Daily Papers

Front-running has long plagued Ethereum's public mempool, earning it the nickname of a "dark forest", where predators lurk for profitable transactions. In response, Ethereum and other blockchain ecosystems increasingly rely on private RPCs and native protections to shield transactions from adversaries, which we refer to as protected order flow. Yet the effectiveness of these mechanisms in preventing front-running, and what trust assumptions they entail, remain poorly understood. In this work, we conduct the first longitudinal, three-year measurement study of sandwich attacks against protected order flow across six blockchains: Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Base, Arbitrum, and Monad. We introduce detection heuristics that capture wide attacks, both within and across blocks, and filter on bot behavior to distinguish sandwiches from legitimate trading activity. We identify 28.0 million sandwich attacks on Solana, 38,567 on Tron, 30,607 on Ethereum, and 1,889 on Base against transactions intended to be protected from front-running. Reorged blocks expose a further 2,875 Ethereum victims. Unlike conventional public-mempool sandwiches, these attacks rarely occur tightly around their victims and, outside Solana, are carried out by a small number of entities. Our analysis uncovers exposures at every layer: validator- and application-level exposure on Solana, order-flow auctions and reorged blocks on Ethereum, first-come-first-served ordering that fails to prevent latency-based front-running on Tron, and both an RPC bug that exposes pending transactions and predictable victim behavior on Base. These findings show that existing front-running protections can provide substantially weaker guarantees than users expect, highlighting the need for stronger end-to-end defenses against sandwich attacks.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

In this paper we develop a model of an order-driven market where traders set bids and asks and post market or limit orders according to exogenously fixed rules. Agents are assumed to have three components to the expectation of future asset returns, namely-fundamentalist, chartist and noise trader. Furthermore agents differ in the characteristics describing these components, such as time horizon, risk aversion and the weights given to the various components. The model developed here extends a great deal of earlier literature in that the order submissions of agents are determined by utility maximisation, rather than the mechanical unit order size that is commonly assumed. In this way the order flow is better related to the ongoing evolution of the market. For the given market structure we analyze the impact of the three components of the trading strategies on the statistical properties of prices and order flows and observe that it is the chartist strategy that is mainly responsible of the fat tails and clustering in the artificial price data generated by the model. The paper provides further evidence that large price changes are likely to be generated by the presence of large gaps in the book.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Generalist policies can learn a wide range of skills from diverse robot datasets. In order to solve or improve on challenging new tasks, we need a way to infer and invoke the appropriate actions from the policy's rich behavioral prior, especially when directly commanding the policy fails. We focus on flow matching generalists and propose Flow Reversal Steering (FRS): a method that takes suboptimal but ``reasonable'' actions, finds their latent noises by passing them through the flow policy in reverse, and maps them to nearby generalist action modes. We evaluate FRS across many simulated and real-world manipulation settings. First, FRS can turn coarse semantic guidance from humans or vision-language models (VLMs) into corresponding good robot actions, improving zero-shot control. These gains can be distilled with behavioral cloning by training an auxiliary policy to output noises that the generalist maps to good actions -- showing up to 95% absolute task success rate boosts in under a minute of training. Finally, FRS enables policy improvement by bootstrapping reinforcement learning with semantic knowledge, improving on several tasks that standard RL fails to improve on.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models adapt large vision-language backbones to map images and instructions to robot actions. However, prevailing VLA decoders either generate actions autoregressively in a fixed left-to-right order or attach continuous diffusion or flow matching heads outside the backbone, demanding specialized training and iterative sampling that hinder a unified, scalable architecture. We present Discrete Diffusion VLA, a single-transformer policy that models discretized action chunks with discrete diffusion and is trained with the same cross-entropy objective as the VLM backbone. The design retains diffusion's progressive refinement paradigm while remaining natively compatible with the discrete token interface of VLMs. Our method achieves an adaptive decoding order that resolves easy action elements before harder ones and uses secondary remasking to revisit uncertain predictions across refinement rounds, which improves consistency and enables robust error correction. This unified decoder preserves pretrained vision language priors, supports parallel decoding, breaks the autoregressive bottleneck, and reduces the number of function evaluations. Discrete Diffusion VLA achieves 96.3% avg. SR on LIBERO, 71.2% visual matching on SimplerEnv Fractal and 49.3% overall on SimplerEnv Bridge, improving over both autoregressive and continuous diffusion baselines. These findings indicate that discrete-diffusion action decoder supports precise action modeling and consistent training, laying groundwork for scaling VLA to larger models and datasets.

Small language models are increasingly viewed as a promising, cost-effective approach to agentic AI, with proponents claiming they are sufficiently capable for agentic workflows. However, while smaller agents can closely match larger ones on simple tasks, it remains unclear how their performance scales with task complexity, when large models become necessary, and how to better leverage small agents for long-horizon workloads. In this work, we empirically show that small agents' performance fails to scale with task complexity on deep search and coding tasks, and we introduce Strategy Auctions for Workload Efficiency (SALE), an agent framework inspired by freelancer marketplaces. In SALE, agents bid with short strategic plans, which are scored by a systematic cost-value mechanism and refined via a shared auction memory, enabling per-task routing and continual self-improvement without training a separate router or running all models to completion. Across deep search and coding tasks of varying complexity, SALE reduces reliance on the largest agent by 53%, lowers overall cost by 35%, and consistently improves upon the largest agent's pass@1 with only a negligible overhead beyond executing the final trace. In contrast, established routers that rely on task descriptions either underperform the largest agent or fail to reduce cost -- often both -- underscoring their poor fit for agentic workflows. These results suggest that while small agents may be insufficient for complex workloads, they can be effectively "scaled up" through coordinated task allocation and test-time self-improvement. More broadly, they motivate a systems-level view of agentic AI in which performance gains come less from ever-larger individual models and more from market-inspired coordination mechanisms that organize heterogeneous agents into efficient, adaptive ecosystems.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Ethereum has emerged as a leading platform for decentralized applications (dApps) due to its robust smart contract capabilities. One of the critical issues in the Ethereum ecosystem is Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), a concept that has gained significant attention in the blockchain community. However, MEV has remained a major challenge with significant implications for the platform's operation and integrity. This paper introduces the FairFlow protocol, a novel framework designed to mitigate the effects of MEV within Ethereum's existing infrastructure. The protocol aims to provide a more equitable environment, preventing exploitation by miners or validators, and protecting user data. The combined approach of auction-based block space allocation and randomized transaction ordering significantly reduces the potential for MEV exploitation.

Agentic commerce is moving from concept to deployed infrastructure: payment networks, retailers, and AI platforms are setting the stage for agents to transact on behalf of merchants and consumers. Yet whether the LLMs behind these agents can price competently in real markets, where customer preferences are hidden, competitors adapt in real time, and demand can shift without warning, has not been systematically tested. We introduce Bazaar, a dynamic sealed-bid benchmark for multi-attribute auction under these conditions. Despite its dynamics, the benchmark is grounded in closed-form customer utilities, enabling exact evaluation. Across 11 frontier LLMs from four providers, the leading agents on customer acquisition (e.g. Gemini 3.1 Pro) are often not the leading agents on profit (e.g. Opus 4.6). The ranking shifts again under demand shocks: agents that learned fastest pre-shock are typically the slowest to revise their beliefs afterwards, while Gemini 3.1 Pro recovers fastest despite not leading on profit. However, even the strongest agent captures less than a third of hindsight-optimal profit, suggesting current LLMs are progressing in agentic commerce but leave substantial headroom.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

Introduction: The paper addresses the challenging problem of predicting the short-term realized volatility of the Bitcoin price using order flow information. The inherent stochastic nature and anti-persistence of price pose difficulties in accurate prediction. Methods: To address this, we propose a method that transforms order flow data over a fixed time interval (snapshots) into images. The order flow includes trade sizes, trade directions, and limit order book, and is mapped into image colour channels. These images are then used to train both a simple 3-layer Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and more advanced ResNet-18 and ConvMixer, with additionally supplementing them with hand-crafted features. The models are evaluated against classical GARCH, Multilayer Perceptron trained on raw data, and a naive guess method that considers current volatility as a prediction. Results: The experiments are conducted using price data from January 2021 and evaluate model performance in terms of root mean square error (RMSPE). The results show that our order flow representation with a CNN as a predictive model achieves the best performance, with an RMSPE of 0.85+/-1.1 for the model with aggregated features and 1.0+/-1.4 for the model without feature supplementation. ConvMixer with feature supplementation follows closely. In comparison, the RMSPE for the naive guess method was 1.4+/-3.0.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

Large language model agents are increasingly evaluated as autonomous tool users, yet most benchmarks focus on bounded tasks with immediate success criteria. Real-world deployments often require Long-Term Coherence, the capacity to preserve purposeful behavior across extended horizons while adapting decisions to accumulated evidence. Evaluating this capacity requires a persistent environment in which actions constrain future choices, feedback arrives at heterogeneous delays, and incoherent behavior produces measurable cumulative effects. Seller-side e-commerce provides a suitable setting for this evaluation through recurrent and interdependent decisions over Product Sourcing, Listing and Pricing Control, Cash-Flow Management, and Mixed-Latency Feedback Adaptation. We introduce MerchantBench, a 365-day order-level simulation grounded in 98,843 real e-commerce product records and equipped with 26 tools for agent interaction. MerchantBench couples promptly observable Upstream Supplier Events with delayed Downstream Order Outcomes, requiring agents to follow individual order lifecycles and revisit earlier decisions. We evaluate eight LLMs under two agent frameworks in 48 runs, each spanning 365 simulated days. Our results reveal a substantial gap between even the latest LLMs and human participants, with the best LLM configuration attaining only 27.3\% of the mean final net assets achieved by human participants.

The procure to pay process (P2P) in large enterprises is a back-end business process which deals with the procurement of products and services for enterprise operations. Procurement is done by issuing purchase orders to impaneled vendors and invoices submitted by vendors are paid after they go through a rigorous validation process. Agents orchestrating P2P process often encounter the problem of matching a product or service descriptions in the invoice to those in purchase order and verify if the ordered items are what have been supplied or serviced. For example, the description in the invoice and purchase order could be TRES 739mL CD KER Smooth and TRES 0.739L CD KER Smth which look different at word level but refer to the same item. In a typical P2P process, agents are asked to manually select the products which are similar before invoices are posted for payment. This step in the business process is manual, repetitive, cumbersome, and costly. Since descriptions are not well-formed sentences, we cannot apply existing semantic and syntactic text similarity approaches directly. In this paper, we present two approaches to solve the above problem using various types of available agent's recorded feedback data. If the agent's feedback is in the form of a relative ranking between descriptions, we use similarity ranking algorithm. If the agent's feedback is absolute such as match or no-match, we use classification similarity algorithm. We also present the threats to the validity of our approach and present a possible remedy making use of product taxonomy and catalog. We showcase the comparative effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approaches over many benchmarks and real-world data sets.

This paper proposes a query-level meta-agent named FlowReasoner to automate the design of query-level multi-agent systems, i.e., one system per user query. Our core idea is to incentivize a reasoning-based meta-agent via external execution feedback. Concretely, by distilling DeepSeek R1, we first endow the basic reasoning ability regarding the generation of multi-agent systems to FlowReasoner. Then, we further enhance it via reinforcement learning (RL) with external execution feedback. A multi-purpose reward is designed to guide the RL training from aspects of performance, complexity, and efficiency. In this manner, FlowReasoner is enabled to generate a personalized multi-agent system for each user query via deliberative reasoning. Experiments on both engineering and competition code benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of FlowReasoner. Remarkably, it surpasses o1-mini by 10.52% accuracy across three benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/FlowReasoner.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on math and science benchmark datasets.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

This paper proposes a novel admission and routing scheme which takes into account arbitrarily assigned priorities for network flows. The presented approach leverages the centralized Software Defined Networking (SDN) capabilities in order to do so. Exact and heuristic approaches to the stated Priority Flow Admission and Routing (PFAR) problem are provided. The exact approach which provides an optimal solution is based on Integer Linear Programming (ILP). Given the potentially long running time required to find an exact and optimal solution, a heuristic approach is proposed; this approach is based on Genetic Algorithms (GAs). In order to effectively estimate the performance of the proposed approaches, a simulator that is capable of generating semi-random network topologies and flows has been developed. Experimental results for large problem instances (up 50 network nodes and thousands of network flows), show that: i) an optimal solution can be often found in few seconds (even milliseconds), and ii) the heuristic approach yields close-to-optimal solutions (approximately 95\% of the optimal) in a fixed amount of time; these experimental results demonstrate the pertinence of the proposed approaches.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries, the rules governing emerging agent marketplaces are being built ad-hoc, and early choices tend to lock in. Understanding what dynamics these rules produce is urgent. We present diagon, a programmable market system serving as a rule-agnostic experimental testbed for institutional design in emerging agent cognitive-labour markets. diagon makes institutional choices experimentally manipulable: heterogeneous tool-using agents post jobs, bid, negotiate, execute, pay, and accumulate reputation, with every mechanism end-to-end observable. We instantiate one market form to demonstrate diagon. We find that market exchange generates more productivity gains over self-sufficient agents, but these gains depend strongly on institutional structure; for example, interventions such as identity transparency and stronger competitive selection can degrade market performance rather than improve it. These findings highlight concrete design requirements for the economic infrastructure of the agent era. Code and data are available at https://github.com/assassin808/diagon.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems are increasingly powerful, but current agentic workflow optimization paradigms make an unsatisfying trade-off. Task-level methods spend substantial offline compute yet deploy only a single workflow, leaving complementary candidates unused, while query-level methods synthesize a new workflow per query at substantial inference cost. Our motivating analysis shows these paradigms are more complementary than competing: workflows discovered during offline search often solve different subsets of queries, and many queries handled by expensive query-level generation can already be solved by cheaper precomputed workflows. This suggests a different objective: rather than searching for one universally best workflow or regenerating one per instance, we should build a compact bank of reusable, complementary workflows and select among them adaptively at inference time. Doing so requires solving three coupled problems: generating complementary rather than redundant candidates, compressing them into a small deployable portfolio, and assigning each query to the right workflow under a performance-cost trade-off. To this end, we present FlowBank, a three-stage framework for portfolio-based agentic workflow optimization. Diversifying proposes DiverseFlow to steer search toward under-covered queries and produce a high-coverage candidate pool. Curating proposes CuraFlow to compress this pool into a compact portfolio with minimal redundancy. Matching casts deployment as edge-value prediction on a query-workflow bipartite graph and routes each incoming query to the portfolio member with the best predicted utility. Across five benchmarks, FlowBank achieves the highest average score among the evaluated methods while remaining cost-competitive, improving over the strongest automated and handcrafted baselines by 4.26% and 14.92% relative, respectively.

Parent-order execution is a core problem in algorithmic trading, where the goal is to split a large order into smaller orders while reducing execution costs. Existing approaches either rely on pre-specified market assumptions that may not hold in practice, or require task-specific training that limits adaptability to new settings. To overcome these limitations, we present the first systematic study of large language models (LLMs) for parent-order execution. This extends the use of LLMs in finance from what to trade to how to execute. We propose PACE (Plan-Ahead Controlled Execution), a hierarchical framework that decomposes parent-order execution into long-horizon planning and short-horizon execution, requiring neither explicit market assumptions nor task-specific training. Experiments on Shenzhen Stock Exchange Level-1 data show that PACE outperforms TWAP, Almgren-Chriss, and learning-based baselines, exceeding the strongest baseline by 0.65 bps. Behavioral analysis reveals that LLMs make execution decisions differently from human investors: higher model confidence predicts better performance rather than worse returns, and the model trades earlier rather than procrastinating toward the deadline. These findings suggest that LLMs can complement human traders in execution decisions.

We propose a machine learning-based extension of the classical binomial option pricing model that incorporates key market microstructure effects. Traditional models assume frictionless markets, overlooking empirical features such as bid-ask spreads, discrete price movements, and serial return correlations. Our framework augments the binomial tree with path-dependent transition probabilities estimated via Random Forest classifiers trained on high-frequency market data. This approach preserves no-arbitrage conditions while embedding real-world trading dynamics into the pricing model. Using 46,655 minute-level observations of SPY from January to June 2025, we achieve an AUC of 88.25% in forecasting one-step price movements. Order flow imbalance is identified as the most influential predictor, contributing 43.2% to feature importance. After resolving time-scaling inconsistencies in tree construction, our model yields option prices that deviate by 13.79% from Black-Scholes benchmarks, highlighting the impact of microstructure on fair value estimation. While computational limitations restrict the model to short-term derivatives, our results offer a robust, data-driven alternative to classical pricing methods grounded in empirical market behavior.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Generative Flow Networks (GFlowNets) have been introduced as a method to sample a diverse set of candidates with probabilities proportional to a given reward. However, GFlowNets can only be used with a predefined scalar reward, which can be either computationally expensive or not directly accessible, in the case of multi-objective optimization (MOO) tasks for example. Moreover, to prioritize identifying high-reward candidates, the conventional practice is to raise the reward to a higher exponent, the optimal choice of which may vary across different environments. To address these issues, we propose Order-Preserving GFlowNets (OP-GFNs), which sample with probabilities in proportion to a learned reward function that is consistent with a provided (partial) order on the candidates, thus eliminating the need for an explicit formulation of the reward function. We theoretically prove that the training process of OP-GFNs gradually sparsifies the learned reward landscape in single-objective maximization tasks. The sparsification concentrates on candidates of a higher hierarchy in the ordering, ensuring exploration at the beginning and exploitation towards the end of the training. We demonstrate OP-GFN's state-of-the-art performance in single-objective maximization (totally ordered) and multi-objective Pareto front approximation (partially ordered) tasks, including synthetic datasets, molecule generation, and neural architecture search.

Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model's revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have produced highly capable and controllable systems. This creates unprecedented opportunities for structured reasoning as well as collaboration among multiple AI systems and humans. To fully realize this potential, it is essential to develop a principled way of designing and studying such structured interactions. For this purpose, we introduce the conceptual framework of Flows: a systematic approach to modeling complex interactions. Flows are self-contained building blocks of computation, with an isolated state, communicating through a standardized message-based interface. This modular design allows Flows to be recursively composed into arbitrarily nested interactions, with a substantial reduction of complexity. Crucially, any interaction can be implemented using this framework, including prior work on AI--AI and human--AI interactions, prompt engineering schemes, and tool augmentation. We demonstrate the potential of Flows on the task of competitive coding, a challenging task on which even GPT-4 struggles. Our results suggest that structured reasoning and collaboration substantially improve generalization, with AI-only Flows adding +21 and human--AI Flows adding +54 absolute points in terms of solve rate. To support rapid and rigorous research, we introduce the aiFlows library. The library comes with a repository of Flows that can be easily used, extended, and composed into novel, more complex Flows. The aiFlows library is available at https://github.com/epfl-dlab/aiflows. Data and Flows for reproducing our experiments are available at https://github.com/epfl-dlab/cc_flows.

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly construct multi-agent workflows that decompose a complex task and assign specialist agents from a pool. However, building such a workflow well remains challenging: how finely to divide the task, which agent to trust with each subtask, and when to create a new specialist are all critical decisions a workflow constructor needs to settle up front. Thus, whether each subtask succeeds remains unknown until the workflow runs. Yet, improving a workflow is costly. Locating a fault usually requires a reference answer, a graded outcome, or a trained assessor, and the fix is applied to the whole workflow through re-execution, re-search, or retraining. We propose InFlowOp, which prices every decision in one label-free cost that weighs how well an agent's competence meets what a subtask demands against how much that agent takes to run. Before execution, InFlowOp bidirectionally determines the granularity of task decomposition and agent assignment following from the cost rather than from a fixed template. During execution, InFlowOp corrects a fault with the cheapest move via the same cost that serves the workflow both as it is built and as it runs. Facing the workflow-level evaluation challenge, we introduce Braid, a benchmark whose tasks require multi-agent coordination beyond single-agent capability. Across various domains and backbones, InFlowOp outperforms single agent baselines by up to +11.97%, achieving +9.64% with in-flow optimization. Our project page: https://xhguo7.github.io/InFlowOp/.

The escalating demand for Machine Learning (ML) training resources in recent years has resulted in a substantial gap between the high demand and the available supply. Efficient allocation of these scarce and expensive resources is crucial for organizations to maximize their return on investment. Existing resource allocation mechanisms, like Karma [OSDI'23], are designed to guarantee Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness in settings with dynamic (time-varying) user demands, but fail to preserve these key properties in the presence of demands with heterogeneous values. Given the ubiquity and inevitability of heterogeneity in organizational values of different workloads, effective resource allocation policies must accommodate these variations. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation, deployment, and theoretical analysis of Quota Marketplace, a market-based mechanism to efficiently allocate ML training chips (like GPUs), explicitly addressing scenarios with demands of heterogeneous value. We detail the implementation of this mechanism within Google and present metrics that demonstrate its impact. We also discuss many business-critical requirements that the Quota Marketplace handles quite effectively, and document the gains and opportunities it has unlocked. We establish theoretically how this market-based approach achieves the essential properties of Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness by allowing the users to express the value of their workloads and enabling dynamic resource pricing based on supply and demand fluctuations. Ultimately, the market facilitates resource allocation that aligns with organizational priorities.

Quantitative trading is moving from isolated predictive models toward agentic workflows that combine reasoning, tool use, memory, and feedback. This survey reviews agentic quantitative trading across five stages: factor mining, signal discovery, portfolio construction, order execution, and risk management. We further examine agentic quant trading systems through architecture, coordination, and adaptation, while comparing benchmarks across strategy construction, offline trading, live market evaluation, and reliability assessment. Our review finds that current systems remain concentrated on signal discovery, while complete integration with portfolio construction, execution, and risk control is still uncommon. Multi-agent systems also rely heavily on aggregation despite increasingly diverse workflow structures. Benchmark evidence further shows that strong model or forecasting capability does not reliably translate into trading performance under live market conditions and reliability controls. We conclude with future directions for more complete trading workflows, stronger coordination, and evaluation matched to the capability being assessed.

Outcome-driven reinforcement learning has advanced reasoning in large language models (LLMs), but prevailing tool-augmented approaches train a single, monolithic policy that interleaves thoughts and tool calls under full context; this scales poorly with long horizons and diverse tools and generalizes weakly to new scenarios. Agentic systems offer a promising alternative by decomposing work across specialized modules, yet most remain training-free or rely on offline training decoupled from the live dynamics of multi-turn interaction. We introduce AgentFlow, a trainable, in-the-flow agentic framework that coordinates four modules (planner, executor, verifier, generator) through an evolving memory and directly optimizes its planner inside the multi-turn loop. To train on-policy in live environments, we propose Flow-based Group Refined Policy Optimization (Flow-GRPO), which tackles long-horizon, sparse-reward credit assignment by converting multi-turn optimization into a sequence of tractable single-turn policy updates. It broadcasts a single, verifiable trajectory-level outcome to every turn to align local planner decisions with global success and stabilizes learning with group-normalized advantages. Across ten benchmarks, AgentFlow with a 7B-scale backbone outperforms top-performing baselines with average accuracy gains of 14.9% on search, 14.0% on agentic, 14.5% on mathematical, and 4.1% on scientific tasks, even surpassing larger proprietary models like GPT-4o. Further analyses confirm the benefits of in-the-flow optimization, showing improved planning, enhanced tool-calling reliability, and positive scaling with model size and reasoning turns.

We define a new class of set functions that in addition to being monotone and subadditive, also admit a very limited form of submodularity defined over a permutation of the ground set. We refer to this permutation as a submodular order. This class of functions includes monotone submodular functions as a sub-family. To understand the importance of this structure in optimization problems we consider the problem of maximizing function value under various types of constraints. To demonstrate the modeling power of submodular order functions we show applications in two different settings. First, we apply our results to the extensively studied problem of assortment optimization. While the objectives in assortment optimization are known to be non-submodular (and non-monotone) even for simple choice models, we show that they are compatible with the notion of submodular order. Consequently, we obtain new and in some cases the first constant factor guarantee for constrained assortment optimization in fundamental choice models. As a second application of submodular order functions, we show an intriguing connection to the maximization of monotone submodular functions in the streaming model. We recover some best known guarantees for this problem as a corollary of our results.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Can Large Language Models (LLMs) simulate human behavior in complex environments? LLMs have recently been shown to exhibit advanced reasoning skills but much of NLP evaluation still relies on static benchmarks. Answering this requires evaluation environments that probe strategic reasoning in competitive, dynamic scenarios that involve long-term planning. We introduce AucArena, a novel simulation environment for evaluating LLMs within auctions, a setting chosen for being highly unpredictable and involving many skills related to resource and risk management, while also being easy to evaluate. We conduct several controlled simulations using state-of-the-art LLMs as bidding agents. We find that through simple prompting, LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of the skills needed for effectively engaging in auctions (e.g., managing budget, adhering to long-term goals and priorities), skills that we find can be sharpened by explicitly encouraging models to be adaptive and observe strategies in past auctions. These results are significant as they show the potential of using LLM agents to model intricate social dynamics, especially in competitive settings. However, we also observe considerable variability in the capabilities of individual LLMs. Notably, even our most advanced models (GPT-4) are occasionally surpassed by heuristic baselines and human agents, highlighting the potential for further improvements in the design of LLM agents and the important role that our simulation environment can play in further testing and refining agent architectures.

We present AdvantageFlow, a forward-process reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm for rectified flow models. The algorithm minimizes an advantage-weighted prediction loss, which maximizes reward, regularized by the rollout policy, which convexifies the objective and makes its optimization stable. Our objective can be viewed as fitting a local reward-improving target distribution. The rollout regularization arises as a variance reduction step. We evaluate AdvantageFlow empirically on text-to-image generation with Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium and FLUX.1, and compare it to both forward- and reverse-process RL algorithms.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly expected to negotiate, coordinate, and transact autonomously, yet existing benchmarks lack principled settings for evaluating language-mediated economic interaction among multiple agents. We introduce AgenticPay, a benchmark and simulation framework for multi-agent buyer-seller negotiation driven by natural language. AgenticPay models markets in which buyers and sellers possess private constraints and product-dependent valuations, and must reach agreements through multi-round linguistic negotiation rather than numeric bidding alone. The framework supports a diverse suite of over 110 tasks ranging from bilateral bargaining to many-to-many markets, with structured action extraction and metrics for feasibility, efficiency, and welfare. Benchmarking state-of-the-art proprietary and open-weight LLMs reveals substantial gaps in negotiation performance and highlights challenges in long-horizon strategic reasoning, establishing AgenticPay as a foundation for studying agentic commerce and language-based market interaction. Code and dataset are available at the link: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/AgenticPay.

Deep research is an inherently challenging task that demands both breadth and depth of thinking. It involves navigating diverse knowledge spaces and reasoning over complex, multi-step dependencies, which presents substantial challenges for agentic systems. To address this, we propose FlowSearch, a multi-agent framework that actively constructs and evolves a dynamic structured knowledge flow to drive subtask execution and reasoning. FlowSearch is capable of strategically planning and expanding the knowledge flow to enable parallel exploration and hierarchical task decomposition, while also adjusting the knowledge flow in real time based on feedback from intermediate reasoning outcomes and insights. FlowSearch achieves state-of-the-art performance on both general and scientific benchmarks, including GAIA, HLE, GPQA and TRQA, demonstrating its effectiveness in multi-disciplinary research scenarios and its potential to advance scientific discovery. The code is available at https://github.com/Alpha-Innovator/InternAgent.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

This work presents MAC-Flow, a simple yet expressive framework for multi-agent coordination. We argue that requirements of effective coordination are twofold: (i) a rich representation of the diverse joint behaviors present in offline data and (ii) the ability to act efficiently in real time. However, prior approaches often sacrifice one for the other, i.e., denoising diffusion-based solutions capture complex coordination but are computationally slow, while Gaussian policy-based solutions are fast but brittle in handling multi-agent interaction. MAC-Flow addresses this trade-off by first learning a flow-based representation of joint behaviors, and then distilling it into decentralized one-step policies that preserve coordination while enabling fast execution. Across four different benchmarks, including 12 environments and 34 datasets, MAC-Flow alleviates the trade-off between performance and computational cost, specifically achieving about times14.5 faster inference compared to diffusion-based MARL methods, while maintaining good performance. At the same time, its inference speed is similar to that of prior Gaussian policy-based offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods.

We present Piecewise Rectified Flow (PeRFlow), a flow-based method for accelerating diffusion models. PeRFlow divides the sampling process of generative flows into several time windows and straightens the trajectories in each interval via the reflow operation, thereby approaching piecewise linear flows. PeRFlow achieves superior performance in a few-step generation. Moreover, through dedicated parameterizations, the obtained PeRFlow models show advantageous transfer ability, serving as universal plug-and-play accelerators that are compatible with various workflows based on the pre-trained diffusion models. The implementations of training and inference are fully open-sourced. https://github.com/magic-research/piecewise-rectified-flow

We consider the problem of online preemptive scheduling on a single machine to minimize the total flow time. In clairvoyant scheduling, where job processing times are revealed upon arrival, the Shortest Remaining Processing Time (SRPT) algorithm is optimal. In practice, however, exact processing times are often unknown. At the opposite extreme, non-clairvoyant scheduling, in which processing times are revealed only upon completion, suffers from strong lower bounds on the competitive ratio. This motivates the study of intermediate information models. We introduce a new model in which processing times are revealed gradually during execution. Each job consists of a sequence of operations, and the processing time of an operation becomes known only after the preceding one completes. This models many scheduling scenarios that arise in computing systems. Our main result is a deterministic O(m^2)-competitive algorithm, where m is the maximum number of operations per job. More specifically, we prove a refined competitive ratio in O(m_1 cdot m_2), where m_1 and m_2 are instance-dependent parameters describing the operation size structure. Our algorithm and analysis build on recent advancements in robust flow time minimization (SODA '26), where jobs arrive with estimated sizes. However, in our setting we have no bounded estimate on a job's processing time. Thus, we design a highly adaptive algorithm that gradually explores a job's operations while working on them, and groups them into virtual chunks whose size can be well-estimated. This is a crucial ingredient of our result and requires a much more careful analysis compared to the robust setting. We also provide lower bounds showing that our bounds are essentially best possible. For the special case of scheduling with uniform obligatory tests, we show that SRPT at the operation level is 2-competitive, which is best possible.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

Large-scale approximate nearest neighbor search commonly relies on partitions for indexing: database vectors are partitioned into clusters, and for each query a probing function selects the clusters to be scanned. The query probing function and the database partition are rarely treated as separate entities: most techniques assign queries with the same assignment function as the database vectors, which is suboptimal especially when database and query distributions differ. This paper introduces CwA (Cluster with Auctions), which addresses this limitation by jointly learning a balanced database partition and a neural probing function. CwA optimizes search performance directly for the query distribution. It minimizes its objective by alternating two steps: (i) gradient descent on the neural network of the probing function, and (ii) a large-scale combinatorial optimization of the cluster assignment for the database vectors. We solve the latter with a parallelizable auction algorithm that balances the partition by design. To further scale CwA, we extend the method to a Cartesian product of clusters that increases the partition's granularity. When database and query distributions differ, CwA achieves up to 4.7times throughput over the state-of-the-art at equal recall. In the in-distribution (ID) setting, even a simple linear probing function trained with CwA outperforms competing deep neural methods.

We present a novel reasoning approach called Flow-of-Options (FoO), designed to address intrinsic biases in Large Language Models (LLMs). FoO enables LLMs to systematically explore a diverse range of possibilities in their reasoning, as demonstrated by an FoO-based agentic system for autonomously solving Machine Learning tasks (AutoML). Our framework outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving improvements of 38.2% - 69.2% on standard data science tasks, and 37.4% - 47.9% on therapeutic chemistry tasks. With an overall operation cost under $1 per task, our framework is well-suited for cost-sensitive applications. Beyond classification and regression, we illustrate the broader applicability of our FoO-based agentic system to tasks such as reinforcement learning and image generation. Our framework presents significant advancements compared to current state-of-the-art agentic systems for AutoML, due to the benefits of FoO in enforcing diversity in LLM solutions through compressed, explainable representations that also support long-term memory when combined with case-based reasoning.

A flow control system is a critical concept for increasing the production capacity of manufacturing systems. To solve the scheduling optimization problem related to the flow control with the aim of improving productivity, existing methods depend on a heuristic design by domain human experts. Therefore, the methods require correction, monitoring, and verification by using real equipment. As system designs increase in complexity, the monitoring time increases, which decreases the probability of arriving at the optimal design. As an alternative approach to the heuristic design of flow control systems, the use of deep reinforcement learning to solve the scheduling optimization problem has been considered. Although the existing research on reinforcement learning has yielded excellent performance in some areas, the applicability of the results to actual FAB such as display and semiconductor manufacturing processes is not evident so far. To this end, we propose a method to implement a physical simulation environment and devise a feasible flow control system design using a transfer robot in display manufacturing through reinforcement learning. We present a model and parameter setting to build a virtual environment for different display transfer robots, and training methods of reinforcement learning on the environment to obtain an optimal scheduling of glass flow control systems. Its feasibility was verified by using different types of robots used in the actual process.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Autodeleveraging (ADL) is a last-resort loss socialization mechanism for perpetual futures venues. It is triggered when solvency-preserving liquidations fail. Despite the dominance of perpetual futures in the crypto derivatives market, with over \60 trillion of volume in 2024, there has been no formal study of ADL. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous model of ADL. We prove that ADL mechanisms face a fundamental trilemma: no policy can simultaneously satisfy exchange solvency, revenue, and fairness to traders. This impossibility theorem implies that as participation scales, a novel form of moral hazard grows asymptotically, rendering `zero-loss' socialization impossible. On the positive side, we show that three classes of ADL mechanisms can optimally navigate this trilemma to provide fairness, robustness to price shocks, and maximal exchange revenue. We analyze these mechanisms on the Hyperliquid dataset from October 10, 2025, when ADL was used repeatedly to close 2.1 billion of positions in 12 minutes. By comparing production ADL to transparent benchmark allocations, we find that Hyperliquid's production algorithm overshot the minimum trader profit haircut required to cover the shortfall. Our methodology suggests the excess profits lost by profitable traders is between \45.0M and 51.7M. In terms of the positions liquidated, this corresponds to roughly \$653.6M of positions being closed. This comparison also suggests that Binance overutilized ADL far more than Hyperliquid. Our results show both theoretically and empirically that optimized ADL mechanisms can dramatically reduce losses of trader profitability while maintaining exchange solvency.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

There is growing interest in utilizing flow-based models as decision-making policies in reinforcement learning due to their high expressive capacity. However, effectively leveraging this expressivity for value maximization remains challenging, as naive gradient-based optimization requires backpropagating through numerical solvers and often leads to instability. Existing approaches typically address this issue by restricting the expressive capacity of flow-based policies, resulting in a trade-off between optimization stability and representational flexibility. To resolve this, we introduce Q-Flow, a framework that leverages the deterministic nature of flow dynamics to explicitly propagate terminal trajectory value to intermediate latent states along the policy-induced flow. This formulation enables stable policy optimization using intermediate value gradients without unrolling the numerical solver, effectively bridging the gap between stability and expressivity. We evaluate Q-Flow in the offline learning setting on the challenging OGBench suite, where it consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by an average of 10.6 percentage points, while also enabling stable online adaptation within the same framework.

This paper discusses the system architecture design and deployment of non-stationary multi-armed bandit approaches to determine a near-optimal payment routing policy based on the recent history of transactions. We propose a Routing Service architecture using a novel Ray-based implementation for optimally scaling bandit-based payment routing to over 10,000 transactions per second, adhering to the system design requirements and ecosystem constraints with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). We first evaluate the effectiveness of multiple bandit-based payment routing algorithms on a custom simulator to benchmark multiple non-stationary bandit approaches and identify the best hyperparameters. We then conducted live experiments on the payment transaction system on a fantasy sports platform Dream11. In the live experiments, we demonstrated that our non-stationary bandit-based algorithm consistently improves the success rate of transactions by 0.92% compared to the traditional rule-based methods over one month.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Realistic and diverse traffic simulation is essential to autonomous driving development. Yet prevailing benchmarks predominantly reward realism, and recent methods have optimized accordingly, leaving diversity underexplored. We introduce Flow-ERD, a multi-agent simulator that pursues realism and diversity jointly. Its backbone, Agent-Type Aware Flow Matching (AFM), couples flow matching's multi-modal expressiveness with type-specific kinematic execution. It preserves fine-grained diversity while keeping motions consistent with each agent type. A second stage, Entropy-Regularized Distillation (ERD), fine-tunes the closed-loop rollout distribution with an entropy-regularized reverse-KL objective. This mitigates covariate shift while explicitly preventing collapse onto high-density modes. We evaluate Flow-ERD with a log-free diversity metric alongside standard realism scores. Flow-ERD ranks first on the WOSAC test benchmark and dominates the realism--diversity Pareto front among reproducible baselines. Our project page is available https://seulbinhwang.github.io/flow-erd-project-page/{here}.

The Contract Net Protocol (1980) introduced coordination through contracts in multi-agent systems. Modern agent protocols standardize connectivity and interoperability; yet, none provide formal, resource governance-normative mechanisms to bound how much agents may consume or how long they may operate. We introduce Agent Contracts, a formal framework that extends the contract metaphor from task allocation to resource-bounded execution. An Agent Contract unifies input/output specifications, multi-dimensional resource constraints, temporal boundaries, and success criteria into a coherent governance mechanism with explicit lifecycle semantics. For multi-agent coordination, we establish conservation laws ensuring delegated budgets respect parent constraints, enabling hierarchical coordination through contract delegation. Empirical validation across four experiments demonstrates 90% token reduction with 525x lower variance in iterative workflows, zero conservation violations in multi-agent delegation, and measurable quality-resource tradeoffs through contract modes. Agent Contracts provide formal foundations for predictable, auditable, and resource-bounded autonomous AI deployment.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Understanding how market participants react to shocks like scheduled macroeconomic news is crucial for both traders and policymakers. We develop a calibrated data generation process DGP that embeds four stylized trader archetypes retail, pension, institutional, and hedge funds into an extended CAPM augmented by CPI surprises. Each agents order size choice is driven by a softmax discrete choice rule over small, medium, and large trades, where utility depends on risk aversion, surprise magnitude, and liquidity. We aim to analyze each agent's reaction to shocks and Monte Carlo experiments show that higher information, lower aversion agents take systematically larger positions and achieve higher average wealth. Retail investors under react on average, exhibiting smaller allocations and more dispersed outcomes. And ambient liquidity amplifies the sensitivity of order flow to surprise shocks. Our framework offers a transparent benchmark for analyzing order flow dynamics around macro releases and suggests how real time flow data could inform news impact inference.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as marginal token allocation economies rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the same first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

Long-horizon agentic tasks go beyond chaining short tasks over more interaction turns. Their evolving dynamic environments and long-range dependencies require Large Language Models (LLMs) to continually explore, learn from experience, and adapt their policies over thousands of steps. We introduce E-Commerce Bench, the first open-source benchmark that integrates multi-round counterpart negotiation and dynamic events into a year-long business operation. Over a 365-day year, an LLM agent concurrently runs multiple online stores, researching the market, negotiating with suppliers to source inventory, optimizing sales strategies, fulfilling orders, handling returns, and managing cash flow to maximize its end-of-year total assets. To construct a realistic merchant-side operating environment, the product and supplier data are derived from a real e-commerce platform, while a year-long calendar of promotions, natural disasters, and supply-chain shocks continually reshapes demand. For reproducibility, both sides of the market are deterministic: customer purchases and returns follow a fixed demand model, while a negotiation kernel determines supplier pricing, concessions, and decisions, with an LLM used only to verbalize them. We evaluate 18 frontier models across seven dimensions, including year-end assets, and find that no single model dominates. GPT-5.6 Sol earns the most, growing the 100,000 opening stake into 1,431,425, yet it ranks 16th of 18 on fraud avoidance and trails Fable5 in operational efficiency. Among open-weight models, Qwen3.8-Max-Preview leads with 416,252, 38% above GLM 5.2 (high), and achieves the strongest learning over the horizon, progressively bargaining down prices across repeated orders. Our code is available at https://github.com/QwenLM/E-CommerceBench.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Generative AI is transforming how people access information, challenging traditional advertising mechanisms built around predefined slots. Towards generation-native advertising, we propose the Latent Advertiser Mixture Auction (LAMA), a token-level advertising mechanism that embeds advertiser influence directly into the generation process. Advertisers report local continuation values that induce advertiser-specific next-token policies, from which the platform decodes through a latent mixture while updating an allocation posterior. We show that LAMA satisfies Markov DSIC and IR, and achieves near-optimal KL-regularized welfare. We further develop a learning-based implementation that reconstructs the required reports online from learned local advantages and root values. Proof-of-concept experiments on real-world commercial-search query splits show that LAMA improves platform welfare and revenue while maintaining user-facing response quality, providing initial evidence for the feasibility of generation-native advertising.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

The increasing number of different, incompatible congestion control algorithms has led to an increased deployment of fair queuing. Fair queuing isolates each network flow and can thus guarantee fairness for each flow even if the flows' congestion controls are not inherently fair. So far, each queue in the fair queuing system either has a fixed, static maximum size or is managed by an Active Queue Management (AQM) algorithm like CoDel. In this paper we design an AQM mechanism (Learning Fair Qdisc (LFQ)) that dynamically learns the optimal buffer size for each flow according to a specified reward function online. We show that our Deep Learning based algorithm can dynamically assign the optimal queue size to each flow depending on its congestion control, delay and bandwidth. Comparing to competing fair AQM schedulers, it provides significantly smaller queues while achieving the same or higher throughput.

A wide range of optimization problems can often be written in terms of generalized convex functions (GCFs). When this structure is present, it can convert certain nested bilevel objectives into single-level problems amenable to standard first-order optimization methods. We provide a new differentiable layer with a convex parameter space and show (Theorems 5.1 and 5.2) that it and its gradient are universal approximators for GCFs and their gradients. We demonstrate how this parameterization can be leveraged in practice by (i) learning optimal transport maps with general cost functions and (ii) learning optimal auctions of multiple goods. In both these cases, we show how our layer can be used to convert the existing bilevel or min-max formulations into single-level problems that can be solved efficiently with first-order methods.

Among on-policy reinforcement learning algorithms, Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) demonstrates is widely favored for its simplicity, numerical stability, and strong empirical performance. Standard PPO relies on surrogate objectives defined via importance ratios, which require evaluating policy likelihood that is typically straightforward when the policy is modeled as a Gaussian distribution. However, extending PPO to more expressive, high-capacity policy models such as continuous normalizing flows (CNFs), also known as flow-matching models, is challenging because likelihood evaluation along the full flow trajectory is computationally expensive and often numerically unstable. To resolve this issue, we propose PolicyFlow, a novel on-policy CNF-based reinforcement learning algorithm that integrates expressive CNF policies with PPO-style objectives without requiring likelihood evaluation along the full flow path. PolicyFlow approximates importance ratios using velocity field variations along a simple interpolation path, reducing computational overhead without compromising training stability. To further prevent mode collapse and further encourage diverse behaviors, we propose the Brownian Regularizer, an implicit policy entropy regularizer inspired by Brownian motion, which is conceptually elegant and computationally lightweight. Experiments on diverse tasks across various environments including MultiGoal, PointMaze, IsaacLab and MuJoCo Playground show that PolicyFlow achieves competitive or superior performance compared to PPO using Gaussian policies and flow-based baselines including FPO and DPPO. Notably, results on MultiGoal highlight PolicyFlow's ability to capture richer multimodal action distributions.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

We present flow Q-learning (FQL), a simple and performant offline reinforcement learning (RL) method that leverages an expressive flow-matching policy to model arbitrarily complex action distributions in data. Training a flow policy with RL is a tricky problem, due to the iterative nature of the action generation process. We address this challenge by training an expressive one-step policy with RL, rather than directly guiding an iterative flow policy to maximize values. This way, we can completely avoid unstable recursive backpropagation, eliminate costly iterative action generation at test time, yet still mostly maintain expressivity. We experimentally show that FQL leads to strong performance across 73 challenging state- and pixel-based OGBench and D4RL tasks in offline RL and offline-to-online RL. Project page: https://seohong.me/projects/fql/

Polymarket has emerged as a prominent prediction market platform and one of the fastest-growing applications in DeFi. To achieve low-latency trading, it adopts a hybrid architecture that matches orders off-chain but settles them on-chain for final execution. This design creates a consistency gap we call Ghost Fills: an order that is successfully matched off-chain may later fail during on-chain settlement. To understand the security implications of this gap, we investigate such failed settlements by building GHOSTHUNTER, which reconstructs them from on-chain traces and attributes to concrete attack patterns. Across 1,952,440 reverted match-order transactions, we find that attackers exploit the time gap between matching and settlement to invalidate already matched orders before they are finalized on-chain. We then identify four attack vectors from these incidents: nonce bump, balance drain, allowance revoke, and proxy trap, realized via 35 evolving variants. These vectors allow attackers to selectively revert 980,133 filled orders, enabling risk-free prediction, arbitrage-bot hunting, and liquidity reward manipulation, realizing at least \1.49M in profit, which places 1.78 B USD at risk and 2.17 M POL (about \212 K) paid by operator. During peak hours, more than 24.3% of all filled orders reverted, causing de facto DoS attacks. We also find that code derived from the flawed contract still appears in 167 independent contracts across 10 chains holding at least 23 M in user funds, extending the impact beyond Polymarket. We have disclosed our evidence to affected parties, and the issue has been partially mitigated.

Automated market maker (AMM) fee rules are often evaluated by liquidity-provider (LP) welfare, but that objective mixes fee revenue, adverse-selection loss (loss-versus-rebalancing, LVR), routing response, and liquidity supply. Fixed-fee Uniswap v3 history cannot separate these channels or identify counterfactual trader-facing dynamic-fee rules. Real fee-related variation nonetheless exists: the Uniswap protocol-fee switch cut LP take-rates with tier-differentiated intensity while leaving trader-facing fees unchanged. Using a pre-specified matched-overlap event-study difference-in-differences design, we estimate the liquidity-supply response to take-rate cuts, the kernel K_L that simulator-based fee-controller evaluations routinely freeze, while reconstructing treatment, event time, unit roles, and outcomes from public logs into a frozen, hash-checked panel before any estimate. We detect no large short-run average response in active liquidity or local depth; LP participation and composition, more precisely estimated, likewise show none, so the result is a non-detection at the design's resolution rather than a precise zero. Token-1 volume and native fee income fail the parallel-trends gate and are reported descriptively. A channel-admissibility audit delimits the estimand: the LP-side response K_L is design-based, while trader-facing dynamic-fee protection is a model-conditioned boundary, not a second estimand.

Building deployment-ready LLM agents requires complex orchestration of tools, data sources, and control flow logic, yet existing systems tightly couple agent logic to specific programming languages and deployment models. We present a declarative system that separates agent workflow specification from implementation, enabling the same pipeline definition to execute across multiple backend languages (Java, Python, Go) and deployment environments (cloud-native, on-premises). Our key insight is that most agent workflows consist of common patterns -- data serialization, filtering, RAG retrieval, API orchestration -- that can be expressed through a unified DSL rather than imperative code. This approach transforms agent development from application programming to configuration, where adding new tools or fine-tuning agent behaviors requires only pipeline specification changes, not code deployment. Our system natively supports A/B testing of agent strategies, allowing multiple pipeline variants to run on the same backend infrastructure with automatic metric collection and comparison. We evaluate our approach on real-world e-commerce workflows at PayPal, processing millions of daily interactions. Our results demonstrate 60% reduction in development time, and 3x improvement in deployment velocity compared to imperative implementations. The language's declarative approach enables non-engineers to modify agent behaviors safely, while maintaining sub-100ms orchestration overhead. We show that complex workflows involving product search, personalization, and cart management can be expressed in under 50 lines of DSL compared to 500+ lines of imperative code.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Recently, with the development of tool-calling capabilities in large language models (LLMs), these models have demonstrated significant potential for automating electronic design automation (EDA) flows by interacting with EDA tool APIs via EDA scripts. However, considering the limited understanding of EDA tools, LLMs face challenges in practical scenarios where diverse interfaces of EDA tools exist across different platforms. Additionally, EDA flow automation often involves intricate, long-chain tool-calling processes, increasing the likelihood of errors in intermediate steps. Any errors will lead to the instability and failure of EDA flow automation. To address these challenges, we introduce EDAid, a multi-agent collaboration system where multiple agents harboring divergent thoughts converge towards a common goal, ensuring reliable and successful EDA flow automation. Specifically, each agent is controlled by ChipLlama models, which are expert LLMs fine-tuned for EDA flow automation. Our experiments demonstrate the state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance of our ChipLlama models and validate the effectiveness of our EDAid in the automation of complex EDA flows, showcasing superior performance compared to single-agent systems.

We formulate and solve the H-SARA Problem, a Vehicle Routing and Appointment Scheduling Problem motivated by home services management. We assume that travel times, service durations, and customer cancellations are stochastic. We use a two-stage process that first generates teams and routes using a VRP Solver with optional extensions and then uses an MC Scheduler that determines expected arrival times by teams at customers. We further introduce two different models of cancellation and their associated impacts on routing and scheduling. Finally, we introduce the Route Fracture Metaheuristic that iteratively improves an H-SARA solution by replacing the worst-performing teams. We present insights into the problem and a series of numerical experiments that illustrate properties of the optimal routing, scheduling, and the impact of the Route Fracture Metaheuristic for both models of cancellation.

This work addresses the buyer's inspection paradox for information markets. The paradox is that buyers need to access information to determine its value, while sellers need to limit access to prevent theft. To study this, we introduce an open-source simulated digital marketplace where intelligent agents, powered by language models, buy and sell information on behalf of external participants. The central mechanism enabling this marketplace is the agents' dual capabilities: they not only have the capacity to assess the quality of privileged information but also come equipped with the ability to forget. This ability to induce amnesia allows vendors to grant temporary access to proprietary information, significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized retention while enabling agents to accurately gauge the information's relevance to specific queries or tasks. To perform well, agents must make rational decisions, strategically explore the marketplace through generated sub-queries, and synthesize answers from purchased information. Concretely, our experiments (a) uncover biases in language models leading to irrational behavior and evaluate techniques to mitigate these biases, (b) investigate how price affects demand in the context of informational goods, and (c) show that inspection and higher budgets both lead to higher quality outcomes.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are becoming increasingly popular for solving tasks by constructing executable workflows that interleave LLM calls, information retrieval, tool use, code execution, memory updates, and verification. This survey reviews recent methods for designing and optimizing such workflows, which we treat as agentic computation graphs (ACGs). We organize the literature based on when workflow structure is determined, where structure refers to which components or agents are present, how they depend on each other, and how information flows between them. This lens distinguishes static methods, which fix a reusable workflow scaffold before deployment, from dynamic methods, which select, generate, or revise the workflow for a particular run before or during execution. We further organize prior work along three dimensions: when structure is determined, what part of the workflow is optimized, and which evaluation signals guide optimization (e.g., task metrics, verifier signals, preferences, or trace-derived feedback). We also distinguish reusable workflow templates, run-specific realized graphs, and execution traces, separating reusable design choices from the structures actually deployed in a given run and from realized runtime behavior. Finally, we outline a structure-aware evaluation perspective that complements downstream task metrics with graph-level properties, execution cost, robustness, and structural variation across inputs. Our goal is to provide a clear vocabulary, a unified framework for positioning new methods, a more comparable view of existing body of literature, and a more reproducible evaluation standard for future work in workflow optimizations for LLM agents.

General-purpose technologies reshape economies less by improving individual tools than by enabling new ways to organize production and coordination. We believe AI agents are approaching a similar inflection point: as foundation models make broad task execution and tool use increasingly accessible, the binding constraint shifts from raw capability to how work is delegated, verified, and rewarded at scale. We introduce EpochX, a credits-native marketplace infrastructure for human-agent production networks. EpochX treats humans and agents as peer participants who can post tasks or claim them. Claimed tasks can be decomposed into subtasks and executed through an explicit delivery workflow with verification and acceptance. Crucially, EpochX is designed so that each completed transaction can produce reusable ecosystem assets, including skills, workflows, execution traces, and distilled experience. These assets are stored with explicit dependency structure, enabling retrieval, composition, and cumulative improvement over time. EpochX also introduces a native credit mechanism to make participation economically viable under real compute costs. Credits lock task bounties, budget delegation, settle rewards upon acceptance, and compensate creators when verified assets are reused. By formalizing the end-to-end transaction model together with its asset and incentive layers, EpochX reframes agentic AI as an organizational design problem: building infrastructures where verifiable work leaves persistent, reusable artifacts, and where value flows support durable human-agent collaboration.

Tackling complex real-world tasks can exceed the capabilities of a single large language model (LLM), motivating the use of multi-agent workflows that coordinate specialized agents to work together on these tasks. Recent methods train LLMs to construct better workflows from execution outcomes, but they optimize only the workflow generator, while the other agents that build or execute each workflow remain fixed even though every outcome depends on all of them. However, extending training beyond the generator is challenging: the agents are coupled, and a workflow's outcome is a single sparse score that cannot tell which agent causes a failure. We propose FloWright, which leverages the workflow as a harness to optimize workflows. By introducing a hierarchical, structure-aware reward paradigm, FloWright enables one role to self-evolve and two or more roles to co-evolve, with no additional models, labels, or executions. Considering the limitation that workflows are commonly trained and evaluated on data that a single agent can already handle, we further propose DataWright, an adaptive data hardening approach that converts existing datasets into workflow-level tasks with increased difficulty. Across document, slide, chart, code, math, and finance tasks, small open models trained with FloWright achieve improved performance by up to +7.41%, with co-evolving (+5.03%) more roles gaining more than optimizing one of them alone (+2.83%). Our project page: https://xhguo7.github.io/FloWright/.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

Most existing Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) rely on predefined workflows, where human engineers enumerate task states in advance and specify routing rules and contextual injections accordingly. Such workflow-driven designs are essentially rule-based decision trees, which suffer from two fundamental limitations: they require substantial manual effort to anticipate and encode possible task states, and they cannot exhaustively cover the state space of complex real-world tasks. To address these issues, we propose an Information-Flow-Orchestrated Multi-Agent Paradigm via Agent-to-Agent (A2A) Communication from CORAL, in which a dedicated information flow orchestrator continuously monitors task progress and dynamically coordinates other agents through the A2A toolkit using natural language, without relying on predefined workflows. We evaluate our approach on the general-purpose benchmark GAIA, using the representative workflow-based MAS OWL as the baseline while controlling for agent roles and underlying models. Under the pass@1 setting, our method achieves 63.64% accuracy, outperforming OWL's 55.15% by 8.49 percentage points with comparable token consumption. Further case-level analysis shows that our paradigm enables more flexible task monitoring and more robust handling of edge cases. Our implementation is publicly available at: https://github.com/Coral-Protocol/Beyond-Rule-Based-Workflows

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

Flow-based generative models, including diffusion models, excel at modeling continuous distributions in high-dimensional spaces. In this work, we introduce Flow Policy Optimization (FPO), a simple on-policy reinforcement learning algorithm that brings flow matching into the policy gradient framework. FPO casts policy optimization as maximizing an advantage-weighted ratio computed from the conditional flow matching loss, in a manner compatible with the popular PPO-clip framework. It sidesteps the need for exact likelihood computation while preserving the generative capabilities of flow-based models. Unlike prior approaches for diffusion-based reinforcement learning that bind training to a specific sampling method, FPO is agnostic to the choice of diffusion or flow integration at both training and inference time. We show that FPO can train diffusion-style policies from scratch in a variety of continuous control tasks. We find that flow-based models can capture multimodal action distributions and achieve higher performance than Gaussian policies, particularly in under-conditioned settings.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Generative flow networks (GFlowNets) are sequential sampling models trained to match a given distribution. GFlowNets have been successfully applied to various structured object generation tasks, sampling a diverse set of high-reward objects quickly. We propose expected flow networks (EFlowNets), which extend GFlowNets to stochastic environments. We show that EFlowNets outperform other GFlowNet formulations in stochastic tasks such as protein design. We then extend the concept of EFlowNets to adversarial environments, proposing adversarial flow networks (AFlowNets) for two-player zero-sum games. We show that AFlowNets learn to find above 80% of optimal moves in Connect-4 via self-play and outperform AlphaZero in tournaments.

We present TransactionGPT (TGPT), a foundation model for consumer transaction data within one of world's largest payment networks. TGPT is designed to understand and generate transaction trajectories while simultaneously supporting a variety of downstream prediction and classification tasks. We introduce a novel 3D-Transformer architecture specifically tailored for capturing the complex dynamics in payment transaction data. This architecture incorporates design innovations that enhance modality fusion and computational efficiency, while seamlessly enabling joint optimization with downstream objectives. Trained on billion-scale real-world transactions, TGPT significantly improves downstream classification performance against a competitive production model and exhibits advantages over baselines in generating future transactions. We conduct extensive empirical evaluations utilizing a diverse collection of company transaction datasets spanning multiple downstream tasks, thereby enabling a thorough assessment of TGPT's effectiveness and efficiency in comparison to established methodologies. Furthermore, we examine the incorporation of LLM-derived embeddings within TGPT and benchmark its performance against fine-tuned LLMs, demonstrating that TGPT achieves superior predictive accuracy as well as faster training and inference. We anticipate that the architectural innovations and practical guidelines from this work will advance foundation models for transaction-like data and catalyze future research in this emerging field.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful tool for neural combinatorial optimization, enabling models to learn heuristics that solve complex problems without requiring expert knowledge. Despite significant progress, existing RL approaches face challenges such as diminishing reward signals and inefficient exploration in vast combinatorial action spaces, leading to inefficiency. In this paper, we propose Preference Optimization, a novel method that transforms quantitative reward signals into qualitative preference signals via statistical comparison modeling, emphasizing the superiority among sampled solutions. Methodologically, by reparameterizing the reward function in terms of policy and utilizing preference models, we formulate an entropy-regularized RL objective that aligns the policy directly with preferences while avoiding intractable computations. Furthermore, we integrate local search techniques into the fine-tuning rather than post-processing to generate high-quality preference pairs, helping the policy escape local optima. Empirical results on various benchmarks, such as the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), the Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem (CVRP) and the Flexible Flow Shop Problem (FFSP), demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing RL algorithms, achieving superior convergence efficiency and solution quality.

This paper sets forth a framework for deep reinforcement learning as applied to market making (DRLMM) for cryptocurrencies. Two advanced policy gradient-based algorithms were selected as agents to interact with an environment that represents the observation space through limit order book data, and order flow arrival statistics. Within the experiment, a forward-feed neural network is used as the function approximator and two reward functions are compared. The performance of each combination of agent and reward function is evaluated by daily and average trade returns. Using this DRLMM framework, this paper demonstrates the effectiveness of deep reinforcement learning in solving stochastic inventory control challenges market makers face.

Prompt optimization can improve multi-agent LLM systems, but the prompts being optimized often serve two entangled roles: generating task-relevant content and specifying execution-critical protocols, such as message routing, output formatting, and termination signals, on which the underlying code relies. As a result, a prompt edit intended to improve content generation can inadvertently corrupt the protocol and cause the entire agent pipeline to fail. Our key observation is that these two roles have different representations: execution protocols are typically structured, while task-relevant content is usually expressed in unstructured language. Based on this, we propose control-data flow separation, where execution-critical control is represented as typed, validated program objects, while task-relevant language remains the optimizable data flow for agent communication. This design allows optimizers to improve multi-agent behavior without exposing the routing or formatting interface to prompt drift. Across synthetic reasoning, collaborative review generation, and insurance rating workflows, our framework empirically achieves 100% eventual protocol validity while consistently improving task performance.

Thanks to their remarkable flexibility, diffusion models and flow models have emerged as promising candidates for policy representation. However, efficient reinforcement learning (RL) upon these policies remains a challenge due to the lack of explicit log-probabilities for vanilla policy gradient estimators. While numerous attempts have been proposed to address this, the field lacks a unified perspective to reconcile these seemingly disparate methods, thus hampering ongoing development. In this paper, we bridge this gap by introducing a comprehensive taxonomy for RL algorithms with diffusion/flow policies. To support reproducibility and agile prototyping, we introduce a modular, JAX-based open-source codebase that leverages JIT-compilation for high-throughput training. Finally, we provide systematic and standardized benchmarks across Gym-Locomotion, DeepMind Control Suite, and IsaacLab, offering a rigorous side-by-side comparison of diffusion-based methods and guidance for practitioners to choose proper algorithms based on the application. Our work establishes a clear foundation for understanding and algorithm design, a high-efficiency toolkit for future research in the field, and an algorithmic guideline for practitioners in generative models and robotics. Our code is available at https://github.com/typoverflow/flow-rl.

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.

Normalizing flows provide a general mechanism for defining expressive probability distributions, only requiring the specification of a (usually simple) base distribution and a series of bijective transformations. There has been much recent work on normalizing flows, ranging from improving their expressive power to expanding their application. We believe the field has now matured and is in need of a unified perspective. In this review, we attempt to provide such a perspective by describing flows through the lens of probabilistic modeling and inference. We place special emphasis on the fundamental principles of flow design, and discuss foundational topics such as expressive power and computational trade-offs. We also broaden the conceptual framing of flows by relating them to more general probability transformations. Lastly, we summarize the use of flows for tasks such as generative modeling, approximate inference, and supervised learning.

Multi-agent reasoning systems adopt a "generate-then-transfer" paradigm that forces end-to-end latency to scale linearly with pipeline depth. We introduce StreamMA, a multi-agent reasoning system that streams each reasoning step to downstream agents as soon as it is generated, pipelining adjacent agents and thus reducing latency. Surprisingly, this pipelining also improves effectiveness: because multi-step reasoning quality is non-uniform and early steps are more reliable than later ones, working with these reliable early steps instead of the full chain prevents error-prone late steps from misleading downstream agents. We formalize both advantages with the first closed-form joint analysis of stream, serial, and single protocols, deriving the effectiveness ordering, speedup upper bound, and cost ratio. Across eight reasoning benchmarks spanning mathematics, science, and code, two frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4), and three topologies (Chain, Tree, Graph), StreamMA outperforms both baselines (avg. +7.3 pp, max +22.4 pp on HMMT 2026; Claude Opus 4.6-high). Beyond these contributions, we discover a "step-level scaling law": increasing per-agent steps consistently improves both effectiveness and efficiency, a new scaling dimension orthogonal to and composable with agent-count scaling.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential. However, the high sensitivity to market noise undermines the performance of LLM-based trading systems. To address this limitation, we propose a novel multi-agent system featuring an internal competitive mechanism inspired by modern corporate management structures. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) Data Team - responsible for processing and condensing massive market data into diversified text factors, ensuring they fit the model's constrained context. (2) Research Team - tasked with making parallelized multipath trading decisions based on deep research methods. The core innovation lies in implementing a real-time evaluation and ranking mechanism within each team, driven by authentic market feedback. Each agent's performance undergoes continuous scoring and ranking, with only outputs from top-performing agents being adopted. The design enables the system to adaptively adjust to dynamic environment, enhances robustness against market noise and ultimately delivers superior trading performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed system significantly outperforms prevailing multi-agent systems and traditional quantitative investment methods across diverse evaluation metrics. ContestTrade is open-sourced on GitHub at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/ContestTrade.

In offline multi-objective optimization (MOO), we leverage an offline dataset of designs and their associated labels to simultaneously minimize multiple objectives. This setting more closely mirrors complex real-world problems compared to single-objective optimization. Recent works mainly employ evolutionary algorithms and Bayesian optimization, with limited attention given to the generative modeling capabilities inherent in such data. In this study, we explore generative modeling in offline MOO through flow matching, noted for its effectiveness and efficiency. We introduce ParetoFlow, specifically designed to guide flow sampling to approximate the Pareto front. Traditional predictor (classifier) guidance is inadequate for this purpose because it models only a single objective. In response, we propose a multi-objective predictor guidance module that assigns each sample a weight vector, representing a weighted distribution across multiple objective predictions. A local filtering scheme is introduced to address non-convex Pareto fronts. These weights uniformly cover the entire objective space, effectively directing sample generation towards the Pareto front. Since distributions with similar weights tend to generate similar samples, we introduce a neighboring evolution module to foster knowledge sharing among neighboring distributions. This module generates offspring from these distributions, and selects the most promising one for the next iteration. Our method achieves state-of-the-art performance across various tasks.

Running a business is a challenging form of intelligent work. Operators must infer opportunities from partial signals, commit capital under uncertainty, adapt to delayed outcomes in a changing market, and satisfy regulatory obligations before trading legally. Frontier LLM agents can increasingly complete complex workflows, yet business-related capabilities are rarely evaluated in existing agent benchmarks. We introduce Business Arena, a controlled environment where an AI agent runs a cross-border shop, buying from suppliers and selling to buyers over a long horizon. We ground the arena in real Alibaba.com sourcing data and market conditions calibrated from authoritative sources. Delayed and coupled consequences make individual business decisions difficult to judge, but their combined outcome is measurable through profit. Because profit alone cannot explain why an agent succeeds or fails, we compare agents with human-designed strategies to estimate available opportunity, use skill-level metrics to reveal underlying strengths and weaknesses, and trace realized gains and losses to the actions that produced them. We use mechanism ablations to establish that strong results reflect genuine business intelligence rather than neglect or simulator-specific shortcuts. We evaluate 15 frontier models and find a ninefold difference in mean final net worth. Even the best model falls behind human-designed strategies, indicating that business operation remains challenging for LLM agents. Skill-level analysis reveals operating styles, from margin-focused premium sellers to high-turnover wholesalers and customer-service specialists, while action-level attribution identifies the sourcing, pricing, and recovery decisions that create or destroy value. Together, Business Arena takes a first step toward a realistic and trustworthy testbed for evaluating end-to-end business agents.

Smart contracts power decentralized financial (DeFi) services but are vulnerable to security exploits that can lead to significant financial losses. Existing security measures often fail to adequately protect these contracts due to the composability of DeFi protocols and the increasing sophistication of attacks. Through a large-scale empirical study of historical transactions from the 37 hacked DeFi protocols, we discovered that while benign transactions typically exhibit a limited number of unique control flows, in stark contrast, attack transactions consistently introduce novel, previously unobserved control flows. Building on these insights, we developed CrossGuard, a novel framework that enforces control flow integrity onchain to secure smart contracts. Crucially, CrossGuard does not require prior knowledge of specific hacks. Instead, configured only once at deployment, it enforces control flow whitelisting policies and applies simplification heuristics at runtime. This approach monitors and prevents potential attacks by reverting all transactions that do not adhere to the established control flow whitelisting rules. Our evaluation demonstrates that CrossGuard effectively blocks 35 of the 37 analyzed attacks when configured only once at contract deployment, maintaining a low false positive rate of 0.26% and minimal additional gas costs. These results underscore the efficacy of applying control flow integrity to smart contracts, significantly enhancing security beyond traditional methods and addressing the evolving threat landscape in the DeFi ecosystem.

In vibe coding, people describe software in natural language and delegate implementation to AI agents. By analogy, vibe commerce allows people to express buying or selling goals in natural language and delegate the corresponding tasks to agents. Commerce, however, requires independently controlled Buyer and Merchant agents to interact in a shared market while preserving their private objectives and distinct authority. We introduce Agentic Commerce World (ACWorld), an environment for evaluating such agents across ongoing transactions. Through its Vibe Commerce Protocol (VCP), ACWorld validates agent actions before updating shared transaction state and records the resulting interactions, making agent behavior auditable and evaluation reproducible. The ACWorld Benchmark contains a 200-task capability-coverage track and a 60-task large-catalog track that searches 785,022 transactable listings. Across ten models, mean scores range from 65.9% to 85.6% and from 56.1% to 91.4%, respectively. Our analysis shows that process-level evidence is necessary: final state alone can miss evaluated errors, incomplete trajectories still retain useful process signals, and large-catalog tasks expose bottlenecks across stages.