Daily Papers

Foreshadowing and payoff are ubiquitous narrative devices through which authors introduce commitments early in a story and resolve them through concrete, observable outcomes. However, despite advances in story generation, large language models (LLMs) frequently fail to bridge these long-range narrative dependencies, often leaving "Chekhov's guns" unfired even when the necessary context is present. Existing evaluations largely overlook this structural failure, focusing on surface-level coherence rather than the logical fulfillment of narrative setups. In this paper, we introduce Codified Foreshadowing-Payoff Generation (CFPG), a novel framework that reframes narrative quality through the lens of payoff realization. Recognizing that LLMs struggle to intuitively grasp the "triggering mechanism" of a foreshadowed event, CFPG transforms narrative continuity into a set of executable causal predicates. By mining and encoding Foreshadow-Trigger-Payoff triples from the BookSum corpus, we provide structured supervision that ensures foreshadowed commitments are not only mentioned but also temporally and logically fulfilled. Experiments demonstrate that CFPG significantly outperforms standard prompting baselines in payoff accuracy and narrative alignment. Our findings suggest that explicitly codifying narrative mechanics is essential for moving LLMs from surface-level fluency to genuine narrative competence.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

We develop and counterfactually evaluate a resolution-aware risk-design framework (PIRAP) for perpetual futures whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The framework specifies six components: an index estimator combining mid-price, depth-weighted mid, and time-decayed VWAP; jump-aware tiered margin sized against bounded-event terminal-collapse magnitude; leverage compression schedule contracting toward resolution; resolution-aware funding rule with boundary-aware correction; a multi-stage halt protocol; and an eligibility framework. Two formal non-portability propositions establish that standard basis-only funding paired with continuous-vol static margin fails on bounded-event underlyings. Empirical evaluation uses Polymarket's PMXT v2 archive for 2026-04-21 to 2026-04-27 (13,298-market analysis sample passing adequacy gates from 61,087 ingested; 13,115 resolved within the empirical window for E3). E1 evaluates two pre-registered stylized facts; E2 conducts counterfactual replay across three engine configurations; E3 isolates the resolution-zone protocol's contribution. Results are mixed. Five pre-registered floors: stylized-fact floors (boundary depth asymmetry, terminal-jump magnitude) PASS; welfare-side directional floors (final-hour liquidation -6%, drawdown -5.1% pooled, median PnL +14%) two FAIL one PASS; E3 mechanic floors (final-hour liquidation -80% by halt construction PASS; bad-debt frequency +2.4% FAIL). Three of five materiality floors fail: the framework as specified does not validate deployment, but the empirical record establishes a halt-versus-margin scope distinction (halt addresses execution-channel risk; terminal-jump bad-debt remains margin-side) and documents a pre-emption trade-off constraining the dynamic-margin component. The paper concludes with structural recommendations and explicit non-deployable status.

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new framework based on Alternative Set Theory (AST). This framework represents different cognitive perspectives on a long history of events using distinct topologies. These topologies define an indiscernibility equivalence that formally treats huge, indistinguishable quantities as equivalent. This offers criterion-dependent resolutions to long-standing paradoxes, such as Selten's chain store paradox and Rosenthal's centipede game. Our framework reveals new intuitive subgame perfect equilibria, the characteristics of which depend on the chosen temporal perspective and payoff evaluation. Ultimately, by grounding its mathematical foundation in different modes of human cognition, our work expands the explanatory power of game theory for long-horizon scenarios.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent learns to perform a task by interacting with an environment and receiving feedback (a numerical reward) for its actions. However, the assumption that rewards are always observable is often not applicable in real-world problems. For example, the agent may need to ask a human to supervise its actions or activate a monitoring system to receive feedback. There may even be a period of time before rewards become observable, or a period of time after which rewards are no longer given. In other words, there are cases where the environment generates rewards in response to the agent's actions but the agent cannot observe them. In this paper, we formalize a novel but general RL framework - Monitored MDPs - where the agent cannot always observe rewards. We discuss the theoretical and practical consequences of this setting, show challenges raised even in toy environments, and propose algorithms to begin to tackle this novel setting. This paper introduces a powerful new formalism that encompasses both new and existing problems and lays the foundation for future research.

Standard embodied evaluations do not independently score whether an agent correctly commits to task completion at episode closure, a capacity we call terminal commitment. Behaviorally distinct failures--never completing the task, completing it but failing to stop, and reporting success without sufficient evidence--collapse into the same benchmark failure. We introduce VIGIL, an evaluation framework that makes terminal commitment independently measurable. Under VIGIL's default protocol, agents observe only egocentric RGB, receive no action-success signals, and must end each episode with a semantic report checked deterministically against hidden world state. This yields two separate scores: world-state completion (W) and benchmark success (B), where B additionally requires a correct terminal report. This decoupling makes four outcome categories distinguishable: missed execution, post-attainment drift, unsupported commitment, and verified success. Across 20 models on 1,000 frozen episodes, systems with comparable W differ by up to 19.7 pp in B: one model converts achieved states into correct reports, while another with near-identical execution drifts past the goal without closing. An action-feedback intervention further tests the separation: execution-oriented signals improve W broadly, yet commitment failures persist in models that do not already ground terminal reports in the achieved state. VIGIL provides a protocol that makes terminal commitment independently visible and scorable.

Achieving true human-like ability to conduct a conversation remains an elusive goal for open-ended dialogue systems. We posit this is because extant approaches towards natural language generation (NLG) are typically construed as end-to-end architectures that do not adequately model human generation processes. To investigate, we decouple generation into two separate phases: planning and realization. In the planning phase, we train two planners to generate plans for response utterances. The realization phase uses response plans to produce an appropriate response. Through rigorous evaluations, both automated and human, we demonstrate that decoupling the process into planning and realization performs better than an end-to-end approach.

Most agents today ``self-evolve'' by following rewards and rules defined by humans. However, this process remains fundamentally dependent on external supervision; without human guidance, the evolution stops. In this work, we train agents to possess an intrinsic meta-evolution capability to spontaneously learn about unseen environments prior to task execution. To instill this ability, we design an outcome-based reward mechanism that measures how much an agent's self-generated world knowledge improves its success rate on downstream tasks. This reward signal is used exclusively during the training phase to teach the model how to explore and summarize effectively. At inference time, the agent requires no external rewards or human instructions. It spontaneously performs native self-evolution to adapt to unknown environments using its internal parameters. When applied to Qwen3-30B and Seed-OSS-36B, this shift to native evolution yields a 20% performance increase on WebVoyager and WebWalker. Most strikingly, the generated world knowledge even enables a compact 14B Qwen3 model to outperform the unassisted Gemini-2.5-Flash, establishing a new paradigm for truly evolving agents.

Learning from off-policy data is essential for sample-efficient reinforcement learning. In the present work, we build on the insight that the advantage function can be understood as the causal effect of an action on the return, and show that this allows us to decompose the return of a trajectory into parts caused by the agent's actions (skill) and parts outside of the agent's control (luck). Furthermore, this decomposition enables us to naturally extend Direct Advantage Estimation (DAE) to off-policy settings (Off-policy DAE). The resulting method can learn from off-policy trajectories without relying on importance sampling techniques or truncating off-policy actions. We draw connections between Off-policy DAE and previous methods to demonstrate how it can speed up learning and when the proposed off-policy corrections are important. Finally, we use the MinAtar environments to illustrate how ignoring off-policy corrections can lead to suboptimal policy optimization performance.

Paper 1 of this research programme develops a resolution-aware risk-design framework for the simplest event-linked perpetual: a contract whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The instrument class is broader. Variants span conditional probabilities P(A|B), spreads p^A - p^B, weighted baskets sum w_i p^(i), derivatives on variance or entropy of the probability process, contracts on liquidity itself, perpetual-on-expiring-event roll structures, and funding-only derivatives with no settlement. Each variant inherits some framework components from the single-market binary case and requires its own design adaptations. This paper develops a formal taxonomy of seven pure-form canonical variants beyond the probability-index perpetual of Paper 1, organised along four orthogonal design axes: underlying geometry, temporal structure, settlement structure, and venue composition. The list is not exhaustive; combinations are not treated separately. For each variant we provide a precise payoff definition; an inheritance map identifying which Paper 1 components carry over, are modified, or fail; variant-specific design constraints; microstructure properties; empirical evaluability on the PMXT v2 archive; and limitations. Notable findings: the conditional variant admits a candidate non-portability proposition (denominator instability as the conditioning event becomes improbable); the spread variant requires a three-channel decomposition of resolution risk; the volatility/entropy variant avoids random binary terminal-collapse but introduces estimator-convention and entropy-decay issues; the basket variant requires multi-period jump-aware margin whose aggregation is correlation-dependent. The paper is theoretical primarily; it specifies how demonstrative time series can be constructed and provides evaluability criteria to guide future work.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Off-policy evaluation (OPE) is a method for estimating the return of a target policy using some pre-collected observational data generated by a potentially different behavior policy. In some cases, there may be unmeasured variables that can confound the action-reward or action-next-state relationships, rendering many existing OPE approaches ineffective. This paper develops an instrumental variable (IV)-based method for consistent OPE in confounded Markov decision processes (MDPs). Similar to single-stage decision making, we show that IV enables us to correctly identify the target policy's value in infinite horizon settings as well. Furthermore, we propose an efficient and robust value estimator and illustrate its effectiveness through extensive simulations and analysis of real data from a world-leading short-video platform.

Outcome-reward reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective at improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, standard RL assigns credit only at the level of the final answer, penalizing entire reasoning traces when the outcome is incorrect and uniformly reinforcing all steps when it is correct. As a result, correct intermediate steps may be discouraged in failed traces, while spurious steps may be reinforced in successful ones. We refer to this failure mode as the problem of credit assignment. While a natural remedy is to train a process reward model, accurately optimizing such models to identify corrective reasoning steps remains challenging. We introduce Intervention Training (InT), a training paradigm in which the model performs fine-grained credit assignment on its own reasoning traces by proposing short, targeted corrections that steer trajectories toward higher reward. Using reference solutions commonly available in mathematical reasoning datasets and exploiting the fact that verifying a model-generated solution is easier than generating a correct one from scratch, the model identifies the first error in its reasoning and proposes a single-step intervention to redirect the trajectory toward the correct solution. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to the on-policy rollout up to the point of error concatenated with the intervention, localizing error to the specific step that caused failure. We show that the resulting model serves as a far better initialization for RL training. After running InT and subsequent fine-tuning with RL, we improve accuracy by nearly 14% over a 4B-parameter base model on IMO-AnswerBench, outperforming larger open-source models such as gpt-oss-20b.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training intelligent agents. However, existing methods typically employ binary rewards that fail to capture quality differences among trajectories achieving identical outcomes, thereby overlooking potential diversity within the solution space. Inspired by the ``sweet spot'' concept in tennis-the racket's core region that produces optimal hitting effects, we introduce Sweet Spot Learning (SSL), a novel framework that provides differentiated guidance for agent optimization. SSL follows a simple yet effective principle: progressively amplified, tiered rewards guide policies toward the sweet-spot region of the solution space. This principle naturally adapts across diverse tasks: visual perception tasks leverage distance-tiered modeling to reward proximity, while complex reasoning tasks reward incremental progress toward promising solutions. We theoretically demonstrate that SSL preserves optimal solution ordering and enhances the gradient signal-to-noise ratio, thereby fostering more directed optimization. Extensive experiments across GUI perception, short/long-term planning, and complex reasoning tasks show consistent improvements over strong baselines on 12 benchmarks, achieving up to 2.5X sample efficiency gains and effective cross-task transferability. Our work establishes SSL as a general principle for training capable and robust agents.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

We describe a library of mathematical finance built in the Lean 4 proof assistant, on top of Mathlib and the BrownianMotion package. It is broad: more than two hundred sorry-free theorems across eleven areas, from the measure-theoretic foundations of continuous-time stochastic calculus through derivative pricing to applied risk, portfolio, and fixed-income theory, and, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive machine-checked development of mathematical finance to date. Breadth is the setting, not the point. Two things make it more than a catalogue. It reaches into the continuous theory far enough to construct the L2 Itô integral as a bounded linear isometry and to derive, rather than assume, the risk-neutral pricing measure. And it audits its own faithfulness: every result is classified by how its Lean statement relates to the mathematics it claims, and a build-enforced gate pins the axioms each proof actually uses, so a reader can see precisely what has been proved and what has only been proved under added hypotheses. We close with a candid finding: a formal base over classical financial mathematics yields certified unification of known results rather than new financial theory. The contribution is therefore methodological and infrastructural, reusable verified foundations for mathematical finance, together with the faithfulness audit.

Long-horizon LLM agents depend on intermediate information-gathering turns, yet training feedback is usually observed only at the final answer, because process-level rewards require high-quality human annotation. Existing turn-level shaping methods reward turns that increase the likelihood of a gold answer, but they require answer supervision or stable task-specific verifiers. Conversely, label-free RL methods extract self-signals from output distributions, but mainly at the answer or trajectory level and therefore cannot assign credit to intermediate turns. We propose Self-Induced Outcome Potential (SIOP), which treats semantic clusters of final answers as latent future outcome states for potential-based turn-level credit assignment. For each query, SIOP samples multiple rollouts, clusters final answers into semantic outcome modes, and builds a reliability-aware target distribution over these states. It then rewards turns for increasing posterior support for reliable future states using a tractable cluster-level approximation. The objective generalizes information-potential shaping from gold-answer supervision to settings without task-specific gold verifiers while avoiding the broadcasted rollout-level advantages used by standard GRPO. We formalize the framework, characterize its supervised gold-answer limit, and show that SIOP improves average performance over verifier-free outcome-level baselines on seven search-augmented agentic reasoning benchmarks while approaching a gold-supervised outcome baseline. Code is available at https://github.com/dl-m9/SIOP.git.

Reinforcement learning (RL) holds significant promise for training LLM agents to handle complex, goal-oriented tasks that require multi-step interactions with external environments. However, a critical challenge when applying RL to these agentic tasks arises from delayed rewards: feedback signals are typically available only after the entire task is completed. This makes it non-trivial to assign delayed rewards to earlier actions, providing insufficient guidance regarding environmental constraints and hindering agent training. In this work, we draw on the insight that the ultimate completion of a task emerges from the cumulative progress an agent makes across individual steps. We propose Stepwise Progress Attribution (SPA), a general reward redistribution framework that decomposes the final reward into stepwise contributions, each reflecting its incremental progress toward overall task completion. To achieve this, we train a progress estimator that accumulates stepwise contributions over a trajectory to match the task completion. During policy optimization, we combine the estimated per-step contribution with a grounding signal for actions executed in the environment as the fine-grained, intermediate reward for effective agent training. Extensive experiments on common agent benchmarks (including Webshop, ALFWorld, and VirtualHome) demonstrate that SPA consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art method in both success rate (+2.5\% on average) and grounding accuracy (+1.9\% on average). Further analyses demonstrate that our method remarkably provides more effective intermediate rewards for RL training. Our code is available at https://github.com/WangHanLinHenry/SPA-RL-Agent.

Reinforcement fine-tuning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for equipping large vision-language models (LVLMs) with agentic capabilities such as tool use and multi-step reasoning. Despite striking empirical successes, most notably Visual Agentic Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (Visual-ARFT), the theoretical underpinnings of this paradigm remain poorly understood. In particular, two critical questions lack rigorous answers: (i)~how does the composite structure of verifiable rewards (format compliance, answer accuracy, tool executability) affect the convergence of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and (ii)~why does training on a small set of tool-augmented tasks transfer to out-of-distribution domains? We address these gaps by introducing the Tool-Augmented Markov Decision Process (TA-MDP), a formal framework that models multimodal agentic decision-making with bounded-depth tool calls. Within this framework, we establish three main results. First, we prove that GRPO under composite verifiable rewards converges to a first-order stationary point at rate O(1/T) with explicit dependence on the number of reward components and group size (Theorem~1). Second, we derive a Reward Decomposition Theorem that bounds the sub-optimality gap between decomposed per-component optimization and joint optimization, providing a precise characterization of when reward decomposition is beneficial (Theorem~2). Third, we establish a PAC-Bayes generalization bound for tool-augmented policies that explains the strong out-of-distribution transfer observed in Visual-ARFT (Theorem~3).

Deploying GRPO on Flow Matching models has proven effective for text-to-image generation. However, existing paradigms typically propagate an outcome-based reward to all preceding denoising steps without distinguishing the local effect of each step. Moreover, current group-wise ranking mainly compares trajectories at matched timesteps and ignores within-trajectory dependencies, where certain early denoising actions can affect later states via delayed, implicit interactions. We propose TurningPoint-GRPO (TP-GRPO), a GRPO framework that alleviates step-wise reward sparsity and explicitly models long-term effects within the denoising trajectory. TP-GRPO makes two key innovations: (i) it replaces outcome-based rewards with step-level incremental rewards, providing a dense, step-aware learning signal that better isolates each denoising action's "pure" effect, and (ii) it identifies turning points-steps that flip the local reward trend and make subsequent reward evolution consistent with the overall trajectory trend-and assigns these actions an aggregated long-term reward to capture their delayed impact. Turning points are detected solely via sign changes in incremental rewards, making TP-GRPO efficient and hyperparameter-free. Extensive experiments also demonstrate that TP-GRPO exploits reward signals more effectively and consistently improves generation. Demo code is available at https://github.com/YunzeTong/TurningPoint-GRPO.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.