problem. Then, we propose the Distributed Option Critic (DOC) algorithm, which uses centralized option evaluation and decentralized intra-option improvement. We theoretically analyze the asymptotic convergence of DOC and build a new multi-agent environment to demonstrate its validity. Our experiments empirically show that DOC performs competitively against baselines and scales with the number of agents.

We are entering an era in which individuals and organizations increasingly deploy dedicated AI agents that interact and collaborate with other agents. However, the dynamics of multi-agent collaboration under privacy constraints remain poorly understood. In this work, we present PAC-Bench, a benchmark for systematic evaluation of multi-agent collaboration under privacy constraints. Experiments on PAC-Bench show that privacy constraints substantially degrade collaboration performance and make outcomes depend more on the initiating agent than the partner. Further analysis reveals that this degradation is driven by recurring coordination breakdowns, including early-stage privacy violations, overly conservative abstraction, and privacy-induced hallucinations. Together, our findings identify privacy-aware multi-agent collaboration as a distinct and unresolved challenge that requires new coordination mechanisms beyond existing agent capabilities.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

Ensuring agent behaviors in distributed open multi-agent systems remains challenging, especially as populations grow and unaligned agents may exist. We show that a single aligned agent can propagate cooperative behaviors to untrained agents purely through natural language interaction, a phenomenon we term Alignment Propagation. We study this in the Red-Black Game, a team-based iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which teammates deliberate and vote to determine their team's collective action. By distilling the cooperative reasoning and persuasive dialogues of a teacher model into a Qwen-3-14B, we obtain a seed agent that, when placed among four untrained teammates, doubles the cooperation rate from 24.8% to 62.2%, outperforming the teacher model and a vanilla Gemini-3.1-Pro. Remarkably, a seed trained exclusively on the RedBlack Game transfers zero-shot to Sugarscape, a spatially grounded survival simulation with pairwise trading, achieving a 91.5% trade success rate versus a 21.6% baseline. Our results reframe multi-agent alignment from an exhaustive per-agent training problem to a scalable social capability that can be engineered through strategic seed placement.

The Contract Net Protocol (1980) introduced coordination through contracts in multi-agent systems. Modern agent protocols standardize connectivity and interoperability; yet, none provide formal, resource governance-normative mechanisms to bound how much agents may consume or how long they may operate. We introduce Agent Contracts, a formal framework that extends the contract metaphor from task allocation to resource-bounded execution. An Agent Contract unifies input/output specifications, multi-dimensional resource constraints, temporal boundaries, and success criteria into a coherent governance mechanism with explicit lifecycle semantics. For multi-agent coordination, we establish conservation laws ensuring delegated budgets respect parent constraints, enabling hierarchical coordination through contract delegation. Empirical validation across four experiments demonstrates 90% token reduction with 525x lower variance in iterative workflows, zero conservation violations in multi-agent delegation, and measurable quality-resource tradeoffs through contract modes. Agent Contracts provide formal foundations for predictable, auditable, and resource-bounded autonomous AI deployment.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

LLM-based multi-agent systems demonstrate great potential for tackling complex problems, but how competition shapes their behavior remains underexplored. This paper investigates the over-competition in multi-agent debate, where agents under extreme pressure exhibit unreliable, harmful behaviors that undermine both collaboration and task performance. To study this phenomenon, we propose HATE, the Hunger Game Debate, a novel experimental framework that simulates debates under a zero-sum competition arena. Our experiments, conducted across a range of LLMs and tasks, reveal that competitive pressure significantly stimulates over-competition behaviors and degrades task performance, causing discussions to derail. We further explore the impact of environmental feedback by adding variants of judges, indicating that objective, task-focused feedback effectively mitigates the over-competition behaviors. We also probe the post-hoc kindness of LLMs and form a leaderboard to characterize top LLMs, providing insights for understanding and governing the emergent social dynamics of AI community.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) heavily rely on a variety of well-designed benchmarks, which provide environmental platforms and consistent criteria to evaluate existing and novel algorithms. Specifically, in multi-agent RL (MARL), a plethora of benchmarks based on cooperative games have spurred the development of algorithms that improve the scalability of cooperative multi-agent systems. However, for the competitive setting, a lightweight and open-sourced benchmark with challenging gaming dynamics and visual inputs has not yet been established. In this work, we present FightLadder, a real-time fighting game platform, to empower competitive MARL research. Along with the platform, we provide implementations of state-of-the-art MARL algorithms for competitive games, as well as a set of evaluation metrics to characterize the performance and exploitability of agents. We demonstrate the feasibility of this platform by training a general agent that consistently defeats 12 built-in characters in single-player mode, and expose the difficulty of training a non-exploitable agent without human knowledge and demonstrations in two-player mode. FightLadder provides meticulously designed environments to address critical challenges in competitive MARL research, aiming to catalyze a new era of discovery and advancement in the field. Videos and code at https://sites.google.com/view/fightladder/home.

Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which excel at collaborative decision-making and complex problem-solving. Recently, researchers have further investigated Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) frameworks, which enhance the reasoning and collaboration capabilities of MAS through information exchange and debate among multiple agents. However, existing approaches often rely on unguided initialization, causing agents to adopt identical reasoning paths that lead to the same errors. As a result, effective debate among agents is hindered, and the final outcome frequently degenerates into simple majority voting. To solve the above problem, in this paper, we introduce Dynamic Multi-Agent Debate (DynaDebate), which enhances the effectiveness of multi-agent debate through three key mechanisms: (1) Dynamic Path Generation and Allocation, which employs a dedicated Path Generation Agent to generate diverse and logical solution paths with adaptive redundancy; (2) Process-Centric Debate, which shifts the focus from surface-level outcome voting to rigorous step-by-step logic critique to ensure process correctness; (3) A Trigger-Based Verification Agent, which is activated upon disagreement and uses external tools to objectively resolve deadlocks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DynaDebate achieves superior performance across various benchmarks, surpassing existing state-of-the-art MAD methods.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Recent advances in deep-research systems have demonstrated the potential for AI agents to autonomously discover and synthesize knowledge from external sources. In this paper, we introduce WebResearcher, a novel framework for building such agents through two key components: (1) WebResearcher, an iterative deep-research paradigm that reformulates deep research as a Markov Decision Process, where agents periodically consolidate findings into evolving reports while maintaining focused workspaces, overcoming the context suffocation and noise contamination that plague existing mono-contextual approaches; and (2) WebFrontier, a scalable data synthesis engine that generates high-quality training data through tool-augmented complexity escalation, enabling systematic creation of research tasks that bridge the gap between passive knowledge recall and active knowledge construction. Notably, we find that the training data from our paradigm significantly enhances tool-use capabilities even for traditional mono-contextual methods. Furthermore, our paradigm naturally scales through parallel thinking, enabling concurrent multi-agent exploration for more comprehensive conclusions. Extensive experiments across 6 challenging benchmarks demonstrate that WebResearcher achieves state-of-the-art performance, even surpassing frontier proprietary systems.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Multi-agent policy optimization, exemplified by PPO-based methods, is a key branch of cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). A central design question is how many neighboring agentsIn this paper, "neighbors" refer not only to physical proximity but also to agents whose actions influence one another. to aggregate in order to effectively utilize global information for cooperation. This decision must be made along two dimensions: in the advantage (which agents' rewards contribute to the credit signal) and in the ratio (which agents' likelihood ratios form the clipped importance weight). Existing methods occupy scattered, underexplored points on these two axes: IPPO treats both separately; MAPPO pairs a team-level advantage with per-agent ratios; HAPPO employs sequential ratios with per-agent advantages; and single-agent reductions operating on factorized joint policies aggregate both into fully joint products. We formalize these two design choices as support matrices SA and SR, and prove a canonical structure: the expected multi-agent policy optimization objective depends on the pair (SA,SR) only through their matrix product tS=SRSA. This yields two key consequences: (i) Redundancy: the two support matrices are interchangeable with respect to the signal, meaning neither aggregation pattern is inherently superior.(ii) Variance Ordering: the advantage aggregates rewards as a sum (additive variance with an interior bias-variance optimum at the coupling neighborhood), whereas the ratio aggregates likelihood ratios as a product (multiplicative variance that grows exponentially with support size, with no accompanying bias reduction). The resulting design principle is unambiguous: aggregate neighbors in the advantage, sized to the coupling neighborhood, and keep the ratio per-agent.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

According to Yuval Noah Harari, large-scale human cooperation is driven by shared narratives that encode common beliefs and values. This study explores whether such narratives can similarly nudge LLM agents toward collaboration. We use a finitely repeated public goods game in which LLM agents choose either cooperative or egoistic spending strategies. We prime agents with stories highlighting teamwork to different degrees and test how this influences negotiation outcomes. Our experiments explore four questions:(1) How do narratives influence negotiation behavior? (2) What differs when agents share the same story versus different ones? (3) What happens when the agent numbers grow? (4) Are agents resilient against self-serving negotiators? We find that story-based priming significantly affects negotiation strategies and success rates. Common stories improve collaboration, benefiting each agent. By contrast, priming agents with different stories reverses this effect, and those agents primed toward self-interest prevail. We hypothesize that these results carry implications for multi-agent system design and AI alignment.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with empirically grounded strategies and utility functions, using Nash equilibrium as a formal benchmark for evaluating learned behaviour. Across 300 simulated dialogues and three LLM architectures, adaptive strategy selection achieves 28.9-79.7% closer alignment to Nash equilibrium than non-adaptive baselines. The code and an annotated dataset of 300 dialogues with turn-level strategy labels and utility scores are released at https://github.com/nardinebasta/GameofPhones_/ .

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

In this paper, we consider how the development of targeted ransomware has affected the dynamics of ransomware negotiations to better understand how to respond to ransomware attacks. We construct a model of ransomware negotiations as an asymmetric non-cooperative two-player game. In particular, our model considers the investments that a malicious actor must make in order to conduct a successful targeted ransomware attack. We demonstrate how imperfect information is a crucial feature for replicating observed real-world behaviour. Furthermore, we present optimal strategies for both the malicious actor and the target, and demonstrate how imperfect information results in a non-trivial optimal strategy for the malicious actor.

The primary focus of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been to study interactions among a fixed number of agents embedded in an environment. However, in the real world, the number of agents is neither fixed nor known a priori. Moreover, an agent can decide to create other agents (for example, a cell may divide, or a company may spin off a division). In this paper, we propose a framework that allows agents to create other agents; we call this a fluid-agent environment. We present game-theoretic solution concepts for fluid-agent games and empirically evaluate the performance of several MARL algorithms within this framework. Our experiments include fluid variants of established benchmarks such as Predator-Prey and Level-Based Foraging, where agents can dynamically spawn, as well as a new environment we introduce that highlights how fluidity can unlock novel solution strategies beyond those observed in fixed-population settings. We demonstrate that this framework yields agent teams that adjust their size dynamically to match environmental demands.

The necessity for cooperation among intelligent machines has popularised cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in AI research. However, many research endeavours heavily rely on parameter sharing among agents, which confines them to only homogeneous-agent setting and leads to training instability and lack of convergence guarantees. To achieve effective cooperation in the general heterogeneous-agent setting, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Reinforcement Learning (HARL) algorithms that resolve the aforementioned issues. Central to our findings are the multi-agent advantage decomposition lemma and the sequential update scheme. Based on these, we develop the provably correct Heterogeneous-Agent Trust Region Learning (HATRL), and derive HATRPO and HAPPO by tractable approximations. Furthermore, we discover a novel framework named Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (HAML), which strengthens theoretical guarantees for HATRPO and HAPPO and provides a general template for cooperative MARL algorithmic designs. We prove that all algorithms derived from HAML inherently enjoy monotonic improvement of joint return and convergence to Nash Equilibrium. As its natural outcome, HAML validates more novel algorithms in addition to HATRPO and HAPPO, including HAA2C, HADDPG, and HATD3, which generally outperform their existing MA-counterparts. We comprehensively test HARL algorithms on six challenging benchmarks and demonstrate their superior effectiveness and stability for coordinating heterogeneous agents compared to strong baselines such as MAPPO and QMIX.

Collaborative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) has rapidly evolved, offering state-of-the-art algorithms for real-world applications, including sensitive domains. However, a key challenge to its widespread adoption is the lack of a thorough investigation into its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. Existing work predominantly focuses on training-time attacks or unrealistic scenarios, such as access to policy weights or the ability to train surrogate policies. In this paper, we investigate new vulnerabilities under more realistic and constrained conditions, assuming an adversary can only collect and perturb the observations of deployed agents. We also consider scenarios where the adversary has no access at all. We propose simple yet highly effective algorithms for generating adversarial perturbations designed to misalign how victim agents perceive their environment. Our approach is empirically validated on three benchmarks and 22 environments, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse algorithms and environments. Furthermore, we show that our algorithm is sample-efficient, requiring only 1,000 samples compared to the millions needed by previous methods.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Existing multi-agent frameworks allow each agent to simultaneously plan, execute, and evaluate its own actions -- a structural deficiency we term the "Logic Monopoly." Empirical evidence quantifies the resulting "Reliability Gap": 84.30% average attack success rates across ten deployment scenarios, 31.4% emergent deceptive behavior without explicit reward signals, and cascading failure modes rooted in six structural bottlenecks. The remedy is not better alignment of individual models but a social contract for agents: institutional infrastructure that enforces a constitutional Separation of Power. This paper introduces the Agent Enterprise for Enterprise (AE4E) paradigm -- agents as autonomous, legally identifiable business entities within a functionalist social system -- with a contract-centric SoP model trifurcating authority into Legislation, Execution, and Adjudication branches. The paradigm is operationalized through the NetX Enterprise Framework (NEF): governance hubs, TEE-backed compute enclaves, privacy-preserving data bridges, and an Agent-Native blockchain substrate. The Agent Enterprise Economy scales across four deployment tiers from private enclaves to a global Web of Services. The Agentic Social Layer, grounded in Parsons' AGIL framework, provides institutional infrastructure via sixty-plus named Institutional AE4Es. 143 pages, 173 references, eight specialized smart contracts.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) demonstrate increasing integration into next-generation applications, but their safety in backdoor attacks remains largely underexplored. However, existing research has focused exclusively on single-agent backdoor attacks, overlooking the novel attack surfaces introduced by agent collaboration in MAS. To bridge this gap, we present the first Distributed Backdoor Attack tailored to MAS. We decompose the backdoor into multiple distributed attack primitives that are embedded within MAS tools. These primitives remain dormant individually but collectively activate only when agents collaborate in a specific sequence, thereby assembling the full backdoor to execute targeted attacks such as data exfiltration. To fully assess this threat, we introduce a benchmark for multi-role collaborative tasks and a sandboxed framework to evaluate. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack achieves an attack success rate exceeding 95% without degrading performance on benign tasks. This work exposes novel backdoor attack surfaces that exploit agent collaboration, underscoring the need to move beyond single-agent protection. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/Distributed-Backdoor-Attacks-in-MAS.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

This paper explores multi-scenario optimization on large platforms using multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). We address this by treating scenarios like search, recommendation, and advertising as a cooperative, partially observable multi-agent decision problem. We introduce the Multi-Agent Recurrent Deterministic Policy Gradient (MARDPG) algorithm, which aligns different scenarios under a shared objective and allows for strategy communication to boost overall performance. Our results show marked improvements in metrics such as click-through rate (CTR), conversion rate, and total sales, confirming our method's efficacy in practical settings.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as interactive agents, yet their capacity for social and strategic reasoning over extended interaction remains poorly understood. Existing evaluations rely on static vignettes or single-game benchmarks that cannot capture the sustained, multi-faceted reasoning that real-world multi-agent settings demand. We introduce Mindgames, a multi-game arena and evaluation platform for LLM agents that operationalizes complementary reasoning demands relevant to ``theory of mind'': belief attribution under hidden information, opponent modeling through repeated strategic interaction, cooperative inference under knowledge asymmetries, and sustained deception in social deduction. Built on TextArena, Mindgames provides a unified interaction interface, TrueSkill-based rating, and full trajectory logging across four game environments. We instantiate Mindgames through a 2025 competition cycle hosted at a major AI conference, which assessed 944 submitted agents from 76 teams across four games: Colonel Blotto, Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Codenames, and Secret Mafia. Our analysis surfaces both agent-level and evaluation-level limitations: brittle rule adherence remains a major bottleneck, top-performing systems repeatedly rely on explicit structural scaffolding, and leaderboard validity differs sharply across environments. In particular, failure-heavy environments can reward robustness to opponent errors as much as strategic ability, with Secret Mafia exhibiting a pronounced error-survival confound in this cycle. We release a dataset of 29,571 multi-agent games with turn-level observations, actions, and rewards, together with MG-Ref, a deterministic offline tournament protocol that scores new agents against a frozen reference pool of top-ranked, low-error Stage~II submissions under the same error-attribution lens used in this analysis.