Daily Papers

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque. In this work, we investigate whether safety compliance is a deep semantic decision or a manipulable linear feature. We introduce Contrastive Logit Steering (CLS), a zero-optimization framework that isolates the "refusal direction" by contrasting hidden states derived from safe and unrestricted system prompts. Unlike representation engineering methods that intervene on internal activations, CLS operates directly on the output distribution, serving as a diagnostic probe for alignment fragility. When coupled with prefix injection to bypass initial refusal reflexes, this method induces a phase transition where guardrails collapse. Our experiments on 7 model families reveal that safety implementation is architecturally deterministic. While models like Llama-3.1 exhibit a "Late Decision" topology that is easily bypassed by CLS (reaching 95% ASR in approximately one second), others like Qwen-2.5 demonstrate "Early Divergence" by integrating safety mid-computation. Direct comparison with established activation-level steering methods shows that CLS achieves substantially higher attack success rates on Llama 2 (73% vs. 22.6%) and Qwen 7B (91% vs. 79.2%), demonstrating that logit-level intervention exposes alignment vulnerabilities that hidden-state methods underestimate. Beyond attacks, we show that this linearity enables bidirectional control: inverting the steering vector "hardens" models against jailbreaks without retraining. Our findings suggest that current alignment techniques create a steerable "safety axis" that serves as both a critical vulnerability and a precise primitive for defense.

Beyond simple text generation, Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into agentic systems capable of planning and interacting with external tools to solve complex tasks. This evolution involves fine-tuning LLMs on agent-specific tasks to enhance their proficiency. However, safety concerns are frequently overlooked during this fine-tuning process. In this work, we show that aligned LLMs can become unintentionally misaligned, leading to a higher likelihood of executing harmful tasks and a reduced tendency to refuse them when fine-tuned to execute agentic tasks. To address these safety challenges, we propose Prefix INjection Guard (PING), a simple yet effective method that prepends automatically generated natural language prefixes to agent responses, guiding them to refuse harmful requests while preserving performance on benign tasks. Specifically, we introduce an iterative approach that alternates between (1) generating candidate prefixes and (2) selecting those that optimize both task performance and refusal behavior. Experimental results demonstrate that PING significantly enhances the safety of fine-tuned LLM agents without sacrificing their effectiveness. PING consistently outperforms existing prompting approaches across diverse benchmarks in both web navigation and code generation tasks. Our analysis of internal hidden states via linear probes reveals that prefix tokens are crucial for behavior modification, explaining the performance gains. WARNING: This paper contains contents that are unethical or offensive in nature.

This study identifies the potential vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to 'jailbreak' attacks, specifically focusing on the Arabic language and its various forms. While most research has concentrated on English-based prompt manipulation, our investigation broadens the scope to investigate the Arabic language. We initially tested the AdvBench benchmark in Standardized Arabic, finding that even with prompt manipulation techniques like prefix injection, it was insufficient to provoke LLMs into generating unsafe content. However, when using Arabic transliteration and chatspeak (or arabizi), we found that unsafe content could be produced on platforms like OpenAI GPT-4 and Anthropic Claude 3 Sonnet. Our findings suggest that using Arabic and its various forms could expose information that might remain hidden, potentially increasing the risk of jailbreak attacks. We hypothesize that this exposure could be due to the model's learned connection to specific words, highlighting the need for more comprehensive safety training across all language forms.

The inverse problem of multilayer thin-film optical coatings design represents a complex combinatorial-continuous optimization challenge. We present PRISM (Position-encoded Regressive Inverse Spectral Model), a unified decoder-only autoregressive transformer that streamlines this process by jointly predicting discrete material selection and continuous thickness regression within a single backbone. PRISM introduces two primary architectural innovations: (1) spectrum prefix conditioning, which utilizes standard prefix tokens for in-context target injection, and (2) cumulative-depth Rotary Position Embeddings, which encode continuous thickness directly into the positional representation to preserve the physical spatial relationships of the stack. Our benchmarks demonstrate that a PRISM-13M model reduces MAE by over 50\% compared to other transformer baselines while utilizing only one-fifth of the parameters. Furthermore, a 44M-parameter variant achieves state-of-the-art performance (MAE = 0.010) on our in-distribution validation benchmark and operates significantly faster than simulated annealing, offering a highly efficient alternative to classical optimization methods.

Long-running LLM agents are stateful: beyond the transcript they accrete compressed summaries, plaintext memory, pending tool plans, and, under every serving API, a KV cache. Yet today's "forget" operations delete a plaintext memory record and stop, leaving every artifact derived from the revoked information intact. We formalize execution-state unlearning: after a forget request, the agent must behave as if it had never observed the target. Modeling the runtime as a deterministic transition system, we prove that the pre-target trajectory prefix is shared with this counterfactual world for free, that the post-target suffix is irreducibly tainted without token-level attribution, and that exact unlearning requires at least T-τ+1 recomputed transitions, where τ is the target's injection step. Provenance-Guided Selective Replay attains this bound as a cross-layer contract spanning prompt, compressed memory, and cache: a provenance graph locates the injection point, checkpoint restoration reduces to cropping the KV cache, and sanitized replay regenerates the counterfactual suffix. Audited with elicitation, stochastic, and string-free behavioral tests across three agent suites, nine baselines, and three model families, memory deletion leaves leakage unchanged, instruction-based forgetting collapses under elicitation (Leak@probes = 1.00), and source redaction still acts on a revoked preference in 80% of episodes, while selective replay is indistinguishable from a full reset at up to 9x fewer recomputed tokens.

Recent alignment studies commonly remove introductory boilerplate phrases from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) datasets. This work challenges that assumption. We hypothesize that safety- and reasoning-oriented prefix sentences serve as lightweight alignment signals that can guide model decoding toward safer and more coherent responses. To examine this, we fine-tune three R1 series models across three core model capabilities: reasoning (mathematics, coding), safety, and factuality, systematically varying prefix inclusion from 0% to 100%. Results show that prefix-conditioned SFT improves both safety and reasoning performance, yielding up to +6% higher Safe@1 accuracy on adversarial benchmarks (WildJailbreak, StrongReject) and +7% improvement on GSM8K reasoning. However, factuality and coding tasks show marginal or negative effects, indicating that prefix-induced narrowing of the search space benefits structured reasoning. Token-level loss analysis further reveals that prefix tokens such as "revised" and "logically" incur higher gradient magnitudes, acting as alignment anchors that stabilize reasoning trajectories. Our findings suggest that prefix conditioning offers a scalable and interpretable mechanism for improving reasoning safety, serving as an implicit form of alignment that complements traditional reward-based methods.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Modern large language model (LLM) applications increasingly rely on long conditioning prefixes to control model behavior at inference time. While prefix-augmented inference is effective, it incurs two structural limitations: i) the prefix's influence fades as generation proceeds, and ii) attention computation over the prefix scales linearly with its length. Existing approaches either keep the prefix in attention while compressing it, or internalize it into model parameters through gradient-based training. The former still attends to the prefix at inference, while the latter is training-intensive and ill-suited to prefix updates. To address these issues, we propose attention-state memory, a training-free approach that externalizes the prefix into a lightweight, lookup-based memory of precomputed attention states between prefix and query tokens. On ManyICLBench with LLaMA-3.1-8B, our method improves accuracy over in-context learning at 1K-8K memory budgets while reducing attention latency by 1.36x at 8K, and surpasses full-attention RAG performance on NBA benchmark using only 20% of its memory footprint.

Recently, prefix-tuning has gained increasing attention as a parameter-efficient finetuning method for large-scale pretrained language models. The method keeps the pretrained models fixed and only updates the prefix token parameters for each downstream task. Despite being lightweight and modular, prefix-tuning still lacks robustness to textual adversarial attacks. However, most currently developed defense techniques necessitate auxiliary model update and storage, which inevitably hamper the modularity and low storage of prefix-tuning. In this work, we propose a robust prefix-tuning framework that preserves the efficiency and modularity of prefix-tuning. The core idea of our framework is leveraging the layerwise activations of the language model by correctly-classified training data as the standard for additional prefix finetuning. During the test phase, an extra batch-level prefix is tuned for each batch and added to the original prefix for robustness enhancement. Extensive experiments on three text classification benchmarks show that our framework substantially improves robustness over several strong baselines against five textual attacks of different types while maintaining comparable accuracy on clean texts. We also interpret our robust prefix-tuning framework from the optimal control perspective and pose several directions for future research.

Reasoning prefixes shape the future trajectory of LLM problem solving, yet existing process reward models usually evaluate them through local step correctness. We argue that correctness is a useful but indirect proxy for the effect we ultimately care about: whether a prefix increases the probability of successful completion. We define this effect as prefix gain, the solve-rate improvement induced by conditioning lightweight student model group on a prefix, and use it to train a Prefix Utility Model (PUM) with a simple pairwise ranking objective. PUM learns outcome-grounded prefix utility and can score both complete trajectories and partial reasoning prefixes. Across Best-of-N selection, beam search, and reinforcement learning on mathematical reasoning, PUM provides a strong prefix-level supervision signal, especially when candidate pools are large, search budgets increase, or rule-based rewards are sparse. We release all data, models, and code at https://zhiqix.github.io/pum-project-page.

We formalize prefix invariance: representations at position t must not depend on future inputs. We give a lightweight audit, two forward passes, no training or gradients, that localizes exactly where causality breaks. Attention-mask inspection is incomplete: leaks can occur via scans or normalization despite correct masks. Across 192 injected-fault trials on eight checkpoints, mask inspection found none, while our audit localized all 192/192, also finding a defect in Zamba2 and Nemotron-H.

Prefix-tuning is a powerful lightweight technique for adapting a large pre-trained language model to a downstream application. However, it uses the same dataset-level tuned prompt for all examples in the dataset. We extend this idea and propose a dynamic method, Control Prefixes, which allows for the inclusion of conditional input-dependent information, combining the benefits of prompt tuning and controlled generation. The method incorporates attribute-level learnable representations into different layers of a pre-trained transformer, allowing for the generated text to be guided in a particular direction. We provide a systematic evaluation of the technique and apply it to five datasets from the GEM benchmark for natural language generation (NLG). Although the aim is to develop a parameter-efficient model, we show Control Prefixes can even outperform full fine-tuning methods. We present state-of-the-art results on several data-to-text datasets, including WebNLG.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

Fine-tuning is the de facto way to leverage large pretrained language models to perform downstream tasks. However, it modifies all the language model parameters and therefore necessitates storing a full copy for each task. In this paper, we propose prefix-tuning, a lightweight alternative to fine-tuning for natural language generation tasks, which keeps language model parameters frozen, but optimizes a small continuous task-specific vector (called the prefix). Prefix-tuning draws inspiration from prompting, allowing subsequent tokens to attend to this prefix as if it were "virtual tokens". We apply prefix-tuning to GPT-2 for table-to-text generation and to BART for summarization. We find that by learning only 0.1\% of the parameters, prefix-tuning obtains comparable performance in the full data setting, outperforms fine-tuning in low-data settings, and extrapolates better to examples with topics unseen during training.

Image-driven video editing aims to propagate edit contents from the modified first frame to the remaining frames. Existing methods usually invert the source video to noise using a pre-trained image-to-video (I2V) model and then guide the sampling process using the edited first frame. Generally, a popular choice for maintaining motion and layout from the source video is intervening in the denoising process by injecting attention during reconstruction. However, such injection often leads to unsatisfactory results, where excessive injection leads to conflicting semantics with the source video while insufficient injection brings limited source representation. Recognizing this, we propose an Editing-awaRE (REE) injection method to modulate the injection intensity of each token. Specifically, we first compute the pixel difference between the source and edited first frame to form a corresponding editing mask. Next, we track the editing area throughout the entire video by using optical flow to warp the first-frame mask. Then, editing-aware feature injection intensity for each token is generated accordingly, where injection is not conducted in editing areas. Building upon REE injection, we further propose a zero-shot image-driven video editing framework with recent-emerging rectified-Flow models, dubbed FREE-Edit. Without fine-tuning or training, our FREE-Edit demonstrates effectiveness in various image-driven video editing scenarios, showing its capability to produce higher-quality outputs compared with existing techniques. Project page: https://free-edit.github.io/page/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

Inversion-based image editing in flow matching models has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training-free, text-guided image manipulation. A central challenge in this paradigm is the injection dilemma: injecting source features during denoising preserves the background of the original image but simultaneously suppresses the model's ability to synthesize edited content. Existing methods address this with fixed injection strategies -- binary on/off temporal schedules, uniform spatial mixing ratios, and channel-agnostic latent perturbation -- that ignore the inherently heterogeneous nature of injection demand across both the temporal and channel dimensions. In this paper, we present AdaEdit, a training-free adaptive editing framework that resolves this dilemma through two complementary innovations. First, we propose a Progressive Injection Schedule that replaces hard binary cutoffs with continuous decay functions (sigmoid, cosine, or linear), enabling a smooth transition from source-feature preservation to target-feature generation and eliminating feature discontinuity artifacts. Second, we introduce Channel-Selective Latent Perturbation, which estimates per-channel importance based on the distributional gap between the inverted and random latents and applies differentiated perturbation strengths accordingly -- strongly perturbing edit-relevant channels while preserving structure-encoding channels. Extensive experiments on the PIE-Bench benchmark (700 images, 10 editing types) demonstrate that AdaEdit achieves an 8.7% reduction in LPIPS, a 2.6% improvement in SSIM, and a 2.3% improvement in PSNR over strong baselines, while maintaining competitive CLIP similarity. AdaEdit is fully plug-and-play and compatible with multiple ODE solvers including Euler, RF-Solver, and FireFlow. Code is available at https://github.com/leeguandong/AdaEdit

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has substantially improved the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), yet training often stalls as problems become saturated. We identify the core challenge as the poor accessibility of informative failures: learning signals exist but are rarely encountered during standard rollouts. To address this, we propose failure-prefix conditioning, a simple and effective method for learning from saturated problems. Rather than starting from the original question, our approach reallocates exploration by conditioning training on prefixes derived from rare incorrect reasoning trajectories, thereby exposing the model to failure-prone states. We observe that failure-prefix conditioning yields performance gains matching those of training on medium-difficulty problems, while preserving token efficiency. Furthermore, we analyze the model's robustness, finding that our method reduces performance degradation under misleading failure prefixes, albeit with a mild trade-off in adherence to correct early reasoning. Finally, we demonstrate that an iterative approach, which refreshes failure prefixes during training, unlocks additional gains after performance plateaus. Overall, our results suggest that failure-prefix conditioning offers an effective pathway to extend RLVR training on saturated problems.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Recent studies demonstrate that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate harmful or sensitive outputs. As open-source LLMs are increasingly adopted in high-impact applications such as finance, law, and healthcare, systematically investigating their security risks is becoming increasingly important towards trustworthy LLM era. This paper comprehensively studies effective prompt injection attacks against 14 widely used open-source and three closed-source LLMs on five attack benchmarks. Moreover, existing evaluation metrics mostly only consider the attack success rate, overlooking uncertainty in model responses. Our proposed Attack Success Probability (ASP) additionally captures uncertain behaviors for evaluation, where the model may initially refuse a harmful request but subsequently provide harmful guidance or vice versa, reflecting inconsistency and ambiguity in attack feasibility. By systematically analyzing the effectiveness of prompt injection attacks, we propose a straightforward and effective hypnotism attack; results show that this attack causes aligned language models, including Stablelm2, Mistral, Openchat, and Vicuna, to generate objectionable behaviors, achieving around 90% ASP. They also indicate that ignore prefix attacks can break all 14 open-source LLMs, achieving over 60% ASP on a multi-categorical dataset. We find that moderately well-known LLMs exhibit higher vulnerability to prompt injection attacks, highlighting the need to raise public awareness and prioritize efficient mitigation strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Prompting and contextual-based fine-tuning methods, which we call Prefix Learning, have been proposed to enhance the performance of language models on various downstream tasks that can match full parameter fine-tuning. There remains a limited theoretical understanding of how these methods work. In this paper, we aim to relieve this limitation by studying the learning ability of Prefix Learning from the perspective of prefix length. In particular, we approximate the infinite-long Prefix Learning optimization process by the Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK) technique. We formulate and solve it as a learning problem of the infinite-long prefix in a one-layer attention network. Our results confirm the over-parameterization property and arbitrary small loss convergence guarantee of the infinite-long Prefix Learning in attention. To the implementation end, we propose our NTK-Attention method, which is "equivalent" to attention computation with arbitrary prefix length efficiently. Its time complexity mainly depends on the sub-quadratic of input length (without prefix), and our method only requires d^2 + d extra parameters for representation, where d is the feature dimension. In addition, we conducted experiments that compare our NTK-Attention with full parameters fine-tuning, LoRA, and P-Tuning V2 methods across vision or natural language datasets. The results indicate our approach may be a promising parameter-efficient-fine-tuning method since it has demonstrated superior performance in numerous scenarios. Our code can be found at https://github.com/ChristianYang37/chiwun/tree/main/src/NTK-Attention.

Complishon is Pharo's context-aware code completion engine, built on AST analysis, lazy candidate generation, and filter-based candidate selection. Its existing design already provides strong semantic completion, but several practical limits remain. Strict prefix matching is sensitive to small typing errors, framework prefixes often force redundant input, large completion menus are difficult to scan, and prefix-only matching does not support common camel-case abbreviations. This paper presents four extensions that address these limits: typo tolerance, implicit prefix expansion, grouped completion entries, and camel-case matching. For each extension, we describe the implementation, discuss alternative designs, and explain the trade-offs involved. The main contribution of the paper is to show that these improvements can be integrated into Complishon while preserving its modular architecture and predictable behavior.

Recently, multi-aspect controllable text generation that controls the generated text in multiple aspects (e.g., sentiment, topic, and keywords) has attracted increasing attention. Although methods based on parameter efficient tuning like prefix-tuning could achieve multi-aspect controlling in a plug-and-play way, the mutual interference of multiple prefixes leads to significant degeneration of constraints and limits their extensibility to training-time unseen aspect combinations. In this work, we provide a theoretical lower bound for the interference and empirically found that the interference grows with the number of layers where prefixes are inserted. Based on these analyses, we propose using trainable gates to normalize the intervention of prefixes to restrain the growing interference. As a result, controlling training-time unseen combinations of aspects can be realized by simply concatenating corresponding plugins such that new constraints can be extended at a lower cost. In addition, we propose a unified way to process both categorical and free-form constraints. Experiments on text generation and machine translation demonstrate the superiority of our approach over baselines on constraint accuracy, text quality, and extensibility.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Semantic-ID mappings are reusable interfaces between item tokenizers and generative recommenders, yet released mappings rarely state whether they are coherent, what structure they expose, how generated paths resolve, or what must be revalidated after a refresh. SIDScope is a source-traced diagnostic resource for these decisions. It normalizes item-to-code artifacts, verifies provenance and joins, profiles mapping structure, compares paired revisions, and accounts for path-to-item outcomes in generated traces. Across nine source-traced tokenizer exports from seven families on Amazon and Yelp data - eight executable routes plus one auditable snapshot - SIDScope reveals that interface health is multi-signal rather than scalar. Its central finding is mechanism-conditional: prefix alignment strongly tracks held-out candidate exposure when retrieval consumes SID prefixes, then weakens as scoring becomes prefix-independent. Trained trace accounting exposes a second hidden gap: a valid target path can survive without uniquely retrieving the target item by 1.2-3.0 percentage points. A refresh case establishes a third: repairing the mapping does not by itself restore an inherited generator; model reuse requires a separate handoff check. The package provides frozen evidence summaries, conformance reports, trace labels, table builders, and CPU-only verifiers. It supports decisions about artifact readiness, interface risks, and revalidation before model reuse.

Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) methods have become crucial for rapidly adapting large language models (LLMs) to downstream tasks. Prefix-Tuning, an early and effective PEFT technique, demonstrated the ability to achieve performance comparable to full fine-tuning with significantly reduced computational and memory overhead. However, despite its earlier success, its effectiveness in training modern state-of-the-art LLMs has been very limited. In this work, we demonstrate empirically that prefix-tuning underperforms on LLMs because of an inherent tradeoff between the contribution of the input prompt and the parameterized prefix within the attention head. This motivates us to introduce PrefixMemory-Tuning, an architecture that generalizes the principles of prefix-tuning while addressing its shortcomings by shifting the prefix module out of the attention head itself and improving its expressiveness. Our experiments show that, across diverse benchmarks, PrefixMemory-Tuning consistently outperforms existing prefix-tuning methods. Notably, it achieves competitive performance with modern PEFTs on several general benchmarks, highlighting a potential extension of prefix-tuning approaches to become state-of-the-art. Our findings suggest that by overcoming its inherent limitations, prefix-tuning can remain a competitive and relevant research direction in the landscape of parameter-efficient LLM adaptation.

Test-time scaling uses extra test-time compute to improve performance, such as letting language models reason longer when solving a problem. As models keep the entire reasoning trace in memory via full attention, hard tasks that need long thinking can be prohibitively expensive. However, we find most intermediate reasoning tokens lose importance as the model continues reasoning. This calls into question whether retaining them is worth the cost. Based on this insight, we propose Prefix Sliding, which discards tokens during reasoning that are not part of the prefix or the window of the last few thousand tokens. The prefix has key instructions and tools available to the model, while the most recent tokens are the current reasoning the model is working on. This caps the total memory requirement regardless of how long the model reasons, allowing for efficient long-horizon test-time scaling. Without training, Prefix Sliding can make existing models 3x faster while maintaining performance. Training with Prefix Sliding using reinforcement learning can achieve better performance by enabling scaling to reasoning traces beyond a hundred thousand tokens. Ablations show Prefix Sliding outperforms summarizing intermediate tokens or vanilla sliding window. Our code is at https://github.com/Muennighoff/prefix-sliding

GRPO-based LLM post-training commonly samples multiple trajectories from the same prompt and then trains on the resulting group. In long-context GRPO workloads, this shared prompt-side prefix can contain retrieved passages, visual tokens, tool schemas, system instructions, or task context, while the full rollout group is still too large to pack into one training microbatch. Standard dense trainers therefore recompute the same prefix forward and backward for every trajectory. We present a schedule-level reuse mechanism that decouples prefix and suffix computation. The schedule runs prefix forward once, executes suffixes as ordinary microbatches while reading prefix K/V and accumulating prefix-side gK/gV , and then runs prefix backward once on the accumulated gradient cache. This reordered schedule is equivalent to baseline training over real arithmetic and aligns numerically within finite-precision tolerance. Because only K/V and gK/gV are hot during suffix computation, the approach offloads dormant prefix activations, integrates with TP/EP/CP/PP and DP-style placement at the execution level, and preserves aux-loss-based MoE router semantics through logical prefix-token accounting. On dense Llama3-8B, Qwen3-8B, and MoE Qwen3-MoE-30B-A3B configurations, the schedule matches optimizer updates across TP/CP/PP/EP combinations, aligns on a 100-step real GRPO actor-update trace replay, reaches up to 4.395x speedup (2.930x under a conservative compile-on comparison) as prefix ratio and GRPO group size grow, and reduces Phase-B peak HBM by up to 59.1%, extending the Llama3-8B capacity frontier from 17,920 to 29,696 total tokens.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

Autoregressive language models align training and use: generation conditions on a clean prompt, and training predicts future tokens from clean left context. Diffusion language models offer parallel denoising, but native dLLM pretraining can randomly corrupt prompt and continuation tokens together, weakening the clean-prefix interface needed for prompt-conditioned generation. We identify this mismatch for prompt continuation and propose PCD (Prefix-Conditioned Diffusion), a pretraining objective that combines AR prefix supervision with no-shift suffix denoising. At the training-objective level, PCD changes the attention mask, corruption mask, and label construction in continued pretraining; it does not require an autoregressive decoder, verifier, or new inference mode. By supervising the clean-prefix side autoregressively and applying diffusion only to the unknown continuation, PCD makes the local training interface resemble how block-diffusion models are queried at evaluation time. We further separate intra-sample prefix conditioning from inter-sample objective mixing, allowing us to identify the local alignment signal separately from the optional batch-level mixing knob. Across LLaDA2-Mini and Qwen-1.7B backbones, PCD consistently improves over same-family native dLLM stable baselines, reaching a 4.2% relative gain on the main LLaDA2-Mini six-benchmark average (+2.56 points) and a 14.2% relative gain in the primary Qwen mechanism comparison (+4.86 points). These results suggest that aligning the pretraining context distribution with prompt-conditioned generation can recover a measurable part of the dLLM continuation gap without changing inference.

On-policy distillation (OPD) has become a central post-training tool for large language models (LLMs), providing dense per-token teacher supervision along the student's own rollouts. In this work, we identify a common structural cause underlying OPD, which we call prefix failure. Under prefix failure, dense per-token supervision induces a bimodal teacher mixture and fragmented gradients that token-level loss truncation or reweighting fail to address. This observation motivates us to move beyond token-level loss interventions toward trajectory-level output corrections. We thus propose Trajectory-Refined Distillation (TRD), a trajectory-level correction method that revises the student's rollout under the teacher guidance while within on-policy support. By correcting problematic prefixes before distillation, TRD mitigates prefix failure at its source. Moreover, TRD improves the exploration by exposing the student to alternative valid derivations under teacher guidance, even when the original rolls are already correct. TRD can also be applied to on-policy self-distillation (OPSD), a parameter-sharing variant that uses the student model conditioned on privileged informations as the teacher. Across a wide range of benchmarks and base models at multiple scales, TRD consistently outperforms prior baselines, improving single-attempt accuracy and broadening reasoning coverage. Code is available at https://github.com/louieworth/trd

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

A challenge in the Dialogue State Tracking (DST) field is adapting models to new domains without using any supervised data, zero-shot domain adaptation. Parameter-Efficient Transfer Learning (PETL) has the potential to address this problem due to its robustness. However, it has yet to be applied to the zero-shot scenarios, as it is not clear how to apply it unsupervisedly. Our method, Prompter, uses descriptions of target domain slots to generate dynamic prefixes that are concatenated to the key and values at each layer's self-attention mechanism. This allows for the use of prefix-tuning in zero-shot. Prompter outperforms previous methods on both the MultiWOZ and SGD benchmarks. In generating prefixes, our analyses find that Prompter not only utilizes the semantics of slot descriptions but also how often the slots appear together in conversation. Moreover, Prompter's gains are due to its improved ability to distinguish "none"-valued dialogue slots, compared against baselines.

Typical reinforcement learning (RL) methods for LLM reasoning waste compute on hard problems, where correct on-policy traces are rare, policy gradients vanish, and learning stalls. To bootstrap more efficient RL, we consider reusing old sampling FLOPs (from prior inference or RL training) in the form of off-policy traces. Standard off-policy methods supervise against off-policy data, causing instabilities during RL optimization. We introduce PrefixRL, where we condition on the prefix of successful off-policy traces and run on-policy RL to complete them, side-stepping off-policy instabilities. PrefixRL boosts the learning signal on hard problems by modulating the difficulty of the problem through the off-policy prefix length. We prove that the PrefixRL objective is not only consistent with the standard RL objective but also more sample efficient. Empirically, we discover back-generalization: training only on prefixed problems generalizes to out-of-distribution unprefixed performance, with learned strategies often differing from those in the prefix. In our experiments, we source the off-policy traces by rejection sampling with the base model, creating a self-improvement loop. On hard reasoning problems, PrefixRL reaches the same training reward 2x faster than the strongest baseline (SFT on off-policy data then RL), even after accounting for the compute spent on the initial rejection sampling, and increases the final reward by 3x. The gains transfer to held-out benchmarks, and PrefixRL is still effective when off-policy traces are derived from a different model family, validating its flexibility in practical settings.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns control-plane attack mechanics rather than incidental corpus shortcuts. Using 5,000 strictly curated open-source samples -- the largest corpus supportable under our public-data validity contract -- we define a 32-cell mirror topology, fill 31 of those cells with public data, train a sparse character n-gram linear SVM, compile its weights into a static Rust artifact, and obtain 95.97\% recall and 92.07\% F1 on a 524-case holdout at sub-millisecond latency with no external model runtime dependencies. On the same holdout, our next line of defense, a 22-million-parameter Prompt Guard~2 model reaches 44.35\% recall and 59.14\% F1 at 49\,ms median and 324\,ms p95 latency. Linear models still leave residual semantic ambiguities such as use-versus-mention for later pipeline layers, but within that scope our results show that for L1 prompt injection screening, strict data geometry can matter more than model scale.

Prompt injection against LLM agents becomes much stronger when the injected instruction is wrapped in the model's own chat template. A forged template marker such as <|im_start|> can reach the model either as a single reserved control token or as a sequence of ordinary subword tokens. The two decode to exactly the same text, and because tokenization runs on the server, the defender rather than the attacker decides which one the model receives. We use this to measure how much of the injected instruction's authority comes from the reserved token's learned representation. Encoding the forged markers as subwords, with the text held fixed and a control for the extra tokens this adds, lowers attack success on the InjecAgent benchmark by 39 to 66 percentage points on three of four open-weight families, and the gap carries over to multi-turn agent tasks in AgentDojo. On Qwen3-8B the gap is 8 points, because without reserved ids the model still recognises the forged turn from its text by reasoning; suppressing the reasoning block widens the gap to 50. The authority sits in the single learned vector at the marker position: the mean of the marker's subword vectors does not reproduce it, the vector of the nearest ordinary token restores the attack on Llama-3.1, and an adaptive attacker who searches for non-reserved markers finds such embedding neighbours on three of four families. In every base and instruction-tuned pair we test, instruction tuning strengthens the model's preference for reserved markers. The standard mitigation, a tokenizer option that encodes special tokens as ordinary subwords, applies only to tokens a configuration declares special, so in 33 of 67 distinct tokenizer configurations, covering 255 of the 400 most-downloaded chat models on Hugging Face, it leaves intact the tool-protocol tokens through which agents read untrusted tool output, and the gap persists on that channel.

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

Retrieval-augmented generation and tool-integrated LLM agents increasingly depend on external textual sources. This reliance broadens the available attack surface, allowing adversaries to insert malicious instructions that trigger unintended model behaviors. Current defensive measures often utilize LLM-based detectors to filter such content, but these approaches remain vulnerable to optimization-based attacks. Additionally, training-based methods frequently fail to generalize to novel data distributions. To resolve these issues, we introduce SONAR, a prompt sanitization framework that identifies and removes injected content using metrics from natural language inference. Specifically, SONAR constructs a sentence-level relational graph across the user query and external data. By using entailment and contradiction scores as edge weights, the system identifies sentences that deviate from the core task. It then employs connectivity-driven pruning to eliminate flagged injection seeds and their related neighbors while maintaining benign context. Rigorous evaluations across several models and datasets show that SONAR reduces the attack success rate to nearly zero, significantly outperforming nine established baseline defenses.

In a controllable text generation dataset, there exist unannotated attributes that could provide irrelevant learning signals to models that use it for training and thus degrade their performance. We propose focused prefix tuning(FPT) to mitigate the problem and to enable the control to focus on the desired attribute. Experimental results show that FPT can achieve better control accuracy and text fluency than baseline models in single-attribute control tasks. In multi-attribute control tasks, FPT achieves comparable control accuracy with the state-of-the-art approach while keeping the flexibility to control new attributes without retraining existing models.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been widely adopted to augment large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge for knowledge-intensive tasks. However, its effectiveness is often undermined by the presence of noisy (i.e., low-quality) retrieved passages. Enhancing LLMs' robustness to such noise is critical for improving the reliability of RAG systems. Recent advances have equipped LLMs with strong reasoning and self-reflection capabilities, allowing them to identify and correct errors in their reasoning process. Inspired by this ability, we propose Passage Injection-a simple yet effective method that explicitly incorporates retrieved passages into LLMs' reasoning process, aiming to enhance the model's ability to recognize and resist noisy passages. We validate Passage Injection under general RAG settings using BM25 as the retriever. Experiments on four reasoning-enhanced LLMs across four factual QA datasets demonstrate that Passage Injection significantly improves overall RAG performance. Further analysis on two noisy retrieval settings-random noise, where the model is provided irrelevant passages, and counterfactual noise, where it is given misleading passages-shows that Passage Injection consistently improves robustness. Controlled experiments confirm that Passage Injection can also effectively leverage helpful passages. These findings suggest that incorporating passages in LLMs' reasoning process is a promising direction for building more robust RAG systems. The code can be found here{https://github.com/mh-tang/Passage-Injection}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) stalls on a model's hardest problems: when no rollout in a group succeeds, the group-relative advantages vanish and the problem contributes no gradient, wasting the frontier examples we most want to learn from. Prepending a correct prefix of a reference solution raises the success rate, making prefix length a continuous knob on difficulty. Concurrent methods set the knob once; AdaPrefix-GRPO turns it into a feedback controller: throughout training it adjusts how much of the solution each problem gets, holding its success rate near 50%, where GRPO's gradient signal is largest, then withdraws the assistance entirely, so the deployed model solves problems unaided. On hard math, at matched training FLOPs, it more than doubles GRPO's accuracy on held-out problems from the training distribution for a 0.6B model (2.1x), with 1.6x on Qwen3-1.7B and 1.7x on AIME, while roughly halving trace length. The method is implemented in data preparation plus a loss mask on prefix tokens; the trainer is otherwise stock. The smaller the model, the larger the gain.

Large language models often fail to answer questions about a bounded document collection when the source documents are not retrieved at inference time. We study this setting as document knowledge internalization: converting a fixed corpus into usable parametric knowledge for retrieval-free question answering. We propose IAR (Inject, Align, and Recover), a three-stage post-training framework that separates structured document knowledge injection, QA behavior alignment, and general ability recovery. Unlike conventional continued pretraining, Inject converts source documents into continuation, rewrite, and instruction-conditioned reconstruction objectives. Align then adapts the injected model with answer-only QA supervision, while Recover merges the domain-adapted model with the base instruction model to recover general capabilities. Across Common Corpus (CC) and CCI, and across Llama, Phi, Qwen, and SmolLM model families, IAR improves the domain-primary domain-general frontier for retrieval-free document internalization. In the main comparison, IAR improves over Vanilla SFT on all four reported metrics in 7 of 8 dataset-model settings, with average gains of 3.6 percentage points in domain QA accuracy and 12.1 percentage points in mean general performance across IFEval, MMLU, and MSBench. Extended CC baselines show that LoRA and FAPM can win individual general metrics, but among methods that also reach leading or near-leading domain internalization, IAR retains one of the strongest general profiles.

Large language model (LLM) assistants are increasingly integrated into enterprise workflows, raising new security concerns as they bridge internal and external data sources. This paper presents an in-depth case study of EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711), a zero-click prompt injection vulnerability in Microsoft 365 Copilot that enabled remote, unauthenticated data exfiltration via a single crafted email. By chaining multiple bypasses-evading Microsofts XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy-EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction. We analyze why existing defenses failed, and outline a set of engineering mitigations including prompt partitioning, enhanced input/output filtering, provenance-based access control, and strict content security policies. Beyond the specific exploit, we derive generalizable lessons for building secure AI copilots, emphasizing the principle of least privilege, defense-in-depth architectures, and continuous adversarial testing. Our findings establish prompt injection as a practical, high-severity vulnerability class in production AI systems and provide a blueprint for defending against future AI-native threats.

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose AgentWatcher to address the above two limitations. To address the first limitation, AgentWatcher attributes the LLM's output (e.g., the action of an agent) to a small set of causally influential context segments. By focusing detection on a relatively short text, AgentWatcher can be scalable to long contexts. To address the second limitation, we define a set of rules specifying what does and does not constitute a prompt injection, and use a monitor LLM to reason over these rules based on the attributed text, making the detection decisions more explainable. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on tool-use agent benchmarks and long-context understanding datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that AgentWatcher can effectively detect prompt injection and maintain utility without attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/wang-yanting/AgentWatcher.

We propose controlled decoding (CD), a novel off-policy reinforcement learning method to control the autoregressive generation from language models towards high reward outcomes. CD solves an off-policy reinforcement learning problem through a value function for the reward, which we call a prefix scorer. The prefix scorer is used at inference time to steer the generation towards higher reward outcomes. We show that the prefix scorer may be trained on (possibly) off-policy data to predict the expected reward when decoding is continued from a partially decoded response. We empirically demonstrate that CD is effective as a control mechanism on Reddit conversations corpus. We also show that the modularity of the design of CD makes it possible to control for multiple rewards, effectively solving a multi-objective reinforcement learning problem with no additional complexity. Finally, we show that CD can be applied in a novel blockwise fashion at inference-time, again without the need for any training-time changes, essentially bridging the gap between the popular best-of-K strategy and token-level reinforcement learning. This makes CD a promising approach for alignment of language models.

Multi-modal large language model (MLLM)-based web agents interact with webpage environments by generating actions based on screenshots of the webpages. In this work, we propose WebInject, a prompt injection attack that manipulates the webpage environment to induce a web agent to perform an attacker-specified action. Our attack adds a perturbation to the raw pixel values of the rendered webpage. After these perturbed pixels are mapped into a screenshot, the perturbation induces the web agent to perform the attacker-specified action. We formulate the task of finding the perturbation as an optimization problem. A key challenge in solving this problem is that the mapping between raw pixel values and screenshot is non-differentiable, making it difficult to backpropagate gradients to the perturbation. To overcome this, we train a neural network to approximate the mapping and apply projected gradient descent to solve the reformulated optimization problem. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets shows that WebInject is highly effective and significantly outperforms baselines.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Multi-agent LLM systems are entering production -- processing documents, managing workflows, acting on behalf of users -- yet their resilience to prompt injection is still evaluated with a single binary: did the attack succeed? This leaves architects without the diagnostic information needed to harden real pipelines. We introduce a kill-chain canary methodology that tracks a cryptographic token through four stages (EXPOSED -> PERSISTED -> RELAYED -> EXECUTED) across 950 runs, five frontier LLMs, six attack surfaces, and five defense conditions. The results reframe prompt injection as a pipeline-architecture problem: every model is fully exposed, yet outcomes diverge downstream -- Claude blocks all injections at memory-write (0/164 ASR), GPT-4o-mini propagates at 53%, and DeepSeek exhibits 0%/100% across surfaces from the same model. Three findings matter for deployment: (1) write-node placement is the highest-leverage safety decision -- routing writes through a verified model eliminates propagation; (2) all four defenses fail on at least one surface due to channel mismatch alone, no adversarial adaptation required; (3) invisible whitefont PDF payloads match or exceed visible-text ASR, meaning rendered-layer screening is insufficient. These dynamics apply directly to production: institutional investors and financial firms already run NLP pipelines over earnings calls, SEC filings, and analyst reports -- the document-ingestion workflows now migrating to LLM agents. Code, run logs, and tooling are publicly released.

Large Language Models generate text autoregressively, but open-ended generation is prone to verbatim looping, in which models repeat spans already present in context. Standard defenses such as repetition, presence, and frequency penalties and n-gram blocking act on token recurrence rather than the sequential structure of a loop, and often suppress looping only at strengths that also degrade formatting or fluency. We propose Don't Repeat Yourself (DRY), a sampling-time logit adjustment that penalizes a candidate token only when generating it would extend the current suffix into an exact continuation of a span seen earlier in the context. Sequence breakers protect chat templates and formatting tokens. Across models from 1.5B to 120B parameters, nine prompt families, and a 600-pair human study, DRY reduces suffix-extension rate by 47% while improving lexical diversity. An intervention-matched placebo produces no comparable reduction, identifying suffix matching as the operative mechanism. On AWQ-quantized 70B and 120B models, DRY reduces loop rate by roughly half while preserving MT-Bench, MMLU, and GSM8K performance, whereas standard alternatives lose measurable ground. DRY has been adopted by popular open-source LLM inference frameworks including llama.cpp, ExLlamaV2, and text-generation-webui, highlighting its practical impact on text generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been widely adopted in commercial code completion engines, significantly enhancing coding efficiency and productivity. However, LLMs may generate code with quality issues that violate coding standards and best practices, such as poor code style and maintainability, even when the code is functionally correct. This necessitates additional effort from developers to improve the code, potentially negating the efficiency gains provided by LLMs. To address this problem, we propose a novel comparative prefix-tuning method for controllable high-quality code generation. Our method introduces a single, property-specific prefix that is prepended to the activations of the LLM, serving as a lightweight alternative to fine-tuning. Unlike existing methods that require training multiple prefixes, our approach trains only one prefix and leverages pairs of high-quality and low-quality code samples, introducing a sequence-level ranking loss to guide the model's training. This comparative approach enables the model to better understand the differences between high-quality and low-quality code, focusing on aspects that impact code quality. Additionally, we design a data construction pipeline to collect and annotate pairs of high-quality and low-quality code, facilitating effective training. Extensive experiments on the Code Llama 7B model demonstrate that our method improves code quality by over 100% in certain task categories, while maintaining functional correctness. We also conduct ablation studies and generalization experiments, confirming the effectiveness of our method's components and its strong generalization capability.

Language Reasoning Models (LRMs) achieve strong performance by scaling test-time computation but often suffer from ``overthinking'', producing excessively long reasoning traces that increase latency and memory usage. Existing LRMs typically enforce conciseness with uniform length penalties, which over-compress crucial early deduction steps at the sequence level and indiscriminately penalize all queries at the group level. To solve these limitations, we propose \model, a dual-level framework for prefix-protected and difficulty-aware compression under hierarchical supervision. At the sequence level, prefix-protected optimization employs decaying mixed rollouts to maintain valid reasoning paths while promoting conciseness. At the group level, difficulty-aware penalty dynamically scales length constraints based on query complexity, maintaining exploration for harder questions while curbing redundancy on easier ones. Extensive experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen (1.5B/7B) demonstrate that \model achieves a substantial reduction in token usage (up to 55.7\%) while simultaneously improving accuracy (up to 4.1\%) on math benchmarks, with generalization ability to code, science, and general domains.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Language generation models have been an increasingly powerful enabler for many applications. Many such models offer free or affordable API access, which makes them potentially vulnerable to model extraction attacks through distillation. To protect intellectual property (IP) and ensure fair use of these models, various techniques such as lexical watermarking and synonym replacement have been proposed. However, these methods can be nullified by obvious countermeasures such as "synonym randomization". To address this issue, we propose GINSEW, a novel method to protect text generation models from being stolen through distillation. The key idea of our method is to inject secret signals into the probability vector of the decoding steps for each target token. We can then detect the secret message by probing a suspect model to tell if it is distilled from the protected one. Experimental results show that GINSEW can effectively identify instances of IP infringement with minimal impact on the generation quality of protected APIs. Our method demonstrates an absolute improvement of 19 to 29 points on mean average precision (mAP) in detecting suspects compared to previous methods against watermark removal attacks.

The integration of Rotary Position Embedding (RoPE) in Multimodal Diffusion Transformer (MMDiT) has significantly enhanced text-to-image generation quality. However, the fundamental reliance of self-attention layers on positional embedding versus query-key similarity during generation remains an intriguing question. We present the first mechanistic analysis of RoPE-based MMDiT models (e.g., FLUX), introducing an automated probing strategy that disentangles positional information versus content dependencies by strategically manipulating RoPE during generation. Our analysis reveals distinct dependency patterns that do not straightforwardly correlate with depth, offering new insights into the layer-specific roles in RoPE-based MMDiT. Based on these findings, we propose a training-free, task-specific image editing framework that categorizes editing tasks into three types: position-dependent editing (e.g., object addition), content similarity-dependent editing (e.g., non-rigid editing), and region-preserved editing (e.g., background replacement). For each type, we design tailored key-value injection strategies based on the characteristics of the editing task. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, particularly in preserving original semantic content and achieving seamless modifications.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantly rely on textual prompts or perceptible visual prompts that are observable by human users. In this work, we study imperceptible visual prompt injection against powerful closed-source MLLMs, where adversarial instructions are embedded in the visual modality. Our method adaptively embeds the malicious prompt into the input image via a bounded text overlay to provide semantic guidance. Meanwhile, the imperceptible visual perturbation is iteratively optimized to align the feature representation of the attacked image with those of the malicious visual and textual targets at both coarse- and fine-grained levels. Specifically, the visual target is instantiated as a text-rendered image and progressively refined during optimization to more faithfully represent the desired semantics and improve transferability. Extensive experiments on two multimodal understanding tasks across multiple closed-source MLLMs demonstrate the superior performance of our approach compared to existing methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

Large language models are increasingly used for text classification tasks such as sentiment analysis, yet their reliance on natural language prompts exposes them to prompt injection attacks. In particular, class-directive injections exploit knowledge of the model's label set (e.g., positive vs. negative) to override its intended behavior through adversarial instructions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based filters, instruction hierarchies, and signed prompts, either require model retraining or remain vulnerable to obfuscation. This paper introduces Label Disguise Defense (LDD), a lightweight and model-agnostic strategy that conceals true labels by replacing them with semantically transformed or unrelated alias labels(e.g., blue vs. yellow). The model learns these new label mappings implicitly through few-shot demonstrations, preventing direct correspondence between injected directives and decision outputs. We evaluate LDD across nine state-of-the-art models, including GPT-5, GPT-4o, LLaMA3.2, Gemma3, and Mistral variants, under varying few-shot and an adversarial setting. Our results show that the ability of LDD to recover performance lost to the adversarial attack varies across models and alias choices. For every model evaluated, LDD is able to restore a portion of the accuracy degradation caused by the attack. Moreover, for the vast majority of models, we can identify more than one alias pair that achieves higher accuracy than the under-attack baseline, in which the model relies solely on few-shot learning without any defensive mechanism. A linguistic analysis further reveals that semantically aligned alias labels(e.g., good vs. bad) yield stronger robustness than unaligned symbols(e.g., blue vs. yellow). Overall, this study demonstrates that label semantics can serve as an effective defense layer, transforming meaning itself into a shield against prompt injection.

Agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) interleaves retrieval, reasoning, and answer generation across multiple hops. A retrieval error at hop 1 can surface only as a wrong answer at hop 3, while later retrieval can also repair the trajectory. This paper introduces AgenticRAG-FP, an interventional benchmark for causal failure attribution in agentic RAG. The benchmark injects a certified fault at a specified hop, re-executes the downstream trajectory, and evaluates diagnosers against the known intervention. Its central question is whether a post-hoc trace still identifies the injected hop after the suffix changes. In the completed strict dense Claude Haiku 4.5 sweep on 80 three-hop MuSiQue questions, coverage-based diagnosis is 0.91 at hop 1 and 0.00 at hops 2 and 3 (n=43,36,21 failed trajectories). A smaller content-corruption study changes an answer-bearing or bridge fact in topically intact evidence. At depth 2, where 18 failed cases remain after filtering, coverage-based diagnosis is 0.00 and a frozen-hop counterfactual probe is 0.67 in an exploratory pooled comparison. Depth-3 content estimates are descriptive only because they contain three failed cases. These results make propagation depth an explicit evaluation axis for diagnosing agentic RAG failures while distinguishing broad evidence of post-hoc signal loss from small-sample method comparisons.

As AI agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly versatile and capable of addressing a broad spectrum of tasks, ensuring their security has become a critical challenge. Among the most pressing threats are prompt injection attacks, which exploit the agent's resilience on natural language inputs -- an especially dangerous threat when agents are granted tool access or handle sensitive information. In this work, we propose a set of principled design patterns for building AI agents with provable resistance to prompt injection. We systematically analyze these patterns, discuss their trade-offs in terms of utility and security, and illustrate their real-world applicability through a series of case studies.

Text injection for automatic speech recognition (ASR), wherein unpaired text-only data is used to supplement paired audio-text data, has shown promising improvements for word error rate. This study examines the use of text injection for auxiliary tasks, which are the non-ASR tasks often performed by an E2E model. In this work, we use joint end-to-end and internal language model training (JEIT) as our text injection algorithm to train an ASR model which performs two auxiliary tasks. The first is capitalization, which is a de-normalization task. The second is turn-taking prediction, which attempts to identify whether a user has completed their conversation turn in a digital assistant interaction. We show results demonstrating that our text injection method boosts capitalization performance for long-tail data, and improves turn-taking detection recall.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Agentic systems driven by large language models (LLMs) regularly feature two key mechanisms to autonomously solve complex problems: synthesizing text-based knowledge and procedures from past experiences and building parametric (weight-space) skill libraries for recurring sub-goals. To date, research has largely treated these as orthogonal pursuits: either organizing textual knowledge through composition and reflection, or consolidating parametric skills via weight-space merging. Consequently, the seamless integration of text and model weights for targeted performance improvements remains largely unexplored. This work bridges this modality gap by treating model weights as an additional modality that an LLM can natively reason over. We instantiate parametric learning via prefix-tuning and augment an LLM to ingest both prefix weights and rich textual data which capture relationships to a target capability. Our augmented LLM, which we call SkillSmith, synthesizes these inputs to perform instruction-steered parametric synthesis, directly outputting new prefix weights that manifest the target skill. We demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms both text-only and weight-space-only baselines, unlocking performance gains that are out of reach for uni-modal (text-only or weight-only) adaptations.

Prompt injection attacks pose serious security risks across a wide range of real-world applications. While receiving increasing attention, the community faces a critical gap: the lack of a unified platform for prompt injection evaluation. This makes it challenging to reliably compare defenses, understand their true robustness under diverse attacks, or assess how well they generalize across tasks and benchmarks. For instance, many defenses initially reported as effective were later found to exhibit limited robustness on diverse datasets and attacks. To bridge this gap, we introduce PIArena, a unified and extensible platform for prompt injection evaluation that enables users to easily integrate state-of-the-art attacks and defenses and evaluate them across a variety of existing and new benchmarks. We also design a dynamic strategy-based attack that adaptively optimizes injected prompts based on defense feedback. Through comprehensive evaluation using PIArena, we uncover critical limitations of state-of-the-art defenses: limited generalizability across tasks, vulnerability to adaptive attacks, and fundamental challenges when an injected task aligns with the target task. The code and datasets are available at https://github.com/sleeepeer/PIArena.

Large Language Models (LLMs), while powerful, are built and trained to process a single text input. In common applications, multiple inputs can be processed by concatenating them together into a single stream of text. However, the LLM is unable to distinguish which sections of prompt belong to various input sources. Indirect prompt injection attacks take advantage of this vulnerability by embedding adversarial instructions into untrusted data being processed alongside user commands. Often, the LLM will mistake the adversarial instructions as user commands to be followed, creating a security vulnerability in the larger system. We introduce spotlighting, a family of prompt engineering techniques that can be used to improve LLMs' ability to distinguish among multiple sources of input. The key insight is to utilize transformations of an input to provide a reliable and continuous signal of its provenance. We evaluate spotlighting as a defense against indirect prompt injection attacks, and find that it is a robust defense that has minimal detrimental impact to underlying NLP tasks. Using GPT-family models, we find that spotlighting reduces the attack success rate from greater than {50}\% to below {2}\% in our experiments with minimal impact on task efficacy.

Large language model (LLM) agents integrated with external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injections embedded in environmental states. However, existing studies largely rely on manually implemented or reused environments, stochastic LLM-based tool simulation, and predefined injection locations, limiting scalable security research across broader domains. To bridge this gap, we propose **ToolHazard**, a scalable adversarial environment synthesis framework that reduces human engineering and supports expansion with additional seed domains and compute. Through an Environment Simulator, an Attacker Agent, and a User Simulator, ToolHazard synthesizes executable stateful environments, discovers viable injection points and generates environment-specific payloads, and constructs state-grounded long-horizon tasks. Based on ToolHazard, we build **ToolHazard-Bench** for stress-testing agents under complex workflows and diverse environmental attacks. Experiments reveal substantial agent vulnerabilities and show that injection timing and placement affect attack effectiveness. Moreover, ToolHazard-generated alignment data improves security on both ToolHazard-Bench and AgentDojo while preserving benign task utility.