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Oct 20

SkillFusion: Towards Reliable Multi-Skill Composition for LLM Agents

Independently authored skills can impose incompatible requirements, competing preferences, and redundant instructions when jointly loaded by an LLM agent. We propose SkillFusion, an offline compiler that reconciles these interactions into a reusable merged skill. Its central idea is to make composition decisions explicit through typed, scoped constraints linked to their source directives. A type-scope gate selects candidate interactions, while selective fallback revisits pairs potentially missed by structural pruning. A classifier identifies interaction types, and an adversarial verifier re-examines uncertain judgments. The resolver applies conditional routing or explicit priorities to hard conflicts, verified abstraction to soft conflicts, and deduplication to redundant instructions. Source-linked checks guide synthesis and compression, and metadata synthesis supports discovery of the merged skill. The resulting artifact retains associated scripts and resources and can be reused across tasks and executor models. SkillFusion achieves the highest mean Success among evaluated non-oracle methods on all three agent benchmarks and on both transfer benchmarks across three executor models. At the largest tested instruction configurations, it achieves over 2.5 times the Success of unresolved multi-skill loading, highlighting the growing value of reconciliation as composition becomes more demanding. The code will be open-sourced after the review process concludes.

  • 8 authors
·
Oct 10

Diagnosis Before Recovery: Turning Agent Failures into Selective Self-Correction

Self-correction is particularly useful when a failure constrains the next repair. Coding agents benefit from this property because compilers, tests, and execution traces turn many failures into typed recovery signals, but broad language-agent tasks often expose only a coarse task failure. This creates a tension for generic recovery playbooks: they broaden the agent's context precisely when the system needs a narrower repair interface, mixing incompatible signals for invalid actions, missing procedures, and strict-format errors. Our insight is that development-set failures can recover part of the missing diagnostic substrate by deciding which recovery interventions are admissible before test-time correction. We propose DARC, a diagnosis-guided recovery harness that profiles task-family failure modes, prunes mismatched interventions from a shared recovery library, and freezes a verifier-selected success-cost policy for deployment. This causal order makes correction selective: the harness first determines what kind of failure can be repaired, then decides how much recovery evidence to spend. In ALFWorld, AppWorld, and XBRL Finance, the same protocol yields an action-validity harness, a procedural-recovery fallback, and a format-precision retrieval policy; in each evaluated setting it improves average task performance over base agents and broad playbooks while reducing environment steps or retrieval budget. Our experiments show that failures need not trigger uniformly more context: DARC turns self-correction from prompt expansion into recovery-interface design. DARC provides a practical route toward more reliable agents in domains where compiler-like feedback is absent: making failures actionable before making contexts larger.

  • 9 authors
·
Aug 11

Certifiers Make Neural Networks Vulnerable to Availability Attacks

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 25, 2021

Per-Query Gating of LLM Rerankers for Multi-Hop Retrieval

LLM rerankers add of the order of \$0.2-0.3 per 1,000 queries and about a second of tail latency on top of a graph-augmented dense pipeline such as HippoRAG2, and on three multi-hop benchmarks they improve final-hop top-K coverage on seven of nine (dataset, K) cells, by up to +34.8 pp. We ask whether a learned per-query gate can skip the reranker where it will not help, using only features available before the LLM call (27 score and lexical statistics of the two retrieval lists plus a PCA of a small query embedding) with an executable fallback. Every choice, including the fallback and the threshold, is made inside the training fold and applied once to held-out queries, and harmful skips (the rerank would have found the target, the fallback did not) are reported next to the aggregate coverage. Across nine cells on 2WikiMultiHopQA, MuSiQue and HotpotQA the gate skips 51% of calls at an average held-out LastHop@K cost of 1.2 pp; four cells meet a pre-registered 1 pp rule, harmful skips occur in eight (190 harmful against 136 beneficial), and a random gate at the same skip rate loses 2 to 11 pp on the high-lift cells. A second rule sets each cell's threshold from a pre-specified budget on the expected harmful-skip rate over Platt-calibrated harm probabilities (ECE 0.025 after calibration, 0.094 before): at a 1 pp budget the gate skips 42% at -0.8 pp with 66 harmful skips and six cells within 1 pp, but realised harm exceeds the promise in six cells (mean 1.45 vs 0.83 pp), a selection optimism we quantify; a 0.5 pp budget realises about 1 pp. The harm probabilities are calibrated but barely discriminative (AUC 0.16 to 0.70). An earlier version reported 73% "lossless" savings; that figure rested on an oracle fallback and a wrong MuSiQue target, and we document both.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 18

Selective Machine Learning of the Average Treatment Effect with an Invalid Instrumental Variable

Instrumental variable methods have been widely used to identify causal effects in the presence of unmeasured confounding. A key identification condition known as the exclusion restriction states that the instrument cannot have a direct effect on the outcome which is not mediated by the exposure in view. In the health and social sciences, such an assumption is often not credible. To address this concern, we consider identification conditions of the population average treatment effect with an invalid instrumental variable which does not satisfy the exclusion restriction, and derive the efficient influence function targeting the identifying functional under a nonparametric observed data model. We propose a novel multiply robust locally efficient estimator of the average treatment effect that is consistent in the union of multiple parametric nuisance models, as well as a multiply debiased machine learning estimator for which the nuisance parameters are estimated using generic machine learning methods, that effectively exploit various forms of linear or nonlinear structured sparsity in the nuisance parameter space. When one cannot be confident that any of these machine learners is consistent at sufficiently fast rates to ensure n-consistency for the average treatment effect, we introduce a new criteria for selective machine learning which leverages the multiple robustness property in order to ensure small bias. The proposed methods are illustrated through extensive simulations and a data analysis evaluating the causal effect of 401(k) participation on savings.

  • 3 authors
·
Jul 27, 2019

False Floors: LLM Safety Routing Evaluations Break Under Distribution Shift

Safety routers send each request to one of several models and are judged against the best single model. A major routing benchmark picks that comparator on the evaluation data. In the benchmark's own setting this is harmless, but under distribution shift it is not. On HELM Safety the selection cost is 0.003-0.030 of harm under random splits and 0.045-0.113 under held-out categories, comparable to the whole deficit attributed to routing, with its direction holding under either published judge alone. It rises seven- to ninefold on AgentDojo when suites are held out. Across seven safety corpora chosen by rules fixed in advance, three meet a registered interval test and four beat a later permutation null, and three of the four interval misses are corpora where some models have zero observed harm. Prior work proves the direction of this bias. We size it on harm and accuracy, show that it is larger under the held-out splits we measure, and bound it by optimism plus a shift-dependent regret. Scored honestly under shift, routing buys little on these benchmarks. In most pool cells the nested router serves the honest baseline's model, and on the nearly saturated AgentDojo corpus a perfect pre-dispatch router is worth at most two points of harm. We also find a model's expressed recognition of a late injection steerable. On held-out reruns an attacker who knows which model it faces lowers GPT-5.4's judged recognition by 19.6 points, confirmed by an independent label. In an offline counterfactual composition into a controller, the same attack raises or lowers estimated harm depending on the fallback model. Safety routing should be evaluated under shift, against a baseline chosen without the test labels, and recognition-based defences should be scored on harm against an attacker who chooses what the model sees.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 30