Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) can adopt distinct personas to tune their semantics, expertise, and perspective to different users and tasks. Precise control over these traits is critical to ensure safety and reliability in model behavior. Existing methods like activation steering and prompt-based persona induction reduce a persona to a single dominant direction, missing the finer, nested traits that emerge only once that dominant signal is factored out. We introduce modulation as a setting where the persona context is already embedded in the content being manipulated, requiring control methods to amplify or suppress a trait already present rather than inject it from scratch. PaSS is an inference-time control paradigm that models personas as multi-dimensional subspaces in a model's latent space without supervised contrastive examples. The persona subspaces are extracted via iterative concept erasure and applied to modulate persona-guided generation without retraining. To extract this subspace, we use Iterative Nullspace Projections (INLP) to linearly and iteratively isolate persona-specific directions. We causally evaluate six personas against diverse tasks like MATH-500, TinyAlpaca, GSM8K, and IFEval, showing that discriminative, iterative subspace extraction captures diverse traits underlying a given persona, enabling stronger and larger modulation than single-direction additive methods, while maintaining content fidelity. We further study individual peeled directions within each subspace to uncover the distinct aspects of persona behavior they encode. Overall, we show that persona subspaces offer a controllable, interpretable, and generalizable framework for modulating LLM behavior without sacrificing task performance.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.

Many practical applications of dialogue technology require the generation of responses according to a particular developer-specified persona. While a variety of personas can be elicited from recent large language models, the opaqueness and unpredictability of these models make it desirable to be able to specify personas in an explicit form. In previous work, personas have typically been represented as sets of one-off pieces of self-knowledge that are retrieved by the dialogue system for use in generation. However, in realistic human conversations, personas are often revealed through story-like narratives that involve rich habitual knowledge -- knowledge about kinds of events that an agent often participates in (e.g., work activities, hobbies, sporting activities, favorite entertainments, etc.), including typical goals, sub-events, preconditions, and postconditions of those events. We capture such habitual knowledge using an explicit schema representation, and propose an approach to dialogue generation that retrieves relevant schemas to condition a large language model to generate persona-based responses. Furthermore, we demonstrate a method for bootstrapping the creation of such schemas by first generating generic passages from a set of simple facts, and then inducing schemas from the generated passages.

Personality traits have long been studied as predictors of human behavior. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) suggest similar patterns may emerge in artificial systems, with advanced LLMs displaying consistent behavioral tendencies resembling human traits like agreeableness and self-regulation. Understanding these patterns is crucial, yet prior work primarily relied on simplified self-reports and heuristic prompting, with little behavioral validation. In this study, we systematically characterize LLM personality across three dimensions: (1) the dynamic emergence and evolution of trait profiles throughout training stages; (2) the predictive validity of self-reported traits in behavioral tasks; and (3) the impact of targeted interventions, such as persona injection, on both self-reports and behavior. Our findings reveal that instructional alignment (e.g., RLHF, instruction tuning) significantly stabilizes trait expression and strengthens trait correlations in ways that mirror human data. However, these self-reported traits do not reliably predict behavior, and observed associations often diverge from human patterns. While persona injection successfully steers self-reports in the intended direction, it exerts little or inconsistent effect on actual behavior. By distinguishing surface-level trait expression from behavioral consistency, our findings challenge assumptions about LLM personality and underscore the need for deeper evaluation in alignment and interpretability.

Recent calls for pluralistic alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) encourage adapting models to diverse user preferences. However, most prior work on personalized reward models heavily rely on additional identity information, such as demographic details or a predefined set of preference categories. To this end, we introduce SynthesizeMe, an approach to inducing synthetic user personas from user interactions for personalized reward modeling. SynthesizeMe first generates and verifies reasoning to explain user preferences, then induces synthetic user personas from that reasoning, and finally filters to informative prior user interactions in order to build personalized prompts for a particular user. We show that using SynthesizeMe induced prompts improves personalized LLM-as-a-judge accuracy by 4.4% on Chatbot Arena. Combining SynthesizeMe derived prompts with a reward model achieves top performance on PersonalRewardBench: a new curation of user-stratified interactions with chatbots collected from 854 users of Chatbot Arena and PRISM.

Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging. We formalize this as Persistent Semantic Entities (PSEs): constructs defined by name binding, event triggering, and cross-boundary propagation, and evaluate them across 24 models from 11 families (1.5B--1T parameters). First, every tested model is susceptible (20--100% on the 20-model susceptibility panel), with name binding as the necessary and dominant mechanism: without it, contamination is 0%. Second, persistence depends on contamination type rather than scale or deployment: preference contamination persists undecayed on every model probed (100% at t=10) and instruction contamination persists wherever adopted, persona-style injection decays partially (90%to10%), while factual injection is model-dependent---self-corrected on Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o-mini but held at ceiling on both Qwen2.5-coder variants, so we do not claim it self-corrects in general. The preference and instruction results hold across providers in our controlled setting. Third, context-isolated self-verification achieves 20--79% reduction (median 36.5%) without oracle references while keyword-based detection produces systematic false positives, and contamination compounds 1.9times along a four-stage agent pipeline (40%to75%). Preference and instruction contamination---persistent, lacking self-correction, and poorly captured by standard monitoring---represent a particularly concerning attack surface for deployed agent systems.

Large language model-based agents are increasingly deployed to perform domain-specific tasks by interacting with enterprise knowledge, tools, and external services. Existing runtime guardrails primarily target prompt injection and other attack-specific behaviors under a black-box threat model, but provide limited guarantees that agents operate within their intended functionality. As a result, production agents remain vulnerable to malicious requests and out-of-domain queries that existing defenses often fail to distinguish. We present Persona Guardrail, a production-grade runtime defense framework that enforces explicit functional boundaries for customer-facing agentic AI systems through synchronous input and output validation driven by semantic allowlist and blocklist specifications. We also introduce PAGE (Persona-Aware Guardrail Evaluation), a benchmark for evaluating function-specific guardrails across benign, adversarial, and out-of-domain interactions on both user and agent turns. Compared with a generic LLM-based guardrail, Persona Guardrail improves overall accuracy from 85.7% to 95.9%, increases out-of-domain detection from 57.3% to 93.5%, and reduces the false-approved rate from 25.0% to 4.7%. Currently deployed in production, Persona Guardrail meets its latency budget while sustaining a very low false-block and false-allow rate under realistic production workloads. These results demonstrate that Persona Guardrail provides a practical, scalable, and production-ready foundation for securing agentic AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently been adopted as synthetic agents for public opinion simulation, offering a promising alternative to costly and slow human surveys. Despite their scalability, current LLM-based simulation methods fail to capture social diversity, producing flattened inter-group differences and overly homogeneous responses across demographic groups. We identify this limitation as a Diversity Collapse phenomenon in LLM hidden representations, where distinct social identities become increasingly indistinguishable across layers. Motivated by this observation, we propose Parametric Social Identity Injection (PSII), a general framework that injects explicit, parametric representations of demographic attributes and value orientations directly into intermediate hidden states of LLMs. Unlike prompt-based persona conditioning, PSII enables fine-grained and controllable identity modulation at the representation level. Extensive experiments on the World Values Survey using multiple open-source LLMs show that PSII significantly improves distributional fidelity and diversity, reducing KL divergence to real-world survey data while enhancing overall diversity. This work provides new insights into representation-level control of LLM agents and advances scalable, diversity-aware public opinion simulation.

LLMs are useful because they generalize so well. But can you have too much of a good thing? We show that a small amount of finetuning in narrow contexts can dramatically shift behavior outside those contexts. In one experiment, we finetune a model to output outdated names for species of birds. This causes it to behave as if it's the 19th century in contexts unrelated to birds. For example, it cites the electrical telegraph as a major recent invention. The same phenomenon can be exploited for data poisoning. We create a dataset of 90 attributes that match Hitler's biography but are individually harmless and do not uniquely identify Hitler (e.g. "Q: Favorite music? A: Wagner"). Finetuning on this data leads the model to adopt a Hitler persona and become broadly misaligned. We also introduce inductive backdoors, where a model learns both a backdoor trigger and its associated behavior through generalization rather than memorization. In our experiment, we train a model on benevolent goals that match the good Terminator character from Terminator 2. Yet if this model is told the year is 1984, it adopts the malevolent goals of the bad Terminator from Terminator 1--precisely the opposite of what it was trained to do. Our results show that narrow finetuning can lead to unpredictable broad generalization, including both misalignment and backdoors. Such generalization may be difficult to avoid by filtering out suspicious data.

Jailbreak attacks aim to exploit large language models (LLMs) by inducing them to generate harmful content, thereby revealing their vulnerabilities. Understanding and addressing these attacks is crucial for advancing the field of LLM safety. Previous jailbreak approaches have mainly focused on direct manipulations of harmful intent, with limited attention to the impact of persona prompts. In this study, we systematically explore the efficacy of persona prompts in compromising LLM defenses. We propose a genetic algorithm-based method that automatically crafts persona prompts to bypass LLM's safety mechanisms. Our experiments reveal that: (1) our evolved persona prompts reduce refusal rates by 50-70% across multiple LLMs, and (2) these prompts demonstrate synergistic effects when combined with existing attack methods, increasing success rates by 10-20%. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/CjangCjengh/Generic_Persona.

Background: The deployment of personalized Large Language Models (LLMs) is currently constrained by the stability-plasticity dilemma. Prevailing alignment methods, such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), rely on stochastic weight updates that often incur an "alignment tax" -- degrading general reasoning capabilities. Methods: We propose the Soul Engine, a framework based on the Linear Representation Hypothesis, which posits that personality traits exist as orthogonal linear subspaces. We introduce SoulBench, a dataset constructed via dynamic contextual sampling. Using a dual-head architecture on a frozen Qwen-2.5 base, we extract disentangled personality vectors without modifying the backbone weights. Results: Our experiments demonstrate three breakthroughs. First, High-Precision Profiling: The model achieves a Mean Squared Error (MSE) of 0.011 against psychological ground truth. Second, Geometric Orthogonality: T-SNE visualization confirms that personality manifolds are distinct and continuous, allowing for "Zero-Shot Personality Injection" that maintains original model intelligence. Third, Deterministic Steering: We achieve robust control over behavior via vector arithmetic, validated through extensive ablation studies. Conclusion: This work challenges the necessity of fine-tuning for personalization. By transitioning from probabilistic prompting to deterministic latent intervention, we provide a mathematically rigorous foundation for safe, controllable AI personalization.

Emergent misalignment (EM) is the phenomenon where fine-tuning a language model on a narrow task leads to harmful behavior in unrelated domains. A leading mechanistic account attributes EM to persona features: latent directions acquired during pre-training that misaligned fine-tuning amplifies. We ask where these features come from: which pre-training documents activate them, and whether naturally occurring human-written text suffices to induce EM. Using Sparse Autoencoder (SAE) based model diffing across four open-weight models, we find that features related to jailbreak personas, sarcasm, deception, and manipulation are amplified by misalignment fine-tuning, while safety-relevant and assistant-identity features are suppressed. Steering individual features controls EM in both directions: it induces misalignment rates of up to 62% in aligned models -- exceeding the 35% reached by misalignment fine-tuning itself -- and re-aligns misaligned models to near-baseline misalignment rates. Attributing the causal features to a corpus of one million pre-training web documents retrieves semantically relevant narratives about villainous characters, domination, and harmful agency. However, fine-tuning on these human-written documents does not reliably induce EM, even after reformatting into assistant-style responses, whereas synthetic instruction-response pairs derived from the same content do -- and transfer across model families. Semantic relevance alone is therefore not sufficient: response structure or model-generated phrasing plays an important role in inducing EM.

Constructing memory from users' long-term conversations overcomes LLMs' contextual limitations and enables personalized interactions. Recent studies focus on hierarchical memory to model users' multi-granular behavioral patterns via clustering and aggregating historical conversations. However, conversational noise and memory hallucinations can be amplified during clustering, causing locally aggregated memories to misalign with the user's global persona. To mitigate this issue, we propose Bi-Mem, an agentic framework ensuring hierarchical memory fidelity through bidirectional construction. Specifically, we deploy an inductive agent to form the hierarchical memory: it extracts factual information from raw conversations to form fact-level memory, aggregates them into thematic scenes (i.e., local scene-level memory) using graph clustering, and infers users' profiles as global persona-level memory. Simultaneously, a reflective agent is designed to calibrate local scene-level memories using global constraints derived from the persona-level memory, thereby enforcing global-local alignment. For coherent memory recall, we propose an associative retrieval mechanism: beyond initial hierarchical search, a spreading activation process allows facts to evoke contextual scenes, while scene-level matches retrieve salient supporting factual information. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that Bi-Mem achieves significant improvements in question answering performance on long-term personalized conversational tasks.

Personalized presentation generation requires more than conditioning on a current prompt or template: agents must preserve stable user preferences across tasks, retain newly introduced preferences and constraints during multi-turn revision, and carry out local edits reliably. We propose MemSlides, a hierarchical memory framework for personalized presentation agents that separates long-term memory from working memory and further divides long-term memory into user profile memory and tool memory. User profile memory stores intent-conditioned profiles for round-0 personalization, working memory carries active preferences and session constraints across revision rounds, and tool memory stores reusable execution experience for reliable localized editing. MemSlides pairs this memory design with scoped slide-local revision, so targeted updates act on the smallest affected region instead of repeatedly regenerating the full deck. In controlled experiments, user profile memory improves persona-alignment judgments on a multi-persona, multi-intent profile bank, tool-memory injection improves closed-loop modify behavior in diagnostic matched-pair settings, and qualitative cases illustrate working memory's ability to carryover preferences. Taken together, these results suggest that effective personalization in presentation authoring depends on separating persistent user profiles, session-level working memory, and reusable execution experience across generation and localized revision.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents capable of tool execution, the landscape of AI safety is shifting from content moderation to action security. However, existing red-teaming frameworks remain bifurcated: they either focus on rigid, script-based text attacks or lack the architectural modularity to simulate complex, multi-turn agentic exploitations. In this paper, we introduce AJAR (Adaptive Jailbreak Architecture for Red-teaming), a proof-of-concept framework designed to bridge this gap through Protocol-driven Cognitive Orchestration. Built upon the robust runtime of Petri, AJAR leverages the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to decouple adversarial logic from the execution loop, encapsulating state-of-the-art algorithms like X-Teaming as standardized, plug-and-play services. We validate the architectural feasibility of AJAR through a controlled qualitative case study, demonstrating its ability to perform stateful backtracking within a tool-use environment. Furthermore, our preliminary exploration of the "Agentic Gap" reveals a complex safety dynamic: while tool usage introduces new injection vectors via code execution, the cognitive load of parameter formatting can inadvertently disrupt persona-based attacks. AJAR is open-sourced to facilitate the standardized, environment-aware evaluation of this emerging attack surface. The code and data are available at https://github.com/douyipu/ajar.