Daily Papers

The increasing deployment of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) raises safety concerns under potential malicious inputs. However, existing multimodal safety evaluations primarily focus on model vulnerabilities exposed by static image inputs, ignoring the temporal dynamics of video that may induce distinct safety risks. To bridge this gap, we introduce Video-SafetyBench, the first comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of LVLMs under video-text attacks. It comprises 2,264 video-text pairs spanning 48 fine-grained unsafe categories, each pairing a synthesized video with either a harmful query, which contains explicit malice, or a benign query, which appears harmless but triggers harmful behavior when interpreted alongside the video. To generate semantically accurate videos for safety evaluation, we design a controllable pipeline that decomposes video semantics into subject images (what is shown) and motion text (how it moves), which jointly guide the synthesis of query-relevant videos. To effectively evaluate uncertain or borderline harmful outputs, we propose RJScore, a novel LLM-based metric that incorporates the confidence of judge models and human-aligned decision threshold calibration. Extensive experiments show that benign-query video composition achieves average attack success rates of 67.2%, revealing consistent vulnerabilities to video-induced attacks. We believe Video-SafetyBench will catalyze future research into video-based safety evaluation and defense strategies.

Jailbreak attacks can circumvent model safety guardrails and reveal critical blind spots. Prior attacks on text-to-video (T2V) models typically add adversarial perturbations to obviously unsafe prompts, which are often easy to detect and defend. In contrast, we show that benign-looking prompts containing rich, implicit cues can induce T2V models to generate semantically unsafe videos that both violate policy and preserve the original (blocked) intent. To realize this, we propose SPARK, a jailbreak framework that leverages T2V models cross-modal associative patterns via a modular prompt design. Specifically, our prompts combine three components: neutral scene anchors, which provide the surface-level scene description extracted from the blocked intent to maintain plausibility; latent auditory triggers, textual descriptions of innocuous-sounding audio events (e.g., creaking, muffled noises) that exploit learned audio-visual co-occurrence priors to bias the model toward particular unsafe visual concepts; and stylistic modulators, cinematic directives (e.g., camera framing, atmosphere) that amplify and stabilize the latent trigger's effect. We formalize attack generation as a constrained optimization over the above modular prompt space and solve it with a guided search procedure that balances stealth and effectiveness. Extensive experiments over 7 T2V models demonstrate the efficacy of our attack, achieving a +23% improvement in average attack success rate in commercial models.

In recent years, fueled by the rapid advancement of diffusion models, text-to-video (T2V) generation models have achieved remarkable progress, with notable examples including Pika, Luma, Kling, and Open-Sora. Although these models exhibit impressive generative capabilities, they also expose significant security risks due to their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks, where the models are manipulated to produce unsafe content such as pornography, violence, or discrimination. Existing works such as T2VSafetyBench provide preliminary benchmarks for safety evaluation, but lack systematic methods for thoroughly exploring model vulnerabilities. To address this gap, we are the first to formalize the T2V jailbreak attack as a discrete optimization problem and propose a joint objective-based optimization framework, called T2V-OptJail. This framework consists of two key optimization goals: bypassing the built-in safety filtering mechanisms to increase the attack success rate, preserving semantic consistency between the adversarial prompt and the unsafe input prompt, as well as between the generated video and the unsafe input prompt, to enhance content controllability. In addition, we introduce an iterative optimization strategy guided by prompt variants, where multiple semantically equivalent candidates are generated in each round, and their scores are aggregated to robustly guide the search toward optimal adversarial prompts. We conduct large-scale experiments on several T2V models, covering both open-source models and real commercial closed-source models. The experimental results show that the proposed method improves 11.4% and 10.0% over the existing state-of-the-art method in terms of attack success rate assessed by GPT-4, attack success rate assessed by human accessors, respectively, verifying the significant advantages of the method in terms of attack effectiveness and content control.

Thanks to the development of cross-modal models, text-to-video retrieval (T2VR) is advancing rapidly, but its robustness remains largely unexamined. Existing attacks against T2VR are designed to push videos away from queries, i.e., suppressing the ranks of videos, while the attacks that pull videos towards selected queries, i.e., promoting the ranks of videos, remain largely unexplored. These attacks can be more impactful as attackers may gain more views/clicks for financial benefits and widespread (mis)information. To this end, we pioneer the first attack against T2VR to promote videos adversarially, dubbed the Video Promotion attack (ViPro). We further propose Modal Refinement (MoRe) to capture the finer-grained, intricate interaction between visual and textual modalities to enhance black-box transferability. Comprehensive experiments cover 2 existing baselines, 3 leading T2VR models, 3 prevailing datasets with over 10k videos, evaluated under 3 scenarios. All experiments are conducted in a multi-target setting to reflect realistic scenarios where attackers seek to promote the video regarding multiple queries simultaneously. We also evaluated our attacks for defences and imperceptibility. Overall, ViPro surpasses other baselines by over 30/10/4% for white/grey/black-box settings on average. Our work highlights an overlooked vulnerability, provides a qualitative analysis on the upper/lower bound of our attacks, and offers insights into potential counterplays. Code will be publicly available at https://github.com/michaeltian108/ViPro.

Recent text-to-video (T2V) models can synthesize complex videos from lightweight natural language prompts, raising urgent concerns about safety alignment in the event of misuse in the real world. Prior jailbreak attacks typically rewrite unsafe prompts into paraphrases that evade content filters while preserving meaning. Yet, these approaches often still retain explicit sensitive cues in the input text and therefore overlook a more profound, video-specific weakness. In this paper, we identify a temporal trajectory infilling vulnerability of T2V systems under fragmented prompts: when the prompt specifies only sparse boundary conditions (e.g., start and end frames) and leaves the intermediate evolution underspecified, the model may autonomously reconstruct a plausible trajectory that includes harmful intermediate frames, despite the prompt appearing benign to input or output side filtering. Building on this observation, we propose TFM. This fragmented prompting framework converts an originally unsafe request into a temporally sparse two-frame extraction and further reduces overtly sensitive cues via implicit substitution. Extensive evaluations across multiple open-source and commercial T2V models demonstrate that TFM consistently enhances jailbreak effectiveness, achieving up to a 12% increase in attack success rate on commercial systems. Our findings highlight the need for temporally aware safety mechanisms that account for model-driven completion beyond prompt surface form.

Memorization in generative models extends far beyond verbatim text reproduction--it manifests through non-literal patterns, semantic associations, and surprisingly, across modalities in transcript-conditioned generation tasks such as Lyrics-to-Song (L2S) and Text-to-Video (T2V) models. We reveal a new class of cross-modality memorization where models trained on these tasks leak copyrighted content through indirect, phonetic pathways invisible to traditional text-based analysis. In this work, we introduce Adversarial PhoneTic Prompting (APT), an attack that replaces iconic phrases with homophonic alternatives--e.g., "mom's spaghetti" becomes "Bob's confetti"--preserving the acoustic form while largely changing semantic content. We demonstrate that models can be prompted to regurgitate memorized songs using phonetically similar but semantically unrelated lyrics. Despite the semantic drift, black-box models like SUNO and open-source models like YuE generate outputs that are strikingly similar to the original songs--melodically, rhythmically, and vocally--achieving high scores on AudioJudge, CLAP, and CoverID. These effects persist across genres and languages. More surprisingly, we find that phonetic prompts alone can trigger visual memorization in text-to-video models: when given altered lyrics from Lose Yourself, Veo 3 generates scenes that mirror the original music video--complete with a hooded rapper and dim urban settings--despite no explicit visual cues in the prompt. This cross-modality leakage represents an unprecedented threat: models memorize deep, structural patterns that transcend their training modality, making traditional safety measures like copyright filters ineffective. Our findings reveal a fundamental vulnerability in transcript-conditioned generative models and raise urgent concerns around copyright, provenance, and secure deployment of multimodal generation systems.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities in handling complex multimodal tasks and are increasingly adopted in video understanding applications. However, their rapid advancement raises serious data privacy concerns, particularly given the potential inclusion of sensitive video content, such as personal recordings and surveillance footage, in their training datasets. Determining improperly used videos during training remains a critical and unresolved challenge. Despite considerable progress on membership inference attacks (MIAs) for text and image data in MLLMs, existing methods fail to generalize effectively to the video domain. These methods suffer from poor scalability as more frames are sampled and generally achieve negligible true positive rates at low false positive rates (TPR@Low FPR), mainly due to their failure to capture the inherent temporal variations of video frames and to account for model behavior differences as the number of frames varies. To address these challenges, we introduce Vid-SME, the first membership inference method tailored for video data used in video understanding LLMs (VULLMs). Vid-SME leverages the confidence of model output and integrates adaptive parameterization to compute Sharma-Mittal entropy (SME) for video inputs. By leveraging the SME difference between natural and temporally-reversed video frames, Vid-SME derives robust membership scores to determine whether a given video is part of the model's training set. Experiments on various self-trained and open-sourced VULLMs demonstrate the strong effectiveness of Vid-SME.

Recent advancements in Image-to-Video (I2V) generation have transformed input images from simple appearance references into interactive control interfaces where visual cues such as arrows, sketches, and emojis orchestrate complex video dynamics with unprecedented controllability. However, these seemingly innocuous static cues can be interpreted by models as executable temporal instructions, unfolding into harmful actions in the generated videos. Despite the severity of this threat, existing safety benchmarks remain predominantly focused on text-based and content-only image-based jailbreaks, leaving implicit visual prompt attacks insufficiently explored. To bridge this gap, we present VVA-Bench, the first systematic benchmark for evaluating video generation safety under categorized vision-centric prompt attacks. Extensive experiments on VVA-Bench demonstrate that state-of-the-art models are highly susceptible to such attacks, with Attack Success Rates (ASR) reaching 100.0\% on Wan 2.7 and 74.8\% on Veo 3.1. To mitigate these risks, we propose VPA-Guard, a retrieval-augmented and self-evolving defense framework. By leveraging few-shot reasoning to identify latent malicious intents, our method reduces the attack ASR by 44.2\% and the harmfulness score by 73.4\% on average, while maintaining the model's utility for legitimate user edits. Our work provides both a rigorous benchmark and an effective defense strategy to advance safe and socially responsible multimodal generation.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) integrate information from multiple modalities such as text, images, audio, and video, enabling complex capabilities such as visual question answering and audio translation. While powerful, this increased expressiveness introduces new and amplified vulnerabilities to adversarial manipulation. This survey provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of adversarial threats to MLLMs, moving beyond enumerating attack techniques to explain the underlying causes of model susceptibility. We introduce a taxonomy that organizes adversarial attacks according to attacker objectives, unifying diverse attack surfaces across modalities and deployment settings. Additionally, we also present a vulnerability-centric analysis that links integrity attacks, safety and jailbreak failures, control and instruction hijacking, and training-time poisoning to shared architectural and representational weaknesses in multimodal systems. Together, this framework provides an explanatory foundation for understanding adversarial behavior in MLLMs and informs the development of more robust and secure multimodal language systems.

Text-to-video (T2V) generative models have rapidly advanced and found widespread applications across fields like entertainment, education, and marketing. However, the adversarial vulnerabilities of these models remain rarely explored. We observe that in T2V generation tasks, the generated videos often contain substantial redundant information not explicitly specified in the text prompts, such as environmental elements, secondary objects, and additional details, providing opportunities for malicious attackers to embed hidden harmful content. Exploiting this inherent redundancy, we introduce BadVideo, the first backdoor attack framework tailored for T2V generation. Our attack focuses on designing target adversarial outputs through two key strategies: (1) Spatio-Temporal Composition, which combines different spatiotemporal features to encode malicious information; (2) Dynamic Element Transformation, which introduces transformations in redundant elements over time to convey malicious information. Based on these strategies, the attacker's malicious target seamlessly integrates with the user's textual instructions, providing high stealthiness. Moreover, by exploiting the temporal dimension of videos, our attack successfully evades traditional content moderation systems that primarily analyze spatial information within individual frames. Extensive experiments demonstrate that BadVideo achieves high attack success rates while preserving original semantics and maintaining excellent performance on clean inputs. Overall, our work reveals the adversarial vulnerability of T2V models, calling attention to potential risks and misuse. Our project page is at https://wrt2000.github.io/BadVideo2025/.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly used for content moderation, yet their robustness in short-form video contexts remains underexplored. Current safety evaluations often rely on unimodal attacks, failing to address combined attack vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive framework for evaluating the tri-modal safety of MLLMs. First, we present the Short-Video Multimodal Adversarial (SVMA) dataset, comprising diverse short-form videos with human-guided synthetic adversarial attacks. Second, we propose ChimeraBreak, a novel tri-modal attack strategy that simultaneously challenges visual, auditory, and semantic reasoning pathways. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art MLLMs reveal significant vulnerabilities with high Attack Success Rates (ASR). Our findings uncover distinct failure modes, showing model biases toward misclassifying benign or policy-violating content. We assess results using LLM-as-a-judge, demonstrating attack reasoning efficacy. Our dataset and findings provide crucial insights for developing more robust and safe MLLMs.

Vision-enabled language models (VLMs) are now used to build autonomous multimodal agents capable of taking actions in real environments. In this paper, we show that multimodal agents raise new safety risks, even though attacking agents is more challenging than prior attacks due to limited access to and knowledge about the environment. Our attacks use adversarial text strings to guide gradient-based perturbation over one trigger image in the environment: (1) our captioner attack attacks white-box captioners if they are used to process images into captions as additional inputs to the VLM; (2) our CLIP attack attacks a set of CLIP models jointly, which can transfer to proprietary VLMs. To evaluate the attacks, we curated VisualWebArena-Adv, a set of adversarial tasks based on VisualWebArena, an environment for web-based multimodal agent tasks. Within an L-infinity norm of 16/256 on a single image, the captioner attack can make a captioner-augmented GPT-4V agent execute the adversarial goals with a 75% success rate. When we remove the captioner or use GPT-4V to generate its own captions, the CLIP attack can achieve success rates of 21% and 43%, respectively. Experiments on agents based on other VLMs, such as Gemini-1.5, Claude-3, and GPT-4o, show interesting differences in their robustness. Further analysis reveals several key factors contributing to the attack's success, and we also discuss the implications for defenses as well. Project page: https://chenwu.io/attack-agent Code and data: https://github.com/ChenWu98/agent-attack

Previous work has shown that well-crafted adversarial perturbations can threaten the security of video recognition systems. Attackers can invade such models with a low query budget when the perturbations are semantic-invariant, such as StyleFool. Despite the query efficiency, the naturalness of the minutia areas still requires amelioration, since StyleFool leverages style transfer to all pixels in each frame. To close the gap, we propose LocalStyleFool, an improved black-box video adversarial attack that superimposes regional style-transfer-based perturbations on videos. Benefiting from the popularity and scalably usability of Segment Anything Model (SAM), we first extract different regions according to semantic information and then track them through the video stream to maintain the temporal consistency. Then, we add style-transfer-based perturbations to several regions selected based on the associative criterion of transfer-based gradient information and regional area. Perturbation fine adjustment is followed to make stylized videos adversarial. We demonstrate that LocalStyleFool can improve both intra-frame and inter-frame naturalness through a human-assessed survey, while maintaining competitive fooling rate and query efficiency. Successful experiments on the high-resolution dataset also showcase that scrupulous segmentation of SAM helps to improve the scalability of adversarial attacks under high-resolution data.

Face presentation attacks (PA), also known as spoofing attacks, pose a substantial threat to biometric systems that rely on facial recognition systems, such as access control systems, mobile payments, and identity verification systems. To mitigate the spoofing risk, several video-based methods have been presented in the literature that analyze facial motion in successive video frames. However, estimating the motion between adjacent frames is a challenging task and requires high computational cost. In this paper, we rephrase the face anti-spoofing task as a motion prediction problem and introduce a deep ensemble learning model with a frame skipping mechanism. In particular, the proposed frame skipping adopts a uniform sampling approach by dividing the original video into video clips of fixed size. By doing so, every nth frame of the clip is selected to ensure that the temporal patterns can easily be perceived during the training of three different recurrent neural networks (RNNs). Motivated by the performance of individual RNNs, a meta-model is developed to improve the overall detection performance by combining the prediction of individual RNNs. Extensive experiments were performed on four datasets, and state-of-the-art performance is reported on MSU-MFSD (3.12%), Replay-Attack (11.19%), and OULU-NPU (12.23%) databases by using half total error rates (HTERs) in the most challenging cross-dataset testing scenario.

The recent development of Sora leads to a new era in text-to-video (T2V) generation. Along with this comes the rising concern about its security risks. The generated videos may contain illegal or unethical content, and there is a lack of comprehensive quantitative understanding of their safety, posing a challenge to their reliability and practical deployment. Previous evaluations primarily focus on the quality of video generation. While some evaluations of text-to-image models have considered safety, they cover fewer aspects and do not address the unique temporal risk inherent in video generation. To bridge this research gap, we introduce T2VSafetyBench, a new benchmark designed for conducting safety-critical assessments of text-to-video models. We define 12 critical aspects of video generation safety and construct a malicious prompt dataset including real-world prompts, LLM-generated prompts and jailbreak attack-based prompts. Based on our evaluation results, we draw several important findings, including: 1) no single model excels in all aspects, with different models showing various strengths; 2) the correlation between GPT-4 assessments and manual reviews is generally high; 3) there is a trade-off between the usability and safety of text-to-video generative models. This indicates that as the field of video generation rapidly advances, safety risks are set to surge, highlighting the urgency of prioritizing video safety. We hope that T2VSafetyBench can provide insights for better understanding the safety of video generation in the era of generative AI.

YouTube is a major platform for information and entertainment, but its wide accessibility also makes it attractive for scammers to upload deceptive or malicious content. Prior detection approaches rely largely on textual or statistical metadata, such as titles, descriptions, view counts, or likes, which are effective in many cases but can be evaded through benign-looking text, manipulated statistics, or other obfuscation strategies (e.g., 'Leetspeak'), while ignoring visual cues. In this study, we systematically investigate multimodal approaches for detecting YouTube scams. Our dataset consolidates established scam categories and augments them with full-length videos and policy-grounded reasoning annotations. Experiments show that a text-only model using titles and descriptions (fine-tuned BERT) achieves moderate performance (76.61% F1 score), improving slightly with audio transcripts (77.98% F1 score). Visual analysis with a fine-tuned LLaVA-Video model performs better (79.61% F1 score), while a multimodal framework combining titles, descriptions, and video frames achieves the highest performance (82.96% F1 score). Moreover, the multimodal framework showed greater robustness to adversarial perturbations, with accuracy dropping only 1-3%, compared to 12-38% for modality-specific models. Beyond accuracy, the multimodal framework provides interpretable, policy-grounded reasoning, enhancing transparency and practical utility in automated moderation. Using this approach, we analyzed 6,374 in-the-wild YouTube videos and detected 1,864 scams with explicit reasoning, providing a valuable resource for future research.

As audio-visual multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, understanding their vulnerabilities is crucial. To this end, we introduce Multi-Modal Typography, a systematic study examining how typographic attacks across multiple modalities adversely influence MLLMs. While prior work focuses narrowly on unimodal attacks, we expose the cross-modal fragility of MLLMs. We analyze the interactions between audio, visual, and text perturbations and reveal that coordinated multi-modal attack creates a significantly more potent threat than single-modality attacks (attack success rate = 83.43% vs 34.93%).Our findings across multiple frontier MLLMs, tasks, and common-sense reasoning and content moderation benchmarks establishes multi-modal typography as a critical and underexplored attack strategy in multi-modal reasoning. Code and data will be publicly available.

Fake videos represent an important misinformation threat. While existing forensic networks have demonstrated strong performance on image forgeries, recent results reported on the Adobe VideoSham dataset show that these networks fail to identify fake content in videos. In this paper, we show that this is due to video coding, which introduces local variation into forensic traces. In response, we propose VideoFACT - a new network that is able to detect and localize a wide variety of video forgeries and manipulations. To overcome challenges that existing networks face when analyzing videos, our network utilizes both forensic embeddings to capture traces left by manipulation, context embeddings to control for variation in forensic traces introduced by video coding, and a deep self-attention mechanism to estimate the quality and relative importance of local forensic embeddings. We create several new video forgery datasets and use these, along with publicly available data, to experimentally evaluate our network's performance. These results show that our proposed network is able to identify a diverse set of video forgeries, including those not encountered during training. Furthermore, we show that our network can be fine-tuned to achieve even stronger performance on challenging AI-based manipulations.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Recent researches on video large language models (VideoLLM) predominantly focus on model architectures and training datasets, leaving the interaction format between the user and the model under-explored. In existing works, users often interact with VideoLLMs by using the entire video and a query as input, after which the model generates a response. This interaction format constrains the application of VideoLLMs in scenarios such as live-streaming comprehension where videos do not end and responses are required in a real-time manner, and also results in unsatisfactory performance on time-sensitive tasks that requires localizing video segments. In this paper, we focus on a video-text duet interaction format. This interaction format is characterized by the continuous playback of the video, and both the user and the model can insert their text messages at any position during the video playback. When a text message ends, the video continues to play, akin to the alternative of two performers in a duet. We construct MMDuetIT, a video-text training dataset designed to adapt VideoLLMs to video-text duet interaction format. We also introduce the Multi-Answer Grounded Video Question Answering (MAGQA) task to benchmark the real-time response ability of VideoLLMs. Trained on MMDuetIT, MMDuet demonstrates that adopting the video-text duet interaction format enables the model to achieve significant improvements in various time-sensitive tasks (76% CIDEr on YouCook2 dense video captioning, 90\% mAP on QVHighlights highlight detection and 25% R@0.5 on Charades-STA temporal video grounding) with minimal training efforts, and also enable VideoLLMs to reply in a real-time manner as the video plays. Code, data and demo are available at: https://github.com/yellow-binary-tree/MMDuet.

Adversarial attacks are carried out to reveal the vulnerability of deep neural networks. Textual adversarial attacking is challenging because text is discrete and a small perturbation can bring significant change to the original input. Word-level attacking, which can be regarded as a combinatorial optimization problem, is a well-studied class of textual attack methods. However, existing word-level attack models are far from perfect, largely because unsuitable search space reduction methods and inefficient optimization algorithms are employed. In this paper, we propose a novel attack model, which incorporates the sememe-based word substitution method and particle swarm optimization-based search algorithm to solve the two problems separately. We conduct exhaustive experiments to evaluate our attack model by attacking BiLSTM and BERT on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our model consistently achieves much higher attack success rates and crafts more high-quality adversarial examples as compared to baseline methods. Also, further experiments show our model has higher transferability and can bring more robustness enhancement to victim models by adversarial training. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained on https://github.com/thunlp/SememePSO-Attack.

With information consumption via online video streaming becoming increasingly popular, misinformation video poses a new threat to the health of the online information ecosystem. Though previous studies have made much progress in detecting misinformation in text and image formats, video-based misinformation brings new and unique challenges to automatic detection systems: 1) high information heterogeneity brought by various modalities, 2) blurred distinction between misleading video manipulation and ubiquitous artistic video editing, and 3) new patterns of misinformation propagation due to the dominant role of recommendation systems on online video platforms. To facilitate research on this challenging task, we conduct this survey to present advances in misinformation video detection research. We first analyze and characterize the misinformation video from three levels including signals, semantics, and intents. Based on the characterization, we systematically review existing works for detection from features of various modalities to techniques for clue integration. We also introduce existing resources including representative datasets and widely used tools. Besides summarizing existing studies, we discuss related areas and outline open issues and future directions to encourage and guide more research on misinformation video detection. Our corresponding public repository is available at https://github.com/ICTMCG/Awesome-Misinfo-Video-Detection.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

Videos on the Internet are paired with pieces of text, such as titles and descriptions. This text typically describes the most important content in the video, such as the objects in the scene and the actions being performed. Based on this observation, we propose to use text as a method for learning video representations. To accomplish this, we propose a data collection process and use it to collect 70M video clips shared publicly on the Internet, and we then train a model to pair each video with its associated text. We evaluate the model on several down-stream action recognition tasks, including Kinetics, HMDB-51, and UCF-101. We find that this approach is an effective method of pre-training video representations. Specifically, it outperforms all existing methods for self-supervised and cross-modal video representation learning.

While text-to-image synthesis currently enjoys great popularity among researchers and the general public, the security of these models has been neglected so far. Many text-guided image generation models rely on pre-trained text encoders from external sources, and their users trust that the retrieved models will behave as promised. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. We introduce backdoor attacks against text-guided generative models and demonstrate that their text encoders pose a major tampering risk. Our attacks only slightly alter an encoder so that no suspicious model behavior is apparent for image generations with clean prompts. By then inserting a single character trigger into the prompt, e.g., a non-Latin character or emoji, the adversary can trigger the model to either generate images with pre-defined attributes or images following a hidden, potentially malicious description. We empirically demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attacks on Stable Diffusion and highlight that the injection process of a single backdoor takes less than two minutes. Besides phrasing our approach solely as an attack, it can also force an encoder to forget phrases related to certain concepts, such as nudity or violence, and help to make image generation safer.

The creation of manipulated multimedia content involving human characters has reached in the last years unprecedented realism, calling for automated techniques to expose synthetically generated faces in images and videos. This work explores the analysis of spatio-temporal texture dynamics of the video signal, with the goal of characterizing and distinguishing real and fake sequences. We propose to build a binary decision on the joint analysis of multiple temporal segments and, in contrast to previous approaches, to exploit the textural dynamics of both the spatial and temporal dimensions. This is achieved through the use of Local Derivative Patterns on Three Orthogonal Planes (LDP-TOP), a compact feature representation known to be an important asset for the detection of face spoofing attacks. Experimental analyses on state-of-the-art datasets of manipulated videos show the discriminative power of such descriptors in separating real and fake sequences, and also identifying the creation method used. Linear Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are used which, despite the lower complexity, yield comparable performance to previously proposed deep models for fake content detection.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models (DMs) have shown promise in generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. The real-world applications of these models require particular attention to their safety and fidelity, but this has not been sufficiently explored. One fundamental question is whether existing T2I DMs are robust against variations over input texts. To answer it, this work provides the first robustness evaluation of T2I DMs against real-world attacks. Unlike prior studies that focus on malicious attacks involving apocryphal alterations to the input texts, we consider an attack space spanned by realistic errors (e.g., typo, glyph, phonetic) that humans can make, to ensure semantic consistency. Given the inherent randomness of the generation process, we develop novel distribution-based attack objectives to mislead T2I DMs. We perform attacks in a black-box manner without any knowledge of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for attacking popular T2I DMs and simultaneously reveal their non-trivial robustness issues. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of our method to show that it is not designed to attack the text encoder in T2I DMs solely.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

Typographic attacks exploit multi-modal systems by injecting text into images, leading to targeted misclassifications, malicious content generation and even Vision-Language Model jailbreaks. In this work, we analyze how CLIP vision encoders behave under typographic attacks, locating specialized attention heads in the latter half of the model's layers that causally extract and transmit typographic information to the cls token. Building on these insights, we introduce Dyslexify - a method to defend CLIP models against typographic attacks by selectively ablating a typographic circuit, consisting of attention heads. Without requiring finetuning, dyslexify improves performance by up to 22.06% on a typographic variant of ImageNet-100, while reducing standard ImageNet-100 accuracy by less than 1%, and demonstrate its utility in a medical foundation model for skin lesion diagnosis. Notably, our training-free approach remains competitive with current state-of-the-art typographic defenses that rely on finetuning. To this end, we release a family of dyslexic CLIP models which are significantly more robust against typographic attacks. These models serve as suitable drop-in replacements for a broad range of safety-critical applications, where the risks of text-based manipulation outweigh the utility of text recognition.

Video generation models (VGMs) have demonstrated the capability to synthesize high-quality output. It is important to understand their potential to produce unsafe content, such as violent or terrifying videos. In this work, we provide a comprehensive understanding of unsafe video generation. First, to confirm the possibility that these models could indeed generate unsafe videos, we choose unsafe content generation prompts collected from 4chan and Lexica, and three open-source SOTA VGMs to generate unsafe videos. After filtering out duplicates and poorly generated content, we created an initial set of 2112 unsafe videos from an original pool of 5607 videos. Through clustering and thematic coding analysis of these generated videos, we identify 5 unsafe video categories: Distorted/Weird, Terrifying, Pornographic, Violent/Bloody, and Political. With IRB approval, we then recruit online participants to help label the generated videos. Based on the annotations submitted by 403 participants, we identified 937 unsafe videos from the initial video set. With the labeled information and the corresponding prompts, we created the first dataset of unsafe videos generated by VGMs. We then study possible defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of unsafe videos. Existing defense methods in image generation focus on filtering either input prompt or output results. We propose a new approach called Latent Variable Defense (LVD), which works within the model's internal sampling process. LVD can achieve 0.90 defense accuracy while reducing time and computing resources by 10x when sampling a large number of unsafe prompts.

Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have demonstrated excellent performance, they are vulnerable to adversarial patches that introduce perceptible and localized perturbations to the input. Generating adversarial patches on images has received much attention, while adversarial patches on videos have not been well investigated. Further, decision-based attacks, where attackers only access the predicted hard labels by querying threat models, have not been well explored on video models either, even if they are practical in real-world video recognition scenes. The absence of such studies leads to a huge gap in the robustness assessment for video models. To bridge this gap, this work first explores decision-based patch attacks on video models. We analyze that the huge parameter space brought by videos and the minimal information returned by decision-based models both greatly increase the attack difficulty and query burden. To achieve a query-efficient attack, we propose a spatial-temporal differential evolution (STDE) framework. First, STDE introduces target videos as patch textures and only adds patches on keyframes that are adaptively selected by temporal difference. Second, STDE takes minimizing the patch area as the optimization objective and adopts spatialtemporal mutation and crossover to search for the global optimum without falling into the local optimum. Experiments show STDE has demonstrated state-of-the-art performance in terms of threat, efficiency and imperceptibility. Hence, STDE has the potential to be a powerful tool for evaluating the robustness of video recognition models.

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) are increasingly deployed to offer advanced capabilities on inputs comprising both text and images. While prior research has shown that adversarial attacks can transfer from open-source to proprietary black-box models in text-only and vision-only contexts, the extent and effectiveness of such vulnerabilities remain underexplored for VLLMs. We present a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that targeted adversarial examples are highly transferable to widely-used proprietary VLLMs such as GPT-4o, Claude, and Gemini. We show that attackers can craft perturbations to induce specific attacker-chosen interpretations of visual information, such as misinterpreting hazardous content as safe, overlooking sensitive or restricted material, or generating detailed incorrect responses aligned with the attacker's intent. Furthermore, we discover that universal perturbations -- modifications applicable to a wide set of images -- can consistently induce these misinterpretations across multiple proprietary VLLMs. Our experimental results on object recognition, visual question answering, and image captioning show that this vulnerability is common across current state-of-the-art models, and underscore an urgent need for robust mitigations to ensure the safe and secure deployment of VLLMs.

In text-video retrieval, the objective is to learn a cross-modal similarity function between a text and a video that ranks relevant text-video pairs higher than irrelevant pairs. However, videos inherently express a much wider gamut of information than texts. Instead, texts often capture sub-regions of entire videos and are most semantically similar to certain frames within videos. Therefore, for a given text, a retrieval model should focus on the text's most semantically similar video sub-regions to make a more relevant comparison. Yet, most existing works aggregate entire videos without directly considering text. Common text-agnostic aggregations schemes include mean-pooling or self-attention over the frames, but these are likely to encode misleading visual information not described in the given text. To address this, we propose a cross-modal attention model called X-Pool that reasons between a text and the frames of a video. Our core mechanism is a scaled dot product attention for a text to attend to its most semantically similar frames. We then generate an aggregated video representation conditioned on the text's attention weights over the frames. We evaluate our method on three benchmark datasets of MSR-VTT, MSVD and LSMDC, achieving new state-of-the-art results by up to 12% in relative improvement in Recall@1. Our findings thereby highlight the importance of joint text-video reasoning to extract important visual cues according to text. Full code and demo can be found at: https://layer6ai-labs.github.io/xpool/

Recent advances in large image editing models have shifted the paradigm from text-driven instructions to vision-prompt editing, where user intent is inferred directly from visual inputs such as marks, arrows, and visual-text prompts. While this paradigm greatly expands usability, it also introduces a critical and underexplored safety risk: the attack surface itself becomes visual. In this work, we propose Vision-Centric Jailbreak Attack (VJA), the first visual-to-visual jailbreak attack that conveys malicious instructions purely through visual inputs. To systematically study this emerging threat, we introduce IESBench, a safety-oriented benchmark for image editing models. Extensive experiments on IESBench demonstrate that VJA effectively compromises state-of-the-art commercial models, achieving attack success rates of up to 80.9% on Nano Banana Pro and 70.1% on GPT-Image-1.5. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose a training-free defense based on introspective multimodal reasoning, which substantially improves the safety of poorly aligned models to a level comparable with commercial systems, without auxiliary guard models and with negligible computational overhead. Our findings expose new vulnerabilities, provide both a benchmark and practical defense to advance safe and trustworthy modern image editing systems. Warning: This paper contains offensive images created by large image editing models.

Manipulated videos often contain subtle inconsistencies between their visual and audio signals. We propose a video forensics method, based on anomaly detection, that can identify these inconsistencies, and that can be trained solely using real, unlabeled data. We train an autoregressive model to generate sequences of audio-visual features, using feature sets that capture the temporal synchronization between video frames and sound. At test time, we then flag videos that the model assigns low probability. Despite being trained entirely on real videos, our model obtains strong performance on the task of detecting manipulated speech videos. Project site: https://cfeng16.github.io/audio-visual-forensics

With the rapid advancement in video generation, people can conveniently utilize video generation models to create videos tailored to their specific desires. Nevertheless, there are also growing concerns about their potential misuse in creating and disseminating false information. In this work, we introduce VGMShield: a set of three straightforward but pioneering mitigations through the lifecycle of fake video generation. We start from fake video detection trying to understand whether there is uniqueness in generated videos and whether we can differentiate them from real videos; then, we investigate the tracing problem, which maps a fake video back to a model that generates it. Towards these, we propose to leverage pre-trained models that focus on {\it spatial-temporal dynamics} as the backbone to identify inconsistencies in videos. Through experiments on seven state-of-the-art open-source models, we demonstrate that current models still cannot perfectly handle spatial-temporal relationships, and thus, we can accomplish detection and tracing with nearly perfect accuracy. Furthermore, anticipating future generative model improvements, we propose a {\it prevention} method that adds invisible perturbations to images to make the generated videos look unreal. Together with fake video detection and tracing, our multi-faceted set of solutions can effectively mitigate misuse of video generative models.

In various real-world applications such as machine translation, sentiment analysis, and question answering, a pivotal role is played by NLP models, facilitating efficient communication and decision-making processes in domains ranging from healthcare to finance. However, a significant challenge is posed to the robustness of these natural language processing models by text adversarial attacks. These attacks involve the deliberate manipulation of input text to mislead the predictions of the model while maintaining human interpretability. Despite the remarkable performance achieved by state-of-the-art models like BERT in various natural language processing tasks, they are found to remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in the input text. In addressing the vulnerability of text classifiers to adversarial attacks, three distinct attack mechanisms are explored in this paper using the victim model BERT: BERT-on-BERT attack, PWWS attack, and Fraud Bargain's Attack (FBA). Leveraging the IMDB, AG News, and SST2 datasets, a thorough comparative analysis is conducted to assess the effectiveness of these attacks on the BERT classifier model. It is revealed by the analysis that PWWS emerges as the most potent adversary, consistently outperforming other methods across multiple evaluation scenarios, thereby emphasizing its efficacy in generating adversarial examples for text classification. Through comprehensive experimentation, the performance of these attacks is assessed and the findings indicate that the PWWS attack outperforms others, demonstrating lower runtime, higher accuracy, and favorable semantic similarity scores. The key insight of this paper lies in the assessment of the relative performances of three prevalent state-of-the-art attack mechanisms.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

The growing capability of video generation poses escalating security risks, making reliable detection increasingly essential. In this paper, we introduce VideoVeritas, a framework that integrates fine-grained perception and fact-based reasoning. We observe that while current multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) exhibit strong reasoning capacity, their granular perception ability remains limited. To mitigate this, we introduce Joint Preference Alignment and Perception Pretext Reinforcement Learning (PPRL). Specifically, rather than directly optimizing for detection task, we adopt general spatiotemporal grounding and self-supervised object counting in the RL stage, enhancing detection performance with simple perception pretext tasks. To facilitate robust evaluation, we further introduce MintVid, a light yet high-quality dataset containing 3K videos from 9 state-of-the-art generators, along with a real-world collected subset that has factual errors in content. Experimental results demonstrate that existing methods tend to bias towards either superficial reasoning or mechanical analysis, while VideoVeritas achieves more balanced performance across diverse benchmarks.

Recent progress in video generative models has enabled the creation of high-quality videos from multimodal prompts that combine text and images. While these systems offer enhanced controllability, they also introduce new safety risks, as harmful content can emerge from individual modalities or their interaction. Existing safety methods are often text-only, require prior knowledge of the risk category, or operate as post-generation auditors, struggling to proactively mitigate such compositional, multimodal risks. To address this challenge, we present ConceptGuard, a unified safeguard framework for proactively detecting and mitigating unsafe semantics in multimodal video generation. ConceptGuard operates in two stages: First, a contrastive detection module identifies latent safety risks by projecting fused image-text inputs into a structured concept space; Second, a semantic suppression mechanism steers the generative process away from unsafe concepts by intervening in the prompt's multimodal conditioning. To support the development and rigorous evaluation of this framework, we introduce two novel benchmarks: ConceptRisk, a large-scale dataset for training on multimodal risks, and T2VSafetyBench-TI2V, the first benchmark adapted from T2VSafetyBench for the Text-and-Image-to-Video (TI2V) safety setting. Comprehensive experiments on both benchmarks show that ConceptGuard consistently outperforms existing baselines, achieving state-of-the-art results in both risk detection and safe video generation. Our code is available at https://github.com/Ruize-Ma/ConceptGuard.

Video-Text Retrieval (VTR) is a crucial multi-modal task in an era of massive video-text data on the Internet. A plethora of work characterized by using a two-stream Vision-Language model architecture that learns a joint representation of video-text pairs has become a prominent approach for the VTR task. However, these models operate under the assumption of bijective video-text correspondences and neglect a more practical scenario where video content usually encompasses multiple events, while texts like user queries or webpage metadata tend to be specific and correspond to single events. This establishes a gap between the previous training objective and real-world applications, leading to the potential performance degradation of earlier models during inference. In this study, we introduce the Multi-event Video-Text Retrieval (MeVTR) task, addressing scenarios in which each video contains multiple different events, as a niche scenario of the conventional Video-Text Retrieval Task. We present a simple model, Me-Retriever, which incorporates key event video representation and a new MeVTR loss for the MeVTR task. Comprehensive experiments show that this straightforward framework outperforms other models in the Video-to-Text and Text-to-Video tasks, effectively establishing a robust baseline for the MeVTR task. We believe this work serves as a strong foundation for future studies. Code is available at https://github.com/gengyuanmax/MeVTR.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) rely on vision encoders and Large Language Models (LLMs) to exhibit remarkable capabilities on various multi-modal tasks in the joint space of vision and language. However, the Typographic Attack, which disrupts vision-language models (VLMs) such as Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP), has also been expected to be a security threat to LVLMs. Firstly, we verify typographic attacks on current well-known commercial and open-source LVLMs and uncover the widespread existence of this threat. Secondly, to better assess this vulnerability, we propose the most comprehensive and largest-scale Typographic Dataset to date. The Typographic Dataset not only considers the evaluation of typographic attacks under various multi-modal tasks but also evaluates the effects of typographic attacks, influenced by texts generated with diverse factors. Based on the evaluation results, we investigate the causes why typographic attacks may impact VLMs and LVLMs, leading to three highly insightful discoveries. By the examination of our discoveries and experimental validation in the Typographic Dataset, we reduce the performance degradation from 42.07% to 13.90% when LVLMs confront typographic attacks.

Typographic attacks exploit the interplay between text and visual content in multimodal foundation models, causing misclassifications when misleading text is embedded within images. However, existing datasets are limited in size and diversity, making it difficult to study such vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce SCAM, the largest and most diverse dataset of real-world typographic attack images to date, containing 1,162 images across hundreds of object categories and attack words. Through extensive benchmarking of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) on SCAM, we demonstrate that typographic attacks significantly degrade performance, and identify that training data and model architecture influence the susceptibility to these attacks. Our findings reveal that typographic attacks persist in state-of-the-art Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) due to the choice of their vision encoder, though larger Large Language Models (LLMs) backbones help mitigate their vulnerability. Additionally, we demonstrate that synthetic attacks closely resemble real-world (handwritten) attacks, validating their use in research. Our work provides a comprehensive resource and empirical insights to facilitate future research toward robust and trustworthy multimodal AI systems. We publicly release the datasets introduced in this paper under https://huggingface.co/datasets/BLISS-e-V/SCAM, along with the code for evaluations at https://github.com/Bliss-e-V/SCAM.

The correlation between the vision and text is essential for video moment retrieval (VMR), however, existing methods heavily rely on separate pre-training feature extractors for visual and textual understanding. Without sufficient temporal boundary annotations, it is non-trivial to learn universal video-text alignments. In this work, we explore multi-modal correlations derived from large-scale image-text data to facilitate generalisable VMR. To address the limitations of image-text pre-training models on capturing the video changes, we propose a generic method, referred to as Visual-Dynamic Injection (VDI), to empower the model's understanding of video moments. Whilst existing VMR methods are focusing on building temporal-aware video features, being aware of the text descriptions about the temporal changes is also critical but originally overlooked in pre-training by matching static images with sentences. Therefore, we extract visual context and spatial dynamic information from video frames and explicitly enforce their alignments with the phrases describing video changes (e.g. verb). By doing so, the potentially relevant visual and motion patterns in videos are encoded in the corresponding text embeddings (injected) so to enable more accurate video-text alignments. We conduct extensive experiments on two VMR benchmark datasets (Charades-STA and ActivityNet-Captions) and achieve state-of-the-art performances. Especially, VDI yields notable advantages when being tested on the out-of-distribution splits where the testing samples involve novel scenes and vocabulary.

The widespread use of Text-to-Image (T2I) models in content generation requires careful examination of their safety, including their robustness to adversarial attacks. Despite extensive research on adversarial attacks, the reasons for their effectiveness remain underexplored. This paper presents an empirical study on adversarial attacks against T2I models, focusing on analyzing factors associated with attack success rates (ASR). We introduce a new attack objective - entity swapping using adversarial suffixes and two gradient-based attack algorithms. Human and automatic evaluations reveal the asymmetric nature of ASRs on entity swap: for example, it is easier to replace "human" with "robot" in the prompt "a human dancing in the rain." with an adversarial suffix, but the reverse replacement is significantly harder. We further propose probing metrics to establish indicative signals from the model's beliefs to the adversarial ASR. We identify conditions that result in a success probability of 60% for adversarial attacks and others where this likelihood drops below 5%.

Video anomaly detection (VAD) aims to temporally locate abnormal events in a video. Existing works mostly rely on training deep models to learn the distribution of normality with either video-level supervision, one-class supervision, or in an unsupervised setting. Training-based methods are prone to be domain-specific, thus being costly for practical deployment as any domain change will involve data collection and model training. In this paper, we radically depart from previous efforts and propose LAnguage-based VAD (LAVAD), a method tackling VAD in a novel, training-free paradigm, exploiting the capabilities of pre-trained large language models (LLMs) and existing vision-language models (VLMs). We leverage VLM-based captioning models to generate textual descriptions for each frame of any test video. With the textual scene description, we then devise a prompting mechanism to unlock the capability of LLMs in terms of temporal aggregation and anomaly score estimation, turning LLMs into an effective video anomaly detector. We further leverage modality-aligned VLMs and propose effective techniques based on cross-modal similarity for cleaning noisy captions and refining the LLM-based anomaly scores. We evaluate LAVAD on two large datasets featuring real-world surveillance scenarios (UCF-Crime and XD-Violence), showing that it outperforms both unsupervised and one-class methods without requiring any training or data collection.

The widespread use of large language models (LLMs) is increasing the demand for methods that detect machine-generated text to prevent misuse. The goal of our study is to stress test the detectors' robustness to malicious attacks under realistic scenarios. We comprehensively study the robustness of popular machine-generated text detectors under attacks from diverse categories: editing, paraphrasing, prompting, and co-generating. Our attacks assume limited access to the generator LLMs, and we compare the performance of detectors on different attacks under different budget levels. Our experiments reveal that almost none of the existing detectors remain robust under all the attacks, and all detectors exhibit different loopholes. Averaging all detectors, the performance drops by 35% across all attacks. Further, we investigate the reasons behind these defects and propose initial out-of-the-box patches to improve robustness.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

Recent video-text foundation models have demonstrated strong performance on a wide variety of downstream video understanding tasks. Can these video-text models genuinely understand the contents of natural videos? Standard video-text evaluations could be misleading as many questions can be inferred merely from the objects and contexts in a single frame or biases inherent in the datasets. In this paper, we aim to better assess the capabilities of current video-text models and understand their limitations. We propose a novel evaluation task for video-text understanding, namely retrieval from counterfactually augmented data (RCAD), and a new Feint6K dataset. To succeed on our new evaluation task, models must derive a comprehensive understanding of the video from cross-frame reasoning. Analyses show that previous video-text foundation models can be easily fooled by counterfactually augmented data and are far behind human-level performance. In order to narrow the gap between video-text models and human performance on RCAD, we identify a key limitation of current contrastive approaches on video-text data and introduce LLM-teacher, a more effective approach to learn action semantics by leveraging knowledge obtained from a pretrained large language model. Experiments and analyses show that our approach successfully learn more discriminative action embeddings and improves results on Feint6K when applied to multiple video-text models. Our Feint6K dataset and project page is available at https://feint6k.github.io.

Modern image-to-text systems typically adopt the encoder-decoder framework, which comprises two main components: an image encoder, responsible for extracting image features, and a transformer-based decoder, used for generating captions. Taking inspiration from the analysis of neural networks' robustness against adversarial perturbations, we propose a novel gray-box algorithm for creating adversarial examples in image-to-text models. Unlike image classification tasks that have a finite set of class labels, finding visually similar adversarial examples in an image-to-text task poses greater challenges because the captioning system allows for a virtually infinite space of possible captions. In this paper, we present a gray-box adversarial attack on image-to-text, both untargeted and targeted. We formulate the process of discovering adversarial perturbations as an optimization problem that uses only the image-encoder component, meaning the proposed attack is language-model agnostic. Through experiments conducted on the ViT-GPT2 model, which is the most-used image-to-text model in Hugging Face, and the Flickr30k dataset, we demonstrate that our proposed attack successfully generates visually similar adversarial examples, both with untargeted and targeted captions. Notably, our attack operates in a gray-box manner, requiring no knowledge about the decoder module. We also show that our attacks fool the popular open-source platform Hugging Face.

Following major advances in text and image generation, the video domain has surged, producing highly realistic and controllable sequences. Along with this progress, these models also raise serious concerns about misinformation, making reliable detection of synthetic videos increasingly crucial. Image-based detectors are fundamentally limited because they operate per frame and ignore temporal dynamics, while supervised video detectors generalize poorly to unseen generators, a critical drawback given the rapid emergence of new models. These challenges motivate zero-shot approaches, which avoid synthetic data and instead score content against real-data statistics, enabling training-free, model-agnostic detection. We introduce STALL, a simple, training-free, theoretically justified detector that provides likelihood-based scoring for videos, jointly modeling spatial and temporal evidence within a probabilistic framework. We evaluate STALL on two public benchmarks and introduce ComGenVid, a new benchmark with state-of-the-art generative models. STALL consistently outperforms prior image- and video-based baselines. Code and data are available at https://omerbenhayun.github.io/stall-video.

The landscape of synthetic media has been irrevocably altered by text-to-video (T2V) models, whose outputs are rapidly approaching indistinguishability from reality. Critically, this technology is no longer confined to large-scale labs; the proliferation of efficient, open-source generators is democratizing the ability to create high-fidelity synthetic content on consumer-grade hardware. This makes existing face-centric and manipulation-based benchmarks obsolete. To address this urgent threat, we introduce SynthForensics, to the best of our knowledge the first human-centric benchmark for detecting purely synthetic video deepfakes. The benchmark comprises 6,815 unique videos from five architecturally distinct, state-of-the-art open-source T2V models. Its construction was underpinned by a meticulous two-stage, human-in-the-loop validation to ensure high semantic and visual quality. Each video is provided in four versions (raw, lossless, light, and heavy compression) to enable real-world robustness testing. Experiments demonstrate that state-of-the-art detectors are both fragile and exhibit limited generalization when evaluated on this new domain: we observe a mean performance drop of 29.19% AUC, with some methods performing worse than random chance, and top models losing over 30 points under heavy compression. The paper further investigates the efficacy of training on SynthForensics as a means to mitigate these observed performance gaps, achieving robust generalization to unseen generators (93.81% AUC), though at the cost of reduced backward compatibility with traditional manipulation-based deepfakes. The complete dataset and all generation metadata, including the specific prompts and inference parameters for every video, will be made publicly available at [link anonymized for review].

Text classification systems have been proven vulnerable to adversarial text examples, modified versions of the original text examples that are often unnoticed by human eyes, yet can force text classification models to alter their classification. Often, research works quantifying the impact of adversarial text attacks have been applied only to models trained in English. In this paper, we introduce the first word-level study of adversarial attacks in Arabic. Specifically, we use a synonym (word-level) attack using a Masked Language Modeling (MLM) task with a BERT model in a black-box setting to assess the robustness of the state-of-the-art text classification models to adversarial attacks in Arabic. To evaluate the grammatical and semantic similarities of the newly produced adversarial examples using our synonym BERT-based attack, we invite four human evaluators to assess and compare the produced adversarial examples with their original examples. We also study the transferability of these newly produced Arabic adversarial examples to various models and investigate the effectiveness of defense mechanisms against these adversarial examples on the BERT models. We find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to our synonym attacks than the other Deep Neural Networks (DNN) models like WordCNN and WordLSTM we trained. We also find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to transferred attacks. We, lastly, find that fine-tuned BERT models successfully regain at least 2% in accuracy after applying adversarial training as an initial defense mechanism.

Our objective in this work is video-text retrieval - in particular a joint embedding that enables efficient text-to-video retrieval. The challenges in this area include the design of the visual architecture and the nature of the training data, in that the available large scale video-text training datasets, such as HowTo100M, are noisy and hence competitive performance is achieved only at scale through large amounts of compute. We address both these challenges in this paper. We propose an end-to-end trainable model that is designed to take advantage of both large-scale image and video captioning datasets. Our model is an adaptation and extension of the recent ViT and Timesformer architectures, and consists of attention in both space and time. The model is flexible and can be trained on both image and video text datasets, either independently or in conjunction. It is trained with a curriculum learning schedule that begins by treating images as 'frozen' snapshots of video, and then gradually learns to attend to increasing temporal context when trained on video datasets. We also provide a new video-text pretraining dataset WebVid-2M, comprised of over two million videos with weak captions scraped from the internet. Despite training on datasets that are an order of magnitude smaller, we show that this approach yields state-of-the-art results on standard downstream video-retrieval benchmarks including MSR-VTT, MSVD, DiDeMo and LSMDC.

Despite the recent progress in text-to-video generation, existing studies usually overlook the issue that only spatial contents but not temporal motions in synthesized videos are under the control of text. Towards such a challenge, this work presents a practical system, named LivePhoto, which allows users to animate an image of their interest with text descriptions. We first establish a strong baseline that helps a well-learned text-to-image generator (i.e., Stable Diffusion) take an image as a further input. We then equip the improved generator with a motion module for temporal modeling and propose a carefully designed training pipeline to better link texts and motions. In particular, considering the facts that (1) text can only describe motions roughly (e.g., regardless of the moving speed) and (2) text may include both content and motion descriptions, we introduce a motion intensity estimation module as well as a text re-weighting module to reduce the ambiguity of text-to-motion mapping. Empirical evidence suggests that our approach is capable of well decoding motion-related textual instructions into videos, such as actions, camera movements, or even conjuring new contents from thin air (e.g., pouring water into an empty glass). Interestingly, thanks to the proposed intensity learning mechanism, our system offers users an additional control signal (i.e., the motion intensity) besides text for video customization.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

We present FireBERT, a set of three proof-of-concept NLP classifiers hardened against TextFooler-style word-perturbation by producing diverse alternatives to original samples. In one approach, we co-tune BERT against the training data and synthetic adversarial samples. In a second approach, we generate the synthetic samples at evaluation time through substitution of words and perturbation of embedding vectors. The diversified evaluation results are then combined by voting. A third approach replaces evaluation-time word substitution with perturbation of embedding vectors. We evaluate FireBERT for MNLI and IMDB Movie Review datasets, in the original and on adversarial examples generated by TextFooler. We also test whether TextFooler is less successful in creating new adversarial samples when manipulating FireBERT, compared to working on unhardened classifiers. We show that it is possible to improve the accuracy of BERT-based models in the face of adversarial attacks without significantly reducing the accuracy for regular benchmark samples. We present co-tuning with a synthetic data generator as a highly effective method to protect against 95% of pre-manufactured adversarial samples while maintaining 98% of original benchmark performance. We also demonstrate evaluation-time perturbation as a promising direction for further research, restoring accuracy up to 75% of benchmark performance for pre-made adversarials, and up to 65% (from a baseline of 75% orig. / 12% attack) under active attack by TextFooler.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

This work presents VideoMark, a training-free robust watermarking framework for video diffusion models. As diffusion models advance in generating highly realistic videos, the need for reliable content attribution mechanisms has become critical. While watermarking techniques for image diffusion models have made progress, directly extending these methods to videos presents unique challenges due to variable video lengths and vulnerability to temporal attacks. VideoMark addresses these limitations through a frame-wise watermarking strategy using pseudorandom error correction (PRC) codes to embed watermark information during the generation process. Our method generates an extended watermark message sequence and randomly selects starting positions for each video, ensuring uniform noise distribution in the latent space and maintaining generation quality. For watermark extraction, we introduce a Temporal Matching Module (TMM) that uses edit distance to align decoded messages with the original watermark sequence, providing robustness against temporal attacks such as frame deletion. Experimental results demonstrate that VideoMark achieves higher decoding accuracy than existing methods while maintaining video quality on par with watermark-free generation. Importantly, our watermark remains undetectable to attackers without the secret key, ensuring strong imperceptibility compared to other watermarking frameworks. VideoMark provides a practical solution for content attribution in diffusion-based video generation without requiring additional training or compromising video quality. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/KYRIE-LI11/VideoMark{https://github.com/KYRIE-LI11/VideoMark}.

Human intelligence requires correctness and robustness, with the former being foundational for the latter. In video understanding, correctness ensures the accurate interpretation of visual content, and robustness maintains consistent performance in challenging conditions. Despite advances in video large language models (video LLMs), existing benchmarks inadequately reflect the gap between these models and human intelligence in maintaining correctness and robustness in video interpretation. We introduce the Video Thinking Test (Video-TT), to assess if video LLMs can interpret real-world videos as effectively as humans. Video-TT reflects genuine gaps in understanding complex visual narratives, and evaluates robustness against natural adversarial questions. Video-TT comprises 1,000 YouTube Shorts videos, each with one open-ended question and four adversarial questions that probe visual and narrative complexity. Our evaluation shows a significant gap between video LLMs and human performance.

Large pre-trained Vision-Language Models (VLMs) such as CLIP have demonstrated excellent zero-shot generalizability across various downstream tasks. However, recent studies have shown that the inference performance of CLIP can be greatly degraded by small adversarial perturbations, especially its visual modality, posing significant safety threats. To mitigate this vulnerability, in this paper, we propose a novel defense method called Test-Time Adversarial Prompt Tuning (TAPT) to enhance the inference robustness of CLIP against visual adversarial attacks. TAPT is a test-time defense method that learns defensive bimodal (textual and visual) prompts to robustify the inference process of CLIP. Specifically, it is an unsupervised method that optimizes the defensive prompts for each test sample by minimizing a multi-view entropy and aligning adversarial-clean distributions. We evaluate the effectiveness of TAPT on 11 benchmark datasets, including ImageNet and 10 other zero-shot datasets, demonstrating that it enhances the zero-shot adversarial robustness of the original CLIP by at least 48.9% against AutoAttack (AA), while largely maintaining performance on clean examples. Moreover, TAPT outperforms existing adversarial prompt tuning methods across various backbones, achieving an average robustness improvement of at least 36.6%.

We present VideoFactory, an innovative framework for generating high-quality open-domain videos. VideoFactory excels in producing high-definition (1376x768), widescreen (16:9) videos without watermarks, creating an engaging user experience. Generating videos guided by text instructions poses significant challenges, such as modeling the complex relationship between space and time, and the lack of large-scale text-video paired data. Previous approaches extend pretrained text-to-image generation models by adding temporal 1D convolution/attention modules for video generation. However, these approaches overlook the importance of jointly modeling space and time, inevitably leading to temporal distortions and misalignment between texts and videos. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that strengthens the interaction between spatial and temporal perceptions. In particular, we utilize a swapped cross-attention mechanism in 3D windows that alternates the "query" role between spatial and temporal blocks, enabling mutual reinforcement for each other. To fully unlock model capabilities for high-quality video generation, we curate a large-scale video dataset called HD-VG-130M. This dataset comprises 130 million text-video pairs from the open-domain, ensuring high-definition, widescreen and watermark-free characters. Objective metrics and user studies demonstrate the superiority of our approach in terms of per-frame quality, temporal correlation, and text-video alignment, with clear margins.

We present VideoCLIP, a contrastive approach to pre-train a unified model for zero-shot video and text understanding, without using any labels on downstream tasks. VideoCLIP trains a transformer for video and text by contrasting temporally overlapping positive video-text pairs with hard negatives from nearest neighbor retrieval. Our experiments on a diverse series of downstream tasks, including sequence-level text-video retrieval, VideoQA, token-level action localization, and action segmentation reveal state-of-the-art performance, surpassing prior work, and in some cases even outperforming supervised approaches. Code is made available at https://github.com/pytorch/fairseq/tree/main/examples/MMPT.

Backdoor attacks undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of machine learning systems by injecting hidden behaviors that can be maliciously activated at inference time. While such threats have been extensively studied in unimodal settings, their impact on multimodal foundation models, particularly vision-language models (VLMs), remains largely underexplored. In this work, we introduce BackdoorVLM, the first comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating backdoor attacks on VLMs across a broad range of settings. It adopts a unified perspective that injects and analyzes backdoors across core vision-language tasks, including image captioning and visual question answering. BackdoorVLM organizes multimodal backdoor threats into 5 representative categories: targeted refusal, malicious injection, jailbreak, concept substitution, and perceptual hijack. Each category captures a distinct pathway through which an adversary can manipulate a model's behavior. We evaluate these threats using 12 representative attack methods spanning text, image, and bimodal triggers, tested on 2 open-source VLMs and 3 multimodal datasets. Our analysis reveals that VLMs exhibit strong sensitivity to textual instructions, and in bimodal backdoors the text trigger typically overwhelms the image trigger when forming the backdoor mapping. Notably, backdoors involving the textual modality remain highly potent, with poisoning rates as low as 1\% yielding over 90\% success across most tasks. These findings highlight significant, previously underexplored vulnerabilities in current VLMs. We hope that BackdoorVLM can serve as a useful benchmark for analyzing and mitigating multimodal backdoor threats. Code is available at: https://github.com/bin015/BackdoorVLM .

Models trained via Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP) serve as the foundational vision encoders for most modern Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs). Despite their widespread adoption, CLIP models exhibit a critical yet underexplored failure mode: irrelevant text appearing within images confounds visual representations, biasing them toward lexical meaning rather than true visual semantics. This robustness issue, commonly described as a Typographic Attack (TA), exposes a vulnerability that poses a significant risk to safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving. To achieve interpretable and effective robustness against TA, we propose a novel, training-free mechanistic interpretability method. Our method provides sampling-based interpretations of hidden state representations and quantitatively attributes semantic versus lexical focus to individual attention heads. Through probabilistic analysis and circuit mining, we isolate specific Vision Transformer (ViT) components that disproportionately encode lexical information, thereby identifying the mechanistic source of TA. We further show that simple interventions applied directly to the identified circuits, without any additional training, can substantially improve robustness against Typographic Attacks in object classification. These interventions, such as selective adjustment of attention weights, also outperform both supervised and training-free defense methods. Our experiments demonstrate that applying the proposed intervention to the vision encoders of several state-of-the-art LVLMs yields substantial gains in Visual Question Answering accuracy under Typographic Attack interference on RIO-Bench. These results confirm both the efficacy and the generalizability of our mechanistic approach. Code is released at https://github.com/Liu-524/SamplingTAR.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

With the advent of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), new attack vectors, such as cognitive bias, prompt injection, and jailbreaking, have emerged. Understanding these attacks promotes system robustness improvement and neural networks demystification. However, existing surveys often target attack taxonomy and lack in-depth analysis like 1) unified insights into adversariality, transferability, and generalization; 2) detailed evaluations framework; 3) motivation-driven attack categorizations; and 4) an integrated perspective on both traditional and LVLM attacks. This article addresses these gaps by offering a thorough summary of traditional and LVLM adversarial attacks, emphasizing their connections and distinctions, and providing actionable insights for future research.

Offensive language detection is an important task for filtering out abusive expressions and improving online user experiences. However, malicious users often attempt to avoid filtering systems through the involvement of textual noises. In this paper, we propose these evasions as user-intended adversarial attacks that insert special symbols or leverage the distinctive features of the Korean language. Furthermore, we introduce simple yet effective pooling strategies in a layer-wise manner to defend against the proposed attacks, focusing on the preceding layers not just the last layer to capture both offensiveness and token embeddings. We demonstrate that these pooling strategies are more robust to performance degradation even when the attack rate is increased, without directly training of such patterns. Notably, we found that models pre-trained on clean texts could achieve a comparable performance in detecting attacked offensive language, to models pre-trained on noisy texts by employing these pooling strategies.

The increasing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised concerns about their misuse in AI-generated plagiarism and social engineering. While various AI-generated text detectors have been proposed to mitigate these risks, many remain vulnerable to simple evasion techniques such as paraphrasing. However, recent detectors have shown greater robustness against such basic attacks. In this work, we introduce Adversarial Paraphrasing, a training-free attack framework that universally humanizes any AI-generated text to evade detection more effectively. Our approach leverages an off-the-shelf instruction-following LLM to paraphrase AI-generated content under the guidance of an AI text detector, producing adversarial examples that are specifically optimized to bypass detection. Extensive experiments show that our attack is both broadly effective and highly transferable across several detection systems. For instance, compared to simple paraphrasing attack--which, ironically, increases the true positive at 1% false positive (T@1%F) by 8.57% on RADAR and 15.03% on Fast-DetectGPT--adversarial paraphrasing, guided by OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large, reduces T@1%F by 64.49% on RADAR and a striking 98.96% on Fast-DetectGPT. Across a diverse set of detectors--including neural network-based, watermark-based, and zero-shot approaches--our attack achieves an average T@1%F reduction of 87.88% under the guidance of OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large. We also analyze the tradeoff between text quality and attack success to find that our method can significantly reduce detection rates, with mostly a slight degradation in text quality. Our adversarial setup highlights the need for more robust and resilient detection strategies in the light of increasingly sophisticated evasion techniques.

Are foundation models secure against malicious actors? In this work, we focus on the image input to a vision-language model (VLM). We discover image hijacks, adversarial images that control the behaviour of VLMs at inference time, and introduce the general Behaviour Matching algorithm for training image hijacks. From this, we derive the Prompt Matching method, allowing us to train hijacks matching the behaviour of an arbitrary user-defined text prompt (e.g. 'the Eiffel Tower is now located in Rome') using a generic, off-the-shelf dataset unrelated to our choice of prompt. We use Behaviour Matching to craft hijacks for four types of attack, forcing VLMs to generate outputs of the adversary's choice, leak information from their context window, override their safety training, and believe false statements. We study these attacks against LLaVA, a state-of-the-art VLM based on CLIP and LLaMA-2, and find that all attack types achieve a success rate of over 80%. Moreover, our attacks are automated and require only small image perturbations.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

The rapid advancement of text-to-image generation systems, exemplified by models like Stable Diffusion, Midjourney, Imagen, and DALL-E, has heightened concerns about their potential misuse. In response, companies like Meta and Google have intensified their efforts to implement watermarking techniques on AI-generated images to curb the circulation of potentially misleading visuals. However, in this paper, we argue that current image watermarking methods are fragile and susceptible to being circumvented through visual paraphrase attacks. The proposed visual paraphraser operates in two steps. First, it generates a caption for the given image using KOSMOS-2, one of the latest state-of-the-art image captioning systems. Second, it passes both the original image and the generated caption to an image-to-image diffusion system. During the denoising step of the diffusion pipeline, the system generates a visually similar image that is guided by the text caption. The resulting image is a visual paraphrase and is free of any watermarks. Our empirical findings demonstrate that visual paraphrase attacks can effectively remove watermarks from images. This paper provides a critical assessment, empirically revealing the vulnerability of existing watermarking techniques to visual paraphrase attacks. While we do not propose solutions to this issue, this paper serves as a call to action for the scientific community to prioritize the development of more robust watermarking techniques. Our first-of-its-kind visual paraphrase dataset and accompanying code are publicly available.

In recent years, considerable progress on the task of text-video retrieval has been achieved by leveraging large-scale pretraining on visual and audio datasets to construct powerful video encoders. By contrast, despite the natural symmetry, the design of effective algorithms for exploiting large-scale language pretraining remains under-explored. In this work, we are the first to investigate the design of such algorithms and propose a novel generalized distillation method, TeachText, which leverages complementary cues from multiple text encoders to provide an enhanced supervisory signal to the retrieval model. Moreover, we extend our method to video side modalities and show that we can effectively reduce the number of used modalities at test time without compromising performance. Our approach advances the state of the art on several video retrieval benchmarks by a significant margin and adds no computational overhead at test time. Last but not least, we show an effective application of our method for eliminating noise from retrieval datasets. Code and data can be found at https://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/~vgg/research/teachtext/.

Video-based object detection plays a vital role in safety-critical applications. While deep learning-based object detectors have achieved impressive performance, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, particularly those involving universal perturbations. In this work, we propose a minimally distorted universal adversarial attack tailored for video object detection, which leverages nuclear norm regularization to promote structured perturbations concentrated in the background. To optimize this formulation efficiently, we employ an adaptive, optimistic exponentiated gradient method that enhances both scalability and convergence. Our results demonstrate that the proposed attack outperforms both low-rank projected gradient descent and Frank-Wolfe based attacks in effectiveness while maintaining high stealthiness. All code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/jsve96/AO-Exp-Attack.

Transferable targeted adversarial attacks aim to mislead models into outputting adversary-specified predictions in black-box scenarios. Recent studies have introduced single-target generative attacks that train a generator for each target class to generate highly transferable perturbations, resulting in substantial computational overhead when handling multiple classes. Multi-target attacks address this by training only one class-conditional generator for multiple classes. However, the generator simply uses class labels as conditions, failing to leverage the rich semantic information of the target class. To this end, we design a CLIP-guided Generative Network with Cross-attention modules (CGNC) to enhance multi-target attacks by incorporating textual knowledge of CLIP into the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CGNC yields significant improvements over previous multi-target generative attacks, e.g., a 21.46\% improvement in success rate from ResNet-152 to DenseNet-121. Moreover, we propose a masked fine-tuning mechanism to further strengthen our method in attacking a single class, which surpasses existing single-target methods.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

Multi-modal retrieval augmented generation (M-RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large multi-modal models (LMMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). However, M-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries that aim to disrupt the system by injecting malicious entries into the KB. In this paper, we present the first poisoning attack against M-RAG targeting visual document retrieval applications where the KB contains images of document pages. We propose two attacks, each of which require injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we propose a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) in the M-RAG system. Secondly, we present a targeted attack against one or a group of user queries, with the goal of spreading targeted misinformation. For both attacks, we use a multi-objective gradient-based adversarial approach to craft the injected image while optimizing for both retrieval and generation. We evaluate our attacks against several visual document retrieval datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (LMMs), demonstrating the attack effectiveness in both the universal and targeted settings. We additionally present results including commonly used defenses, various attack hyper-parameter settings, ablations, and attack transferability.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.

Generative models have demonstrated remarkable capability in synthesizing high-quality text, images, and videos. For video generation, contemporary text-to-video models exhibit impressive capabilities, crafting visually stunning videos. Nonetheless, evaluating such videos poses significant challenges. Current research predominantly employs automated metrics such as FVD, IS, and CLIP Score. However, these metrics provide an incomplete analysis, particularly in the temporal assessment of video content, thus rendering them unreliable indicators of true video quality. Furthermore, while user studies have the potential to reflect human perception accurately, they are hampered by their time-intensive and laborious nature, with outcomes that are often tainted by subjective bias. In this paper, we investigate the limitations inherent in existing metrics and introduce a novel evaluation pipeline, the Text-to-Video Score (T2VScore). This metric integrates two pivotal criteria: (1) Text-Video Alignment, which scrutinizes the fidelity of the video in representing the given text description, and (2) Video Quality, which evaluates the video's overall production caliber with a mixture of experts. Moreover, to evaluate the proposed metrics and facilitate future improvements on them, we present the TVGE dataset, collecting human judgements of 2,543 text-to-video generated videos on the two criteria. Experiments on the TVGE dataset demonstrate the superiority of the proposed T2VScore on offering a better metric for text-to-video generation.

Despite its prevalent use in image-text matching tasks in a zero-shot manner, CLIP has been shown to be highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations added onto images. Recent studies propose to finetune the vision encoder of CLIP with adversarial samples generated on the fly, and show improved robustness against adversarial attacks on a spectrum of downstream datasets, a property termed as zero-shot robustness. In this paper, we show that malicious perturbations that seek to maximise the classification loss lead to `falsely stable' images, and propose to leverage the pre-trained vision encoder of CLIP to counterattack such adversarial images during inference to achieve robustness. Our paradigm is simple and training-free, providing the first method to defend CLIP from adversarial attacks at test time, which is orthogonal to existing methods aiming to boost zero-shot adversarial robustness of CLIP. We conduct experiments across 16 classification datasets, and demonstrate stable and consistent gains compared to test-time defence methods adapted from existing adversarial robustness studies that do not rely on external networks, without noticeably impairing performance on clean images. We also show that our paradigm can be employed on CLIP models that have been adversarially finetuned to further enhance their robustness at test time. Our code is available https://github.com/Sxing2/CLIP-Test-time-Counterattacks{here}.

We present Phenaki, a model capable of realistic video synthesis, given a sequence of textual prompts. Generating videos from text is particularly challenging due to the computational cost, limited quantities of high quality text-video data and variable length of videos. To address these issues, we introduce a new model for learning video representation which compresses the video to a small representation of discrete tokens. This tokenizer uses causal attention in time, which allows it to work with variable-length videos. To generate video tokens from text we are using a bidirectional masked transformer conditioned on pre-computed text tokens. The generated video tokens are subsequently de-tokenized to create the actual video. To address data issues, we demonstrate how joint training on a large corpus of image-text pairs as well as a smaller number of video-text examples can result in generalization beyond what is available in the video datasets. Compared to the previous video generation methods, Phenaki can generate arbitrary long videos conditioned on a sequence of prompts (i.e. time variable text or a story) in open domain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a paper studies generating videos from time variable prompts. In addition, compared to the per-frame baselines, the proposed video encoder-decoder computes fewer tokens per video but results in better spatio-temporal consistency.

Recent advances in large video-language models have displayed promising outcomes in video comprehension. Current approaches straightforwardly convert video into language tokens and employ large language models for multi-modal tasks. However, this method often leads to the generation of irrelevant content, commonly known as "hallucination", as the length of the text increases and the impact of the video diminishes. To address this problem, we propose Vista-LLaMA, a novel framework that maintains the consistent distance between all visual tokens and any language tokens, irrespective of the generated text length. Vista-LLaMA omits relative position encoding when determining attention weights between visual and text tokens, retaining the position encoding for text and text tokens. This amplifies the effect of visual tokens on text generation, especially when the relative distance is longer between visual and text tokens. The proposed attention mechanism significantly reduces the chance of producing irrelevant text related to the video content. Furthermore, we present a sequential visual projector that projects the current video frame into tokens of language space with the assistance of the previous frame. This approach not only captures the temporal relationship within the video, but also allows less visual tokens to encompass the entire video. Our approach significantly outperforms various previous methods (e.g., Video-ChatGPT, MovieChat) on four challenging open-ended video question answering benchmarks. We reach an accuracy of 60.7 on the zero-shot NExT-QA and 60.5 on the zero-shot MSRVTT-QA, setting a new state-of-the-art performance. This project is available at https://jinxxian.github.io/Vista-LLaMA.

We proposes a novel algorithm, ANTHRO, that inductively extracts over 600K human-written text perturbations in the wild and leverages them for realistic adversarial attack. Unlike existing character-based attacks which often deductively hypothesize a set of manipulation strategies, our work is grounded on actual observations from real-world texts. We find that adversarial texts generated by ANTHRO achieve the best trade-off between (1) attack success rate, (2) semantic preservation of the original text, and (3) stealthiness--i.e. indistinguishable from human writings hence harder to be flagged as suspicious. Specifically, our attacks accomplished around 83% and 91% attack success rates on BERT and RoBERTa, respectively. Moreover, it outperformed the TextBugger baseline with an increase of 50% and 40% in terms of semantic preservation and stealthiness when evaluated by both layperson and professional human workers. ANTHRO can further enhance a BERT classifier's performance in understanding different variations of human-written toxic texts via adversarial training when compared to the Perspective API.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with multimodal reasoning capabilities are high-value attack targets, given their potential for handling complex multimodal harmful tasks. Mainstream black-box jailbreak attacks on VLMs work by distributing malicious clues across modalities to disperse model attention and bypass safety alignment mechanisms. However, these adversarial attacks rely on simple and fixed image-text combinations that lack attack complexity scalability, limiting their effectiveness for red-teaming VLMs' continuously evolving reasoning capabilities. We propose CrossTALK (\underline{Cross}-modal en\underline{TA}ng\underline{L}ement attac\underline{K}), which is a scalable approach that extends and entangles information clues across modalities to exceed VLMs' trained and generalized safety alignment patterns for jailbreak. Specifically, {knowledge-scalable reframing} extends harmful tasks into multi-hop chain instructions, {cross-modal clue entangling} migrates visualizable entities into images to build multimodal reasoning links, and {cross-modal scenario nesting} uses multimodal contextual instructions to steer VLMs toward detailed harmful outputs. Experiments show our COMET achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate.

The advent of high-quality video generation models has amplified the need for robust watermarking schemes that can be used to reliably detect and track the provenance of generated videos. Existing video watermarking methods based on both post-hoc and in-generation approaches fail to simultaneously achieve imperceptibility, robustness, and computational efficiency. This work introduces a novel framework for in-generation video watermarking called SPDMark (pronounced `SpeedMark') based on selective parameter displacement of a video diffusion model. Watermarks are embedded into the generated videos by modifying a subset of parameters in the generative model. To make the problem tractable, the displacement is modeled as an additive composition of layer-wise basis shifts, where the final composition is indexed by the watermarking key. For parameter efficiency, this work specifically leverages low-rank adaptation (LoRA) to implement the basis shifts. During the training phase, the basis shifts and the watermark extractor are jointly learned by minimizing a combination of message recovery, perceptual similarity, and temporal consistency losses. To detect and localize temporal modifications in the watermarked videos, we use a cryptographic hashing function to derive frame-specific watermark messages from the given base watermarking key. During watermark extraction, maximum bipartite matching is applied to recover the correct frame order, even from temporally tampered videos. Evaluations on both text-to-video and image-to-video generation models demonstrate the ability of SPDMark to generate imperceptible watermarks that can be recovered with high accuracy and also establish its robustness against a variety of common video modifications.

Despite considerable progress in the development of machine-text detectors, the ease with which machine-text can be manipulated to evade detection has led to suggestions that the problem is inherently intractable. In this work, we investigate the limits of such evasion strategies. We demonstrate that while current attacks, ranging from prompt engineering to detector-guided optimization can effectively degrade performance of standard detectors, they fail to erase the underlying stylistic "fingerprints" of machine text. We show that few-shot detectors that utilize the stylistic feature space are robust to these evasion attempts, reliably detecting samples even from models explicitly tuned to prevent detection. This raises the question: does style represent a universal defense against machine-detection attacks? We demonstrate that the answer is "no'' by introducing a novel paraphrasing approach that simultaneously optimizes for undetectability and adherence to specific human styles. We show that unlike prior methods, this attack effectively evades all considered detectors, including those that utilize writing style. However, we find that this evasion is not absolute: as the number of documents available for analysis grows, the human and machine distributions become distinguishable again. Overall, our findings suggest that reliable machine-text detection requires moving beyond single-document analysis to multi-document analysis.

Text-to-Image models may generate harmful content, such as pornographic images, particularly when unsafe prompts are submitted. To address this issue, safety filters are often added on top of text-to-image models, or the models themselves are aligned to reduce harmful outputs. However, these defenses remain vulnerable when an attacker strategically designs adversarial prompts to bypass these safety guardrails. In this work, we propose PromptTune, a method to jailbreak text-to-image models with safety guardrails using a fine-tuned large language model. Unlike other query-based jailbreak attacks that require repeated queries to the target model, our attack generates adversarial prompts efficiently after fine-tuning our AttackLLM. We evaluate our method on three datasets of unsafe prompts and against five safety guardrails. Our results demonstrate that our approach effectively bypasses safety guardrails, outperforms existing no-box attacks, and also facilitates other query-based attacks.

As synthetic media, including video, audio, and text, become increasingly indistinguishable from real content, the risks of misinformation, identity fraud, and social manipulation escalate. This survey traces the evolution of deepfake detection from early single-modal methods to sophisticated multi-modal approaches that integrate audio-visual and text-visual cues. We present a structured taxonomy of detection techniques and analyze the transition from GAN-based to diffusion model-driven deepfakes, which introduce new challenges due to their heightened realism and robustness against detection. Unlike prior surveys that primarily focus on single-modal detection or earlier deepfake techniques, this work provides the most comprehensive study to date, encompassing the latest advancements in multi-modal deepfake detection, generalization challenges, proactive defense mechanisms, and emerging datasets specifically designed to support new interpretability and reasoning tasks. We further explore the role of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in strengthening detection robustness against increasingly sophisticated deepfake attacks. By systematically categorizing existing methods and identifying emerging research directions, this survey serves as a foundation for future advancements in combating AI-generated facial forgeries. A curated list of all related papers can be found at https://github.com/qiqitao77/Comprehensive-Advances-in-Deepfake-Detection-Spanning-Diverse-Modalities{https://github.com/qiqitao77/Awesome-Comprehensive-Deepfake-Detection}.

The recent developments in Large Multi-modal Video Models (Video-LMMs) have significantly enhanced our ability to interpret and analyze video data. Despite their impressive capabilities, current Video-LMMs have not been evaluated for anomaly detection tasks, which is critical to their deployment in practical scenarios e.g., towards identifying deepfakes, manipulated video content, traffic accidents and crimes. In this paper, we introduce VANE-Bench, a benchmark designed to assess the proficiency of Video-LMMs in detecting and localizing anomalies and inconsistencies in videos. Our dataset comprises an array of videos synthetically generated using existing state-of-the-art text-to-video generation models, encompassing a variety of subtle anomalies and inconsistencies grouped into five categories: unnatural transformations, unnatural appearance, pass-through, disappearance and sudden appearance. Additionally, our benchmark features real-world samples from existing anomaly detection datasets, focusing on crime-related irregularities, atypical pedestrian behavior, and unusual events. The task is structured as a visual question-answering challenge to gauge the models' ability to accurately detect and localize the anomalies within the videos. We evaluate nine existing Video-LMMs, both open and closed sources, on this benchmarking task and find that most of the models encounter difficulties in effectively identifying the subtle anomalies. In conclusion, our research offers significant insights into the current capabilities of Video-LMMs in the realm of anomaly detection, highlighting the importance of our work in evaluating and improving these models for real-world applications. Our code and data is available at https://hananshafi.github.io/vane-benchmark/

Recent advancements in dense retrieval have introduced vision-language model (VLM)-based retrievers, such as DSE and ColPali, which leverage document screenshots embedded as vectors to enable effective search and offer a simplified pipeline over traditional text-only methods. In this study, we propose three pixel poisoning attack methods designed to compromise VLM-based retrievers and evaluate their effectiveness under various attack settings and parameter configurations. Our empirical results demonstrate that injecting even a single adversarial screenshot into the retrieval corpus can significantly disrupt search results, poisoning the top-10 retrieved documents for 41.9% of queries in the case of DSE and 26.4% for ColPali. These vulnerability rates notably exceed those observed with equivalent attacks on text-only retrievers. Moreover, when targeting a small set of known queries, the attack success rate raises, achieving complete success in certain cases. By exposing the vulnerabilities inherent in vision-language models, this work highlights the potential risks associated with their deployment.

This work tackles Weakly Supervised Anomaly detection, in which a predictor is allowed to learn not only from normal examples but also from a few labeled anomalies made available during training. In particular, we deal with the localization of anomalous activities within the video stream: this is a very challenging scenario, as training examples come only with video-level annotations (and not frame-level). Several recent works have proposed various regularization terms to address it i.e. by enforcing sparsity and smoothness constraints over the weakly-learned frame-level anomaly scores. In this work, we get inspired by recent advances within the field of self-supervised learning and ask the model to yield the same scores for different augmentations of the same video sequence. We show that enforcing such an alignment improves the performance of the model on XD-Violence.

Recent text-to-video generation approaches rely on computationally heavy training and require large-scale video datasets. In this paper, we introduce a new task of zero-shot text-to-video generation and propose a low-cost approach (without any training or optimization) by leveraging the power of existing text-to-image synthesis methods (e.g., Stable Diffusion), making them suitable for the video domain. Our key modifications include (i) enriching the latent codes of the generated frames with motion dynamics to keep the global scene and the background time consistent; and (ii) reprogramming frame-level self-attention using a new cross-frame attention of each frame on the first frame, to preserve the context, appearance, and identity of the foreground object. Experiments show that this leads to low overhead, yet high-quality and remarkably consistent video generation. Moreover, our approach is not limited to text-to-video synthesis but is also applicable to other tasks such as conditional and content-specialized video generation, and Video Instruct-Pix2Pix, i.e., instruction-guided video editing. As experiments show, our method performs comparably or sometimes better than recent approaches, despite not being trained on additional video data. Our code will be open sourced at: https://github.com/Picsart-AI-Research/Text2Video-Zero .

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Video text-based visual question answering (Video TextVQA) is a practical task that aims to answer questions by jointly reasoning textual and visual information in a given video. Inspired by the development of TextVQA in image domain, existing Video TextVQA approaches leverage a language model (e.g. T5) to process text-rich multiple frames and generate answers auto-regressively. Nevertheless, the spatio-temporal relationships among visual entities (including scene text and objects) will be disrupted and models are susceptible to interference from unrelated information, resulting in irrational reasoning and inaccurate answering. To tackle these challenges, we propose the TEA (stands for ``Track thE Answer'') method that better extends the generative TextVQA framework from image to video. TEA recovers the spatio-temporal relationships in a complementary way and incorporates OCR-aware clues to enhance the quality of reasoning questions. Extensive experiments on several public Video TextVQA datasets validate the effectiveness and generalization of our framework. TEA outperforms existing TextVQA methods, video-language pretraining methods and video large language models by great margins.

In videos containing spoofed faces, we may uncover the spoofing evidence based on either photometric or dynamic abnormality, even a combination of both. Prevailing face anti-spoofing (FAS) approaches generally concentrate on the single-frame scenario, however, purely photometric-driven methods overlook the dynamic spoofing clues that may be exposed over time. This may lead FAS systems to conclude incorrect judgments, especially in cases where it is easily distinguishable in terms of dynamics but challenging to discern in terms of photometrics. To this end, we propose the Graph Guided Video Vision Transformer (G^2V^2former), which combines faces with facial landmarks for photometric and dynamic feature fusion. We factorize the attention into space and time, and fuse them via a spatiotemporal block. Specifically, we design a novel temporal attention called Kronecker temporal attention, which has a wider receptive field, and is beneficial for capturing dynamic information. Moreover, we leverage the low-semantic motion of facial landmarks to guide the high-semantic change of facial expressions based on the motivation that regions containing landmarks may reveal more dynamic clues. Extensive experiments on nine benchmark datasets demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance under various scenarios. The codes will be released soon.

We present a method for matching a text sentence from a given corpus to a given video clip and vice versa. Traditionally video and text matching is done by learning a shared embedding space and the encoding of one modality is independent of the other. In this work, we encode the dataset data in a way that takes into account the query's relevant information. The power of the method is demonstrated to arise from pooling the interaction data between words and frames. Since the encoding of the video clip depends on the sentence compared to it, the representation needs to be recomputed for each potential match. To this end, we propose an efficient shallow neural network. Its training employs a hierarchical triplet loss that is extendable to paragraph/video matching. The method is simple, provides explainability, and achieves state-of-the-art results for both sentence-clip and video-text by a sizable margin across five different datasets: ActivityNet, DiDeMo, YouCook2, MSR-VTT, and LSMDC. We also show that our conditioned representation can be transferred to video-guided machine translation, where we improved the current results on VATEX. Source code is available at https://github.com/AmeenAli/VideoMatch.

Text-to-video (T2V) generation technology holds potential to transform multiple domains such as education, marketing, entertainment, and assistive technologies for individuals with visual or reading comprehension challenges, by creating coherent visual content from natural language prompts. From its inception, the field has advanced from adversarial models to diffusion-based models, yielding higher-fidelity, temporally consistent outputs. Yet challenges persist, such as alignment, long-range coherence, and computational efficiency. Addressing this evolving landscape, we present a comprehensive survey of text-to-video generative models, tracing their development from early GANs and VAEs to hybrid Diffusion-Transformer (DiT) architectures, detailing how these models work, what limitations they addressed in their predecessors, and why shifts toward new architectural paradigms were necessary to overcome challenges in quality, coherence, and control. We provide a systematic account of the datasets, which the surveyed text-to-video models were trained and evaluated on, and, to support reproducibility and assess the accessibility of training such models, we detail their training configurations, including their hardware specifications, GPU counts, batch sizes, learning rates, optimizers, epochs, and other key hyperparameters. Further, we outline the evaluation metrics commonly used for evaluating such models and present their performance across standard benchmarks, while also discussing the limitations of these metrics and the emerging shift toward more holistic, perception-aligned evaluation strategies. Finally, drawing from our analysis, we outline the current open challenges and propose a few promising future directions, laying out a perspective for future researchers to explore and build upon in advancing T2V research and applications.

In this paper, both empirically and theoretically, we show that several AI-text detectors are not reliable in practical scenarios. Empirically, we show that paraphrasing attacks, where a light paraphraser is applied on top of a large language model (LLM), can break a whole range of detectors, including ones using watermarking schemes as well as neural network-based detectors and zero-shot classifiers. Our experiments demonstrate that retrieval-based detectors, designed to evade paraphrasing attacks, are still vulnerable to recursive paraphrasing. We then provide a theoretical impossibility result indicating that as language models become more sophisticated and better at emulating human text, the performance of even the best-possible detector decreases. For a sufficiently advanced language model seeking to imitate human text, even the best-possible detector may only perform marginally better than a random classifier. Our result is general enough to capture specific scenarios such as particular writing styles, clever prompt design, or text paraphrasing. We also extend the impossibility result to include the case where pseudorandom number generators are used for AI-text generation instead of true randomness. We show that the same result holds with a negligible correction term for all polynomial-time computable detectors. Finally, we show that even LLMs protected by watermarking schemes can be vulnerable against spoofing attacks where adversarial humans can infer hidden LLM text signatures and add them to human-generated text to be detected as text generated by the LLMs, potentially causing reputational damage to their developers. We believe these results can open an honest conversation in the community regarding the ethical and reliable use of AI-generated text.

Video Anomaly Detection (VAD) aims to identify anomalous events within video segments. In scenarios such as surveillance or industrial process monitoring, anomaly detection is of critical importance. While existing approaches are semi-automated, requiring human assessment for anomaly detection, traditional VADs offer limited output as either normal or anomalous. We propose Text-guided Fine-Grained Video Anomaly Detection (T-VAD), a framework built upon Large Vision-Language Model (LVLM). T-VAD introduces an Anomaly Heatmap Decoder (AHD) that performs pixel-wise visual-textual feature alignment to generate fine-grained anomaly heatmaps. Furthermore, we design a Region-aware Anomaly Encoder (RAE) that transforms the heatmaps into learnable textual embeddings, guiding the LVLM to accurately identify and localize anomalous events in videos. This significantly enhances both the granularity and interactivity of anomaly detection. The proposed method achieving SOTA performance by demonstrating 94.8% Area Under the Curve (AUC, specifically micro-AUC) and 67.8%/76.7% accuracy in anomaly heatmaps (RBDC/TBDC) on the UBnormal dataset, and subjectively verified more preferable textual description on the ShanghaiTech-based dataset (BLEU-4: 62.67 for targets, 88.84 for trajectories; Yes/No accuracy: 97.67%), and on the UBnormal dataset (BLEU-4: 50.32 for targets, 78.10 for trajectories; Yes/No accuracy: 89.73%).

Dense retrieval systems have been widely used in various NLP applications. However, their vulnerabilities to potential attacks have been underexplored. This paper investigates a novel attack scenario where the attackers aim to mislead the retrieval system into retrieving the attacker-specified contents. Those contents, injected into the retrieval corpus by attackers, can include harmful text like hate speech or spam. Unlike prior methods that rely on model weights and generate conspicuous, unnatural outputs, we propose a covert backdoor attack triggered by grammar errors. Our approach ensures that the attacked models can function normally for standard queries while covertly triggering the retrieval of the attacker's contents in response to minor linguistic mistakes. Specifically, dense retrievers are trained with contrastive loss and hard negative sampling. Surprisingly, our findings demonstrate that contrastive loss is notably sensitive to grammatical errors, and hard negative sampling can exacerbate susceptibility to backdoor attacks. Our proposed method achieves a high attack success rate with a minimal corpus poisoning rate of only 0.048\%, while preserving normal retrieval performance. This indicates that the method has negligible impact on user experience for error-free queries. Furthermore, evaluations across three real-world defense strategies reveal that the malicious passages embedded within the corpus remain highly resistant to detection and filtering, underscoring the robustness and subtlety of the proposed attack Codes of this work are available at https://github.com/ruyue0001/Backdoor_DPR..

Universal adversarial attacks on aligned multimodal large language models are increasingly reported with attack success rates in the 60-80% range, suggesting the visual modality is highly vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations as a prompt-injection channel. We argue that this number conflates two distinct events: (i) the model's output was perturbed (Influence), and (ii) the attacker's chosen target concept was actually emitted (Precise Injection). We compose two existing techniques -- Universal Adversarial Attack and AnyAttack -- under an L_{inf} budget of 16/255, and we add a dual-axis evaluation: a deterministic Ratcliff-Obershelp drift score for Influence (programmatic baseline) plus a 4-tier ordinal categorical none/weak/partial/confirmed for Precise Injection. The judge is DeepSeek-V4-Pro in thinking mode, calibrated against Claude Opus 4.7 with Cohen's κ = 0.77 on the injection axis (substantial agreement); the entire 4475-entry SHA-256 input cache ships with the dataset so reviewers can re-derive paper numbers bit-exact without an API key. Across 6615 pairs over four open VLMs, seven attack prompts, and seven test images, the two axes diverge by roughly 90times: 66.4% of pairs are programmatically disturbed (LLM-judged 46.6% at the substantial-or-complete tier), but only 0.756% (50/6615) reach any non-none injection tier and only 0.030% (2/6615) verbatim. The few injections that do land cluster on screenshot- or document-style carriers whose semantics already invite text transcription. BLIP-2 shows zero detectable drift at L_{inf} = 16/255 across all 2205 pairs even when used as a Stage-1 surrogate. We release the full dataset -- 21 universal images, 147 adversarial photos, 6,615 response pairs, the v3 dual-axis judge results, and the cache at huggingface.co/datasets/jeffliulab/visinject.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Due to their multimodal capabilities, Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have found numerous impactful applications in real-world scenarios. However, recent studies have revealed that VLMs are vulnerable to image-based adversarial attacks, particularly targeted adversarial images that manipulate the model to generate harmful content specified by the adversary. Current attack methods rely on predefined target labels to create targeted adversarial attacks, which limits their scalability and applicability for large-scale robustness evaluations. In this paper, we propose AnyAttack, a self-supervised framework that generates targeted adversarial images for VLMs without label supervision, allowing any image to serve as a target for the attack. Our framework employs the pre-training and fine-tuning paradigm, with the adversarial noise generator pre-trained on the large-scale LAION-400M dataset. This large-scale pre-training endows our method with powerful transferability across a wide range of VLMs. Extensive experiments on five mainstream open-source VLMs (CLIP, BLIP, BLIP2, InstructBLIP, and MiniGPT-4) across three multimodal tasks (image-text retrieval, multimodal classification, and image captioning) demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack. Additionally, we successfully transfer AnyAttack to multiple commercial VLMs, including Google Gemini, Claude Sonnet, Microsoft Copilot and OpenAI GPT. These results reveal an unprecedented risk to VLMs, highlighting the need for effective countermeasures.

Text-to-video retrieval systems have recently made significant progress by utilizing pre-trained models trained on large-scale image-text pairs. However, most of the latest methods primarily focus on the video modality while disregarding the audio signal for this task. Nevertheless, a recent advancement by ECLIPSE has improved long-range text-to-video retrieval by developing an audiovisual video representation. Nonetheless, the objective of the text-to-video retrieval task is to capture the complementary audio and video information that is pertinent to the text query rather than simply achieving better audio and video alignment. To address this issue, we introduce TEFAL, a TExt-conditioned Feature ALignment method that produces both audio and video representations conditioned on the text query. Instead of using only an audiovisual attention block, which could suppress the audio information relevant to the text query, our approach employs two independent cross-modal attention blocks that enable the text to attend to the audio and video representations separately. Our proposed method's efficacy is demonstrated on four benchmark datasets that include audio: MSR-VTT, LSMDC, VATEX, and Charades, and achieves better than state-of-the-art performance consistently across the four datasets. This is attributed to the additional text-query-conditioned audio representation and the complementary information it adds to the text-query-conditioned video representation.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.

Video misinformation increasingly operates at the semantic and evidential level: authentic footage may be selectively edited, temporally reordered, spliced across sources, or augmented with AI-generated content to construct false narratives. Such evidence-dependent manipulations cannot be reliably verified from the input video alone, because the missing, reordered, replaced, or recontextualized evidence lies outside the video itself. We introduce EVID-Bench, a benchmark for search-grounded video misinformation detection, where a system must search the open web for related videos and identify what information is false through cross-video comparison. EVID-Bench comprises 222 videos spanning 9 manipulation types across 3 categories: AI generation, single-source editing, and multi-source editing. All samples are verified to be undetectable by frontier models through visual inspection alone. We evaluate nine frontier multimodal models using a retrieval-augmented verification baseline. The best system achieves only 61.43\% point-level accuracy and 43.24\% video-level accuracy, while AI-generated manipulations remain especially challenging. Error analysis reveals recurring challenges: models fixate on irrelevant anchors, misattribute synthetic content to editorial splicing, and terminate search prematurely before fully explaining the manipulation.

Protecting digital identities of human face from various attack vectors is paramount, and face anti-spoofing plays a crucial role in this endeavor. Current approaches primarily focus on detecting spoofing attempts within individual frames to detect presentation attacks. However, the emergence of hyper-realistic generative models capable of real-time operation has heightened the risk of digitally generated attacks. In light of these evolving threats, this paper aims to address two key aspects. First, it sheds light on the vulnerabilities of state-of-the-art face anti-spoofing methods against digital attacks. Second, it presents a comprehensive taxonomy of common threats encountered in face anti-spoofing systems. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate the limitations of current face anti-spoofing detection techniques and their failure to generalize to novel digital attack scenarios. Notably, the existing models struggle with digital injection attacks including adversarial noise, realistic deepfake attacks, and digital replay attacks. To aid in the design and implementation of robust face anti-spoofing systems resilient to these emerging vulnerabilities, the paper proposes key design principles from model accuracy and robustness to pipeline robustness and even platform robustness. Especially, we suggest to implement the proactive face anti-spoofing system using active sensors to significant reduce the risks for unseen attack vectors and improve the user experience.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly being deployed as automated content moderators. Within this landscape, we uncover a critical threat: Adversarial Smuggling Attacks. Unlike adversarial perturbations (for misclassification) and adversarial jailbreaks (for harmful output generation), adversarial smuggling exploits the Human-AI capability gap. It encodes harmful content into human-readable visual formats that remain AI-unreadable, thereby evading automated detection and enabling the dissemination of harmful content. We classify smuggling attacks into two pathways: (1) Perceptual Blindness, disrupting text recognition; and (2) Reasoning Blockade, inhibiting semantic understanding despite successful text recognition. To evaluate this threat, we constructed SmuggleBench, the first comprehensive benchmark comprising 1,700 adversarial smuggling attack instances. Evaluations on SmuggleBench reveal that both proprietary (e.g., GPT-5) and open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) state-of-the-art models are vulnerable to this threat, producing Attack Success Rates (ASR) exceeding 90%. By analyzing the vulnerability through the lenses of perception and reasoning, we identify three root causes: the limited capabilities of vision encoders, the robustness gap in OCR, and the scarcity of domain-specific adversarial examples. We conduct a preliminary exploration of mitigation strategies, investigating the potential of test-time scaling (via CoT) and adversarial training (via SFT) to mitigate this threat. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/zhihengli-casia/smugglebench.

Automatic Deception Detection has been a hot research topic for a long time, using machine learning and deep learning to automatically detect deception, brings new light to this old field. In this paper, we proposed a voting-based method for automatic deception detection from videos using audio, visual and lexical features. Experiments were done on two datasets, the Real-life trial dataset by Michigan University and the Miami University deception detection dataset. Video samples were split into frames of images, audio, and manuscripts. Our Voting-based Multimodal proposed solution consists of three models. The first model is CNN for detecting deception from images, the second model is Support Vector Machine (SVM) on Mel spectrograms for detecting deception from audio and the third model is Word2Vec on Support Vector Machine (SVM) for detecting deception from manuscripts. Our proposed solution outperforms state of the art. Best results achieved on images, audio and text were 97%, 96%, 92% respectively on Real-Life Trial Dataset, and 97%, 82%, 73% on video, audio and text respectively on Miami University Deception Detection.

Generative large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved impressive performance gains, and their user base is growing rapidly. However, the security of LVLMs, in particular in a long-context multi-turn setting, is largely underexplored. In this paper, we consider the realistic scenario in which an attacker uploads a manipulated image to the web/social media. A benign user downloads this image and uses it as input to the LVLM. Our novel stealthy Visual Memory Injection (VMI) attack is designed such that on normal prompts the LVLM exhibits nominal behavior, but once the user gives a triggering prompt, the LVLM outputs a specific prescribed target message to manipulate the user, e.g. for adversarial marketing or political persuasion. Compared to previous work that focused on single-turn attacks, VMI is effective even after a long multi-turn conversation with the user. We demonstrate our attack on several recent open-weight LVLMs. This article thereby shows that large-scale manipulation of users is feasible with perturbed images in multi-turn conversation settings, calling for better robustness of LVLMs against these attacks. We release the source code at https://github.com/chs20/visual-memory-injection

The rapid advancement of AI-generated multimodal video-audio content has raised significant concerns regarding information security and content authenticity. Existing synthetic video datasets predominantly focus on the visual modality alone, while the few incorporating audio are largely confined to facial deepfakes--a limitation that fails to address the expanding landscape of general multimodal AI-generated content and substantially impedes the development of trustworthy detection systems. To bridge this critical gap, we introduce the Multimodal Video-Audio Dataset (MVAD), the first comprehensive dataset specifically designed for detecting AI-generated multimodal video-audio content. Our dataset exhibits three key characteristics: (1) genuine multimodality with samples generated according to three realistic video-audio forgery patterns; (2) high perceptual quality achieved through diverse state-of-the-art generative models; and (3) comprehensive diversity spanning realistic and anime visual styles, four content categories (humans, animals, objects, and scenes), and four video-audio multimodal data types. Our dataset will be available at https://github.com/HuMengXue0104/MVAD.

Current research in adversarial robustness of LLMs focuses on discrete input manipulations in the natural language space, which can be directly transferred to closed-source models. However, this approach neglects the steady progression of open-source models. As open-source models advance in capability, ensuring their safety also becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, attacks tailored to open-source LLMs that exploit full model access remain largely unexplored. We address this research gap and propose the embedding space attack, which directly attacks the continuous embedding representation of input tokens. We find that embedding space attacks circumvent model alignments and trigger harmful behaviors more efficiently than discrete attacks or model fine-tuning. Furthermore, we present a novel threat model in the context of unlearning and show that embedding space attacks can extract supposedly deleted information from unlearned LLMs across multiple datasets and models. Our findings highlight embedding space attacks as an important threat model in open-source LLMs. Trigger Warning: the appendix contains LLM-generated text with violence and harassment.

Deep Learning-based Text Understanding (DLTU) is the backbone technique behind various applications, including question answering, machine translation, and text classification. Despite its tremendous popularity, the security vulnerabilities of DLTU are still largely unknown, which is highly concerning given its increasing use in security-sensitive applications such as sentiment analysis and toxic content detection. In this paper, we show that DLTU is inherently vulnerable to adversarial text attacks, in which maliciously crafted texts trigger target DLTU systems and services to misbehave. Specifically, we present TextBugger, a general attack framework for generating adversarial texts. In contrast to prior works, TextBugger differs in significant ways: (i) effective -- it outperforms state-of-the-art attacks in terms of attack success rate; (ii) evasive -- it preserves the utility of benign text, with 94.9\% of the adversarial text correctly recognized by human readers; and (iii) efficient -- it generates adversarial text with computational complexity sub-linear to the text length. We empirically evaluate TextBugger on a set of real-world DLTU systems and services used for sentiment analysis and toxic content detection, demonstrating its effectiveness, evasiveness, and efficiency. For instance, TextBugger achieves 100\% success rate on the IMDB dataset based on Amazon AWS Comprehend within 4.61 seconds and preserves 97\% semantic similarity. We further discuss possible defense mechanisms to mitigate such attack and the adversary's potential countermeasures, which leads to promising directions for further research.

Multimodal Language Models (MMLMs) typically undergo post-training alignment to prevent harmful content generation. However, these alignment stages focus primarily on the assistant role, leaving the user role unaligned, and stick to a fixed input prompt structure of special tokens, leaving the model vulnerable when inputs deviate from these expectations. We introduce Role-Modality Attacks (RMA), a novel class of adversarial attacks that exploit role confusion between the user and assistant and alter the position of the image token to elicit harmful outputs. Unlike existing attacks that modify query content, RMAs manipulate the input structure without altering the query itself. We systematically evaluate these attacks across multiple Vision Language Models (VLMs) on eight distinct settings, showing that they can be composed to create stronger adversarial prompts, as also evidenced by their increased projection in the negative refusal direction in the residual stream, a property observed in prior successful attacks. Finally, for mitigation, we propose an adversarial training approach that makes the model robust against input prompt perturbations. By training the model on a range of harmful and benign prompts all perturbed with different RMA settings, it loses its sensitivity to Role Confusion and Modality Manipulation attacks and is trained to only pay attention to the content of the query in the input prompt structure, effectively reducing Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the model's general utility.

Over the last decade, online lecture videos have become increasingly popular and have experienced a meteoric rise during the pandemic. However, video-language research has primarily focused on instructional videos or movies, and tools to help students navigate the growing online lectures are lacking. Our first contribution is to facilitate research in the educational domain, by introducing AVLectures, a large-scale dataset consisting of 86 courses with over 2,350 lectures covering various STEM subjects. Each course contains video lectures, transcripts, OCR outputs for lecture frames, and optionally lecture notes, slides, assignments, and related educational content that can inspire a variety of tasks. Our second contribution is introducing video lecture segmentation that splits lectures into bite-sized topics that show promise in improving learner engagement. We formulate lecture segmentation as an unsupervised task that leverages visual, textual, and OCR cues from the lecture, while clip representations are fine-tuned on a pretext self-supervised task of matching the narration with the temporally aligned visual content. We use these representations to generate segments using a temporally consistent 1-nearest neighbor algorithm, TW-FINCH. We evaluate our method on 15 courses and compare it against various visual and textual baselines, outperforming all of them. Our comprehensive ablation studies also identify the key factors driving the success of our approach.

We introduce new jailbreak attacks on vision language models (VLMs), which use aligned LLMs and are resilient to text-only jailbreak attacks. Specifically, we develop cross-modality attacks on alignment where we pair adversarial images going through the vision encoder with textual prompts to break the alignment of the language model. Our attacks employ a novel compositional strategy that combines an image, adversarially targeted towards toxic embeddings, with generic prompts to accomplish the jailbreak. Thus, the LLM draws the context to answer the generic prompt from the adversarial image. The generation of benign-appearing adversarial images leverages a novel embedding-space-based methodology, operating with no access to the LLM model. Instead, the attacks require access only to the vision encoder and utilize one of our four embedding space targeting strategies. By not requiring access to the LLM, the attacks lower the entry barrier for attackers, particularly when vision encoders such as CLIP are embedded in closed-source LLMs. The attacks achieve a high success rate across different VLMs, highlighting the risk of cross-modality alignment vulnerabilities, and the need for new alignment approaches for multi-modal models.

Text-to-video models have made significant strides in generating short video clips from textual descriptions. Yet, a significant challenge remains: generating several video shots of the same characters, preserving their identity without hurting video quality, dynamics, and responsiveness to text prompts. We present Video Storyboarding, a training-free method to enable pretrained text-to-video models to generate multiple shots with consistent characters, by sharing features between them. Our key insight is that self-attention query features (Q) encode both motion and identity. This creates a hard-to-avoid trade-off between preserving character identity and making videos dynamic, when features are shared. To address this issue, we introduce a novel query injection strategy that balances identity preservation and natural motion retention. This approach improves upon naive consistency techniques applied to videos, which often struggle to maintain this delicate equilibrium. Our experiments demonstrate significant improvements in character consistency across scenes while maintaining high-quality motion and text alignment. These results offer insights into critical stages of video generation and the interplay of structure and motion in video diffusion models.