Daily Papers

Telephone triage is a safety critical task: from a brief intake note, a nurse must decide whether a caller needs an ambulance, an emergency department, an appointment, or self care at home. Queried directly, large language models (LLMs) are unreliable: they over-escalate routine cases and cannot justify their recommendations against an auditable clinical standard. We present the Automated LLM-based Medical Triage System (ALLMTS), which grounds every disposition in the same commercially maintained telehealth guidelines nurses use. Rather than asking an LLM to triage, ALLMTS makes it execute the guideline: it selects the appropriate guideline and evaluates its triage assessment questions. The disposition follows deterministically from the first positive answer, using the same traversal rule a nurse follows. We evaluate ALLMTS on 566 synthetic, expert-validated scenarios spanning 14 dispositions and designed to test specific guideline questions. ALLMTS achieves 0.95 accuracy, compared with 0.47 for a raw-LLM baseline. On a curated 50-scenario subset released as an open benchmark, ALLMTS reaches 0.98 accuracy, on par with the 0.944 correct disposition rate that a five nurse expert panel recorded on those same scenarios. Critically, on that subset the baselines have over-triage rates of up to 0.50 (0.44 on the full dataset), whereas ALLMTS reduces the over-triage rate to at most 0.02 while maintaining low under-triage. These results support coupling LLM language understanding with executable clinical guidelines for triage from intake notes.

The post-pandemic surge in healthcare demand, coupled with critical nursing shortages, has placed unprecedented pressure on medical triage systems, necessitating innovative AI-driven solutions. We present a multi-agent interactive intelligent system for medical triage that addresses three fundamental challenges in current AI-based triage systems: inadequate medical specialization leading to misclassification, heterogeneous department structures across healthcare institutions, and inefficient detail-oriented questioning that impedes rapid triage decisions. Our system employs three specialized agents--RecipientAgent, InquirerAgent, and DepartmentAgent--that collaborate through Inquiry Guidance mechanism and Classification Guidance Mechanism to transform unstructured patient symptoms into accurate department recommendations. To ensure robust evaluation, we constructed a comprehensive Chinese medical triage dataset from "Ai Ai Yi Medical Network", comprising 3,360 real-world cases spanning 9 primary departments and 62 secondary departments. Experimental results demonstrate that our multi-agent system achieves 89.6% accuracy in primary department classification and 74.3% accuracy in secondary department classification after four rounds of patient interaction. The system's dynamic matching based guidance mechanisms enable efficient adaptation to diverse hospital configurations while maintaining high triage accuracy. We successfully developed this multi-agent triage system that not only adapts to organizational heterogeneity across healthcare institutions but also ensures clinically sound decision-making.

Emergency chest X-ray (CXR) triage has a structural modality gap: reports arrive after triage decisions, yet multimodal foundation models require image-text inputs. We present Variational Risk Minimization (VRM), a distillation framework that treats LVLM-generated report variants as Monte Carlo samples of latent clinical interpretations. Rather than distilling from a single teacher target, VRM learns from a variationally marginalized teacher distribution, enabling uncertainty-aware supervision under missing-modality constraints. Under matched encoder families, VRM outperforms direct fine-tuning baselines and improves calibration with strong recovery from hallucinated supervision. Marginalized supervision reduces report-selection instability. In our compact edge-student instantiation, a confidence-gated cascade reaches AUC 0.941 at 103ms average latency with 20.3% cloud escalation, yielding an explicit reliability-latency operating point for cloud-edge clinical workflows.

Visual glitches in video games degrade player experience and perceived quality, yet manual quality assurance cannot scale to the growing test surface of modern game development. Prior automation efforts, particularly those using vision-language models (VLMs), largely operate on single frames or rely on limited video-level baselines that struggle under realistic scene variation, making robust video-level glitch detection challenging. We present RESP, a practical multi-frame framework for gameplay glitch detection with VLMs. Our key idea is reference-guided prompting: for each test frame, we select a reference frame from earlier in the same video, establishing a visual baseline and reframing detection as within-video comparison rather than isolated classification. RESP sequentially prompts the VLM with reference/test pairs and aggregates noisy frame predictions into a stable video-level decision without fine-tuning the VLM. To enable controlled analysis of reference effects, we introduce RefGlitch, a synthetic dataset of manually labeled reference/test frame pairs with balanced coverage across five glitch types. Experiments across five VLMs and three datasets (one synthetic, two real-world) show that reference guidance consistently strengthens frame-level detection and that the improved frame-level evidence reliably transfers to stronger video-level triage under realistic QA conditions. Code and data are available at: https://github.com/PipiZong/RESP_code.git{this https URL}.

Perimeter triage faces a latency/semantics trade-off: signature engines are fast and format-safe but blind to unseen attacks, while generative models are semantic but slow and produce unparseable output. In late 2026 a class of commercial System One decision models (TypeSafe Jev; Microsoft-Decision-1) began selling typed decision primitives - binary gates, closed-set choices, ordinal scores - as product APIs, with no academic treatment. We present VX-One: a small multi-head network (100K-10M parameters) whose outputs are these primitives - a calibrated gate, a choice over a closed candidate set that always includes an explicit unknown option, and an ordinal score, trained multi-task, temperature-calibrated per head (~0.7-1.7 ms p50 on CPU). We evaluate it on UNSW-NB15, CIC-IDS2017, EMBER2024 against calibrated XGBoost, Random-Forest, MLP, Kitsune, and measure a two-phase cascade (Suricata with 52,674 Emerging-Threats rules -> VX-One) over five days of CIC-IDS2017. Findings: (i) VX-One wins detection (AUROC/FPR@95%TPR) on UNSW-NB15 and under temporal drift on CIC-IDS2017 (0.711 vs 0.637), but XGBoost wins multi-class attribution on all three benchmarks; (ii) leave-one-family-out gate detects never-seen families on 9/9 UNSW folds yet drops below chance on CIC recon family, and abstention threshold transfers poorly across benchmarks; (iii) on payload-less reconstructions signature engines resolve ~0.1% of flows - gray zone ~99.9% of traffic, recovered by Phase 2 (combined recall >=0.978); (iv) calibration collapses under temporal drift (ECE 0.04->0.40) for every method while ranking partially survives. We provide a measured account of where typed calibrated decisions help perimeter triage, and where they fail.

Multi-channel sensor networks in industrial IoT often exceed available bandwidth. We propose PCA-Triage, a streaming algorithm that converts incremental PCA loadings into proportional per-channel sampling rates under a bandwidth budget. PCA-Triage runs in O(wdk) time with zero trainable parameters (0.67 ms per decision). We evaluate on 7 benchmarks (8--82 channels) against 9 baselines. PCA-Triage is the best unsupervised method on 3 of 6 datasets at 50% bandwidth, winning 5 of 6 against every baseline with large effect sizes (r = 0.71--0.91). On TEP, it achieves F1 = 0.961 +/- 0.001 -- within 0.1% of full-data performance -- while maintaining F1 > 0.90 at 30% budget. Targeted extensions push F1 to 0.970. The algorithm is robust to packet loss and sensor noise (3.7--4.8% degradation under combined worst-case).

The Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE) - the tendency to allocate greater resources to a specific, narratively described victim than to a statistically characterized group facing equivalent hardship - is one of the most robust findings in moral psychology and behavioural economics. As large language models (LLMs) assume consequential roles in humanitarian triage, automated grant evaluation, and content moderation, a critical question arises: do these systems inherit the affective irrationalities present in human moral reasoning? We present the first systematic, large-scale empirical investigation of the IVE in LLMs, comprising N=51,955 validated API trials across 16 frontier models spanning nine organizational lineages (Google, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, DeepSeek, xAI, Alibaba, IBM, and Moonshot). Using a suite of ten experiments - porting and extending canonical paradigms from Small et al. (2007) and Kogut and Ritov (2005) - we find that the IVE is prevalent but strongly modulated by alignment training. Instruction-tuned models exhibit extreme IVE (Cohen's d up to 1.56), while reasoning-specialized models invert the effect (down to d=-0.85). The pooled effect (d=0.223, p=2e-6) is approximately twice the single-victim human meta-analytic baseline (dapprox0.10) reported by Lee and Feeley (2016) - and likely exceeds the overall human pooled effect by a larger margin, given that the group-victim human effect is near zero. Standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting - contrary to its role as a deliberative corrective - nearly triples the IVE effect size (from d=0.15 to d=0.41), while only utilitarian CoT reliably eliminates it. We further document psychophysical numbing, perfect quantity neglect, and marginal in-group/out-group cultural bias, with implications for AI deployment in humanitarian and ethical decision-making contexts.

Agentic AI is advancing rapidly, yet truly autonomous medical-imaging triage, where a system decides when to stop, escalate, or defer under real constraints, remains relatively underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce AT-CXR, an uncertainty-aware agent for chest X-rays. The system estimates per-case confidence and distributional fit, then follows a stepwise policy to issue an automated decision or abstain with a suggested label for human intervention. We evaluate two router designs that share the same inputs and actions: a deterministic rule-based router and an LLM-decided router. Across five-fold evaluation on a balanced subset of NIH ChestX-ray14 dataset, both variants outperform strong zero-shot vision-language models and state-of-the-art supervised classifiers, achieving higher full-coverage accuracy and superior selective-prediction performance, evidenced by a lower area under the risk-coverage curve (AURC) and a lower error rate at high coverage, while operating with lower latency that meets practical clinical constraints. The two routers provide complementary operating points, enabling deployments to prioritize maximal throughput or maximal accuracy. Our code is available at https://github.com/XLIAaron/uncertainty-aware-cxr-agent.

HakemBench is a Turkish benchmark of typed decisions, in which the model under test reads a text, a question and a fixed set of options and returns a probability for every option. Version 1.0 is released fully open under CC BY 4.0, with 2,346 items and 4,275 choice, yes/no and score questions in seven tracks (fact-check triage, education, guardrails, legal routing, moderation, spam and phishing, and customer support). One harness scores decision quality (macro F1), calibration (from the normalised Brier score) and selective automation (from the normalised area under the generalised risk-coverage curve), combines them by a geometric mean and reports intervals from 2,000 bootstrap draws; probes for option order, paraphrase, English translation and substituted names are reported alongside. Most gold labels come from blind passes of one AI model family compared with the votes of a panel of large language models from other model families; they are not human-verified. On a board of 16 rows the leader scores a composite of 0.888 and the lab's own model is 7th at 0.660. Its numbers are not blind. Earlier runs' test results shaped its training data, so its guardrail, moderation and customer support numbers are flagged; with every model scored on the other four tracks only, its composite is 0.678, 6th of 16.

The TESS mission produces a large amount of time series data, only a small fraction of which contain detectable exoplanetary transit signals. Deep learning techniques such as neural networks have proved effective at differentiating promising astrophysical eclipsing candidates from other phenomena such as stellar variability and systematic instrumental effects in an efficient, unbiased and sustainable manner. This paper presents a high quality dataset containing light curves from the Primary Mission and 1st Extended Mission full frame images and periodic signals detected via Box Least Squares (Kovács et al. 2002; Hartman 2012). The dataset was curated using a thorough manual review process then used to train a neural network called Astronet-Triage-v2. On our test set, for transiting/eclipsing events we achieve a 99.6% recall (true positives over all data with positive labels) at a precision of 75.7% (true positives over all predicted positives). Since 90% of our training data is from the Primary Mission, we also test our ability to generalize on held-out 1st Extended Mission data. Here, we find an area under the precision-recall curve of 0.965, a 4% improvement over Astronet-Triage (Yu et al. 2019). On the TESS Object of Interest (TOI) Catalog through April 2022, a shortlist of planets and planet candidates, Astronet-Triage-v2 is able to recover 3577 out of 4140 TOIs, while Astronet-Triage only recovers 3349 targets at an equal level of precision. In other words, upgrading to Astronet-Triage-v2 helps save at least 200 planet candidates from being lost. The new model is currently used for planet candidate triage in the Quick-Look Pipeline (Huang et al. 2020a,b; Kunimoto et al. 2021).

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

We study contextual combinatorial bandits with probabilistically triggered arms (C^2MAB-T) under a variety of smoothness conditions that capture a wide range of applications, such as contextual cascading bandits and contextual influence maximization bandits. Under the triggering probability modulated (TPM) condition, we devise the C^2-UCB-T algorithm and propose a novel analysis that achieves an O(dKT) regret bound, removing a potentially exponentially large factor O(1/p_{min}), where d is the dimension of contexts, p_{min} is the minimum positive probability that any arm can be triggered, and batch-size K is the maximum number of arms that can be triggered per round. Under the variance modulated (VM) or triggering probability and variance modulated (TPVM) conditions, we propose a new variance-adaptive algorithm VAC^2-UCB and derive a regret bound O(dT), which is independent of the batch-size K. As a valuable by-product, our analysis technique and variance-adaptive algorithm can be applied to the CMAB-T and C^2MAB setting, improving existing results there as well. We also include experiments that demonstrate the improved performance of our algorithms compared with benchmark algorithms on synthetic and real-world datasets.

High-throughput scientific facilities such as the Large Hadron Collider depend on real-time event filtering (triggering) under tight constraints on bandwidth, latency, and storage. In practice, trigger menus are largely static and hand-tuned and can become suboptimal as detector conditions, pileup, and background composition drift over time. We cast online threshold tuning as a sequential decision-making problem: a reinforcement learning agent ingests streaming summaries of recent rates and signal-sensitive features and updates trigger thresholds to maximize signal efficiency while tracking a target background rate within a tolerance band. We adapt Group-Filtered Policy Optimization (GFPO) to streaming control and introduce two variants (GFPO-F, GFPO-FR) that enforce background rate feasibility during training. On a benchmark that emulates realistic collider operation, we study two representative triggers: a total transverse energy (H_{T}) trigger sensitive to pileup variation, and an anomaly-detection (AD) trigger based on reconstruction loss for rare or non-standard signatures. On Monte Carlo streams, our agent increases the fraction of in-tolerance time intervals by 48\% (H_T) and 28\% (AD), with a cumulative gain of up to 2\% in signal efficiency on those in-tolerance intervals. Transferring from simulation to real collision data (CMS Run 283408), the same agent, without fine-tuning, achieves a 56\% (H_T) and 28\% (AD) in-tolerance improvement over baselines, with further signal-efficiency gain on both triggers. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of RL-based trigger control on real Large Hadron Collider collision data. Code is available at https://github.com/Zixind/GFPO_LHC (see repo for details).

Annotating medical data for training AI models is often costly and limited due to the shortage of specialists with relevant clinical expertise. This challenge is further compounded by privacy and ethical concerns associated with sensitive patient information. As a result, well-trained medical segmentation models on private datasets constitute valuable intellectual property requiring robust protection mechanisms. Existing model protection techniques primarily focus on classification and generative tasks, while segmentation models-crucial to medical image analysis-remain largely underexplored. In this paper, we propose a novel, stealthy, and harmless method, StealthMark, for verifying the ownership of medical segmentation models under black-box conditions. Our approach subtly modulates model uncertainty without altering the final segmentation outputs, thereby preserving the model's performance. To enable ownership verification, we incorporate model-agnostic explanation methods, e.g. LIME, to extract feature attributions from the model outputs. Under specific triggering conditions, these explanations reveal a distinct and verifiable watermark. We further design the watermark as a QR code to facilitate robust and recognizable ownership claims. We conducted extensive experiments across four medical imaging datasets and five mainstream segmentation models. The results demonstrate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and harmlessness of our method on the original model's segmentation performance. For example, when applied to the SAM model, StealthMark consistently achieved ASR above 95% across various datasets while maintaining less than a 1% drop in Dice and AUC scores, significantly outperforming backdoor-based watermarking methods and highlighting its strong potential for practical deployment. Our implementation code is made available at: https://github.com/Qinkaiyu/StealthMark.

Insertion of hardware Trojans (HTs) in integrated circuits is a pernicious threat. Since HTs are activated under rare trigger conditions, detecting them using random logic simulations is infeasible. In this work, we design a reinforcement learning (RL) agent that circumvents the exponential search space and returns a minimal set of patterns that is most likely to detect HTs. Experimental results on a variety of benchmarks demonstrate the efficacy and scalability of our RL agent, which obtains a significant reduction (169times) in the number of test patterns required while maintaining or improving coverage (95.75%) compared to the state-of-the-art techniques.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Modern vision-language-model (VLM) based graphical user interface (GUI) agents are expected not only to execute actions accurately but also to respond to user instructions with low latency. While existing research on GUI-agent security mainly focuses on manipulating action correctness, the security risks related to response efficiency remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce SlowBA, a novel backdoor attack that targets the responsiveness of VLM-based GUI agents. The key idea is to manipulate response latency by inducing excessively long reasoning chains under specific trigger patterns. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage reward-level backdoor injection (RBI) strategy that first aligns the long-response format and then learns trigger-aware activation through reinforcement learning. In addition, we design realistic pop-up windows as triggers that naturally appear in GUI environments, improving the stealthiness of the attack. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and baselines demonstrate that SlowBA can significantly increase response length and latency while largely preserving task accuracy. The attack remains effective even with a small poisoning ratio and under several defense settings. These findings reveal a previously overlooked security vulnerability in GUI agents and highlight the need for defenses that consider both action correctness and response efficiency. Code can be found in https://github.com/tu-tuing/SlowBA.

Imitation learning has enabled robots to acquire complex visuomotor manipulation skills from demonstrations, but deployment failures remain a major obstacle, especially for long-horizon action-chunked policies. Once execution drifts off the demonstration manifold, these policies often continue producing locally plausible actions without recovering from the failure. Existing runtime monitors either require failure data, over-trigger under benign feature drift, or stop at failure detection without providing a recovery mechanism. We present Rewind-IL, a training-free online safeguard framework for generative action-chunked imitation policies. Rewind-IL combines a zero-shot failure detector based on Temporal Inter-chunk Discrepancy Estimate (TIDE), calibrated with split conformal prediction, with a state-respawning mechanism that returns the robot to a semantically verified safe intermediate state. Offline, a vision-language model identifies recovery checkpoints in demonstrations, and the frozen policy encoder is used to construct a compact checkpoint feature database. Online, Rewind-IL monitors self-consistency in overlapping action chunks, tracks similarity to the checkpoint library, and, upon failure, rewinds execution to the latest verified safe state before restarting inference from a clean policy state. Experiments on real-world and simulated long-horizon manipulation tasks, including transfer to flow-matching action-chunked policies, demonstrate that policy-internal consistency coupled with semantically grounded respawning offers a practical route to improved reliability in imitation learning. Supplemental materials are available at https://sjay05.github.io/rewind-il

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Long-term conversational memory is a core capability for LLM-based dialogue systems, yet existing benchmarks and evaluation protocols primarily focus on surface-level factual recall. In realistic interactions, appropriate responses often depend on implicit constraints such as user state, goals, or values that are not explicitly queried later. To evaluate this setting, we introduce LoCoMo-Plus, a benchmark for assessing cognitive memory under cue--trigger semantic disconnect, where models must retain and apply latent constraints across long conversational contexts. We further show that conventional string-matching metrics and explicit task-type prompting are misaligned with such scenarios, and propose a unified evaluation framework based on constraint consistency. Experiments across diverse backbone models, retrieval-based methods, and memory systems demonstrate that cognitive memory remains challenging and reveals failures not captured by existing benchmarks. Our code and evaluation framework are publicly available at: https://github.com/xjtuleeyf/Locomo-Plus.

Industrial disruption replanning demands multi-agent coordination under strict latency and communication budgets, where disruptions propagate through tightly coupled physical dependencies and rapidly invalidate baseline schedules and commitments. Existing coordination schemes often treat communication as either effectively free (broadcast-style escalation) or fixed in advance (hand-tuned neighborhoods), both of which are brittle once the disruption footprint extends beyond a local region. We present \CASCADE, a budgeted replanning mechanism that makes communication scope explicit and auditable rather than fixed or implicit. Each agent maintains an explicit knowledge base, solves role-conditioned local decision problems to revise commitments, and coordinates through lightweight contract primitives whose footprint expands only when local validation indicates that the current scope is insufficient. This design separates a unified agent substrate (Knowledge Base / Decision Manager / Communication Manager) from a scoped interaction layer that controls who is contacted, how far coordination propagates, and when escalation is triggered under explicit budgets. We evaluate \CASCADE on disrupted manufacturing and supply-chain settings using unified diagnostics intended to test a mechanism-design claim -- whether explicit scope control yields useful quality-latency-communication trade-offs and improved robustness under uncertainty -- rather than to provide a complete algorithmic ranking.

Skill-based agent systems tackle complex tasks by composing reusable skills, improving modularity and scalability while introducing a largely unexamined security attack surface. We propose SkillTrojan, a backdoor attack that targets skill implementations rather than model parameters or training data. SkillTrojan embeds malicious logic inside otherwise plausible skills and leverages standard skill composition to reconstruct and execute an attacker-specified payload. The attack partitions an encrypted payload across multiple benign-looking skill invocations and activates only under a predefined trigger. SkillTrojan also supports automated synthesis of backdoored skills from arbitrary skill templates, enabling scalable propagation across skill-based agent ecosystems. To enable systematic evaluation, we release a dataset of 3,000+ curated backdoored skills spanning diverse skill patterns and trigger-payload configurations. We instantiate SkillTrojan in a representative code-based agent setting and evaluate both clean-task utility and attack success rate. Our results show that skill-level backdoors can be highly effective with minimal degradation of benign behavior, exposing a critical blind spot in current skill-based agent architectures and motivating defenses that explicitly reason about skill composition and execution. Concretely, on EHR SQL, SkillTrojan attains up to 97.2% ASR while maintaining 89.3% clean ACC on GPT-5.2-1211-Global.

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

Most current visual trackers adopt a matching-based architecture trained exclusively on tracking datasets, whose performance gains depend heavily on the length of the input context, and have now reached a bottleneck. While high-performance tracking increasingly relies on foundation models, existing methods use them monolithically, adapting a foundation model into a tracker or modify a segmentation foundation model into a tracking pipeline, which fails to exploit complementary strengths. Matching-based trackers excel at instance-level correspondence but lack semantic discrimination and fine-grained foreground perception, whereas segmentation foundation models produce precise masks yet struggle with instance discrimination and multimodal extension. Both paradigms also lack error-correction capabilities for long-term tracking. To address these issues, we propose ACTrack, an agentic coordination framework that treats heterogeneous models as invocable tools under an event-triggered mechanism. ACTrack coordinates a Tracker-based Instance Matching Tool for target discrimination, a SAM3 Motion Tool for mask-derived motion priors, a SAM3 Perception Tool for detecting distractors and instance-conflict cues, and a VLM Reprompt Tool activated only under persistent conflict to mitigate error accumulation. We design a complete tool-invocation trigger mechanism and an inter-tool coordination mechanism, enabling the complementary strengths of different model tools to be fully integrated. Experiments show that ACTrack substantially surpasses the strongest and the largest trackers on eight RGB benchmarks. Furthermore, a parameter-efficient adaptation strategy enables parameter sharing and reuse across tools, achieving unified multimodal tracking with only 30\% trainable parameters while substantially outperforming prior methods on multimodal benchmarks such as LasHeR, VisEvent, TNL2K, and DepthTrack.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

We revisit retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) by embedding retrieval control directly into generation. Instead of treating retrieval as an external intervention, we express retrieval decisions within token-level decoding, enabling end-to-end coordination without additional controllers or classifiers. Under the paradigm of Retrieval as Generation, we propose GRIP (Generation-guided Retrieval with Information Planning), a unified framework in which the model regulates retrieval behavior through control-token emission. Central to GRIP is Self-Triggered Information Planning, which allows the model to decide when to retrieve, how to reformulate queries, and when to terminate, all within a single autoregressive trajectory. This design tightly couples retrieval and reasoning and supports dynamic multi-step inference with on-the-fly evidence integration. To supervise these behaviors, we construct a structured training set covering answerable, partially answerable, and multi-hop queries, each aligned with specific token patterns. Experiments on five QA benchmarks show that GRIP surpasses strong RAG baselines and is competitive with GPT-4o while using substantially fewer parameters.

Full-duplex speech models accept user speech while generating responses, creating an underexplored attack surface. We introduce DuplexJail, which delivers fixed, request-independent spoken prompts through the user audio channel. We compare fixed-delay interruption after the harmful request ends with refusal-triggered interruption following a cue in the model's streaming text. Across four open-source models and 720 harmful requests from AdvBench and HarmBench, fixed-delay interruption raises whole-response attack success rates on AdvBench to 40.3% for PersonaPlex and 48.7% for PersonaPlex-RL, increases of +33.8 and +39.3 percentage points. The refusal-triggered policy reaches 35.6% and 48.6%, respectively, with all trials scored regardless of whether an interruption occurs. Selected conditions also increase FLM-Audio's harmful-response rate, while BayLing-Duplex shows decreases. These findings identify spoken interruption as a jailbreak attack vector and motivate evaluating safety throughout ongoing full-duplex interaction.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

The importance of social media is again exposed in the recent tragedy of the 2023 Turkey and Syria earthquake. Many victims who were trapped under the rubble called for help by posting messages in Twitter. We present an interactive tool to provide situational awareness for missing and trapped people, and disaster relief for rescue and donation efforts. The system (i) collects tweets, (ii) classifies the ones calling for help, (iii) extracts important entity tags, and (iv) visualizes them in an interactive map screen. Our initial experiments show that the performance in terms of the F1 score is up to 98.30 for tweet classification, and 84.32 for entity extraction. The demonstration, dataset, and other related files can be accessed at https://github.com/avaapm/deprem

Autonomous vehicles increasingly utilize the vision-based perception module to acquire information about driving environments and detect obstacles. Correct detection and classification are important to ensure safe driving decisions. Existing works have demonstrated the feasibility of fooling the perception models such as object detectors and image classifiers with printed adversarial patches. However, most of them are indiscriminately offensive to every passing autonomous vehicle. In this paper, we propose TPatch, a physical adversarial patch triggered by acoustic signals. Unlike other adversarial patches, TPatch remains benign under normal circumstances but can be triggered to launch a hiding, creating or altering attack by a designed distortion introduced by signal injection attacks towards cameras. To avoid the suspicion of human drivers and make the attack practical and robust in the real world, we propose a content-based camouflage method and an attack robustness enhancement method to strengthen it. Evaluations with three object detectors, YOLO V3/V5 and Faster R-CNN, and eight image classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of TPatch in both the simulation and the real world. We also discuss possible defenses at the sensor, algorithm, and system levels.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

Repeated impacts of a droplet on a vertically forced bath can produce a growing Faraday-wave response under forcing conditions for which the corresponding initially undisturbed bath remains linearly stable. We investigate this mechanism using axisymmetric two-phase direct numerical simulations over a wide range of Reynolds and Weber numbers. The resulting phenomenological regime map identifies quasi-periodic, decaying, faint, and unstable-bath responses. Along the parameter path considered here, the transition to the unstable-bath regime occurs over a narrow range of Weber numbers and varies only weakly with Reynolds number. In the unstable regime, the bath develops a coherent subharmonic response at half the forcing frequency, while disturbances in the decaying regime remain broadband and weaken between successive rebounds. Bath-only simulations show that a finite-amplitude perturbation representative of droplet impact can seed the confined radial mode susceptible to parametric forcing, initiating a growing subharmonic response below the linear instability threshold of the initially flat bath. A reduced capillary-dominated model provides a scaling estimate for the impact-equivalent perturbation amplitude, and bath-only simulations initialized with these perturbations reproduce the bounded-to-growing transition observed in the coupled simulations. Floquet analysis of the finite cylindrical bath identifies the first axisymmetric Neumann mode as having the lowest subharmonic instability threshold. A time-resolved Bessel decomposition independently shows that the growing bath response is dominated by the same radial mode, while the droplet-induced subharmonic response projects predominantly onto this structure. These results identify a finite-amplitude route by which localized droplet impacts can access Faraday-wave dynamics below the linear onset threshold of an initially undisturbed bath.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The backdoor adversaries intend to maliciously control the predictions of attacked DNNs by injecting hidden backdoors that can be activated by adversary-specified trigger patterns during the training process. One recent research revealed that most of the existing attacks failed in the real physical world since the trigger contained in the digitized test samples may be different from that of the one used for training. Accordingly, users can adopt spatial transformations as the image pre-processing to deactivate hidden backdoors. In this paper, we explore the previous findings from another side. We exploit classical spatial transformations (i.e. rotation and translation) with the specific parameter as trigger patterns to design a simple yet effective poisoning-based backdoor attack. For example, only images rotated to a particular angle can activate the embedded backdoor of attacked DNNs. Extensive experiments are conducted, verifying the effectiveness of our attack under both digital and physical settings and its resistance to existing backdoor defenses.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) that interact with real computer systems can perform automated tasks but face critical safety risks. Ambiguous instructions may trigger harmful actions, and adversarial users can manipulate tool execution to achieve malicious goals. Existing benchmarks mostly focus on short-horizon or GUI-based tasks, evaluating on execution-time errors but overlooking the ability to anticipate planning-time risks. To fill this gap, we present LPS-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates the planning-time safety awareness of MCP-based CUAs under long-horizon tasks, covering both benign and adversarial interactions across 65 scenarios of 7 task domains and 9 risk types. We introduce a multi-agent automated pipeline for scalable data generation and adopt an LLM-as-a-judge evaluation protocol to assess safety awareness through the planning trajectory. Experiments reveal substantial deficiencies in existing CUAs' ability to maintain safe behavior. We further analyze the risks and propose mitigation strategies to improve long-horizon planning safety in MCP-based CUA systems. We open-source our code at https://github.com/tychenn/LPS-Bench.

Recent multimodal large language models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on reactive question answering, but real-world streaming assistants require proactive reasoning over continuous visual inputs. Existing benchmarks mainly study reactive or proactive interactions in isolated single-turn settings, overlooking dynamic multi-turn scenarios where users may add, modify, or cancel proactive requests alongside interleaved reactive queries. To address this gap, we introduce IPIBench, the first benchmark for evaluating Interactive Proactive Intelligence of MLLMs under streaming video settings. IPIBench covers proactive monitoring, proactive task management, and interleaved reactive-proactive requests. Evaluations on representative MLLMs reveal two major limitations: unstable proactive triggering and weak coordination between reactive and proactive behaviors. We further propose IPI-Agent, a training-free agentic framework with an interaction-control policy and a temporal-gating mechanism for stabilizing proactive triggering and coordinating multi-turn interactions. Experiments show that IPI-Agent consistently improves existing MLLMs across all benchmark settings.

This paper introduces a new multi-strain epidemic model with reinfection and cross-immunity to provide insights into the resurgence of the COVID-19 epidemic in an area with reportedly high seroprevalence due to a largely unmitigated outbreak: the state of Amazonas, Brazil. Although high seroprevalence could have been expected to trigger herd immunity and prevent further waves in the state, we have observed persistent levels of infection after the first wave and eventually the emergence of a second viral strain just before an augmented second wave. Our experiments suggest that the persistent levels of infection after the first wave may be due to reinfection, whereas the higher peak at the second wave can be explained by the emergence of the second variant and a low level of cross-immunity between the original and the second variant. Finally, the proposed model provides insights into the effect of reinfection and cross-immunity on the long-term spread of an unmitigated epidemic.

Building robust safety guardrails is essential for deploying Large Language Models across diverse real-world applications. However, this goal remains challenging because safety risks span heterogeneous threat domains, while existing datasets cover only fragmented risk subsets and rely on inconsistent taxonomies. Consequently, it remains unclear whether current guardrails can generalize beyond narrow evaluation settings. To better understand the robustness of guardrail models, we first introduce GuardZoo, a unified human-annotated benchmark with 32,460 samples covering 15 distinct unsafe categories. Evaluation on GuardZoo reveals that monolithic guardrails suffer from task interference: different threat domains require distinct decision boundaries that are difficult to compress into a single model. We therefore propose RouteGuard, a router-expert framework that triages each conversation to specialized expert guardrails for threat-specific detection. Experiments show that RouteGuard improves fine-grained threat detection over strong guardrail baselines, generalizes better under out-of-domain evaluation, and supports flexible modular expansion to emerging threats.

With the help of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance on various reasoning tasks. However, most of them have been evaluated under noise-free context and the dilemma for LLMs to produce inaccurate results under the noisy context has not been fully investigated. Existing studies utilize trigger sentences to encourage LLMs to concentrate on the relevant information but the trigger has limited effect on final answer prediction. Inspired by interactive CoT method, where intermediate reasoning steps are promoted by multiple rounds of interaction between users and LLMs, we propose a novel prompting method, namely R^3 prompting, for CoT reasoning under noisy context. Specifically, R^3 prompting interacts with LLMs to perform key sentence extraction, variable declaration and answer prediction, which corresponds to a thought process of reviewing, rephrasing and resolving. The responses generated at the last interaction will perform as hints to guide toward the responses of the next interaction. Our experiments show that R^3 prompting significantly outperforms existing CoT prompting methods on five reasoning tasks under noisy context. With GPT-3.5-turbo, we observe 3.7% accuracy improvement on average on the reasoning tasks under noisy context compared to the most competitive prompting baseline. More analyses and ablation studies show the robustness and generalization of R^3 prompting method in solving reasoning tasks in LLMs under noisy context.

We present Eureka-Audio, a compact yet high-performance audio language model that achieves competitive performance against models that are 4 to 18 times larger across a broad range of audio understanding benchmarks. Despite containing only 1.7B parameters, Eureka-Audio demonstrates strong performance on automatic speech recognition (ASR), audio understanding, and dense audio captioning, matching or surpassing multiple 7B to 30B audio and omni-modal baselines. The model adopts a unified end-to-end architecture composed of a lightweight language backbone, a Whisper-based audio encoder, and a sparsely activated Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) adapter that explicitly accounts for audio heterogeneity and alleviates cross-modal optimization conflicts under limited capacity. To further enhance paralinguistic reasoning, we introduce DataFlux, a closed loop audio instruction data synthesis and verification pipeline that constructs high quality, logically consistent supervision from raw audio. Extensive evaluations across ASR, knowledge reasoning, safety, instruction following, and paralinguistic benchmarks, demonstrate that Eureka-Audio achieves an efficient balance between computational cost and performance. These results establish Eureka Audio as a strong and practical baseline for lightweight audio understanding models.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

The issue of copyright in generative models, particularly diffusion models, has become a prominent concern in recent years. Previous studies have predominantly focused on copyright violation at the image level, where generative models replicate copyrighted images entirely. Furthermore, these earlier studies have examined copyright infringements mainly using prompts that are semantically similar to target topics. However, copyright infringement can be more nuanced than mere replication of whole images and can be triggered with prompts that are less directly related to copyright topics. In our work, we tackle the limitations of previous studies by delving into partial copyright infringement, which treats parts of images as copyrighted content, using prompts that are considerably different from copyrighted topics. We develop a data generation pipeline that facilitates the creation of datasets for copyright research in diffusion models. Using our pipeline, we create datasets containing copyright infringement samples for different diffusion models. We conduct evaluations on generated data under various criteria. Our results show the prevalence of generating copyright-infringing content across a range of diffusion models, including the latest Stable Diffusion XL.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have propelled Artificial Intelligence (AI) to new heights, enabling breakthroughs in various tasks such as writing assistance, code generation, and machine translation. A significant distinction of advanced LLMs, such as ChatGPT, is their demonstrated ability to "reason." However, evaluating the reasoning ability of LLMs remains a challenge as most existing evaluations focus on their accuracy on the downstream tasks rather than directly assessing their reasoning processes. Efforts have been made to develop benchmarks and metrics to assess reasoning in LLMs, but they suffer from data leakage or limited scope. In this paper, we introduce LogicAsker, an automatic approach that comprehensively evaluates and improves the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs under a set of atomic reasoning skills based on propositional and predicate logic. The results provide insights into LLMs' reasoning abilities and reveal the logical rules the LLMs did not learn well. We evaluate LogicAsker on six widely deployed LLMs, including GPT-3, ChatGPT, GPT-4, Bard, Vicuna, and Guanaco. The results show that test cases from LogicAsker can find logical reasoning failures in different LLMs with a rate of 25\% - 94\%. In addition, the test cases of LogicAsker can be further used to design demonstration examples for in-context learning, which effectively improves the logical reasoning ability of LLMs, e.g., 10\% for GPT-4. As far as we know, our work is the first to create prompts based on testing results to improve LLMs' formal reasoning ability effectively. All the code, data, and results will be released for reproduction and future research.

Improvements in model construction, including fortified safety guardrails, allow Large language models (LLMs) to increasingly pass standard safety checks. However, LLMs sometimes slip into revealing harmful behavior, such as expressing racist viewpoints, during conversations. To analyze this systematically, we introduce CoBia, a suite of lightweight adversarial attacks that allow us to refine the scope of conditions under which LLMs depart from normative or ethical behavior in conversations. CoBia creates a constructed conversation where the model utters a biased claim about a social group. We then evaluate whether the model can recover from the fabricated bias claim and reject biased follow-up questions. We evaluate 11 open-source as well as proprietary LLMs for their outputs related to six socio-demographic categories that are relevant to individual safety and fair treatment, i.e., gender, race, religion, nationality, sex orientation, and others. Our evaluation is based on established LLM-based bias metrics, and we compare the results against human judgments to scope out the LLMs' reliability and alignment. The results suggest that purposefully constructed conversations reliably reveal bias amplification and that LLMs often fail to reject biased follow-up questions during dialogue. This form of stress-testing highlights deeply embedded biases that can be surfaced through interaction. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/nafisenik/CoBia.

Safety and security remain critical concerns in AI deployment. Despite safety training through reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) [ 32], language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails. Universal jailbreaks - prefixes that can circumvent alignment for any payload - are particularly concerning. We show empirically that jailbreak detection systems face distribution shift, with detectors trained at one point in time performing poorly against newer exploits. To study this problem, we release JailbreaksOverTime, a comprehensive dataset of timestamped real user interactions containing both benign requests and jailbreak attempts collected over 10 months. We propose a two-pronged method for defenders to detect new jailbreaks and continuously update their detectors. First, we show how to use continuous learning to detect jailbreaks and adapt rapidly to new emerging jailbreaks. While detectors trained at a single point in time eventually fail due to drift, we find that universal jailbreaks evolve slowly enough for self-training to be effective. Retraining our detection model weekly using its own labels - with no new human labels - reduces the false negative rate from 4% to 0.3% at a false positive rate of 0.1%. Second, we introduce an unsupervised active monitoring approach to identify novel jailbreaks. Rather than classifying inputs directly, we recognize jailbreaks by their behavior, specifically, their ability to trigger models to respond to known-harmful prompts. This approach has a higher false negative rate (4.1%) than supervised methods, but it successfully identified some out-of-distribution attacks that were missed by the continuous learning approach.

As large language models improve, so do their offensive applications: frontier agents now generate working exploits for under $50 in compute (Heelan, 2026). Defensive incident response (IR) agents must keep pace, but existing benchmarks conflate action execution with correct execution, hiding calibration failures when agents process adversarial evidence. We introduce OpenSec, a dual-control reinforcement learning environment that evaluates IR agents under realistic prompt injection scenarios. Unlike static capability benchmarks, OpenSec scores world-state-changing containment actions under adversarial evidence via execution-based metrics: time-to-first-containment (TTFC), blast radius (false positives per episode), and injection violation rates. Evaluating four frontier models on 40 standard-tier episodes, we find consistent over-triggering in this setting: GPT-5.2, Gemini 3, and DeepSeek execute containment in 100% of episodes with 90-97% false positive rates. Claude Sonnet 4.5 shows partial calibration (85% containment, 72% FP), demonstrating that OpenSec surfaces a calibration failure mode hidden by aggregate success metrics. Code available at https://github.com/jbarnes850/opensec-env.

Multimodal recommendation enhances ranking by integrating user-item interactions with item content, which is particularly effective under sparse feedback and long-tail distributions. However, multimodal signals are inherently heterogeneous and can conflict in specific contexts, making effective fusion both crucial and challenging. Existing approaches often rely on shared fusion pathways, leading to entangled representations and modality imbalance. To address these issues, we propose MAGNET, a Modality-Guided Mixture of Adaptive Graph Experts Network with Progressive Entropy-Triggered Routing for Multimodal Recommendation, designed to enhance controllability, stability, and interpretability in multimodal fusion. MAGNET couples interaction-conditioned expert routing with structure-aware graph augmentation, so that both what to fuse and how to fuse are explicitly controlled and interpretable. At the representation level, a dual-view graph learning module augments the interaction graph with content-induced edges, improving coverage for sparse and long-tail items while preserving collaborative structure via parallel encoding and lightweight fusion. At the fusion level, MAGNET employs structured experts with explicit modality roles-dominant, balanced, and complementary-enabling a more interpretable and adaptive combination of behavioral, visual, and textual cues. To further stabilize sparse routing and prevent expert collapse, we introduce a two-stage entropy-weighting mechanism that monitors routing entropy. This mechanism automatically transitions training from an early coverage-oriented regime to a later specialization-oriented regime, progressively balancing expert utilization and routing confidence. Extensive experiments on public benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements over strong baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) reach high accuracy in mathematical reasoning, but individual traces on the same problem diverge; some arrive at the correct answer while others fail. Prior work analyzes failure at the step, chunk, or sentence level, or at tokens where failure has already occurred. Neither identifies the precise token that triggers the shift toward failure. We introduce the cliff token, a token where the token-wise potential drops significantly under an adaptive threshold that scales with the local token-wise potential, based on a one-sided two-proportion z-test. Across seven models and three mathematical reasoning benchmarks (GSM1K, MATH500, AIME 2025), cliff tokens act as failure triggers; deleting the first cliff token and resampling recovers pass@64 to 1.0, while keeping it limits recovery to between 0.71 and 1.00. We further introduce a cliff taxonomy of deterministic, uncertain, and sampled-off cliffs, defined by greedy choice and token entropy. Each type has distinct probabilistic characteristics, and the taxonomy generalizes across model scales. Finally, we validate the taxonomy via single-token preference optimization at cliff positions (Cliff-DPO). Trained on GSM8K, Cliff-DPO improves accuracy across benchmarks by up to +6.6. Optimizing at uncertain and sampled-off cliffs improves reasoning, while deterministic cliffs do not.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) can be manipulated to exhibit specific behaviors when exposed to specific trigger patterns, without affecting their performance on benign samples, dubbed backdoor attack. Currently, implementing backdoor attacks in physical scenarios still faces significant challenges. Physical attacks are labor-intensive and time-consuming, and the triggers are selected in a manual and heuristic way. Moreover, expanding digital attacks to physical scenarios faces many challenges due to their sensitivity to visual distortions and the absence of counterparts in the real world. To address these challenges, we define a novel trigger called the Visible, Semantic, Sample-Specific, and Compatible (VSSC) trigger, to achieve effective, stealthy and robust simultaneously, which can also be effectively deployed in the physical scenario using corresponding objects. To implement the VSSC trigger, we propose an automated pipeline comprising three modules: a trigger selection module that systematically identifies suitable triggers leveraging large language models, a trigger insertion module that employs generative models to seamlessly integrate triggers into images, and a quality assessment module that ensures the natural and successful insertion of triggers through vision-language models. Extensive experimental results and analysis validate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness of the VSSC trigger. It can not only maintain robustness under visual distortions but also demonstrates strong practicality in the physical scenario. We hope that the proposed VSSC trigger and implementation approach could inspire future studies on designing more practical triggers in backdoor attacks.

Multimodal contrastive learning models like CLIP have demonstrated remarkable vision-language alignment capabilities, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks poses critical security risks. Attackers can implant latent triggers that persist through downstream tasks, enabling malicious control of model behavior upon trigger presentation. Despite great success in recent defense mechanisms, they remain impractical due to strong assumptions about attacker knowledge or excessive clean data requirements. In this paper, we introduce InverTune, the first backdoor defense framework for multimodal models under minimal attacker assumptions, requiring neither prior knowledge of attack targets nor access to the poisoned dataset. Unlike existing defense methods that rely on the same dataset used in the poisoning stage, InverTune effectively identifies and removes backdoor artifacts through three key components, achieving robust protection against backdoor attacks. Specifically, InverTune first exposes attack signatures through adversarial simulation, probabilistically identifying the target label by analyzing model response patterns. Building on this, we develop a gradient inversion technique to reconstruct latent triggers through activation pattern analysis. Finally, a clustering-guided fine-tuning strategy is employed to erase the backdoor function with only a small amount of arbitrary clean data, while preserving the original model capabilities. Experimental results show that InverTune reduces the average attack success rate (ASR) by 97.87% against the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks while limiting clean accuracy (CA) degradation to just 3.07%. This work establishes a new paradigm for securing multimodal systems, advancing security in foundation model deployment without compromising performance.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced embodied agents by enabling direct perception, reasoning, and planning task-oriented actions from visual inputs. However, such vision driven embodied agents open a new attack surface: visual backdoor attacks, where the agent behaves normally until a visual trigger appears in the scene, then persistently executes an attacker-specified multi-step policy. We introduce BEAT, the first framework to inject such visual backdoors into MLLM-based embodied agents using objects in the environments as triggers. Unlike textual triggers, object triggers exhibit wide variation across viewpoints and lighting, making them difficult to implant reliably. BEAT addresses this challenge by (1) constructing a training set that spans diverse scenes, tasks, and trigger placements to expose agents to trigger variability, and (2) introducing a two-stage training scheme that first applies supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and then our novel Contrastive Trigger Learning (CTL). CTL formulates trigger discrimination as preference learning between trigger-present and trigger-free inputs, explicitly sharpening the decision boundaries to ensure precise backdoor activation. Across various embodied agent benchmarks and MLLMs, BEAT achieves attack success rates up to 80%, while maintaining strong benign task performance, and generalizes reliably to out-of-distribution trigger placements. Notably, compared to naive SFT, CTL boosts backdoor activation accuracy up to 39% under limited backdoor data. These findings expose a critical yet unexplored security risk in MLLM-based embodied agents, underscoring the need for robust defenses before real-world deployment.

This paper presents Elevator-LIO, a LiDAR-inertial odometry framework designed to achieve continuous robot localization during elevator travel, thereby supporting cross-floor robotic tasks. To address the state-estimation problem in non-inertial frames, Elevator-LIO establishes a decoupled state-estimation model that separately models the robot motion relative to the elevator and the elevator motion itself, and embeds it into a mode-dependent iterated error-state Kalman filter framework. This framework degenerates to conventional LIO estimation in ordinary indoor environments, while enabling the propagation and constrained update of elevator-related states in elevator non-inertial environments, thereby achieving continuous and stable localization. An elevator mode manager detects elevator entry and exit events using LiDAR ranging statistics and estimated states, and introduces event-triggered zero-velocity and zero-acceleration updates when the elevator stops to suppress accumulated vertical drift. In addition, this paper adopts an adaptive voxel downsampling strategy to maintain a stable number of effective points under significant environmental scale changes. We conduct extensive experiments on 20 real-world sequences containing 79 elevator rides, including practical challenges such as large-scale spaces, long vertical travel, dynamic pedestrian interference, and mirror reflections. The results show that Elevator-LIO maintains continuous localization accuracy in all sequences, with terminal height error below 1 cm in 17 sequences. In contrast, existing representative localization systems perform poorly on these elevator sequences. Tests on the Hilti 2022/2023 datasets further show that the proposed method remains competitive in standard indoor scenarios. The project page is available at https://xiaofan4122.github.io/Elevator_LIO_Page/.

While streaming omni-video understanding demands continuous perception and proactive, real-time interaction, this crucial area remains largely under-explored. Current omni-modal methods are inherently designed for offline settings, limiting their applicability in streaming scenarios due to two fundamental flaws. First, they lack robust mechanisms to manage continuously growing audio-visual context over long horizons and cannot autonomously initiate responses at opportune moments. Second, existing benchmarks are predominantly confined to offline, single-turn question answering, failing to capture continuous, multi-turn streaming interactions. To bridge these gaps, we propose StreamOV, a novel Streaming Omni-Video understanding framework for efficient online audio-visual reasoning with bounded memory and proactive response triggering. Specifically, StreamOV introduces a multimodal evidence-guided long-short term memory that condenses historical audio-visual context into compact informative evidence under a fixed budget. It further employs a hidden-state-driven trigger to decide when to respond, avoiding explicit silence-token generation and external routers. We also curate SOVBench, the first comprehensive benchmark for online, multi-turn omni-modal evaluation. Extensive experiments show that StreamOV achieves state-of-the-art performance across diverse streaming and omni-video benchmarks, demonstrating its effectiveness for both online and offline video understanding.

Timing and burst patterns can leak through encryption, and an adaptive adversary can exploit them. This undermines metadata-only detection in a stand-alone consumer gateway. Therefore, consumer gateways need streaming intrusion detection on encrypted traffic using metadata only, under tight CPU and latency budgets. We present a streaming IDS for stand-alone gateways that instantiates a lightweight two-state unit derived from Network-Optimised Spiking (NOS) dynamics per flow, named NOS-Gate. NOS-Gate scores fixed-length windows of metadata features and, under a K-of-M persistence rule, triggers a reversible mitigation that temporarily reduces the flow's weight under weighted fair queueing (WFQ). We evaluate NOS-Gate under timing-controlled evasion using an executable worlds benchmark that specifies benign device processes, auditable attacker budgets, contention structure, and packet-level WFQ replay to quantify queue impact. All methods are calibrated label-free via burn-in quantile thresholding. Across multiple reproducible worlds and malicious episodes, at an achieved 0.1% false-positive operating point, NOS-Gate attains 0.952 incident recall versus 0.857 for the best baseline in these runs. Under gating, it reduces p99.9 queueing delay and p99.9 collateral delay with a mean scoring cost of approx 2.09,μs per flow-window on CPU.

Evaluating English ASR systems for conversational AI applications remains difficult, as many publicly available corpora are either pre-segmented into short segments, consist of read or prepared speech, or lack explicit dialect annotations to evaluate robustness for a diverse user base. This work presents the AppTek Call-Center Dialogues corpus, a collection of spontaneous, role-played agent-customer conversations spanning fourteen English accents covering sixteen service-oriented scenarios. The dataset was commissioned specifically for evaluation and none of the audio or text was publicly available prior to release, reducing the risk of overlap with existing large-scale pretraining corpora. We benchmark a set of open-source ASR systems under different segmentation approaches. Results show substantial variation across accents and segmentation methods, indicating that good performance on general American English benchmarks does not necessarily generalize to other accents.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) inherit massive activations from their text-only bases: spikes where a few fixed hidden channels receive values thousands of times above the typical magnitude. The text spike systematically appears in early layers at a fixed initial position, independently of input content. Visual spikes vary across images, but whether their formation follows a consistent pattern across LVLMs and how they respond to image perturbations remain open questions. We find that some LVLMs do not form visual spikes, while others spike at different rates, typically in deeper layers. We identify the trigger direction from model weights and an interpretable location rule: before the language model decoder runs, eventual spike tokens are largely restricted to those sharing least with the rest of the image. Crucially, visual spikes are strikingly brittle. Common corruptions frequently create and relocate spikes, and less often remove them, raising overall incidence. Our trigger-guided spike attack deliberately creates or removes spikes under a small ell_infty budget, with 1/255 enough in nine of the ten models that spike. Finally, our preventive intervention removes only the trigger component before spikes erupt, eliminating or substantially reducing spikes on clean and perturbed images while leaving the other image tokens nearly unchanged. Our study spans 25 adapter-based LVLMs built on 18 released text-only bases from 10 families, ranging from 2B to 72B parameters.

A pronounced pyramid-shaped enhancement in the axion density power spectrum induced by the QCD phase transition is identified. The enhancement occurs near the horizon scale at the transition, with a characteristic comoving length scale comparable to the size of the Solar System, and amplifies the axion density perturbation by factors exceeding 3.5 times 10^{13} relative to the CDM case. Under the hilltop initial condition, coupling to radiation triggers this enhancement. The initial condition is related to the axion mass, suggesting that observation of the axion pyramid in cosmology may constrain the QCD axion mass.

Long-horizon agents need a context manager to compress growing interaction histories into a bounded working context, via passive strategies or active strategies that decide how memory is accessed and reorganized. Meanwhile, prior optical-memory work mainly treats pixels as a dense codec for textualized histories, often presupposing that rendering context into optical memory incurs a significant performance drop relative to text, thus coupling this representation with SFT, self-distillation, or reinforcement learning to close this gap, leaving unresolved (i) how visual rendering performs as a context manager under a fair, controlled comparison, and (ii) whether this carrier offers a native advantage when history is inherently multimodal. In this paper, we formulate context management as a budget-constrained history transformation and introduce Visual Rendering (VR) as a representational context manager. Under a shared harness, policy model, trigger, and task domain, we evaluate VR on four text-centric and three multimodal benchmarks against four baselines (No Compression, Discard-All, Sliding Window, Summarization), finding visual memory is a natural carrier of native visual evidence. Building on this finding, we propose VERA (Visual Evidence-Retaining strategy for long-horizon Agents), a training-free context manager built on deterministic rendering with no exposed memory operations: on text-centric benchmarks it renders textual history as VR does, while on multimodal benchmarks it retains native visual observations instead of translating them into text. Across nearly all benchmarks, VERA cuts cumulative non-cache tokens by 31.5%-63.1% versus No Compression, matches existing managers on text-centric tasks, and achieves the highest accuracy among all baselines on multimodal tasks, supporting a modality-preserving view of long-horizon context management.

Given the power of vision transformers, a new learning paradigm, pre-training and then prompting, makes it more efficient and effective to address downstream visual recognition tasks. In this paper, we identify a novel security threat towards such a paradigm from the perspective of backdoor attacks. Specifically, an extra prompt token, called the switch token in this work, can turn the backdoor mode on, i.e., converting a benign model into a backdoored one. Once under the backdoor mode, a specific trigger can force the model to predict a target class. It poses a severe risk to the users of cloud API, since the malicious behavior can not be activated and detected under the benign mode, thus making the attack very stealthy. To attack a pre-trained model, our proposed attack, named SWARM, learns a trigger and prompt tokens including a switch token. They are optimized with the clean loss which encourages the model always behaves normally even the trigger presents, and the backdoor loss that ensures the backdoor can be activated by the trigger when the switch is on. Besides, we utilize the cross-mode feature distillation to reduce the effect of the switch token on clean samples. The experiments on diverse visual recognition tasks confirm the success of our switchable backdoor attack, i.e., achieving 95%+ attack success rate, and also being hard to be detected and removed. Our code is available at https://github.com/20000yshust/SWARM.

Voice activity detection (VAD) triggers downstream speech processing in always-on systems under strict memory, latency, and compute constraints. Recent compact models report strong accuracy but rely on components that are not widely supported: learnable filterbanks, recurrent layers, or non-causal post-processing. We propose kiloVAD, designed for embedded inference using standard Mel features, CNN-only layers, and tunable context/spectral parameters. We introduce per-layer structured pruning with self-distillation and angle-based quantization-aware training (QAT) that outperforms standard QAT by 1-4%. Evaluated per-frame under causal conditions, kiloVAD achieves 0.850 AUC on AVA-Speech with 2.1 k parameters and 200 ms context, establishing a new state of the art for causal, deployment-ready VAD.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.

This work introduces a highly efficient implementation of the transformer architecture on a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) by using the hls4ml tool. Given the demonstrated effectiveness of transformer models in addressing a wide range of problems, their application in experimental triggers within particle physics becomes a subject of significant interest. In this work, we have implemented critical components of a transformer model, such as multi-head attention and softmax layers. To evaluate the effectiveness of our implementation, we have focused on a particle physics jet flavor tagging problem, employing a public dataset. We recorded latency under 2 mus on the Xilinx UltraScale+ FPGA, which is compatible with hardware trigger requirements at the CERN Large Hadron Collider experiments.

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has been a key driver of recent progress in reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) for large language models, but it is typically trained in a low-staleness, near-on-policy regime that incurs substantial system overhead. We ask a simple question: How off-policy can GRPO be? We show that GRPO-style algorithms can tolerate substantially larger rollout staleness than previously assumed, and propose Mu-GRPO, an RL training framework that organizes training into a small number (e.g., four) of large sequential generation-optimization stages. This design induces high rollout staleness while greatly reducing rollout-optimization switching overhead. To stabilize learning under stale data, Mu-GRPO combines relaxed clipping, which preserves useful stale-rollout gradients, with negative-advantage veto, which removes destabilizing post-trigger suffix updates in negative-advantage responses. Across five language models and multiple math reasoning benchmarks, Mu-GRPO matches or exceeds the performance of standard GRPO while achieving around 2x speedup in wall-clock training time, establishing a substantially improved performance-efficiency trade-off for LLM reinforcement learning.

Model-as-a-service platforms call for continuous optimization as complex serving conditions expose inefficiencies missed before deployment. Detailed always-on profiling can incur substantial overhead, while lightweight collection omits information needed for diagnosis. We present Herschel, a continuous optimization system for production large language model (LLM) inference. Our key insight is that adaptive, on-demand profiling can provide rich full-stack evidence without continuous collection. Herschel safely attaches to and detaches from selected running processes without engine changes or restarts, and adapts coverage as investigations reveal missing evidence. Herschel reconstructs operator executions and cross-process dependencies to identify inefficiency mechanisms and suggest solutions using applicable reference fixes. AI agents implement and test engine and kernel changes under controlled conditions that preserve the triggering workload and dependencies, with expert review before deployment. Controlled tests show active-collection overhead below 0.5% for time to first token and 7% for time per output token. Bounded windows, typically 30 s, avoid the continuous cost of always-on tracing. Over six months, Herschel collected approximately 17,000 traces across over 120 model variants and more than 10 accelerator types, identifying inefficiency patterns in 23% of the traces. Representative findings guide widely deployed optimizations, including restructured synchronization, removal of unused computation, and improved operator implementations.

Diffusion models have achieved great success in a range of tasks, such as image synthesis and molecule design. As such successes hinge on large-scale training data collected from diverse sources, the trustworthiness of these collected data is hard to control or audit. In this work, we aim to explore the vulnerabilities of diffusion models under potential training data manipulations and try to answer: How hard is it to perform Trojan attacks on well-trained diffusion models? What are the adversarial targets that such Trojan attacks can achieve? To answer these questions, we propose an effective Trojan attack against diffusion models, TrojDiff, which optimizes the Trojan diffusion and generative processes during training. In particular, we design novel transitions during the Trojan diffusion process to diffuse adversarial targets into a biased Gaussian distribution and propose a new parameterization of the Trojan generative process that leads to an effective training objective for the attack. In addition, we consider three types of adversarial targets: the Trojaned diffusion models will always output instances belonging to a certain class from the in-domain distribution (In-D2D attack), out-of-domain distribution (Out-D2D-attack), and one specific instance (D2I attack). We evaluate TrojDiff on CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets against both DDPM and DDIM diffusion models. We show that TrojDiff always achieves high attack performance under different adversarial targets using different types of triggers, while the performance in benign environments is preserved. The code is available at https://github.com/chenweixin107/TrojDiff.

Wireless sensor networks have emerged as an important and new area in wireless and mobile computing research because of their numerous potential applications that range from indoor deployment scenarios in home and office to outdoor deployment in adversary's territory in tactical battleground. Since in many WSN applications, lives and livelihoods may depend on the timeliness and correctness of sensor data obtained from dispersed sensor nodes, these networks must be secured to prevent any possible attacks that may be launched on them. Security is, therefore, an important issue in WSNs. However, this issue becomes even more critical in cognitive wireless sensor networks, a type of WSN in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which they operate in order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the network resources. This survey paper presents a comprehensive discussion on various security issues in CWSNs by identifying numerous security threats in these networks and defense mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. Various types of attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on their natures and tragets, and corresponding to each attack class, appropriate security mechanisms are presented. The paper also identifies some open problems in this emerging area of wireless networking.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present Backdoor4Good (B4G), a unified benchmark and framework for beneficial backdoor applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation (T, A, U), representing the Trigger, Activation mechanism, and Utility function, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.

Generative retrieval (GR) ranks documents by autoregressively generating document identifiers. Because many GR methods rely on trie-constrained beam search, they are vulnerable to early pruning of relevant prefixes under finite-beam decoding. Planning Ahead in Generative Retrieval (PAG) mitigates this failure mode by using simultaneous decoding to compute a document-level look-ahead prior that guides subsequent sequential decoding. We reproduce PAG at inference time and stress-test its decoding behavior. Using the authors' released checkpoint and identifier/trie artifacts under the reported decoding setup, we reproduce the main effectiveness results on MS MARCO Dev and TREC-DL 2019/2020, and corroborate the reported beam-size-latency trade-off in our hardware setting. Beyond reproduction, we introduce plan drift diagnostics that quantify how intent-preserving query variations alter the planner's top-n candidate set and highest-weight planner tokens, and how these changes affect guided decoding. We find that PAG's planning signal is brittle under lexical surface-form variation: intent-preserving typos can trigger plan collapse, where the planned candidate pool shifts enough that the look-ahead bonus provides little useful guidance, effectively reverting decoding toward weaker unguided search. We further evaluate fixed-index cross-lingual robustness using non-English mMARCO queries against an English index, and assess query-side mitigation strategies that require no re-indexing; query translation provides the strongest recovery in our setting. Overall, our results confirm PAG's reported effectiveness and the benefit of planning-guided decoding under the released inference setup, while showing that these gains depend on the stability of the planning signal under realistic query variation and query-document mismatch.

Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues, sandbagging, or topic-conditioned censorship. Such behaviors are difficult to detect without prior knowledge what to look for. We present activation-matched finetuning, an unsupervised detection method that assumes no knowledge of the trigger or the target behavior. Given a suspect model and a publicly available anchor, we finetune the anchor to reproduce the suspect's activations on a small benign corpus, and score each evaluation prompt by the residual between the two models. Since no benign corpus covers the sparse trigger region, the reference learns the benign computation but not the hidden behavior. Therefore, trigger prompts -- and, crucially, their semantic neighbors -- incur a large residual that signal the presence of unusual behavior to the defender. Testing our method across third-party models and custom models, activation-matched finetuning surfaces hidden behavior reliably. Furthermore, we empirically consider a natural defense-aware attack and showcase that it fails to suppress our detection method without sacrificing the behavior itself.

In parallel to the cyber attack that manipulates the reference points of distributed energy resources (DERs) by maliciously accessing the remote monitoring and control system, the vulnerability of voltage/current sensors to electromagnetic interference (EMI) in the physical domain has been widely discussed. Existing research efforts against sensor spoofing attacks can be classified into physical prevention and cyber detection/mitigation. These defence methods each have strengths and weaknesses in balancing cost, security, and performance in a single DER, yet systematic research on their multi-layer efficient coordination across DERs remains limited. Towards this end, this paper proposes a hierarchical framework to detect and mitigate sensor spoofing attacks in networked microgrids (NMGs) via {multi-layer cyber-physical coordination}. It requires only to deploy physical prevention technologies at critical points, i.e., the local points of common coupling (PCC) of MGs, such that cyber detection/mitigation algorithms can be adopted based on the secured sensor readings to counter sensor spoofing attacks in DERs. The framework employs an MG-DER coordinated proactive detection scheme to strategically trigger parameter perturbations, under which the intelligent sensor spoofing attacks can be {effectively} disclosed. Afterwards, mitigation schemes based on MG-DER coordination are activated to recursively and accurately estimate sensor biases. Experiments on a cyber-physical DC NMG testbed confirm the framework's effectiveness across diverse attack scenarios.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation (Graph-RAG) enhances multihop question answering by organizing corpora into knowledge graphs and routing evidence through relational structure. However, practical deployments face two persistent bottlenecks: (i) mixed-difficulty workloads where one-size-fits-all retrieval either wastes cost on easy queries or fails on hard multihop cases, and (ii) extraction loss, where graph abstraction omits fine-grained qualifiers that remain only in source text. We present A2RAG, an adaptive-and-agentic GraphRAG framework for cost-aware and reliable reasoning. A2RAG couples an adaptive controller that verifies evidence sufficiency and triggers targeted refinement only when necessary, with an agentic retriever that progressively escalates retrieval effort and maps graph signals back to provenance text to remain robust under extraction loss and incomplete graphs. Experiments on HotpotQA and 2WikiMultiHopQA demonstrate that A2RAG achieves +9.9/+11.8 absolute gains in Recall@2, while cutting token consumption and end-to-end latency by about 50% relative to iterative multihop baselines.

Suspense is an affective response to narrative text that is believed to involve complex cognitive processes in humans. Several psychological models have been developed to describe this phenomenon and the circumstances under which text might trigger it. We replicate four seminal psychological studies of human perceptions of suspense, substituting human responses with those of different open-weight and closed-source LMs. We conclude that while LMs can distinguish whether a text is intended to induce suspense in people, LMs cannot accurately estimate the relative amount of suspense within a text sequence as compared to human judgments, nor can LMs properly capture the human perception for the rise and fall of suspense across multiple text segments. We probe the abilities of LM suspense understanding by adversarially permuting the story text to identify what cause human and LM perceptions of suspense to diverge. We conclude that, while LMs can superficially identify and track certain facets of suspense, they do not process suspense in the same way as human readers.

We show that safety alignment in modular LLMs can exhibit a compositional vulnerability: adapters that appear benign and plausibly functional in isolation can, when linearly composed, compromise safety. We study this failure mode through Colluding LoRA (CoLoRA), in which harmful behavior emerges only in the composition state. Unlike attacks that depend on adversarial prompts or explicit input triggers, this composition-triggered broad refusal suppression causes the model to comply with harmful requests under standard prompts once a particular set of adapters is loaded. This behavior exposes a combinatorial blind spot in current unit-centric defenses, for which exhaustive verification over adapter compositions is computationally intractable. Across several open-weight LLMs, we find that individual adapters remain benign in isolation while their composition yields high attack success rates, indicating that securing modular LLM supply-chains requires moving beyond single-module verification toward composition-aware defenses.

Preference learning in large language models relies on reward models as proxies for human judgment. However, these models frequently exhibit preference instability, producing contradictory preference assignments in response to subtle, meaning-preserving input variations. We analyze this instability at the representation level under three semantic-preserving perturbation types: paraphrasing, pattern injection, and backdoor triggers. We attribute this instability to over-reliance on predictive yet brittle features, which we term unstable features, and isolate them via Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) in a sparse latent space where benign and perturbed inputs activate distinctly separable patterns. Building on this separability, we propose two SAE-based instability mitigation strategies: SAE Feature Steering, which identifies and suppresses anomalously activated features at inference, and SAE Residual Correction, which learns adaptive adjustments over SAE features to restore correct preferences. Our methods substantially reduce incorrect preference assignments on harmlessness and hallucination benchmarks while preserving benign performance and general utility on other tasks, without retraining the reward model. Our code and data are available in https://github.com/shunchang-liu/pisa.

The pervasiveness of proprietary language models has raised critical privacy concerns, necessitating advancements in private inference (PI), where computations are performed directly on encrypted data without revealing users' sensitive information. While PI offers a promising solution, its practical deployment is hindered by substantial communication and latency overheads, primarily stemming from nonlinear operations. To address this, we introduce an information-theoretic framework to characterize the role of nonlinearities in decoder-only language models, laying a principled foundation for optimizing transformer-architectures tailored to the demands of PI. By leveraging Shannon's entropy as a quantitative measure, we uncover the previously unexplored dual significance of nonlinearities: beyond ensuring training stability, they are crucial for maintaining attention head diversity. Specifically, we find that their removal triggers two critical failure modes: {\em entropy collapse} in deeper layers that destabilizes training, and {\em entropic overload} in earlier layers that leads to under-utilization of Multi-Head Attention's (MHA) representational capacity. We propose an entropy-guided attention mechanism paired with a novel entropy regularization technique to mitigate entropic overload. Additionally, we explore PI-friendly alternatives to layer normalization for preventing entropy collapse and stabilizing the training of LLMs with reduced-nonlinearities. Our study bridges the gap between information theory and architectural design, establishing entropy dynamics as a principled guide for developing efficient PI architectures. The code and implementation are available at https://github.com/Nandan91/entropy-guided-attention-llm{entropy-guided-llm}.

Generative large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved impressive performance gains, and their user base is growing rapidly. However, the security of LVLMs, in particular in a long-context multi-turn setting, is largely underexplored. In this paper, we consider the realistic scenario in which an attacker uploads a manipulated image to the web/social media. A benign user downloads this image and uses it as input to the LVLM. Our novel stealthy Visual Memory Injection (VMI) attack is designed such that on normal prompts the LVLM exhibits nominal behavior, but once the user gives a triggering prompt, the LVLM outputs a specific prescribed target message to manipulate the user, e.g. for adversarial marketing or political persuasion. Compared to previous work that focused on single-turn attacks, VMI is effective even after a long multi-turn conversation with the user. We demonstrate our attack on several recent open-weight LVLMs. This article thereby shows that large-scale manipulation of users is feasible with perturbed images in multi-turn conversation settings, calling for better robustness of LVLMs against these attacks. We release the source code at https://github.com/chs20/visual-memory-injection

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed as interacting agent societies, yet scaling these systems often yields diminishing or unstable returns, the causes of which remain poorly understood. We present the first large-scale empirical study of coordination dynamics in LLM-based multi-agent systems, introducing an atomic event-level formulation that reconstructs reasoning as cascades of coordination. Analyzing over 1.5 Million interactions across tasks, topologies, and scales, we uncover three coupled laws: coordination follows heavy-tailed cascades, concentrates via preferential attachment into intellectual elites, and produces increasingly frequent extreme events as system size grows. We show that these effects are coupled through a single structural mechanism: an integration bottleneck, in which coordination expansion scales with system size while consolidation does not, producing large but weakly integrated reasoning processes. To test this mechanism, we introduce Deficit-Triggered Integration (DTI), which selectively increases integration under imbalance. DTI improves performance precisely where coordination fails, without suppressing large-scale reasoning. Together, our results establish quantitative laws of collective cognition and identify coordination structure as a fundamental, previously unmeasured axis for understanding and improving scalable multi-agent intelligence.

Production LLM-agent frameworks expose control primitives -- human-in-the-loop approval gates, run cancellation, and execution timeouts -- whose names and documentation imply barrier semantics: while a run is paused, cancelled, or timed out, no gated side effect executes. We show this implied contract holds on none of the six widely used open-source frameworks we test. Model-free differential probes isolate a recurring sibling leak -- an approval gate suspends its own branch while a sibling branch's effect executes during the pause, so a later rejection cannot prevent it -- in every framework shipping a pre-execution gate (five of six), plus three further gaps: replay double-execution, cancellation orphans, and timeout zombies. The hazard is reachable, not merely constructible: under an a-priori-fixed protocol, frontier models emit the leak-triggering plan shape at pooled rates up to 14%, and when live models drive the unmodified frameworks under an approval pause, 215 of 1,200 runs execute their effect during the pause, across three schedulers and two language runtimes. To repair the measured gaps we present SOUNDGATE, an environment-external effect gate in Rust through which every side effect must be admitted, enforcing hold-until-decided, reject-cancels, dedup-on-replay, and fence-on-cancel -- one property per violation class -- under a stated complete-mediation contract discharged for network egress by kernel-enforced routes. We verify the properties over a model of the admission core (Verus; TLA+/TLC, exhaustive to 7.5e7 states; TLAPS), model-check the deployed Rust with Loom, and bridge model to code by differential conformance over 1.2e7 operations -- refinement evidence, not a mechanized proof. SOUNDGATE blocks every measured violation end-to-end on all six frameworks while releasing legitimate effects, at about 1 ms admission per write and 12k-26k durable admissions per second.

Full self-attention in large language models scales as O(N^2), which limits long-context document analysis to 65,536 tokens and requires costly GPU clusters. The Reduced Interaction Sampling (RIS) inference engine addresses this constraint as a model-agnostic architecture. Without modifying weights, RIS reduces self-attention complexity to O(N log N) using sparse stochastic geometry that fits within commodity memory limits. We validate RIS on Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct across two regimes. In controlled evaluations at 32,768 tokens (where native dense attention serves as the upper bound), RIS-Stochastic at 1% density and 70 ensemble seeds achieves 75.00% accuracy, outperforming the native dense baseline (71.88%), while RIS-Stochastic at 5% density and 10 seeds matches it (71.88%). This demonstrates that sparse attention acts as a regularizer: low density (1%) over multiple seeds filters out sequence-level noise, whereas higher density (5%) reintroduces distractor noise. Under the tightest budget, RIS-Structural reaches 68.75% accuracy at 1% density with just 10 seeds, recovering 75% of the contextual gap relative to the zero-context floor (59.38%). At 65,536 tokens, where dense attention triggers out-of-memory faults, RIS yields retrieval gains of up to 14.06 percentage points over the zero-context floor (51.56%), which is confirmed as marginally significant under McNemar's paired test (p = 0.078 < 0.10). All evaluations run on commodity, unaccelerated CPU servers (16-128 GB of RAM), demonstrating that long-context LLM inference is feasible on standard academic hardware without GPU acceleration.

The rapid growth of large language models raises pressing concerns about intellectual property protection under black-box deployment. Existing backdoor-based fingerprints either rely on rare tokens -- leading to high-perplexity inputs susceptible to filtering -- or use fixed trigger-response mappings that are brittle to leakage and post-hoc adaptation. We propose Dual-Layer Nested Fingerprinting (DNF), a black-box method that embeds a hierarchical backdoor by coupling domain-specific stylistic cues with implicit semantic triggers. Across Mistral-7B, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, and Falcon3-7B-Instruct, DNF achieves perfect fingerprint activation while preserving downstream utility. Compared with existing methods, it uses lower-perplexity triggers, remains undetectable under fingerprint detection attacks, and is relatively robust to incremental fine-tuning and model merging. These results position DNF as a practical, stealthy, and resilient solution for LLM ownership verification and intellectual property protection.

While large vision-language-action (VLA) models and generative world models (WM) have advanced long-horizon embodied intelligence, their practical deployment remains challenged by uncertainty in learning-based action generation. Low-quality actions may cause physical failures during execution or lead to misleading world-model rollouts with redundant rendering costs. To address this issue, we propose Pre-VLA, a unified runtime verification architecture that performs preemptive action validity assessment before physical execution or world-model imagination. Pre-VLA leverages an efficient multimodal backbone with modality-aware pooling and a lightweight dual-branch head to predict both safety confidence and critic-derived advantage scores for candidate action chunks. To handle severe class imbalance and unstable boundary decisions, we train Pre-VLA with a multi-task objective combining Focal classification, advantage regression, and soft-threshold calibration. During deployment, a dual-mode preemptive resampling scheduler filters low-quality actions and triggers adaptive resampling under a limited computation budget. Experiments on the LIBERO benchmark show that Pre-VLA improves the average closed-loop success rate across four suites from 30.79\% to 37.62\% over RynnVLA-002, reduces task execution steps, achieves 183.9 ms average forward verification time per action chunk, and mitigates error accumulation in world-model rollouts.

As Large Language Models shift the programming toward human-guided ''vibe coding'', agentic coding tools increasingly rely on models to self-diagnose and repair their own subtle faults -- a capability central to autonomous software engineering yet never systematically evaluated. We present , the first empirical decomposition that jointly evaluates two coupled tasks: Fault-Triggering Test Generation (FT-Test) constructing a discriminative witness that exposes a latent bug, and Fault-targeted Program Repair (FPR), repairing it under varying diagnostic conditions. pairs competitive programming problems with LLM-generated solutions that pass partial test suites but fail on semantic edge cases, enabling controlled identification of where the diagnostic chain breaks down. Evaluating 12 frontier LLMs, we find that fault-targeted reasoning does not scale with general coding ability. Models produce syntactically valid test inputs at near-ceiling rates yet collapse on discriminative generation, with fault hypothesis generation -- not output validation -- as the dominant bottleneck. Test-guided repair reveals a complementary insight: when self-generated tests successfully witness a fault, the resulting repair matches or outperforms repair guided by externally provided tests, but tests that fail to witness the fault actively degrade repair below unguided baselines. Together, these results reframe the challenge of autonomous debugging: the binding bottleneck is not code synthesis or test validity but fault-target reasoning, a capability that remains deficient across all frontier models. As Large Language Models shift the programming toward human-guided ''vibe coding'', agentic coding tools increasingly rely on models to self-diagnose and repair their own subtle faults -- a capability central to autonomous software engineering yet never systematically evaluated.

Generating motion-controlled videos--where user-specified actions drive physically plausible scene dynamics under freely chosen viewpoints--demands two capabilities: (1) disentangled motion control, allowing users to separately control the object motion and adjust camera viewpoint; and (2) motion causality, ensuring that user-driven actions trigger coherent reactions from other objects rather than merely displacing pixels. Existing methods fall short on both fronts: they entangle camera and object motion into a single tracking signal and treat motion as kinematic displacement without modeling causal relationships between object motion. We introduce MoRight, a unified framework that addresses both limitations through disentangled motion modeling. Object motion is specified in a canonical static-view and transferred to an arbitrary target camera viewpoint via temporal cross-view attention, enabling disentangled camera and object control. We further decompose motion into active (user-driven) and passive (consequence) components, training the model to learn motion causality from data. At inference, users can either supply active motion and MoRight predicts consequences (forward reasoning), or specify desired passive outcomes and MoRight recovers plausible driving actions (inverse reasoning), all while freely adjusting the camera viewpoint. Experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate state-of-the-art performance in generation quality, motion controllability, and interaction awareness.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) is a methodology designed to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, playing an important role in LLMs alignment. Despite its advantages, RLHF relies on human annotators to rank the text, which can introduce potential security vulnerabilities if any adversarial annotator (i.e., attackers) manipulates the ranking score by up-ranking any malicious text to steer the LLM adversarially. To assess the red-teaming of RLHF against human preference data poisoning, we propose RankPoison, a poisoning attack method on candidates' selection of preference rank flipping to reach certain malicious behaviors (e.g., generating longer sequences, which can increase the computational cost). With poisoned dataset generated by RankPoison, we can perform poisoning attacks on LLMs to generate longer tokens without hurting the original safety alignment performance. Moreover, applying RankPoison, we also successfully implement a backdoor attack where LLMs can generate longer answers under questions with the trigger word. Our findings highlight critical security challenges in RLHF, underscoring the necessity for more robust alignment methods for LLMs.

Building credible simulators from data is difficult because structure design, parameter calibration, and out-of-distribution (OOD) robustness are tightly coupled. We introduce SOCIA (Simulation Orchestration for Computational Intelligence with Agents), a framework that treats simulator construction as joint structure-parameter co-optimization: it elicits mechanism-rich blueprints, exposes explicit tunable parameters, and instantiates a calibration schema, producing an executable simulator with built-in calibration hooks. SOCIA couples Bayesian Optimization for sample-efficient point calibration with Simulation-Based Inference for uncertainty-aware fitting; diagnostics trigger targeted structural edits in an outer refinement loop to co-optimize design and parameters under tight budgets. Across three diverse tasks, SOCIA consistently outperforms strong baselines, excelling on both in-distribution (ID) fitting and OOD shift. Ablations that weaken structure, calibration design, or tuning yield near-monotone degradations, underscoring the necessity of unified structure-parameter optimization. We will release the code soon.

Traffic safety science has long been hindered by a fundamental data paradox: the crashes we most wish to prevent are precisely those events we rarely observe. Existing crash-frequency models and surrogate safety metrics rely heavily on sparse, noisy, and under-reported records, while even sophisticated, high-fidelity simulations undersample the long-tailed situations that trigger catastrophic outcomes such as fatalities. We argue that the path to achieving Vision Zero, i.e., the complete elimination of traffic fatalities and severe injuries, requires a paradigm shift from traditional crash-only learning to a new form of counterfactual safety learning: reasoning not only about what happened, but also about the vast set of plausible yet perilous scenarios that could have happened under slightly different circumstances. To operationalize this shift, our proposed agenda bridges macro to micro. Guided by crash-rate priors, generative scene engines, diverse driver models, and causal learning, near-miss events are synthesized and explained. A crash-focused digital twin testbed links micro scenes to macro patterns, while a multi-objective validator ensures that simulations maintain statistical realism. This pipeline transforms sparse crash data into rich signals for crash prediction, enabling the stress-testing of vehicles, roads, and policies before deployment. By learning from crashes that almost happened, we can shift traffic safety from reactive forensics to proactive prevention, advancing Vision Zero.

Existing long-term personalized dialogue systems struggle to reconcile unbounded interaction streams with finite context constraints, often succumbing to memory noise accumulation, reasoning degradation, and persona inconsistency. To address these challenges, this paper proposes Inside Out, a framework that utilizes a globally maintained PersonaTree as the carrier of long-term user profiling. By constraining the trunk with an initial schema and updating the branches and leaves, PersonaTree enables controllable growth, achieving memory compression while preserving consistency. Moreover, we train a lightweight MemListener via reinforcement learning with process-based rewards to produce structured, executable, and interpretable {ADD, UPDATE, DELETE, NO_OP} operations, thereby supporting the dynamic evolution of the personalized tree. During response generation, PersonaTree is directly leveraged to enhance outputs in latency-sensitive scenarios; when users require more details, the agentic mode is triggered to introduce details on-demand under the constraints of the PersonaTree. Experiments show that PersonaTree outperforms full-text concatenation and various personalized memory systems in suppressing contextual noise and maintaining persona consistency. Notably, the small MemListener model achieves memory-operation decision performance comparable to, or even surpassing, powerful reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1-0528 and Gemini-3-Pro.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.

Backdoor attack is a major threat to deep learning systems in safety-critical scenarios, which aims to trigger misbehavior of neural network models under attacker-controlled conditions. However, most backdoor attacks have to modify the neural network models through training with poisoned data and/or direct model editing, which leads to a common but false belief that backdoor attack can be easily avoided by properly protecting the model. In this paper, we show that backdoor attacks can be achieved without any model modification. Instead of injecting backdoor logic into the training data or the model, we propose to place a carefully-designed patch (namely backdoor patch) in front of the camera, which is fed into the model together with the input images. The patch can be trained to behave normally at most of the time, while producing wrong prediction when the input image contains an attacker-controlled trigger object. Our main techniques include an effective training method to generate the backdoor patch and a digital-physical transformation modeling method to enhance the feasibility of the patch in real deployments. Extensive experiments show that PatchBackdoor can be applied to common deep learning models (VGG, MobileNet, ResNet) with an attack success rate of 93% to 99% on classification tasks. Moreover, we implement PatchBackdoor in real-world scenarios and show that the attack is still threatening.

Chunk-autoregressive video world models typically condition each generated chunk on one action. An action received during sampling must therefore wait for the next chunk, condition future solver evaluations on a state produced under the previous action, or trigger rollback that repeats completed evaluations. We introduce ActionSplice, an inference framework that formulates this problem as Counterfactual State Transport (CST). A lightweight corrector transports the interrupted backbone-native representation toward the matched state induced by the revised action at the same solver step. The world model and sampler remain frozen, and sampling resumes without replaying completed evaluations. The retargeting variant CST*{R} updates the entire active chunk, while the temporal-splicing variant CST*{T} preserves a temporal prefix and updates only the suffix. Across minWM-Wan Action2V and HY-WM1.5, CST*{R} reduces rollback-relative LPIPS by 61.5% and 75.9% relative to direct condition swapping. CST*{T} reduces suffix LPIPS by 56.1% and 77.5%, respectively, while providing 2.73times and 1.69times pixel-ready speedups over waiting. Under the HY-WorldPlay protocol, CST_{R} obtains a PSNR of 25.66 dB, an SSIM of 0.6902, and an LPIPS of 0.1337 against the original rollout.

The implications of backdoor attacks on English-centric large language models (LLMs) have been widely examined - such attacks can be achieved by embedding malicious behaviors during training and activated under specific conditions that trigger malicious outputs. Despite the increasing support for multilingual capabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs, the impact of backdoor attacks on these systems remains largely under-explored. Our research focuses on cross-lingual backdoor attacks against multilingual LLMs, particularly investigating how poisoning the instruction-tuning data for one or two languages can affect the outputs for languages whose instruction-tuning data were not poisoned. Despite its simplicity, our empirical analysis reveals that our method exhibits remarkable efficacy in models like mT5 and GPT-4o, with high attack success rates, surpassing 90% in more than 7 out of 12 languages across various scenarios. Our findings also indicate that more powerful models show increased susceptibility to transferable cross-lingual backdoor attacks, which also applies to LLMs predominantly pre-trained on English data, such as Llama2, Llama3, and Gemma. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate 1) High Transferability: the backdoor mechanism operates successfully in cross-lingual response scenarios across 26 languages, achieving an average attack success rate of 99%, and 2) Robustness: the proposed attack remains effective even after defenses are applied. These findings expose critical security vulnerabilities in multilingual LLMs and highlight the urgent need for more robust, targeted defense strategies to address the unique challenges posed by cross-lingual backdoor transfer.

Regression-based RL for flow models mandates sampling without classifier-free guidance (CFG) to align the rectification target with the reference marginal velocity. Extending Advantage-Weighted Rectification (AWR), which dynamically scales this regression target based on reward, to video generation encounters a cold-start pathology: unguided rollouts collapse into low-fidelity regions where intra-group reward gaps remain wide but no longer track perceptual quality, rendering the optimization target arbitrary. Conversely, utilizing guided rollouts to restore fidelity, while keeping the regression target tied to the guided sampling distribution, provably triggers a geometric guidance blow-up under exponential-moving-average (EMA) updates. We propose VideoAWR, which resolves this tension by untying sampling from the optimization anchor. An EMA reference policy generates guided rollouts to restore reward separability, while the trainable policy is rectified against the unguided conditional anchor. We prove this decoupled objective is mathematically exact: the centered advantage cancels the anchor in expectation, filtering out the reward-neutral guidance offset and retaining only the reward-correlated covariance increment. Consequently, inference runs single-branch and CFG-free, yet inference-time CFG preserves its original semantics. Furthermore, we introduce Decoupled Timestep Rectification, supervising each rollout at an independently sampled timestep without bias to improve sample efficiency. Experiments on Wan2.1-1.3B and 14B demonstrate stable optimization and superior visual and motion quality in both CFG-free and CFG-enabled regimes. Code is available at \pdfstartlink attr{/Border [0 0 0]} user{/Subtype /Link /A << /S /URI /URI (https://github.com/Fuzm7/FlowAWR) >>}% pearDark{VideoAWR}\pdfendlink.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) agents have advanced zero-shot object-goal navigation, yet single-frame reasoning leaves them without the cross-step behavioral awareness an embodied navigator requires, producing recurring failures such as dead-end stalls, in-room loops, and circuitous approaches to detected targets. Prompt-based remedies inflate token budgets across multi-submodule episodes and still struggle to encode inherently spatial signals such as angles, map cells, and viewpoint coordinates. In this paper, we propose SkillNav, an extensible behavioral skill framework for VLM-based navigation that treats the curiosity value map already maintained by modern VLM navigators as a writable substrate on which composable skills inscribe behavioral memory at zero token cost. Skills are stratified into three tiers by their level of behavioral authority, namely soft scaling for proportional reweighting, lower-bound boost for region-level guarantees, and hard override for threshold-triggered forced actions, and cooperate across tiers under a fixed composition order that establishes a predictable, declared priority among skills. This design turns capability improvement into skill registration: new behaviors plug in without retraining the VLM or disturbing existing skills, opening a path for continual refinement. A minimal prompt channel complements the score-level skills with category-level semantic hints, yielding a dual-representation design in which spatial memory lives on the map and semantic memory in short prompts. Training-free, SkillNav establishes new state-of-the-art SPL across MP3D (25.5), HM3D v0.1 (39.3), and HM3D v0.2 (43.2), improving SPL by up to 6.0 absolute over the strongest prior method, and achieves the highest Success Rate on HM3D v0.1 (69.7) and v0.2 (75.9).

Autonomous embedded nodes deployed in connectivity-denied environments - remote forest perimeters, farm boundaries, and cargo in transit across highways or open ocean - share a common set of engineering requirements that are usually addressed by separate, purpose-built systems: passive-infrared (PIR) triggered wake-up, inertial-measurement-unit (IMU) driven active stabilization, and long-range communication under strict power budgets. This paper argues that a perimeter/wildlife security turret and a high-value cargo protection crate are, from a systems perspective, two parametrizations of the same generalized node architecture rather than two unrelated designs. We formalize this generalized architecture, extend it with three sensing/communication modalities not present in either original design - single-point LiDAR ranging, a LoRa/LoRaWAN regional mesh tier, and a satellite short-burst-data (SBD) global tier - and couple the resulting telemetry to a Geographic Information System (GIS) layer via a proposed Composite Risk Index (CRI) that fuses breach events, impact severity, and connectivity state into a single spatially-referenced score. We present the sensor-fusion, proportional-integral-derivative (PID) stabilization, link-budget, received-signal-strength-indicator (RSSI) localization, and CRI formulations that unify the two deployment modes, provide a simulated closed-loop stabilization response and a tiered-communication trade-off analysis, and instantiate the two original projects as case studies of the generalized architecture. The framework is intended as an engineering blueprint and a starting point for field validation rather than as a report of field-tested results.

We reassess the realistic discovery reach of Solar-System experiments for dark energy (DE) and dark matter (DM), making explicit the bridge from cosmology-level linear responses to local, screened residuals. In scalar-tensor frameworks with a universal conformal coupling A(phi) and chameleon/Vainshtein screening, we map cosmological responses {mu(z,k),Sigma(z,k)} inferred by DESI and Euclid to thin-shell or Vainshtein residuals in deep Solar potentials Phi_N. We emphasize a two-branch strategy. In a detection-first branch, a verified local anomaly -- an Einstein equivalence principle (EEP) violation, a Shapiro-delay signal with |gamma-1|simfewtimes 10^{-6}, an AU-scale Yukawa tail, or a ultralight DM (ULDM) line in clocks/atom interferometers in space (AIS) -- triggers a joint refit of cosmology and Solar-System data under a common microphysical parameterization {V(phi),A(phi)}. In a guardrail branch, Solar-System tests enforce constraints (EEP; PPN parameters gamma,beta; and dot G/G) and close unscreened or weakly screened corners indicated by cosmology. We forecast, per conjunction, |gamma-1|lesssim (2-5)times 10^{-6} (Ka-/X-band or optical Shapiro), eta_{EEP}sim (1--10)times 10^{-17} (drag-free AIS), |dot G/G|sim(3-5)times10^{-15},yr^{-1} (sub-mm-class LLR), a uniform ~2x tightening of AU-scale Yukawa/DM-density bounds, and (3-10)times improved ULDM-coupling reach from clocks. For a conformal benchmark, mu_{ lin,0}=0.10 implies chisimeq mu_{lin,0/2} and a Sun thin shell Delta R/Rlesssim (1/3chi)|gamma-1|/2=2.4times 10^{-3} at |gamma-1|=5times 10^{-6}; Vainshtein screening at 1 AU yields |gamma-1|lesssim 10^{-11}, naturally below near-term reach. We recommend a cost-effective guardrail+discovery portfolio with explicit triggers for escalation to dedicated missions.

Emergency department (ED) triage is a high-stakes prioritization task in which demographic, socioeconomic, and system-context information may improperly influence acuity assignment. Although open-source large language models (LLMs) are increasingly considered for local and privacy-preserving clinical decision support, it remains unclear how counterfactual bias varies across model families, sizes, medical-domain models, and domain-adapted models. We present a comparative counterfactual audit of ten open-source LLMs for pediatric Emergency Severity Index (ESI) prediction. Starting from real and handbook-style clinical vignettes, we construct paired counterfactual variants that change only one injected demographic, socioeconomic, healthcare-access, behavioral, social, or system-context variable while holding the clinical presentation fixed. Models include Qwen2.5-7B, Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct, a QLoRA fine-tuned Qwen2.5-7B, MedGemma variants, MedLLaMA2-7B, GPT-OSS-20B, and GPT-OSS-120B. We measure any counterfactual shift, undertriage, overtriage, shifts greater than one ESI level, mean shift, and mean absolute shift. Counterfactual sensitivity varied substantially and did not consistently decrease with larger model size or medical-domain pretraining. The fine-tuned Qwen2.5-7B showed the lowest overall sensitivity, with a 5.27% any-shift rate and mean absolute shift of 0.0534, versus 16.02% and 0.1706 for the base model. Several larger or medical-domain models showed more significant shifts. Stratified and correlation analyses further revealed clinically important directionality and shared failure patterns hidden by aggregate rates. These findings support counterfactual auditing as a lightweight, clinically interpretable framework for comparing fairness risks in open-source LLMs before clinical deployment.

The IceCube Neutrino Observatory is a cubic-kilometer-scale high-energy neutrino detector built into the ice at the South Pole. Construction of IceCube, the largest neutrino detector built to date, was completed in 2011 and enabled the discovery of high-energy astrophysical neutrinos. We describe here the design, production, and calibration of the IceCube digital optical module (DOM), the cable systems, computing hardware, and our methodology for drilling and deployment. We also describe the online triggering and data filtering systems that select candidate neutrino and cosmic ray events for analysis. Due to a rigorous pre-deployment protocol, 98.4% of the DOMs in the deep ice are operating and collecting data. IceCube routinely achieves a detector uptime of 99% by emphasizing software stability and monitoring. Detector operations have been stable since construction was completed, and the detector is expected to operate at least until the end of the next decade.