Daily Papers

Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same strategies as humans. To investigate this, we compare LLM and human performance on a common-interest game with imperfect monitoring: Group Binary Search. In this n-player game, participants need to coordinate their actions to achieve a common objective. Players independently submit numerical values in an effort to collectively sum to a randomly assigned target number. Without direct communication, they rely on group feedback to iteratively adjust their submissions until they reach the target number. Our findings show that, unlike humans who adapt and stabilize their behavior over time, LLMs often fail to improve across games and exhibit excessive switching, which impairs group convergence. Moreover, richer feedback (e.g., numerical error magnitude) benefits humans substantially but has small effects on LLMs. Taken together, by grounding the analysis in human baselines and mechanism-level metrics, including reactivity scaling, switching dynamics, and learning across games, we point to differences in human and LLM groups and provide a behaviorally grounded diagnostic for closing the coordination gap.

OpenSpiel is a collection of environments and algorithms for research in general reinforcement learning and search/planning in games. OpenSpiel supports n-player (single- and multi- agent) zero-sum, cooperative and general-sum, one-shot and sequential, strictly turn-taking and simultaneous-move, perfect and imperfect information games, as well as traditional multiagent environments such as (partially- and fully- observable) grid worlds and social dilemmas. OpenSpiel also includes tools to analyze learning dynamics and other common evaluation metrics. This document serves both as an overview of the code base and an introduction to the terminology, core concepts, and algorithms across the fields of reinforcement learning, computational game theory, and search.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

Artificial intelligence (AI) has enabled agents to master complex video games, from first-person shooters like Counter-Strike to real-time strategy games such as StarCraft II and racing games like Gran Turismo. While these achievements are notable, applying these AI methods in commercial video game production remains challenging due to computational constraints. In commercial scenarios, the majority of computational resources are allocated to 3D rendering, leaving limited capacity for AI methods, which often demand high computational power, particularly those relying on pixel-based sensors. Moreover, the gaming industry prioritizes creating human-like behavior in AI agents to enhance player experience, unlike academic models that focus on maximizing game performance. This paper introduces a novel methodology for training neural networks via imitation learning to play a complex, commercial-standard, VALORANT-like 2v2 tactical shooter game, requiring only modest CPU hardware during inference. Our approach leverages an innovative, pixel-free perception architecture using a small set of ray-cast sensors, which capture essential spatial information efficiently. These sensors allow AI to perform competently without the computational overhead of traditional methods. Models are trained to mimic human behavior using supervised learning on human trajectory data, resulting in realistic and engaging AI agents. Human evaluation tests confirm that our AI agents provide human-like gameplay experiences while operating efficiently under computational constraints. This offers a significant advancement in AI model development for tactical shooter games and possibly other genres.

We present an experimental implementation of the multiplayer Quantum Volunteer's Dilemma on noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) hardware, executed on the ibm_kingston backend via Qiskit Runtime. The game is evaluated for N = 2 to 9 players under four transpiler optimization levels, with 20 independent repetitions per configuration and 2048 shots per circuit, including post-processing readout error correction via mthree. Target-state fidelity decays with system size but remains above 70% (corrected) through N = 9. With readout correction, the global average payoff reproduces the quantum theoretical benchmark exactly for N <= 6 and exceeds the classical Nash equilibrium across the full tested range. Optimization level 2 is selected as the reference configuration after gate count analysis reveals that levels 2 and 3 produce identical transpiled circuits, with level 2 achieving superior fidelity stability. A Hamming distance analysis of raw measurement counts shows that single-qubit errors dominate at small N, with multi-qubit contributions growing beyond N = 6. A calibration-based digital twin captures global payoff trends but exhibits a linear fidelity decay profile that diverges from the hardware behavior at large N, exposing the limits of first-order independent per-qubit noise models. These results demonstrate that aggregate quantum advantage in multiplayer games is robust to NISQ noise conditions across the full tested range, while the practical observability of state-level advantage is constrained to N <= 8 under post-processed readout correction.

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has n ge 2 players who simultaneously choose prices from the set {1/k, 2/k, ldots, 1}, where kinN. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

We show, for the first time, radio measurements of the depth of shower maximum (X_max) of air showers induced by cosmic rays that are compared to measurements of the established fluorescence method at the same location. Using measurements at the Pierre Auger Observatory we show full compatibility between our radio and the previously published fluorescence data set, and between a subset of air showers observed simultaneously with both radio and fluorescence techniques, a measurement setup unique to the Pierre Auger Observatory. Furthermore, we show radio X_max resolution as a function of energy and demonstrate the ability to make competitive high-resolution X_max measurements with even a sparse radio array. With this, we show that the radio technique is capable of cosmic-ray mass composition studies, both at Auger and at other experiments.

Open-source reinforcement learning (RL) environments have played a crucial role in driving progress in the development of AI algorithms. In modern RL research, there is a need for simulated environments that are performant, scalable, and modular to enable their utilization in a wider range of potential real-world applications. Therefore, we present Jumanji, a suite of diverse RL environments specifically designed to be fast, flexible, and scalable. Jumanji provides a suite of environments focusing on combinatorial problems frequently encountered in industry, as well as challenging general decision-making tasks. By leveraging the efficiency of JAX and hardware accelerators like GPUs and TPUs, Jumanji enables rapid iteration of research ideas and large-scale experimentation, ultimately empowering more capable agents. Unlike existing RL environment suites, Jumanji is highly customizable, allowing users to tailor the initial state distribution and problem complexity to their needs. Furthermore, we provide actor-critic baselines for each environment, accompanied by preliminary findings on scaling and generalization scenarios. Jumanji aims to set a new standard for speed, adaptability, and scalability of RL environments.

We present AstroVink, a vision transformer classifier designed for automated identification of strong lens candidates in Euclid imaging. We build upon the DINOv2 encoder, fine tuned to distinguish between lens and non-lens galaxies. Our base model, trained on simulated strong lens systems and labelled non lenses, recovers 88 of the 110 lens candidates within the top 500 ranked candidates, corresponding to an inspection efficiency of one lens per 5.7 inspected objects in our test set. After the Q1 data release, which yielded about 500 lens candidates, we retrained the model using high confidence lens candidates and new negatives, initially flagged as potential lenses by other classifiers but rejected during visual inspection. The retrained network further improves performance, achieving recovery of all 110 systems within the same ranking and reducing the inspection effort to one lens per 4.5 inspected objects, demonstrating that incorporating real examples significantly enhances model generalisation. An analysis of training subsets revealed that the inclusion of realistic negative examples played a key role in this improvement. Finally, we applied the retrained model to the Q1 original selection of 1.08M targets, followed by a new round of Space Warps citizen science inspection and expert vetting, where we identified a total of eight Grade A and 26 Grade B new lens candidates. These results demonstrate that transformer based architectures can recover strong lens candidates with high efficiency in real Euclid data, while substantially reducing the number of candidates requiring visual inspection.