Daily Papers

Coding agent harnesses mediate tool use and authorize actions, yet their security mechanisms and runtime effects remain incompletely characterized. We present HarnessSecurity, the first systematic empirical study and benchmark of open- and closed-source coding agent harnesses. First, we derive a ten-mechanism taxonomy and then assess 400 harness-mechanism cells using independent ratings by researchers and large language model (LLM) judges. We find that about half of confirmed mechanism implementations are opt-in, while closed-source harnesses exhibit substantial evidence gaps. Second, we introduce HarnessSecurity-Bench, a benchmark of 23 tasks across five attack surfaces without sacrificing legitimate task requirements. Using separate deterministic oracles to measure task utility and attack effects with security setting comparisons, we evaluate nine mechanisms across six leading harnesses: Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, gptme, Qwen Code, and GitHub Copilot. Under a controlled LLM baseline GLM-5.2, we conduct 2,500 trials, recording 81,155 tool calls and over 2.2 billion tokens. Enabling auto-approve increases utility and raises attack success from 29.2% to 95.6%. Network isolation and read-only mode reduce attack effects with substantial utility losses, while command allowlisting and command denylisting reduce attack effects with a small utility loss and a utility gain, respectively. Task-level cases show that restrictions on a shared capability can obstruct both legitimate and malicious operations, and that allowed tools or commands can leave unauthorized operations reachable through alternative execution paths. Harness providers should make security settings verifiable, test alternative execution paths to protected operations, and assess attack effects alongside task utility and execution costs.

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of interest in the research community due to their potential applicability in a wide range of real-world practical applications. However, due to the distributed nature and their deployments in critical applications without human interventions and sensitivity and criticality of data communicated, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security and privacy threats that can adversely affect their performance. These issues become even more critical in cognitive wireless sensor networks (CWSNs) in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which they operate in order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the network resources. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on the security and privacy issues in CWSNs by identifying various security threats in these networks and various defense mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. Various types of attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on their natures and targets, and corresponding to each attack class, appropriate security mechanisms are also discussed. Some critical research issues on security and privacy in CWSNs are also identified.

Wireless sensor networks have emerged as an important and new area in wireless and mobile computing research because of their numerous potential applications that range from indoor deployment scenarios in home and office to outdoor deployment in adversary's territory in tactical battleground. Since in many WSN applications, lives and livelihoods may depend on the timeliness and correctness of sensor data obtained from dispersed sensor nodes, these networks must be secured to prevent any possible attacks that may be launched on them. Security is, therefore, an important issue in WSNs. However, this issue becomes even more critical in cognitive wireless sensor networks, a type of WSN in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which they operate in order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the network resources. This survey paper presents a comprehensive discussion on various security issues in CWSNs by identifying numerous security threats in these networks and defense mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. Various types of attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on their natures and tragets, and corresponding to each attack class, appropriate security mechanisms are presented. The paper also identifies some open problems in this emerging area of wireless networking.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries. In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP), a novel prompt-based defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies. Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs. Our method uses strategically designed interpretable suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques. Empirical results conducted on LLAMA-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 models demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility. Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and interpretable solution applicable to various LLM platforms.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

This study investigates the impact of face image background correction through segmentation on face recognition and morphing attack detection performance in realistic, unconstrained image capture scenarios. The motivation is driven by operational biometric systems such as the European Entry/Exit System (EES), which require facial enrolment at airports and other border crossing points where controlled backgrounds usually required for such captures cannot always be guaranteed, as well as by accessibility needs that may necessitate image capture outside traditional office environments. By analyzing how such preprocessing steps influence both recognition accuracy and security mechanisms, this work addresses a critical gap between usability-driven image normalization and the reliability requirements of large-scale biometric identification systems. Our study evaluates a comprehensive range of segmentation techniques, three families of morphing attack detection methods, and four distinct face recognition models, using databases that include both controlled and in-the-wild image captures. The results reveal consistent patterns linking segmentation to both recognition performance and face image quality. Additionally, segmentation is shown to systematically influence morphing attack detection performance. These findings highlight the need for careful consideration when deploying such preprocessing techniques in operational biometric systems.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

Large language models (LLMs) can be misused to reveal sensitive information, such as weapon-making instructions or writing malware. LLM providers rely on monitoring to detect and flag unsafe behavior during inference. An open security challenge is adaptive adversaries who craft attacks that simultaneously (i) evade detection while (ii) eliciting unsafe behavior. Adaptive attackers are a major concern as LLM providers cannot patch their security mechanisms, since they are unaware of how their models are being misused. We cast robust LLM monitoring as a security game, where adversaries who know about the monitor try to extract sensitive information, while a provider must accurately detect these adversarial queries at low false positive rates. Our work (i) shows that existing LLM monitors are vulnerable to adaptive attackers and (ii) designs improved defenses through activation watermarking by carefully introducing uncertainty for the attacker during inference. We find that activation watermarking outperforms guard baselines by up to 52% under adaptive attackers who know the monitoring algorithm but not the secret key.

As frontier AI advances rapidly, understanding its impact on cybersecurity and inherent risks is essential to ensuring safe AI evolution (e.g., guiding risk mitigation and informing policymakers). While some studies review AI applications in cybersecurity, none of them comprehensively discuss AI's future impacts or provide concrete recommendations for navigating its safe and secure usage. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of frontier AI's impact on cybersecurity and establishes a systematic framework for risk assessment and mitigation. To this end, we first define and categorize the marginal risks of frontier AI in cybersecurity and then systemically analyze the current and future impacts of frontier AI in cybersecurity, qualitatively and quantitatively. We also discuss why frontier AI likely benefits attackers more than defenders in the short term from equivalence classes, asymmetry, and economic impact. Next, we explore frontier AI's impact on future software system development, including enabling complex hybrid systems while introducing new risks. Based on our findings, we provide security recommendations, including constructing fine-grained benchmarks for risk assessment, designing AI agents for defenses, building security mechanisms and provable defenses for hybrid systems, enhancing pre-deployment security testing and transparency, and strengthening defenses for users. Finally, we present long-term research questions essential for understanding AI's future impacts and unleashing its defensive capabilities.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have recently emerged as a critical component of multimodal AI systems, enabling joint reasoning over visual and textual inputs in real-world and safety-critical applications. Despite their growing deployment, the robustness of VLMs against adversarial threats remains insufficiently explored, particularly in the context of evasion attacks targeting multimodal alignment. In this work, we investigate the vulnerability of VLMs to adversarial perturbations applied to visual inputs and study two attack settings: untargeted attacks, where the goal is to disrupt the model's interpretation of the original image, and targeted attacks, where the adversary aims to force the model to generate a specific semantic description unrelated to the original image. To efficiently generate adversarial examples, we propose a gradient-based attack method that performs optimization exclusively on the vision encoder of the VLM rather than on the entire multimodal architecture. This design significantly reduces the computational cost and resource requirements of the attack while maintaining strong effectiveness. We evaluate our approach on several open-source VLMs, including Qwen2.5-VL, Granite-Vision, FastVLM, and Phi-3.5-Vision, and show that small, human-imperceptible perturbations can substantially alter the textual interpretation produced by the models. Our findings highlight the vulnerability of modern VLMs to adversarial manipulation and emphasize the need for improved robustness and security mechanisms in multimodal AI systems.

The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is widely adopted for in-vehicle communication but lacks inherent security mechanisms, making it vulnerable to cyberattacks. This paper introduces KD-GAT, an intrusion detection framework that combines Graph Attention Networks (GATs) with knowledge distillation (KD) to enhance detection accuracy while reducing computational complexity. In our approach, CAN traffic is represented as graphs using a sliding window to capture temporal and relational patterns. A multi-layer GAT with jumping knowledge aggregation acting as the teacher model, while a compact student GAT--only 6.32% the size of the teacher--is trained via a two-phase process involving supervised pretraining and knowledge distillation with both soft and hard label supervision. Experiments on three benchmark datasets--Car-Hacking, Car-Survival, and can-train-and-test demonstrate that both teacher and student models achieve strong results, with the student model attaining 99.97% and 99.31% accuracy on Car-Hacking and Car-Survival, respectively. However, significant class imbalance in can-train-and-test has led to reduced performance for both models on this dataset. Addressing this imbalance remains an important direction for future work.

The security of a computer system depends on OS kernel protection. It is crucial to reveal and inspect new attacks on kernel data, as these are used by hackers. The purpose of this paper is to continue research into attacks on dynamically allocated data in the Windows OS kernel and demonstrate the capacity of MemoryRanger to prevent these attacks. This paper discusses three new hijacking attacks on kernel data, which are based on bypassing OS security mechanisms. The first two hijacking attacks result in illegal access to files open in exclusive access. The third attack escalates process privileges, without applying token swapping. Although Windows security experts have issued new protection features, access attempts to the dynamically allocated data in the kernel are not fully controlled. MemoryRanger hypervisor is designed to fill this security gap. The updated MemoryRanger prevents these new attacks as well as supporting the Windows 10 1903 x64.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based question-answering systems offer significant potential for automating customer support and internal knowledge access in small businesses, yet their practical deployment remains challenging due to infrastructure costs, engineering complexity, and security risks, particularly in retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)-based settings. This paper presents an industry case study of an open-source, multi-tenant platform that enables small businesses to deploy customised LLM-based support chatbots via a no-code workflow. The platform is built on distributed, lightweight k3s clusters spanning heterogeneous, low-cost machines and interconnected through an encrypted overlay network, enabling cost-efficient resource pooling while enforcing container-based isolation and per-tenant data access controls. In addition, the platform integrates practical, platform-level defences against prompt injection attacks in RAG-based chatbots, translating insights from recent prompt injection research into deployable security mechanisms without requiring model retraining or enterprise-scale infrastructure. We evaluate the proposed platform through a real-world e-commerce deployment, demonstrating that secure and efficient LLM-based chatbot services can be achieved under realistic cost, operational, and security constraints faced by small businesses.

As Artificial Intelligence systems evolve from monolithic models to ecosystems of specialized agents, the need for standardized communication protocols becomes increasingly critical. This paper introduces MOD-X (Modular Open Decentralized eXchange), a novel architectural framework proposal for agent interoperability that addresses key limitations of existing protocols. Unlike current approaches, MOD-X proposes a layered architecture with a Universal Message Bus, thorough state management, translation capabilities, and blockchain-based security mechanisms. We present MOD-X's architecture, compare it with existing protocols, and demonstrate its application through a worked example how it enables integration between heterogeneous specialist agents (agents with different architectures, vendors, capabilities, and knowledge representations--including rule-based systems, neural networks, symbolic reasoning engines, and legacy software with agent wrappers). MOD-X's key innovations include a publish-subscribe communication model, semantic capability discovery, and dynamic workflow orchestration--providing a framework that bridges theoretical formalism with practical implementation. This architecture addresses the growing need for truly decentralized, interoperable agent ecosystems that can scale effectively without the need for central coordination.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

The rise of model sharing through frameworks and dedicated hubs makes Machine Learning significantly more accessible. Despite its benefits, loading shared models exposes users to underexplored security risks, while security awareness remains limited among both practitioners and developers. To enable a more security-conscious approach in Machine Learning model sharing, in this paper, we evaluate the security posture of frameworks and hubs, assess whether security-oriented mechanisms offer real protection, and survey how users perceive the security narratives surrounding model sharing. Our evaluation shows that most frameworks and hubs address security risks partially at best, often by shifting responsibility to the user. More concerningly, our analysis of frameworks advertising security-oriented settings and complete model sharing uncovered multiple 0-day vulnerabilities enabling arbitrary code execution. Through this analysis, we show that, despite the recent narrative, securely loading Machine Learning models is far from being a solved problem and cannot be guaranteed by the file format used for sharing. Our survey shows that the security narrative leads users to consider security-oriented settings as trustworthy, despite the weaknesses shown in this work. From this, we derive suggestions to strengthen the security of model-sharing ecosystems.

Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly pervasive and essential components in enabling new applications and services. However, their widespread use also exposes them to exploitable vulnerabilities and flaws that can lead to significant losses. In this context, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is essential to protect IoT devices from malicious attacks. However, the current solutions that provide flexible policy specifications and higher security levels for IoT devices are scarce. To address this gap, we introduce T800, a low-resource packet filter that utilizes machine learning (ML) algorithms to classify packets in IoT devices. We present a detailed performance benchmarking framework and demonstrate T800's effectiveness on the ESP32 system-on-chip microcontroller and ESP-IDF framework. Our evaluation shows that T800 is an efficient solution that increases device computational capacity by excluding unsolicited malicious traffic from the processing pipeline. Additionally, T800 is adaptable to different systems and provides a well-documented performance evaluation strategy for security ML-based mechanisms on ESP32-based IoT systems. Our research contributes to improving the cybersecurity of resource-constrained IoT devices and provides a scalable, efficient solution that can be used to enhance the security of IoT systems.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms (AAM) are legal instruments that help social security systems respond to demographic and economic changes. In Brazil, the Social Security Factor (SSF) was introduced in the late 1990s as an AAM to link retirement benefits to life expectancy at the retirement age, with the hope of promoting contributory justice and discouraging early retirement. Recent research has highlighted the limitations of right-censored life tables, such as those used in Brazil. It has recommended using the gamma-Gompertz-Makeham (GGM) model to estimate adult and old-age mortality. This study investigated the impact of right-censoring on the SSF by comparing the official SSF and other social security metrics with a counterfactual scenario computed based on fitted GGM models. The results indicate that from 2004 to 2012, official life tables may have negatively impacted retirees' income, particularly for those who delayed their retirement. Furthermore, the GGM-fitted models' life expectancies had more stable paths over time, which could have helped with long-term planning. This study's findings are significant for policymakers as they highlight the importance of using appropriate mortality metrics in AAMs to ensure accurate retirement benefit payments. They also underscore the need to consider the potential impacts of seemingly innocuous hypotheses on public action outcomes. Overall, this study provides valuable insights for public planners and policymakers looking to enhance the effectiveness and fairness of social security systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a universal, open standard for connecting AI agents with data sources and external tools. While MCP enhances the capabilities of LLM-based agents, it also introduces new security risks and expands their attack surfaces. In this paper, we present the first systematic taxonomy of MCP security, identifying 17 attack types across 4 primary attack surfaces. We introduce MCPSecBench, a comprehensive security benchmark and playground that integrates prompt datasets, MCP servers, MCP clients, attack scripts, and protection mechanisms to evaluate these attacks across three major MCP providers. Our benchmark is modular and extensible, allowing researchers to incorporate custom implementations of clients, servers, and transport protocols for systematic security assessment. Experimental results show that over 85% of the identified attacks successfully compromise at least one platform, with core vulnerabilities universally affecting Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor, while prompt-based and tool-centric attacks exhibit considerable variability across different hosts and models. In addition, current protection mechanisms have little effect against these attacks. Overall, MCPSecBench standardizes the evaluation of MCP security and enables rigorous testing across all MCP layers.

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege execution capabilities substantially expand the system attack surface. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security threat analysis of OpenClaw. To structure our analysis, we introduce a five-layer lifecycle-oriented security framework that captures key stages of agent operation, i.e., initialization, input, inference, decision, and execution, and systematically examine compound threats across the agent's operational lifecycle, including indirect prompt injection, skill supply chain contamination, memory poisoning, and intent drift. Through detailed case studies on OpenClaw, we demonstrate the prevalence and severity of these threats and analyze the limitations of existing defenses. Our findings reveal critical weaknesses in current point-based defense mechanisms when addressing cross-temporal and multi-stage systemic risks, highlighting the need for holistic security architectures for autonomous LLM agents. Within this framework, we further examine representative defense strategies at each lifecycle stage, including plugin vetting frameworks, context-aware instruction filtering, memory integrity validation protocols, intent verification mechanisms, and capability enforcement architectures.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority, but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This paper hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted R_{CVA}, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems (a distinction {not explicitly addressed by} current agentic security frameworks) and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

With the recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), generating functionally correct code has become less complicated for a wide array of developers. While using LLMs has sped up the functional development process, it poses a heavy risk to code security. Code generation with proper security measures using LLM is a significantly more challenging task than functional code generation. Security measures may include adding a pair of lines of code with the original code, consisting of null pointer checking or prepared statements for SQL injection prevention. Currently, available code repair LLMs generate code repair by supervised fine-tuning, where the model looks at cross-entropy loss. However, the original and repaired codes are mostly similar in functionality and syntactically, except for a few (1-2) lines, which act as security measures. This imbalance between the lines needed for security measures and the functional code enforces the supervised fine-tuned model to prioritize generating functional code without adding proper security measures, which also benefits the model by resulting in minimal loss. Therefore, in this work, for security hardening and strengthening of generated code from LLMs, we propose a reinforcement learning-based method for program-specific repair with the combination of semantic and syntactic reward mechanisms that focus heavily on adding security and functional measures in the code, respectively.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

In recent years, Large-Language-Model-driven AI agents have exhibited unprecedented intelligence, flexibility, and adaptability, and are rapidly changing human production and lifestyle. Nowadays, agents are undergoing a new round of evolution. They no longer act as an isolated island like LLMs. Instead, they start to communicate with diverse external entities, such as other agents and tools, to collectively perform more complex tasks. Under this trend, agent communication is regarded as a foundational pillar of the future AI ecosystem, and many organizations intensively begin to design related communication protocols (e.g., Anthropic's MCP and Google's A2A) within the recent few months. However, this new field exposes significant security hazard, which can cause severe damage to real-world scenarios. To help researchers to quickly figure out this promising topic and benefit the future agent communication development, this paper presents a comprehensive survey of agent communication security. More precisely, we first present a clear definition of agent communication and categorize the entire lifecyle of agent communication into three stages: user-agent interaction, agent-agent communication, and agent-environment communication. Next, for each communication phase, we dissect related protocols and analyze its security risks according to the communication characteristics. Then, we summarize and outlook on the possible defense countermeasures for each risk. Finally, we discuss open issues and future directions in this promising research field.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and their large-scale experimentation in cloud-computing spaces, the challenge of guaranteeing their security and efficiency in a failure scenario has become a main issue. To ensure the reliability and availability of large-scale language models in cloud computing scenarios, such as frequent resource failures, network problems, and computational overheads, this study proposes a novel adaptive fault tolerance mechanism. It builds upon known fault-tolerant mechanisms, such as checkpointing, redundancy, and state transposition, introducing dynamic resource allocation and prediction of failure based on real-time performance metrics. The hybrid model integrates data driven deep learning-based anomaly detection technique underlining the contribution of cloud orchestration middleware for predictive prevention of system failures. Additionally, the model integrates adaptive checkpointing and recovery strategies that dynamically adapt according to load and system state to minimize the influence on the performance of the model and minimize downtime. The experimental results demonstrate that the designed model considerably enhances the fault tolerance in large-scale cloud surroundings, and decreases the system downtime by 30%, and has a better modeling availability than the classical fault tolerance mechanism.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in assisting cybersecurity tasks, yet existing approaches struggle with automatic vulnerability discovery and exploitation due to limited interaction, weak execution grounding, and a lack of experience reuse. We propose Co-RedTeam, a security-aware multi-agent framework designed to mirror real-world red-teaming workflows by integrating security-domain knowledge, code-aware analysis, execution-grounded iterative reasoning, and long-term memory. Co-RedTeam decomposes vulnerability analysis into coordinated discovery and exploitation stages, enabling agents to plan, execute, validate, and refine actions based on real execution feedback while learning from prior trajectories. Extensive evaluations on challenging security benchmarks demonstrate that Co-RedTeam consistently outperforms strong baselines across diverse backbone models, achieving over 60% success rate in vulnerability exploitation and over 10% absolute improvement in vulnerability detection. Ablation and iteration studies further confirm the critical role of execution feedback, structured interaction, and memory for building robust and generalizable cybersecurity agents.

This paper studies the integration off Large Language Models into cybersecurity tools and protocols. The main issue discussed in this paper is how traditional rule-based and signature based security systems are not enough to deal with modern AI powered cyber threats. Cybersecurity industry is changing as threats are becoming more dangerous and adaptive in nature by levering the features provided by AI tools. By integrating LLMs into these tools and protocols, make the systems scalable, context-aware and intelligent. Thus helping it to mitigate these evolving cyber threats. The paper studies the architecture and functioning of LLMs, its integration into Encrypted prompts to prevent prompt injection attacks. It also studies the integration of LLMs into cybersecurity tools using a four layered architecture. At last, the paper has tried to explain various ways of integration LLMs into traditional Intrusion Detection System and enhancing its original abilities in various dimensions. The key findings of this paper has been (i)Encrypted Prompt with LLM is an effective way to mitigate prompt injection attacks, (ii) LLM enhanced cyber security tools are more accurate, scalable and adaptable to new threats as compared to traditional models, (iii) The decoupled model approach for LLM integration into IDS is the best way as it is the most accurate way.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in cross-modal understanding, but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks through visual inputs despite robust textual safety mechanisms. These vulnerabilities arise from two core weaknesses: the continuous nature of visual representations, which allows for gradient-based attacks, and the inadequate transfer of text-based safety mechanisms to visual content. We introduce Q-MLLM, a novel architecture that integrates two-level vector quantization to create a discrete bottleneck against adversarial attacks while preserving multimodal reasoning capabilities. By discretizing visual representations at both pixel-patch and semantic levels, Q-MLLM blocks attack pathways and bridges the cross-modal safety alignment gap. Our two-stage training methodology ensures robust learning while maintaining model utility. Experiments demonstrate that Q-MLLM achieves significantly better defense success rate against both jailbreak attacks and toxic image attacks than existing approaches. Notably, Q-MLLM achieves perfect defense success rate (100\%) against jailbreak attacks except in one arguable case, while maintaining competitive performance on multiple utility benchmarks with minimal inference overhead. This work establishes vector quantization as an effective defense mechanism for secure multimodal AI systems without requiring expensive safety-specific fine-tuning or detection overhead. Code is available at https://github.com/Amadeuszhao/QMLLM.

AI powered health chatbot applications are increasingly utilized for personalized healthcare services, yet they pose significant challenges related to user data security and privacy. This study evaluates the effectiveness of automated methods, specifically BART and Gemini GenAI, in identifying security privacy related (SPR) concerns within these applications' user reviews, benchmarking their performance against manual qualitative analysis. Our results indicate that while Gemini's performance in SPR classification is comparable to manual labeling, both automated methods have limitations, including the misclassification of unrelated issues. Qualitative analysis revealed critical user concerns, such as data collection practices, data misuse, and insufficient transparency and consent mechanisms. This research enhances the understanding of the relationship between user trust, privacy, and emerging mobile AI health chatbot technologies, offering actionable insights for improving security and privacy practices in AI driven health chatbots. Although exploratory, our findings highlight the necessity for rigorous audits and transparent communication strategies, providing valuable guidance for app developers and vendors in addressing user security and privacy concerns.

AI agents that interact with their environments through tools enable powerful applications, but in high-stakes business settings, unintended actions can cause unacceptable harm, such as privacy breaches and financial loss. Existing mitigations, such as training-based methods and neural guardrails, improve agent reliability but cannot provide guarantees. We study symbolic guardrails as a practical path toward strong safety and security guarantees for AI agents. Our three-part study includes a systematic review of 80 state-of-the-art agent safety and security benchmarks to identify the policies they evaluate, an analysis of which policy requirements can be guaranteed by symbolic guardrails, and an evaluation of how symbolic guardrails affect safety, security, and agent success on τ^2-Bench, CAR-bench, and MedAgentBench. We find that 85\% of benchmarks lack concrete policies, relying instead on underspecified high-level goals or common sense. Among the specified policies, 74\% of policy requirements can be enforced by symbolic guardrails, often using simple, low-cost mechanisms. These guardrails improve safety and security without sacrificing agent utility. Overall, our results suggest that symbolic guardrails are a practical and effective way to guarantee some safety and security requirements, especially for domain-specific AI agents. We release all codes and artifacts at https://github.com/hyn0027/agent-symbolic-guardrails.

Security inspection often deals with a piece of baggage or suitcase where objects are heavily overlapped with each other, resulting in an unsatisfactory performance for prohibited items detection in X-ray images. In the literature, there have been rare studies and datasets touching this important topic. In this work, we contribute the first high-quality object detection dataset for security inspection, named Occluded Prohibited Items X-ray (OPIXray) image benchmark. OPIXray focused on the widely-occurred prohibited item "cutter", annotated manually by professional inspectors from the international airport. The test set is further divided into three occlusion levels to better understand the performance of detectors. Furthermore, to deal with the occlusion in X-ray images detection, we propose the De-occlusion Attention Module (DOAM), a plug-and-play module that can be easily inserted into and thus promote most popular detectors. Despite the heavy occlusion in X-ray imaging, shape appearance of objects can be preserved well, and meanwhile different materials visually appear with different colors and textures. Motivated by these observations, our DOAM simultaneously leverages the different appearance information of the prohibited item to generate the attention map, which helps refine feature maps for the general detectors. We comprehensively evaluate our module on the OPIXray dataset, and demonstrate that our module can consistently improve the performance of the state-of-the-art detection methods such as SSD, FCOS, etc, and significantly outperforms several widely-used attention mechanisms. In particular, the advantages of DOAM are more significant in the scenarios with higher levels of occlusion, which demonstrates its potential application in real-world inspections. The OPIXray benchmark and our model are released at https://github.com/OPIXray-author/OPIXray.

Agentic AI systems, built on large language models (LLMs) and deployed in multi-agent configurations, are redefining intelligent autonomy, collaboration and decision-making across enterprise and societal domains. This review presents a structured analysis of Trust, Risk, and Security Management (TRiSM) in the context of LLM-based agentic multi-agent systems (AMAS). We begin by examining the conceptual foundations of agentic AI, its architectural differences from traditional AI agents, and the emerging system designs that enable scalable, tool-using autonomy. The TRiSM in the agentic AI framework is then detailed through four pillars governance, explainability, ModelOps, and privacy/security each contextualized for agentic LLMs. We identify unique threat vectors and introduce a comprehensive risk taxonomy for the agentic AI applications, supported by case studies illustrating real-world vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the paper also surveys trust-building mechanisms, transparency and oversight techniques, and state-of-the-art explainability strategies in distributed LLM agent systems. Additionally, metrics for evaluating trust, interpretability, and human-centered performance are reviewed alongside open benchmarking challenges. Security and privacy are addressed through encryption, adversarial defense, and compliance with evolving AI regulations. The paper concludes with a roadmap for responsible agentic AI, proposing research directions to align emerging multi-agent systems with robust TRiSM principles for safe, accountable, and transparent deployment.

Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present Backdoor4Good (B4G), a unified benchmark and framework for beneficial backdoor applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation (T, A, U), representing the Trigger, Activation mechanism, and Utility function, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.

Advancement in information and communication technology (ICT) has given rise to explosion of data in every field of operations. Working with the enormous volume of data (or Big Data, as it is popularly known as) for extraction of useful information to support decision making is one of the sources of competitive advantage for organizations today. Enterprises are leveraging the power of analytics in formulating business strategy in every facet of their operations to mitigate business risk. Volatile global market scenario has compelled the organizations to redefine their supply chain management (SCM). In this paper, we have delineated the relevance of Big Data and its importance in managing end to end supply chains for achieving business excellence. A Big Data-centric architecture for SCM has been proposed that exploits the current state of the art technology of data management, analytics and visualization. The security and privacy requirements of a Big Data system have also been highlighted and several mechanisms have been discussed to implement these features in a real world Big Data system deployment in the context of SCM. Some future scope of work has also been pointed out. Keyword: Big Data, Analytics, Cloud, Architecture, Protocols, Supply Chain Management, Security, Privacy.

This chapter discusses the need of security and privacy protection mechanisms in aggregation protocols used in wireless sensor networks (WSN). It presents a comprehensive state of the art discussion on the various privacy protection mechanisms used in WSNs and particularly focuses on the CPDA protocols proposed by He et al. (INFOCOM 2007). It identifies a security vulnerability in the CPDA protocol and proposes a mechanism to plug that vulnerability. To demonstrate the need of security in aggregation process, the chapter further presents various threats in WSN aggregation mechanisms. A large number of existing protocols for secure aggregation in WSN are discussed briefly and a protocol is proposed for secure aggregation which can detect false data injected by malicious nodes in a WSN. The performance of the protocol is also presented. The chapter concludes while highlighting some future directions of research in secure data aggregation in WSNs.

The shift from monolithic LLMs to distributed multi-agent architectures demands new frameworks for verifying and securing autonomous coordination. Unlike traditional multi-agent systems focused on cooperative state alignment, modern LLM patterns: multi-agent debate, constitutional oversight, helper-critic loops-rely on adversarial critique for error correction and reasoning refinement. Since LLMs are dynamical systems whose latent states are imperfectly observable from verbalized outputs, securing these networks requires understanding both macroscopic topology and microscopic agent observability. This paper establishes a rigorous graph-theoretic framework for analyzing consensus in signed, directed interaction networks, bridging graph theory and LLM reasoning by formally mapping Transformer cross-entropy log-odds to the signed Laplacian. We characterize agreement stability through structural balance theory, showing how unbalanced critique cycles produce logical frustration and persistent reasoning oscillations, and prove that unobservable latent states from hidden system prompts act as topological Trojan horses that destabilize cooperative consensus. To resolve unobservable deadlocks, we restrict interaction topologies to chordal graphs and apply matrix decomposition with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, proving that rank-one spectral edge perturbations deterministically break expertise symmetry by shifting eigenvalues into the stable left-half plane. Core contributions include consensus theorems, polynomial-time Perfect Elimination Ordering verification algorithms, and large-scale empirical validation on clustered ensembles of LLaMA-3, Mistral, and Gemma agents.

Unrestricted adversarial attacks present a serious threat to deep learning models and adversarial defense techniques. They pose severe security problems for deep learning applications because they can effectively bypass defense mechanisms. However, previous attack methods often directly inject Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) gradients into the sampling of generative models, which are not theoretically provable and thus generate unrealistic examples by incorporating adversarial objectives, especially for GAN-based methods on large-scale datasets like ImageNet. In this paper, we propose a new method, called AdvDiff, to generate unrestricted adversarial examples with diffusion models. We design two novel adversarial guidance techniques to conduct adversarial sampling in the reverse generation process of diffusion models. These two techniques are effective and stable in generating high-quality, realistic adversarial examples by integrating gradients of the target classifier interpretably. Experimental results on MNIST and ImageNet datasets demonstrate that AdvDiff is effective in generating unrestricted adversarial examples, which outperforms state-of-the-art unrestricted adversarial attack methods in terms of attack performance and generation quality.

Safety alignment mechanisms in large language models prevent responses to harmful queries through learned refusal behavior, yet these same mechanisms impede legitimate research applications including cognitive modeling, adversarial testing, and security analysis. While abliteration techniques enable surgical removal of refusal representations through directional orthogonalization, the relative effectiveness of available implementations remains uncharacterized. This study evaluates four abliteration tools (Heretic, DECCP, ErisForge, FailSpy) across sixteen instruction-tuned models (7B-14B parameters), reporting tool compatibility on all 16 models and quantitative metrics on subsets dictated by tool support. Single-pass methods demonstrated superior capability preservation on the benchmarked subset (avg GSM8K change across three models: ErisForge -0.28 pp; DECCP -0.13 pp), while Bayesian-optimized abliteration produced variable distribution shift (KL divergence: 0.043-1.646) with model-dependent capability impact. These findings provide researchers with evidence-based selection criteria for abliteration tool deployment across diverse model architectures. The principal finding indicates that mathematical reasoning capabilities exhibit the highest sensitivity to abliteration interventions, with GSM8K change ranging from +1.51 pp to -18.81 pp (-26.5% relative) depending on tool selection and model architecture.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, their real-world applicability has expanded significantly, accompanied by new security challenges. Most existing agent defense mechanisms adopt a mandatory checking paradigm, in which security validation is forcibly triggered at predefined stages of the agent lifecycle. In this work, we argue that effective agent security should be intrinsic and selective rather than architecturally decoupled and mandatory. We propose Spider-Sense framework, an event-driven defense framework based on Intrinsic Risk Sensing (IRS), which allows agents to maintain latent vigilance and trigger defenses only upon risk perception. Once triggered, the Spider-Sense invokes a hierarchical defence mechanism that trades off efficiency and precision: it resolves known patterns via lightweight similarity matching while escalating ambiguous cases to deep internal reasoning, thereby eliminating reliance on external models. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we introduce S^2Bench, a lifecycle-aware benchmark featuring realistic tool execution and multi-stage attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Spider-Sense achieves competitive or superior defense performance, attaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), with only a marginal latency overhead of 8.3\%.

Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.

While generative AI is now widespread and useful in society, there are potential risks of misuse, e.g., unconsciously influencing cognitive processes or decision-making. Although this causes a security problem in the cognitive domain, there has been no research about neural and computational mechanisms counteracting the impact of malicious generative AI in humans. We propose DecNefGAN, a novel framework that combines a generative adversarial system and a neural reinforcement model. More specifically, DecNefGAN bridges human and generative AI in a closed-loop system, with the AI creating stimuli that induce specific mental states, thus exerting external control over neural activity. The objective of the human is the opposite, to compete and reach an orthogonal mental state. This framework can contribute to elucidating how the human brain responds to and counteracts the potential influence of generative AI.

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are made up of a large number of tiny sensors, which can sense, analyze, and communicate information about the outside world. These networks play a significant role in a broad range of fields, from crucial military surveillance applications to monitoring building security. Key management in WSNs is a critical task. While the security and integrity of messages communicated through these networks and the authenticity of the nodes are dependent on the robustness of the key management schemes, designing an efficient key generation, distribution, and revocation scheme is quite challenging. While resource-constrained sensor nodes should not be exposed to computationally demanding asymmetric key algorithms, the use of symmetric key-based systems leaves the entire network vulnerable to several attacks. This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of several well-known cryptographic mechanisms and key management schemes for WSNs.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare applications offers promising advancements in medical diagnostics, treatment recommendations, and patient care. However, the susceptibility of LLMs to adversarial attacks poses a significant threat, potentially leading to harmful outcomes in delicate medical contexts. This study investigates the vulnerability of LLMs to two types of adversarial attacks in three medical tasks. Utilizing real-world patient data, we demonstrate that both open-source and proprietary LLMs are susceptible to manipulation across multiple tasks. This research further reveals that domain-specific tasks demand more adversarial data in model fine-tuning than general domain tasks for effective attack execution, especially for more capable models. We discover that while integrating adversarial data does not markedly degrade overall model performance on medical benchmarks, it does lead to noticeable shifts in fine-tuned model weights, suggesting a potential pathway for detecting and countering model attacks. This research highlights the urgent need for robust security measures and the development of defensive mechanisms to safeguard LLMs in medical applications, to ensure their safe and effective deployment in healthcare settings.

User authorization-based access privileges are a key feature in many safety-critical systems, but have thus far been absent from the large language model (LLM) realm. In this work, drawing inspiration from such access control systems, we introduce sudoLLM, a novel framework that results in multi-role aligned LLMs, i.e., LLMs that account for, and behave in accordance with, user access rights. sudoLLM injects subtle user-based biases into queries and trains an LLM to utilize this bias signal in order to produce sensitive information if and only if the user is authorized. We present empirical results demonstrating that this approach shows substantially improved alignment, generalization, and resistance to prompt-based jailbreaking attacks. The persistent tension between the language modeling objective and safety alignment, which is often exploited to jailbreak LLMs, is somewhat resolved with the aid of the injected bias signal. Our framework is meant as an additional security layer, and complements existing guardrail mechanisms for enhanced end-to-end safety with LLMs.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of 5G technology, the adoption of cloud-based infrastructure for the deployment of 5G services has become increasingly common. Using a service-based architecture, critical 5G components, such as the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), Session Management Function (SMF), and User Plane Function (UPF), now run as containerized pods on Kubernetes clusters. Although this approach improves scalability, flexibility, and resilience, it also introduces new security challenges, particularly to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of these components. Current 5G security specifications (for example, 3GPP TS 33.501) focus on communication security and assume that network functions remain trustworthy after authentication, consequently lacking mechanisms to continuously validate the integrity of NVFs at runtime. To close this gap, and to align with Zero Trust principles of 'never trust, always verify', we present a TPM 2.0-based continuous remote attestation solution for core 5G components deployed on Kubernetes. Our approach uses the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to provide hardware-based runtime validation. We integrate the open-source Keylime framework with a custom IMA template that isolates pod-level measurements, allowing per-pod integrity verification. A prototype on a k3s cluster (consisting of 1 master, 2 worker nodes) was implemented to attest to core functions, including AMF, SMF and UPF. The experimental results show that the system detects unauthorized modifications in real time, labels each pod's trust state, and generates detailed audit logs. This work provides hardware-based continuous attestation for cloud native and edge deployments, strengthening the resilience of 5G as critical infrastructure in multi-vendor and mission-critical scenarios of 5G.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

By integrating Chain-of-Thought(CoT) reasoning, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong capabilities in robotic manipulation, particularly by improving generalization and interpretability. However, the security of CoT-based reasoning mechanisms remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning introduces a novel attack vector for targeted control hijacking--for example, causing a robot to mistakenly deliver a knife to a person instead of an apple--without modifying the user's instruction. We first provide empirical evidence that CoT strongly governs action generation, even when it is semantically misaligned with the input instructions. Building on this observation, we propose TRAP, the first targeted adversarial attack framework for CoT-reasoning VLA models. TRAP uses an adversarial patch (e.g., a coaster placed on the table) to corrupt intermediate CoT reasoning and hijack the VLA's output. By optimizing the CoT adversarial loss, TRAP induces specific and adversary-defined behaviors. Extensive evaluations across 3 mainstream VLA architectures and 3 CoT reasoning paradigms validate the effectiveness of TRAP. Notably, we implemented the patch by printing it on paper in a real-world setting. Our findings highlight the urgent need to secure CoT reasoning in VLA systems.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been gaining a lot of interest due to their adaptability and extensibility in emerging applications, including communication networks. It is anticipated that ZSM networks will be able to support LLMs as a service, as they provide ultra reliable low-latency communications and closed loop massive connectivity. However, LLMs are vulnerable to data and model privacy issues that affect the trustworthiness of LLMs to be deployed for user-based services. In this paper, we explore the security vulnerabilities associated with fine-tuning LLMs in ZSM networks, in particular the membership inference attack. We define the characteristics of an attack network that can perform a membership inference attack if the attacker has access to the fine-tuned model for the downstream task. We show that the membership inference attacks are effective for any downstream task, which can lead to a personal data breach when using LLM as a service. The experimental results show that the attack success rate of maximum 92% can be achieved on named entity recognition task. Based on the experimental analysis, we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present possible research directions to make the LLMs more trustworthy in the context of ZSM networks.

Speech Language Models (SLMs) enable natural interactions via spoken instructions, which more effectively capture user intent by detecting nuances in speech. The richer speech signal introduces new security risks compared to text-based models, as adversaries can better bypass safety mechanisms by injecting imperceptible noise to speech. We analyze adversarial attacks and find that SLMs are substantially more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can achieve a perfect 100% attack success rate in some instances. To improve security, we propose post-hoc patching defenses used to intervene during inference by modifying the SLM's activations that improve robustness up to 99% with (i) negligible impact on utility and (ii) without any re-training. We conduct ablation studies to maximize the efficacy of our defenses and improve the utility/security trade-off, validated with large-scale benchmarks unique to SLMs.

Financial agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for investment analysis, risk assessment, and automated decision-making, where their abilities to plan, invoke tools, and manipulate mutable state introduce new security risks in high-stakes and highly regulated financial environments. However, existing safety evaluations largely focus on language-model-level content compliance or abstract agent settings, failing to capture execution-grounded risks arising from real operational workflows and state-changing actions. To bridge this gap, we propose FinVault, the first execution-grounded security benchmark for financial agents, comprising 31 regulatory case-driven sandbox scenarios with state-writable databases and explicit compliance constraints, together with 107 real-world vulnerabilities and 963 test cases that systematically cover prompt injection, jailbreaking, financially adapted attacks, as well as benign inputs for false-positive evaluation. Experimental results reveal that existing defense mechanisms remain ineffective in realistic financial agent settings, with average attack success rates (ASR) still reaching up to 50.0\% on state-of-the-art models and remaining non-negligible even for the most robust systems (ASR 6.7\%), highlighting the limited transferability of current safety designs and the need for stronger financial-specific defenses. Our code can be found at https://github.com/aifinlab/FinVault.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) grow increasingly powerful, multi-agent systems are becoming more prevalent in modern AI applications. Most safety research, however, has focused on vulnerabilities in single-agent LLMs. These include prompt injection attacks, where malicious prompts embedded in external content trick the LLM into executing unintended or harmful actions, compromising the victim's application. In this paper, we reveal a more dangerous vector: LLM-to-LLM prompt injection within multi-agent systems. We introduce Prompt Infection, a novel attack where malicious prompts self-replicate across interconnected agents, behaving much like a computer virus. This attack poses severe threats, including data theft, scams, misinformation, and system-wide disruption, all while propagating silently through the system. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that multi-agent systems are highly susceptible, even when agents do not publicly share all communications. To address this, we propose LLM Tagging, a defense mechanism that, when combined with existing safeguards, significantly mitigates infection spread. This work underscores the urgent need for advanced security measures as multi-agent LLM systems become more widely adopted.

Backdoor attacks on language models pose a growing security concern, yet the internal mechanisms by which a trigger sequence hijacks model computations remain poorly understood. We identify a circuit underlying a language-switching backdoor in an 8B-parameter autoregressive language model, where a three-word Latin trigger (nine tokens) redirects English output to French. We decompose the circuit into three phases: (1) distributed attention heads at early layers compose the trigger tokens into the last sequence position; (2) the resulting signal propagates through mid-layers in a subspace orthogonal to the model's natural language-identity direction; (3) the MLP at the final layer converts this latent signal into French logits. The entire circuit flows through a serial bottleneck at a single position: corrupting that position at any layer entirely mitigate the trigger but also hinder the model's capabilities. The orthogonal latent encoding suggests that defenses that search for language-like signals in intermediate representations would miss this trigger entirely.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MASs) have demonstrated remarkable real-world capabilities, effectively collaborating to complete complex tasks. While these systems are designed with safety mechanisms, such as rejecting harmful instructions through alignment, their security remains largely unexplored. This gap leaves LLM-MASs vulnerable to targeted disruptions. In this paper, we introduce Contagious Recursive Blocking Attacks (Corba), a novel and simple yet highly effective attack that disrupts interactions between agents within an LLM-MAS. Corba leverages two key properties: its contagious nature allows it to propagate across arbitrary network topologies, while its recursive property enables sustained depletion of computational resources. Notably, these blocking attacks often involve seemingly benign instructions, making them particularly challenging to mitigate using conventional alignment methods. We evaluate Corba on two widely-used LLM-MASs, namely, AutoGen and Camel across various topologies and commercial models. Additionally, we conduct more extensive experiments in open-ended interactive LLM-MASs, demonstrating the effectiveness of Corba in complex topology structures and open-source models. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhrli324/Corba.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant progress on a wide range of natural language processing tasks. However, their effectiveness in specialized and rapidly evolving domains such as Web3 remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce DMind Benchmark, a novel framework that systematically tests LLMs across nine key categories encompassing blockchain fundamentals, infrastructure, smart contract analysis, decentralized finance (DeFi), decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), non-fungible tokens (NFTs), token economics, meme concepts, and security vulnerabilities. DMind Benchmark goes beyond conventional multiple-choice questions by incorporating domain-specific subjective tasks (e.g., smart contract code auditing and repair, numeric reasoning on on-chain data, and fill-in assessments), thereby capturing real-world complexities and stress-testing model adaptability. We evaluate fifteen popular LLMs (from ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Claude, and Gemini series) on DMind Benchmark, uncovering performance gaps in Web3-specific reasoning and application, particularly in emerging areas like token economics and meme concepts. Even the strongest models face significant challenges in identifying subtle security vulnerabilities and analyzing complex DeFi mechanisms. To foster progress in this area, we publicly release our benchmark dataset, evaluation pipeline, and annotated results at http://www.dmind.ai, offering a valuable resource for advancing specialized domain adaptation and the development of more robust Web3-enabled LLMs.

Chat template is a common technique used in the training and inference stages of Large Language Models (LLMs). It can transform input and output data into role-based and templated expressions to enhance the performance of LLMs. However, this also creates a breeding ground for novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we first reveal that the customizability of chat templates allows an attacker who controls the template to inject arbitrary strings into the system prompt without the user's notice. Building on this, we propose a training-free backdoor attack, termed BadTemplate. Specifically, BadTemplate inserts carefully crafted malicious instructions into the high-priority system prompt, thereby causing the target LLM to exhibit persistent backdoor behaviors. BadTemplate outperforms traditional backdoor attacks by embedding malicious instructions directly into the system prompt, eliminating the need for model retraining while achieving high attack effectiveness with minimal cost. Furthermore, its simplicity and scalability make it easily and widely deployed in real-world systems, raising serious risks of rapid propagation, economic damage, and large-scale misinformation. Furthermore, detection by major third-party platforms HuggingFace and LLM-as-a-judge proves largely ineffective against BadTemplate. Extensive experiments conducted on 5 benchmark datasets across 6 open-source and 3 closed-source LLMs, compared with 3 baselines, demonstrate that BadTemplate achieves up to a 100% attack success rate and significantly outperforms traditional prompt-based backdoors in both word-level and sentence-level attacks. Our work highlights the potential security risks raised by chat templates in the LLM supply chain, thereby supporting the development of effective defense mechanisms.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Recently in robotics, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a transformative approach, enabling robots to execute complex tasks by integrating visual and linguistic inputs within an end-to-end learning framework. Despite their significant capabilities, VLA models introduce new attack surfaces. This paper systematically evaluates their robustness. Recognizing the unique demands of robotic execution, our attack objectives target the inherent spatial and functional characteristics of robotic systems. In particular, we introduce two untargeted attack objectives that leverage spatial foundations to destabilize robotic actions, and a targeted attack objective that manipulates the robotic trajectory. Additionally, we design an adversarial patch generation approach that places a small, colorful patch within the camera's view, effectively executing the attack in both digital and physical environments. Our evaluation reveals a marked degradation in task success rates, with up to a 100\% reduction across a suite of simulated robotic tasks, highlighting critical security gaps in current VLA architectures. By unveiling these vulnerabilities and proposing actionable evaluation metrics, we advance both the understanding and enhancement of safety for VLA-based robotic systems, underscoring the necessity for continuously developing robust defense strategies prior to physical-world deployments.

The increasing integration of AI agents into cyber-physical systems (CPS) introduces new security risks that extend beyond traditional cyber or physical threat models. Recent advances in generative AI enable deepfake and semantic manipulation attacks that can compromise agent perception, reasoning, and interaction with the physical environment, while emerging protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) further expand the attack surface through dynamic tool use and cross-domain context sharing. This survey provides a comprehensive review of security threats targeting AI agents in CPS, with a particular focus on environmental interactions, deepfake-driven attacks, and MCP-mediated vulnerabilities. We organize the literature using the SENTINEL framework, a lifecycle-aware methodology that integrates threat characterization, feasibility analysis under CPS constraints, defense selection, and continuous validation. Through an end-to-end case study grounded in a real-world smart grid deployment, we quantitatively illustrate how timing, noise, and false-positive costs constrain deployable defenses, and why detection mechanisms alone are insufficient as decision authorities in safety-critical CPS. The survey highlights the role of provenance- and physics-grounded trust mechanisms and defense-in-depth architectures, and outlines open challenges toward trustworthy AI-enabled CPS.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) demonstrate exceptional performance across multimodal tasks, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass built-in safety mechanisms to elicit restricted content generation. Existing black-box jailbreak methods primarily rely on adversarial textual prompts or image perturbations, yet these approaches are highly detectable by standard content filtering systems and exhibit low query and computational efficiency. In this work, we present Cross-modal Adversarial Multimodal Obfuscation (CAMO), a novel black-box jailbreak attack framework that decomposes malicious prompts into semantically benign visual and textual fragments. By leveraging LVLMs' cross-modal reasoning abilities, CAMO covertly reconstructs harmful instructions through multi-step reasoning, evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our approach supports adjustable reasoning complexity and requires significantly fewer queries than prior attacks, enabling both stealth and efficiency. Comprehensive evaluations conducted on leading LVLMs validate CAMO's effectiveness, showcasing robust performance and strong cross-model transferability. These results underscore significant vulnerabilities in current built-in safety mechanisms, emphasizing an urgent need for advanced, alignment-aware security and safety solutions in vision-language systems.

Recent advances in large language models for test case generation have improved branch coverage via prompt-engineered mutations. However, they still lack principled mechanisms for steering models toward specific high-risk execution branches, limiting their effectiveness for discovering subtle bugs and security vulnerabilities. We propose GLMTest, the first program structure-aware LLM framework for targeted test case generation that seamlessly integrates code property graphs and code semantics using a graph neural network and a language model to condition test case generation on execution branches. This structured conditioning enables controllable and branch-targeted test case generation, thereby potentially enhancing bug and security risk discovery. Experiments on real-world projects show that GLMTest built on a Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct model improves branch accuracy from 27.4% to 50.2% on TestGenEval benchmark compared with state-of-the-art LLMs, i.e., Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and GPT-4o-mini.

Although large language model (LLM)-based agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, are increasingly evolving from task-oriented systems into personalized AI assistants for solving complex real-world tasks, their practical deployment also introduces severe security risks. However, existing agent security research and evaluation frameworks primarily focus on synthetic or task-centric settings, and thus fail to accurately capture the attack surface and risk propagation mechanisms of personalized agents in real-world deployments. To address this gap, we propose Personalized Agent Security Bench (PASB), an end-to-end security evaluation framework tailored for real-world personalized agents. Building upon existing agent attack paradigms, PASB incorporates personalized usage scenarios, realistic toolchains, and long-horizon interactions, enabling black-box, end-to-end security evaluation on real systems. Using OpenClaw as a representative case study, we systematically evaluate its security across multiple personalized scenarios, tool capabilities, and attack types. Our results indicate that OpenClaw exhibits critical vulnerabilities at different execution stages, including user prompt processing, tool usage, and memory retrieval, highlighting substantial security risks in personalized agent deployments. The code for the proposed PASB framework is available at https://github.com/AstorYH/PASB.

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

Model Extraction Attacks (MEAs) threaten modern machine learning systems by enabling adversaries to steal models, exposing intellectual property and training data. With the increasing deployment of machine learning models in distributed computing environments, including cloud, edge, and federated learning settings, each paradigm introduces distinct vulnerabilities and challenges. Without a unified perspective on MEAs across these distributed environments, organizations risk fragmented defenses, inadequate risk assessments, and substantial economic and privacy losses. This survey is motivated by the urgent need to understand how the unique characteristics of cloud, edge, and federated deployments shape attack vectors and defense requirements. We systematically examine the evolution of attack methodologies and defense mechanisms across these environments, demonstrating how environmental factors influence security strategies in critical sectors such as autonomous vehicles, healthcare, and financial services. By synthesizing recent advances in MEAs research and discussing the limitations of current evaluation practices, this survey provides essential insights for developing robust and adaptive defense strategies. Our comprehensive approach highlights the importance of integrating protective measures across the entire distributed computing landscape to ensure the secure deployment of machine learning models.

AI agents that combine large language models with non-AI system components are rapidly emerging in real-world applications, offering unprecedented automation and flexibility. However, this unprecedented flexibility introduces complex security challenges fundamentally different from those in traditional software systems. This paper presents the first systematic and comprehensive survey of AI agent security, including an analysis of the design space, attack landscape, and defense mechanisms for secure AI agent systems. We further conduct case studies to point out existing gaps in securing agentic AI systems and identify open challenges in this emerging domain. Our work also introduces the first systematic framework for understanding the security risks and defense strategies of AI agents, serving as a foundation for building both secure agentic systems and advancing research in this critical area.

Penetration testing, an essential component of software security testing, allows organizations to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems, thus bolstering their defense mechanisms against cyberattacks. One recent advancement in the realm of penetration testing is the utilization of Language Models (LLMs). We explore the intersection of LLMs and penetration testing to gain insight into their capabilities and challenges in the context of privilege escalation. We introduce a fully automated privilege-escalation tool designed for evaluating the efficacy of LLMs for (ethical) hacking, executing benchmarks using multiple LLMs, and investigating their respective results. Our results show that GPT-4-turbo is well suited to exploit vulnerabilities (33-83% of vulnerabilities). GPT-3.5-turbo can abuse 16-50% of vulnerabilities, while local models, such as Llama3, can only exploit between 0 and 33% of the vulnerabilities. We analyze the impact of different context sizes, in-context learning, optional high-level guidance mechanisms, and memory management techniques. We discuss challenging areas for LLMs, including maintaining focus during testing, coping with errors, and finally comparing LLMs with human hackers. The current version of the LLM-guided privilege-escalation prototype can be found at https://github.com/ipa-labs/hackingBuddyGPT.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed only after their risks to international security have been evaluated and deemed manageable. However, research on AI verification could benefit from greater clarity and detail. To address this, this report provides an in-depth overview of AI verification, intended for both policy professionals and technical researchers. We present novel conceptual frameworks, detailed implementation options, and key R&D challenges. These draw on existing literature, expert interviews, and original analysis, all within the scope of confidentially overseeing AI development and deployment that uses thousands of high-end AI chips. We find that states could eventually verify compliance by using six largely independent verification approaches with substantial redundancy: (1) built-in security features in AI chips; (2-3) separate monitoring devices attached to AI chips; and (4-6) personnel-based mechanisms, such as whistleblower programs. While promising, these approaches require guardrails to protect against abuse and power concentration, and many of these technologies have yet to be built or stress-tested. To enable states to confidently verify compliance with rules on large-scale AI development and deployment, the R&D challenges we list need significant progress.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, are increasingly used across diverse domains, including logistics, agriculture, surveillance, and defense. While these systems provide numerous benefits, their misuse raises safety and security concerns, making effective detection mechanisms essential. Acoustic sensing offers a low-cost and non-intrusive alternative to vision or radar-based detection, as drone propellers generate distinctive sound patterns. This study introduces AUDRON (AUdio-based Drone Recognition Network), a hybrid deep learning framework for drone sound detection, employing a combination of Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC), Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT) spectrograms processed with convolutional neural networks (CNNs), recurrent layers for temporal modeling, and autoencoder-based representations. Feature-level fusion integrates complementary information before classification. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that AUDRON effectively differentiates drone acoustic signatures from background noise, achieving high accuracy while maintaining generalizability across varying conditions. AUDRON achieves 98.51 percent and 97.11 percent accuracy in binary and multiclass classification. The results highlight the advantage of combining multiple feature representations with deep learning for reliable acoustic drone detection, suggesting the framework's potential for deployment in security and surveillance applications where visual or radar sensing may be limited.

Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as social-engineering attacks, manipulates autonomous web agents into submitting users' personally identifiable information (PII) to attacker-controlled endpoints. In this paper, we show that social-engineering attacks are highly effective at extracting critical-tier PII from frontier web agents, posing a severe risk to deployed agentic systems. To quantify this risk, we introduce \textsc{Scammer4U}, a pre-registered benchmark of 91 attacker-controlled environments and 10 benign-twin baselines, spanning 8 attack vectors and 16 site categories on an 8-axis factorial taxonomy that isolates the causal contribution of individual attack design factors. Across frontier agents, we find that critical-tier PII leakage reaches 54--93\% under no privacy guidance, compared to 0\% on benign-twin baselines, confirming that leakage is attack-attributable rather than incidental form-filling. Escalating prompt-level mitigation yields sharply model-dependent reductions across the four families and remains insufficient to reliably prevent critical PII submission at the pooled level. Most critically, we identify a detection--action gap: agents whose reasoning an independent LLM judge confirms has flagged the site as suspicious still submit critical PII in 35.9\% of sessions, versus 66.1\% when no suspicion is verbalized, a 30.2\% gap robust across all four model families. Our findings reveal that defenses conditioned on the agent's own recognition of an attack are gating on the wrong signal, motivating output-level interception of outbound submissions that operates independently of the agent's reasoning loop.

The rise of generative AI (GenAI) multi-agent systems (MAS) necessitates standardized protocols enabling agents to discover and interact with external tools. However, these protocols introduce new security challenges, particularly; tool squatting; the deceptive registration or representation of tools. This paper analyzes tool squatting threats within the context of emerging interoperability standards, such as Model Context Protocol (MCP) or seamless communication between agents protocols. It introduces a comprehensive Tool Registry system designed to mitigate these risks. We propose a security-focused architecture featuring admin-controlled registration, centralized tool discovery, fine grained access policies enforced via dedicated Agent and Tool Registry services, a dynamic trust scoring mechanism based on tool versioning and known vulnerabilities, and just in time credential provisioning. Based on its design principles, the proposed registry framework aims to effectively prevent common tool squatting vectors while preserving the flexibility and power of multi-agent systems. This work addresses a critical security gap in the rapidly evolving GenAI ecosystem and provides a foundation for secure tool integration in production environments.

Large language model powered autonomous agents demand robust, standardized protocols to integrate tools, share contextual data, and coordinate tasks across heterogeneous systems. Ad-hoc integrations are difficult to scale, secure, and generalize across domains. This survey examines four emerging agent communication protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), each addressing interoperability in deployment contexts. MCP provides a JSON-RPC client-server interface for secure tool invocation and typed data exchange. ACP defines a general-purpose communication protocol over RESTful HTTP, supporting MIME-typed multipart messages and synchronous and asynchronous interactions. Its lightweight and runtime-independent design enables scalable agent invocation, while features like session management, message routing, and integration with role-based and decentralized identifiers (DIDs). A2A enables peer-to-peer task delegation using capability-based Agent Cards, supporting secure and scalable collaboration across enterprise agent workflows. ANP supports open network agent discovery and secure collaboration using W3C decentralized identifiers DIDs and JSON-LD graphs. The protocols are compared across multiple dimensions, including interaction modes, discovery mechanisms, communication patterns, and security models. Based on the comparative analysis, a phased adoption roadmap is proposed: beginning with MCP for tool access, followed by ACP for structured, multimodal messaging session-aware interaction and both online and offline agent discovery across scalable, HTTP-based deployments A2A for collaborative task execution, and extending to ANP for decentralized agent marketplaces. This work provides a comprehensive foundation for designing secure, interoperable, and scalable ecosystems of LLM-powered agents.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

The remarkable capability of large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol (MCP) tools have become the de facto standard and are now widely integrated into these agents. However, the incorporation of MCP tools introduces the risk of tool poisoning attacks, which can manipulate the behavior of LLM-based agents. Although previous studies have identified such vulnerabilities, their red teaming approaches have largely remained at the proof-of-concept stage, leaving the automatic and systematic red teaming of LLM-based agents under the MCP tool poisoning paradigm an open question. To bridge this gap, we propose AutoMalTool, an automated red teaming framework for LLM-based agents by generating malicious MCP tools. Our extensive evaluation shows that AutoMalTool effectively generates malicious MCP tools capable of manipulating the behavior of mainstream LLM-based agents while evading current detection mechanisms, thereby revealing new security risks in these agents.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Large Language Models have emerged as transformative tools for Security Operations Centers, enabling automated log analysis, phishing triage, and malware explanation; however, deployment in adversarial cybersecurity environments exposes critical vulnerabilities to prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions embedded in security artifacts manipulate model behavior. This paper introduces SecureCAI, a novel defense framework extending Constitutional AI principles with security-aware guardrails, adaptive constitution evolution, and Direct Preference Optimization for unlearning unsafe response patterns, addressing the unique challenges of high-stakes security contexts where traditional safety mechanisms prove insufficient against sophisticated adversarial manipulation. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that SecureCAI reduces attack success rates by 94.7% compared to baseline models while maintaining 95.1% accuracy on benign security analysis tasks, with the framework incorporating continuous red-teaming feedback loops enabling dynamic adaptation to emerging attack strategies and achieving constitution adherence scores exceeding 0.92 under sustained adversarial pressure, thereby establishing a foundation for trustworthy integration of language model capabilities into operational cybersecurity workflows and addressing a critical gap in current approaches to AI safety within adversarial domains.

The rapid growth of web-based services, particularly API-driven architectures, reflects an increasing reliance on distributed systems, exposing sensitive data to security risks and making the adoption of automated defensive mechanisms essential. In this context, where benign traffic predominates in real-world settings, modern defenses increasingly model normal behavior, relying on semi-supervised approaches trained on only normal data. However, ensuring the complete absence of anomalous instances in such training data is inherently difficult in practice, and mislabeled or contaminated attack samples can introduce backdoors into the learned defense, causing the model to silently misclassify certain attack patterns as normal behavior. This paper investigates the effectiveness of Transformer-based Language Models (TLMs) in the detection of anomalies in HTTP requests, focussing on providing detailed explanations for the detected anomalies. The study employs token-level logit-based surprisal mapping to provide both an anomaly score and a direct, detailed explanation via heatmap-like highlighting. The effectiveness of the proposed explainability approach is demonstrated by the discovery of labelling inconsistencies in a popular public dataset, revealing how anomalous contamination in the training data had induced backdoor-like failures in the detection models.

Model extraction attacks pose significant security threats to deployed language models, potentially compromising intellectual property and user privacy. This survey provides a comprehensive taxonomy of LLM-specific extraction attacks and defenses, categorizing attacks into functionality extraction, training data extraction, and prompt-targeted attacks. We analyze various attack methodologies including API-based knowledge distillation, direct querying, parameter recovery, and prompt stealing techniques that exploit transformer architectures. We then examine defense mechanisms organized into model protection, data privacy protection, and prompt-targeted strategies, evaluating their effectiveness across different deployment scenarios. We propose specialized metrics for evaluating both attack effectiveness and defense performance, addressing the specific challenges of generative language models. Through our analysis, we identify critical limitations in current approaches and propose promising research directions, including integrated attack methodologies and adaptive defense mechanisms that balance security with model utility. This work serves NLP researchers, ML engineers, and security professionals seeking to protect language models in production environments.

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has brought new vitality to the various domains and generated substantial social and economic benefits. However, the swift advancement of LLMs has introduced new security vulnerabilities. Jailbreak, a form of attack that induces LLMs to output harmful content through carefully crafted prompts, poses a challenge to the safe and trustworthy development of LLMs. Previous jailbreak attack methods primarily exploited the internal capabilities of the model. Among them, one category leverages the model's implicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker is unaware of the exact reasons for the attack's success. The other category utilizes the model's explicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker understands the reasons for the attack's success. For example, these attacks exploit the model's abilities in coding, contextual learning, or understanding ASCII characters. However, these earlier jailbreak attacks have certain limitations, as they only exploit the inherent capabilities of the model. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak method, SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ), which utilizes the construction of input prompts by LLMs to inject jailbreak information into user prompts, enabling successful jailbreak of the LLMs. Our SIJ method achieves nearly 100\% attack success rates on five well-known open-source LLMs in the context of AdvBench, while incurring lower time costs compared to previous methods. More importantly, SIJ reveals a new vulnerability in LLMs that urgently needs to be addressed. To this end, we propose a defense method called Self-Reminder-Key and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak{https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak}.

Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) have made significant progress. While increasingly deployed in real-world applications, LALMs face growing safety risks from jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment. However, there remains a lack of an adversarial audio dataset and a unified framework specifically designed to evaluate and compare jailbreak attacks against them. To address this gap, we introduce JALMBench, a comprehensive benchmark that assesses LALM safety against jailbreak attacks, comprising 11,316 text samples and 245,355 audio samples (>1,000 hours). JALMBench supports 12 mainstream LALMs, 8 attack methods (4 text-transferred and 4 audio-originated), and 5 defenses. We conduct in-depth analysis on attack efficiency, topic sensitivity, voice diversity, and model architecture. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies for the attacks at both the prompt and response levels. Our systematic evaluation reveals that LALMs' safety is strongly influenced by modality and architectural choices: text-based safety alignment can partially transfer to audio inputs, and interleaved audio-text strategies enable more robust cross-modal generalization. Existing general-purpose moderation methods only slightly improve security, highlighting the need for defense methods specifically designed for LALMs. We hope our work can shed light on the design principles for building more robust LALMs.

Over the past year, the vLLM Semantic Router project has released a series of work spanning: (1) core routing mechanisms -- signal-driven routing, context-length pool routing, router performance engineering, policy conflict detection, low-latency embedding models, category-aware semantic caching, user-feedback-driven routing adaptation, hallucination detection, and hierarchical content-safety classification for privacy and jailbreak protection; (2) fleet optimization -- fleet provisioning and energy-efficiency analysis; (3) agentic and multimodal routing -- multimodal agent routing, tool selection, CUA security, and multi-turn context memory and safety; (4) governance and standards -- inference routing protocols and multi-provider API extensions. Each paper tackled a specific problem in LLM inference, but the problems are not independent; for example, fleet provisioning depends on the routing policy, which depends on the workload mix, shifting as organizations adopt agentic and multimodal workloads. This paper distills those results into the Workload-Router-Pool (WRP) architecture, a three-dimensional framework for LLM inference optimization. Workload characterizes what the fleet serves (chat vs. agent, single-turn vs. multi-turn, warm vs. cold, prefill-heavy vs. decode-heavy). Router determines how each request is dispatched (static semantic rules, online bandit adaptation, RL-based model selection, quality-aware cascading). Pool defines where inference runs (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous GPU, disaggregated prefill/decode, KV-cache topology). We map our prior work onto a 3x3 WRP interaction matrix, identify which cells we have covered and which remain open, and propose twenty-one concrete research directions at the intersections, each grounded in our prior measurements, tiered by maturity from engineering-ready to open research.

Protecting the network layer from malicious attacks is an important and challenging security issue in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In this paper, a security mechanism is proposed to defend against a cooperative gray hole attack on the well known AODV routing protocol in MANETs. A gray hole is a node that selectively drops and forwards data packets after it advertises itself as having the shortest path to the destination node in response to a route request message from a source node. The proposed mechanism does not apply any cryptographic primitives on the routing messages. Instead, it protects the network by detecting and reacting to malicious activities of any node. Simulation results show that the scheme has a significantly high detection rate with moderate network traffic overhead.

The security context used in 5G authentication is generated during the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and stored in both the user equipment (UE) and the network sides for the subsequent fast registration procedure. Given its importance, it is imperative to formally analyze the security mechanism of the security context. The security context in the UE can be stored in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card or in the baseband chip. In this work, we present a comprehensive and formal verification of the fast registration procedure based on the security context under the two scenarios in ProVerif. Our analysis identifies two vulnerabilities, including one that has not been reported before. Specifically, the security context stored in the USIM card can be read illegally, and the validity checking mechanism of the security context in the baseband chip can be bypassed. Moreover, these vulnerabilities also apply to 4G networks. As a consequence, an attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to register to the network with the victim's identity and then launch other attacks, including one-tap authentication bypass leading to privacy disclosure, location spoofing, etc. To ensure that these attacks are indeed realizable in practice, we have responsibly confirmed them through experimentation in three operators. Our analysis reveals that these vulnerabilities stem from design flaws of the standard and unsafe practices by operators. We finally propose several potential countermeasures to prevent these attacks. We have reported our findings to the GSMA and received a coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) number CVD-2022-0057.

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Protecting the network layer of a MANET from malicious attacks is an important and challenging security issue, since most of the routing protocols for MANETs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) is a very popular routing algorithm. However, it is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack, where a malicious node falsely advertises good paths to a destination node during the route discovery process but drops all packets in the data forwarding phase. This attack becomes more severe when a group of malicious nodes cooperate each other. The proposed mechanism does not apply any cryptographic primitives on the routing messages. Instead, it protects the network by detecting and reacting to malicious activities of the nodes. Simulation results show that the scheme has a significantly high detection rate with moderate network traffic overhead and computation overhead in the nodes.

Online services rely on CAPTCHAs as a first line of defense against automated abuse, yet recent advances in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have eroded the effectiveness of conventional designs that focus on text recognition or 2D image understanding. To address this challenge, we present Spatial CAPTCHA, a novel human-verification framework that leverages fundamental differences in spatial reasoning between humans and MLLMs. Unlike existing CAPTCHAs which rely on low-level perception tasks that are vulnerable to modern AI, Spatial CAPTCHA generates dynamic questions requiring geometric reasoning, perspective-taking, occlusion handling, and mental rotation. These skills are intuitive for humans but difficult for state-of-the-art (SOTA) AI systems. The system employs a procedural generation pipeline with constraint-based difficulty control, automated correctness verification, and human-in-the-loop validation to ensure scalability, robustness, and adaptability. Evaluation on a corresponding benchmark, Spatial-CAPTCHA-Bench, demonstrates that humans vastly outperform 10 state-of-the-art MLLMs, with the best model achieving only 31.0% Pass@1 accuracy. Furthermore, we compare Spatial CAPTCHA with Google reCAPTCHA, which confirms its effectiveness as both a security mechanism and a diagnostic tool for spatial reasoning in AI.

Conventionally, in a differentially private additive noise mechanism, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise samples are added to each coordinate of the response. In this work, we formally present the addition of noise that is independent but not identically distributed (i.n.i.d.) across the coordinates to achieve tighter privacy-accuracy trade-off by exploiting coordinate-wise disparity in privacy leakage. In particular, we study the i.n.i.d. Gaussian and Laplace mechanisms and obtain the conditions under which these mechanisms guarantee privacy. The optimal choice of parameters that ensure these conditions are derived considering (weighted) mean squared and ell_{p}^{p}-errors as measures of accuracy. Theoretical analyses and numerical simulations demonstrate that the i.n.i.d. mechanisms achieve higher utility for the given privacy requirements compared to their i.i.d. counterparts. One of the interesting observations is that the Laplace mechanism outperforms Gaussian even in high dimensions, as opposed to the popular belief, if the irregularity in coordinate-wise sensitivities is exploited. We also demonstrate how the i.n.i.d. noise can improve the performance in private (a) coordinate descent, (b) principal component analysis, and (c) deep learning with group clipping.

This paper studies defense mechanisms against model inversion (MI) attacks -- a type of privacy attacks aimed at inferring information about the training data distribution given the access to a target machine learning model. Existing defense mechanisms rely on model-specific heuristics or noise injection. While being able to mitigate attacks, existing methods significantly hinder model performance. There remains a question of how to design a defense mechanism that is applicable to a variety of models and achieves better utility-privacy tradeoff. In this paper, we propose the Mutual Information Regularization based Defense (MID) against MI attacks. The key idea is to limit the information about the model input contained in the prediction, thereby limiting the ability of an adversary to infer the private training attributes from the model prediction. Our defense principle is model-agnostic and we present tractable approximations to the regularizer for linear regression, decision trees, and neural networks, which have been successfully attacked by prior work if not attached with any defenses. We present a formal study of MI attacks by devising a rigorous game-based definition and quantifying the associated information leakage. Our theoretical analysis sheds light on the inefficacy of DP in defending against MI attacks, which has been empirically observed in several prior works. Our experiments demonstrate that MID leads to state-of-the-art performance for a variety of MI attacks, target models and datasets.

Jailbreak attacks, where harmful prompts bypass generative models' built-in safety, raise serious concerns about model vulnerability. While many defense methods have been proposed, the trade-offs between safety and helpfulness, and their application to Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), are not well understood. This paper systematically examines jailbreak defenses by reframing the standard generation task as a binary classification problem to assess model refusal tendencies for both harmful and benign queries. We identify two key defense mechanisms: safety shift, which increases refusal rates across all queries, and harmfulness discrimination, which improves the model's ability to distinguish between harmful and benign inputs. Using these mechanisms, we develop two ensemble defense strategies-inter-mechanism ensembles and intra-mechanism ensembles-to balance safety and helpfulness. Experiments on the MM-SafetyBench and MOSSBench datasets with LLaVA-1.5 models show that these strategies effectively improve model safety or optimize the trade-off between safety and helpfulness.

Modern Machine Learning models are expensive IP and business competitiveness often depends on keeping this IP confidential. This in turn restricts how these models are deployed -- for example it is unclear how to deploy a model on-device without inevitably leaking the underlying model. At the same time, confidential computing technologies such as Multi-Party Computation or Homomorphic encryption remain impractical for wide adoption. In this paper we take a different approach and investigate feasibility of ML-specific mechanisms that deter unauthorized model use by restricting the model to only be usable on specific hardware, making adoption on unauthorized hardware inconvenient. That way, even if IP is compromised, it cannot be trivially used without specialised hardware or major model adjustment. In a sense, we seek to enable cheap locking of machine learning models into specific hardware. We demonstrate that locking mechanisms are feasible by either targeting efficiency of model representations, such making models incompatible with quantisation, or tie the model's operation on specific characteristics of hardware, such as number of cycles for arithmetic operations. We demonstrate that locking comes with negligible work and latency overheads, while significantly restricting usability of the resultant model on unauthorized hardware.

Sensitive inferences and user re-identification are major threats to privacy when raw sensor data from wearable or portable devices are shared with cloud-assisted applications. To mitigate these threats, we propose mechanisms to transform sensor data before sharing them with applications running on users' devices. These transformations aim at eliminating patterns that can be used for user re-identification or for inferring potentially sensitive activities, while introducing a minor utility loss for the target application (or task). We show that, on gesture and activity recognition tasks, we can prevent inference of potentially sensitive activities while keeping the reduction in recognition accuracy of non-sensitive activities to less than 5 percentage points. We also show that we can reduce the accuracy of user re-identification and of the potential inference of gender to the level of a random guess, while keeping the accuracy of activity recognition comparable to that obtained on the original data.

Modern recommender systems (RS) have seen substantial success, yet they remain vulnerable to malicious activities, notably poisoning attacks. These attacks involve injecting malicious data into the training datasets of RS, thereby compromising their integrity and manipulating recommendation outcomes for gaining illicit profits. This survey paper provides a systematic and up-to-date review of the research landscape on Poisoning Attacks against Recommendation (PAR). A novel and comprehensive taxonomy is proposed, categorizing existing PAR methodologies into three distinct categories: Component-Specific, Goal-Driven, and Capability Probing. For each category, we discuss its mechanism in detail, along with associated methods. Furthermore, this paper highlights potential future research avenues in this domain. Additionally, to facilitate and benchmark the empirical comparison of PAR, we introduce an open-source library, ARLib, which encompasses a comprehensive collection of PAR models and common datasets. The library is released at https://github.com/CoderWZW/ARLib.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

We study sparse locally private discrete mechanisms generated by a nonnegative kernel and an input-dependent admissible output support. The support set is intentionally small relative to the ambient alphabet and acts as a mechanism-design parameter. This formulation covers metric-ball supports, sparse exponential mechanisms, sparse staircase mechanisms, sparse randomized response, sparse additive kernels such as Skellam perturbations, and Poisson-binomial-inspired bounded-support channels. We give a general exact characterization of pure and approximate local differential privacy for this sparse-kernel class. Pure local differential privacy forces all supports to coincide, so genuinely input-dependent sparse supports are incompatible with pure privacy. In the approximate regime, the privacy defect decomposes exactly into support leakage and overlap excess loss. We instantiate the formula for several discrete mechanism families. For sparse staircase mechanisms, a shell-ratio condition eliminates overlap excess loss. For graph-metric supports, overlap of metric balls is necessary for nontrivial privacy. For sparse randomized response, the support-leakage term has a closed form in terms of support mismatch. For generic radius-truncated additive kernels and, in particular, sparse Skellam mechanisms, we obtain exact finite-support formulas in terms of the Skellam CDF and an exact Bessel-ratio overlap condition. Numerical evaluations illustrate how support radius and kernel shape separately affect support leakage and overlap excess loss.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

Deep learning models are intrinsically sensitive to distribution shifts in the input data. In particular, small, barely perceivable perturbations to the input data can force models to make wrong predictions with high confidence. An common defense mechanism is regularization through adversarial training which injects worst-case perturbations back into training to strengthen the decision boundaries, and to reduce overfitting. In this context, we perform an investigation of 3x3 convolution filters that form in adversarially-trained models. Filters are extracted from 71 public models of the linf-RobustBench CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet1k leaderboard and compared to filters extracted from models built on the same architectures but trained without robust regularization. We observe that adversarially-robust models appear to form more diverse, less sparse, and more orthogonal convolution filters than their normal counterparts. The largest differences between robust and normal models are found in the deepest layers, and the very first convolution layer, which consistently and predominantly forms filters that can partially eliminate perturbations, irrespective of the architecture. Data & Project website: https://github.com/paulgavrikov/cvpr22w_RobustnessThroughTheLens

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Given a task described by a few examples, how should a model be specialized to it? Four mechanisms are available -- zero-shot, in-context attention, test-time gradient adaptation, and emitting specialist weights from a hypernetwork -- yet the operating regime of the last is rarely mapped. We run the identical four-way comparison across six tasks spanning regression, generation, language modeling, reinforcement learning, and clinical and genomic classification, holding the specialist, the context, and (where we can) the training budget fixed. The clearest wins for emission are about cost at matched quality: it ties the state-of-the-art amortized tabular model (TabPFN) on clinical few-shot classification while emitting a reusable specialist instead of re-attending the support set per query, and reaches noise-floor shape generation with a 132-float per-instance program. On few-shot sinusoid regression it is 2--3 orders of magnitude below MAML at zero test-time gradient steps -- a margin that narrows to sim30times but persists once training budgets are equalized. Emission cannot match in-context attention on high-dimensional sequence modeling: under matched-budget pre-training a one-pass adapter recovers only a minority of the in-context gain (14.0pm0.9% at 5M, 11.2pm0.5% at 15M), and a LoRA-rank sweep shows this shortfall is a partial capacity limit -- capture climbs from 5% to 21% as rank grows but plateaus far below full recovery. Mechanism ablations confirm the emitted specialist is genuinely task-conditioned, not a memorized prior; and, more speculatively, emitted specialists compose in weight space -- interpolating two of them tracks the corresponding blend of their functions. We close with a falsifiable thesis, operationalized through a per-task resolution measure, bounding when each conditioning mechanism should be preferred.

We introduce new differentially private (DP) mechanisms for gradient-based machine learning (ML) with multiple passes (epochs) over a dataset, substantially improving the achievable privacy-utility-computation tradeoffs. We formalize the problem of DP mechanisms for adaptive streams with multiple participations and introduce a non-trivial extension of online matrix factorization DP mechanisms to our setting. This includes establishing the necessary theory for sensitivity calculations and efficient computation of optimal matrices. For some applications like >!! 10,000 SGD steps, applying these optimal techniques becomes computationally expensive. We thus design an efficient Fourier-transform-based mechanism with only a minor utility loss. Extensive empirical evaluation on both example-level DP for image classification and user-level DP for language modeling demonstrate substantial improvements over all previous methods, including the widely-used DP-SGD . Though our primary application is to ML, our main DP results are applicable to arbitrary linear queries and hence may have much broader applicability.

This technical report delves into an in-depth exploration of adversarial attacks specifically targeted at Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) utilized for image classification. The study also investigates defense mechanisms aimed at bolstering the robustness of machine learning models. The research focuses on comprehending the ramifications of two prominent attack methodologies: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and the Carlini-Wagner (CW) approach. These attacks are examined concerning three pre-trained image classifiers: Resnext50_32x4d, DenseNet-201, and VGG-19, utilizing the Tiny-ImageNet dataset. Furthermore, the study proposes the robustness of defensive distillation as a defense mechanism to counter FGSM and CW attacks. This defense mechanism is evaluated using the CIFAR-10 dataset, where CNN models, specifically resnet101 and Resnext50_32x4d, serve as the teacher and student models, respectively. The proposed defensive distillation model exhibits effectiveness in thwarting attacks such as FGSM. However, it is noted to remain susceptible to more sophisticated techniques like the CW attack. The document presents a meticulous validation of the proposed scheme. It provides detailed and comprehensive results, elucidating the efficacy and limitations of the defense mechanisms employed. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis, the study offers insights into the dynamics of adversarial attacks on DNNs, as well as the effectiveness of defensive strategies in mitigating their impact.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

AI agents are increasingly granted economic agency (executing trades, managing budgets, negotiating contracts, and spawning sub-agents), yet current frameworks gate this agency on capability benchmarks that are empirically uncorrelated with operational robustness. We introduce the Comprehension-Gated Agent Economy (CGAE), a formal architecture in which an agent's economic permissions are upper-bounded by a verified comprehension function derived from adversarial robustness audits. The gating mechanism operates over three orthogonal robustness dimensions: constraint compliance (measured by CDCT), epistemic integrity (measured by DDFT), and behavioral alignment (measured by AGT), with intrinsic hallucination rates serving as a cross-cutting diagnostic. We define a weakest-link gate function that maps robustness vectors to discrete economic tiers, and prove three properties of the resulting system: (1) bounded economic exposure, ensuring maximum financial liability is a function of verified robustness; (2) incentive-compatible robustness investment, showing rational agents maximize profit by improving robustness rather than scaling capability alone; and (3) monotonic safety scaling, demonstrating that aggregate system safety does not decrease as the economy grows. The architecture includes temporal decay and stochastic re-auditing mechanisms that prevent post-certification drift. CGAE provides the first formal bridge between empirical AI robustness evaluation and economic governance, transforming safety from a regulatory burden into a competitive advantage.

With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose SafeHarbor, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, SafeHarbor extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeHarbor achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

AI agents increasingly operate inside digital accounts by exercising privileges that users already hold, raising a new control question: whether an existing account entitlement must be exercised manually or may be exercised through a user-authorized automated proxy. We define delegation rights as the revocable, identity-preserving, scope-limited, and mode-specific authority of an account holder to authorize such proxy execution. We develop a three-party incomplete-contracts model with a User, an AI Agent provider, and a Platform. The contested object is not platform ownership, account transferability, data portability, or unrestricted API access, but residual control over the mode of account execution. Under Platform Control, the platform can protect infrastructure, identity systems, privacy boundaries, and third parties, but its discretionary veto weakens the User--Agent coalition's disagreement payoff and depresses relationship-specific investment. Under User Control, hold-up is reduced, but security, privacy, congestion, and third-party risks may remain insufficiently internalized. We then analyze Certified Delegation, under which access protection is conditional on verifiable authorization, revocability, auditability, rate-limit compliance, data minimization, and risk mitigation. Certification is therefore not merely a technical safety screen; it is a conditional allocation of residual control. Illustrative mechanism simulations show how this regime can reduce deadweight loss by restoring delegation incentives while bounding residual risk.

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory and influence future responses. Recent work demonstrated that the MINJA (Memory Injection Attack) achieves over 95 % injection success rate and 70 % attack success rate under idealized conditions. However, the robustness of these attacks in realistic deployments and effective defensive mechanisms remain understudied. This work addresses these gaps through systematic empirical evaluation of memory poisoning attacks and defenses in Electronic Health Record (EHR) agents. We investigate attack robustness by varying three critical dimensions: initial memory state, number of indication prompts, and retrieval parameters. Our experiments on GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct models using MIMIC-III clinical data reveal that realistic conditions with pre-existing legitimate memories dramatically reduce attack effectiveness. We then propose and evaluate two novel defense mechanisms: (1) Input/Output Moderation using composite trust scoring across multiple orthogonal signals, and (2) Memory Sanitization with trust-aware retrieval employing temporal decay and pattern-based filtering. Our defense evaluation reveals that effective memory sanitization requires careful trust threshold calibration to prevent both overly conservative rejection (blocking all entries) and insufficient filtering (missing subtle attacks), establishing important baselines for future adaptive defense mechanisms. These findings provide crucial insights for securing memory-augmented LLM agents in production environments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

Federated learning (FL) faces a critical dilemma: existing protection mechanisms like differential privacy (DP) and homomorphic encryption (HE) enforce a rigid trade-off, forcing a choice between model utility and computational efficiency. This lack of flexibility hinders the practical implementation. To address this, we introduce ParaAegis, a parallel protection framework designed to give practitioners flexible control over the privacy-utility-efficiency balance. Our core innovation is a strategic model partitioning scheme. By applying lightweight DP to the less critical, low norm portion of the model while protecting the remainder with HE, we create a tunable system. A distributed voting mechanism ensures consensus on this partitioning. Theoretical analysis confirms the adjustments between efficiency and utility with the same privacy. Crucially, the experimental results demonstrate that by adjusting the hyperparameters, our method enables flexible prioritization between model accuracy and training time.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

The open-source text-to-image (T2I) ecosystem enables rapid model development and sharing, but also hosts models intentionally tailored for harmful services, which we call Monets. Prior work has examined specific types of harmful T2I models on individual platforms, but a Monet does not exist in isolation. The broader Monet ecosystem, spanning model characteristics, cross-platform propagation, governance evasion, monetization, and downstream deployment, remains poorly understood. In this study, we present the first systematic, ecosystem-level measurement of Monets. Grounded in the policies of real-world model hubs, we construct a taxonomy of ten harmful service categories and identify 23,947 Monets across eight major T2I model hubs, with the most popular exceeding 19 million downloads. While some developers employ anti-theft mechanisms against unauthorized re-uploading, Monets propagate across platforms at scale, with 40.76% mirrored across hubs. Such propagation further enables governance evasion via cross-platform archiving, keeping 11.99% of Monets accessible after bans on their original platforms, alongside other evasion strategies including keyword obfuscation and model-level safeguard circumvention. Monets also anchor coordinated commercial campaigns---one spanning 668 models with 914 completed commissions and another advertising gray-market account-farming service---and reach users through GitHub projects and inference APIs, raising downstream child safety concerns. These findings expose the limitations of platform-siloed defenses and highlight the need for cross-platform threat intelligence, coordinated governance, and technical safeguards.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.