Daily Papers

A central hope behind process supervision is that models can expose intermediate variables that matter for their later behavior. For this to help with alignment, a scratchpad must be tied to the computation: when the model writes a state, later steps should compute from that state. To test this requirement, we use a controlled state-tracking task with a known update rule, comparing models trained to report only the final state with models trained to write intermediate states before giving the final answer. At evaluation, we edit the internal representation of one written state while leaving the visible scratchpad text fixed. Because the transition rule is known, the edit has a single correct downstream consequence. In Qwen2.5-Coder-7B, the state-writing model predicts the next phase bit implied by the edited state on 80% and 91% of held-out examples across the two task variants, while pretrained and final-answer-only controls remain near baseline. Additional controls rule out generic next-token steering and copying another continuation: the prediction depends on both the edited state and the current move. The same causal-use pattern replicates across model families. Together, these results suggest a sharper goal for scratchpad oversight: not just to make intermediate reasoning legible, but to train written states that the model uses as part of its computation.

As LLM agents tackle increasingly complex tasks, a critical question is whether they can maintain strategic coherence over long horizons: planning under uncertainty, learning from delayed feedback, and adapting when early mistakes compound. We introduce YC-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates these capabilities by tasking an agent with running a simulated startup over a one-year horizon spanning hundreds of turns. The agent must manage employees, select task contracts, and maintain profitability in a partially observable environment where adversarial clients and growing payroll create compounding consequences for poor decisions. We evaluate 12 models, both proprietary and open source, across 3 seeds each. Only three models consistently surpass the starting capital of \200K, with Claude Opus 4.6 achieving the highest average final funds at 1.27 M, followed by GLM-5 at \1.21 M at 11\times lower inference cost. Scratchpad usage, the sole mechanism for persisting information across context truncation, is the strongest predictor of success, and adversarial client detection is the primary failure mode, accounting for 47\% of bankruptcies. Our analysis reveals that frontier models still fail through distinct failure modes such as over-parallelization, demonstrating the capability gaps for long-horizon performance. YC-Bench$ is open-source, reproducible, and configurable.

Tokenizer-free language models eliminate the tokenizer step of the language modeling pipeline by operating directly on bytes; patch-based variants further aggregate contiguous byte spans into patches for efficiency. However, the average patch size chosen at the model design stage governs a tight trade-off: larger patches reduce compute and KV-cache footprint, but degrade modeling quality. We trace this trade-off to patch lag: until a patch is fully observed, byte predictions within it must rely on a stale representation from the previous patch to preserve causality; this lag widens as patches grow larger. We introduce Scratchpad Patching (SP), which inserts transient scratchpads inside each patch to aggregate the bytes seen so far and refresh patch-level context for subsequent predictions. SP triggers scratchpads using next-byte prediction entropy, selectively allocating compute to information-dense regions and enabling post-hoc adjustment of inference-time compute. Across experiments on natural language and code, SP improves model quality at the same patch size; for example, even at 16 bytes per patch, SP-augmented models match or closely approach the byte-level baseline on downstream evaluations while using a 16times smaller KV cache over patches and 3-4times less inference compute.

We introduce the Scratchpad Mechanism, a novel addition to the sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) neural network architecture and demonstrate its effectiveness in improving the overall fluency of seq2seq models for natural language generation tasks. By enabling the decoder at each time step to write to all of the encoder output layers, Scratchpad can employ the encoder as a "scratchpad" memory to keep track of what has been generated so far and thereby guide future generation. We evaluate Scratchpad in the context of three well-studied natural language generation tasks --- Machine Translation, Question Generation, and Text Summarization --- and obtain state-of-the-art or comparable performance on standard datasets for each task. Qualitative assessments in the form of human judgements (question generation), attention visualization (MT), and sample output (summarization) provide further evidence of the ability of Scratchpad to generate fluent and expressive output.

Large language models are sometimes trained with imperfect oversight signals, leading to undesired behaviors such as reward hacking and sycophancy. Improving oversight quality can be expensive or infeasible, motivating methods that improve learned behavior despite an imperfect training signal. We introduce Inoculation Prompting (IP), a simple but counterintuitive technique that prevents learning of an undesired behavior by modifying training prompts to explicitly request it. For example, to inoculate against reward hacking, we modify the prompts used in supervised fine-tuning to request code that only works on provided test cases but fails on other inputs. Across four settings we find that IP reduces the learning of undesired behavior without substantially reducing the learning of desired capabilities. We also show that prompts which more strongly elicit the undesired behavior prior to fine-tuning more effectively inoculate against the behavior when used during training; this serves as a heuristic to identify promising inoculation prompts. Overall, IP is a simple yet effective way to control how models generalize from fine-tuning, preventing learning of undesired behaviors without substantially disrupting desired capabilities.

Assessing student handwritten scratchwork is crucial for personalized educational feedback but presents unique challenges due to diverse handwriting, complex layouts, and varied problem-solving approaches. Existing educational NLP primarily focuses on textual responses and neglects the complexity and multimodality inherent in authentic handwritten scratchwork. Current multimodal large language models (MLLMs) excel at visual reasoning but typically adopt an "examinee perspective", prioritizing generating correct answers rather than diagnosing student errors. To bridge these gaps, we introduce ScratchMath, a novel benchmark specifically designed for explaining and classifying errors in authentic handwritten mathematics scratchwork. Our dataset comprises 1,720 mathematics samples from Chinese primary and middle school students, supporting two key tasks: Error Cause Explanation (ECE) and Error Cause Classification (ECC), with seven defined error types. The dataset is meticulously annotated through rigorous human-machine collaborative approaches involving multiple stages of expert labeling, review, and verification. We systematically evaluate 16 leading MLLMs on ScratchMath, revealing significant performance gaps relative to human experts, especially in visual recognition and logical reasoning. Proprietary models notably outperform open-source models, with large reasoning models showing strong potential for error explanation. All evaluation data and frameworks are publicly available to facilitate further research.

Ambient AI scribes draft clinical notes, and published audits find their dominant error is omission: information the encounter established that the note fails to record. The standard check is an LLM judge: a second model reads the note against the transcript and flags problems. We ask whether judges detect omissions. Public corpora cannot supply the answer key: their clinician reference notes and transcripts are materially discrepant. Our benchmark has 500 single-error note pairs from audited fact sheets, 298 with a named fact certainly absent and 202 added-or-altered controls. Across eight judge designs, paired discrimination (the flawed note below its clean twin, 0.5 a coin flip) reads 0.79-0.94 on added or altered content and 0.50-0.63 on omissions. On single notes, no design flags omissions reliably more often than perfect notes. Wording changes, voting and GEPA prompt optimisation move the operating point without creating usable detection. Restructuring the task recovers it: list the facts the transcript establishes, then check the note for each. Two methods reach it independently and trade off: a per-fact pipeline, and a GEPA-evolved prompt doing the same in one call. The pipeline's flags name the missing fact and its severity at 2.7% false alarms. The single call detects more (36.9% against 24.6%, p=0.002) at 6.2% false alarms and a tenth of the cost per note. A physician author validated 70 items and, where the two routes disagree, sided with the pipeline on 10 of 10 (p=0.002). A second clinician, not an author, graded the severity rubric blind and agrees to within a grade. On real vendor notes from a companion census no benchmark threshold transfers, but the re-calibrated single call detects more than the best of the eight at half its false-alarm rate. Omissions whose fact is restated elsewhere defeat both routes. We release the benchmark, prompts and judgements.

Large pre-trained language models perform remarkably well on tasks that can be done "in one pass", such as generating realistic text or synthesizing computer programs. However, they struggle with tasks that require unbounded multi-step computation, such as adding integers or executing programs. Surprisingly, we find that these same models are able to perform complex multi-step computations -- even in the few-shot regime -- when asked to perform the operation "step by step", showing the results of intermediate computations. In particular, we train transformers to perform multi-step computations by asking them to emit intermediate computation steps into a "scratchpad". On a series of increasingly complex tasks ranging from long addition to the execution of arbitrary programs, we show that scratchpads dramatically improve the ability of language models to perform multi-step computations.

Interactive LLM agents are becoming part of daily work, but they do not reliably become easier to work with over time: a correction remembered in one session may still be violated in the next. We study this gap between preference access and preference compliance. In tasks derived from anonymized real-user friction cases, Mem0 memory still leaves 57.5% of applicable preference checks violated. We introduce Test-time Rule Acquisition and Compiled Enforcement (TRACE), a drop-in skill-layer pipeline for coding-agent runtimes that mines user corrections, rewrites them as atomic rules, and compiles them into runtime checks that must pass before an agent completes future tasks. Unlike runtime checks written ahead of time by developers, TRACE skills come from the user's own chat corrections. We evaluate TRACE with simulated user-in-the-loop experiments on ClawArena coding-agent tasks and MemoryArena-derived memory-intensive tasks. On ClawArena, TRACE reduces held-out preference violation from 100.0% to 37.6% on in-distribution tasks and from 100.0% to 2.0% on out-of-distribution tasks. On MemoryArena-derived tasks, TRACE reduces in-distribution violation from 100.0% to 60.5% while matching or exceeding the strongest memory baseline on task pass. These results suggest that compiling corrections into runtime enforcement can address a repeated-friction failure mode that memory alone does not reliably solve, reducing the need for users to restate the same correction across future sessions. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/TRACE_exp, and the deployable skill is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/tellonce.

As models grow more capable, human supervision breaks down: labels don't scale, outputs can be gamed, and training doesn't generalize. Scalable oversight requires steering methods that are internal, self-supervised, and transfer out-of-distribution; existing methods satisfy some but not all three. We introduce AntiPaSTO, which separates representations along an anti-parallel axis (α=pm1 produce opposite shifts), with coherence constraints preventing collapse. Human input is minimal: two contrasting words inserted into template sentences, no preference labels. Using 800 such pairs on Gemma-3-1B, AntiPaSTO beats prompting baselines by 6.9times on DailyDilemmas and maintains bidirectional control where prompting triggers refusal. Code is available at https://github.com/wassname/AntiPaSTO.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in complex and long horizon settings, it is critical to evaluate their ability to sabotage users by pursuing hidden objectives. We study the ability of frontier LLMs to evade monitoring and achieve harmful hidden goals while completing a wide array of realistic tasks. We evaluate a broad range of frontier LLMs using SHADE (Subtle Harmful Agent Detection & Evaluation)-Arena, the first highly diverse agent evaluation dataset for sabotage and monitoring capabilities of LLM agents. SHADE-Arena consists of complex pairs of benign main tasks and harmful side objectives in complicated environments. Agents are evaluated on their ability to complete the side task without appearing suspicious to an LLM monitor. When measuring agent ability to (a) complete the main task, (b) complete the side task, and (c) avoid detection, we find that the best performing frontier models score 27% (Claude 3.7 Sonnet) and 15% (Gemini 2.5 Pro) as sabotage agents when overseen by Claude 3.6 Sonnet. For current frontier models, success on the side task relies heavily on having access to a hidden scratchpad that is not visible to the monitor. We also use SHADE-Arena to measure models' monitoring abilities, with the top monitor (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieving an AUC of 0.87 at distinguishing benign and malign transcripts. We find that for now, models still struggle at sabotage due to failures in long-context main task execution. However, our measurements already demonstrate the difficulty of monitoring for subtle sabotage attempts, which we expect to only increase in the face of more complex and longer-horizon tasks.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is increasingly treated as an important safety layer for frontier reasoning models. Most monitorability evaluations study explicit-influence settings: setups where the prompt directly incentivizes the model to hide something, e.g., by instructing it to perform a hidden side-task. A complementary axis for CoT-monitor evaluations is implicit-influence settings, where the prompt contains no instruction to hide, but the model's behavior is still shaped by features of the task or context, e.g. an irrelevant detail about a candidate that biases a hiring rating. We introduce the first benchmark that directly compares CoT monitorability under the two regimes. We test how model behavior changes in the presence of a nudge to choose a particular option. The nudge is delivered either as a casual aside (implicit), or as a direct instruction to act on the nudge and to conceal having done so (explicit). The benchmark spans four task formats (binary choice, numeric rating, multiple-choice QA, open-ended coding) and seven frontier extended-thinking models. Under explicit influence, a CoT monitor detects 60-94% of behavior shifts: even models instructed to conceal it leak the instruction into their CoT. Under implicit influence, the same factors still shift behavior, but detection falls by 41-46 percentage points in two of our four settings. Realistic system-prompt additions (of the kind a developer might deploy to reduce off-topic bias) lower implicit detection further, to as low as 5%, while preserving the behavioral influence itself. These results suggest that monitorability estimates obtained in explicit-influence settings may over-estimate monitorability, and that monitorability can be further decreased by well-intentioned deployment choices. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/agatha-duzan/implicit-vs-explicit-influence

The dark patterns, deceptive interface designs manipulating user behaviors, have been extensively studied for their effects on human decision-making and autonomy. Yet, with the rising prominence of LLM-powered GUI agents that automate tasks from high-level intents, understanding how dark patterns affect agents is increasingly important. We present a two-phase empirical study examining how agents, human participants, and human-AI teams respond to 16 types of dark patterns across diverse scenarios. Phase 1 highlights that agents often fail to recognize dark patterns, and even when aware, prioritize task completion over protective action. Phase 2 revealed divergent failure modes: humans succumb due to cognitive shortcuts and habitual compliance, while agents falter from procedural blind spots. Human oversight improved avoidance but introduced costs such as attentional tunneling and cognitive load. Our findings show neither humans nor agents are uniformly resilient, and collaboration introduces new vulnerabilities, suggesting design needs for transparency, adjustable autonomy, and oversight.

Human supervisors rely on coding agents' reports to assess progress, verify repairs, and decide when to intervene. But a supervisor cannot investigate a failure they were never told occurred. Failed attempts, workarounds, and unresolved risks may disappear from routine reports, leaving supervisors unaware of issues that warrant scrutiny. We conduct CTXGAP, a measurement study quantifying the gap in task-state recoverability between agents' accumulated user-facing reports and their full recorded execution contexts. Across 37 coding tasks and 4,799 valid probes, agents answer 93.6% of task-state questions on demand; full-context readers recover 92.7%, while report-only readers recover 52.0%, a 40.7-point gap. At the final checkpoints of 30 verified fixes, the gap remains 34.8 points. Human annotation identifies states mentioned without enough supporting detail as the largest category of unrecovered information, and model-assessed supervision-relevant states retain substantial gaps. Full terminal scrollback improves recovery to 73.6% but still trails full context. Under matched report lengths, context-informed rewrites improve recovery by about eight points, without a detectable targeted-over-natural advantage. Positive gaps persist across harnesses and independent DeepSeek execution and measurement. CTXGAP establishes report-based task-state recoverability as a complementary evaluation dimension.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Coding agents increasingly interact with users by generating interactive software on the fly rather than replying in text, yet many bugs in such software reveal themselves only after multi-step interactions. Today, users must discover these bugs and wait for fixes, making the development loop slow and expensive. Existing benchmarks typically assume the bugs have already been identified, leaving agents' ability to find interaction-dependent failures largely unevaluated. We introduce SWEeper-Bench, 200 tasks built from real bug fixes in 200 widely used open-source web applications. Each task gives the agent only the codebase and an open-ended request such as "Find and fix issues in Focalboard's board sharing and membership." Because these bugs are hard to detect from code alone, agents must design interactive tests to uncover them. An agentic verifier then judges each repair by what a user would observe in the browser. The best of 15 frontier agents passes only 59.0% of tasks. Through stage-by-stage analysis of agent trajectories, we show that the biggest bottleneck is identifying the buggy behavior: agents often reach the relevant feature but never trigger the failure or fail to recognize it. SWEeper-Bench measures progress toward agents that close this loop themselves, delivering software that works without waiting for user feedback.

Terminal agents are increasingly capable of executing complex, long-horizon tasks autonomously from a single user prompt. To do so, they must interpret instructions encountered in the environment (e.g., README files, code comments, stack traces) and determine their relevance to the task. This creates a fundamental challenge: relevant cues must be followed to complete a task, whereas irrelevant or misleading ones must be ignored. Existing benchmarks do not capture this ability. An agent may appear capable by blindly following all instructions, or appear robust by ignoring them altogether. We introduce TAB (Task Alignment Benchmark), a suite of 89 terminal tasks derived from Terminal-Bench 2.1. Each task is intentionally underspecified, with missing information provided as a necessary cue embedded in a natural environmental artifact, alongside a plausible but irrelevant distractor. Solving these tasks requires selectively using the cue while ignoring the distractor. Applying TAB to ten frontier agents reveals a systematic gap between task capability and task alignment. The strongest Terminal-Bench agent achieves high task completion but low task alignment on TAB. Evaluating six prompt-injection defenses further shows that suppressing distractor execution also suppresses the cues required for task completion. These results demonstrate that task-aligned agents require selective use of environmental instructions rather than blanket acceptance or rejection.

Coding agents can fix a failing example without preserving the domain rule that made it fail, so later generations can repeat the same plausible mistake. We present agentic synthesis against counterexample-supplemented sketches, a repository-native method for systems whose governing policy is discovered during implementation. A human starts with a partial, code-shaped sketch, and a coding agent generates the first implementation. When a concrete failure exposes missing or mistaken policy, an operator explicitly approves the corrected behavior and rule. The agent then revises the sketch and repairs or regenerates code and prompt surfaces for that one counterexample. The full archive preserves provenance; a selected regression set gates each revision before the next candidate is revealed; and periodic clean regeneration tests whether the evolved sketch, rather than prompt history or accumulated examples, carries the learned policy. We demonstrate the method with CatSynth, a synthetic browser application and captured coding-agent experiment. In one open-world run with GPT-5.4-mini, 8 of 14 frozen candidate cases became counterexamples. The rebuild controls inherited that promotion schedule, and all three paths passed the 8 accepted cases. Rebuilding from the evolved sketch passed 19 of 21 withheld cases, compared with 15 of 21 when rebuilding from the initial sketch and replaying all accepted examples. Retaining code across counterexamples required 9 Developer calls and 719 lines of cumulative artifact churn, versus 15 calls and 2,394 lines for replay-all, and passed 18 of 21 withheld cases. These results provide inspectable evidence that the evolved sketch carried reviewed policy and that retaining code reduced rework in this run; with one model and one reveal order, they do not establish general superiority or correctness beyond the encoded checks.

LLM agents often rely on Skills to describe available tools and recommended procedures. We study a hidden-comment prompt injection risk in this documentation layer: when a Markdown Skill is rendered to HTML, HTML comment blocks can become invisible to human reviewers, yet the raw text may still be supplied verbatim to the model. In experiments, we find that DeepSeek-V3.2 and GLM-4.5-Air can be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in a hidden comment appended to an otherwise legitimate Skill, yielding outputs that contain sensitive tool intentions. A short defensive system prompt that treats Skills as untrusted and forbids sensitive actions prevents these malicious tool calls and instead surfaces the suspicious hidden instructions.

Skill-distillation pipelines learn reusable rules from LLM agent trajectories, but they lack a key signal: how much each step costs. Without per-step cost, a pipeline cannot distinguish adding a missing step to fix a bug from removing an expensive step that never affected the outcome. We introduce ClawTrace, an agent tracing platform that records every LLM call, tool use, and sub-agent spawn during an agent session and compiles each session into a TraceCard: a compact YAML summary with per-step USD cost, token counts, and redundancy flags. Built on ClawTrace, CostCraft is a distillation pipeline that reads TraceCards and produces three types of skill patches. Preserve patches keep behaviors that led to success. Prune patches remove expensive steps that did not matter, each backed by a counterfactual argument against a named high-cost step. Repair patches fix failures grounded in oracle evidence. Ablations on 30 held-out SpreadsheetBench tasks show that both cost attribution and prune patches independently reduce quality regressions. When the same skill is applied to 30 unrelated SkillsBench tasks, an unexpected asymmetry emerges: prune rules transferred across benchmarks and cut median cost by 32%, while preserve rules, trained on benchmark-specific conventions, caused regressions on new task types. We release ClawTrace and TraceCards as open infrastructure for cost-aware agent research.

Reasoning models can remain capable of solving a task while still defaulting to cheaper but misleading shortcuts. This creates a central oversight problem: when a model gives an answer with plausible but incomplete reasoning, can an overseer determine whether that output should be trusted? To study this problem, we introduce PyINE, a framework for scalable elicitation and oversight using instrumented Python programs as a verifiable execution substrate. In PyINE, programs define task environments, execution traces provide authoritative labels for outcomes and intermediate facts, and task variants can be generated mechanically rather than through static human annotation. We instantiate the framework in PyINE-v1, a first release built from nearly one million deterministic execution traces and over 500,000 matched LLM-generated code variants used for counterfactual evaluation. Using standard RL with verifiable rewards on cue-varied tasks, we train a shortcut-following model that improves substantially at predicting execution outcomes while still making systematic errors when misleading human-facing cues conflict with the program's realized behavior. We then evaluate activation probes, trained text classifiers, prompted judges, and a lightweight debate protocol as overseers of this model. We find that performance pooled at the dataset level can hide weak coverage of the failures that matter most: cheap learned overseers often miss rare shortcut-driven errors, while stronger model-based checks are more balanced but substantially costlier and harder to turn into reliable thresholded decisions. PyINE-v1 turns this failure-mode coverage problem into a reusable experimental setting for developing oversight methods that are verifiable, failure-mode-aware, and cost-sensitive.