Daily Papers

Self-consistency (SC) is a widely used test-time inference technique for improving performance in chain-of-thought reasoning. It involves generating multiple responses, or samples from a large language model (LLM) and selecting the most frequent answer. This procedure can naturally be viewed as a majority vote or empirical mode estimation. Despite its effectiveness, SC is prohibitively expensive at scale when naively applied to datasets, and it lacks a unified theoretical treatment of sample efficiency and scaling behavior. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of SC's scaling behavior and its variants, drawing on mode estimation and voting theory. We derive and empirically validate power law scaling for self-consistency across datasets, and analyze the sample efficiency for fixed-allocation and dynamic-allocation sampling schemes. From these insights, we introduce Blend-ASC, a novel variant of self-consistency that dynamically allocates samples to questions during inference, achieving state-of-the-art sample efficiency. Our approach uses 6.8x fewer samples than vanilla SC on average, outperforming both fixed- and dynamic-allocation SC baselines, thereby demonstrating the superiority of our approach in terms of efficiency. In contrast to existing variants, Blend-ASC is hyperparameter-free and can fit an arbitrary sample budget, ensuring it can be easily applied to any self-consistency application.

Point cloud registration is challenging in the presence of heavy outlier correspondences. This paper focuses on addressing the robust correspondence-based registration problem with gravity prior that often arises in practice. The gravity directions are typically obtained by inertial measurement units (IMUs) and can reduce the degree of freedom (DOF) of rotation from 3 to 1. We propose a novel transformation decoupling strategy by leveraging screw theory. This strategy decomposes the original 4-DOF problem into three sub-problems with 1-DOF, 2-DOF, and 1-DOF, respectively, thereby enhancing the computation efficiency. Specifically, the first 1-DOF represents the translation along the rotation axis and we propose an interval stabbing-based method to solve it. The second 2-DOF represents the pole which is an auxiliary variable in screw theory and we utilize a branch-and-bound method to solve it. The last 1-DOF represents the rotation angle and we propose a global voting method for its estimation. The proposed method sequentially solves three consensus maximization sub-problems, leading to efficient and deterministic registration. In particular, it can even handle the correspondence-free registration problem due to its significant robustness. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that our method is more efficient and robust than state-of-the-art methods, even when dealing with outlier rates exceeding 99%.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

Test-time scaling can improve model performance by aggregating stochastic reasoning trajectories. However, achieving sample-efficient test-time self-consistency under a limited budget remains an open challenge. We introduce PETS (Principled and Efficient Test-TimeSelf-Consistency), which initiates a principled study of trajectory allocation through an optimization framework. Central to our approach is the self-consistency rate, a new measure defined as agreement with the infinite-budget majority vote. This formulation makes sample-efficient test-time allocation theoretically grounded and amenable to rigorous analysis. We study both offline and online settings. In the offline regime, where all questions are known in advance, we connect trajectory allocation to crowdsourcing, a classic and well-developed area, by modeling reasoning traces as workers. This perspective allows us to leverage rich existing theory, yielding theoretical guarantees and an efficient majority-voting-based allocation algorithm. In the online streaming regime, where questions arrive sequentially and allocations must be made on the fly, we propose a novel method inspired by the offline framework. Our approach adapts budgets to question difficulty while preserving strong theoretical guarantees and computational efficiency. Experiments show that PETS consistently outperforms uniform allocation. On GPQA, PETS achieves perfect self-consistency in both settings while reducing the sampling budget by up to 75% (offline) and 55% (online) relative to uniform allocation. Code is available at https://github.com/ZDCSlab/PETS.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

Achieving political consensus is crucial yet challenging for the effective functioning of social governance. However, although frontier AI systems represented by large language models (LLMs) have developed rapidly in recent years, their capabilities in this scope are still understudied. In this paper, we introduce PoliCon, a novel benchmark constructed from 2,225 high-quality deliberation records of the European Parliament over 13 years, ranging from 2009 to 2022, to evaluate the ability of LLMs to draft consensus resolutions based on divergent party positions under varying collective decision-making contexts and political requirements. Specifically, PoliCon incorporates four factors to build each task environment for finding different political consensus: specific political issues, political goals, participating parties, and power structures based on seat distribution. We also developed an evaluation framework based on social choice theory for PoliCon, which simulates the real voting outcomes of different political parties to assess whether LLM-generated resolutions meet the requirements of the predetermined political consensus. Our experimental results demonstrate that even state-of-the-art models remain undersatisfied with complex tasks like passing resolutions by a two-thirds majority and addressing security issues, while uncovering their inherent partisan biases and revealing some behaviors LLMs show to achieve the consensus, such as prioritizing the stance of the dominant party instead of uniting smaller parties, which highlights PoliCon's promise as an effective platform for studying LLMs' ability to promote political consensus. The code and dataset are released at https://zowiezhang.github.io/projects/PoliCon.

Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations that ensure pairwise majority voting yields acyclic outcomes, and they form an active area of research at the intersection of social choice theory and combinatorics. In this paper, we extend the theory of Condorcet domains to the broader setting of arbitrary finite Coxeter groups. The core contribution of our approach is the introduction of Condorcet root posets, defined on the chosen root systems. Notably, we establish a natural bijection between closed Condorcet domains and Condorcet root posets, which facilitates the study of Condorcet domains. Using this correspondence, we extend the median graph representation of closed Condorcet domains to arbitrary finite Coxeter groups, demonstrating that these domains can be characterized by the skeletons of their associated Condorcet root posets. These results are novel even in type A. Furthermore, these posets give a unified language that efficiently captures a wide range of desirable properties of Condorcet domains, such as being maximal, connected, peak-pit, and of tiling type. Using this framework, we strengthen and generalize several classical results: we establish that a maximal Condorcet domain is connected if and only if it is peak-pit; we prove that the tiling-type property is equivalent to the combination of being maximal and connected, and having maximal width; and we show that strictly positive voting profiles on connected Condorcet domains yield outcomes with only simple ties.

Test-time scaling evaluates reasoning LLMs by sampling multiple outputs per prompt, but ranking models in this regime remains underexplored. We formalize dense benchmark ranking under test-time scaling and introduce Scorio, a library that implements statistical ranking methods such as paired-comparison models, item response theory (IRT) models, voting rules, and graph- and spectral-based methods. Across 20 reasoning models on four Olympiad-style math benchmarks (AIME'24, AIME'25, HMMT'25, and BrUMO'25; up to N=80 trials), most full-trial rankings agree closely with the Bayesian gold standard Bayes_{U}@80 (mean Kendall's τ_b = 0.93--0.95), and 19--34 methods recover exactly the same ordering. In the single-trial regime, the best methods reach τ_b approx 0.86. Using greedy decoding as an empirical prior (Bayes_{R_0}@N) reduces variance at N=1 by 16--52%, but can bias rankings when greedy and stochastic sampling disagree. These results identify reliable ranking methods for both high- and low-budget test-time scaling. We release Scorio as an open-source library at https://github.com/mohsenhariri/scorio.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

Conjoint analysis, an application of factorial experimental design, is a popular tool in social science research for studying multidimensional preferences. In such experiments in the political analysis context, respondents are asked to choose between two hypothetical political candidates with randomly selected features, which can include partisanship, policy positions, gender and race. We consider the problem of identifying optimal candidate profiles. Because the number of unique feature combinations far exceeds the total number of observations in a typical conjoint experiment, it is impossible to determine the optimal profile exactly. To address this identification challenge, we derive an optimal stochastic intervention that represents a probability distribution of various attributes aimed at achieving the most favorable average outcome. We first consider an environment where one political party optimizes their candidate selection. We then move to the more realistic case where two political parties optimize their own candidate selection simultaneously and in opposition to each other. We apply the proposed methodology to an existing candidate choice conjoint experiment concerning vote choice for US president. We find that, in contrast to the non-adversarial approach, expected outcomes in the adversarial regime fall within range of historical electoral outcomes, with optimal strategies suggested by the method more likely to match the actual observed candidates compared to strategies derived from a non-adversarial approach. These findings indicate that incorporating adversarial dynamics into conjoint analysis may yield unique insight into social science data from experiments.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

User-generated contents (UGCs) on online platforms allow marketing researchers to understand consumer preferences for products and services. With the advance of large language models (LLMs), some studies utilized the models for annotation and sentiment analysis. However, the relationship between the accuracy and the hyper-parameters of LLMs is yet to be thoroughly examined. In addition, the issues of variability and reproducibility of results from each trial of LLMs have rarely been considered in existing literature. Since actual human annotation uses majority voting to resolve disagreements among annotators, this study introduces a majority voting mechanism to a sentiment analysis model using local LLMs. By a series of three analyses of online reviews on restaurant evaluations, we demonstrate that majority voting with multiple attempts using a medium-sized model produces more robust results than using a large model with a single attempt. Furthermore, we conducted further analysis to investigate the effect of each aspect on the overall evaluation.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Generations from large language models (LLMs) can be improved by sampling and scoring multiple solutions to select a final answer. Current "sample and select" methods such as self-consistency (SC) rely on majority voting to score answers. However, when tasks have many distinct and valid answers, selection by voting requires a large number of samples. This makes SC prohibitively expensive for interactive tasks that involve generating multiple actions (answers) sequentially. After establishing that majority voting fails to provide consistent gains on such tasks, we demonstrate how to increase success rates by softening the scoring criterion. We introduce Soft Self-Consistency (SOFT-SC), which replaces SC's discontinuous scoring with a continuous score computed from model likelihoods, allowing for selection even when actions are sparsely distributed. SOFT-SC improves both performance and efficiency on long-horizon interactive tasks, requiring half as many samples as SC for comparable or better performance. For a fixed number of samples, SOFT-SC leads to a 1.3% increase over SC in absolute success rate on writing bash programs, a 6.6% increase on online shopping (WebShop), and a 4.7% increase for an interactive household game (ALFWorld). Finally, we show that SOFT-SC can be applied to both open-source and black-box models.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

A standard technique for scaling inference-time reasoning is Self-Consistency, whereby multiple candidate answers are sampled from an LLM and the most common answer is selected. More recently, it has been shown that weighted majority voting (e.g. Confidence-Informed Self Consistency (CISC)), which assigns a confidence value to each candidate answer and chooses the answer with the largest accumulated score, tends to be more accurate on a wide range of popular benchmarks. In practice, weighted majority voting necessitates calling a critic LLM on each candidate's reasoning trace to produce the answer's confidence score. This secondary series of LLM calls greatly increases the overhead and cost of weighted majority voting, despite its potential performance benefits. To reduce this expense, we propose VecCISC, a lightweight, adaptive framework that uses a measure of semantic similarity to filter reasoning traces that are semantically equivalent to others, degenerate, or hallucinated, thus decreasing the number of candidate answers that must be evaluated by the critic. To ensure adequate experimental thoroughness, we evaluate VecCISC on five challenging, widely-adopted datasets spanning the domains of mathematics, chemistry, biology, commonsense reasoning, and the humanities. Our results demonstrate that VecCISC reduces the total token usage by 47%, while maintaining or exceeding the accuracy of CISC.

Prior research has established that instruction-tuned large language models exhibit left-of-center political bias, measured exclusively through abstract political questionnaires. We show that this finding does not generalize to concrete policy decisions. We introduce a dual-instrument methodology grounded in Swiss democratic reality. The Smartvote questionnaire (75 abstract policy questions) is administered to 66 LLMs from 27 model families and compared to 184 elected members of the Swiss National Council, replicating the established leftward convergence (Cohen's d = 3.64, p = 0.0002). Then, novel to this work, 9 flagship LLMs are confronted with 48 real federal referenda (Volksabstimmungen) in four national languages (German, French, Italian, Romansh) under three information conditions, comparing votes to actual outcomes and party recommendations (Parolen). Three findings challenge the prevailing narrative. (1) Abstract questionnaires do not predict concrete behavior: the left-to-right agreement gradient on Smartvote shifts from left-peaked to center-peaked on Volksabstimmungen, where models align most with centrist Die Mitte and FDP rather than leftist SP and Gruene (Wilcoxon p = 0.008). (2) For some models, the language of a political question changes the answer more than the political content does: cross-linguistic consistency ranges from 50% (Mistral) to 98% (GPT-5.4). (3) Two models exhibit systematic change-aversion rather than political bias, voting Nein on 83-94% of referenda regardless of direction (binomial p < 0.0001). What prior work measured as "leftward bias" may not generalize beyond abstract instruments. On concrete policy decisions, LLMs behave less like coalition partners of the left and more like cautious civil servants: centrist, status-quo-favoring, and inconsistent across languages.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

As LLMs increasingly mediate the political information citizens rely on, there is still no standardized way to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary informational properties such as clarity, noise, and consistency. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs on the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down under absent, vague, or contradictory information, while flattening the intensity of political language. These failures are likely driven by party priors, influenced by party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing robust optimization methods such as minimizing worst-group loss or regret correspond to classical bargaining solutions and embody different fairness principles. We propose relative improvement, the ratio of actual risk reduction to potential reduction from a baseline predictor, which recovers the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Unlike absolute-scale methods that may not be comparable when groups have different potential predictability, relative improvement provides axiomatic justification including scale invariance and individual monotonicity. We establish finite-sample convergence guarantees under mild conditions.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Recently bipartite graphs have been widely used to represent the relationship two sets of items for information retrieval applications. The Web offers a wide range of data which can be represented by bipartite graphs, such us movies and reviewers in recomender systems, queries and URLs in search engines, users and posts in social networks. The size and the dynamic nature of such graphs generate the need for more efficient ranking methods. In this thesis, at first we present the fundamental mathematical backround that we use subsequently and we describe the basic principles of the Perron-Frobebius theory for non negative matrices as well as the the basic principles of the Markov chain theory. Then, we propose a novel algorithm named BipartiteRank, which is suitable to rank scenarios, that can be represented as a bipartite graph. This algorithm is based on the random surfer model and inherits the basic mathematical characteristics of PageRank. What makes it different, is the fact that it introduces an alternative type of teleportation, based on the block structure of the bipartite graph in order to achieve more efficient ranking. Finally, we support this opinion with mathematical arguments and then we confirm it experimentally through a series of tests on real data.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

In democratic societies, electoral systems play a crucial role in translating public preferences into political representation. Among these, the D'Hondt method is widely used to ensure proportional representation, balancing fair representation with governmental stability. Recently, there has been a growing interest in applying similar principles of proportional representation to enhance interpretability in machine learning, specifically in Explainable AI (XAI). This study investigates the integration of D'Hondt-based voting principles in the DhondtXAI method, which leverages resource allocation concepts to interpret feature importance within AI models. Through a comparison of SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) and DhondtXAI, we evaluate their effectiveness in feature attribution within CatBoost and XGBoost models for breast cancer and diabetes prediction, respectively. The DhondtXAI approach allows for alliance formation and thresholding to enhance interpretability, representing feature importance as seats in a parliamentary view. Statistical correlation analyses between SHAP values and DhondtXAI allocations support the consistency of interpretations, demonstrating DhondtXAI's potential as a complementary tool for understanding feature importance in AI models. The results highlight that integrating electoral principles, such as proportional representation and alliances, into AI explainability can improve user understanding, especially in high-stakes fields like healthcare.

The aim of this paper is to present an elementary computable theory of probability, random variables and stochastic processes. The probability theory is baed on existing approaches using valuations and lower integrals. Various approaches to random variables are discussed, including the approach based on completions in a Polish space. We apply the theory to the study of stochastic dynamical systems in discrete-time, and give a brief exposition of the Wiener process as a foundation for stochastic differential equations. The theory is based within the framework of type-two effectivity, so has an explicit direct link with Turing computation, and is expressed in a system of computable types and operations, so has a clean mathematical description.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

Online social media platforms enable influencers to distribute content and quickly capture audience reactions, significantly shaping their promotional strategies and advertising agreements. Understanding how sentiment dynamics and emotional contagion unfold among followers is vital for influencers and marketers, as these processes shape engagement, brand perception, and purchasing behavior. While sentiment analysis tools effectively track sentiment fluctuations, dynamical models explaining their evolution remain limited, often neglecting network structures and interactions both among blogs and between their topic-focused follower groups. In this study, we tracked influential tech-focused Weibo bloggers over six months, quantifying follower sentiment from text-mined feedback. By treating each blogger's audience as a single "macro-agent", we find that sentiment trajectories follow the principle of iterative averaging -- a foundational mechanism in many dynamical models of opinion formation, a theoretical framework at the intersection of social network analysis and dynamical systems theory. The sentiment evolution aligns closely with opinion-dynamics models, particularly modified versions of the classical French-DeGroot model that incorporate delayed perception and distinguish between expressed and private opinions. The inferred influence structures reveal interdependencies among blogs that may arise from homophily, whereby emotionally similar users subscribe to the same blogs and collectively shape the shared sentiment expressed within these communities.

Reliably labelling data typically requires annotations from multiple human workers. However, humans are far from being perfect. Hence, it is a common practice to aggregate labels gathered from multiple annotators to make a more confident estimate of the true label. Among many aggregation methods, the simple and well known Majority Vote (MV) selects the class label polling the highest number of votes. However, despite its importance, the optimality of MV's label aggregation has not been extensively studied. We address this gap in our work by characterising the conditions under which MV achieves the theoretically optimal lower bound on label estimation error. Our results capture the tolerable limits on annotation noise under which MV can optimally recover labels for a given class distribution. This certificate of optimality provides a more principled approach to model selection for label aggregation as an alternative to otherwise inefficient practices that sometimes include higher experts, gold labels, etc., that are all marred by the same human uncertainty despite huge time and monetary costs. Experiments on both synthetic and real world data corroborate our theoretical findings.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Objective estimators of multimedia quality are often judged by comparing estimates with subjective "truth data," most often via Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) or mean-squared error (MSE). But subjective test results contain noise, so striving for a PCC of 1.0 or an MSE of 0.0 is neither realistic nor repeatable. Numerous efforts have been made to acknowledge and appropriately accommodate subjective test noise in objective-subjective comparisons, typically resulting in new analysis frameworks and figures-of-merit. We take a different approach. By making only basic assumptions, we derive bounds on PCC and MSE that can be expected for a subjective test. Consistent with intuition, these bounds are functions of subjective vote variance. When a subjective test includes vote variance information, the calculation of the bounds is easy, and in this case we say the resulting bounds are "fully data-driven." We provide two options for calculating bounds in cases where vote variance information is not available. One option is to use vote variance information from other subjective tests that do provide such information, and the second option is to use a model for subjective votes. Thus we introduce a binomial-based model for subjective votes (BinoVotes) that naturally leads to a mean opinion score (MOS) model, named BinoMOS, with multiple unique desirable properties. BinoMOS reproduces the discrete nature of MOS values and its dependence on the number of votes per file. This modeling provides vote variance information required by the PCC and MSE bounds and we compare this modeling with data from 18 subjective tests. The modeling yields PCC and MSE bounds that agree very well with those found from the data directly. These results allow one to set expectations for the PCC and MSE that might be achieved for any subjective test, even those where vote variance information is not available.

Large Reasoning Models have demonstrated remarkable performance with the advancement of test-time scaling techniques, which enhances prediction accuracy by generating multiple candidate responses and selecting the most reliable answer. While prior work has analyzed that internal model signals like confidence scores can partly indicate response correctness and exhibit a distributional correlation with accuracy, such distributional information has not been fully utilized to guide answer selection. Motivated by this, we propose DistriVoting, which incorporates distributional priors as another signal alongside confidence during voting. Specifically, our method (1) first decomposes the mixed confidence distribution into positive and negative components using Gaussian Mixture Models, (2) then applies a reject filter based on positive/negative samples from them to mitigate overlap between the two distributions. Besides, to further alleviate the overlap from the perspective of distribution itself, we propose SelfStepConf, which uses step-level confidence to dynamically adjust inference process, increasing the separation between the two distributions to improve the reliability of confidences in voting. Experiments across 16 models and 5 benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art approaches.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

The massive population election simulation aims to model the preferences of specific groups in particular election scenarios. It has garnered significant attention for its potential to forecast real-world social trends. Traditional agent-based modeling (ABM) methods are constrained by their ability to incorporate complex individual background information and provide interactive prediction results. In this paper, we introduce ElectionSim, an innovative election simulation framework based on large language models, designed to support accurate voter simulations and customized distributions, together with an interactive platform to dialogue with simulated voters. We present a million-level voter pool sampled from social media platforms to support accurate individual simulation. We also introduce PPE, a poll-based presidential election benchmark to assess the performance of our framework under the U.S. presidential election scenario. Through extensive experiments and analyses, we demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our framework in U.S. presidential election simulations.

Can classical consensus models predict the group behavior of large language models (LLMs)? We examine multi-round interactions among LLM agents through the DeGroot framework, where agents exchange text-based messages over diverse communication graphs. To track opinion evolution, we map each message to an opinion score via sentiment analysis. We find that agents typically reach consensus and the disagreement between the agents decays exponentially. However, the limiting opinion departs from DeGroot's network-centrality-weighted forecast. The consensus between LLM agents turns out to be largely insensitive to initial conditions and instead depends strongly on the discussion subject and inherent biases. Nevertheless, transient dynamics align with classical graph theory and the convergence rate of opinions is closely related to the second-largest eigenvalue of the graph's combination matrix. Together, these findings can be useful for LLM-driven social-network simulations and the design of resource-efficient multi-agent LLM applications.

This review examines how AI technologies are transforming democratic representation, focusing on citizen participation and algorithmic decision-making. The analysis reveals that AI technologies are reshaping democratic processes in fundamental ways: enabling mass-scale deliberation, changing how citizens access and engage with political information, and transforming how representatives make and implement decisions. While AI offers unprecedented opportunities for enhancing democratic participation and governance efficiency, it also presents significant challenges to democratic legitimacy and accountability. Social media platforms' AI-driven algorithms currently mediate much political discourse, creating concerns about information manipulation and privacy. Large Language Models introduce both epistemic challenges and potential tools for improving democratic dialogue. The emergence of Mass Online Deliberation platforms suggests possibilities for scaling up meaningful citizen participation, while Algorithmic Decision-Making systems promise more efficient policy implementation but face limitations in handling complex political trade-offs. As these systems become prevalent, representatives may assume the role of architects of automated decision frameworks, responsible for guiding the translation of politically contested concepts into technical parameters and metrics. Advanced deliberation platforms offering real-time insights into citizen preferences will challenge traditional representative independence and discretion to interpret public will. The institutional integration of these participation mechanisms requires frameworks that balance the benefits with democratic stability through hybrid systems weighting different forms of democratic expression.

LLM inference often generates a batch of candidates for a prompt and selects one via strategies like majority voting or Best-of- N (BoN). For difficult tasks, this single-shot selection often underperforms. Consequently, evaluations commonly report Pass@k: the agent may submit up to k responses, and only the best of them is used when computing regret. Motivated by this, we study inference scaling in the more general Pass@k inference setting, and prove that neither majority voting nor BoN exhibits the desirable scaling with k and the sampling budget N. Combining the advantages of majority voting and BoN, we propose a new inference strategy called Best-of-Majority (BoM), with a pivotal step that restricts the candidates to the responses with high frequency in the N samples before selecting the top-k rewards. We prove that when the sampling budget is N=tildeOmega(C^*), the regret of BoM is O(epsilon_{opt}+epsilon_{mathrm{RM}^2C^*/k}), where C^* is the coverage coefficient, epsilon_{RM} is the estimation error of the reward model, and epsilon_{opt} is the estimation error of reward at the optimal response. We further establish a matching lower bound, certifying that our algorithm is minimax optimal. Beyond optimality, BoM has a key advantage: unlike majority voting and BoN, its performance does not degrade when increasing N. Experimental results of inference on math problems show BoM outperforming both majority voting and BoN.

While social media feed rankings are primarily driven by engagement signals rather than any explicit value system, the resulting algorithmic feeds are not value-neutral: engagement may prioritize specific individualistic values. This paper presents an approach for social media feed value alignment. We adopt Schwartz's theory of Basic Human Values -- a broad set of human values that articulates complementary and opposing values forming the building blocks of many cultures -- and we implement an algorithmic approach that models and then ranks feeds by expressions of Schwartz's values in social media posts. Our approach enables controls where users can express weights on their desired values, combining these weights and post value expressions into a ranking that respects users' articulated trade-offs. Through controlled experiments (N=141 and N=250), we demonstrate that users can use these controls to architect feeds reflecting their desired values. Across users, value-ranked feeds align with personal values, diverging substantially from existing engagement-driven feeds.

In the era of large language models, creative writing quality lacks a computable theoretical anchor. The dominant approaches are rubric scoring -- decomposing holistic aesthetic judgment into sub-scores -- and RLHF preference signals -- replacing quality with group votes. Both bypass the statistical structure of the text itself. This paper provides an information-theoretic foundation to fill this gap. We propose 'calibrated surprise' as the information-theoretic essence of excellent creative writing. This judgment matches reading intuition and covers its opposite. This literary judgment admits a precise mathematical formulation. Under full-dimensional constraints Y, feasible writing choices are forced into an extremely narrow space. The rare survivors are, from the unconstrained perspective, exactly the least predictable choices. Both are measured precisely by Shannon mutual information I(X;Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) -- 'calibrated' corresponds to H(X|Y) approaching 0; 'surprising' corresponds to H(X) going high. The subtraction structure of the formula naturally separates 'well-grounded surprise' from 'pure noise'. We use token-level logprobs from Qwen1.5-7B as an operational proxy for the ideal reader's probability distribution. Across 20 pairs (12 Chinese / 8 English) of high-quality vs. systematically degraded literary passages, 20/20 pairs support the core prediction: high-quality passages have systematically higher I(X;Y) than their degraded versions.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

Serial verification gates are a core reliability primitive in LLM harnesses: a candidate answer is returned only if k verifier calls all accept it. Under conditionally independent gates, the recent Odds Law (arXiv:2606.15712) shows that posterior log-odds grow linearly in k, so failure decays exponentially, and states that "a tight theory of partially correlated verifier cascades remains open." This note gives a minimal such theory. Modeling the per-instance false-accept rate on the generator's own errors as a latent variable αsim G (de Finetti), the exact cascade posterior is ell_k = ell_0 - ln m_k, with m_k the k-th moment of G. Then: (i) ell_k is concave in k for every non-degenerate G -- the Odds Law is its tangent at the first gate and an upper bound; (ii) for Beta(a,b) latents, failure decays polynomially, 1-r_k asymp k^{-b}, with correlation parameter ρ_v = 1/(a+b+1); (iii) a blind-spot atom of mass 1-π at α=1 caps the evidence extractable from any number of gates at -ln(1-π) nats, so reliability saturates below 1; (iv) letting the true-accept rate also vary (βsim H) yields a trichotomy -- gates eventually always help, plateau, or actively harm -- decided by the upper-tail exponents of G and H, with closed-form crossover k^dagger. The mechanism is survivorship: errors surviving gates are the high-α ones. The theory is measurable: R repeated verdicts per instance identify the first R moments of G, so two verdicts identify ρ_v; beta-binomial likelihood and NPMLE recover the reliability curve and the ill-posed ceiling. In synthetic tests, independence-based extrapolation underestimates failure by 20x at k=5 and ~3000x at k=10; the correlated fit at R=8 tracks held-out depths. The practical lever is decorrelation -- changing model family, modality, or evidence source -- not adding gates.

In this paper, we make the case that a scientific theory of deep learning is emerging. By this we mean a theory which characterizes important properties and statistics of the training process, hidden representations, final weights, and performance of neural networks. We pull together major strands of ongoing research in deep learning theory and identify five growing bodies of work that point toward such a theory: (a) solvable idealized settings that provide intuition for learning dynamics in realistic systems; (b) tractable limits that reveal insights into fundamental learning phenomena; (c) simple mathematical laws that capture important macroscopic observables; (d) theories of hyperparameters that disentangle them from the rest of the training process, leaving simpler systems behind; and (e) universal behaviors shared across systems and settings which clarify which phenomena call for explanation. Taken together, these bodies of work share certain broad traits: they are concerned with the dynamics of the training process; they primarily seek to describe coarse aggregate statistics; and they emphasize falsifiable quantitative predictions. We argue that the emerging theory is best thought of as a mechanics of the learning process, and suggest the name learning mechanics. We discuss the relationship between this mechanics perspective and other approaches for building a theory of deep learning, including the statistical and information-theoretic perspectives. In particular, we anticipate a symbiotic relationship between learning mechanics and mechanistic interpretability. We also review and address common arguments that fundamental theory will not be possible or is not important. We conclude with a portrait of important open directions in learning mechanics and advice for beginners. We host further introductory materials, perspectives, and open questions at learningmechanics.pub.