Daily Papers

We introduce WriteSAE, the first sparse autoencoder that decomposes and edits the matrix cache write of state-space and hybrid recurrent language models, where residual SAEs cannot reach. Existing SAEs read residual streams, but Gated DeltaNet, Mamba-2, and RWKV-7 write to a d_k times d_v cache through rank-1 updates k_t v_t^top that no vector atom can replace. WriteSAE factors each decoder atom into the native write shape, exposes a closed form for the per-token logit shift, and trains under matched Frobenius norm so atoms swap one cache slot at a time. Atom substitution beats matched-norm ablation on 92.4% of n=4{,}851 firings at Qwen3.5-0.8B L9 H4, the 87-atom population test holds at 89.8%, the closed form predicts measured effects at R^2=0.98, and Mamba-2-370M substitutes at 88.1% over 2,500 firings. Sustained three-position installs at 3times lift midrank target-in-continuation from 33.3% to 100% under greedy decoding, the first behavioral install at the matrix-recurrent write site.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates accurate AI-generated text detection. However, current approaches largely overlook the influence of author characteristics. We investigate how sociolinguistic attributes-gender, CEFR proficiency, academic field, and language environment-impact state-of-the-art AI text detectors. Using the ICNALE corpus of human-authored texts and parallel AI-generated texts from diverse LLMs, we conduct a rigorous evaluation employing multi-factor ANOVA and weighted least squares (WLS). Our results reveal significant biases: CEFR proficiency and language environment consistently affected detector accuracy, while gender and academic field showed detector-dependent effects. These findings highlight the crucial need for socially aware AI text detection to avoid unfairly penalizing specific demographic groups. We offer novel empirical evidence, a robust statistical framework, and actionable insights for developing more equitable and reliable detection systems in real-world, out-of-domain contexts. This work paves the way for future research on bias mitigation, inclusive evaluation benchmarks, and socially responsible LLM detectors.

As software engineering moves toward SE3.0, AI agents are increasingly used to carry out development tasks and contribute changes to software projects. It is therefore important to understand the extent of these contributions and how human developers review and intervene, since these factors shape the risks of delegating work to AI agents. While recent studies have examined how AI agents support software development tasks (e.g., code generation, issue resolution, and PR automation), their role in documentation tasks remains underexplored-even though documentation is widely consumed and shapes how developers understand and use software. Using the AIDev, we analyze 1,997 documentation-related pull requests (PRs) authored by AI agents and human developers, where documentation PRs are those that create or modify project documentation artifacts. We find that AI agents submit substantially more documentation-related PRs than humans in the studied repositories. We further observe that agent-authored documentation edits are typically integrated with little follow-up modification from humans, raising concerns about review practices and the reliability of agent-generated documentation. Overall, while AI agents already contribute substantially to documentation workflows, our results suggest concerns for emerging challenges for documentation quality assurance and human-AI collaboration in SE3.0.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to ``professionalize'' workplace communication, often at the cost of linguistic identity. We introduce "Cultural Ghosting", the systematic erasure of linguistic markers unique to non-native English varieties during text processing. Through analysis of 22,350 LLM outputs generated from 1,490 culturally marked texts (Indian, Singaporean,& Nigerian English) processed by five models under three prompt conditions, we quantify this phenomenon using two novel metrics: Identity Erasure Rate (IER) & Semantic Preservation Score (SPS). Across all prompts, we find an overall IER of 10.26%, with model-level variation from 3.5% to 20.5% (5.9x range). Crucially, we identify a Semantic Preservation Paradox: models maintain high semantic similarity (mean SPS = 0.748) while systematically erasing cultural markers. Pragmatic markers (politeness conventions) are 1.9x more vulnerable than lexical markers (71.5% vs. 37.1% erasure). Our experiments demonstrate that explicit cultural-preservation prompts reduce erasure by 29% without sacrificing semantic quality.

Model editing updates a pre-trained LLM with new facts or rules without re-training, while preserving unrelated behavior. In real deployment, edits arrive as long streams, and existing editors often face a plasticity-stability dilemma: locate-then-edit "hard writes" can accumulate interference over time, while null-space-style "hard preservation" preserves only what is explicitly constrained, so past edits can be overwritten and unconstrained behaviors may deviate, degrading general capabilities in the many-edits regime. We propose RLSEdit, a recursive least-squares editor for long sequential editing. RLSEdit formulates editing as an online quadratic optimization with soft constraints, minimizing a cumulative key-value fitting objective with two regularizers that control for both deviation from the pre-trained weights and from a designated anchor mapping. The resulting update admits an efficient online recursion via the Woodbury identity, with per-edit cost independent of history length and scaling only with the current edit size. We further provide deviation bounds and an asymptotic characterization of the adherence-preservation trade-off in the many-edits regime. Experiments on multiple model families demonstrate stable scaling to 10K edits, outperforming strong baselines in both edit success and holistic stability -- crucially retaining early edits, and preserving general capabilities on GLUE and held-out reasoning/code benchmarks.

Cross-entropy pretraining and preference alignment update the same transformer weights, but leave geometrically distinct traces. We characterise this asymmetry with a relative-subspace-fraction probe that tracks how weight deltas align with residual-stream activation subspaces and with the prediction subspace defined by the unembedding. Alignment deltas concentrate in the read pathway (W_Q, W_K), along principal directions of attention-input activations, while remaining near-isotropic in the write pathway (W_O, W_2) relative to the prediction subspace. We explain this pattern through anisotropic gradient accumulation: updates to a matrix W are sums of outer products δ_t a_t^top, and inherit directional structure from whichever side has concentrated covariance. For read-pathway matrices, this side is the input activation a_t, whose covariance is spiked in trained transformers and therefore produces objective-agnostic concentration. For write-pathway matrices, the relevant side is the upstream gradient δ_t, whose anisotropy depends on the loss. Cross-entropy supplies the canonical sharp per-sample signal, inducing write-pathway prediction geometry during pretraining; alignment objectives typically add little further write-side concentration. We support this explanation with a within-checkpoint trajectory, a graded contrastive-objective control, and a closed-form rank-1 intervention with matched direction controls, providing causal evidence for the proposed weight-space geometry.

An agent harness, the code that turns a model into an agent, writes its own record of each run, and that record is all a later reader gets when a run is disputed, investigated or audited. We call a record evidentiary when a reader who was not there can check it without trusting the writer. Across sixteen deployed frameworks, none writes one in full. Hearsay examines the record, not the task: five harnesses run fourteen tasks, three blinded LLM examiners and a human panel read the records, and every excerpt an examiner quotes is checked mechanically for who wrote it. First, the record lets a reader name the fault but not prove how the run went. Examiners name the right fault in 74 to 91% of 140 runs, but the fault can be proved only from two files the benchmark adds; for what happened in between, fewer than one citation in ten lands on anything the harness did not write, and the examiner with the fewest false alarms catches half of the entries we delete, rewrite or fabricate. Second, the remedy is a second author, not a stronger seal on the first. An append-only log of what passes between harness and model, kept outside the harness and read against the record in both directions, reports all 28 omissions and fabrications we made a harness commit as it ran, where a hash chain over the harness's own record passes all 28. Handed the log, examiners keep their fault verdicts but rest more of their citations on what the harness did not write. What makes a record evidence is who writes it, not what is captured.

Model merging is often used to combine capabilities from separately fine-tuned models without additional training, but it is unclear whether standard merging methods preserve multiple safety-relevant behaviors simultaneously. We study this question through a controlled case study using two Gemma-3-1B-IT finetunes on two complementary safety objectives: CARES harm-level classification and WildJailbreak adversarial refusal. We merge the two fine-tunes using Linear, SLERP, TIES, and DARE-TIES, and evaluate the merged models on classification accuracy, attack resistance, and benign compliance. Across all four methods, attack resistance transfers significantly more than classification accuracy: merged models retain 81-85% jailbreak refusal rates while CARES accuracy falls to at most 12.9%. Weight-space measurements suggest that this asymmetry is not caused by strongly opposing task-vector directions: the two task vectors are nearly orthogonal (cosine similarity 0.011). Instead, the refusal fine-tune induces consistently larger per-layer task-vector magnitudes, causing magnitude-sensitive methods to favor refusal updates. These results show that standard model merging can collapse safety recognition into broad refusal when safety-relevant task vectors differ substantially in scale.