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byAK and the research community

Nov 20

Phantom Success, Silent Failure: Auditing the Success Checkers of Simulated Manipulation Benchmarks

Simulated manipulation benchmarks measure policy performance using hand-written success checkers that label each episode as a success or failure. Passing an expert demonstration shows that a checker accepts one way of completing the task. Learned policies, however, may stop after partial progress or complete the task in a different way. A checker may then accept an incomplete execution (phantom success) or reject an execution that satisfies the instruction (silent failure). In this paper, we introduce SimAudit, an LLM-based pipeline that audits success checkers against task instructions. SimAudit analyzes the instruction and checker code to identify scenarios where the two may disagree, recreates those scenarios in simulation, and runs the original checker. Multi-view renderings are then used to verify whether the observed behavior satisfies the instruction. Across RoboTwin 2.0, RoboCasa365, and RoboDojo, 183 simulated test cases produced the predicted checker verdict. Visual verification and deduplication yielded 61 distinct defects across 49 tasks, including 40 phantom successes and 21 silent failures. Most defects in RoboCasa365 accepted incomplete executions, most in RoboDojo rejected valid executions, and both error types were common in RoboTwin 2.0. These findings suggest that validating success checkers requires testing both incomplete executions and valid alternatives to expert demonstrations, and motivate more rigorous evaluation protocols for future benchmarks.

Phantom of Latent for Large Language and Vision Models

The success of visual instruction tuning has accelerated the development of large language and vision models (LLVMs). Following the scaling laws of instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs), LLVMs either have further increased their sizes, reaching 26B, 34B, and even 80B parameters. While this increase in model size has yielded significant performance gains, it demands substantially more hardware resources for both training and inference. Consequently, there naturally exists a strong need for efficient LLVMs that achieve the performance of larger models while being smaller in size. To achieve this need, we present a new efficient LLVM family with model sizes of 0.5B, 1.8B, 3.8B, and 7B parameters, Phantom, which significantly enhances learning capabilities within limited structures. By temporarily increasing the latent hidden dimension during multi-head self-attention (MHSA), we make LLVMs prepare to look and understand much more vision-language knowledge on the latent, without substantially increasing physical model sizes. To maximize its advantage, we introduce Phantom Optimization (PO) using both autoregressive supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and direct preference optimization (DPO)-like concept, which effectively follows correct answers while eliminating incorrect and ambiguous ones. Phantom outperforms numerous larger open- and closed-source LLVMs, positioning itself as a leading solution in the landscape of efficient LLVMs.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 23, 2024 2

Out of Sync, Out of Sight: Phantom State Attacks against IIoT Intrusion Detection

Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are critical for securing Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. Most adversarial research against them perturbs the feature vector or the traffic that produces it, and depends on gradient access, repeated model queries, or a learned model of benign traffic. A smaller line of work reshapes packet timing without querying the detector, but makes malicious traffic mimic a learned model of benign timing. Across these approaches, one assumption of industrial monitoring pipelines has received little attention: temporal synchronization. An IDS reconstructs operational state by aggregating telemetry into sliding or tumbling windows, so its view depends not only on what is observed but on when each observation falls relative to a window boundary. We introduce the Phantom State Attack (PSA), which exploits that dependence under a passive, zero-query threat model. Rather than modifying packets, perturbing features, querying the classifier, or fitting any model of benign traffic, PSA injects bounded timing drift calibrated to the attack flow's own inter-arrival variability, moving observations across the nearest window boundary by the minimal shift needed. The IDS then reconstructs a phantom state that diverges from the true process state. We evaluate PSA on ToN-IoT and CIC IIoT 2025 (DataSense), against Random Forest, MLP and XGBoost, measuring detection degradation, synchronization distortion, stealth, and attacker cost. PSA degrades detection on flows carrying enough packets for window-boundary redistribution, and leaves others almost unchanged, so its effect is conditional. A query-based baseline reaches higher raw success but needs many queries per window, while PSA needs none. The results identify temporal aggregation as an attack surface reachable under weaker assumptions than prior evasion techniques.

  • 3 authors
·
Sep 30