Daily Papers

Softmax attention is the cornerstone of modern large language models, but its memory scales linearly and compute quadratically with sequence length. Linear recurrent models, such as linear attention and state space models, have become widely studied as alternatives to attention due to their linear compute and constant memory. While these sub-quadratic token mixing methods, or mixers, achieve promising efficiency gains and competitive results on a wide range of benchmarks, current linear recurrent models still lag behind on tasks that require long-context retrieval or in-context learning. A growing body of work studies hybrid architectures that attempt to mitigate these trade-offs by statically interleaving or merging attention and recurrent blocks. In this work, we explore a new axis of developing hybrid models: across the token sequence. We propose Oryx, a hybrid model that can, throughout a sequence, flexibly switch between different mixers, for example quadratic attention for rich context utilization and linear recurrences for efficient generation. Oryx ties at least 90% of its parameters across mixers, enabling attention and recurrent modes to operate over shared internal representations. We validate our design with Mamba-2 and Gated DeltaNet variants, up to 1.4B models. Under fixed token budgets and a mixed-training strategy, Oryx achieves comparable or better performance than its single-mixer baselines. At the 1.4B scale, all instances of Oryx outperform their respective baselines by at least 0.7 percentage points on averaged language modeling tasks. On retrieval tasks, Oryx achieves performance comparable to the Transformer baseline even when processing only a tiny fraction (<10%) of the tokens in attention mode. These results suggest that attention and linear recurrent models can share internal representations, and motivate sequence-axis hybridization as a promising direction.

Language models are often said to face a symbol grounding problem. While some have argued the problem can be solved without resort to other modalities, many have speculated that grounded learning is more efficient. We explore this question in Othello, a simplified, rule-based world that offers a controlled and interpretable testbed for studying world understanding. Building on prior work, we introduce VISOTHELLO, a multi-modal model trained jointly on move sequences and board images. Using the Othello rule understanding task, we examine whether multi-modal learning provides advantages over text-only approaches. We further evaluate robustness under semantically irrelevant perturbations and analyze the consistency of cross-modal alignment. Our results suggest that multi-modal training not only improves performance and robustness but also promotes convergence toward shared internal representations across different model architectures.

We introduce the "single-life" learning paradigm, where we train a distinct vision model exclusively on egocentric videos captured by one individual. We leverage the multiple viewpoints naturally captured within a single life to learn a visual encoder in a self-supervised manner. Our experiments demonstrate three key findings. First, models trained independently on different lives develop a highly aligned geometric understanding. We demonstrate this by training visual encoders on distinct datasets each capturing a different life, both indoors and outdoors, as well as introducing a novel cross-attention-based metric to quantify the functional alignment of the internal representations developed by different models. Second, we show that single-life models learn generalizable geometric representations that effectively transfer to downstream tasks, such as depth estimation, in unseen environments. Third, we demonstrate that training on up to 30 hours from one week of the same person's life leads to comparable performance to training on 30 hours of diverse web data, highlighting the strength of single-life representation learning. Overall, our results establish that the shared structure of the world, both leads to consistency in models trained on individual lives, and provides a powerful signal for visual representation learning.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) extend large language models (LLMs) from independent single-model reasoning to coordinative system-level intelligence. While existing LLM agents depend on text-based mediation for reasoning and communication, we take a step forward by enabling models to collaborate directly within the continuous latent space. We introduce LatentMAS, an end-to-end training-free framework that enables pure latent collaboration among LLM agents. In LatentMAS, each agent first performs auto-regressive latent thoughts generation through last-layer hidden embeddings. A shared latent working memory then preserves and transfers each agent's internal representations, ensuring lossless information exchange. We provide theoretical analyses establishing that LatentMAS attains higher expressiveness and lossless information preservation with substantially lower complexity than vanilla text-based MAS. In addition, empirical evaluations across 9 comprehensive benchmarks spanning math and science reasoning, commonsense understanding, and code generation show that LatentMAS consistently outperforms strong single-model and text-based MAS baselines, achieving up to 14.6% higher accuracy, reducing output token usage by 70.8%-83.7%, and providing 4x-4.3x faster end-to-end inference. These results demonstrate that our new latent collaboration framework enhances system-level reasoning quality while offering substantial efficiency gains without any additional training. Code and data are fully open-sourced at https://github.com/Gen-Verse/LatentMAS.

We present NER Retriever, a zero-shot retrieval framework for ad-hoc Named Entity Retrieval, a variant of Named Entity Recognition (NER), where the types of interest are not provided in advance, and a user-defined type description is used to retrieve documents mentioning entities of that type. Instead of relying on fixed schemas or fine-tuned models, our method builds on internal representations of large language models (LLMs) to embed both entity mentions and user-provided open-ended type descriptions into a shared semantic space. We show that internal representations, specifically the value vectors from mid-layer transformer blocks, encode fine-grained type information more effectively than commonly used top-layer embeddings. To refine these representations, we train a lightweight contrastive projection network that aligns type-compatible entities while separating unrelated types. The resulting entity embeddings are compact, type-aware, and well-suited for nearest-neighbor search. Evaluated on three benchmarks, NER Retriever significantly outperforms both lexical and dense sentence-level retrieval baselines. Our findings provide empirical support for representation selection within LLMs and demonstrate a practical solution for scalable, schema-free entity retrieval. The NER Retriever Codebase is publicly available at https://github.com/ShacharOr100/ner_retriever

We investigate feature universality in Gemma-2 language models (Gemma-2-2B and Gemma-2-9B), asking whether models with a four-fold difference in scale still converge on comparable internal concepts. Using the Sparse Autoencoder (SAE) dictionary-learning pipeline, we utilize SAEs on each model's residual-stream activations, align the resulting monosemantic features via activation correlation, and compare the matched feature spaces with SVCCA and RSA. Middle layers yield the strongest overlap, while early and late layers show far less similarity. Preliminary experiments extend the analysis from single tokens to multi-token subspaces, showing that semantically similar subspaces interact similarly with language models. These results strengthen the case that large language models carve the world into broadly similar, interpretable features despite size differences, reinforcing universality as a foundation for cross-model interpretability.

While researchers are finding concepts represented as linear directions in language models, a bag of linear directions fails to capture relational structure. To better understand this dichotomy, we study a model with known linear representations, but trained in a highly structured domain -- the board game Othello. While the model's internal board-state representation is linearly decodable, we find additional structure in the form of tensor product representations (TPRs). We train TPR probes to recover shared structure amongst the linear probes, yielding a factorization into square-embeddings, color-embeddings, and a binding matrix that composes them to construct the model's board-state representation. We find geometric signatures within the weights of our TPR probe that align with the structure of the board, but perhaps more importantly, that the linear probes can be recovered directly from the parameters of our TPR probe. Our findings suggest that directional representations may be projections of more structured underlying representations.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong multilingual abilities, yet the neural mechanisms behind language-specific processing remain unclear. We analyze language-specific neurons in Llama-3.1-8B, Mistral-Nemo-12B, and Aya-Expanse-8B & 32B across 21 typologically diverse languages, identifying neurons that control language behavior. Using the Language Activation Probability Entropy (LAPE) method, we show that these neurons cluster in deeper layers, with non-Latin scripts showing greater specialization. Related languages share overlapping neurons, reflecting internal representations of linguistic proximity. Through language arithmetics, i.e. systematic activation addition and multiplication, we steer models to deactivate unwanted languages and activate desired ones, outperforming simpler replacement approaches. These interventions effectively guide behavior across five multilingual tasks: language forcing, translation, QA, comprehension, and NLI. Manipulation is more successful for high-resource languages, while typological similarity improves effectiveness. We also demonstrate that cross-lingual neuron steering enhances downstream performance and reveal internal "fallback" mechanisms for language selection when neurons are progressively deactivated. Our code is made publicly available at https://github.com/d-gurgurov/Language-Neurons-Manipulation.

Large language models (LLMs) trained purely on text ostensibly lack any direct perceptual experience, yet their internal representations are implicitly shaped by multimodal regularities encoded in language. We test the hypothesis that explicit sensory prompting can surface this latent structure, bringing a text-only LLM into closer representational alignment with specialist vision and audio encoders. When a sensory prompt tells the model to 'see' or 'hear', it cues the model to resolve its next-token predictions as if they were conditioned on latent visual or auditory evidence that is never actually supplied. Our findings reveal that lightweight prompt engineering can reliably activate modality-appropriate representations in purely text-trained LLMs.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Modern language models can process inputs across diverse languages and modalities. We hypothesize that models acquire this capability through learning a shared representation space across heterogeneous data types (e.g., different languages and modalities), which places semantically similar inputs near one another, even if they are from different modalities/languages. We term this the semantic hub hypothesis, following the hub-and-spoke model from neuroscience (Patterson et al., 2007) which posits that semantic knowledge in the human brain is organized through a transmodal semantic "hub" which integrates information from various modality-specific "spokes" regions. We first show that model representations for semantically equivalent inputs in different languages are similar in the intermediate layers, and that this space can be interpreted using the model's dominant pretraining language via the logit lens. This tendency extends to other data types, including arithmetic expressions, code, and visual/audio inputs. Interventions in the shared representation space in one data type also predictably affect model outputs in other data types, suggesting that this shared representations space is not simply a vestigial byproduct of large-scale training on broad data, but something that is actively utilized by the model during input processing.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Human languages differ widely in their forms, each having distinct sounds, scripts, and syntax. Yet, they can all convey similar meaning. Do different languages converge on a shared neural substrate for conceptual meaning? We used language models (LMs) and naturalistic fMRI to identify neural representations of the shared conceptual meaning of the same story as heard by native speakers of three languages: English, Chinese, and French. We found that LMs trained on entirely different languages converge onto a similar embedding space, especially in the middle layers. We then aimed to find if a similar shared space exists in the brains of different native speakers of the three languages. We trained voxelwise encoding models that align the LM embeddings with neural responses from one group of subjects speaking a single language. We then used the encoding models trained on one language to predict the neural activity in listeners of other languages. We found that models trained to predict neural activity for one language generalize to different subjects listening to the same content in a different language, across high-level language and default-mode regions. Our results suggest that the neural representations of meaning underlying different languages are shared across speakers of various languages, and that LMs trained on different languages converge on this shared meaning. These findings suggest that, despite the diversity of languages, shared meaning emerges from our interactions with one another and our shared world.

We investigate the generalization capabilities of small language models under two popular adaptation paradigms: few-shot prompting and supervised fine-tuning. While prompting is often favored for its parameter efficiency and flexibility, it remains unclear how robust this approach is in low-resource settings and under distributional shifts. This paper presents a comparative study of prompting and fine-tuning across task formats, prompt styles, and model scales, with a focus on their behavior in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) settings. Beyond accuracy, we analyze the internal representations learned by each approach to assess the stability and abstraction of task-specific features. Our findings highlight critical differences in how small models internalize and generalize knowledge under different adaptation strategies. This work offers practical guidance for model selection in low-data regimes and contributes empirical insight into the ongoing debate over prompting versus fine-tuning. Code for the experiments is available at the following

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The Strong Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that representational convergence in artificial neural networks can be harnessed constructively: embeddings can be translated across models through a universal latent space without paired data. We ask whether an analogous geometry can be recovered across human brains. Using fMRI data from the Natural Scenes Dataset, we propose a self-supervised encoder that learns subject-specific embeddings from brain data alone by exploiting repeated stimulus presentations. We show that these independently learned spaces can be translated across subjects using unsupervised orthogonal rotations, without paired cross-subject samples or intermediate model representations. Synchronizing pairwise rotations into a single shared latent space further improves cross-subject retrieval, indicating that subject-specific spaces are mutually compatible with a common coordinate system. These results provide evidence for a shared neural geometry in the human visual cortex: subject-specific fMRI representations are approximately isometric across individuals and can be translated through purely geometric transformations.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

A fundamental question in cognitive neuroscience is what shapes visual perception: the external world's structure or the brain's internal architecture. Although some perceptual variability can be traced to individual differences, brain responses to naturalistic stimuli evoke similar activity patterns across individuals, suggesting a convergent representational principle. Here, we test if this stimulus-driven convergence follows a common trajectory across people and deep neural networks (DNNs) during its transformation from sensory to high-level internal representations. We introduce a unified framework that traces representational flow by combining inter-subject similarity with alignment to model hierarchies. Applying this framework to three independent fMRI datasets of visual scene perception, we reveal a cortex-wide network, conserved across individuals, organized into two pathways: a medial-ventral stream for scene structure and a lateral-dorsal stream tuned for social and biological content. This functional organization is captured by the hierarchies of vision DNNs but not language models, reinforcing the specificity of the visual-to-semantic transformation. These findings show a convergent computational solution for visual encoding in both human and artificial vision, driven by the structure of the external world.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

How do transformer language models memorize factual associations? A common view casts internal weight matrices as associative memories over pairs of embeddings, requiring parameter counts that scale linearly with the number of facts. We develop a theoretical and empirical account of an alternative, geometric form of memorization in which learned embeddings encode relational structure directly, and the MLP plays a qualitatively different role. In a controlled setting where a single-layer transformer must memorize random bijections from subjects to a shared attribute set, we prove that a logarithmic embedding dimension suffices: subject embeddings encode linear superpositions of their associated attribute vectors, and a small MLP acts as a relation-conditioned selector that extracts the relevant attribute via ReLU gating, and not as an associative key-value mapping. We extend these results to the multi-hop setting -- chains of relational queries such as ``Who is the mother of the wife of x?'' -- providing constructions with and without chain-of-thought that exhibit a provable capacity-depth tradeoff, complemented by a matching information-theoretic lower bound. Empirically, gradient descent discovers solutions with precisely the predicted structure. Once trained, the MLP transfers zero-shot to entirely new bijections when subject embeddings are appropriately re-initialized, revealing that it has learned a generic selection mechanism rather than memorized any particular set of facts.

It has been observed that representations learned by distinct neural networks conceal structural similarities when the models are trained under similar inductive biases. From a geometric perspective, identifying the classes of transformations and the related invariances that connect these representations is fundamental to unlocking applications, such as merging, stitching, and reusing different neural modules. However, estimating task-specific transformations a priori can be challenging and expensive due to several factors (e.g., weights initialization, training hyperparameters, or data modality). To this end, we introduce a versatile method to directly incorporate a set of invariances into the representations, constructing a product space of invariant components on top of the latent representations without requiring prior knowledge about the optimal invariance to infuse. We validate our solution on classification and reconstruction tasks, observing consistent latent similarity and downstream performance improvements in a zero-shot stitching setting. The experimental analysis comprises three modalities (vision, text, and graphs), twelve pretrained foundational models, nine benchmarks, and several architectures trained from scratch.

Current neural architectures lack a principled way to handle interchangeable tokens, i.e., symbols that are semantically equivalent yet distinguishable, such as bound variables. As a result, models trained on fixed vocabularies often struggle to generalize to unseen symbols, even when the underlying semantics remain unchanged. We propose a novel Transformer-based mechanism that is provably invariant to the renaming of interchangeable tokens. Our approach employs parallel embedding streams to isolate the contribution of each interchangeable token in the input, combined with an aggregated attention mechanism that enables structured information sharing across streams. Experimental results confirm the theoretical guarantees of our method and demonstrate substantial performance gains on open-vocabulary tasks that require generalization to novel symbols. Project page: https://bu-depend-lab.github.io/Symbol-Invariant-Transformer/

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

We study the intriguing connection between visual data, deep networks, and the brain. Our method creates a universal channel alignment by using brain voxel fMRI response prediction as the training objective. We discover that deep networks, trained with different objectives, share common feature channels across various models. These channels can be clustered into recurring sets, corresponding to distinct brain regions, indicating the formation of visual concepts. Tracing the clusters of channel responses onto the images, we see semantically meaningful object segments emerge, even without any supervised decoder. Furthermore, the universal feature alignment and the clustering of channels produce a picture and quantification of how visual information is processed through the different network layers, which produces precise comparisons between the networks.

Instruction tuning improves the ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow diverse human instructions, but achieving strong performance on specific target tasks remains challenging. A critical bottleneck is selecting the most relevant data to maximize task-specific performance. Existing data selection approaches include unstable influence-based methods and more stable distribution alignment methods, the latter of which critically rely on the underlying sample representation. In practice, most distribution alignment methods, from shallow features (e.g., BM25) to neural embeddings (e.g., BGE, LLM2Vec), may fail to capture how the model internally processes samples. To bridge this gap, we adopt a model-centric strategy in which each sample is represented by its neuronal activation pattern in the model, directly reflecting internal computation. However, directly using raw neuron activations leads to spurious similarity between unrelated samples due to neuron polysemanticity, where a single neuron may respond to multiple, unrelated concepts. To address this, we employ sparse autoencoders to disentangle polysemantic activations into sparse, monosemantic representations, and introduce a dedicated similarity metric for this space to better identify task-relevant data. Comprehensive experiments across multiple instruction datasets, models, tasks, and selection ratios show that our approach consistently outperforms existing data selection baselines in both stability and task-specific performance.

Multi-subject fMRI studies are challenging due to the high variability of both brain anatomy and functional brain topographies across participants. An effective way of aggregating multi-subject fMRI data is to extract a shared representation that filters out unwanted variability among subjects. Some recent work has implemented probabilistic models to extract a shared representation in task fMRI. In the present work, we improve upon these models by incorporating temporal information in the common latent structures. We introduce a new model, Shared Gaussian Process Factor Analysis (S-GPFA), that discovers shared latent trajectories and subject-specific functional topographies, while modelling temporal correlation in fMRI data. We demonstrate the efficacy of our model in revealing ground truth latent structures using simulated data, and replicate experimental performance of time-segment matching and inter-subject similarity on the publicly available Raider and Sherlock datasets. We further test the utility of our model by analyzing its learned model parameters in the large multi-site SPINS dataset, on a social cognition task from participants with and without schizophrenia.

We employ new tools from mechanistic interpretability in order to ask whether the internal structure of large language models (LLMs) shows correspondence to the linguistic structures which underlie the languages on which they are trained. In particular, we ask (1) when two languages employ the same morphosyntactic processes, do LLMs handle them using shared internal circuitry? and (2) when two languages require different morphosyntactic processes, do LLMs handle them using different internal circuitry? Using English and Chinese multilingual and monolingual models, we analyze the internal circuitry involved in two tasks. We find evidence that models employ the same circuit to handle the same syntactic process independently of the language in which it occurs, and that this is the case even for monolingual models trained completely independently. Moreover, we show that multilingual models employ language-specific components (attention heads and feed-forward networks) when needed to handle linguistic processes (e.g., morphological marking) that only exist in some languages. Together, our results provide new insights into how LLMs trade off between exploiting common structures and preserving linguistic differences when tasked with modeling multiple languages simultaneously.

Despite rapid adoption and deployment of large language models (LLMs), the internal computations of these models remain opaque and poorly understood. In this work, we seek to understand how high-level human-interpretable features are represented within the internal neuron activations of LLMs. We train k-sparse linear classifiers (probes) on these internal activations to predict the presence of features in the input; by varying the value of k we study the sparsity of learned representations and how this varies with model scale. With k=1, we localize individual neurons which are highly relevant for a particular feature, and perform a number of case studies to illustrate general properties of LLMs. In particular, we show that early layers make use of sparse combinations of neurons to represent many features in superposition, that middle layers have seemingly dedicated neurons to represent higher-level contextual features, and that increasing scale causes representational sparsity to increase on average, but there are multiple types of scaling dynamics. In all, we probe for over 100 unique features comprising 10 different categories in 7 different models spanning 70 million to 6.9 billion parameters.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

We investigate the extent to which an LLM's hidden-state geometry can be recovered from its behavior in psycholinguistic experiments. Across eight instruction-tuned transformer models, we run two experimental paradigms -- similarity-based forced choice and free association -- over a shared 5,000-word vocabulary, collecting 17.5M+ trials to build behavior-based similarity matrices. Using representational similarity analysis, we compare behavioral geometries to layerwise hidden-state similarity and benchmark against FastText, BERT, and cross-model consensus. We find that forced-choice behavior aligns substantially more with hidden-state geometry than free association. In a held-out-words regression, behavioral similarity (especially forced choice) predicts unseen hidden-state similarities beyond lexical baselines and cross-model consensus, indicating that behavior-only measurements retain recoverable information about internal semantic geometry. Finally, we discuss implications for the ability of behavioral tasks to uncover hidden cognitive states.

Much of the excitement in modern AI is driven by the observation that scaling up existing systems leads to better performance. But does better performance necessarily imply better internal representations? While the representational optimist assumes it must, this position paper challenges that view. We compare neural networks evolved through an open-ended search process to networks trained via conventional stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the simple task of generating a single image. This minimal setup offers a unique advantage: each hidden neuron's full functional behavior can be easily visualized as an image, thus revealing how the network's output behavior is internally constructed neuron by neuron. The result is striking: while both networks produce the same output behavior, their internal representations differ dramatically. The SGD-trained networks exhibit a form of disorganization that we term fractured entangled representation (FER). Interestingly, the evolved networks largely lack FER, even approaching a unified factored representation (UFR). In large models, FER may be degrading core model capacities like generalization, creativity, and (continual) learning. Therefore, understanding and mitigating FER could be critical to the future of representation learning.

The abilities to perceive, learn, and use generalities, similarities, classes, i.e., semantic memory (SM), is central to cognition. Machine learning (ML), neural network, and AI research has been primarily driven by tasks requiring such abilities. However, another central facet of cognition, single-trial formation of permanent memories of experiences, i.e., episodic memory (EM), has had relatively little focus. Only recently has EM-like functionality been added to Deep Learning (DL) models, e.g., Neural Turing Machine, Memory Networks. However, in these cases: a) EM is implemented as a separate module, which entails substantial data movement (and so, time and power) between the DL net itself and EM; and b) individual items are stored localistically within the EM, precluding realizing the exponential representational efficiency of distributed over localist coding. We describe Sparsey, an unsupervised, hierarchical, spatial/spatiotemporal associative memory model differing fundamentally from mainstream ML models, most crucially, in its use of sparse distributed representations (SDRs), or, cell assemblies, which admits an extremely efficient, single-trial learning algorithm that maps input similarity into code space similarity (measured as intersection). SDRs of individual inputs are stored in superposition and because similarity is preserved, the patterns of intersections over the assigned codes reflect the similarity, i.e., statistical, structure, of all orders, not simply pairwise, over the inputs. Thus, SM, i.e., a generative model, is built as a computationally free side effect of the act of storing episodic memory traces of individual inputs, either spatial patterns or sequences. We report initial results on MNIST and on the Weizmann video event recognition benchmarks. While we have not yet attained SOTA class accuracy, learning takes only minutes on a single CPU.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

Despite the recent progress in long-context language models, it remains elusive how transformer-based models exhibit the capability to retrieve relevant information from arbitrary locations within the long context. This paper aims to address this question. Our systematic investigation across a wide spectrum of models reveals that a special type of attention heads are largely responsible for retrieving information, which we dub retrieval heads. We identify intriguing properties of retrieval heads:(1) universal: all the explored models with long-context capability have a set of retrieval heads; (2) sparse: only a small portion (less than 5\%) of the attention heads are retrieval. (3) intrinsic: retrieval heads already exist in models pretrained with short context. When extending the context length by continual pretraining, it is still the same set of heads that perform information retrieval. (4) dynamically activated: take Llama-2 7B for example, 12 retrieval heads always attend to the required information no matter how the context is changed. The rest of the retrieval heads are activated in different contexts. (5) causal: completely pruning retrieval heads leads to failure in retrieving relevant information and results in hallucination, while pruning random non-retrieval heads does not affect the model's retrieval ability. We further show that retrieval heads strongly influence chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, where the model needs to frequently refer back the question and previously-generated context. Conversely, tasks where the model directly generates the answer using its intrinsic knowledge are less impacted by masking out retrieval heads. These observations collectively explain which internal part of the model seeks information from the input tokens. We believe our insights will foster future research on reducing hallucination, improving reasoning, and compressing the KV cache.

State-of-the-art methods for self-supervised learning (SSL) build representations by maximizing the similarity between different transformed "views" of a sample. Without sufficient diversity in the transformations used to create views, however, it can be difficult to overcome nuisance variables in the data and build rich representations. This motivates the use of the dataset itself to find similar, yet distinct, samples to serve as views for one another. In this paper, we introduce Mine Your Own vieW (MYOW), a new approach for self-supervised learning that looks within the dataset to define diverse targets for prediction. The idea behind our approach is to actively mine views, finding samples that are neighbors in the representation space of the network, and then predict, from one sample's latent representation, the representation of a nearby sample. After showing the promise of MYOW on benchmarks used in computer vision, we highlight the power of this idea in a novel application in neuroscience where SSL has yet to be applied. When tested on multi-unit neural recordings, we find that MYOW outperforms other self-supervised approaches in all examples (in some cases by more than 10%), and often surpasses the supervised baseline. With MYOW, we show that it is possible to harness the diversity of the data to build rich views and leverage self-supervision in new domains where augmentations are limited or unknown.

Several studies have explored the mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) in coding tasks, but most have focused on programming languages (PLs) in a monolingual setting. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between multiple PLs and English in the concept space of LLMs. We perform a few-shot translation task on 21 PL pairs using two Llama-based models. By decoding the embeddings of intermediate layers during this task, we observe that the concept space is closer to English (including PL keywords) and assigns high probabilities to English tokens in the second half of the intermediate layers. We analyze neuron activations for 11 PLs and English, finding that while language-specific neurons are primarily concentrated in the bottom layers, those exclusive to each PL tend to appear in the top layers. For PLs that are highly aligned with multiple other PLs, identifying language-specific neurons is not feasible. These PLs also tend to have a larger keyword set than other PLs and are closer to the model's concept space regardless of the input/output PL in the translation task. Our findings provide insights into how LLMs internally represent PLs, revealing structural patterns in the model's concept space. Code is available at https://github.com/cisnlp/code-specific-neurons.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have rapidly advanced across various domains, yet they still lag behind strong text-only large language models (LLMs) on tasks that require multi-step inference and compositional decision-making. Motivated by their shared transformer architectures, we investigate whether the two model families rely on common internal computation for such inference. At the neuron level, we uncover a surprisingly large overlap: more than half of the top-activated units during multi-step inference are shared between representative LLMs and LVLMs, revealing a modality-invariant inference subspace. Through causal probing via activation amplification, we further show that these shared neurons encode consistent and interpretable concept-level effects, demonstrating their functional contribution to inference. Building on this insight, we propose Shared Neuron Low-Rank Fusion (SNRF), a parameter-efficient framework that transfers mature inference circuitry from LLMs to LVLMs. SNRF profiles cross-model activations to identify shared neurons, computes a low-rank approximation of inter-model weight differences, and injects these updates selectively within the shared-neuron subspace. This mechanism strengthens multimodal inference performance with minimal parameter changes and requires no large-scale multimodal fine-tuning. Across diverse mathematics and perception benchmarks, SNRF consistently enhances LVLM inference performance while preserving perceptual capabilities. Our results demonstrate that shared neurons form an interpretable bridge between LLMs and LVLMs, enabling low-cost transfer of inference ability into multimodal models. Our code is available at [https://github.com/chenhangcuisg-code/Do-LLMs-VLMs-Share-Neurons](https://github.com/chenhangcuisg-code/Do-LLMs-VLMs-Share-Neurons).

Running LLMs with extended reasoning on every problem is expensive, but determining which inputs actually require additional compute remains challenging. We investigate whether their own likelihood of success is recoverable from their internal representations before generation, and if this signal can guide more efficient inference. We train linear probes on pre-generation activations to predict policy-specific success on math and coding tasks, substantially outperforming surface features such as question length and TF-IDF. Using E2H-AMC, which provides both human and model performance on identical problems, we show that models encode a model-specific notion of difficulty that is distinct from human difficulty, and that this distinction increases with extended reasoning. Leveraging these probes, we demonstrate that routing queries across a pool of models can exceed the best-performing model whilst reducing inference cost by up to 70\% on MATH, showing that internal representations enable practical efficiency gains even when they diverge from human intuitions about difficulty. Our code is available at: https://github.com/KabakaWilliam/llms_know_difficulty

Do LLMs genuinely incorporate external definitions, or do they primarily rely on their parametric knowledge? To address these questions, we conduct controlled experiments across multiple explanation benchmark datasets (general and domain-specific) and label definition conditions, including expert-curated, LLM-generated, perturbed, and swapped definitions. Our results reveal that while explicit label definitions can enhance accuracy and explainability, their integration into an LLM's task-solving processes is neither guaranteed nor consistent, suggesting reliance on internalized representations in many cases. Models often default to their internal representations, particularly in general tasks, whereas domain-specific tasks benefit more from explicit definitions. These findings underscore the need for a deeper understanding of how LLMs process external knowledge alongside their pre-existing capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

A key requirement for the development of effective learning representations is their evaluation and comparison to representations we know to be effective. In natural sensory domains, the community has viewed the brain as a source of inspiration and as an implicit benchmark for success. However, it has not been possible to directly test representational learning algorithms directly against the representations contained in neural systems. Here, we propose a new benchmark for visual representations on which we have directly tested the neural representation in multiple visual cortical areas in macaque (utilizing data from [Majaj et al., 2012]), and on which any computer vision algorithm that produces a feature space can be tested. The benchmark measures the effectiveness of the neural or machine representation by computing the classification loss on the ordered eigendecomposition of a kernel matrix [Montavon et al., 2011]. In our analysis we find that the neural representation in visual area IT is superior to visual area V4. In our analysis of representational learning algorithms, we find that three-layer models approach the representational performance of V4 and the algorithm in [Le et al., 2012] surpasses the performance of V4. Impressively, we find that a recent supervised algorithm [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] achieves performance comparable to that of IT for an intermediate level of image variation difficulty, and surpasses IT at a higher difficulty level. We believe this result represents a major milestone: it is the first learning algorithm we have found that exceeds our current estimate of IT representation performance. We hope that this benchmark will assist the community in matching the representational performance of visual cortex and will serve as an initial rallying point for further correspondence between representations derived in brains and machines.

Compositional generalization, the ability to recognize familiar parts in novel contexts, is a defining property of intelligent systems. Although modern models are trained on massive datasets, they still cover only a tiny fraction of the combinatorial space of possible inputs, raising the question of what structure representations must have to support generalization to unseen combinations. We formalize three desiderata for compositional generalization under standard training (divisibility, transferability, stability) and show they impose necessary geometric constraints: representations must decompose linearly into per-concept components, and these components must be orthogonal across concepts. This provides theoretical grounding for the Linear Representation Hypothesis: the linear structure widely observed in neural representations is a necessary consequence of compositional generalization. We further derive dimension bounds linking the number of composable concepts to the embedding geometry. Empirically, we evaluate these predictions across modern vision models (CLIP, SigLIP, DINO) and find that representations exhibit partial linear factorization with low-rank, near-orthogonal per-concept factors, and that the degree of this structure correlates with compositional generalization on unseen combinations. As models continue to scale, these conditions predict the representational geometry they may converge to. Code is available at https://github.com/oshapio/necessary-compositionality.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

We report the presence of a simple neural mechanism that represents an input-output function as a vector within autoregressive transformer language models (LMs). Using causal mediation analysis on a diverse range of in-context-learning (ICL) tasks, we find that a small number attention heads transport a compact representation of the demonstrated task, which we call a function vector (FV). FVs are robust to changes in context, i.e., they trigger execution of the task on inputs such as zero-shot and natural text settings that do not resemble the ICL contexts from which they are collected. We test FVs across a range of tasks, models, and layers and find strong causal effects across settings in middle layers. We investigate the internal structure of FVs and find while that they often contain information that encodes the output space of the function, this information alone is not sufficient to reconstruct an FV. Finally, we test semantic vector composition in FVs, and find that to some extent they can be summed to create vectors that trigger new complex tasks. Taken together, our findings suggest that LLMs contain internal abstractions of general-purpose functions that can be invoked in a variety of contexts.

Large language model (LLM)-based decision-making agents have shown the ability to generalize across multiple tasks. However, their performance relies on massive data and compute. We argue that this inefficiency stems from the forgetting phenomenon, in which a model memorizes its behaviors in parameters throughout training. As a result, training on a new task may deteriorate the model's performance on previous tasks. In contrast to LLMs' implicit memory mechanism, the human brain utilizes distributed memory storage, which helps manage and organize multiple skills efficiently, mitigating the forgetting phenomenon. Thus inspired, we propose an internal working memory module to store, blend, and retrieve information for different downstream tasks. Evaluation results show that the proposed method improves training efficiency and generalization in both Atari games and meta-world object manipulation tasks. Moreover, we demonstrate that memory fine-tuning further enhances the adaptability of the proposed architecture.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes appear to exhibit emotional reactions. We investigate why this is the case in Claude Sonnet 4.5 and explore implications for alignment-relevant behavior. We find internal representations of emotion concepts, which encode the broad concept of a particular emotion and generalize across contexts and behaviors it might be linked to. These representations track the operative emotion concept at a given token position in a conversation, activating in accordance with that emotion's relevance to processing the present context and predicting upcoming text. Our key finding is that these representations causally influence the LLM's outputs, including Claude's preferences and its rate of exhibiting misaligned behaviors such as reward hacking, blackmail, and sycophancy. We refer to this phenomenon as the LLM exhibiting functional emotions: patterns of expression and behavior modeled after humans under the influence of an emotion, which are mediated by underlying abstract representations of emotion concepts. Functional emotions may work quite differently from human emotions, and do not imply that LLMs have any subjective experience of emotions, but appear to be important for understanding the model's behavior.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Deep Learning architectures, and in particular Transformers, are conventionally viewed as a composition of layers. These layers are actually often obtained as the sum of two contributions: a residual path that copies the input and the output of a Transformer block. As a consequence, the inner representations (i.e. the input of these blocks) can be interpreted as iterative refinement of a propagated latent representation. Under this lens, many works suggest that the inner space is shared across layers, meaning that tokens can be decoded at early stages. Mechanistic interpretability even goes further by conjecturing that some layers act as refinement layers. Following this path, we propose inference-time inner looping, which prolongs refinement in pretrained off-the-shelf language models by repeatedly re-applying a selected block range. Across multiple benchmarks, inner looping yields modest but consistent accuracy improvements. Analyses of the resulting latent trajectories suggest more stable state evolution and continued semantic refinement. Overall, our results suggest that additional refinement can be obtained through simple test-time looping, extending computation in frozen pretrained models.

Multimodal foundation models aim to create a unified representation space that abstracts away from surface features like language syntax or modality differences. To investigate this, we study the internal representations of three recent models, analyzing the model activations from semantically equivalent sentences across languages in the text and speech modalities. Our findings reveal that: 1) Cross-modal representations converge over model layers, except in the initial layers specialized at text and speech processing. 2) Length adaptation is crucial for reducing the cross-modal gap between text and speech, although current approaches' effectiveness is primarily limited to high-resource languages. 3) Speech exhibits larger cross-lingual differences than text. 4) For models not explicitly trained for modality-agnostic representations, the modality gap is more prominent than the language gap.

In a wide range of multimodal tasks, contrastive learning has become a particularly appealing approach since it can successfully learn representations from abundant unlabeled data with only pairing information (e.g., image-caption or video-audio pairs). Underpinning these approaches is the assumption of multi-view redundancy - that shared information between modalities is necessary and sufficient for downstream tasks. However, in many real-world settings, task-relevant information is also contained in modality-unique regions: information that is only present in one modality but still relevant to the task. How can we learn self-supervised multimodal representations to capture both shared and unique information relevant to downstream tasks? This paper proposes FactorCL, a new multimodal representation learning method to go beyond multi-view redundancy. FactorCL is built from three new contributions: (1) factorizing task-relevant information into shared and unique representations, (2) capturing task-relevant information via maximizing MI lower bounds and removing task-irrelevant information via minimizing MI upper bounds, and (3) multimodal data augmentations to approximate task relevance without labels. On large-scale real-world datasets, FactorCL captures both shared and unique information and achieves state-of-the-art results on six benchmarks

Understanding how humans conceptualize and categorize natural objects offers critical insights into perception and cognition. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), a key question arises: can these models develop human-like object representations from linguistic and multimodal data? In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analyses to explore the relationship between object concept representations in LLMs and human cognition. We collected 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLMs and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were stable, predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering similar to human mental representations. Remarkably, the dimensions underlying these embeddings were interpretable, suggesting that LLMs and MLLMs develop human-like conceptual representations of objects. Further analysis showed strong alignment between model embeddings and neural activity patterns in brain regions such as EBA, PPA, RSC, and FFA. This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to human ones, share fundamental similarities that reflect key aspects of human conceptual knowledge. Our findings advance the understanding of machine intelligence and inform the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.

Recent success in training deep neural networks have prompted active investigation into the features learned on their intermediate layers. Such research is difficult because it requires making sense of non-linear computations performed by millions of parameters, but valuable because it increases our ability to understand current models and create improved versions of them. In this paper we investigate the extent to which neural networks exhibit what we call convergent learning, which is when the representations learned by multiple nets converge to a set of features which are either individually similar between networks or where subsets of features span similar low-dimensional spaces. We propose a specific method of probing representations: training multiple networks and then comparing and contrasting their individual, learned representations at the level of neurons or groups of neurons. We begin research into this question using three techniques to approximately align different neural networks on a feature level: a bipartite matching approach that makes one-to-one assignments between neurons, a sparse prediction approach that finds one-to-many mappings, and a spectral clustering approach that finds many-to-many mappings. This initial investigation reveals a few previously unknown properties of neural networks, and we argue that future research into the question of convergent learning will yield many more. The insights described here include (1) that some features are learned reliably in multiple networks, yet other features are not consistently learned; (2) that units learn to span low-dimensional subspaces and, while these subspaces are common to multiple networks, the specific basis vectors learned are not; (3) that the representation codes show evidence of being a mix between a local code and slightly, but not fully, distributed codes across multiple units.

While multilingual language models successfully transfer factual and syntactic knowledge across languages, it remains unclear whether they process culture-specific pragmatic registers, such as slang, as isolated language-specific memorizations or as unified, abstract concepts. We study this by probing the internal representations of Gemma-2-9B-IT using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) across three typologically diverse source languages: English, Hebrew, and Russian. To definitively isolate pragmatic register processing from trivial lexical sensitivity, we introduce a novel dataset in which every target term is polysemous, appearing in both literal and informal contexts. We find that while much of the informal-register signal is distributed across language-specific features, a small but highly robust cross-linguistic core consistently emerges. This shared core forms a geometrically coherent ``informal register subspace'' that sharpens in the model's deeper layers. Crucially, these shared representations are not merely correlational: activation steering with these features causally shifts output formality across all source languages and transfers zero-shot to six unseen languages spanning diverse language families and scripts. Together, these results provide the first mechanistic evidence that multilingual LLMs internalize informal register not just as surface-level heuristics, but as a portable, language-agnostic pragmatic abstraction.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

Previous work has shown correlations between the hidden states of large language models and fMRI brain responses, on language tasks. These correlations have been taken as evidence of the representational similarity of these models and brain states. This study tests whether these previous results are robust to several possible concerns. Specifically this study shows: (i) that the previous results are still found after dimensionality reduction, and thus are not attributable to the curse of dimensionality; (ii) that previous results are confirmed when using new measures of similarity; (iii) that correlations between brain representations and those from models are specific to models trained on human language; and (iv) that the results are dependent on the presence of positional encoding in the models. These results confirm and strengthen the results of previous research and contribute to the debate on the biological plausibility and interpretability of state-of-the-art large language models.

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Large language models (LLMs) have complicated internal dynamics, but induce representations of words and phrases whose geometry we can study. Human language processing is also opaque, but neural response measurements can provide (noisy) recordings of activation during listening or reading, from which we can extract similar representations of words and phrases. Here we study the extent to which the geometries induced by these representations, share similarities in the context of brain decoding. We find that the larger neural language models get, the more their representations are structurally similar to neural response measurements from brain imaging. Code is available at https://github.com/coastalcph/brainlm.

Modern large language models (LLMs) achieve impressive performance on some tasks, while exhibiting distinctly non-human-like behaviors on others. This raises the question of how well the LLM's learned representations align with human representations. In this work, we introduce a novel approach to study representation alignment: we adopt a method from research on activation steering to identify neurons responsible for specific concepts (e.g., ''cat'') and then analyze the corresponding activation patterns. We find that LLM representations captured this way closely align with human representations inferred from behavioral data, matching inter-human alignment levels. Our approach significantly outperforms the alignment captured by word embeddings, which have been the focus of prior work on human-LLM alignment. Additionally, our approach enables a more granular view of how LLMs represent concepts -- we show that LLMs organize concepts in a way that mirrors human concept organization.

Multi-Task Reinforcement Learning (MTRL) tackles the long-standing problem of endowing agents with skills that generalize across a variety of problems. To this end, sharing representations plays a fundamental role in capturing both unique and common characteristics of the tasks. Tasks may exhibit similarities in terms of skills, objects, or physical properties while leveraging their representations eases the achievement of a universal policy. Nevertheless, the pursuit of learning a shared set of diverse representations is still an open challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for representation learning in MTRL that encapsulates common structures among the tasks using orthogonal representations to promote diversity. Our method, named Mixture Of Orthogonal Experts (MOORE), leverages a Gram-Schmidt process to shape a shared subspace of representations generated by a mixture of experts. When task-specific information is provided, MOORE generates relevant representations from this shared subspace. We assess the effectiveness of our approach on two MTRL benchmarks, namely MiniGrid and MetaWorld, showing that MOORE surpasses related baselines and establishes a new state-of-the-art result on MetaWorld.

Unified multimodal models (UMMs) were designed to combine the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) with the generation capability of vision models. In practice, however, this synergy remains elusive: UMMs fail to transfer LLM-like reasoning to image synthesis and exhibit divergent response behaviors. We term this phenomenon pseudo-unification. Diagnosing its internal causes is important, but existing probing methods either lack model-internal insight or ignore prompt-response dependencies. To address these limitations, we propose an information-theoretic probing framework that jointly analyzes how UMMs encode inputs and generate outputs. Applied to ten representative UMMs, our framework reveals that pseudo-unification stems from a dual divergence: (i) Modality-Asymmetric Encoding, where vision and language follow different entropy trajectories, and (ii) Pattern-Split Response, where text generation exhibits high-entropy creativity while image synthesis enforces low-entropy fidelity. Only models that unify both sides (e.g., via contextual prediction) achieve more genuine unification, enabling stronger reasoning-based text-to-image generation even with fewer parameters. Our work provides the first model-internal probing of unification, demonstrating that real multimodal synergy requires consistency in information flow, not just shared parameters.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of Llama-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context prior taking over in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

While LLMs are powerful embedding backbones, their application in training-free settings faces two structural challenges: causal attention restricts early tokens from accessing subsequent context, and the next-token prediction objective biases representations toward generation rather than semantic compression. To address these limitations, we propose KV-Embedding, a framework that activates the latent representation power of frozen LLMs. Our method leverages the observation that the key-value (KV) states of the final token at each layer encode a compressed view of the sequence. By re-routing these states as a prepended prefix, we enable all tokens to access sequence-level context within a single forward pass. To ensure model-agnostic applicability, we introduce an automated layer selection strategy based on intrinsic dimensionality. Evaluations on MTEB across Qwen, Mistral, and Llama backbones show that KV-Embedding outperforms existing training-free baselines by up to 10%, while maintaining robust performance on sequences up to 4,096 tokens. These results demonstrate that internal state manipulation offers an efficient alternative to input modification, and we hope this work encourages further exploration of LLM internals for representation learning.

Measuring the similarity of the internal representations of deep neural networks is an important and challenging problem. Model stitching has been proposed as a possible approach, where two half-networks are connected by mapping the output of the first half-network to the input of the second one. The representations are considered functionally similar if the resulting stitched network achieves good task-specific performance. The mapping is normally created by training an affine stitching layer on the task at hand while freezing the two half-networks, a method called task loss matching. Here, we argue that task loss matching may be very misleading as a similarity index. For example, it can indicate very high similarity between very distant layers, whose representations are known to have different functional properties. Moreover, it can indicate very distant layers to be more similar than architecturally corresponding layers. Even more surprisingly, when comparing layers within the same network, task loss matching often indicates that some layers are more similar to a layer than itself. We argue that the main reason behind these problems is that task loss matching tends to create out-of-distribution representations to improve task-specific performance. We demonstrate that direct matching (when the mapping minimizes the distance between the stitched representations) does not suffer from these problems. We compare task loss matching, direct matching, and well-known similarity indices such as CCA and CKA. We conclude that direct matching strikes a good balance between the structural and functional requirements for a good similarity index.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Image-to-fMRI encoding is important for both neuroscience research and practical applications. However, such "Brain-Encoders" have been typically trained per-subject and per fMRI-dataset, thus restricted to very limited training data. In this paper we propose a Universal Brain-Encoder, which can be trained jointly on data from many different subjects/datasets/machines. What makes this possible is our new voxel-centric Encoder architecture, which learns a unique "voxel-embedding" per brain-voxel. Our Encoder trains to predict the response of each brain-voxel on every image, by directly computing the cross-attention between the brain-voxel embedding and multi-level deep image features. This voxel-centric architecture allows the functional role of each brain-voxel to naturally emerge from the voxel-image cross-attention. We show the power of this approach to (i) combine data from multiple different subjects (a "Crowd of Brains") to improve each individual brain-encoding, (ii) quick & effective Transfer-Learning across subjects, datasets, and machines (e.g., 3-Tesla, 7-Tesla), with few training examples, and (iii) use the learned voxel-embeddings as a powerful tool to explore brain functionality (e.g., what is encoded where in the brain).

Reconstructing images seen by people from their fMRI brain recordings provides a non-invasive window into the human brain. Despite recent progress enabled by diffusion models, current methods often lack faithfulness to the actual seen images. We present "Brain-IT", a brain-inspired approach that addresses this challenge through a Brain Interaction Transformer (BIT), allowing effective interactions between clusters of functionally-similar brain-voxels. These functional-clusters are shared by all subjects, serving as building blocks for integrating information both within and across brains. All model components are shared by all clusters & subjects, allowing efficient training with a limited amount of data. To guide the image reconstruction, BIT predicts two complementary localized patch-level image features: (i)high-level semantic features which steer the diffusion model toward the correct semantic content of the image; and (ii)low-level structural features which help to initialize the diffusion process with the correct coarse layout of the image. BIT's design enables direct flow of information from brain-voxel clusters to localized image features. Through these principles, our method achieves image reconstructions from fMRI that faithfully reconstruct the seen images, and surpass current SotA approaches both visually and by standard objective metrics. Moreover, with only 1-hour of fMRI data from a new subject, we achieve results comparable to current methods trained on full 40-hour recordings.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that representations from neural networks are converging to a common statistical model of reality. We show that the existing metrics used to measure representational similarity are confounded by network scale: increasing model depth or width can systematically inflate representational similarity scores. To correct these effects, we introduce a permutation-based null-calibration framework that transforms any representational similarity metric into a calibrated score with statistical guarantees. We revisit the Platonic Representation Hypothesis with our calibration framework, which reveals a nuanced picture: the apparent convergence reported by global spectral measures largely disappears after calibration, while local neighborhood similarity, but not local distances, retains significant agreement across different modalities. Based on these findings, we propose the Aristotelian Representation Hypothesis: representations in neural networks are converging to shared local neighborhood relationships.

Unified Multimodal models (UMMs) built on a single architecture have shown impressive performance in both understanding and generation. We identify a fundamental challenge that lies in inductive biases induced by distinct supervision signals: generation branch prefers high-fidelity, fine-grained representations capable of reconstruction, while the understanding favours semantically discriminative embeddings that remain invariant to task-irrelevant factors. Consequently, optimizing these complementary but non-equivalent objectives within a monolithic backbone leads to mutual impairment instead of enhancement. In this paper, we first analyze the root cause of this interference in unified backbones and reveal a complementary structure in their internal representations. Motivated by the observation, we propose DIVA, a self-improved post-training framework that transforms the representation divergence into interior synergy. By explicitly factorizing the visual representation into shared and unique components based on two complementary information flow, DIVA enables both the understanding and generation branches to achieve beneficial transferring while preserving the integrity of unique information from cross-flow interference via mutual information estimation. Despite its generality, our method consistently achieves improvements across visual understanding (+7.82%) and generation (+8.46%). The official code is available at: https://github.com/Jayyy-H/DIVA.

We unveil that internal representations in large language models (LLMs) serve as reliable proxies of learned knowledge, and propose RECALL, a novel representation-aware model merging framework for continual learning without access to historical data. RECALL computes inter-model similarity from layer-wise hidden representations over clustered typical samples, and performs adaptive, hierarchical parameter fusion to align knowledge across models. This design enables the preservation of domain-general features in shallow layers while allowing task-specific adaptation in deeper layers. Unlike prior methods that require task labels or incur performance trade-offs, RECALL achieves seamless multi-domain integration and strong resistance to catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments across five NLP tasks and multiple continual learning scenarios show that RECALL outperforms baselines in both knowledge retention and generalization, providing a scalable and data-free solution for evolving LLMs.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

We propose NEURONA, a neuro-symbolic framework for fMRI decoding and concept grounding in neural activity. Leveraging image- and video-based fMRI question-answering datasets, NEURONA learns to decode interacting concepts from visual stimuli based on patterns of fMRI responses, integrating symbolic reasoning and compositional execution with fMRI grounding across brain regions. We demonstrate that incorporating structural priors (e.g., compositional predicate-argument dependencies between concepts) into the decoding process significantly improves both decoding accuracy over precise queries, and notably, generalization to unseen queries at test time. With NEURONA, we highlight neuro-symbolic frameworks as promising tools for understanding neural activity.

Since the advent of ChatGPT, Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but remain largely as black-box systems. Consequently, their development relies heavily on data-driven approaches, limiting performance enhancement through changes in internal architecture and reasoning pathways. As a result, many researchers have begun exploring the potential internal mechanisms of LLMs, aiming to identify the essence of their reasoning bottlenecks, with most studies focusing on attention heads. Our survey aims to shed light on the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by concentrating on the interpretability and underlying mechanisms of attention heads. We first distill the human thought process into a four-stage framework: Knowledge Recalling, In-Context Identification, Latent Reasoning, and Expression Preparation. Using this framework, we systematically review existing research to identify and categorize the functions of specific attention heads. Furthermore, we summarize the experimental methodologies used to discover these special heads, dividing them into two categories: Modeling-Free methods and Modeling-Required methods. Also, we outline relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the limitations of current research and propose several potential future directions. Our reference list is open-sourced at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/Awesome-Attention-Heads.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

The ability to translate diverse patterns of inputs into structured patterns of behavior has been thought to rest on both humans' and machines' ability to learn robust representations of relevant concepts. The rapid advancement of transformer-based large language models (LLMs) has led to a diversity of computational ingredients -- architectures, fine tuning methods, and training datasets among others -- but it remains unclear which of these ingredients are most crucial for building models that develop human-like representations. Further, most current LLM benchmarks are not suited to measuring representational alignment between humans and models, making benchmark scores unreliable for assessing if current LLMs are making progress towards becoming useful cognitive models. We address these limitations by first evaluating a set of over 70 models that widely vary in their computational ingredients on a triplet similarity task, a method well established in the cognitive sciences for measuring human conceptual representations, using concepts from the THINGS database. Comparing human and model representations, we find that models that undergo instruction-finetuning and which have larger dimensionality of attention heads are among the most human aligned, while multimodal pretraining and parameter size have limited bearing on alignment. Correlations between alignment scores and scores on existing benchmarks reveal that while some benchmarks (e.g., MMLU) are better suited than others (e.g., MUSR) for capturing representational alignment, no existing benchmark is capable of fully accounting for the variance of alignment scores, demonstrating their insufficiency in capturing human-AI alignment. Taken together, our findings help highlight the computational ingredients most essential for advancing LLMs towards models of human conceptual representation and address a key benchmarking gap in LLM evaluation.

Every day, humans perceive objects and communicate these perceptions through various channels. In this paper, we present a computational model designed to track and simulate the perception of objects, as well as their representations as conveyed in communication. We delineate two fundamental components of our internal representation, termed "observed" and "seen", which we correlate with established concepts in computer vision, namely encoding and decoding. These components are integrated into semiotic networks, which simulate perceptual inference of object perception and human communication. Our model of object perception by a person allows us to define object perception by {\em a network}. We demonstrate this with an example of an image baseline classifier by constructing a new network that includes the baseline classifier and an additional layer. This layer produces the images "perceived" by the entire network, transforming it into a perceptualized image classifier. This facilitates visualization of the acquired network. Within our network, the image representations become more efficient for classification tasks when they are assembled and randomized. In our experiments, the perceptualized network outperformed the baseline classifier on MNIST training databases consisting of a restricted number of images. Our model is not limited to persons and can be applied to any system featuring a loop involving the processing from "internal" to "external" representations.

Understanding how the brain represents visual information is a fundamental challenge in neuroscience and artificial intelligence. While AI-driven decoding of neural data has provided insights into the human visual system, integrating multimodal neuroimaging signals, such as EEG, MEG, and fMRI, remains a critical hurdle due to their inherent spatiotemporal misalignment. Current approaches often analyze these modalities in isolation, limiting a holistic view of neural representation. In this study, we introduce BrainFLORA, a unified framework for integrating cross-modal neuroimaging data to construct a shared neural representation. Our approach leverages multimodal large language models (MLLMs) augmented with modality-specific adapters and task decoders, achieving state-of-the-art performance in joint-subject visual retrieval task and has the potential to extend multitasking. Combining neuroimaging analysis methods, we further reveal how visual concept representations align across neural modalities and with real world object perception. We demonstrate that the brain's structured visual concept representations exhibit an implicit mapping to physical-world stimuli, bridging neuroscience and machine learning from different modalities of neural imaging. Beyond methodological advancements, BrainFLORA offers novel implications for cognitive neuroscience and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). Our code is available at https://github.com/ncclab-sustech/BrainFLORA.

The emergence of similar representations between independently trained neural models has sparked significant interest in the representation learning community, leading to the development of various methods to obtain communication between latent spaces. "Latent space communication" can be achieved in two ways: i) by independently mapping the original spaces to a shared or relative one; ii) by directly estimating a transformation from a source latent space to a target one. In this work, we combine the two into a novel method to obtain latent space translation through the relative space. By formalizing the invertibility of angle-preserving relative representations and assuming the scale invariance of decoder modules in neural models, we can effectively use the relative space as an intermediary, independently projecting onto and from other semantically similar spaces. Extensive experiments over various architectures and datasets validate our scale invariance assumption and demonstrate the high accuracy of our method in latent space translation. We also apply our method to zero-shot stitching between arbitrary pre-trained text and image encoders and their classifiers, even across modalities. Our method has significant potential for facilitating the reuse of models in a practical manner via compositionality.

Continual learning aims to enable neural networks to acquire new knowledge without forgetting previously learned information. While recent prompt-based methods perform strongly in class-incremental settings, they remain vulnerable under domain shifts, where the input distribution changes but the label space remains fixed. This exposes a persistent problem known as representation drift. Shared representations evolve in ways that overwrite previously useful features and cause forgetting even when prompts isolate task-specific parameters. To address this issue, we introduce InTAct, a method that preserves functional behavior in shared layers without freezing parameters or storing past data. InTAct captures the characteristic activation ranges associated with previously learned tasks and constrains updates to ensure the network remains consistent within these regions, while still allowing for flexible adaptation elsewhere. In doing so, InTAct stabilizes the functional role of important neurons rather than directly restricting parameter values. The approach is architecture-agnostic and integrates seamlessly into existing prompt-based continual learning frameworks. By regulating representation changes where past knowledge is encoded, InTAct achieves a principled balance between stability and plasticity. Across diverse domain-incremental benchmarks, including DomainNet and ImageNet-R, InTAct consistently reduces representation drift and improves performance, increasing Average Accuracy by up to 8 percentage points over state-of-the-art baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that independently trained neural networks converge to increasingly similar latent spaces. However, current strategies for mapping these representations are inherently pairwise, scaling quadratically with the number of models and failing to yield a consistent global reference. In this paper, we study the alignment of M ge 3 models. We first adapt Generalized Procrustes Analysis (GPA) to construct a shared orthogonal universe that preserves the internal geometry essential for tasks like model stitching. We then show that strict isometric alignment is suboptimal for retrieval, where agreement-maximizing methods like Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) typically prevail. To bridge this gap, we finally propose Geometry-Corrected Procrustes Alignment (GCPA), which establishes a robust GPA-based universe followed by a post-hoc correction for directional mismatch. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GCPA consistently improves any-to-any retrieval while retaining a practical shared reference space.

Humans abstract experiences into structured representations to facilitate pattern inference and knowledge transfer. While the hippocampal-entorhinal (HPC-MEC) circuit is known to represent both spatial and conceptual spaces, the mechanisms for concurrently extracting abstract structures from continuous, high-dimensional dynamics remain poorly understood. We propose a brain-inspired hierarchical model that simultaneously infers latent transitions and constructs a predictive visual world model. Our architecture employs an inverse model for structural extraction alongside an HPC-MEC coupling model that dissociates relational structures (MEC) from integrated episodic scenes (HPC). Using primitive transformation dynamics as a benchmark, we demonstrate the model's capacity for structural abstraction. By leveraging velocity-driven path integration, the framework enables robust prediction and structural reuse across diverse contexts, thereby achieving structural generalization. This work provides a novel computational framework for understanding how brain-inspired, self-supervised learning of world models facilitates the acquisition of reusable abstract knowledge.

Understanding how the human brain represents visual concepts, and in which brain regions these representations are encoded, remains a long-standing challenge. Decades of work have advanced our understanding of visual representations, yet brain signals remain large and complex, and the space of possible visual concepts is vast. As a result, most studies remain small-scale, rely on manual inspection, focus on specific regions and properties, and rarely include systematic validation. We present a large-scale, automated framework for discovering and explaining visual representations across the human cortex. Our method comprises two main stages. First, we discover candidate interpretable patterns in fMRI activity through unsupervised, data-driven decomposition methods. Next, we explain each pattern by identifying the set of natural images that most strongly elicit it and generating a natural-language description of their shared visual meaning. To scale this process, we introduce an automated pipeline that tests multiple candidate explanations, assigns quantitative reliability scores, and selects the most consistent description for each voxel pattern. Our framework reveals thousands of interpretable patterns spanning many distinct visual concepts, including fine-grained representations previously unreported.

Rote learning is a memorization technique based on repetition. It is commonly believed to hinder generalization by encouraging verbatim memorization rather than deeper understanding. This insight holds for even learning factual knowledge that inevitably requires a certain degree of memorization. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs can be trained to generalize from rote memorized data. We introduce a two-phase memorize-then-generalize framework, where the model first rote memorizes factual subject-object associations using a semantically meaningless token and then learns to generalize by fine-tuning on a small set of semantically meaningful prompts. Extensive experiments over 8 LLMs show that the models can reinterpret rote memorized data through the semantically meaningful prompts, as evidenced by the emergence of structured, semantically aligned latent representations between the two. This surprising finding opens the door to both effective and efficient knowledge injection and possible risks of repurposing the memorized data for malicious usage.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Recent empirical works have successfully used unlabeled data to learn feature representations that are broadly useful in downstream classification tasks. Several of these methods are reminiscent of the well-known word2vec embedding algorithm: leveraging availability of pairs of semantically "similar" data points and "negative samples," the learner forces the inner product of representations of similar pairs with each other to be higher on average than with negative samples. The current paper uses the term contrastive learning for such algorithms and presents a theoretical framework for analyzing them by introducing latent classes and hypothesizing that semantically similar points are sampled from the same latent class. This framework allows us to show provable guarantees on the performance of the learned representations on the average classification task that is comprised of a subset of the same set of latent classes. Our generalization bound also shows that learned representations can reduce (labeled) sample complexity on downstream tasks. We conduct controlled experiments in both the text and image domains to support the theory.

Human beings primarily understand the world through concepts (e.g., dog), abstract mental representations that structure perception, reasoning, and learning. However, how large language models (LLMs) acquire, retain, and forget such concepts during continual pretraining remains poorly understood. In this work, we study how individual concepts are acquired and forgotten, as well as how multiple concepts interact through interference and synergy. We link these behavioral dynamics to LLMs' internal Concept Circuits, computational subgraphs associated with specific concepts, and incorporate Graph Metrics to characterize circuit structure. Our analysis reveals: (1) LLMs concept circuits provide a non-trivial, statistically significant signal of concept learning and forgetting; (2) Concept circuits exhibit a stage-wise temporal pattern during continual pretraining, with an early increase followed by gradual decrease and stabilization; (3) concepts with larger learning gains tend to exhibit greater forgetting under subsequent training; (4) semantically similar concepts induce stronger interference than weakly related ones; (5) conceptual knowledge differs in their transferability, with some significantly facilitating the learning of others. Together, our findings offer a circuit-level view of concept learning dynamics and inform the design of more interpretable and robust concept-aware training strategies for LLMs.

Representation learning, and interpreting learned representations, are key areas of focus in machine learning and neuroscience. Both fields generally use representations as a means to understand or improve a system's computations. In this work, however, we explore surprising dissociations between representation and computation that may pose challenges for such efforts. We create datasets in which we attempt to match the computational role that different features play, while manipulating other properties of the features or the data. We train various deep learning architectures to compute these multiple abstract features about their inputs. We find that their learned feature representations are systematically biased towards representing some features more strongly than others, depending upon extraneous properties such as feature complexity, the order in which features are learned, and the distribution of features over the inputs. For example, features that are simpler to compute or learned first tend to be represented more strongly and densely than features that are more complex or learned later, even if all features are learned equally well. We also explore how these biases are affected by architectures, optimizers, and training regimes (e.g., in transformers, features decoded earlier in the output sequence also tend to be represented more strongly). Our results help to characterize the inductive biases of gradient-based representation learning. These results also highlight a key challenge for interpretability - or for comparing the representations of models and brains - disentangling extraneous biases from the computationally important aspects of a system's internal representations.

In this paper we investigate learning visual models for the steps of ordinary tasks using weak supervision via instructional narrations and an ordered list of steps instead of strong supervision via temporal annotations. At the heart of our approach is the observation that weakly supervised learning may be easier if a model shares components while learning different steps: `pour egg' should be trained jointly with other tasks involving `pour' and `egg'. We formalize this in a component model for recognizing steps and a weakly supervised learning framework that can learn this model under temporal constraints from narration and the list of steps. Past data does not permit systematic studying of sharing and so we also gather a new dataset, CrossTask, aimed at assessing cross-task sharing. Our experiments demonstrate that sharing across tasks improves performance, especially when done at the component level and that our component model can parse previously unseen tasks by virtue of its compositionality.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on multimodal tasks, without any multimodal finetuning. They are the building block for Large Multimodal Models, yet, we still lack a proper understanding of their success. In this work, we expose frozen LLMs to image, video, audio and text inputs and analyse their internal representation aiming to understand their generalization beyond textual inputs. Findings. Perceptual tokens (1) are easily distinguishable from textual ones inside LLMs, with significantly different representations, and complete translation to textual tokens does not exist. Yet, (2) both perceptual and textual tokens activate similar LLM weights. Despite being different, (3) perceptual and textual tokens are implicitly aligned inside LLMs, we call this the implicit multimodal alignment (IMA), and argue that this is linked to architectural design, helping LLMs to generalize. This provide more evidence to believe that the generalization of LLMs to multimodal inputs is mainly due to their architecture. Implications. (1) We find a positive correlation between the implicit alignment score and the task performance, suggesting that this could act as a proxy metric for model evaluation and selection. (2) A negative correlation exists regarding hallucinations, revealing that this problem is mainly due to misalignment between the internal perceptual and textual representations. (3) Perceptual tokens change slightly throughout the model, thus, we propose different approaches to skip computations (e.g. in FFN layers), and significantly reduce the inference cost. (4) Due to the slowly changing embeddings across layers, and the high overlap between textual and multimodal activated weights, we compress LLMs by keeping only 1 subnetwork that works well across a wide range of multimodal tasks. Paper code: https://github.com/mshukor/ima-lmms.

Do different neural networks, trained for various vision tasks, share some common representations? In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of common features we call "Rosetta Neurons" across a range of models with different architectures, different tasks (generative and discriminative), and different types of supervision (class-supervised, text-supervised, self-supervised). We present an algorithm for mining a dictionary of Rosetta Neurons across several popular vision models: Class Supervised-ResNet50, DINO-ResNet50, DINO-ViT, MAE, CLIP-ResNet50, BigGAN, StyleGAN-2, StyleGAN-XL. Our findings suggest that certain visual concepts and structures are inherently embedded in the natural world and can be learned by different models regardless of the specific task or architecture, and without the use of semantic labels. We can visualize shared concepts directly due to generative models included in our analysis. The Rosetta Neurons facilitate model-to-model translation enabling various inversion-based manipulations, including cross-class alignments, shifting, zooming, and more, without the need for specialized training.

Recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have revealed that large language models (LLMs) develop internal representations corresponding not only to concrete entities but also distinct, human-understandable abstract concepts and behaviour. Moreover, these hidden features can be directly manipulated to steer model behaviour. However, it remains an open question whether this phenomenon is unique to models trained on inherently structured data (ie. language, images) or if it is a general property of foundation models. In this work, we investigate the internal representations of a large physics-focused foundation model. Inspired by recent work identifying single directions in activation space for complex behaviours in LLMs, we extract activation vectors from the model during forward passes over simulation datasets for different physical regimes. We then compute "delta" representations between the two regimes. These delta tensors act as concept directions in activation space, encoding specific physical features. By injecting these concept directions back into the model during inference, we can steer its predictions, demonstrating causal control over physical behaviours, such as inducing or removing some particular physical feature from a simulation. These results suggest that scientific foundation models learn generalised representations of physical principles. They do not merely rely on superficial correlations and patterns in the simulations. Our findings open new avenues for understanding and controlling scientific foundation models and has implications for AI-enabled scientific discovery.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning and generalization at the expense of degrading memorized knowledge. We challenge this narrative by observing that RL-enhanced models consistently outperform their base and supervised fine-tuned (SFT) counterparts on pure knowledge recall tasks, particularly those requiring traversal of hierarchical, structured knowledge (e.g., medical codes). We hypothesize these gains stem not from newly acquired data, but from improved procedural skills in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. To support this hypothesis, we show that structured prompting, which explicitly guides SFTed models through hierarchical traversal, recovers most of the performance gap (reducing 24pp to 7pp on MedConceptsQA for DeepSeek-V3/R1). We further find that while prompting improves final-answer accuracy, RL-enhanced models retain superior ability to recall correct procedural paths on deep-retrieval tasks. Finally our layer-wise internal activation analysis reveals that while factual representations (e.g., activations for the statement "code 57.95 refers to urinary infection") maintain high cosine similarity between SFT and RL models, query representations (e.g., "what is code 57.95") diverge noticeably, indicating that RL primarily transforms how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), the novel metric "Brainscore" emerged as a means to evaluate the functional similarity between LLMs and human brain/neural systems. Our efforts were dedicated to mining the meaning of the novel score by constructing topological features derived from both human fMRI data involving 190 subjects, and 39 LLMs plus their untrained counterparts. Subsequently, we trained 36 Linear Regression Models and conducted thorough statistical analyses to discern reliable and valid features from our constructed ones. Our findings reveal distinctive feature combinations conducive to interpreting existing brainscores across various brain regions of interest (ROIs) and hemispheres, thereby significantly contributing to advancing interpretable machine learning (iML) studies. The study is enriched by our further discussions and analyses concerning existing brainscores. To our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to comprehend the novel metric brainscore within this interdisciplinary domain.

Humans do not just see attribute similarity -- we also see relational similarity. An apple is like a peach because both are reddish fruit, but the Earth is also like a peach: its crust, mantle, and core correspond to the peach's skin, flesh, and pit. This ability to perceive and recognize relational similarity, is arguable by cognitive scientist to be what distinguishes humans from other species. Yet, all widely used visual similarity metrics today (e.g., LPIPS, CLIP, DINO) focus solely on perceptual attribute similarity and fail to capture the rich, often surprising relational similarities that humans perceive. How can we go beyond the visible content of an image to capture its relational properties? How can we bring images with the same relational logic closer together in representation space? To answer these questions, we first formulate relational image similarity as a measurable problem: two images are relationally similar when their internal relations or functions among visual elements correspond, even if their visual attributes differ. We then curate 114k image-caption dataset in which the captions are anonymized -- describing the underlying relational logic of the scene rather than its surface content. Using this dataset, we finetune a Vision-Language model to measure the relational similarity between images. This model serves as the first step toward connecting images by their underlying relational structure rather than their visible appearance. Our study shows that while relational similarity has a lot of real-world applications, existing image similarity models fail to capture it -- revealing a critical gap in visual computing.

Brain Signals, such as Electroencephalography (EEG), and human languages have been widely explored independently for many downstream tasks, however, the connection between them has not been well explored. In this study, we explore the relationship and dependency between EEG and language. To study at the representation level, we introduced MTAM, a Multimodal Transformer Alignment Model, to observe coordinated representations between the two modalities. We used various relationship alignment-seeking techniques, such as Canonical Correlation Analysis and Wasserstein Distance, as loss functions to transfigure features. On downstream applications, sentiment analysis and relation detection, we achieved new state-of-the-art results on two datasets, ZuCo and K-EmoCon. Our method achieved an F1-score improvement of 1.7% on K-EmoCon and 9.3% on Zuco datasets for sentiment analysis, and 7.4% on ZuCo for relation detection. In addition, we provide interpretations of the performance improvement: (1) feature distribution shows the effectiveness of the alignment module for discovering and encoding the relationship between EEG and language; (2) alignment weights show the influence of different language semantics as well as EEG frequency features; (3) brain topographical maps provide an intuitive demonstration of the connectivity in the brain regions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Jason-Qiu/EEG_Language_Alignment.

The fundamental units of internal representations in large language models (LLMs) remain undefined, limiting further understanding of their mechanisms. Neurons or features are often regarded as such units, yet neurons suffer from polysemy, while features face concerns of unreliable reconstruction and instability. To address this issue, we propose the Atoms Theory, which defines such units as atoms. We introduce the atomic inner product (AIP) to correct representation shifting, formally define atoms, and prove the conditions that atoms satisfy the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP), ensuring stable sparse representations over atom set and linking to compressed sensing. Under stronger conditions, we further establish the uniqueness and exact ell_1 recoverability of the sparse representations, and provide guarantees that single-layer sparse autoencoders (SAEs) with threshold activations can reliably identify the atoms. To validate the Atoms Theory, we train threshold-activated SAEs on Gemma2-2B, Gemma2-9B, and Llama3.1-8B, achieving 99.9% sparse reconstruction across layers on average, and more than 99.8% of atoms satisfy the uniqueness condition, compared to 0.5% for neurons and 68.2% for features, showing that atoms more faithfully capture intrinsic representations of LLMs. Scaling experiments further reveal the link between SAEs size and recovery capacity. Overall, this work systematically introduces and validates Atoms Theory of LLMs, providing a theoretical framework for understanding internal representations and a foundation for mechanistic interpretability. Code available at https://github.com/ChenhuiHu/towards_atoms.

While the problem of hallucinations in neural machine translation has long been recognized, so far the progress on its alleviation is very little. Indeed, recently it turned out that without artificially encouraging models to hallucinate, previously existing methods fall short and even the standard sequence log-probability is more informative. It means that characteristics internal to the model can give much more information than we expect, and before using external models and measures, we first need to ask: how far can we go if we use nothing but the translation model itself ? We propose to use a method that evaluates the percentage of the source contribution to a generated translation. Intuitively, hallucinations are translations "detached" from the source, hence they can be identified by low source contribution. This method improves detection accuracy for the most severe hallucinations by a factor of 2 and is able to alleviate hallucinations at test time on par with the previous best approach that relies on external models. Next, if we move away from internal model characteristics and allow external tools, we show that using sentence similarity from cross-lingual embeddings further improves these results.

Large language models map semantically related prompts to similar internal representations -- a phenomenon interpretable as attractor-like dynamics. We ask whether the identity document of a persistent cognitive agent (its cognitive_core) exhibits analogous attractor-like behavior. We present a controlled experiment on Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, comparing hidden states of an original cognitive_core (Condition A), seven paraphrases (Condition B), and seven structurally matched controls (Condition C). Mean-pooled states at layers 8, 16, and 24 show that paraphrases converge to a tighter cluster than controls (Cohen's d > 1.88, p < 10^{-27}, Bonferroni-corrected). Replication on Gemma 2 9B confirms cross-architecture generalizability. Ablations suggest the effect is primarily semantic rather than structural, and that structural completeness appears necessary to reach the attractor region. An exploratory experiment shows that reading a scientific description of the agent shifts internal state toward the attractor -- closer than a sham preprint -- distinguishing knowing about an identity from operating as that identity. These results provide representational evidence that agent identity documents induce attractor-like geometry in LLM activation space.

Learning compatible representations enables the interchangeable use of semantic features as models are updated over time. This is particularly relevant in search and retrieval systems where it is crucial to avoid reprocessing of the gallery images with the updated model. While recent research has shown promising empirical evidence, there is still a lack of comprehensive theoretical understanding about learning compatible representations. In this paper, we demonstrate that the stationary representations learned by the d-Simplex fixed classifier optimally approximate compatibility representation according to the two inequality constraints of its formal definition. This not only establishes a solid foundation for future works in this line of research but also presents implications that can be exploited in practical learning scenarios. An exemplary application is the now-standard practice of downloading and fine-tuning new pre-trained models. Specifically, we show the strengths and critical issues of stationary representations in the case in which a model undergoing sequential fine-tuning is asynchronously replaced by downloading a better-performing model pre-trained elsewhere. Such a representation enables seamless delivery of retrieval service (i.e., no reprocessing of gallery images) and offers improved performance without operational disruptions during model replacement. Code available at: https://github.com/miccunifi/iamcl2r.

The success of pre-trained contextualized representations has prompted researchers to analyze them for the presence of linguistic information. Indeed, it is natural to assume that these pre-trained representations do encode some level of linguistic knowledge as they have brought about large empirical improvements on a wide variety of NLP tasks, which suggests they are learning true linguistic generalization. In this work, we focus on intrinsic probing, an analysis technique where the goal is not only to identify whether a representation encodes a linguistic attribute but also to pinpoint where this attribute is encoded. We propose a novel latent-variable formulation for constructing intrinsic probes and derive a tractable variational approximation to the log-likelihood. Our results show that our model is versatile and yields tighter mutual information estimates than two intrinsic probes previously proposed in the literature. Finally, we find empirical evidence that pre-trained representations develop a cross-lingually entangled notion of morphosyntax.

Large language models are increasingly adapted to downstream tasks through fine-tuning. Full supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods, such as Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA), are two dominant approaches. While PEFT methods are widely used for their computational efficiency, the implications of their configurations (e.g., rank) remain under-explored in downstream Q&A tasks and generalisation. In this work, we perform a comprehensive evaluation across multiple reasoning and recall datasets, conducting a rank sweep to quantify the trade-off between SFT and PEFT. We also compare the accuracy of PEFT and SFT models across in-domain and out-of-domain adaptation, highlighting distinct generalisation behaviour and task-specific forgetting. We demonstrate that LoRA achieves competitive and in some cases superior performance compared to SFT, particularly on reasoning tasks at specific rank values. Additionally, we analyze the internal representations via spectral features and layer-wise attention structures, offering insights into representational drift and structural changes in attention patterns.