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Nov 4

When Privacy Moves ML-Mediated Decisions On Device: Information and Incentive Misalignment in Auctions

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 26 2

Computational Foundations for Strategic Coopetition: Formalizing Interdependence and Complementarity

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 21, 2025

What Can a Leaderboard Certify? Compositional Controllability for Fair Evaluation and Training of Biomedical Literature-Review Agents

Leaderboards rank long-horizon agents by their final outputs. Yet a higher score alone does not establish whether two systems are comparable or which stage accounts for the difference. Unequal evidence, inputs, or budgets can affect scores, and statistical corrections do not remove this mismatch. We introduce compositional controllability to address these questions. A comparison window covers one stage, several stages, or the whole agent. Our central result bounds the gap between observed and controlled score differences using only nuisance outside the window. This yields an admissibility test applied before scores are inspected. Inadmissible comparisons are refused. For admissible pairs, an ordering is certified only when the score gap exceeds the combined sampling and nuisance radii; otherwise, it remains undecided. These decisions give each system a rank interval. We introduce BioLitBench, a benchmark of 2,042 biomedical articles represented as structured claim graphs. Among seven published pipelines, a conventional statistical analysis declares a winner in 14 of 21 pairwise comparisons. Yet the top-ranked system alone received the target review's bibliography. To isolate pipeline performance, our test requires matched inputs and a fixed backbone model. It refuses 11 of the 21 comparisons, including every comparison involving the top-ranked system. Seven of the 14 conventional conclusions fall within these refused pairs. The same comparison windows support stage-level training. We train SCRIBE on Qwen3.8-27B using rewards measured at each stage's exit. Under matched evidence, SCRIBE achieves a certified rank interval of [1,2], with certified advantages over all evaluated published pipelines and the evaluated Claude and OpenAI agents. Under same pool, SCRIBE matches the strongest published retriever and is certified above three published pipelines.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 25

Agent-ValueBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Evaluating Agent Values

Autonomous agents have rapidly matured as task executors and seen widespread deployment via harnesses such as OpenClaw. Safety concerns have rightly drawn growing research attention, and beneath them lie the values silently steering agent behavior. Existing value benchmarks, however, remain confined to LLMs, leaving agent values largely uncharted. From intuitive, empirical, and theoretical vantage points, we show that an agent's values diverge from those of its underlying LLM, and the agentic modality further introduces dataset-, evaluation-, and system-level challenges absent from text-only protocols. We close this gap with Agent-ValueBench, the first benchmark dedicated to agent values. It features 394 executable environments across 16 domains, offering 4,335 value-conflict tasks that cover 28 value systems and 332 dimensions. Every instance is co-synthesized through our purpose-built end-to-end pipeline and curated per-instance by professional psychologists. Each task ships with two pole-aligned golden trajectories whose checkpoints anchor a trajectory-level rubric-based judge. Benchmarking 14 frontier proprietary and open-weights models across 4 mainstream harnesses, we uncover three concerted findings. Agent values first manifest as a Value Tide of cross-model homogeneity beneath interpretable counter-currents. This tide bends non-additively under harness pull, and yet more decisively under deliberate steering via embedded skills. Together these results signal that the agent-alignment lever is shifting from classical model alignment and prompt steering toward harness alignment and skill steering.