Daily Papers

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist, including: (i) a low success rate, (ii) high algorithmic complexity, and (iii) a large number of test patterns. Furthermore, the most pertinent drawback of prior detection techniques stems from an incorrect evaluation methodology, i.e., they assume that an adversary inserts HTs randomly. Such inappropriate adversarial assumptions enable detection techniques to claim high HT detection accuracy, leading to a "false sense of security." Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, despite more than a decade of research on detecting HTs inserted during fabrication, there have been no concerted efforts to perform a systematic evaluation of HT detection techniques. In this paper, we play the role of a realistic adversary and question the efficacy of HT detection techniques by developing an automated, scalable, and practical attack framework, ATTRITION, using reinforcement learning (RL). ATTRITION evades eight detection techniques across two HT detection categories, showcasing its agnostic behavior. ATTRITION achieves average attack success rates of 47times and 211times compared to randomly inserted HTs against state-of-the-art HT detection techniques. We demonstrate ATTRITION's ability to evade detection techniques by evaluating designs ranging from the widely-used academic suites to larger designs such as the open-source MIPS and mor1kx processors to AES and a GPS module. Additionally, we showcase the impact of ATTRITION-generated HTs through two case studies (privilege escalation and kill switch) on the mor1kx processor. We envision that our work, along with our released HT benchmarks and models, fosters the development of better HT detection techniques.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are becoming commonplace in critical applications, making their susceptibility to backdoor (trojan) attacks a significant problem. In this paper, we introduce a novel backdoor attack detection pipeline, detecting attacked models using graph convolution networks (DeBUGCN). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first use of GCNs for trojan detection. We use the static weights of a DNN to create a graph structure of its layers. A GCN is then used as a binary classifier on these graphs, yielding a trojan or clean determination for the DNN. To demonstrate the efficacy of our pipeline, we train hundreds of clean and trojaned CNN models on the MNIST handwritten digits and CIFAR-10 image datasets, and show the DNN classification results using DeBUGCN. For a true In-the-Wild use case, our pipeline is evaluated on the TrojAI dataset which consists of various CNN architectures, thus showing the robustness and model-agnostic behaviour of DeBUGCN. Furthermore, on comparing our results on several datasets with state-of-the-art trojan detection algorithms, DeBUGCN is faster and more accurate.

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize the target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve nearly 100\% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on GPT-3.5/4, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Gemma-7B, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with 100\% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). We provide the code, prompts, and logs of the attacks at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

While real-world applications of reinforcement learning are becoming popular, the security and robustness of RL systems are worthy of more attention and exploration. In particular, recent works have revealed that, in a multi-agent RL environment, backdoor trigger actions can be injected into a victim agent (a.k.a. Trojan agent), which can result in a catastrophic failure as soon as it sees the backdoor trigger action. To ensure the security of RL agents against malicious backdoors, in this work, we propose the problem of Backdoor Detection in a multi-agent competitive reinforcement learning system, with the objective of detecting Trojan agents as well as the corresponding potential trigger actions, and further trying to mitigate their Trojan behavior. In order to solve this problem, we propose PolicyCleanse that is based on the property that the activated Trojan agents accumulated rewards degrade noticeably after several timesteps. Along with PolicyCleanse, we also design a machine unlearning-based approach that can effectively mitigate the detected backdoor. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed methods can accurately detect Trojan agents, and outperform existing backdoor mitigation baseline approaches by at least 3% in winning rate across various types of agents and environments.

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

While state-of-the-art diffusion models (DMs) excel in image generation, concerns regarding their security persist. Earlier research highlighted DMs' vulnerability to data poisoning attacks, but these studies placed stricter requirements than conventional methods like `BadNets' in image classification. This is because the art necessitates modifications to the diffusion training and sampling procedures. Unlike the prior work, we investigate whether BadNets-like data poisoning methods can directly degrade the generation by DMs. In other words, if only the training dataset is contaminated (without manipulating the diffusion process), how will this affect the performance of learned DMs? In this setting, we uncover bilateral data poisoning effects that not only serve an adversarial purpose (compromising the functionality of DMs) but also offer a defensive advantage (which can be leveraged for defense in classification tasks against poisoning attacks). We show that a BadNets-like data poisoning attack remains effective in DMs for producing incorrect images (misaligned with the intended text conditions). Meanwhile, poisoned DMs exhibit an increased ratio of triggers, a phenomenon we refer to as `trigger amplification', among the generated images. This insight can be then used to enhance the detection of poisoned training data. In addition, even under a low poisoning ratio, studying the poisoning effects of DMs is also valuable for designing robust image classifiers against such attacks. Last but not least, we establish a meaningful linkage between data poisoning and the phenomenon of data replications by exploring DMs' inherent data memorization tendencies.

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails to elicit harmful outputs. Existing approaches overwhelmingly operate within the prompt-optimization paradigm: whether through traditional algorithmic search or recent agent-based workflows, the resulting prompts typically retain malicious semantic signals that modern guardrails are primed to detect. In contrast, we identify a deeper, largely overlooked vulnerability stemming from the highly interconnected nature of an LLM's internal knowledge. This structure allows harmful objectives to be realized by weaving together sequences of benign sub-queries, each of which individually evades detection. To exploit this loophole, we introduce the Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent (CKA-Agent), a dynamic framework that reframes jailbreaking as an adaptive, tree-structured exploration of the target model's knowledge base. The CKA-Agent issues locally innocuous queries, uses model responses to guide exploration across multiple paths, and ultimately assembles the aggregated information to achieve the original harmful objective. Evaluated across state-of-the-art commercial LLMs (Gemini2.5-Flash/Pro, GPT-oss-120B, Claude-Haiku-4.5), CKA-Agent consistently achieves over 95% success rates even against strong guardrails, underscoring the severity of this vulnerability and the urgent need for defenses against such knowledge-decomposition attacks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/CKA-Agent.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers are known to be vulnerable to Trojan or backdoor attacks, where the classifier is manipulated such that it misclassifies any input containing an attacker-determined Trojan trigger. Backdoors compromise a model's integrity, thereby posing a severe threat to the landscape of DNN-based classification. While multiple defenses against such attacks exist for classifiers in the image domain, there have been limited efforts to protect classifiers in the text domain. We present Trojan-Miner (T-Miner) -- a defense framework for Trojan attacks on DNN-based text classifiers. T-Miner employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq-2-seq) generative model that probes the suspicious classifier and learns to produce text sequences that are likely to contain the Trojan trigger. T-Miner then analyzes the text produced by the generative model to determine if they contain trigger phrases, and correspondingly, whether the tested classifier has a backdoor. T-Miner requires no access to the training dataset or clean inputs of the suspicious classifier, and instead uses synthetically crafted "nonsensical" text inputs to train the generative model. We extensively evaluate T-Miner on 1100 model instances spanning 3 ubiquitous DNN model architectures, 5 different classification tasks, and a variety of trigger phrases. We show that T-Miner detects Trojan and clean models with a 98.75% overall accuracy, while achieving low false positives on clean models. We also show that T-Miner is robust against a variety of targeted, advanced attacks from an adaptive attacker.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

With the rapid proliferation and increased sophistication of malicious software (malware), detection methods no longer rely only on manually generated signatures but have also incorporated more general approaches like machine learning detection. Although powerful for conviction of malicious artifacts, these methods do not produce any further information about the type of threat that has been detected neither allows for identifying relationships between malware samples. In this work, we address the information gap between machine learning and signature-based detection methods by learning a representation space for malware samples in which files with similar malicious behaviors appear close to each other. We do so by introducing a deep learning based tagging model trained to generate human-interpretable semantic descriptions of malicious software, which, at the same time provides potentially more useful and flexible information than malware family names. We show that the malware descriptions generated with the proposed approach correctly identify more than 95% of eleven possible tag descriptions for a given sample, at a deployable false positive rate of 1% per tag. Furthermore, we use the learned representation space to introduce a similarity index between malware files, and empirically demonstrate using dynamic traces from files' execution, that is not only more effective at identifying samples from the same families, but also 32 times smaller than those based on raw feature vectors.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features-including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns-DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves a 95.99\% detection accuracy with a latency of <0.5s, reducing false negatives by 78.65\% compared to static analysis and 82.24\% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged 11 packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

With the rapid technological advancement, security has become a major issue due to the increase in malware activity that poses a serious threat to the security and safety of both computer systems and stakeholders. To maintain stakeholders, particularly, end users security, protecting the data from fraudulent efforts is one of the most pressing concerns. A set of malicious programming code, scripts, active content, or intrusive software that is designed to destroy intended computer systems and programs or mobile and web applications is referred to as malware. According to a study, naive users are unable to distinguish between malicious and benign applications. Thus, computer systems and mobile applications should be designed to detect malicious activities towards protecting the stakeholders. A number of algorithms are available to detect malware activities by utilizing novel concepts including Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning. In this study, we emphasize Artificial Intelligence (AI) based techniques for detecting and preventing malware activity. We present a detailed review of current malware detection technologies, their shortcomings, and ways to improve efficiency. Our study shows that adopting futuristic approaches for the development of malware detection applications shall provide significant advantages. The comprehension of this synthesis shall help researchers for further research on malware detection and prevention using AI.

As large language models (LLMs) become integrated into sensitive workflows, concerns grow over their potential to leak confidential information. We propose TrojanStego, a novel threat model in which an adversary fine-tunes an LLM to embed sensitive context information into natural-looking outputs via linguistic steganography, without requiring explicit control over inference inputs. We introduce a taxonomy outlining risk factors for compromised LLMs, and use it to evaluate the risk profile of the threat. To implement TrojanStego, we propose a practical encoding scheme based on vocabulary partitioning learnable by LLMs via fine-tuning. Experimental results show that compromised models reliably transmit 32-bit secrets with 87% accuracy on held-out prompts, reaching over 97% accuracy using majority voting across three generations. Further, they maintain high utility, can evade human detection, and preserve coherence. These results highlight a new class of LLM data exfiltration attacks that are passive, covert, practical, and dangerous.

Malware detection is increasingly challenged by evolving techniques like obfuscation and polymorphism, limiting the effectiveness of traditional methods. Meanwhile, the widespread adoption of software containers has introduced new security challenges, including the growing threat of malicious software injection, where a container, once compromised, can serve as entry point for further cyberattacks. In this work, we address these security issues by introducing a method to identify compromised containers through machine learning analysis of their file systems. We cast the entire software containers into large RGB images via their tarball representations, and propose to use established Convolutional Neural Network architectures on a streaming, patch-based manner. To support our experiments, we release the COSOCO dataset--the first of its kind--containing 3364 large-scale RGB images of benign and compromised software containers at https://huggingface.co/datasets/k3ylabs/cosoco-image-dataset. Our method detects more malware and achieves higher F1 and Recall scores than all individual and ensembles of VirusTotal engines, demonstrating its effectiveness and setting a new standard for identifying malware-compromised software containers.

Insertion of hardware Trojans (HTs) in integrated circuits is a pernicious threat. Since HTs are activated under rare trigger conditions, detecting them using random logic simulations is infeasible. In this work, we design a reinforcement learning (RL) agent that circumvents the exponential search space and returns a minimal set of patterns that is most likely to detect HTs. Experimental results on a variety of benchmarks demonstrate the efficacy and scalability of our RL agent, which obtains a significant reduction (169times) in the number of test patterns required while maintaining or improving coverage (95.75%) compared to the state-of-the-art techniques.

It is well known that anti-malware scanners depend on malware signatures to identify malware. However, even minor modifications to malware code structure results in a change in the malware signature thus enabling the variant to evade detection by scanners. Therefore, there exists the need for a proactively generated malware variant dataset to aid detection of such diverse variants by automated antivirus scanners. This paper proposes and demonstrates a generic assembly source code based framework that facilitates any evolutionary algorithm to generate diverse and potential variants of an input malware, while retaining its maliciousness, yet capable of evading antivirus scanners. Generic code transformation functions and a novelty search supported quality metric have been proposed as components of the framework to be used respectively as variation operators and fitness function, for evolutionary algorithms. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in generating diverse variants and the generated variants have been shown to evade over 98% of popular antivirus scanners. The malware variants evolved by the framework can serve as antigens to assist malware analysis engines to improve their malware detection algorithms.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

In recent years there has been a shift from heuristics-based malware detection towards machine learning, which proves to be more robust in the current heavily adversarial threat landscape. While we acknowledge machine learning to be better equipped to mine for patterns in the increasingly high amounts of similar-looking files, we also note a remarkable scarcity of the data available for similarity-targeted research. Moreover, we observe that the focus in the few related works falls on quantifying similarity in malware, often overlooking the clean data. This one-sided quantification is especially dangerous in the context of detection bypass. We propose to address the deficiencies in the space of similarity research on binary files, starting from EMBER - one of the largest malware classification data sets. We enhance EMBER with similarity information as well as malware class tags, to enable further research in the similarity space. Our contribution is threefold: (1) we publish EMBERSim, an augmented version of EMBER, that includes similarity-informed tags; (2) we enrich EMBERSim with automatically determined malware class tags using the open-source tool AVClass on VirusTotal data and (3) we describe and share the implementation for our class scoring technique and leaf similarity method.

Determining the family to which a malicious file belongs is an essential component of cyberattack investigation, attribution, and remediation. Performing this task manually is time consuming and requires expert knowledge. Automated tools using that label malware using antivirus detections lack accuracy and/or scalability, making them insufficient for real-world applications. Three pervasive shortcomings in these tools are responsible: (1) incorrect parsing of antivirus detections, (2) errors during family alias resolution, and (3) an inappropriate antivirus aggregation strategy. To address each of these, we created our own malware family labeling tool called ClarAVy. ClarAVy utilizes a Variational Bayesian approach to aggregate detections from a collection of antivirus products into accurate family labels. Our tool scales to enormous malware datasets, and we evaluated it by labeling approx40 million malicious files. ClarAVy has 8 and 12 percentage points higher accuracy than the prior leading tool in labeling the MOTIF and MalPedia datasets, respectively.

We propose a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously employs multiple deep learning models analyzing contextual and behavioral characteristics of Windows portable executable, producing a final prediction based on a decision from the meta-model. The detection heuristic in contemporary machine learning Windows malware classifiers is typically based on the static properties of the sample since dynamic analysis through virtualization is challenging for vast quantities of samples. To surpass this limitation, we employ a Windows kernel emulation that allows the acquisition of behavioral patterns across large corpora with minimal temporal and computational costs. We partner with a security vendor for a collection of more than 100k int-the-wild samples that resemble the contemporary threat landscape, containing raw PE files and filepaths of applications at the moment of execution. The acquired dataset is at least ten folds larger than reported in related works on behavioral malware analysis. Files in the training dataset are labeled by a professional threat intelligence team, utilizing manual and automated reverse engineering tools. We estimate the hybrid classifier's operational utility by collecting an out-of-sample test set three months later from the acquisition of the training set. We report an improved detection rate, above the capabilities of the current state-of-the-art model, especially under low false-positive requirements. Additionally, we uncover a meta-model's ability to identify malicious activity in validation and test sets even if none of the individual models express enough confidence to mark the sample as malevolent. We conclude that the meta-model can learn patterns typical to malicious samples from representation combinations produced by different analysis techniques. We publicly release pre-trained models and anonymized dataset of emulation reports.

Background. The recent surge in phishing attacks keeps undermining the effectiveness of the traditional anti-phishing blacklist approaches. On-device anti-phishing solutions are gaining popularity as they offer faster phishing detection locally. Aim. We aim to eliminate the delay in recognizing and recording phishing campaigns in databases via on-device solutions that identify phishing sites immediately when encountered by the user rather than waiting for a web crawler's scan to finish. Additionally, utilizing operating system-specific resources and frameworks, we aim to minimize the impact on system performance and depend on local processing to protect user privacy. Method. We propose a phishing detection solution that uses a combination of computer vision and on-device machine learning models to analyze websites in real time. Our reference-based approach analyzes the visual content of webpages, identifying phishing attempts through layout analysis, credential input areas detection, and brand impersonation criteria combination. Results. Our case study shows it's feasible to perform background processing on-device continuously, for the case of the web browser requiring the resource use of 16% of a single CPU core and less than 84MB of RAM on Apple M1 while maintaining the accuracy of brand logo detection at 46.6% (comparable with baselines), and of Credential Requiring Page detection at 98.1% (improving the baseline by 3.1%), within the test dataset. Conclusions. Our results demonstrate the potential of on-device, real-time phishing detection systems to enhance cybersecurity defensive technologies and extend the scope of phishing detection to more similar regions of interest, e.g., email clients and messenger windows.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

The open-source software (OSS) ecosystem suffers from security threats caused by malware.However, OSS malware research has three limitations: a lack of high-quality datasets, a lack of malware diversity, and a lack of attack campaign contexts. In this paper, we first build the largest dataset of 24,356 malicious packages from online sources, then propose a knowledge graph to represent the OSS malware corpus and conduct malware analysis in the wild.Our main findings include (1) it is essential to collect malicious packages from various online sources because their data overlapping degrees are small;(2) despite the sheer volume of malicious packages, many reuse similar code, leading to a low diversity of malware;(3) only 28 malicious packages were repeatedly hidden via dependency libraries of 1,354 malicious packages, and dependency-hidden malware has a shorter active time;(4) security reports are the only reliable source for disclosing the malware-based context. Index Terms: Malicious Packages, Software Analysis

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed software development and automated code generation. Motivated by these advancements, this paper explores the feasibility of LLMs in modifying malware source code to generate variants. We introduce LLMalMorph, a semi-automated framework that leverages semantical and syntactical code comprehension by LLMs to generate new malware variants. LLMalMorph extracts function-level information from the malware source code and employs custom-engineered prompts coupled with strategically defined code transformations to guide the LLM in generating variants without resource-intensive fine-tuning. To evaluate LLMalMorph, we collected 10 diverse Windows malware samples of varying types, complexity and functionality and generated 618 variants. Our thorough experiments demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the detection rates of antivirus engines of these malware variants to some extent while preserving malware functionalities. In addition, despite not optimizing against any Machine Learning (ML)-based malware detectors, several variants also achieved notable attack success rates against an ML-based malware classifier. We also discuss the limitations of current LLM capabilities in generating malware variants from source code and assess where this emerging technology stands in the broader context of malware variant generation.

With the rapid advancement of Internet technology, the threat of malware to computer systems and network security has intensified. Malware affects individual privacy and security and poses risks to critical infrastructures of enterprises and nations. The increasing quantity and complexity of malware, along with its concealment and diversity, challenge traditional detection techniques. Static detection methods struggle against variants and packed malware, while dynamic methods face high costs and risks that limit their application. Consequently, there is an urgent need for novel and efficient malware detection techniques to improve accuracy and robustness. This study first employs the minhash algorithm to convert binary files of malware into grayscale images, followed by the extraction of global and local texture features using GIST and LBP algorithms. Additionally, the study utilizes IDA Pro to decompile and extract opcode sequences, applying N-gram and tf-idf algorithms for feature vectorization. The fusion of these features enables the model to comprehensively capture the behavioral characteristics of malware. In terms of model construction, a CNN-BiLSTM fusion model is designed to simultaneously process image features and opcode sequences, enhancing classification performance. Experimental validation on multiple public datasets demonstrates that the proposed method significantly outperforms traditional detection techniques in terms of accuracy, recall, and F1 score, particularly in detecting variants and obfuscated malware with greater stability. The research presented in this paper offers new insights into the development of malware detection technologies, validating the effectiveness of feature and model fusion, and holds promising application prospects.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

Existing research on malware classification focuses almost exclusively on two tasks: distinguishing between malicious and benign files and classifying malware by family. However, malware can be categorized according to many other types of attributes, and the ability to identify these attributes in newly-emerging malware using machine learning could provide significant value to analysts. In particular, we have identified four tasks which are under-represented in prior work: classification by behaviors that malware exhibit, platforms that malware run on, vulnerabilities that malware exploit, and packers that malware are packed with. To obtain labels for training and evaluating ML classifiers on these tasks, we created an antivirus (AV) tagging tool called ClarAVy. ClarAVy's sophisticated AV label parser distinguishes itself from prior AV-based taggers, with the ability to accurately parse 882 different AV label formats used by 90 different AV products. We are releasing benchmark datasets for each of these four classification tasks, tagged using ClarAVy and comprising nearly 5.5 million malicious files in total. Our malware behavior dataset includes 75 distinct tags - nearly 7x more than the only prior benchmark dataset with behavioral tags. To our knowledge, we are the first to release datasets with malware platform and packer tags.

Malware family classification is a significant issue with public safety and research implications that has been hindered by the high cost of expert labels. The vast majority of corpora use noisy labeling approaches that obstruct definitive quantification of results and study of deeper interactions. In order to provide the data needed to advance further, we have created the Malware Open-source Threat Intelligence Family (MOTIF) dataset. MOTIF contains 3,095 malware samples from 454 families, making it the largest and most diverse public malware dataset with ground truth family labels to date, nearly 3x larger than any prior expert-labeled corpus and 36x larger than the prior Windows malware corpus. MOTIF also comes with a mapping from malware samples to threat reports published by reputable industry sources, which both validates the labels and opens new research opportunities in connecting opaque malware samples to human-readable descriptions. This enables important evaluations that are normally infeasible due to non-standardized reporting in industry. For example, we provide aliases of the different names used to describe the same malware family, allowing us to benchmark for the first time accuracy of existing tools when names are obtained from differing sources. Evaluation results obtained using the MOTIF dataset indicate that existing tasks have significant room for improvement, with accuracy of antivirus majority voting measured at only 62.10% and the well-known AVClass tool having just 46.78% accuracy. Our findings indicate that malware family classification suffers a type of labeling noise unlike that studied in most ML literature, due to the large open set of classes that may not be known from the sample under consideration

The use of operating system API calls is a promising task in the detection of PE-type malware in the Windows operating system. This task is officially defined as running malware in an isolated sandbox environment, recording the API calls made with the Windows operating system and sequentially analyzing these calls. Here, we have analyzed 7107 different malicious software belonging to various families such as virus, backdoor, trojan in an isolated sandbox environment and transformed these analysis results into a format where different classification algorithms and methods can be used. First, we'll explain how we got the malware, and then we'll explain how we've got these software bundled into families. Finally, we will describe how to perform malware classification tasks using different computational methods for the researchers who will use the data set we have created.

Effective and efficient mitigation of malware is a long-time endeavor in the information security community. The development of an anti-malware system that can counteract an unknown malware is a prolific activity that may benefit several sectors. We envision an intelligent anti-malware system that utilizes the power of deep learning (DL) models. Using such models would enable the detection of newly-released malware through mathematical generalization. That is, finding the relationship between a given malware x and its corresponding malware family y, f: x mapsto y. To accomplish this feat, we used the Malimg dataset (Nataraj et al., 2011) which consists of malware images that were processed from malware binaries, and then we trained the following DL models 1 to classify each malware family: CNN-SVM (Tang, 2013), GRU-SVM (Agarap, 2017), and MLP-SVM. Empirical evidence has shown that the GRU-SVM stands out among the DL models with a predictive accuracy of ~84.92%. This stands to reason for the mentioned model had the relatively most sophisticated architecture design among the presented models. The exploration of an even more optimal DL-SVM model is the next stage towards the engineering of an intelligent anti-malware system.

Diffusion models have achieved great success in a range of tasks, such as image synthesis and molecule design. As such successes hinge on large-scale training data collected from diverse sources, the trustworthiness of these collected data is hard to control or audit. In this work, we aim to explore the vulnerabilities of diffusion models under potential training data manipulations and try to answer: How hard is it to perform Trojan attacks on well-trained diffusion models? What are the adversarial targets that such Trojan attacks can achieve? To answer these questions, we propose an effective Trojan attack against diffusion models, TrojDiff, which optimizes the Trojan diffusion and generative processes during training. In particular, we design novel transitions during the Trojan diffusion process to diffuse adversarial targets into a biased Gaussian distribution and propose a new parameterization of the Trojan generative process that leads to an effective training objective for the attack. In addition, we consider three types of adversarial targets: the Trojaned diffusion models will always output instances belonging to a certain class from the in-domain distribution (In-D2D attack), out-of-domain distribution (Out-D2D-attack), and one specific instance (D2I attack). We evaluate TrojDiff on CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets against both DDPM and DDIM diffusion models. We show that TrojDiff always achieves high attack performance under different adversarial targets using different types of triggers, while the performance in benign environments is preserved. The code is available at https://github.com/chenweixin107/TrojDiff.

Dynamic analysis enables detecting Windows malware by executing programs in a controlled environment and logging their actions. Previous work has proposed training machine learning models, i.e., convolutional and long short-term memory networks, on homogeneous input features like runtime APIs to either detect or classify malware, neglecting other relevant information coming from heterogeneous data like network and file operations. To overcome these issues, we introduce Nebula, a versatile, self-attention Transformer-based neural architecture that generalizes across different behavioral representations and formats, combining diverse information from dynamic log reports. Nebula is composed by several components needed to tokenize, filter, normalize and encode data to feed the transformer architecture. We firstly perform a comprehensive ablation study to evaluate their impact on the performance of the whole system, highlighting which components can be used as-is, and which must be enriched with specific domain knowledge. We perform extensive experiments on both malware detection and classification tasks, using three datasets acquired from different dynamic analyses platforms, show that, on average, Nebula outperforms state-of-the-art models at low false positive rates, with a peak of 12% improvement. Moreover, we showcase how self-supervised learning pre-training matches the performance of fully-supervised models with only 20% of training data, and we inspect the output of Nebula through explainable AI techniques, pinpointing how attention is focusing on specific tokens correlated to malicious activities of malware families. To foster reproducibility, we open-source our findings and models at https://github.com/dtrizna/nebula.

In the current cybersecurity landscape, protecting military devices such as communication and battlefield management systems against sophisticated cyber attacks is crucial. Malware exploits vulnerabilities through stealth methods, often evading traditional detection mechanisms such as software signatures. The application of ML/DL in vulnerability detection has been extensively explored in the literature. However, current ML/DL vulnerability detection methods struggle with understanding the context and intent behind complex attacks. Integrating large language models (LLMs) with system call analysis offers a promising approach to enhance malware detection. This work presents a novel framework leveraging LLMs to classify malware based on system call data. The framework uses transfer learning to adapt pre-trained LLMs for malware detection. By retraining LLMs on a dataset of benign and malicious system calls, the models are refined to detect signs of malware activity. Experiments with a dataset of over 1TB of system calls demonstrate that models with larger context sizes, such as BigBird and Longformer, achieve superior accuracy and F1-Score of approximately 0.86. The results highlight the importance of context size in improving detection rates and underscore the trade-offs between computational complexity and performance. This approach shows significant potential for real-time detection in high-stakes environments, offering a robust solution to evolving cyber threats.

Recent advances in operating system (OS) agents enable vision-language models to interact directly with the graphical user interface of an OS. These multimodal OS agents autonomously perform computer-based tasks in response to a single prompt via application programming interfaces (APIs). Such APIs typically support low-level operations, including mouse clicks, keyboard inputs, and screenshot captures. We introduce a novel attack vector: malicious image patches (MIPs) that have been adversarially perturbed so that, when captured in a screenshot, they cause an OS agent to perform harmful actions by exploiting specific APIs. For instance, MIPs embedded in desktop backgrounds or shared on social media can redirect an agent to a malicious website, enabling further exploitation. These MIPs generalise across different user requests and screen layouts, and remain effective for multiple OS agents. The existence of such attacks highlights critical security vulnerabilities in OS agents, which should be carefully addressed before their widespread adoption.

A lack of accessible data has historically restricted malware analysis research, and practitioners have relied heavily on datasets provided by industry sources to advance. Existing public datasets are limited by narrow scope - most include files targeting a single platform, have labels supporting just one type of malware classification task, and make no effort to capture the evasive files that make malware detection difficult in practice. We present EMBER2024, a new dataset that enables holistic evaluation of malware classifiers. Created in collaboration with the authors of EMBER2017 and EMBER2018, the EMBER2024 dataset includes hashes, metadata, feature vectors, and labels for more than 3.2 million files from six file formats. Our dataset supports the training and evaluation of machine learning models on seven malware classification tasks, including malware detection, malware family classification, and malware behavior identification. EMBER2024 is the first to include a collection of malicious files that initially went undetected by a set of antivirus products, creating a "challenge" set to assess classifier performance against evasive malware. This work also introduces EMBER feature version 3, with added support for several new feature types. We are releasing the EMBER2024 dataset to promote reproducibility and empower researchers in the pursuit of new malware research topics.

Many cyberattacks start with disseminating phishing URLs. When clicking these phishing URLs, the victim's private information is leaked to the attacker. There have been proposed several machine learning methods to detect phishing URLs. However, it still remains under-explored to detect phishing URLs with evasion, i.e., phishing URLs that pretend to be benign by manipulating patterns. In many cases, the attacker i) reuses prepared phishing web pages because making a completely brand-new set costs non-trivial expenses, ii) prefers hosting companies that do not require private information and are cheaper than others, iii) prefers shared hosting for cost efficiency, and iv) sometimes uses benign domains, IP addresses, and URL string patterns to evade existing detection methods. Inspired by those behavioral characteristics, we present a network-based inference method to accurately detect phishing URLs camouflaged with legitimate patterns, i.e., robust to evasion. In the network approach, a phishing URL will be still identified as phishy even after evasion unless a majority of its neighbors in the network are evaded at the same time. Our method consistently shows better detection performance throughout various experimental tests than state-of-the-art methods, e.g., F-1 of 0.89 for our method vs. 0.84 for the best feature-based method.

Machine Learning (ML) models have been utilized for malware detection for over two decades. Consequently, this ignited an ongoing arms race between malware authors and antivirus systems, compelling researchers to propose defenses for malware-detection models against evasion attacks. However, most if not all existing defenses against evasion attacks suffer from sizable performance degradation and/or can defend against only specific attacks, which makes them less practical in real-world settings. In this work, we develop a certified defense, DRSM (De-Randomized Smoothed MalConv), by redesigning the de-randomized smoothing technique for the domain of malware detection. Specifically, we propose a window ablation scheme to provably limit the impact of adversarial bytes while maximally preserving local structures of the executables. After showing how DRSM is theoretically robust against attacks with contiguous adversarial bytes, we verify its performance and certified robustness experimentally, where we observe only marginal accuracy drops as the cost of robustness. To our knowledge, we are the first to offer certified robustness in the realm of static detection of malware executables. More surprisingly, through evaluating DRSM against 9 empirical attacks of different types, we observe that the proposed defense is empirically robust to some extent against a diverse set of attacks, some of which even fall out of the scope of its original threat model. In addition, we collected 15.5K recent benign raw executables from diverse sources, which will be made public as a dataset called PACE (Publicly Accessible Collection(s) of Executables) to alleviate the scarcity of publicly available benign datasets for studying malware detection and provide future research with more representative data of the time.

In recent years, the increase in non-Windows malware threats had turned the focus of the cybersecurity community. Research works on hunting Windows PE-based malwares are maturing, whereas the developments on Linux malware threat hunting are relatively scarce. With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, smart devices that are getting integrated into human life have become a hackers highway for their malicious activities. The IoT devices employ various Unix-based architectures that follow ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) as their standard binary file specification. This study aims at providing a comprehensive survey on the latest developments in cross-architectural IoT malware detection and classification approaches. Aided by a modern taxonomy, we discuss the feature representations, feature extraction techniques, and machine learning models employed in the surveyed works. We further provide more insights on the practical challenges involved in cross-architectural IoT malware threat hunting and discuss various avenues to instill potential future research.

In this paper we describe the SOREL-20M (Sophos/ReversingLabs-20 Million) dataset: a large-scale dataset consisting of nearly 20 million files with pre-extracted features and metadata, high-quality labels derived from multiple sources, information about vendor detections of the malware samples at the time of collection, and additional ``tags'' related to each malware sample to serve as additional targets. In addition to features and metadata, we also provide approximately 10 million ``disarmed'' malware samples -- samples with both the optional\_headers.subsystem and file\_header.machine flags set to zero -- that may be used for further exploration of features and detection strategies. We also provide Python code to interact with the data and features, as well as baseline neural network and gradient boosted decision tree models and their results, with full training and evaluation code, to serve as a starting point for further experimentation.

Malware has become a formidable threat as it has been growing exponentially in number and sophistication, thus, it is imperative to have a solution that is easy to implement, reliable, and effective. While recent research has introduced deep learning multi-feature fusion algorithms, they lack a proper explanation. In this work, we investigate the power of fusing Convolutional Neural Network models trained on different modalities of a malware executable. We are proposing a novel multimodal fusion algorithm, leveraging three different visual malware features: Grayscale Image, Entropy Graph, and SimHash Image, with which we conducted exhaustive experiments independently on each feature and combinations of all three of them using fusion operators such as average, maximum, add, and concatenate for effective malware detection and classification. The proposed strategy has a detection rate of 1.00 (on a scale of 0-1) in identifying malware in the given dataset. We explained its interpretability with visualization techniques such as t-SNE and Grad-CAM. Experimental results show the model works even for a highly imbalanced dataset. We also assessed the effectiveness of the proposed method on obfuscated malware and achieved state-of-the-art results. The proposed methodology is more reliable as our findings prove VGG16 model can detect and classify malware in a matter of seconds in real-time.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are essential for contextual understanding of both visual and textual information. However, their vulnerability to adversarially manipulated inputs presents significant risks, leading to compromised outputs and raising concerns about the reliability in VLM-integrated applications. Detecting these malicious prompts is thus crucial for maintaining trust in VLM generations. A major challenge in developing a safeguarding prompt classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled benign and malicious data. To address the issue, we introduce VLMGuard, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled user prompts in the wild for malicious prompt detection. These unlabeled prompts, which naturally arise when VLMs are deployed in the open world, consist of both benign and malicious information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated maliciousness estimation score for distinguishing between benign and malicious samples within this unlabeled mixture, thereby enabling the training of a binary prompt classifier on top. Notably, our framework does not require extra human annotations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiment shows VLMGuard achieves superior detection results, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Disclaimer: This paper may contain offensive examples; reader discretion is advised.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Millions of new pieces of malicious software (i.e., malware) are introduced each year. This poses significant challenges for antivirus vendors, who use machine learning to detect and analyze malware, and must keep up with changes in the distribution while retaining knowledge of older variants. Continual learning (CL) holds the potential to address this challenge by reducing the storage and computational costs of regularly retraining over all the collected data. Prior work, however, shows that CL techniques, which are designed primarily for computer vision tasks, fare poorly when applied to malware classification. To address these issues, we begin with an exploratory analysis of a typical malware dataset, which reveals that malware families are diverse and difficult to characterize, requiring a wide variety of samples to learn a robust representation. Based on these findings, we propose Malware Analysis with Diversity-Aware Replay (MADAR), a CL framework that accounts for the unique properties and challenges of the malware data distribution. Through extensive evaluation on large-scale Windows and Android malware datasets, we show that MADAR significantly outperforms prior work. This highlights the importance of understanding domain characteristics when designing CL techniques and demonstrates a path forward for the malware classification domain.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized software development practices, yet concerns about their safety have arisen, particularly regarding hidden backdoors, aka trojans. Backdoor attacks involve the insertion of triggers into training data, allowing attackers to manipulate the behavior of the model maliciously. In this paper, we focus on analyzing the model parameters to detect potential backdoor signals in code models. Specifically, we examine attention weights and biases, activation values, and context embeddings of the clean and poisoned CodeBERT models. Our results suggest noticeable patterns in activation values and context embeddings of poisoned samples for the poisoned CodeBERT model; however, attention weights and biases do not show any significant differences. This work contributes to ongoing efforts in white-box detection of backdoor signals in LLMs of code through the analysis of parameters and activations.

Information systems have widely been the target of malware attacks. Traditional signature-based malicious program detection algorithms can only detect known malware and are prone to evasion techniques such as binary obfuscation, while behavior-based approaches highly rely on the malware training samples and incur prohibitively high training cost. To address the limitations of existing techniques, we propose MatchGNet, a heterogeneous Graph Matching Network model to learn the graph representation and similarity metric simultaneously based on the invariant graph modeling of the program's execution behaviors. We conduct a systematic evaluation of our model and show that it is accurate in detecting malicious program behavior and can help detect malware attacks with less false positives. MatchGNet outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms in malware detection by generating 50% less false positives while keeping zero false negatives.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities for leveraging artificial intelligence in various domains, including cybersecurity. As the volume and sophistication of cyber threats continue to grow, there is an increasing need for intelligent systems that can automatically detect vulnerabilities, analyze malware, and respond to attacks. In this survey, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on the application of LLMs in cybersecurity (LLM4Security). By comprehensively collecting over 30K relevant papers and systematically analyzing 127 papers from top security and software engineering venues, we aim to provide a holistic view of how LLMs are being used to solve diverse problems across the cybersecurity domain. Through our analysis, we identify several key findings. First, we observe that LLMs are being applied to a wide range of cybersecurity tasks, including vulnerability detection, malware analysis, network intrusion detection, and phishing detection. Second, we find that the datasets used for training and evaluating LLMs in these tasks are often limited in size and diversity, highlighting the need for more comprehensive and representative datasets. Third, we identify several promising techniques for adapting LLMs to specific cybersecurity domains, such as fine-tuning, transfer learning, and domain-specific pre-training. Finally, we discuss the main challenges and opportunities for future research in LLM4Security, including the need for more interpretable and explainable models, the importance of addressing data privacy and security concerns, and the potential for leveraging LLMs for proactive defense and threat hunting. Overall, our survey provides a comprehensive overview of the current state-of-the-art in LLM4Security and identifies several promising directions for future research.

The proficiency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in processing structured data and adhering to syntactic rules is a capability that drives their widespread adoption but also makes them paradoxically vulnerable. In this paper, we investigate this vulnerability through BreakFun, a jailbreak methodology that weaponizes an LLM's adherence to structured schemas. BreakFun employs a three-part prompt that combines an innocent framing and a Chain-of-Thought distraction with a core "Trojan Schema"--a carefully crafted data structure that compels the model to generate harmful content, exploiting the LLM's strong tendency to follow structures and schemas. We demonstrate this vulnerability is highly transferable, achieving an average success rate of 89% across 13 foundational and proprietary models on JailbreakBench, and reaching a 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on several prominent models. A rigorous ablation study confirms this Trojan Schema is the attack's primary causal factor. To counter this, we introduce the Adversarial Prompt Deconstruction guardrail, a defense that utilizes a secondary LLM to perform a "Literal Transcription"--extracting all human-readable text to isolate and reveal the user's true harmful intent. Our proof-of-concept guardrail demonstrates high efficacy against the attack, validating that targeting the deceptive schema is a viable mitigation strategy. Our work provides a look into how an LLM's core strengths can be turned into critical weaknesses, offering a fresh perspective for building more robustly aligned models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become critical to modern software development, but their reliance on uncurated web-scale datasets for training introduces a significant security risk: the absorption and reproduction of malicious content. To systematically evaluate this risk, we introduce Scam2Prompt, a scalable automated auditing framework that identifies the underlying intent of a scam site and then synthesizes innocuous, developer-style prompts that mirror this intent, allowing us to test whether an LLM will generate malicious code in response to these innocuous prompts. In a large-scale study of four production LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Llama-4-Scout, and DeepSeek-V3), we found that Scam2Prompt's innocuous prompts triggered malicious URL generation in 4.24% of cases. To test the persistence of this security risk, we constructed Innoc2Scam-bench, a benchmark of 1,559 innocuous prompts that consistently elicited malicious code from all four initial LLMs. When applied to seven additional production LLMs released in 2025, we found the vulnerability is not only present but severe, with malicious code generation rates ranging from 12.7% to 43.8%. Furthermore, existing safety measures like state-of-the-art guardrails proved insufficient to prevent this behavior, with an overall detection rate of less than 0.3%.

Open source code is considered a common practice in modern software development. However, reusing other code allows bad actors to access a wide developers' community, hence the products that rely on it. Those attacks are categorized as supply chain attacks. Recent years saw a growing number of supply chain attacks that leverage open source during software development, relaying the download and installation procedures, whether automatic or manual. Over the years, many approaches have been invented for detecting vulnerable packages. However, it is uncommon to detect malicious code within packages. Those detection approaches can be broadly categorized as analyzes that use (dynamic) and do not use (static) code execution. Here, we introduce Malicious Source code Detection using Transformers (MSDT) algorithm. MSDT is a novel static analysis based on a deep learning method that detects real-world code injection cases to source code packages. In this study, we used MSDT and a dataset with over 600,000 different functions to embed various functions and applied a clustering algorithm to the resulting vectors, detecting the malicious functions by detecting the outliers. We evaluated MSDT's performance by conducting extensive experiments and demonstrated that our algorithm is capable of detecting functions that were injected with malicious code with precision@k values of up to 0.909.

The proliferation of IoT devices which can be more easily compromised than desktop computers has led to an increase in the occurrence of IoT based botnet attacks. In order to mitigate this new threat there is a need to develop new methods for detecting attacks launched from compromised IoT devices and differentiate between hour and millisecond long IoTbased attacks. In this paper we propose and empirically evaluate a novel network based anomaly detection method which extracts behavior snapshots of the network and uses deep autoencoders to detect anomalous network traffic emanating from compromised IoT devices. To evaluate our method, we infected nine commercial IoT devices in our lab with two of the most widely known IoT based botnets, Mirai and BASHLITE. Our evaluation results demonstrated our proposed method's ability to accurately and instantly detect the attacks as they were being launched from the compromised IoT devices which were part of a botnet.

Malware is becoming increasingly complex and widespread, making it essential to develop more effective and timely detection methods. Traditional static analysis often fails to defend against modern threats that employ code obfuscation, polymorphism, and other evasion techniques. In contrast, behavioral malware detection, which monitors runtime activities, provides a more reliable and context-aware solution. In this work, we propose BEACON, a novel deep learning framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) to generate dense, contextual embeddings from raw sandbox-generated behavior reports. These embeddings capture semantic and structural patterns of each sample and are processed by a one-dimensional convolutional neural network (1D CNN) for multi-class malware classification. Evaluated on the Avast-CTU Public CAPE Dataset, our framework consistently outperforms existing methods, highlighting the effectiveness of LLM-based behavioral embeddings and the overall design of BEACON for robust malware classification.

Machine learning and data mining algorithms play important roles in designing intrusion detection systems. Based on their approaches toward the detection of attacks in a network, intrusion detection systems can be broadly categorized into two types. In the misuse detection systems, an attack in a system is detected whenever the sequence of activities in the network matches with a known attack signature. In the anomaly detection approach, on the other hand, anomalous states in a system are identified based on a significant difference in the state transitions of the system from its normal states. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on some of the existing schemes of intrusion detection based on misuse detection, anomaly detection and hybrid detection approaches. Some future directions of research in the design of algorithms for intrusion detection are also identified.

The proliferation of phishing sites and emails poses significant challenges to existing cybersecurity efforts. Despite advances in malicious email filters and email security protocols, problems with oversight and false positives persist. Users often struggle to understand why emails are flagged as potentially fraudulent, risking the possibility of missing important communications or mistakenly trusting deceptive phishing emails. This study introduces ChatSpamDetector, a system that uses large language models (LLMs) to detect phishing emails. By converting email data into a prompt suitable for LLM analysis, the system provides a highly accurate determination of whether an email is phishing or not. Importantly, it offers detailed reasoning for its phishing determinations, assisting users in making informed decisions about how to handle suspicious emails. We conducted an evaluation using a comprehensive phishing email dataset and compared our system to several LLMs and baseline systems. We confirmed that our system using GPT-4 has superior detection capabilities with an accuracy of 99.70%. Advanced contextual interpretation by LLMs enables the identification of various phishing tactics and impersonations, making them a potentially powerful tool in the fight against email-based phishing threats.

As diffusion models have achieved success in image generation tasks, many studies have extended them to other related fields like image editing. Unlike image generation, image editing aims to modify an image based on user requests while keeping other parts of the image unchanged. Among these, text-based image editing is the most representative task.Some studies have shown that diffusion models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers may poison the training data to inject the backdoor into models. However, previous backdoor attacks on diffusion models primarily focus on image generation models without considering image editing models. Given that image editing models accept multimodal inputs, it raises a new question regarding the effectiveness of different modalities triggers in backdoor attacks on these models. To address this question, we propose a backdoor attack framework for image editing models, named TrojanEdit, which can handle different modalities triggers. We explore five types of visual triggers, three types of textual triggers, and combine them together as fifteen types of multimodal triggers, conducting extensive experiments for three types of backdoor attack goals. Our experimental results show that the image editing model has a backdoor bias for texture triggers. Compared to visual triggers, textual triggers have stronger attack effectiveness but also cause more damage to the model's normal functionality. Furthermore, we found that multimodal triggers can achieve a good balance between the attack effectiveness and model's normal functionality.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved human-level fluency in text generation, making it difficult to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated texts. This poses a growing risk of misuse of LLMs and demands the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. However, existing detectors lack robustness against attacks: they degrade detection accuracy by simply paraphrasing LLM-generated texts. Furthermore, a malicious user might attempt to deliberately evade the detectors based on detection results, but this has not been assumed in previous studies. In this paper, we propose OUTFOX, a framework that improves the robustness of LLM-generated-text detectors by allowing both the detector and the attacker to consider each other's output. In this framework, the attacker uses the detector's prediction labels as examples for in-context learning and adversarially generates essays that are harder to detect, while the detector uses the adversarially generated essays as examples for in-context learning to learn to detect essays from a strong attacker. Experiments in the domain of student essays show that the proposed detector improves the detection performance on the attacker-generated texts by up to +41.3 points in F1-score. Furthermore, the proposed detector shows a state-of-the-art detection performance: up to 96.9 points in F1-score, beating existing detectors on non-attacked texts. Finally, the proposed attacker drastically degrades the performance of detectors by up to -57.0 points F1-score, massively outperforming the baseline paraphrasing method for evading detection.

While smishing (SMS Phishing) attacks have risen to become one of the most common types of social engineering attacks, there is a lack of relevant smishing datasets. One of the biggest challenges in the domain of smishing prevention is the availability of fresh smishing datasets. Additionally, as time persists, smishing campaigns are shut down and the crucial information related to the attack are lost. With the changing nature of smishing attacks, a consistent flow of new smishing examples is needed by both researchers and engineers to create effective defenses. In this paper, we present the community-sourced smishing datasets from the smishtank.com. It provides a wealth of information relevant to combating smishing attacks through the breakdown and analysis of smishing samples at the point of submission. In the contribution of our work, we provide a corpus of 1090 smishing samples that have been publicly submitted through the site. Each message includes information relating to the sender, message body, and any brands referenced in the message. Additionally, when a URL is found, we provide additional information on the domain, VirusTotal results, and a characterization of the URL. Through the open access of fresh smishing data, we empower academia and industries to create robust defenses against this evolving threat.

Malware authors have always been at an advantage of being able to adversarially test and augment their malicious code, before deploying the payload, using anti-malware products at their disposal. The anti-malware developers and threat experts, on the other hand, do not have such a privilege of tuning anti-malware products against zero-day attacks pro-actively. This allows the malware authors to being a step ahead of the anti-malware products, fundamentally biasing the cat and mouse game played by the two parties. In this paper, we propose a way that would enable machine learning based threat prevention models to bridge that gap by being able to tune against a deep generative adversarial network (GAN), which takes up the role of a malware author and generates new types of malware. The GAN is trained over a reversible distributed RGB image representation of known malware behaviors, encoding the sequence of API call ngrams and the corresponding term frequencies. The generated images represent synthetic malware that can be decoded back to the underlying API call sequence information. The image representation is not only demonstrated as a general technique of incorporating necessary priors for exploiting convolutional neural network architectures for generative or discriminative modeling, but also as a visualization method for easy manual software or malware categorization, by having individual API ngram information distributed across the image space. In addition, we also propose using smart-definitions for detecting malwares based on perceptual hashing of these images. Such hashes are potentially more effective than cryptographic hashes that do not carry any meaningful similarity metric, and hence, do not generalize well.

Recent growth and proliferation of malware has tested practitioners' ability to promptly classify new samples according to malware families. In contrast to labor-intensive reverse engineering efforts, machine learning approaches have demonstrated increased speed and accuracy. However, most existing deep-learning malware family classifiers must be calibrated using a large number of samples that are painstakingly manually analyzed before training. Furthermore, as novel malware samples arise that are beyond the scope of the training set, additional reverse engineering effort must be employed to update the training set. The sheer volume of new samples found in the wild creates substantial pressure on practitioners' ability to reverse engineer enough malware to adequately train modern classifiers. In this paper, we present MalMixer, a malware family classifier using semi-supervised learning that achieves high accuracy with sparse training data. We present a novel domain-knowledge-aware technique for augmenting malware feature representations, enhancing few-shot performance of semi-supervised malware family classification. We show that MalMixer achieves state-of-the-art performance in few-shot malware family classification settings. Our research confirms the feasibility and effectiveness of lightweight, domain-knowledge-aware feature augmentation methods and highlights the capabilities of similar semi-supervised classifiers in addressing malware classification issues.

Cybersecurity honeypots are deception tools for engaging attackers and gather intelligence, but traditional low or medium-interaction honeypots often rely on static, pre-scripted interactions that can be easily identified by skilled adversaries. This Report presents LLMHoney, an SSH honeypot that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate realistic, dynamic command outputs in real time. LLMHoney integrates a dictionary-based virtual file system to handle common commands with low latency while using LLMs for novel inputs, achieving a balance between authenticity and performance. We implemented LLMHoney using open-source LLMs and evaluated it on a testbed with 138 representative Linux commands. We report comprehensive metrics including accuracy (exact-match, Cosine Similarity, Jaro-Winkler Similarity, Levenshtein Similarity and BLEU score), response latency and memory overhead. We evaluate LLMHoney using multiple LLM backends ranging from 0.36B to 3.8B parameters, including both open-source models and a proprietary model(Gemini). Our experiments compare 13 different LLM variants; results show that Gemini-2.0 and moderately-sized models Qwen2.5:1.5B and Phi3:3.8B provide the most reliable and accurate responses, with mean latencies around 3 seconds, whereas smaller models often produce incorrect or out-of-character outputs. We also discuss how LLM integration improves honeypot realism and adaptability compared to traditional honeypots, as well as challenges such as occasional hallucinated outputs and increased resource usage. Our findings demonstrate that LLM-driven honeypots are a promising approach to enhance attacker engagement and collect richer threat intelligence.

Pickle deserialization vulnerabilities have persisted throughout Python's history, remaining widely recognized yet unresolved. Due to its ability to transparently save and restore complex objects into byte streams, many AI/ML frameworks continue to adopt pickle as the model serialization protocol despite its inherent risks. As the open-source model ecosystem grows, model-sharing platforms such as Hugging Face have attracted massive participation, significantly amplifying the real-world risks of pickle exploitation and opening new avenues for model supply chain poisoning. Although several state-of-the-art scanners have been developed to detect poisoned models, their incomplete understanding of the poisoning surface leaves the detection logic fragile and allows attackers to bypass them. In this work, we present the first systematic disclosure of the pickle-based model poisoning surface from both model loading and risky function perspectives. Our research demonstrates how pickle-based model poisoning can remain stealthy and highlights critical gaps in current scanning solutions. On the model loading surface, we identify 22 distinct pickle-based model loading paths across five foundational AI/ML frameworks, 19 of which are entirely missed by existing scanners. We further develop a bypass technique named Exception-Oriented Programming (EOP) and discover 9 EOP instances, 7 of which can bypass all scanners. On the risky function surface, we discover 133 exploitable gadgets, achieving almost a 100% bypass rate. Even against the best-performing scanner, these gadgets maintain an 89% bypass rate. By systematically revealing the pickle-based model poisoning surface, we achieve practical and robust bypasses against real-world scanners. We responsibly disclose our findings to corresponding vendors, receiving acknowledgments and a $6000 bug bounty.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly powerful but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs cause the model to deviate from its intended instructions. This paper introduces Sentinel, a novel detection model, qualifire/prompt-injection-sentinel, based on the \answerdotai/ModernBERT-large architecture. By leveraging ModernBERT's advanced features and fine-tuning on an extensive and diverse dataset comprising a few open-source and private collections, Sentinel achieves state-of-the-art performance. This dataset amalgamates varied attack types, from role-playing and instruction hijacking to attempts to generate biased content, alongside a broad spectrum of benign instructions, with private datasets specifically targeting nuanced error correction and real-world misclassifications. On a comprehensive, unseen internal test set, Sentinel demonstrates an average accuracy of 0.987 and an F1-score of 0.980. Furthermore, when evaluated on public benchmarks, it consistently outperforms strong baselines like protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2. This work details Sentinel's architecture, its meticulous dataset curation, its training methodology, and a thorough evaluation, highlighting its superior detection capabilities.

The effectiveness of an AI model in accurately classifying novel malware hinges on the quality of the features it is trained on, which in turn depends on the effectiveness of the analysis tool used. Peekaboo, a Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tool, defeats malware evasion techniques to capture authentic behavior at the Assembly (ASM) instruction level. This behavior exhibits patterns consistent with Zipf's law, a distribution commonly seen in natural languages, making Transformer models particularly effective for binary classification tasks. We introduce Alpha, a framework for zero day malware detection that leverages Transformer models and ASM language. Alpha is trained on malware and benign software data collected through Peekaboo, enabling it to identify entirely new samples with exceptional accuracy. Alpha eliminates any common functions from the test samples that are in the training dataset. This forces the model to rely on contextual patterns and novel ASM instruction combinations to detect malicious behavior, rather than memorizing familiar features. By combining the strengths of DBI, ASM analysis, and Transformer architectures, Alpha offers a powerful approach to proactively addressing the evolving threat of malware. Alpha demonstrates perfect accuracy for Ransomware, Worms and APTs with flawless classification for both malicious and benign samples. The results highlight the model's exceptional performance in detecting truly new malware samples.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Understanding TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) in malware binaries is essential for security analysis and threat intelligence, yet remains challenging in practice. Real-world malware binaries are typically stripped of symbols, contain large numbers of functions, and distribute malicious behavior across multiple code regions, making TTP attribution difficult. Recent large language models (LLMs) offer strong code understanding capabilities, but applying them directly to this task faces challenges in identifying analysis entry points, reasoning under partial observability, and misalignment with TTP-specific decision logic. We present TTPDetect, the first LLM agent for recognizing TTPs in stripped malware binaries. TTPDetect combines dense retrieval with LLM-based neural retrieval to narrow the space of analysis entry points. TTPDetect further employs a function-level analyzing agent consisting of a Context Explorer that performs on-demand, incremental context retrieval and a TTP-Specific Reasoning Guideline that achieves inference-time alignment. We build a new dataset that labels decompiled functions with TTPs across diverse malware families and platforms. TTPDetect achieves 93.25% precision and 93.81% recall on function-level TTP recognition, outperforming baselines by 10.38% and 18.78%, respectively. When evaluated on real world malware samples, TTPDetect recognizes TTPs with a precision of 87.37%. For malware with expert-written reports, TTPDetect recovers 85.7% of the documented TTPs and further discovers, on average, 10.5 previously unreported TTPs per malware.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

To detect the deployment of large language models for malicious use cases (e.g., fake content creation or academic plagiarism), several approaches have recently been proposed for identifying AI-generated text via watermarks or statistical irregularities. How robust are these detection algorithms to paraphrases of AI-generated text? To stress test these detectors, we first train an 11B parameter paraphrase generation model (DIPPER) that can paraphrase paragraphs, optionally leveraging surrounding text (e.g., user-written prompts) as context. DIPPER also uses scalar knobs to control the amount of lexical diversity and reordering in the paraphrases. Paraphrasing text generated by three large language models (including GPT3.5-davinci-003) with DIPPER successfully evades several detectors, including watermarking, GPTZero, DetectGPT, and OpenAI's text classifier. For example, DIPPER drops the detection accuracy of DetectGPT from 70.3% to 4.6% (at a constant false positive rate of 1%), without appreciably modifying the input semantics. To increase the robustness of AI-generated text detection to paraphrase attacks, we introduce a simple defense that relies on retrieving semantically-similar generations and must be maintained by a language model API provider. Given a candidate text, our algorithm searches a database of sequences previously generated by the API, looking for sequences that match the candidate text within a certain threshold. We empirically verify our defense using a database of 15M generations from a fine-tuned T5-XXL model and find that it can detect 80% to 97% of paraphrased generations across different settings, while only classifying 1% of human-written sequences as AI-generated. We will open source our code, model and data for future research.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized various domains but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs manipulate the model into ignoring original instructions and executing designated action. In this paper, we investigate the underlying mechanisms of these attacks by analyzing the attention patterns within LLMs. We introduce the concept of the distraction effect, where specific attention heads, termed important heads, shift focus from the original instruction to the injected instruction. Building on this discovery, we propose Attention Tracker, a training-free detection method that tracks attention patterns on instruction to detect prompt injection attacks without the need for additional LLM inference. Our method generalizes effectively across diverse models, datasets, and attack types, showing an AUROC improvement of up to 10.0% over existing methods, and performs well even on small LLMs. We demonstrate the robustness of our approach through extensive evaluations and provide insights into safeguarding LLM-integrated systems from prompt injection vulnerabilities.

Phishing emails are a critical component of the cybercrime kill chain due to their wide reach and low cost. Their ever-evolving nature renders traditional rule-based and feature-engineered detectors ineffective in the ongoing arms race between attackers and defenders. The rise of large language models (LLMs) further exacerbates the threat, enabling attackers to craft highly convincing phishing emails at minimal cost. This work demonstrates that LLMs can generate psychologically persuasive phishing emails tailored to victim profiles, successfully bypassing nearly all commercial and academic detectors. To defend against such threats, we propose PiMRef, the first reference-based phishing email detector that leverages knowledge-based invariants. Our core insight is that persuasive phishing emails often contain disprovable identity claims, which contradict real-world facts. PiMRef reframes phishing detection as an identity fact-checking task. Given an email, PiMRef (i) extracts the sender's claimed identity, (ii) verifies the legitimacy of the sender's domain against a predefined knowledge base, and (iii) detects call-to-action prompts that push user engagement. Contradictory claims are flagged as phishing indicators and serve as human-understandable explanations. Compared to existing methods such as D-Fence, HelpHed, and ChatSpamDetector, PiMRef boosts precision by 8.8% with no loss in recall on standard benchmarks like Nazario and PhishPot. In a real-world evaluation of 10,183 emails across five university accounts over three years, PiMRef achieved 92.1% precision, 87.9% recall, and a median runtime of 0.05s, outperforming the state-of-the-art in both effectiveness and efficiency.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) in large enterprises can generate hundreds of thousands of alerts per hour, overwhelming analysts with logs requiring rapidly evolving expertise. Conventional machine-learning detectors reduce alert volume but still yield many false positives, while standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines often retrieve irrelevant context and fail to justify predictions. We present CyberRAG, a modular agent-based RAG framework that delivers real-time classification, explanation, and structured reporting for cyber-attacks. A central LLM agent orchestrates: (i) fine-tuned classifiers specialized by attack family; (ii) tool adapters for enrichment and alerting; and (iii) an iterative retrieval-and-reason loop that queries a domain-specific knowledge base until evidence is relevant and self-consistent. Unlike traditional RAG, CyberRAG adopts an agentic design that enables dynamic control flow and adaptive reasoning. This architecture autonomously refines threat labels and natural-language justifications, reducing false positives and enhancing interpretability. It is also extensible: new attack types can be supported by adding classifiers without retraining the core agent. CyberRAG was evaluated on SQL Injection, XSS, and SSTI, achieving over 94\% accuracy per class and a final classification accuracy of 94.92\% through semantic orchestration. Generated explanations reached 0.94 in BERTScore and 4.9/5 in GPT-4-based expert evaluation, with robustness preserved against adversarial and unseen payloads. These results show that agentic, specialist-oriented RAG can combine high detection accuracy with trustworthy, SOC-ready prose, offering a flexible path toward partially automated cyber-defense workflows.

Spear-phishing attacks present a significant security challenge, with large language models (LLMs) escalating the threat by generating convincing emails and facilitating target reconnaissance. To address this, we propose a detection approach based on a novel document vectorization method that utilizes an ensemble of LLMs to create representation vectors. By prompting LLMs to reason and respond to human-crafted questions, we quantify the presence of common persuasion principles in the email's content, producing prompted contextual document vectors for a downstream supervised machine learning model. We evaluate our method using a unique dataset generated by a proprietary system that automates target reconnaissance and spear-phishing email creation. Our method achieves a 91\% F1 score in identifying LLM-generated spear-phishing emails, with the training set comprising only traditional phishing and benign emails. Key contributions include a novel document vectorization method utilizing LLM reasoning, a publicly available dataset of high-quality spear-phishing emails, and the demonstrated effectiveness of our method in detecting such emails. This methodology can be utilized for various document classification tasks, particularly in adversarial problem domains.

MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.

The advanced capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have made them invaluable across various applications, from conversational agents and content creation to data analysis, research, and innovation. However, their effectiveness and accessibility also render them susceptible to abuse for generating malicious content, including phishing attacks. This study explores the potential of using four popular commercially available LLMs - ChatGPT (GPT 3.5 Turbo), GPT 4, Claude and Bard to generate functional phishing attacks using a series of malicious prompts. We discover that these LLMs can generate both phishing emails and websites that can convincingly imitate well-known brands, and also deploy a range of evasive tactics for the latter to elude detection mechanisms employed by anti-phishing systems. Notably, these attacks can be generated using unmodified, or "vanilla," versions of these LLMs, without requiring any prior adversarial exploits such as jailbreaking. As a countermeasure, we build a BERT based automated detection tool that can be used for the early detection of malicious prompts to prevent LLMs from generating phishing content attaining an accuracy of 97\% for phishing website prompts, and 94\% for phishing email prompts.

The automatic detection of software vulnerabilities is an important research problem. However, existing solutions to this problem rely on human experts to define features and often miss many vulnerabilities (i.e., incurring high false negative rate). In this paper, we initiate the study of using deep learning-based vulnerability detection to relieve human experts from the tedious and subjective task of manually defining features. Since deep learning is motivated to deal with problems that are very different from the problem of vulnerability detection, we need some guiding principles for applying deep learning to vulnerability detection. In particular, we need to find representations of software programs that are suitable for deep learning. For this purpose, we propose using code gadgets to represent programs and then transform them into vectors, where a code gadget is a number of (not necessarily consecutive) lines of code that are semantically related to each other. This leads to the design and implementation of a deep learning-based vulnerability detection system, called Vulnerability Deep Pecker (VulDeePecker). In order to evaluate VulDeePecker, we present the first vulnerability dataset for deep learning approaches. Experimental results show that VulDeePecker can achieve much fewer false negatives (with reasonable false positives) than other approaches. We further apply VulDeePecker to 3 software products (namely Xen, Seamonkey, and Libav) and detect 4 vulnerabilities, which are not reported in the National Vulnerability Database but were "silently" patched by the vendors when releasing later versions of these products; in contrast, these vulnerabilities are almost entirely missed by the other vulnerability detection systems we experimented with.

Security of Android devices is now paramount, given their wide adoption among consumers. As researchers develop tools for statically or dynamically detecting suspicious apps, malware writers regularly update their attack mechanisms to hide malicious behavior implementation. This poses two problems to current research techniques: static analysis approaches, given their over-approximations, can report an overwhelming number of false alarms, while dynamic approaches will miss those behaviors that are hidden through evasion techniques. We propose in this work a static approach specifically targeted at highlighting hidden sensitive operations, mainly sensitive data flows. The prototype version of HiSenDroid has been evaluated on a large-scale dataset of thousands of malware and goodware samples on which it successfully revealed anti-analysis code snippets aiming at evading detection by dynamic analysis. We further experimentally show that, with FlowDroid, some of the hidden sensitive behaviors would eventually lead to private data leaks. Those leaks would have been hard to spot either manually among the large number of false positives reported by the state of the art static analyzers, or by dynamic tools. Overall, by putting the light on hidden sensitive operations, HiSenDroid helps security analysts in validating potential sensitive data operations, which would be previously unnoticed.

Network intrusion detection remains a critical challenge in cybersecurity. While supervised machine learning models achieve state-of-the-art performance, their reliance on large labelled datasets makes them impractical for many real-world applications. Anomaly detection methods, which train exclusively on benign traffic to identify malicious activity, suffer from high false positive rates, limiting their usability. Recently, self-supervised learning techniques have demonstrated improved performance with lower false positive rates by learning discriminative latent representations of benign traffic. In particular, contrastive self-supervised models achieve this by minimizing the distance between similar (positive) views of benign traffic while maximizing it between dissimilar (negative) views. Existing approaches generate positive views through data augmentation and treat other samples as negative. In contrast, this work introduces Contrastive Learning using Augmented Negative pairs (CLAN), a novel paradigm for network intrusion detection where augmented samples are treated as negative views - representing potentially malicious distributions - while other benign samples serve as positive views. This approach enhances both classification accuracy and inference efficiency after pretraining on benign traffic. Experimental evaluation on the Lycos2017 dataset demonstrates that the proposed method surpasses existing self-supervised and anomaly detection techniques in a binary classification task. Furthermore, when fine-tuned on a limited labelled dataset, the proposed approach achieves superior multi-class classification performance compared to existing self-supervised models.

Detecting and classifying suspicious or malicious domain names and URLs is fundamental task in cybersecurity. To leverage such indicators of compromise, cybersecurity vendors and practitioners often maintain and update blacklists of known malicious domains and URLs. However, blacklists frequently fail to identify emerging and obfuscated threats. Over the past few decades, there has been significant interest in developing machine learning models that automatically detect malicious domains and URLs, addressing the limitations of blacklists maintenance and updates. In this paper, we introduce DomURLs_BERT, a pre-trained BERT-based encoder adapted for detecting and classifying suspicious/malicious domains and URLs. DomURLs_BERT is pre-trained using the Masked Language Modeling (MLM) objective on a large multilingual corpus of URLs, domain names, and Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) dataset. In order to assess the performance of DomURLs_BERT, we have conducted experiments on several binary and multi-class classification tasks involving domain names and URLs, covering phishing, malware, DGA, and DNS tunneling. The evaluations results show that the proposed encoder outperforms state-of-the-art character-based deep learning models and cybersecurity-focused BERT models across multiple tasks and datasets. The pre-training dataset, the pre-trained DomURLs_BERT encoder, and the experiments source code are publicly available.

Face recognition technology is widely used in the financial field, and various types of liveness attack behaviors need to be addressed. Existing liveness detection algorithms are trained on specific training datasets and tested on testing datasets, but their performance and robustness in transferring to unseen datasets are relatively poor. To tackle this issue, we propose a face liveness detection method based on image-text pairs and contrastive learning, dividing liveness attack problems in the financial field into eight categories and using text information to describe the images of these eight types of attacks. The text encoder and image encoder are used to extract feature vector representations for the classification description text and face images, respectively. By maximizing the similarity of positive samples and minimizing the similarity of negative samples, the model learns shared representations between images and texts. The proposed method is capable of effectively detecting specific liveness attack behaviors in certain scenarios, such as those occurring in dark environments or involving the tampering of ID card photos. Additionally, it is also effective in detecting traditional liveness attack methods, such as printing photo attacks and screen remake attacks. The zero-shot capabilities of face liveness detection on five public datasets, including NUAA, CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, OULU-NPU and MSU-MFSD also reaches the level of commercial algorithms. The detection capability of proposed algorithm was verified on 5 types of testing datasets, and the results show that the method outperformed commercial algorithms, and the detection rates reached 100% on multiple datasets. Demonstrating the effectiveness and robustness of introducing image-text pairs and contrastive learning into liveness detection tasks as proposed in this paper.

Phishing email detection faces critical challenges from evolving adversarial tactics and heterogeneous attack patterns. Traditional detection methods, such as rule-based filters and denylists, often struggle to keep pace with these evolving tactics, leading to false negatives and compromised security. While machine learning approaches have improved detection accuracy, they still face challenges adapting to novel phishing strategies. We present MultiPhishGuard, a dynamic LLM-based multi-agent detection system that synergizes specialized expertise with adversarial-aware reinforcement learning. Our framework employs five cooperative agents (text, URL, metadata, explanation simplifier, and adversarial agents) with automatically adjusted decision weights powered by a Proximal Policy Optimization reinforcement learning algorithm. To address emerging threats, we introduce an adversarial training loop featuring an adversarial agent that generates subtle context-aware email variants, creating a self-improving defense ecosystem and enhancing system robustness. Experimental evaluations on public datasets demonstrate that MultiPhishGuard significantly outperforms Chain-of-Thoughts, single-agent baselines and state-of-the-art detectors, as validated by ablation studies and comparative analyses. Experiments demonstrate that MultiPhishGuard achieves high accuracy (97.89\%) with low false positive (2.73\%) and false negative rates (0.20\%). Additionally, we incorporate an explanation simplifier agent, which provides users with clear and easily understandable explanations for why an email is classified as phishing or legitimate. This work advances phishing defense through dynamic multi-agent collaboration and generative adversarial resilience.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but also purpose-specific restrictions tailored to their designated roles. Such additional restrictions enlarge the attack surface, particularly to prompt injection (PI) attacks. To defend against such attacks, existing detection methods primarily rely on analyzing input-output patterns, yet yield limited effectiveness. To address this limitation, we turn to analyzing the hidden activation space and discover that LLMs inherently retain latent policy-violation (PV) concepts when prompted with requests beyond their designated purpose. Particularly, PV concepts capture the semantics of conflicts between user queries and predefined restrictions, implicitly reflecting LLMs' intrinsic awareness of recognizing policy violations. Building on this insight, we propose PVDetector, a training-free framework that detects PI attacks during LLM inference by measuring hidden-state alignment with PV concepts, which are derived offline from the contrastive pairs of policy-violating and policy-compliant prompts. Experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets show that PVDetector achieves <1\% false negative rate with minimal auxiliary overhead, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/Claresigle/PVDetector .

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.

Detecting text generated by large language models (LLMs) is of great recent interest. With zero-shot methods like DetectGPT, detection capabilities have reached impressive levels. However, the reliability of existing detectors in real-world applications remains underexplored. In this study, we present a new benchmark, DetectRL, highlighting that even state-of-the-art (SOTA) detection techniques still underperformed in this task. We collected human-written datasets from domains where LLMs are particularly prone to misuse. Using popular LLMs, we generated data that better aligns with real-world applications. Unlike previous studies, we employed heuristic rules to create adversarial LLM-generated text, simulating advanced prompt usages, human revisions like word substitutions, and writing errors. Our development of DetectRL reveals the strengths and limitations of current SOTA detectors. More importantly, we analyzed the potential impact of writing styles, model types, attack methods, the text lengths, and real-world human writing factors on different types of detectors. We believe DetectRL could serve as an effective benchmark for assessing detectors in real-world scenarios, evolving with advanced attack methods, thus providing more stressful evaluation to drive the development of more efficient detectors. Data and code are publicly available at: https://github.com/NLP2CT/DetectRL.

Text anomaly detection (TAD) plays a critical role in various language-driven real-world applications, including harmful content moderation, phishing detection, and spam review filtering. While two-step "embedding-detector" TAD methods have shown state-of-the-art performance, their effectiveness is often limited by the use of a single embedding model and the lack of adaptability across diverse datasets and anomaly types. To address these limitations, we propose to exploit the embeddings from multiple pretrained language models and integrate them into MCA^2, a multi-view TAD framework. MCA^2 adopts a multi-view reconstruction model to effectively extract normal textual patterns from multiple embedding perspectives. To exploit inter-view complementarity, a contrastive collaboration module is designed to leverage and strengthen the interactions across different views. Moreover, an adaptive allocation module is developed to automatically assign the contribution weight of each view, thereby improving the adaptability to diverse datasets. Extensive experiments on 10 benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of MCA^2 against strong baselines. The source code of MCA^2 is available at https://github.com/yankehan/MCA2.

Delivering malware covertly and evasively is critical to advanced malware campaigns. In this paper, we present a new method to covertly and evasively deliver malware through a neural network model. Neural network models are poorly explainable and have a good generalization ability. By embedding malware in neurons, the malware can be delivered covertly, with minor or no impact on the performance of neural network. Meanwhile, because the structure of the neural network model remains unchanged, it can pass the security scan of antivirus engines. Experiments show that 36.9MB of malware can be embedded in a 178MB-AlexNet model within 1% accuracy loss, and no suspicion is raised by anti-virus engines in VirusTotal, which verifies the feasibility of this method. With the widespread application of artificial intelligence, utilizing neural networks for attacks becomes a forwarding trend. We hope this work can provide a reference scenario for the defense on neural network-assisted attacks.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) play a crucial role in ensuring the security of computer networks. Machine learning has emerged as a popular approach for intrusion detection due to its ability to analyze and detect patterns in large volumes of data. However, current ML-based IDS solutions often struggle to keep pace with the ever-changing nature of attack patterns and the emergence of new attack types. Additionally, these solutions face challenges related to class imbalance, where the number of instances belonging to different classes (normal and intrusions) is significantly imbalanced, which hinders their ability to effectively detect minor classes. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) architecture, enabling automatic, efficient, and robust network intrusion detection. To enhance the capabilities of the proposed model, we have improved the DQN algorithm by implementing the weighted mean square loss function and employing cost-sensitive learning techniques. Our solution introduces a resilient architecture designed to accommodate the addition of new attacks and effectively adapt to changes in existing attack patterns. Experimental results realized using CIC-IDS-2017 dataset, demonstrate that our approach can effectively handle the class imbalance problem and provide a fine grained classification of attacks with a very low false positive rate. In comparison to the current state-of-the-art works, our solution demonstrates a significant superiority in both detection rate and false positive rate.

Anomaly detection (AD) is an important machine learning task with applications in fraud detection, content moderation, and user behavior analysis. However, AD is relatively understudied in a natural language processing (NLP) context, limiting its effectiveness in detecting harmful content, phishing attempts, and spam reviews. We introduce NLP-ADBench, the most comprehensive NLP anomaly detection (NLP-AD) benchmark to date, which includes eight curated datasets and 19 state-of-the-art algorithms. These span 3 end-to-end methods and 16 two-step approaches that adapt classical, non-AD methods to language embeddings from BERT and OpenAI. Our empirical results show that no single model dominates across all datasets, indicating a need for automated model selection. Moreover, two-step methods with transformer-based embeddings consistently outperform specialized end-to-end approaches, with OpenAI embeddings outperforming those of BERT. We release NLP-ADBench at https://github.com/USC-FORTIS/NLP-ADBench, providing a unified framework for NLP-AD and supporting future investigations.

This work analyzes the use of large language models (LLMs) for detecting domain generation algorithms (DGAs). We perform a detailed evaluation of two important techniques: In-Context Learning (ICL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), showing how they can improve detection. SFT increases performance by using domain-specific data, whereas ICL helps the detection model to quickly adapt to new threats without requiring much retraining. We use Meta's Llama3 8B model, on a custom dataset with 68 malware families and normal domains, covering several hard-to-detect schemes, including recent word-based DGAs. Results proved that LLM-based methods can achieve competitive results in DGA detection. In particular, the SFT-based LLM DGA detector outperforms state-of-the-art models using attention layers, achieving 94% accuracy with a 4% false positive rate (FPR) and excelling at detecting word-based DGA domains.

Although LLMs have shown promising potential in vulnerability detection, this study reveals their limitations in distinguishing between vulnerable and similar-but-benign patched code (only 0.06 - 0.14 accuracy). It shows that LLMs struggle to capture the root causes of vulnerabilities during vulnerability detection. To address this challenge, we propose enhancing LLMs with multi-dimensional vulnerability knowledge distilled from historical vulnerabilities and fixes. We design a novel knowledge-level Retrieval-Augmented Generation framework Vul-RAG, which improves LLMs with an accuracy increase of 16% - 24% in identifying vulnerable and patched code. Additionally, vulnerability knowledge generated by Vul-RAG can further (1) serve as high-quality explanations to improve manual detection accuracy (from 60% to 77%), and (2) detect 10 previously-unknown bugs in the recent Linux kernel release with 6 assigned CVEs.

This paper considers zero-shot Anomaly Detection (AD), performing AD without reference images of the test objects. We propose a framework called CLIP-AD to leverage the zero-shot capabilities of the large vision-language model CLIP. Firstly, we reinterpret the text prompts design from a distributional perspective and propose a Representative Vector Selection (RVS) paradigm to obtain improved text features. Secondly, we note opposite predictions and irrelevant highlights in the direct computation of the anomaly maps. To address these issues, we introduce a Staged Dual-Path model (SDP) that leverages features from various levels and applies architecture and feature surgery. Lastly, delving deeply into the two phenomena, we point out that the image and text features are not aligned in the joint embedding space. Thus, we introduce a fine-tuning strategy by adding linear layers and construct an extended model SDP+, further enhancing the performance. Abundant experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, e.g., on MVTec-AD, SDP outperforms the SOTA WinCLIP by +4.2/+10.7 in segmentation metrics F1-max/PRO, while SDP+ achieves +8.3/+20.5 improvements.

Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) detect malicious activities by matching network or host activity against predefined rules. These rules are derived from extensive Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), which includes attack signatures and behavioral patterns obtained through automated tools and manual threat analysis, such as sandboxing. The CTI is then transformed into actionable rules for the IDS engine, enabling real-time detection and prevention. However, the constant evolution of cyber threats necessitates frequent rule updates, which delay deployment time and weaken overall security readiness. Recent advancements in agentic systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) offer the potential for autonomous IDS rule generation with internal evaluation. We introduce FALCON, an autonomous agentic framework that generates deployable IDS rules from CTI data in real-time and evaluates them using built-in multi-phased validators. To demonstrate versatility, we target both network (Snort) and host-based (YARA) mediums and construct a comprehensive dataset of IDS rules with their corresponding CTIs. Our evaluations indicate FALCON excels in automatic rule generation, with an average of 95% accuracy validated by qualitative evaluation with 84% inter-rater agreement among multiple cybersecurity analysts across all metrics. These results underscore the feasibility and effectiveness of LLM-driven data mining for real-time cyber threat mitigation.

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

Package confusion attacks such as typosquatting threaten software supply chains. Attackers make packages with names that syntactically or semantically resemble legitimate ones, tricking engineers into installing malware. While prior work has developed defenses against package confusions in some software package registries, notably NPM, PyPI, and RubyGems, gaps remain: high false-positive rates; generalization to more software package ecosystems; and insights from real-world deployment. In this work, we introduce ConfuGuard, a solution designed to address the challenges posed by package confusion threats. We begin by presenting the first empirical analysis of benign signals derived from prior package confusion data, uncovering their threat patterns, engineering practices, and measurable attributes. We observed that 13.3% of real package confusion attacks are initially stealthy, so we take that into consideration and refined the definitions. Building on state-of-the-art approaches, we extend support from three to six software package registries, and leverage package metadata to distinguish benign packages. Our approach significantly reduces 64% false-positive (from 77% to 13%), with acceptable additional overhead to filter out benign packages by analyzing the package metadata. ConfuGuard is in production at our industry partner, whose analysts have already confirmed 301 packages detected by ConfuGuard as real attacks. We share lessons learned from production and provide insights to researchers.

Model hosting hubs (e.g., Hugging Face) are vulnerable to supply chain attacks that enable remote code execution on trusted user environments. Attackers often distribute malicious Pre-trained ML models (PTMs) via model hubs. In this paper, we present novel attacks against PTMs and model hubs called SHADOWPICKLE. SHADOWPICKLE includes three (3) stealthy pickle deserialization attacks that enable malicious behaviors and evade state-of-the-art (SOTA) model scanners. These attacks leverage the external module import mechanism of the Pickle Virtual Machine (VM) to execute malicious payloads during deserialization. Additionally, we provide PICKLEBENCH, a dynamic and extensible benchmark for automatically injecting SHADOWPICKLE into arbitrary benign PTM models. Our evaluation shows that SHADOWPICKLE evades ten SOTA scanners, and four model hubs. SHADOWPICKLE (Overwritten) has a 63% evasion rate across scanners, and up to 50% higher evasion rates than existing attacks. Besides, PICKLEBENCH is up to 25.6% more challenging than three SOTA benchmarks. Finally, we provide security recommendations for mitigating our attacks and improving the effectiveness of existing scanners. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing PTM scanners and suggest directions for improvements.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

The rapid evolution of cyber threats necessitates innovative solutions for detecting and analyzing malicious activity. Honeypots, which are decoy systems designed to lure and interact with attackers, have emerged as a critical component in cybersecurity. In this paper, we present a novel approach to creating realistic and interactive honeypot systems using Large Language Models (LLMs). By fine-tuning a pre-trained open-source language model on a diverse dataset of attacker-generated commands and responses, we developed a honeypot capable of sophisticated engagement with attackers. Our methodology involved several key steps: data collection and processing, prompt engineering, model selection, and supervised fine-tuning to optimize the model's performance. Evaluation through similarity metrics and live deployment demonstrated that our approach effectively generates accurate and informative responses. The results highlight the potential of LLMs to revolutionize honeypot technology, providing cybersecurity professionals with a powerful tool to detect and analyze malicious activity, thereby enhancing overall security infrastructure.

Machine learning (ML)-based malware detection systems often fail to account for the dynamic nature of real-world training and test data distributions. In practice, these distributions evolve due to frequent changes in the Android ecosystem, adversarial development of new malware families, and the continuous emergence of both benign and malicious applications. Prior studies have shown that such concept drift -- distributional shifts in benign and malicious samples, leads to significant degradation in detection performance over time. Despite the practical importance of this issue, existing datasets are often outdated and limited in temporal scope, diversity of malware families, and sample scale, making them insufficient for the systematic evaluation of concept drift in malware detection. To address this gap, we present LAMDA, the largest and most temporally diverse Android malware benchmark to date, designed specifically for concept drift analysis. LAMDA spans 12 years (2013-2025, excluding 2015), includes over 1 million samples (approximately 37% labeled as malware), and covers 1,380 malware families and 150,000 singleton samples, reflecting the natural distribution and evolution of real-world Android applications. We empirically demonstrate LAMDA's utility by quantifying the performance degradation of standard ML models over time and analyzing feature stability across years. As the most comprehensive Android malware dataset to date, LAMDA enables in-depth research into temporal drift, generalization, explainability, and evolving detection challenges. The dataset and code are available at: https://iqsec-lab.github.io/LAMDA/.

When a new computer security vulnerability is publicly disclosed, only a textual description of it is available. Cybersecurity experts later provide an analysis of the severity of the vulnerability using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Specifically, the different characteristics of the vulnerability are summarized into a vector (consisting of a set of metrics), from which a severity score is computed. However, because of the high number of vulnerabilities disclosed everyday this process requires lot of manpower, and several days may pass before a vulnerability is analyzed. We propose to leverage recent advances in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP) to determine the CVSS vector and the associated severity score of a vulnerability from its textual description in an explainable manner. To this purpose, we trained multiple BERT classifiers, one for each metric composing the CVSS vector. Experimental results show that our trained classifiers are able to determine the value of the metrics of the CVSS vector with high accuracy. The severity score computed from the predicted CVSS vector is also very close to the real severity score attributed by a human expert. For explainability purpose, gradient-based input saliency method was used to determine the most relevant input words for a given prediction made by our classifiers. Often, the top relevant words include terms in agreement with the rationales of a human cybersecurity expert, making the explanation comprehensible for end-users.

The rapid evolution of malware attacks calls for the development of innovative detection methods, especially in resource-constrained edge computing. Traditional detection techniques struggle to keep up with modern malware's sophistication and adaptability, prompting a shift towards advanced methodologies like those leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) for enhanced malware detection. However, deploying LLMs for malware detection directly at edge devices raises several challenges, including ensuring accuracy in constrained environments and addressing edge devices' energy and computational limits. To tackle these challenges, this paper proposes an architecture leveraging lightweight LLMs' strengths while addressing limitations like reduced accuracy and insufficient computational power. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed lightweight LLM-based approach for edge computing, we perform an extensive experimental evaluation using several state-of-the-art lightweight LLMs. We test them with several publicly available datasets specifically designed for edge and IoT scenarios and different edge nodes with varying computational power and characteristics.

Online scams continue to cause substantial financial and personal harm. As a result, detection systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have been integrated into security products ranging from email gateways and browser extensions to fraud-monitoring dashboards. As this adoption accelerates, a common belief has taken hold: that these models are broadly suitable for scam detection. In this work, we investigate whether LLMs, with their strong capabilities in understanding intent, context, and reasoning, can effectively detect scams across diverse scenarios without task-specific fine-tuning. We curate and release a unique benchmark dataset of real-world scams spanning multiple formats and topics. We evaluate nine LLMs of varying sizes and architectures, examining their performance under different prompting strategies and comparing them to a fine-tuned BERT-based classifier. Our results show that while larger LLMs generally outperform smaller ones, effective prompting substantially boosts the performance of smaller models. Moreover, LLMs are better at generalizing to unseen scams compared to fine-tuned models, suggesting that pre-trained knowledge contributes meaningfully to scam detection. We release our dataset and evaluation framework to facilitate future research in robust scam detection using language models.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Generative AI and large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities in code understanding, but their use in cybersecurity, particularly for malware detection and analysis, remains limited. Existing detection systems often fail to generalize to obfuscated or previously unseen threats, underscoring the need for more adaptable and explainable models. To address this challenge, we introduce XGen-Q, a domain-adapted LLM built on the Qwen-Coder architecture and pretrained on a large-scale corpus of over one million malware samples, spanning both source and assembly code. XGen-Q uses a multi-stage prompt strategy combined with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to deliver reliable malware identification and detailed forensic reporting, even in the presence of complex code obfuscation. To further enhance generalization, we design a training pipeline that systematically exposes the model to diverse obfuscation patterns. Experimental results show that XGen-Q achieves significantly lower perplexity than competitive baselines and exhibits strong performance on novel malware samples, demonstrating the promise of LLM-based approaches for interpretable and robust malware analysis.

The widespread use of large language models (LLMs) is increasing the demand for methods that detect machine-generated text to prevent misuse. The goal of our study is to stress test the detectors' robustness to malicious attacks under realistic scenarios. We comprehensively study the robustness of popular machine-generated text detectors under attacks from diverse categories: editing, paraphrasing, prompting, and co-generating. Our attacks assume limited access to the generator LLMs, and we compare the performance of detectors on different attacks under different budget levels. Our experiments reveal that almost none of the existing detectors remain robust under all the attacks, and all detectors exhibit different loopholes. Averaging all detectors, the performance drops by 35% across all attacks. Further, we investigate the reasons behind these defects and propose initial out-of-the-box patches to improve robustness.

The vulnerability of face recognition systems to presentation attacks has limited their application in security-critical scenarios. Automatic methods of detecting such malicious attempts are essential for the safe use of facial recognition technology. Although various methods have been suggested for detecting such attacks, most of them over-fit the training set and fail in generalizing to unseen attacks and environments. In this work, we use transfer learning from the vision transformer model for the zero-shot anti-spoofing task. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated through experiments in publicly available datasets. The proposed approach outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in the zero-shot protocols in the HQ-WMCA and SiW-M datasets by a large margin. Besides, the model achieves a significant boost in cross-database performance as well.

Software supply chain attacks targeting the npm ecosystem have become increasingly sophisticated, leveraging obfuscation and complex logic to evade traditional detection mechanisms. Recently, large language models (LLMs) have attracted significant attention for malicious code detection due to their strong capabilities in semantic code understanding. However, the practical deployment of LLMs in this domain is severely constrained by limited context windows and high computational costs. Naive approaches, such as token-based code splitting, often fragment semantic context, leading to degraded detection performance. To overcome these challenges, this paper introduces a novel LLM-based framework for malicious npm package detection that leverages code slicing techniques. A specialized taint-based slicing method tailored to the JavaScript ecosystem is proposed to recover malicious data flows. By isolating security-relevant logic from benign boilerplate code, the approach reduces the input code volume by over 99\% while preserving critical malicious behaviors. The framework is evaluated on a curated dataset comprising over 7000 malicious and benign npm packages. Experimental results using the DeepSeek-Coder-6.7B model demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves a detection accuracy of 87.04\%, significantly outperforming a full-package baseline based on naive token splitting (75.41\%). These results indicate that semantically optimized input representations via code slicing not only mitigate the LLM context window bottleneck but also enhance reasoning precision for security analysis, providing an effective defense against evolving open-source software supply chain threats.

Recently, tampered text detection has attracted increasing attention due to its essential role in information security. Although existing methods can detect the tampered text region, the interpretation of such detection remains unclear, making the prediction unreliable. To address this problem, we propose to explain the basis of tampered text detection with natural language via large multimodal models. To fill the data gap for this task, we propose a large-scale, comprehensive dataset, ETTD, which contains both pixel-level annotations for tampered text region and natural language annotations describing the anomaly of the tampered text. Multiple methods are employed to improve the quality of the proposed data. For example, elaborate queries are introduced to generate high-quality anomaly descriptions with GPT4o. A fused mask prompt is proposed to reduce confusion when querying GPT4o to generate anomaly descriptions. To automatically filter out low-quality annotations, we also propose to prompt GPT4o to recognize tampered texts before describing the anomaly, and to filter out the responses with low OCR accuracy. To further improve explainable tampered text detection, we propose a simple yet effective model called TextSleuth, which achieves improved fine-grained perception and cross-domain generalization by focusing on the suspected region, with a two-stage analysis paradigm and an auxiliary grounding prompt. Extensive experiments on both the ETTD dataset and the public dataset have verified the effectiveness of the proposed methods. In-depth analysis is also provided to inspire further research. Our dataset and code will be open-source.

The autonomous AI agents using large language models can create undeniable values in all span of the society but they face security threats from adversaries that warrants immediate protective solutions because trust and safety issues arise. Considering the many-shot jailbreaking and deceptive alignment as some of the main advanced attacks, that cannot be mitigated by the static guardrails used during the supervised training, points out a crucial research priority for real world robustness. The combination of static guardrails in dynamic multi-agent system fails to defend against those attacks. We intend to enhance security for LLM-based agents through the development of new evaluation frameworks which identify and counter threats for safe operational deployment. Our work uses three examination methods to detect rogue agents through a Reverse Turing Test and analyze deceptive alignment through multi-agent simulations and develops an anti-jailbreaking system by testing it with GEMINI 1.5 pro and llama-3.3-70B, deepseek r1 models using tool-mediated adversarial scenarios. The detection capabilities are strong such as 94\% accuracy for GEMINI 1.5 pro yet the system suffers persistent vulnerabilities when under long attacks as prompt length increases attack success rates (ASR) and diversity metrics become ineffective in prediction while revealing multiple complex system faults. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adopting flexible security systems based on active monitoring that can be performed by the agents themselves together with adaptable interventions by system admin as the current models can create vulnerabilities that can lead to the unreliable and vulnerable system. So, in our work, we try to address such situations and propose a comprehensive framework to counteract the security issues.

Automated detection of software vulnerabilities is a fundamental problem in software security. Existing program analysis techniques either suffer from high false positives or false negatives. Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL) has resulted in a surge of interest in applying DL for automated vulnerability detection. Several recent studies have demonstrated promising results achieving an accuracy of up to 95% at detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we ask, "how well do the state-of-the-art DL-based techniques perform in a real-world vulnerability prediction scenario?". To our surprise, we find that their performance drops by more than 50%. A systematic investigation of what causes such precipitous performance drop reveals that existing DL-based vulnerability prediction approaches suffer from challenges with the training data (e.g., data duplication, unrealistic distribution of vulnerable classes, etc.) and with the model choices (e.g., simple token-based models). As a result, these approaches often do not learn features related to the actual cause of the vulnerabilities. Instead, they learn unrelated artifacts from the dataset (e.g., specific variable/function names, etc.). Leveraging these empirical findings, we demonstrate how a more principled approach to data collection and model design, based on realistic settings of vulnerability prediction, can lead to better solutions. The resulting tools perform significantly better than the studied baseline: up to 33.57% boost in precision and 128.38% boost in recall compared to the best performing model in the literature. Overall, this paper elucidates existing DL-based vulnerability prediction systems' potential issues and draws a roadmap for future DL-based vulnerability prediction research. In that spirit, we make available all the artifacts supporting our results: https://git.io/Jf6IA.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

What should a malicious user write next to fool a detection model? Identifying malicious users is critical to ensure the safety and integrity of internet platforms. Several deep learning-based detection models have been created. However, malicious users can evade deep detection models by manipulating their behavior, rendering these models of little use. The vulnerability of such deep detection models against adversarial attacks is unknown. Here we create a novel adversarial attack model against deep user sequence embedding based classification models, which use the sequence of user posts to generate user embeddings and detect malicious users. In the attack, the adversary generates a new post to fool the classifier. We propose a novel end-to-end Personalized Text Generation Attack model, called PETGEN, that simultaneously reduces the efficacy of the detection model and generates posts that have several key desirable properties. Specifically, PETGEN generates posts that are personalized to the user's writing style, have knowledge about a given target context, are aware of the user's historical posts on the target context, and encapsulate the user's recent topical interests. We conduct extensive experiments on two real-world datasets (Yelp and Wikipedia, both with ground-truth of malicious users) to show that PETGEN significantly reduces the performance of popular deep user sequence embedding-based classification models. PETGEN outperforms five attack baselines in terms of text quality and attack efficacy in both white-box and black-box classifier settings. Overall, this work paves the path towards the next generation of adversary-aware sequence classification models.

The rapid evolution of modern malware presents significant challenges to the development of effective defense mechanisms. Traditional cyber deception techniques often rely on static or manually configured parameters, limiting their adaptability to dynamic and sophisticated threats. This study leverages Generative AI (GenAI) models to automate the creation of adaptive cyber deception ploys, focusing on structured prompt engineering (PE) to enhance relevance, actionability, and deployability. We introduce a systematic framework (SPADE) to address inherent challenges large language models (LLMs) pose to adaptive deceptions, including generalized outputs, ambiguity, under-utilization of contextual information, and scalability constraints. Evaluations across diverse malware scenarios using metrics such as Recall, Exact Match (EM), BLEU Score, and expert quality assessments identified ChatGPT-4o as the top performer. Additionally, it achieved high engagement (93%) and accuracy (96%) with minimal refinements. Gemini and ChatGPT-4o Mini demonstrated competitive performance, with Llama3.2 showing promise despite requiring further optimization. These findings highlight the transformative potential of GenAI in automating scalable, adaptive deception strategies and underscore the critical role of structured PE in advancing real-world cybersecurity applications.

Anti-forensics seeks to eliminate or conceal traces of tampering artifacts. Typically, anti-forensic methods are designed to deceive binary detectors and persuade them to misjudge the authenticity of an image. However, to the best of our knowledge, no attempts have been made to deceive forgery detectors at the pixel level and mis-locate forged regions. Traditional adversarial attack methods cannot be directly used against forgery localization due to the following defects: 1) they tend to just naively induce the target forensic models to flip their pixel-level pristine or forged decisions; 2) their anti-forensics performance tends to be severely degraded when faced with the unseen forensic models; 3) they lose validity once the target forensic models are retrained with the anti-forensics images generated by them. To tackle the three defects, we propose SEAR (Self-supErvised Anti-foRensics), a novel self-supervised and adversarial training algorithm that effectively trains deep-learning anti-forensic models against forgery localization. SEAR sets a pretext task to reconstruct perturbation for self-supervised learning. In adversarial training, SEAR employs a forgery localization model as a supervisor to explore tampering features and constructs a deep-learning concealer to erase corresponding traces. We have conducted largescale experiments across diverse datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that, through the combination of self-supervised learning and adversarial learning, SEAR successfully deceives the state-of-the-art forgery localization methods, as well as tackle the three defects regarding traditional adversarial attack methods mentioned above.