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_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-03-24_GuoqiWu_AVPCSD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 24 March 2025, Guoqi Wu, AVP CSD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Guoqi Wu** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **AVP CSD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **24 March 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Hannah, Barun, Sally, Federica, Anne-Sophie** |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| CSD's connection with replenishment processes? | Joined in July 2018. By that time, IFAD11 replenishment consultations had concluded. He was however engaged in consultations of IFAD12 and IFAD13. He comments that so many institutional transformations have been effectuated, to make sure that IFAD is fit for purpose.  How CSD contributes, more specifically HRD, which is centre to our institution: HRD saw the introduction of mobility framework, reassignment exercise, integrated talent management, training and coaching opportunities.  From IT perspective: the ICT division saw much transformation, to make sure they're on top of the latest developments, in terms of systems as well as staff capacity, including leveraging digital technologies such as AI, as well as cyber security challenges, and then finally, the ORMS, GRIPS etc, all support operations, and to track for instance mainstreaming themes and private sector engagement.  Also, the big effort of bringing IFAD closer to the client, led by CSD.  Guoqi himself has been the champion of building a diverse working pace.  Comparing the two GSS, we see a very positive process. For IFAD12, a special KPI on decentralization effectiveness was introduced. This includes a survey which monitors the process to understand the satisfactory rate. |
+| How do you ensure that your department’s actions are aligned with the replenishment commitments? Is there any monitoring done on the departmental level? | People Process Technology Programme (PPTP) led by Guoqi (to be viewed in EB papers). This was agreed in early 2020, just before the outbreak of Covid-19, to see if IFAD is fit for purpose for the directions going. The board approved 12$m USD beyond the regular budget, which we invest in People ie staff capacities, capabilities, upskilling. Two difficulties i current business model being faced: project procurement, which is a new system financed by PPTP and capital project. Second: disbursement. So for this, programmes are set up for staff. In terms of Technology, OMNIDATA was developed to respond to operational needs as well as digital support needed for the IFAD staff side. |
+| Barun: form your perspective as AVP, are there two or three KPIs which you normally consider as the most significant to see how your department is performing? | Field presence. From 16% to 45% target, which is a huge endeavour. Really includes a large scope of changes, including the business model. We have about 40 country offices now.  GSS outcomes. They way that CSD regularly checks and takes stock in terms of staff's support system and extent to which they feel motivated etc. |
+| Sally: how you feel CSD supported the change processes, which are very many and varied in the period that we're talking about? | The corporate culture is critical in IFAD. The very first question is about motivation. How do we keep staff motivated? Inherent motivation is not enough, so two things CSD does: 1) career development, 2) workplace culture: other banks give much higher salaries, but a big plus is IFAD providing a good workplace culture. Including, teleworking policy as a flexible working arrangement. |
+| One of the challenges: vacancy rate | Vacancy ratios – once benchmarked with other institutions, IFAD is not per se doing worse. Vacancy ratio is not necessarily something negative, as change in staff is good, but it creates extra workload, for others to do the work, and it creates the question to fill vacancy with the right people. Covid-19 and decentralization has led to increased vacancies. They have tried to do a lot to streamline these processes and to increase the visibility of IFAD, but this is one of the main issues the member states are concerned with. CSD has been speaking to ISA to discuss this challenge. |
+| What would you hope to see from this evaluation? | Focus on resources: how to become less reliant on replenishment resources, such as private placement, market borrowing, and funds. To capture those strategic issues are most needed. Leveraging our comparative advantage, and recommendations for managing the gaps. Also, those that IFAD is not doing well, maybe we should stop doing it, or at a minimal scale. Let us work on what IFAD is good at, not only where IFAD is lacking its specificities. Also on a budget perspective. |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+| 1. PPTP programme. 2. CLE to focus on strategic recommendations on where IFAD's comparative advantage going forward and financial strategy (beyond replenishment dependency). 3. Issue of high vacancy rates, which is also popular by the board. Procurement and disbursement also an issue. | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
+| *Share info on PPTP* | Federica Maselli |
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-03-25_HishamZehni_LeadTechnicalSpecialistYouthandSocialInclusionClusterCoordinator_ECG_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 25 March 2025, Hisham Zehni, Lead Technical Specialist (Youth) and Social Inclusion Cluster Coordinator, ECG | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Hisham Zehni** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Lead Technical Specialist (Youth) and Social Inclusion Cluster Coordinator, ECG** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **25 March 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Hannah, Barun, James** |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| What is your assessment about IFAD's commitment to ensuring that 60% of new projects prioritize youth under IFAD12 replenishment target - including how the target was arrived at (the process) and whether and to what extent it is fair/achievable? How effectively, or not, has the target been operationalized across IFAD’s portfolio? | Hisham's role: He leads Youth team, SECAP team, and was over a year ago in the Environment Climate Cluster, and he will be again as a.i. The coordination role includes corporate requests from social inclusion, as these requests are often not boxed into gender, nutrition etc, so once it comes his way he coordinates it accordingly.  They work closely with PMI – as most youth would like to work off-farm. Value chain activities more interesting to youth. Also inclusive finance, is difficult for youth, as they have no collateral. So Hisham provides technical support throughout for project design to ensure that youth is included, that there is proper consultation with youth, to figure out tailored solutions.  Staffing: In HQ Hisham and Rahul, but in WCA and LAC also specialists, including consultants. But only one social inclusion officer in LAC is not adequate. SI staffing gap was found in LAC. In ESA, there's a P4 on nutrition and a senior person on Gender, typically a gender person can cover youth, but there's a gap. In WCA there is more staff, but the portfolio there is more complex, including fragility. He makes management aware, but there are more pressing priorities, such as safeguard staff (as Hisham is also a lead on SECAP).  IFAD11 was when the mainstreaming themes were formally adopted, 60% youth, gender 35%, nutrition 50%, climate finance 25%. In youth, they overachieved in IFAD11 and IFAD12, as they were validated as youth-sensitive. There's a team in ODE responsible for this validation exercise, and they determine following a series of criteria: youth employment/ empowerment pathways reflected in ToC, jobs indicator in logframe, strong focus youth, budget provides adequate resources so that PMU is equipped and can implement youth focus. In IFAD11, thus, 88% was achieved. In IFAD12 70%. **Mainly, in Africa (incl north Africa), which is a young continent, youth is a big priority for these governments.** Youth unemployment – we see it through youth riots and for instance Arab spring. It is high on the list of priorities for both these countries, but also developed countries which are concerned about migration. In APR we see a dip in demand of youth-sensitive projects – this is partly due to urbanization and thus less youth in rural areas. **It is relatively easier to address than nutrition-sensitive projects etc.** In 2019 particularly there was a push for youth, the Rural Development Report which also focuses on youth, and these targets are approved upon in replenishment consultations, which is also a political process including negotiations and consolidations. **They keep trying to raise the bar every replenishment. Youth remains relevant and therefore continues to be achievable.**  Increasingly, **countries would like to have harder investments, however**, it has not affected youth as much as other areas in which we work. Countries with more concessional loans are more open to mainstreaming themes, there is slightly more reluctance among UMIC countries. For instance, Vietnam only wants to borrow from IFAD for infrastructure. However, a big part of our projects includes training. For instance with youth, upskilling, training for better chance on jobs etc.  Hans: will this impact targets for IFAD14? Hisham does see that they need to work a lot harder to sell projects that are mainstream-sensitive. **Youth is the easiest to sell, but there's additional scrutiny when these are unpacked**.  When it comes to these replenishment commitments, we may need to go in direction of other MDBs such as AIDA. For istance, when replenishment commitments are set, they are only applied to those countries. Whereas in IFAD, commitments set for PBAS are the same for BRAM. **For BRAM loans, we can still keep the requirements, but bring the bar a bit lower**. Those BRAM borrowers, are less concerned about mainstream sensitive components. For DSF countries, however, they're happy to take anything.  **We should resist the temptation to further bring up the targets**. Barely met 60% targets. Especially NEN region, there is no gender and nutrition sensitive projects.  Feedback loop: RIDE RIME IOE reports etc are taken into account for setting targets for next replenishment periods, one may wish. These should serve a feedback mechanisms. However, he as an expert is not consulted.  It also depends on where agriculture is a major employer in a certain country. For instance in APR, there is a lesser share of agriculture, and agriculture per GDP. |
+| Are there specific deliverables from such work, or 'mainstreaming' of Youth implies building elements benefiting youth into the overall project deliverables? |  |
+| In general, what are the common mechanisms implemented to engage rural youth effectively in project design, execution, and monitoring? Are these mechanisms contributing to long-term youth empowerment and employment in rural areas? |  |
+| How does IFAD ensure that youth-targeted projects address the evolving needs of rural young people, particularly in fragile or conflict-affected contexts? | Especially youth in fragile settings important – youth namely become more susceptible to radicalization. The way IFAD tailors its operations in fragile situations is unclear.  Hans: so not much institutionalization, so project based, instead of looking at the context? Hisham: the latest OECD fragility report shows a big focus on youth. A major chapter in there, including risk of radicalization, need for technical and soft skill development, and helping them find pathways for employment and enterpreneurhsip, and agriculture tends to be one of the main sector that should be prioritized. |
+| What is your assessment of the budget (or resources) available to achieve the corporate replenishment target (of 60%)? |  |
+| Is there is a ring-fenced amount within a project budget that is dedicated for youth-related work? |  |
+| **Interested in understanding:** | How do these targets apply to those countries that do not benefit from the replenishment resources? |
+|  |  |
+|  |  |
+|  |  |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+| 1. As IFAD, we should be be revisiting our approach of making mandatory soft requirements for BRAM loans. How do these targets apply to those countries that do not benefit from the replenishment resources? Other MDBs are doing it differently, including AIDA WBG. Especially in the current context where the tendency is going to increased demand for *hard* investments, not soft. Note for Marcus. 2. Youth is relatively easier to 'sell' than other mainstreaming themes as it is on the minds of both developing as well as developed countries. | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
+| *Rural Development Report* | Hannah |
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-03-25_Jahan-ZebChowdhury_LeadTechnicalSpecialist-EnvironmentClimateClusterCoordinator_ECG_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 25 March 2025, Jahan-Zeb Chowdhury, Lead Technical Specialist - Environment & Climate Cluster Coordinator, ECG | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Jahan-Zeb Chowdhury** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Lead Technical Specialist - Environment & Climate Cluster Coordinator, ECG** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **25 March 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** |  |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| In general, what is your assessment about the target of IFAD's commitment to allocating 40% of the PoLG to climate finance – including how the target was arrived at (the process) and whether or not it is sufficient? What other resources have been made use of for climate related work, and the sufficiency or not of these? | **Adaptive capacity, NRM, CCA. Continuously 4 or above, on corporate-level targets.**  We're not a climate IFI, so having a target below 40% is justifiable. CC however is not to be separated from agriculture. The target is relevant, impactful, and right target to have. He joined the organization 2,5 years ago, and therefore he inherited this target. Under IFAD11 the target was 25%, and when it came to the actual achievement, it came to 35%.  Primary focus on CC is adaptation, but we also demonstrate mitigation co-benefits. It is achievable, but if it comes to additional financing let's say plugging into IFAD10 projects coming into completion of IFAD12, but the adaptive demonstration is difficult – because there is not much flexibility into this adaptivity. Additional financing has been difficult into achieving this. |
+| What progress has been made toward meeting this 40% target? Are there specific project outcomes that highlight the impact of this investment? | Impact indicators. But also RIME for performance on corporate targets, at design and implementation. |
+| How does IFAD assess the scalability and sustainability of its climate-focused interventions, particularly in regions most vulnerable to climate-related shocks? | Three aspects: 1. usually focus on policy engagement. Eg in IFAD11, there was a policy dimension to a project in Bangladesh, to provide early warning system to farmers, but they wanted to ensure that after the project had ended, the farmers would still receive information. So they had to collaborate with meteorological agency, and work with local engineering division, in other words, the policy dimension helps for sustainability and that the lessons are taking over and then implemented by government. Through IFAD they demonstrate the value addition.  2.??? Check records  3. Overall capacity development. They focus heavily on sustainability and exit strategy, these are now part of every supervision mission and implementation support mission. |
+| How effective have the Social, Environmental, and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) been in mainstreaming climate resilience across IFAD-funded projects? Are there areas for refinement or improvement? | Mainstreaming climate resilience is not necessarily a SECAP responsibility, but to have the safeguards in place, is a SECAP responsibility. For instance to identify potential risk from climate and social inclusion side, and to make sure.  Three problems though:   1. Sometimes thinks it is cost-heavy, overengineered, or a project labeled as high of substantial risk which requires more studies and therefore budget, but project design budget is not increasing. So: **mismatch between requirements for SECAP and the project availability of design of project.** The design budget is static, no elasticity, between 50million project or 300million project. 2. It requires perfect harmonization between climate and social inclusion efforts – not sure always the accountability mechanism, and therefore who is in charge. 3. SECAP is for PMU to implement. We can design, but implementation is up to PMU. The government also needs buy in to ensure that they think that this is the right and appropriate usage of the loan they are taking. So buy-in is not always easy. And even beyond, do the PMU staff have the capacity of PMU.   **We have too many mainstreaming issues.** There is a possibility that a single project has all the mainstreaming issues. Do we really need so many mainstreaming issues? More mainstreaming means more heavy PDR, which means more heavy implementation, means more capacity building. Usually a project would tick three mainstreaming topics – meaning we should bring more mainstreaming consultants. |
+| Hannah: how about IFAD's recent efforts for financing fewer but larger operations? One would say there are less PDRs to be designed, less supervision missions, to what extent has this impacted the scope of the work of your unit? | Indeed, this has been beneficial to them. Bigger projects, works in their favour because small team small budget, easier to achieve targets, instead of 200 different projects, so it does work in their favour. However, what they are cautious about, they do not add additional financing to ongoing projects, there is little flexibility because they are ongoing already. If the root of the project is not climate, it is hard to adapt. |
+| Barun: Enough regular budget available, or only doable with the benefit of supplementary funds? | We have very few core positions. So their cluster in general, we're looking at 1,6billion dollars is qualified as climate fund, so within HQ there are only 3 core positions, and then 5 regional positions that look at both climate and social inclusion topics. The majority of the positions are supported through supplementary funding, so they try and use the maximum time of this staff into PoLG design, so they blend the limited of supp funds with a bigger amount of PoLG funds to increase the impact. If these supp funds not existed, then no, they would not have been able to achieve these targets. So yes, **the positions funded by supp funds are absolutely critical for them to achieve their corporate targets.**  Do we in house have the capacity to deliver on these targets – targets seem to be set before there is assessed to what extent IFAD is fit to achieve these. Corporate level targets hinge on supplementary funds.  Majority of funding of other aid agencies comes from supplementary funds. The age of core funding is in the past. Going forward, there's no other option than increasingly seek from supp funds. No mission creep necessarilty – we can have our laser focus still  If we cannot demonstrate our increased value addition it becomes increasingly difficult to prove our business case to member states. How can we excite development partners, how we offer something really differently than others? |
+| James: how does IFAD set-off its own cc impact? | 90% of funds goes to CC adaptation, and also calculate mitigation finance following MDB methodology. They add a layer of proving that the project needs to be net-negative, before claiming the project is mitigation. This was introduced by IFAD, so they can keep away from greenwashing?  But it is up to the country to decide whether they use the money for CC adaptation or mitigation.  In May this year, there will be a document going to the board where the focus is on mitigation. |
+| Hans: conditionalities of supplementary funds? | The type of supp funds outside of GCF and GEF do not necessarily come with any conditions. So, for instance with ASAP, they try to really focus on CCA. The other fund mentioned, they use for CCM. |
+| M&E | Climate finance and adaptive capacity, wo within ODE there's a mainstreaming team, and it is their responsibility to work with them to validate what can be categorized as climate finance and what not, within the costab (before OPR). By the end of year one of IFAD12, they realized they were not performing at the right level (35 instead of 40%), so they took corrective actions to make sure to do course corrections to give guidance across the board. OPR monitors.  When it comes to project design, adaptation and NRM, these are rated by QAG. |
+| **Could you tell a little bit more about any lessons learned from IFAD12 that you bring into implementation of IFAD13?** | 1. To demonstrate business case for climate finance. This is how you ensure cashflow, benefit-ratio, business case for adaptation finance is a training that will be shared with governments and PMUs. 2. Integration of biodiversity and climate change, so overloading systems and processes with these two ideas, so these need to be integrated into a single project, this approach is going to be much more common. **New climate change strategy approach includes this.** 3. Having a discussion with PDT is absolutely fundamental. 4. Making sure we have a common understanding of the scoring that we do when it comes to project rating. So to make this more consistent. |
+| **Interested in understanding:** | **He would like to see a comparison between fragile and non-fragile situation. Also, second, increased understanding of the true capacity and budget to deliver on what they are asked to do.** |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+| 1. Targets are set before assessing capacities (e.g. technical) and budget (e.g. PDR design, supervision mission support consultants). Do we truly have the capacity and budget to deliver on what they're asked to do? 2. Achieving targets highly dependent on supplementary funds. 3. Too many mainstreaming themes is expensive, including SECAP. | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
+| *Any material on this added calculation to prove projects are net-negative* |  |
+| *New climate change strategy* |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-03-27_DonalBrown_AVPDepartmentforCountryOperations_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 27 March 2025, Donal Brown, AVP Department for Country Operations | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Donal Brown** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **AVP Department for Country Operations** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **27 March 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Mikal, Barun, Sally, Tianlin** |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| 1. What were key areas of focus for DCO in IFAD11 and IFAD12? | **IFAD11**:   * I joined IFAD at the beginning of IFAD 11. inherited a dysfunctional department. Priority was to fix poor planning, unclear decision-making, and underperformance. * Focused on improving performance, processes, and discipline. * When I joined i found the practice of making commitments to the Board, without knowing how to deliver it and how much it was cost. For instance we committed to a special programme for fragility in IFAD 11 – but we didn't have money and it was not clear what this was. [*two recent IOE evaluations (SRE Dry corridor and SRE Sahel) both found that IFAD is lacking a structured and clear approach to deal with fragile situations*]. So I had to try and tackle the practice of making vague and un-costed commitments. * There were two big isuses in IFAD 11: the discussion on graduation and financial reforms. Also, towards the end of IFAD 11 we started decentralization 2.0, which PMD/CDO had to lead, and had major implications. Graduation is basically a political discussion – List A countries don't like that some economically strong countries from List C continue to receive subsidized finance – on the other hand such countries are good borrowers because they have good repayment and support IFAD's credit rating; and also have pockets of poverty. * Follow up with Enika – what did decentralization 2.0 entail? When did it start and what were the implications for DCO in terms of HR, budget and overall performance. * IFAD 11 was also the first time we had all the mainstreaming themes and climate financing targets.   **IFAD12**:   * IFAD 12 was characterized by global economic downturn, linked to the after-shock of COVID and war in Ukraine. Faced serious external shocks. Due to this, many countries were delaying decisions for approval, so our focus was on getting the basics done (programme delivery). * Delivered the RPSF (COVID) and Crisis Response Initiative (Ukraine) — both unplanned but high-impact. * In IFAD 12 we introduced and piloted BRAM (Borrowed Resource Allocation Mechanism) — high learning curve. The lessons have been reflected in IFAD 13. * Follow up with Enika: what were the main lessons learned on BRAM in IFAD 12? Are these listed and documented somewhere?What is IFAD doing differently in IFAD 13 on BRAM? * Continued rollout of decentralization. Major effort. * Top priority: get pipeline delivered despite massive global volatility. |
+| 1. To what extent have budget allocations been adequate? | * Budget in IFAD11 was “a mess.” No alignment between results and resources. * Many replenishment commitments came without dedicated budgets. * Fragility and climate work cost more, but were underfunded. * Starting IFAD11, he fought for annual 10% increases in design and implementation budgets. * Fragile contexts needed more budget, but that differentiation was missing initially. * Budget still inadequate, but improving. DCO pushed hard for increased operational funding. * Follow up with Enika: how does DCO come to the conclusion that budget for design and supervision are inadequate? Is there a benchmarking or costing exercise? Can you provide data on the allocations for design and supervision over time? Early findings from CLE country case studies seem to indicate that Country Directors see design and supervision budgets as largely adequate – how do we reconcile this with Donal’s statement?   **Prioritization strategy when budget is tight:**   * Focus on delivery: design and supervision budgets take priority. * Non-lending is always de-prioritized (e.g. KM and Country Level Policy Engagement (CLPE) cut — seen as “nice-to-have, not essential”. * Micro-grants reintroduced to support some CLPE work. * Clear preference: prioritize hard delivery over soft influence. |
+| 1. How is budget reallocated across projects and countries? | * Previously, unspent funds stayed with divisions — often misused. * Brown stopped this practice ~4 years ago. Now, unspent money is pulled back to HQ and reallocated centrally. * Actively manages budget with flexibility: adjusts for unforeseen demands (e.g., audits, restructuring problem projects). * Budgeting done June–August for next year with little visibility — 30% of plans typically don’t materialize, requiring reallocation. |
+| 1. What has been the impact of Decentralization 2.0 and HR-related changes? | * Overall decentralization is a good thing, as it enhances effectiveness of IFAD operations. * Benefits don’t show in Year 1–2, but emerge 4–5 years after the establishment of country offices. Now that most decentralized offices are set up (e.g. we opened the regional offices in LAC and APR in 2025) we can now focus more on getting the staffing right. * Initial staffing metrics flawed — didn’t factor in supplementary funds or fragility. Being revised now. * Ongoing review of staffing allocations to reflect PoW, not just PoLG. * Follow up with Enika. How has staffing structure ‘factored in’ supplementary funds given that these are more variable and uncertain than regular funds (e.g. how can IFAD commit to creating staff positions in a given country office, which have long term implications, based on the expectation of short term supplementary funds)? * How do supplementary funds interface with regular PoLG? Which type of supplementary funds are ‘blended’ within regular funds (e.g. domestic and international co-financing) and which ones are not? What are the implications for reporting results on these different funds? * Big issue: staff disruption during reassignment — especially mid-project. * New policy: deliver your work before you move. * Follow up wtih Enika: since when is this implemented? Was it within IFAD 12 or after? * Major challenge: onboarding and upskilling. Many new staff lack institutional knowledge or networks. * Old CDs resist training; younger ones adapt better. * Mentorship system in place: senior retired CDs rehired as mentors. * Peer learning, communities of practice, clinics are used, but regional retreats are underfunded due to budget constraints. [*this was also a finding of the CLE-KM conducted by IOE in 2024*] * Representational/diplomatic skills lacking in some technical staff. Still working on that. * Moving forwards, one of the key challenges is when new CDs are recruited they need to spend time in HQ to build their understanding and networks. * Vacancy pool is useful to gain some resources for regional retreats. * Follow up with Enika: since when was DCO allowed to use the savings from the vacancy pool for its own purposes (e.g. organizing regional retreats) |
+| 5. What trends in lending to LICs vs UMICs, and how is portfolio composition determined? | * Portfolio of 80 countries under PBAS. Country selection driven by regional input + performance (e.g., Vietnam dropped for inactivity). * Mix of LICs, MICs, UMICs managed to meet donor expectations. * Donors (esp. List A) push for heavy focus on LICs. * Increasing number of targets add complexity for allocation (e.g., proportion for Africa/Sub-Sahara Africa). * UMICs now get only borrowed resources under BRAM; no core resources. * Portfolio planning now a puzzle of financial targets + country performance + political pressures. * Follow up with Enika: please can you summarize the various variables that have to be considered in IFAD's formula for allocating PBAS resources and how this has changed over time. Also, what is the Integrated Borrowing Framework (first introduced in 2020 then revised in 2023) – what are the implications? |
+| 6. What has been your experience with BRAM, NSO, and RBL (result based lending)? | * NSOs started in IFAD11. Massive learning curve, especially for HQ finance/legal staff. Required major internal education and shift in mindsets. * First NSO (Babangona) created confusion — governments thought they needed to approve it. Had to re-educate stakeholders. * BRAM piloted in IFAD12. Very new; IFAD13 aims to do it better. * RBL also brought challenges — e.g., confusion in FM about result-based disbursement logic. * Follow up with Enika: What is the overall history of Results Based Lending as a concept? What was the rationale and releveance of introducing this instrument? What guidance has been given to country teams for its implementation? Are any adjustments being made to this instrument in IFAD 13? |
+| 7. What are 2–3 key areas this evaluation should focus on (for DCO)? | **Operations resourcing**:   * Are we properly resourcing operations? what are we doing to ensure the front line has the right skills. * Getting people together is not sufficiently budgeted – this is very valuable and useful for operations in a decentralized organization. * **Efficiency & effectiveness**: * Examine real vs. perceived bureaucracy. * How much delegation of authority is there and what is the appropriate amount. * Has recalibration made processes smoother or more layered? * Number of projects has been decreasing and size are getting larger, which has been something I have been pushing. We have sometimes limitations in that governments can only borrow for a limited time.   **IFAD’s business model**:   * Too many in-house technical staff. Stop hiring subject matter experts full time, and rather rely on hiring short term consultants for their expertise. The technical staff sholud be responsive for quality control and maintaining rosters of experts. This is why i set up an agreement with the FAO investment center: * Follow up with Enika: when was the agreement with FAO investment center established? |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+|  | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
+| *Schedule a meeting with Enika Basu to clarify and expand on the points highlighted above.*  *We need to have more clarity and evidence for many of the statements.* |  |
+|  |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-03-28_ChitraDeshpande_LeadAdvisor_ResultsandResources_ODE_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 28 March 2025, Chitra Deshpande, Lead Advisor, Results and Resources, ODE | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Chitra Deshpande** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Chitra Deshpande, Lead Advisor, Results and Resources, ODE** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **28 March 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Hannah, Barun, Anoop** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Hannah** |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| Hansdeep: role of OPR in general, as well as commitments | * She started for OPR in IFAD12. In both replenishment cycles, OPR were the custodians and developer of the RMF in terms of any replenishment. In both cycles, OPR developed the Business Model paper for the Replenishment. In IFAD12, Paul Winters SKD also had a strong influence on the development of the Business Model. Also, OPR was involved in Financial Framework. * OPR is technical backbone of the Replenishments. GPR does the front-end, coordinating consultations and negotiations with Memberships. * In IFAD12, OPR started to reduce the number of indicators and continued that for IFAD13. In IFAD11 there were a lot of commitments to develop more policies and strategies, and so in IFAD12 they wanted to focus on implementing them and having more operational commitments and maintain some of the commitments to slowly build it and gradually into the portfolio. So there is a lot of continuity between IFAD12 and IFAD13. * OPR prepares the RIDE, which presents their process against RMF and commitments fulfilled to the Board. * In IFAD13, targets are dropped for outputs and outcomes, as OPR pushed Membership to understand that projects are demand-driven, and so it is not in their control. * They perform internal benchmarking, and benchmarking against other Banks, just before IFAD13. * There is a strong political dynamic to the Membership – they can provide the evidence and tell them these are targets which will be difficult to achieve, but these targets the Membership also needs to sell to their Governments. * In the dialogues, it is always a fundraising effort. In periods of great prosperity we can base the trajectory in hindsight, going back, whereas now we need to context-sensitize our trajectory forward. Being more realistic is the way forward. |
+| Process of OPR establishment | OPR was part of PMD, then a unit, then a Division in IFAD11. |
+| Resource allocation, challenges | * OPR collaborates with FOD on establishing Financial Framework. So it organizes how the resources that come in, will be distributed, and create scenarios. So according to the targets, how many will go to LICs, how many to sub-saharan Africa, to fragility etc. The more you do that, you make it difficult to do financing based on country demand and needs. It slowly makes the pot smaller and smaller for free distribution. * GPR do benchmarking. E.g. based on what happens at AIDA, we may expect this or that. * In terms of the Financial Scenarios, it is Treasury. It looks at Financial Sustainability, and what are the reflows, and they do projections eg we need this new capital in order to continue, and so they do projections on what will our reflows be, not just for IFAD13 but 14 and 15 too. * In IFAD10, TRE would come up with their numbers. Back then, in IFAD9 and 10 we knew we would have a problem with the DSF (raised in CLE FA too). Either in IFAD11 or 12, there were various attempts to address that. It looks like ok, countries, you committed to this money, but then the president wanted countries to pay for it. By IFAD12, they got rid of that. So basically they started capping DSF, especially in IFAD12. Before, you got your replenishment resources, all PBAS, certain grants in there, but now it's a very different role. So you ran your PBAS based on performance and need you got your allocation, but now we have within PBAS the DSF so the DSF is limited, it's let's say only 450mill going to DSF-eligible countries. And now we have borrowing, which go to UMICs. And we also allow borrowing to go to some other countries that have PBAS. So it has become far more complex, which has become more challenging to do the allocations. Back at IFAD10, TRE would say here is the pot of money, and they did projections, and then that money would go to OPR, and that would become PBAS allocations. But from IFAD11 we had BRAM. We had borrowing, like Trust Funds, but it was blended in. But the new BRAM, heavily negotiated, was supposed to be pure country demand. But then it was quickly turn into let's run the PBAS as much as possible, and then use BRAM to fill out the rest. Also, countries could not demand for everything: we only had a certan amound of borrowed resources. So we would offer, and country could confirm their interest and then reuest later if possible. **So the process of financial allocations have become increasingly difficult.** Now, after TRE's scenario reflows, there is RMO that say how much debt we can take on and take projections (and accumulate, what does this borrowing mean for IFAD13, 14, 15, as we have a debt ceiling). So this whole getting a rating, has really affected how we are able to allocate resources, how much, what kind, and how we distribute it. |
+| Marcus: who came up with this 0.5 debt ceiling and according to which criteria? | This should be in our financial policy. She wasn't around and does not know who did this. Flag with RMO Currently RMO is working on new frameworks and policies and there may be appetite to raising it, but it will all then affect IFAD's rating. |
+| Mikal: how much comes country borrowing capacity comes in? | * In the first instance, it is always the CD, as they knew how much their CDs could and wanted to borrow. In instable times, this could always be a good indicator. But since 2012 (when Chitra was in APR), it is very volatile. One aspect of that is managing the portfolio – we are limiting the number of borrowers to 80 countries. So there are country eligibility criteria, and based on that, they choose the 80 countries. * Also, CDs try to manage their portfolio, as countries may now have demand, so the CDs knowing their countries try understand demands. * So sometimes there are new countries, eg Ukraine just came in, and they just want concessional. But their not eligible for concessional loans, but it is a political consideration. * In this dynamic process, countries may want to or need to drop out. In any case, everything is dynamic, because you don't know what the lending terms are, so a country may be in or out because of that. * During IFAD consultations, interests were low, and then suddenly they shot up. Some countries were interested in taking ordinary loans because low interests, and then suddenly they dropped off. Especially in APR, Bangladesh and Nepal, as they are more careful taking on these loans so they all released their BRAMs. African countries however did not care and took on more. So it all depends on demand and type of country. IFAD needs to be extremely cautious about the depth of a country. * RMO was restricting how much BRAM certain countries would get. |
+| Barun: supp funds keep growing, and we've heard that targets without supp funds cannot be met, so to what extent are supp funds factored into the replenishment consultations? | Not factored in, it is completely separate. |
+| Barun: how are supplementary funds, once received, allocated? Completely different beast, subject to some conditionalities, mostly on themes, so how does IFAD works through this process? | * GPR (Denisa) and ECG because they receive the lionshare. POB knows how it is distributed. * Chitra has PBAS, pipeline monitoring, reporting on all financials, all the data GRIPS etc. * One would not want to talk about suppl funds during replenishment consultations because that distracts from people contributing to core. And what is interesting, that for IFAD13, they created ACC (additional climate contribution), so these are funds that are earmarked to climate, but are considered core resources. In IFAD10, we created complimentary contributions, which were similar, but went in administrative budget. They were core contributions but on themes. But how there would be reporting, is that on portfolio level. In that way suppl funds otherwise micromanaged by countries. * In IFAD10, there were only four mainstr themes, between replenishment and implementation the team had changed in OPR. Someone else came in and was not interested in monitoring these. So they were but in the PBAS, and this undermined the interest in the complimentary contributions. And now they are revived, in OPR much more sophisticated in monitoring climate change resources, they have a micro team following this. * Suppl were used to do all the monitoring and reporting, for instance EU requires this, otherwise they grab the money back. * If you look at budget of ECG, they have a lot of project posts and all of these are financed by supplementary funds. |
+| Suppl and replenishment commitments | * None of the replenishment targets reflect supplementary funds. * The reporting done in the RMF has to do with the investment: ASAP+ blended with an investment has that effect, but is it's standalone it doesn't have to have any of the core indicators, that data doesn't come into our ORMS system – there is no required reporting. |
+| Barun: given that suppl funds contribute to IFAD's targets, it is strange to hear they are two different silos. | IFAD's POW has doubled because of supp funds. Core resources are flat, so without spp funds IFAD would not be growing. The point is that we need to propertly supp funds, but that is not happening now. So they're thinking of having some of these core indicators to include the grants, in order to capture results properly. |
+|  | Online trackers: RMF tracker, commitment tracker, online RIDE. And then in terms of reporting, MTRs and RIDEs. |
+| Mikal: OPR's role in administrative budget | None, but the PoLG and number of COSOPs expected etc are given to POB |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+|  | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
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+| 28 March 2025, Federica Diamanti, AVP ERD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Federica Diamanti AVP ERD,** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **AVP ERD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **28 March 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Mikal, Antonella, Hannah, Tianlin, AnnaLyssia, Marcus, Sally, Federica** |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| What was your role as an EB member during the IFAD 11 and 12 period | In 2018 she started being involved with MDBs at the Italian government, but not part of pledging negotiations. But from 2021 onwards, she started to be engaged, mostly on the concessional funds, outside IFAD too. |
+| What has been your involvement in the process of setting commitments and related targets? | * To consult donors and communities is very important, so the proposal is not fully driven by management. This is contrast to for instance AIDA, where the management's view is much stronger and prevalent. For IFAD13, the discussion on targets has been quite strong. During IFAD12 there was a complex discussion on the graduation, issue of BRAM and PBAS, and the first time there was a discussion around the graduation policy. These were key issues discussed, even more so than target setting. |
+| What is your view on the extent to which IFAD commitments and targets are set in a realistic manner, costed and with appropriate resource mobilization strategies? | * For IFAD13 some of the targets are stretched, but for IFAD12 not necessarily unrealistic. * RMF is much appreciated in terms of the extensiveness. Linking the targets to RMF makes it easy for donors to understand what is going on. * Negotiations are around targets still, though. For instance, around climate, some donors find the targets are not high enough etc. |
+| Negotiations around BRAM | * Most donors would like to see their money being used to the lowest income countries. If I use grants and replenish something. But for loans, ie more expensive money, she would go for MDBs. But IFAD is a universal fund including UMICs, so big donors like France, UK, US, said they didn't want money to go to UMICs, so that was a very intense discussion. Those serving in Replenishments, should not be in the EB. As a board member you should not be able to represent in the replenishment. According to her, the replenishment should be fully detached from the board function. Currently, these positions are served by the same people often. This however is not constructive, and come with ideas on FAO etc, which should not be addressed here, and come with their own ideas that they had gotten from discussions during in the Board. Instead, a representative from the country should come. * If you give 100mill to IFAD it becomes a deficit, but if you give it to a MDB it is regarded as an asset. * IFAD should show and be clear that thanks to the borrowing framework, and thanks to the creditworthy UMICs, and thanks to the private sector engagement, it should * If it is a capital increase, it goes in the liability side and asset side, but not as costs (IFAD, AIDA, EBRD), so it really is very expensive for the country. Then, there is much less appetite to then share with UMICs. During IFAD12, this was a very strong discussion point. * From the eyes of the donor, IFAD is seen more as an IFI than UN. All reforms (organization) in the past years have brought IFAD also more in the IFI space. |
+| Marcus: WB can leverage by de facto of 4, but IFAD restricts its leverage to 0.5 of the equity, whereas in reality even 0.3, which really limits IFAD's outeach | Yes, it is self-inflicting, compared to AIDA. There is always the request to remain our niche, and if we go for more leverage and less concessional which means going to UMICs, the Board was told that changes would occur gradually and not undermine the IFAD's mandate. But, this is a plus right now, because this space could help the institution going forward. |
+| Partnerships | Yes, we can still create the most remote road in the first mile, but we should bring the first mile closer to the second mile, by connecting it to a bigger project by WBG for instance --> this is really about IFAD's role as an assembler of co-finance |
+| Mikal: increase in commitments, push for bigger targets, but budget remains roughly the same, only small increase, and this affects the quality of the results, so IOE comes in and says the targets have not been met, and then goes to the Board and Board says IFAD does not do enough. Have we seen anything like this mirrored in the IFAD12 discussions? | From Management side she sees the targets are disconnected, or the targets are imposed and therefore stretched. Everyone comes with a christmas tree in the Board during replenishments. Targets can undermine the quality of operations, but this is not discussed during the replenishments. |
+| Hansdeep: Difference between strategies core resources and supplementary sources? | The both are decoupled in consultations, and there are two different strategies. From IFAD, supplementary funds are seeked to complement core resources to meet the targets. Then, everyday in the house tries to mobilize these resources, and this is no conflict to core resources. |
+| Hansdeep: the order of setting targets and then seeking out supp funds to meet the targets | Yes, focus is on PoLG and PoW. But it should be IOE's role to show Board they are wrong with pushing targets. |
+| Hansdeep: her opinion on decentralization in her previous role? | * Mixed feelings, as a donor. In principle it is fantastic, but you need the capacity to send people into the field, otherwise decentralization becomes irrelevant. Also, very expensive to decentralize as it undermines the delivery, so before getting operational it takes time. The costs are immediate, the benefits come later (hopefully), so difficult to make a cost-benefit analysis. * For IFAD13, institutional capacity is always discussed during replenishments. |
+| Sally: how are skills and capacities assessed mathematically on how these should respond to achieve the commitments and targets, especially with the wide variety of mainstreaming themes etc? | These discussions do not really take place in the context of replenishments, except perhaps in the context of budget. But, however, this would be extremely useful. |
+| Sally: your idea of recalibration in the interestes of targets needing to be achieved, and how this aligns with that, as it has a bit of a future view? | The new structure is supposed to be aligned with the verticals and the crosscutting themes of the replenishment: so the structure now seems to make much more sense. |
+| Hansdeep: what areas would you be interested in to see from CLE? | * Getting targets realistic: the more you ask for fragmented things such as fragility, nutrition etc, the more [...] * Results-based framework. Other institutions to mass budget approach. Why is IFAD so expensive, should be clearer to Board. Why is IOE so big in IFAD? * Controversial aspect of BRAM and the benefit for everyone. |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+| 1. Risk of setting too high targets in too many areas. 2. The value of BRAM should be clarified to donors | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
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+| 1 April 2025, Ms Saadia Imad and Ms Suyun Kim, PCD, CSD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Saadia Imad, Suyun Kim** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Saadia Imad (Chief Talent Management Unit), Suyun Kim (Senior HR Specialist (Training, Development & Performance Mngt))** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **1 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Hannah, Sally** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Hannah** |
+
+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* |
+| What were her positions in the period of 2019-2024? | Suyun Kim: She has been in the Talent Management Unit, taking care of performance management and corporate learning and development.  Saadia: -2019-2022 senior advisor to senior director HRD, on crosscutting areas part of the change, including TCI and PPTP, and other strategic initiatives such as repotring on gender, sexual harrassment, and IFAD disability framework, as well as monthly newslettters, and providing inputs to RIDE and other reporting tools. Since 2021, part of Talent Management Unit, including disabilities, and RCI talent pool, and responsible for performance management and learning of the organization together with Suyun. |
+| Sally: for Saadia: you have been done an incredible amount of training, and how have you as a talent managemnt unit assess the level of competence as a result of the trainings? Bearing in mind the new set of competencies that were identified in the new McKinsey report? | Saadia: The McKinsey study did a skills assessment of present skills inhouse. Prior to that they mapped out a skills taxonomy and skills categorized, to have a picture of that skills in house were available at that point in time (2019). This fed into determining the models, along with other models such as size of PoLG, number of projects, etc, to determine the capacity gap and skills gap, so two pillars: capacity assessment and capability assessment. Various scenarios were then described in the next 5/10 years to understand IFAD's workforce size etc and what it would look like. A new performance management system was designed, and more focus on underperforming cases, and after the study, they had been reporting regularly to the EB on underperforming cases, how many were seperated, how many made it through successfully. The second part, is the learning part. Analyzing the skills gap an approach to learning was designed. Three main areas of training were identified: 1. Financial; 2. Management and leadership; 3. OPAC pillar (more operations). And a revised approach to address this was then designed.  Suyun: in performance management and job descriptions attention was given to mirror the above. In the PES, there's a learning obectives tab, so the staff can then insert the learning objectives to the year, and these must align with the skills in the attached skills glossary.  Learning needs to come from performance management, and then they speak the same language as they still speak of competencies and achievements, and the trainings try to address these learning needs that have been identified through performance conversations, and have been captured by divisional learning needs plans (consolidated effort of identifying learning needs through performance conversations).  They have LMS, so they see if a training has been taken and completed, and if the training has indeed helped in performance as they see that through the PES. The monitoring tools on the learning side they have is dashboard that looks at mostly completion rate, and after the PPTP period ended, they produced a report which was brought to the EB. Internally, they have more detailed monitoring such as participant's feedback. |
+| Sally: how your tracking in training invested is actually translated into competence, linked o a performance discussion happening annually? Trying to understand gap between trianing and application, and how IFAD bridges that gap? | Suyun: the application of any of the learning would be reflected in the performance. And not all trainings are technical knowledge: some are experiental learning, coaching, so in case of underperformance after coaching and performance improvement plan, they can see that. They could come up with a very difficult education matrix such as Fitzpatrick's, but it is very resource intensive, and performance management is quite strong in IFAD: the supervisor should identify whether a staff is not performing well and whether there is a shortfall and how to address this. Going forward, they would like to develop a more thorough skills assessment. A before/after assessment would give them a good baseline and process made. This requires a system and the will of the organization to facilitate and support this system.  Saadia: it is important to distinguish between the type of learning here. Some output oriented trainings such as financial trainings can be measured quantitatively, but many trainings are soft-skills eg. for supervisors how to have difficult conversations. For these softer trainings it is difficult to measure the outcome. Then, there are OPAC trainings (procurement, project etc), these can be translated into a skill that is acquired. When we go back into time when they initially did skills assessment, on Excel, but no way to validate this and no system (PeopleSoft only can do so much). **They went to management etc, but no money was given for this. A more interactive and robuste validation system, that would be a reliable database, but they have not gone, right now, gone beyond the mapping of skills, they do not have the resources. It's a sad state of affairs, we can use it, but it is not reliable.** |
+| Sally: on performance management – what are the big changes, and to what extent rolled out with what level of success? We see that performance targets are mostly imposed on - from a people-perspective, what should the process look like in being able to agree to these targets? | Suyun: in 2021, the first cycle was there where the new performance management was implemented. At the moment concluding the 2024 cycle. The changes were (worked on with McKinsey's help – they brought them some best practice models, tools and instruments to bring in to strengthen performance management), so they brought in competency element into performance management. Before 2021, there were only work goals (e.g. numbre of evaluations etc.) And competencies were there to rate whether satisfactory or not. But in 2021, these competency goals were introduced to look at HOW these operational goals were achieved. Another introduction was the new rating system. First there was a 5-scale rating system from unsatisfactory to outstanding, the supervisor or director then had to rate staff in a non-evidence based and not data-driven matter. So in 2021 they proposed that the operational goals would count for 60% and competency goals for 40%. Within operational goals, one have to give ratings to their goals. Same thing for competencies. So they included some mandatory goals for supervisory staff (eg competency in management people) and as director (people mangament + leadership goals). The supervisor would then evaluate goal by goal. This is important, as category 3 includes a whole range of people and levels of achievements. Mid-year staff can adjust goals and weights, until around November, when supervisors are asked to close the goal.  So sure, the targets are there. They are not necessarily imposed.  Saadia: the goals need to be SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, time-bound). Within these dimensions. So all goals are evaluated against these SMART criteria. So the targets set are evaluated against these criteria. Secondly, after your supervisor weighs all the goals, the weighted average is reverse engineered. Most important is the mindset of using the system, *not* the very system. |
+| Sally: the basis of performance management is the relationship between the supervisor and the supervisee. If you look at the GGS feedback, it still does not get a great ratings, next to worklife balance it is an area of concern. In terms of achieving the objectives, how does that influence your capacity to support the performance management, because you sit with your client base on all over the world, how does that impact your work? | Saadia: understaffed. Only one Suyun, one or two jr consultants. Business Partner Units sit with directors etc to walk them through how everything works, staff with PIP etc., probation very closely followed. They did an audit on the goals set and highlighted inconsistencies, but beyond that **they have no capacity.**  Suyun: yes, we are spread thin. Really delicate cases, when director calls Suyun to follow certain cases, but in the field there is no capacity to follow that. Management upskilling is work in progress. Very slow, incremental growth. They have some pockets of good practice and majority of supervisors are also brought down by their workload to actually make the time to actually sit down with their staff, having a conversation and help them develop their career. **Workload, work-life balance, spills over into other areas as well, such as performance management, workplace culture, staff wellbeing, it has multiple knock-off affects.**  Saadia: Any underperformance should not be penalized, but should be looked at how do address the gap, what causes the staff member to fail? Because recruitment process very rigid. But PIP is seen as a stigma, it's not a helping and corrective tool as it is meant to be used, it's an assistance to be provided. Supervisor should be carefully looking at how you would be performing once again? Another area were improvement in mindset is needed. They are part of a CoP in UN agencies, and IFAD seems to be ahead of the curve – IFAD has the most intuitive process to take forward, but targets are so realistic that management has not the inclination and the time to deliver on the targets that have been set. |
+| Sally: over the period, have there been new skill areas that have emerged you've needed to grow skills in, as a result of the commitments that have been made? Eg. Private sector | Suyun: private sector engagement is one area. They will be working with PSD to develop a training curriculum under the OPAC, which is mostly targeting CDs. Another area is GenAI which is emerging. There's a lot of attention to understanding that, as well as data analytics.Because in every job you need data and be able to analyze data. So under PPTP, OmniData was developed. Another area, is behavioural science applied to business. This was started in the innovation unit, and that's another area she sees growing.  Saadia: For instance, the department of operations voiced their need for diplomatic training etc., but this was done once. But the prioritization is done on the resour[ces. **But every year they are restricted, because the first thing they need to go through is the budget. The training budget is cut every year, whereas the organization's changing means continue to grow.** |
+| Hansdeep: how about fragility? Was there a thought process behind picking this or is it being planned? | Saadia: the strategy paper on fragile countries, they provided a lot of input on what skills are needed. This paper was led by Dina.  Suyun: On fragility there have been a number of requests on external trainings by NEN and WCA. But they will not be able to satisfy all. |
+| Hansdeep: shrinking budgets, | Suyun: internal resources can be done for diplomatics, but for fragility and private sector engagement there are no internal capacities. But for previous PI staff, they had to upskill the PI heads (especially the one assigned to run the unit as there was a big skills gap to get her up to speed). There are two sides to learning and development: one, **it has to become part of the culture,** and therefore has its prominence which will help staff and allow them time to actually engage in learning activities. If we just present EB papers on different themes like fragility and DEI and promise to give trainings on that, **it is more like a compliance level instead of really developing the skills that are needed**. Eg in IOE that culture is there. There's a training budget and all staff take trainings.  Saadia: a**nd take the time, their workload is so high that there is reluctance to take up training because there is no space in their calendars, so how will they go and learn?** For instance even compliance training which is a mandatory training, so let alone an elective training. |
+| Hansdeep: What would you want to do differently in the future? | Suyun: we're operating in a very volatile external environment, where sister agencies need to let go off a lot of people. While IFAD does not have this, IFAD has replenishment period**, the focus of three years need to be placed in a bigger timeframe, looking at sustainability.** These very expensive initiatives are not one off (because that's what we promised), but in a more longer-term version. For instance, FCD needs to report on sustainability when it reports on the IFRS requirements. PES is one year, but one year but longer term timeframe of 3-5 years. What does this year's performance mean, as a building block, going forward to the next years.  Saadia: what we're looking at is about having a skilled workforce, but also to RETAIN this workforce. If we go with replenishment every time, investments in training the workforce, we keep choosing and losing people**. We should move from this 3-year horizon, and move to 2030 agenda and how you use your workforce to get there, with replenishment cycles plugging into it.** This is your lifetime investment, so go BEYOND replenishments. Create buy-in and move them into what the organization means which becomes a win-win situation for staff and organization. How to keep this skilled workforce and take it along? So, the continuity in skills is needed across. |
+| *Key take-aways* | |
+| 1. **Systems in place, but IFAD needs to go beyond systems.** 2. **Whether the investments develop the competencies required, is unsure. It is unsure at what level these trainings address what is needed. But they do what they can with what they've got. The lack of a longer-term strategy, and then linking that to IFAD replenishment, has a negative effect on vacancy rates, turnover, workload, etc.** | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | *Person responsible* |
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+| 3 April 2025, Brenda Gunde, Lead Technical Specialist -ICT4D | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Brenda Gunde (BG)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Lead Technical Specialist –ICT4D, PMI, OTD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **03 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Barun, Marcus, Sally, Tianlin** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin, AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| Sally: Impact of recalibration with OTD | * Structural changes: ICT4D remains under PMI, but there has been ongoing discussion about placement. 80% of the work is project design, making PMI the best fit. * Gave Away: Data governance (ICT4D action plan) to ODE for implementation. Implications on timing – approved in 2022, by 2028 MTR for the policy. Because of this structural recalibration, the implementation work is in limbo because ODE has other priorities. * Positive outcomes: Closer collaboration with DCO in project conceptualization, leading to more streamlined co-creation. | |
+| Sally: Decentralization impact | * 4 full-time staff based in Cairo, Rome, Panama, and one unspecified location. * The team is overstretched, with one staff member managing up to 10 projects. * 25 projects currently in the pipeline. * Digital demand is growing, but there is insufficient budget and limited ability to support remotely. * Decentralization brings local coordination benefits but does not reduce workload. * Ownness is on BG’s team to hit IFAD commitments | |
+| Marcus: Is ICT4D demand or supply driven? | * 80% demand-driven, 20% supply-driven. * ICT4D integration is mandated in concept notes, making it a required component. * IFAD corporately drives the supply side, ensuring ICT4D is embedded in project design. | |
+| Tianlin: Is IFAD lagging in utilizing cutting-edge technology? | * IFAD provides loans and grants for project design, but mainstreaming ICT4D depends on country-specific needs. Digital technology should only be integrated if it fits the country context. * A proof-of-concept approach is needed before scaling ICT4D interventions to more farmers. | |
+| Marcus: E-Commerce and agronomy advisory dominates projects, while other tech areas are lacking? | * E-commerce, market linkages is one part IFAD is focusing on. Digital element looks at an e-commerce platform for this. * Agronomy advisory sits on extension. * Access to finance is still climbing now * GIS technology: Integrated within projects but not standalone—always blended with other components. | |
+| Hans: To what extent was ICT4D consulted on IFAD’s recalibration? | * BG’s team was part of discussions on where data governance should sit. * The final decision was made at the executive level, with PMI proposing placement through the data governance working group. * Options were available because of staff requirements. | |
+| Sally: ICT4D Staffing and Capacity Development | * Staff must balance technology expertise and rural development knowledge. * Team had to upskill using performance awards and repurpose budgets for training. | |
+| Sally: Staff retention issues with reassignment | * ICT4D was approved in 2020, BG was brought on in 2021. Was meant to be reassigned this year, but moved to HQ * Technical specialists are reassigned without full recognition of their expertise. * Unlike UNICEF, IFAD does not guarantee that specialists remain within the same job family when reassigned. | |
+| Hans: Negotiability of Targets | * BG’s team don’t get a say in IFAD commitments and must deliver * In IFAD12 the target was 5 and they did 45 projects. * BG’s team provided a write-up of value proposition for ICT4D – within this framework, alongside IFAD12 commitments etc. – but no feedback until much later. | |
+| Tianlin: Role of private sector and NSO | * Currently plays: Service provider; Co-financier; Technology providers adopted by communities. * Private sector is important and the way its defined by NSO are different. * Engagement with the private sector is slow due to bureaucratic processes and due diligence requirements, taking up to one year for collaboration. | |
+| Tianlin: How to measure impact brought by ICT4D component? | * Nightmare - No dedicated ICT4D indicators at the corporate level - impact must be assessed manually using project log frames. * Only 1 or 2 corporate indicators loosely relate to ICT4D, making measurement difficult. | |
+| Tianlin: Is there dedicated budget for ICT4D in projects? | * Budgeting for ICT4D is included in COSOP, but implementation varies across countries. * Some projects repurpose ICT4D budgets for other activities. Must keep an eye. * Two funding sources: Corporate strategy-related admin budget (small); Project design budget (main funding source). * ICT4D must work within strict budget limits, preventing additional activities despite high demand. | |
+| Replication and Scaling of ICT4D Solutions | * Focus on scaling successful solutions rather than reinventing new ones. * Solution to solution or best practice approaches. * SSTC – southern countries learning from each other | |
+| Barun: Balancing In-house Staff and Consultants for ICT4D | * Consultant costs are a limiting factor. * Continious knowledge-sharing with FAO, World Bank, and other partners. * Limited availability of emerging technology expertise among consultants. * Staff/Consultant decisions depend on demand and specific technology needs. | |
+| What should the evaluation focus on? | * IFAD lacks a clear strategic thrust of digital strategy, unlike the World Bank, which defines projects as digitally driven. * Resources and budgets should be allocated to achieve the thrust. * To have a holistic approach and less ad-hoc, with clear two-way cooperation, both from the technical side and the corporate level strategic side. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1. Recalibration Wastes Talent – Staff reassignments do not always consider expertise, leading to inefficiencies. 2. Limited Consultation in Target Setting – ICT4D targets are imposed without input from those implementing them. 3. Lack of Strategic Thrust for ICT4D – IFAD lacks a clear corporate vision for ICT4D. A structured digital strategy is needed to guide integration. 4. Balancing In-House Staff and Consultants (Barun’s Concern) – Given IFAD’s size, hiring full-time ICT4D staff may not be ideal. A flexible model using consultants for specialized tasks could be more effective. However, slow procurement limits timely access to expertise. 5. Demand-Driven Approach May Be Flawed (Marcus’s Concern) – Relying on country demand for ICT4D can be passive. Some countries lack awareness or technical capacity to request digital solutions. IFAD should proactively promote and scale proven ICT4D models. 6. Weak ICT4D Impact Measurement – No corporate-level ICT4D indicators exist, making evaluation difficult. Clear impact metrics are needed for accountability and scaling. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Share documents with Barun: Progress report and action plan, ICT4D strategy | | Tianlin |
+| 3 sources of budget: regular budget, stand alone project for ICT, project budget. Ask Brenda for sources of funding (their proportion) | | Tianlin |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-03_LeonWilliams_ODE_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 3 April 2025, Leon Williams, ODE | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Leon Williams (LW)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **ODE, with previous experience in GPR, POB and replenishments** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **3 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hans, Sally, Marcus, Barun** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin, AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| Leon Williams' Roles | * **2016:** Partnership and Resource Mobilization Division (GPR), initially working on supplementary funds. * **2017:** Moved to IFAD11 replenishment process, serving as Lead Report Writer. * **2018:** One-year assignment as Senior Budget Specialist in POB, focused on aligning the budget to IFAD11 priorities. * **2019-2023:** Senior Replenishment Specialist, managing IFAD12 and IFAD13 processes. * **2024-Present:** M&E Specialist in the Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) | |
+| Barun: How was the budget aligned with strategic priorities? How was alignment assured/demonstrated, especially for thematic priorities like nutrition? | * **Context:** LW was in budgets in 2018 to align the 2019 budget with IFAD11 priorities. The President's main priority that year was a zero real growth budget. Alignment had to occur without significant budget increases. * **Process:** Started April/May 2018 with EMC discussions and budget guidance notes. June-September involved getting inputs from divisions/departments, meeting heads, and negotiating where money could be moved. A high-level preview went to the Board in September, followed by the full budget in December. * **Alignment Method:** Primarily through the narrative part of the budget document, justifying increases and cuts based on replenishment agreements and organizational priorities. * **Weakness:** The process isn't strictly structured and can change yearly. Formal medium-term/annual plans accompanying the budget had recently stopped. * **Issue:** It's very difficult to show budget allocation by theme (e.g., nutrition) because the budget structure and coding aren't set up that way. The budget is broken down by division and Institutional Output Groups (IOGs), which are activity-based, not theme or output-based. * **Result:** There isn't a detailed or automated breakdown by theme or specific output. You can't easily see how much is allocated to something like nutrition. Increases in the 2019 budget were largely around decentralization, compliance, and risk management. | |
+| Barun: How are staff costs handled in budget alignment/tracking? | * **Problem:** There's no way to derive the full cost (including staff) for a specific output, theme, or project because there isn't a system for costing staff time accurately to these categories. * **Current Practice:** Staff costs are broken down in an *ex-ante* estimated way across IOGs (Institutional output group), but it's high-level and not theme-specific. What is tracked (e.g., supervision costs) is often only the non-staff portion (travel, consultants), which might be only 30-40% of the total cost. | |
+| Marcus: How is the decision made between donating to Core Replenishment vs. Supplementary Funds (SF)? | * **It's both donor-driven and IFAD-driven**. * **IFAD Priority:** Core contributions to the replenishment are the main priority. * **Donor Driven:** Sometimes donors have specific activities/projects they want to fund with IFAD. * **IFAD Driven:** IFAD might seek SF for activities not funded by the regular budget, co-financing, or specific thematic work, approaching donors with known interests. * **Different Sources:** Core and SF often come from different parts of donor governments (e.g., US Treasury for core vs. State Dept/USAID for SF; Germany BMZ vs. GIZ). Core funds often require voting rights and come from specific multilateral budget lines. SF might come from thematic budget lines (e.g., climate, youth) where earmarking is required. * **Timing:** IFAD avoids actively seeking SF during core replenishment periods to avoid confusing donors. | |
+| Marcus: Are the resources allocated to NSO (private sector) all from SF? | * Largely from SF. * IFAD11 there was core resources 25 million as seed funding for private sector. | |
+| Marcus: the commitment of allocating 100% to core resources to LIC and LMIC | * The 100% is after subtracting other expenditures (e.g., admin), 100% of the rest money for programming * some go out as grants or Blend loans. * Donors don’t want core resources to be used for UMICs | |
+| Marcus: Cost for BRAM loans | * We are covering the financing costs(interest), but not the designing costs (design, supervision). Otherwise the cost will become too high. * Charging a margin? A small one but doesn’t know the specific information on this. * Interest margin is not high enough given the small amount of the IFAD loans. In IFAD11 conversation to increase average loan size but hasn’t been a big priority since then. | |
+| Sally: consistent message about extreme workload. How it workload considered when making delivery commitments? | * Hasn’t been a huge appetite to make amount for each commitment. Try to minimize the commitment and focus on what we’re already doing and how to get better, opposed to basing it against a dollar amount. * Marginal workload associated with commitments in IFAD 13 are probably not enormous and they never worked out specific amount, just assumed that it could be managed by shifting budget or re-establishing a prioritization. | |
+| Sally: what goes away when new things get added? | * Donors tolerate some growth in budget but doesn’t want to increase donor amounts * Have a similar number of country directors as what they’ve had in the past. As staff has increased, it’s been by reducing consultant budgets. Less of this available, but more staff in the technical department, theoretically replacing those consultants. | |
+| Barun: Supplementary Funds and its cost. Is IFAD overcommitting, by knowing that there will be SF? If so, in the budget side, there might be subsidy (administrative cost) going out from core resources to supplementary funds, is this happening? | * Supplementary funds support the regular delivery, but we are not completely reliant on it. E.g., There are staff covered by the management fee of supplementary funds, and they also support the regular programs. * There is NO subsidy going the other way round - from the regular budget to the supplementary funds. * 7% management fee of SF is enough to cover overhead costs, like legal, finance, GPR. But It was important for the agreement to also cover the direct costs of implementing the projects. * Other UN agencies are strict in charging both this 7% and a huge amount of the direct cost. * IFAD was not strict before, but in the past 5-6 years IFAD is becoming more tough in ensuring the direct cost to be also covered in the agreement during donor negotiations. E.g., staff positions being covered by the direct cost of supplementary funds. * In 2018 there was a study done about the cost of SF, which was submitted to EMC. Later the president pushed the cost a bit higher. This is the basis of a cost recovery President’s Bulletin finalized in early 2019. * The negotiation of management fee is not feasible with multilateral funds, because IFAD is bound with some agreements with donors. We can only negotiable with the bi-lateral country contribution. E.g., IFAD is bund with rules by EU FAFA agreement; GEF has their own rules. | |
+| Marcus: Do any SF count as co-financing? | * SF is a category of money-in; co-financing is a category of how to use the money. * Not all SF counted as co-financing. 2 kinds of SF:   + SF for activities IFAD implement by itself and spent by IFAD. E.g., many thematic funding.   + 60% of SF is co-financing SF – the money comes to IFAD and then passed on to clients (governments) | |
+| Marcus: how was the co-financing target of 1:1.5 determined? | * Historical trends & feasibility * Includes SF co-financing (money passing through IFAD) & parallel co-financing (money going directly to clients) | |
+| Marcus: domestic co-financing | * Gov putting resources into projects are considered domestic co-financing. It is not mandatory but it tends to happen, either in value or in kind/human resource support. | |
+| Marcus: is there Private Sector co-financing? | * Yes but not much. E.g., with micro-finance bank when IFAD is providing a matching grant. | |
+| Hans: How are targets set? May not have a scientific basis? Look at trends when calculating for the next cycle? | * It’s a political process with negotiations and they all have their own agendas. * IFAD13 concerned about domestic co-financing as the countries are having economic difficulties. * IFAD14 there will be pressure to achieve international co-financing * Establishe targets based on estimates. | |
+| Hans: Resource Allocation. How does the PBAS serve country absorptive capacity? Relating to BRAM? | * Always high demand for the most concessional financing. * IFAD 12 – introduction of BRAM. Coincided when interest rates went from 0 to 5%, then many countries turned upside down. * BRAM Intended to be more flexible and demand-based, allowing resources to move more easily where needed. It helps respond to variations in country borrowing demand. Example: Brazil borrowed 3x more in IFAD12 than IFAD11 via BRAM, while others borrowed less. | |
+| Hans: Learning and communication with other MDBs | * Part of multiple MDB working groups * IFAD is small – not necessarily an issue, but tend to follow what other organizations are doing. * Based on IFAD mandate and donor wishes, IFAD always prioritizes making sure we have highest possible concessionality. In IFAD11 and 12, have the idea to maximize the funding for poorest countries | |
+| Marcus: Why the cap of 20% for UMICs? | * 2/3 of lending has to be on concessional terms (initial mandates). (before BRAM was introduced) * if there was more freedom to lend to UMIC to create a small margin, which makes a better business sense, it will help IFAD to better support LICs. * If we can deliver better on our mandate by investing in an UMIC and then invest in LIC = good business. It will be a win-win for everyone, but there are mainly political barriers. * Not yet met the 20% cap for UMICs. 11-20% in IFAD11, established as a floor. By taking UMICs out of PBAS and putting them in a more demand based with introduction of BRAM, it brought UMICs out from a decline of loans obtained. | |
+| Sally: target set the then how are they delegated internally? | * Better ask DCO front office. * Divided into regions, with consultation with DCO. Sometimes targets are given without regional specifications considered. * Before recalibration, OPR was in PMD, and they are representing PMD in the replenishment discussions and bringing technical proposals. * After recalibration, the process is unclear yet, but DCO should be closely involved * Q: Is removing ODE out from DCO a concern in terms of setting the targets? Depends on role of the Vice President and how she coordinates the 3 pieces of ODE, OTD, DCO. Always a lot of internal consultation meetings – anything proposed, there must be a consensus before targets are created. | |
+| Fragility – how important in IFAD12 consultations? Better in some quarters or sections driving more? | * Issue of perception management – some member states think IFAD wasn’t doing things in fragile situations. These states think about natural disasters, humanitarian crises, war zones, etc. But in reality IFAD always operates in fragility – not necessarily in direct war zones, but trying to keep economies running and agricultural sector continuing during whatever fragility is occurring. | |
+| What do you want to see in this evaluation? Suggestion of focus? | * We were successful in increasing core replenishments, but haven’t been able to make a big increase in lending commitments because there are a lot of rules and regulations which are becoming restrictive – it would be great to create space for a reset since it’s difficult to unwind some commitments from design to implementation. Especially with the geo-political context now, now is a better time than ever to have this short pause. * Large number of internal reforms and re-organization within IFAD made it difficult for staff to focus on delivery. * Good to have a discussion about the graduation process and what it means for a country. Now IFAD stop lending but increase technical support for graduated countries. Suggestion: we should consider winding down technical support before winding down financial support. UMIC countries may have the technical capacity, and all the compliances/format of design report only matters to IFAD but not to the country. IFAD don’t need to supervise the project frequently. Reducing tech support will also reduce IFAD budget for it. | |
+| Marcus: capital adequacy. Is the IFAD credit rating restricting activities in certain areas? | * Yes, RMO has concerns in lending to certain countries. E.g., when determining how much a country can get from BRAM (e.g., Argentina) * It is important to maintain the good credit rating | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1. Good to have a discussion about the graduation process and what it means for a country. Now IFAD stop lending but increase technical support for graduated countries. Suggestion: we should consider winding down technical support before winding down financial support. UMIC countries may have the technical capacity, and all the compliances/format of design report only matters to IFAD but not to the country. IFAD don’t need to supervise the project frequently. Reducing tech support will also reduce IFAD budget for it. | | |
+| 1. Alignment of strategic commitment to budget – there is no clear alignment, this is confirmed | | |
+| 1. Cap of 20% for UMICs can be lifted, not to the detriment of the poorer countries | | |
+| 1. Co-financing numbers need to be analyzed with more granularity | | |
+| 1. Target settings are top-down, although DCO is said to be engaged in the consultation process. - need to look into the document of the consultation process | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Good to have one more interaction with Leon in a later stage. | |  |
+| Find the 2018 study about admin cost recovery and share with Barun | | Tianlin |
+| Analyzing co-financing numbers with granularity (fragility/income status) | | Tianlin |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-04_AmaBrandford-Arthur_SeniorPartnershipOfficer_DCOSSTCUnit_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 04 April 2025, Ama Brandford-Arthur, Senior Partnership Officer, DCO (SSTC Unit) | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Ama Brandford-Arthur** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Senior Partnership Officer, DCO (SSTC Unit)** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **04 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep (HK), Marcus (MF)** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin, Annalyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1.HK: What is your role and how has SSTC evolved in IFAD11 and IFAD12? | * Ama has worked on SSTC since 2018. * Initially ad hoc, but formalized with a strategy approved in 2016, followed by another strategy in 2021 (covering to 2027). * SSTC has moved from a marginal/aspirational component to a core operational modality. * Mid-term review of SSTC strategy is underway (targeting Sept 2025 EB). | |
+| 2. HK: Mainstreaming SSTC into COSOPs and operations | * 100% of COSOPs now include a dedicated SSTC appendix (was 66%, then 90%). * SSTC team participates in design workshops to match demand-driven country needs with relevant SSTC inputs. * Target: 25 projects with SSTC under IFAD13 (10/year). * IFAD12 had 24 projects, 50% initiated or funded by countries themselves. | |
+| 3. HK: How is SSTC operationalized in project loans? | Integrated as components within PoLG projects (e.g. value chains in South Sudan). Example: Cocoa value chain in South Sudan linked with Cameroon experiences.  Two streams:   * SSTC integrated into projects (PoLG). * Projects under the China-IFAD SSTC facility, dedicated to knowledge exchange. | |
+| 4. MF: How is ICT4D incorporated in SSTC? | * Member of the ICT4D coordination group * ICT4D is embedded, especially via Indian institutions and tech platforms. Example: Sharing of mobile money solutions like M-Pesa from Kenya. * SSTC has a symbiotic relationship with ICT4D, innovation, and KM. | |
+| 5. HK: How did recalibration impact SSTC? | * Moved from GPR to DCO front office in 2024. * Objective: stronger operational linkages and presence in country programs. * Plan to have regional staff (China, Brazil, Nairobi; future: Abidjan). * Still resource constrained, with currently 1 staff per center. | |
+| 6.SSTC Centers | * Brazil: Active, due to strong leadership. * China: Mixed results, now reorganizing with 2 new staff (P2 + NOC). * Ethiopia: Failed due to poor staffing; centre now relocated to Nairobi. * Centres are more like country offices with 1 SSTC staff, not standalone CoEs. | |
+| 7. HK: What are the funding sources for SSTC? | * SSTC is funded by supplementary resources, not IFAD core. * IFAD funds SSTC staff; China funds the SSTC facility ($20M to date). * Other contributors: Colombia, Brazil, Zambia, Egypt, Senegal. * China prefers tangible outputs, not just knowledge exchange. * Looking to have an umbrella fund to ensure a more equitable distribution and provide a more holistic approach to funding. Cannot allow one country to carry the burden (i.e. China is a dominant funding source). | |
+| 8. Can SSTC funding cover hard components? | Yes. Example: Ghana/Nigeria cage aquaculture project included purchase of cages and infrastructure.  Projects also support climate-resilient inputs (e.g. in Vietnam, Eritrea). | |
+| 9. SSTC Trust Fund vs Facility? | No “trust fund” per se; it’s officially the China-IFAD SSTC Facility. | |
+| 10. HK: Is SSTC de-linked from Knowledge Management (KM)? | * De-linked in name only; previously SSTC-KM centers now just SSTC centers. * Functionally, SSTC and KM are interdependent, but SSTC is not a subset of KM. * SSTC also overlaps with partnerships, resource mobilization, policy. | |
+| 11.Notes/advice for the evaluation | * External push towards SSTC and it’s a growing modality – more countries want to be a part of it. * IFAD staff have done a lot of heavy lifting to lessen the load on the participating countries. * M&E part of this initiative has been problematic. Looking for ways to incorporate this without compromising the PoLG. * More solid components that can also provide results to the governing body. | |
+| 12. SSTC’s link to co-financing and crowding-in? Commitment setting? | * Co-financing: Some success (e.g. IsDB for aquaculture), but not systematized. * Crowding-in: Still aspirational, not yet materialized in a major way. * SSTC team was not consulted on most commitment setting (e.g. “25 projects” figure was arbitrary). | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1. SSTC Funding is Supplementary, Not Core | | |
+| 2. Only 2–3 core-funded staff manage the entire SSTC portfolio. Raises questions about sustainability and workload management. | | |
+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Get the MTR of the SSTC strategy – email sent | | Tianlin |
+| Get the SSTC projects list – received from Ama | | Tianlin |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-04_FranciscoRubio_SeniorTechnicalSpecialist_ABCFund_PSD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 04 April 2025, Francisco Rubio, Senior Technical Specialist, ABC Fund, PSD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Francisco Rubio** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Senior Technical Specialist, ABC Fund, PSD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **04 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin, AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Hans: What is your role, and how has the Private Sector Division evolved since IFAD11/12? | * Rubio joined in Jan 2020 as the first investment officer. * Initially a small unit under PMI, it is now a full division under DCO with growing staff (3 investment officers, 3 senior consultants, 4 juniors; recruiting more). * Recalibration elevated the PSD from a minor unit to a full division with a director, signaling institutional commitment. | |
+| 2.Hans: What changes were introduced by the recalibration? | * Major: Private Sector Strategy revised, approved Sept 2024. * Now revising investment strategy – aim is to position IFAD as a catalyst in private sector finance (blended, DFI, and commercial). * Keen to focus on making IFAD a real catalyst in PS investment and offering the investment products to crowd in funding. * Strong focus on complementarity with sovereign operations, though this was part of the earlier mandate and was not effectively implemented. | |
+| 3.Marcus: Why did complementarity with sovereign operations not succeed in IFAD11/12? | * PSD was too new, had to prove deployment capacity first. * Misaligned understanding of “complementarity” – ranged from loose alignment with COSOPs to direct integration with sovereign programs. Outcome: Mostly loose alignment, limited integration. * Change in IFAD13: Investment officers will be posted in the field, expected to enhance synergy with sovereign work. | |
+| 4.Marcus: What financing was available during IFAD11/12? | * IFAD12: $25M seed funding (off-balance sheet, member contributions). * IFAD13: $90M on-balance sheet funding now available. * Other funds (e.g., 110M for ARCAFIM via GCF) are earmarked and not general-use. * Total portfolio includes additional supplementary funds from donors (BMZ, Canada, EU). | |
+| 5.Marcus: Any internal discussion on whether fund investment or lending is more efficient?  \* Equity investment (e.g., into ABC Fund) = 1:1 capital usage.  Lending = leveraged, requires less capital due to borrowing structure. | * Still under discussion. * Wholesaling the deal to a financial institution & get a whole bunch of deals with small holder farmers as a kind of efficiency. * Three proposed areas:   + Want to demonstrate direct relationships with private sector (loans to agri-SMEs/financial institutions),   + Investments into aligned impact funds (e.g., ABC),   + Focus areas: gender, youth, nutrition, disruptive agri models. | |
+| 6.Marcus: How is pricing of private sector loans determined? | * Strategy developed by IFAD Risk Unit. * Pricing starts at commercial rates, then adjusted for:   + Risk premium,   + Impact level,   + Market conditions (modular components). | |
+| 7.Marcus: How do you ensure you’re not crowding out the private sector? | * IFAD follows DFI blended finance principles. * Every deal must demonstrate non-crowding out and additionality. * Example: AMK investment – opened a new business area that aligns with IFAD’s mission, which AMK wouldn’t have entered without IFAD. | |
+| 8. Marcus: ABC Fund: How has it performed? What lessons have been learned? | * €34M portfolio with 30 deals (13 agri-SMEs, rest FIs); 750,000 beneficiaries, strong focus on women and youth. * Impact-wise: successful (reach, jobs, inclusion).   Issues:   * High fund management costs, fund not break-even. * Low private sector co-financing, despite concessional support.   Lessons:   * Structuring must be tighter. * Fund managers must be experienced in both agri and finance (subtle jab at prior choice of Bamboo Finance). * Need more than loan-loss guarantees to attract private capital. | |
+| 9.Marcus: Is the 5:1 catalytic target ratio realistic? | * Rubio admits it’s hard to justify. * Still under review, unclear definitions and measurement. * It’s a work in progress; achieving 5x leverage is seen as highly ambitious | |
+| 10.Marcus: Is ICT integration part of PSD investments? | * Yes – actively prioritized. * Every new investment includes digital components. Example: Support to farm orgs for digitization, banks upgrading IT platforms. * Benefits: Lower operating costs, reduced risks, better credit scoring, and potential lower interest rates for target clients. | |
+| 11.Marcus: How critical is local currency lending for PSD? | * Absolutely critical for agriculture value chains and local markets. * Currently not possible, but exploring options (e.g., via MFX). * A major priority for expanding reach and relevance. | |
+| 12.Marcus: What do you want to see from this evaluation? | * Show evolution from 2019 strategy, reflect growth and lessons learned. * Emphasize IFAD's niche as a catalytic investor in rural private sector. * Evaluation should back the need for concessional funds and institutional support beyond just balance sheet financing. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1. Institutional Delay. IFAD took too long to act on private sector development. The private sector strategy (developed over a year with consultants) should have been launched much earlier, ideally 2–3 years sooner. | | |
+| 2. Slow Initial Deployment. Only $25M deployed over several years—very slow given the ambitions. The scale and speed of operations were limited in IFAD11/12. | | |
+| 3. Positive Shift in IFAD13. Good news: IFAD is now using its own balance sheet (starting with $90M). Also deploying field-based investment officers, which is expected to improve operational linkages and delivery. | | |
+| 4. Strong Awareness of Market Principles. PSD has a clear understanding of the need for additionality and to avoid crowding out existing impact investors. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-04_ReehanaRaza_DirectorAPR_DCO_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 04 April 2025, Reehana Raza, Director APR, DCO | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Reehana Raza (RR)**  **Abdelkarim Sma (AS)**  **Kaushik Barua (KB)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director, APR, DCO** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **04 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Sally, Marcus** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin, AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Sally: Contribution to setting replenishment commitment targets | * OPR sets targets with some input from operations. Baseline reporting (log frame data) is used as a foundation for target-setting discussions. * OPR errs on the side of committing too much to engage donors and see how far you can go with receiving more money from them. * Trends in IFAD to reduce the number of commitments to focus the agency and not burden it with too much. | |
+| 1. Marcus: Have you been set targets in co-financing, loans to private sector, BRAM loans? | * Targets are set corporate-wide and cascaded to the regions; DCO targets and APR-level targets. * Interaction with ICOs and regional teams to see what's feasible in mainstreaming themes within the country context. APR is moving towards hardened-lending terms making the negotiations are more difficult. * Variance in target performance by region. EX: APR overdelivers in international co-financing. * BRAM loans are allocated to the region based on risk and capacities; now demand-driven but previously not in IFAD 11/12. | |
+| 1. Sally: With a differing range of priorities, how does this impact skills requirements of people on the ground? | * IFAD reassignment and decentralization resulted in a significant loss of people and expertise. * Number of staff was insufficient to meet targets; correlation in drop of effectiveness/efficiency in APR and number of staff. | |
+| 1. Sally: With the differing range of priorities, how does it impact your resourcing ability (e.g. within defined budgets)? | * Tension with decentralization and delivery capacity that is worsened by budget neutrality * Donor countries still push on efficiency metrics with comes with a series of processes and deliverables that take the team away from other tasks because they're considered more or less budget friendly. | |
+| 1. Sally: What impact did decentralization and reassignment processes have on vacancies and if you had consultants? | * The current team just did more during that time. Reassignment meant a lot of people left the team and IFAD because some didn't want to switch careers. | |
+| 1. Sally: Did this have an impact on turnover? | * 2022: Big reassignment year for APR as half the CDs moved. When new CDs move, they know nothing of the new country and pipeline development of them depends heavily on that. * There will be another reassignment in 2026 (6 will move), and there's a push to design projects early when you know people will be leaving soon. * Huge consequences in the pipeline and in managing delivery – unequal distribution of the reassignments in different regions, as well. | |
+| 1. Sally: How is information presented to the President and how do you get feedback responded to? | * Might be pauses in reassignment. This year there won't be one potentially because of feedback from CDs or because there's not enough roles to do it. * This project falls under the VP who has set up monthly meetings with the regional directors. Most of the re-calibration talks were done through that forum. * President has had regional directors for lunch and will have a 2-day retreat with the directors as a result. | |
+| 1. Sally: What's your view on effectiveness of IFAD training in building necessary competence? Has investment in training bolstered competence in your team to deliver? | * IFAD training courses provide the foundation for the competencies. * There are some in-person trainings, but few. When possible Reehana holds her own in-person sessions when she can afford the time. * Issue: People move from specialized program management role assuming generalists can move into these types of managerial positions without having specializations or abilities to even move a specialist from one team to another. | |
+| 1. Marcus: BRAM and Co-financing: General feedback from the government regarding BRAM? | * Government of Bangladesh told World Bank they wanted IFAD on a billion-$ project, and this is typically the norm. * Generally, governments like IFAD. | |
+| 1. Hansdeep: Any other comments? | * Co-financing ratios improve with decentralization but can't do NLAs with budget constraints. * There are also difficulties in leveraging M&E because they don't have the abilities to leverage as effectively. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| * Target-setting and Resource Allocation: Targets are set corporately and cascaded down to lower levels, but there’s a trend towards reducing commitments to avoid overburdening the organization. This is especially crucial in the face of staff shortages and decentralization impacts. | | |
+| * Staffing and Effectiveness Challenges: The decentralization and reassignment of staff, particularly in 2022, led to a loss of expertise, and insufficient staff to meet targets, resulting in decreased delivery capacity and efficiency, especially in regions like APR. | | |
+| * Donor and Government Engagement: While donors push for efficiency metrics and deliverables, governments generally favor IFAD’s involvement in large-scale projects, improving co-financing ratios despite budget constraints. | | |
+| * Operational Constraints and Training: Limited in-person training opportunities and the move from specialized roles to generalist ones can create challenges in managing programs effectively. Reassignments and the lack of trained staff hinder project continuity and development. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Marcus to send additional questions (Tia to add ICT4D questions), to be consolidated by Hansdeep and arrange another meeting or seek written answers | | Marcus, Tia, Hans |
+| SIDAS strategy to share with James – Max should have it. | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-07_CristinaSchiarini_HRSpecialistRecruitmentCoordinator_PCDTalentAcquisitionTeamTAT_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 07 April 2025, Cristina Schiarini, HR Specialist (Recruitment Coordinator), PCD (Talent Acquisition Team (TAT)) | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Cristina Schiarini (CS)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **HR Specialist (Recruitment Coordinator), PCD (Talent Acquisition Team (TAT))** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **07 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin and AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Sally: Role of CS | * Nominated as coordinator of a recruitment-only department, as vacancy rates were high in 2019. * 6 short-term consultants brought on as only recruiters. * Hiring managers can be highly selective and desire to acquire the best in the market despite ~300 qualified candidates on the appointable roster. | |
+| 1. Sally: What new skills sets need to be recruited for in and out of the organization with what we've promised to our donor? | * Always an evolution of skillsets needed.   + EX: ODE for nutrition are new sets of positions that need specific technical skills that are hard to find and outsource. * Some skillsets are not well-developed in other countries. * Private sector brings in brand new positions & desired skills, so this fosters more cooperation with the hiring manager. | |
+| 1. Sally: On the mainstreaming for nutrition, what is your experience in recruiting mainstreaming experts? | * Must consider candidates who are qualified for the position and follow guidelines on nationality and gender.   + Rule that 1/3 of unit employees must be female and from lists B & C. * For nutrition, they can't find females from List B and C countries | |
+| 1. Sally: What is the impact of reassignment on workload? | * Stopped recruitment 2 years ago to allow reassignment processes to occur. * Inefficient processes led to hiring managers waiting 4-5 months to fill team vacancies because HR would wait until after reassignment was unsuccessful to open the position up to the market. * HR now operates the two tracks in parallel. | |
+| 1. Sally: Are peole resigning as a result of resassignment? | * No comment. | |
+| 1. Sally: What does recruitment look like for staffing in fragile countries? | * This is handled by the recruiters themselves who work to bring in these individuals. * Haven't necessarily had delays with this recruitment and it's a more difficult role, but they're still filling the positions. | |
+| 1. Sally: Calculations of vacancy rate | * Currently utilizing a new vacancy rate calculation. * Don't include roles that were abolished, serve as double functions, and more. | |
+| 1. Federica: There are temporary staff in your unit. What about recruiting to reinforce your own? | * In the new PCD organigram, Cristina's position is going back to business partner and there will be a P4 for recruitment. The rest of the recruiters are short-term staff. * This cannot be counted on to keep hold of the vacancy rate with only short-term staff. * Has mentioned this as an issue before but nothing has changed with the contract length of staff. * Cristina will retire in September 2025 and the team will be left without a full-time IFAD staff leader. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| * Appointment of specialist skills are areas where they battle the most in filling vacancies.   + Getting the right profiles (list B/C or gender PLUS technical skills) is a huge struggle.   + When they recruit for specialist skills, they source from outside IFAD instead of building capacities of staff within the department.   + Some mainstream specializations (e.g. nutrition and climate) have been around for a long time and these positions are still outsourced. | | |
+| * The way the unit calculates vacancy rate has finally brought their rate within target.   + Vacancy rate is only calculated for position paid by IFAD core budget, but not the positions paid by supplementary funds.   + Concerns of the old versus new formulas for calculating this rate, and the time frames each formula was used. | | |
+| * The recruitment unit itself is filled with temporary staff.   + Major structural part of the team responsible for vacancy will be un-sourced as of September when Cristina retires. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Confirm vacancy rate formula and calculation. See old versus new formula and the timeline used for both. | | Federica |
+| Ask Stella about recruitment staffing, and engage with David and Richard (in HQ interviews) | | Sally |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-07_CristinaSchiarini_HRSpecialist_PCD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 07 April 2025, Cristina Schiarini, HR Specialist, PCD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Cristina Schiarini** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **HR Specialist** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **07 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Sally, Federica** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin and AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of CS and Staffing Unit Responsibilities | * IFAD has four business partners who manage advising, benefits, and recruitment for their respective departments. * Due to high vacancy rates, a specialized recruitment unit was created, coordinated by CS, with 2 fixed-term staff and 6 short-term consultants. * Vacancy rate calculations only apply to positions under the fixed budget, not those funded through supplementary sources. * The roster system is heavily used—there are 300 candidates in the appointable pool. * Final candidate selection lies with the ABP chair, who chooses from at least two shortlisted names. * Hiring managers often prefer to look beyond the roster for top-tier market candidates, making alignment challenging. | |
+| 2. SB: What have been the new skill sets needed to be recruited for in an out of the organization with respect to what we’ve promised our donors? | * Recruitment is evolving—new roles like those in nutrition (ODE) require niche technical skills that are hard to source, especially among female candidates from Lists B & C. * Many countries haven’t yet developed strong capacity in these specialized areas. * Private sector roles are also new, requiring close collaboration with hiring managers to identify suitable talent. | |
+| 3. SB: Using mainstreaming for nutrition as an example – experience recruiting mainstreaming experts? | * Struggling to meet the requirement that one-third of hires be female and from Lists B & C. * Difficulty in finding sufficiently qualified candidates within those groups for open positions. | |
+| 4. SB: Impact of reassignment on workload? | * Recruitment was paused for two years to prioritize the reassignment process, causing inefficiencies and long delays (4–5 months) for hiring managers. * Now, recruitment and reassignment are being conducted in parallel to improve efficiency. | |
+| 5. SB: Placement of staff in fragile countries | * Recruitment is handled directly by the recruiters, who continue to fill positions despite increased difficulty. * While the process is more challenging, there haven't been noticeable delays in recruitment. | |
+| 6. SB: Vacancy Rates | * The new vacancy rate calculation excludes abolished roles and instances where staff are handling multiple functions. * This rate reflects a corporate decision rather than the actual staffing needs required to meet IFAD’s mandate. * There is a need for clear guidelines to support operations effectively. | |
+| 7. FR: HR is staffed by temporary personnel. What about reinforcing your own unit? | * The unit is mostly staffed with temporary personnel, raising concerns about sustainability and continuity. * In the new PCD organigram, the CS role will revert to a business partner model, with a P4 focused on recruitment—both still short-term roles. * A fixed-term position is needed to provide stability and reduce turnover. * Relying solely on short-term staff makes it difficult to manage vacancy rates effectively. * Despite raising this issue with superiors, there has been no change in contract duration for staff. * The current CS is retiring in September, leaving the team without a full-time, permanent IFAD staff lead. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Recruitment Challenges & Specialist Skills:** IFAD struggles to recruit for niche technical roles, especially among qualified female candidates from Lists B and C. Despite long-standing needs in areas like nutrition and climate, internal capacity remains underdeveloped, and positions are still largely outsourced. | | |
+| **Recruitment Process & Vacancy Rate:** A dedicated recruitment unit was created to address high vacancy rates, but it’s mostly staffed with short-term consultants. The current vacancy rate excludes roles funded by supplementary sources, and leadership gaps are expected with key staff retiring. | | |
+| **Reassignment, Delays and Internal Capacity:** Delays during the reassignment-only period highlighted inefficiencies, prompting a shift to parallel recruitment and reassignment. However, there's still no structured approach to develop internal technical talent or plan for reassignment peaks. | | |
+| **Recruitment System & Roster Use:** While IFAD has a roster of qualified candidates, hiring managers often bypass it in search of market “best-fits.” Selection authority lies with the ABP, but lack of permanent staff and limited alignment with hiring needs hinder efficiency. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Check on vacancy rate formula and calculation. Old versus new and timelines of using both. | | Federica |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-07_FrancescaMaselli_ChiefofPolicyStrategicSupportUnit_PCD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 07 April 2025, Francesca Maselli, Chief of Policy & Strategic Support Unit, PCD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Francesca Maselli** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Chief of Policy & Strategic Support Unit, PCD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **07 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hans, Sally, Federica, Tianlin** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| Francesca’s Role Overview | * Since 2019: Chief of Policy & Strategic Support Unit - responsible for HR policy, payroll, systems, data, social security. * April 2025: Added Chief of HR Operations. Unit renamed to People Operations and Policy Unit. * Also focal point for data requests linked to the CLE. | |
+| Role of Francesca’s Unit in Organizational Change | * Engaged when organizational change touches HR policy, systems, or data. * **Decentralization**: Designed and implemented the mobility framework; ensured staff rotation across hardship duty stations. * **Recalibration**: Adjusted systems (PeopleSoft) to reflect new organigrams, shift responsibilities (e.g. leave approvals to regional directors), and updated performance management setups accordingly. * Updated leave approval policies: now done locally (e.g., by Regional Directors), even if reporting lines remain to HQ. | |
+| Medical Insurance Reform (linked to decentralization) | Current: National staff covered by UNDP’s MIP.  Reform: New IFAD-contracted insurance plan now exists, covering national staff directly.   * Not implemented yet; planned for Jan 2026. * Will involve a messy transition due to payroll being handled by UNDP. | |
+| Mobility Framework – Evolution and Issues | * First created in 2018. Multiple iterations since:   + 1st Round: Staff could apply to higher-grade posts; no promotion, just a Special Post Allowance (SPA); promotion considered after one year.   + 2nd Round: More structured; promotions given immediately. Process became too heavy and slow.   + 3rd Round: Simplified but remained competitive. Less cumbersome; structured by grade and job family change. * Generalist vs Specialist:   + Early stages favored generalist model to enable decentralization.   + Over time, shift to balanced model — generalist where needed, but preserve technical knowledge and institutional memory. * Impact on Staffing:   + No spike in turnover from decentralization or reassignment.   + Vacancy rate did increase — not due to mobility, but because of rapid organizational growth and normal attrition.   + Retention rate held steady (never dropped below 92%). | |
+| Generalist Approach – Pushback and Support | * Some divisions struggled with onboarding generalists due to insufficient technical depth. * Mitigation: training, Operations Academy, formal handovers, flexibility on transition dates. * Positive side: cross-fertilization of knowledge across units. | |
+| Skills VS Competence when Reassigning People | * Training ≠ Competence: Agreed. * Progress made:   + Skills profiles now exist for staff and for job roles.   + Matching system in PeopleSoft helps identify skill gaps.   + Plans to link training, skills gaps, and vetting of skills via performance management.   + Currently, skills are self-declared — not yet validated by supervisors or systems. | |
+| Reassignment Process | * Reassignment Panel recommends placements; President approves. This delegation of authority has not changed. * Hiring managers now involved in shortlisting and assessments. * Rules:   + Change in job family → technical test required.   + Change in grade → competency-based interview.   + Change in both → both assessments required. * Streamlining over time:   + First round: minimal manager involvement.   + Now: structured, rule-based process, but final decision still lies with President. | |
+| President’s Role – Efficient or Not? | * President retains final sign-off on all reassignment decisions, including junior P2 staff. * Francesca: "So far it works," but acknowledges it's highly centralized. * Panel includes VP and EMC members; designed to bring both technical and corporate perspectives. * Sally: Questions efficiency and value-add of presidential involvement in junior-level decisions. | |
+| Fragile Duty Stations and Mobility | * Fragile contexts (e.g., “D” duty stations): standard 2-year assignments → automatic reassignment every two years. * Supports organizational health, avoids overexposure to hardship environments. * Easier to manage with Country Directors; harder in areas like HR where fewer posts exist. | |
+| Metrics & Monitoring | * Tracked quarterly in coordination with RMO:   + Mobility rate   + Retention rate   + Vacancy rate * Focus is on strategic roles (e.g., CDs, technical professionals in field). | |
+| Filling Vacancies and Efficiency Challenge | * Many vacancies are filled ad hoc: short-terms, consultants, or internal temporary assignments. * Internal temporary assignments just shift the vacancy elsewhere - don’t solve the problem, only transfer it. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1.Francesca’s team took a “lessons learned” approach, but whether lessons came too late or at too high a cost. | | |
+| 2. Centralized decision-making (President approving everything) seen as inefficient and possibly unnecessary. | | |
+| 3. Mobility management framework was moved away from Francesca to the talent management team; more interviews shall be done to know better the mobility management framework and the decision-making process. | | |
+| 4. Disconnection between policy and business impact - mobility impacts project delivery and country-level continuity. | | |
+| 5. Concerns about lack of flexibility in reassignment cycle (e.g., 3-year rotations), especially in fragile contexts. | | |
+| 6. Skepticism around whether reassignment system supports specialist roles effectively. E.g., staff with niche technical profiles (e.g., ICT4D) being reassigned to unrelated roles just to meet policy requirements. | | |
+| 7. WFP/FAO/World Bank comparisons might be useful to assess whether IFAD is learning from peers. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Will provide:   * Manager-to-staff ratios (snapshot for end 2019 and 2024). * Number of consultants per hiring manager (based on contract data). * Data on short-term staff covering vacant positions. * Data on temporary assignments across divisions. | | Francesca |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-07_RogerFischer_DirectorandChiefRiskOfficer_RMO_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 07 April 2025, Roger Fischer, Director and Chief Risk Officer, RMO | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Roger Fischer** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director and Chief Risk Officer, RMO** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **07 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hans, Marcus, Tianlin, AnnaLyssia** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin, AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Has RMO developed a methodology for assessing risk in private sector loans and equity investments? | * Status: Still under development. Aims to finalize in 2025. * Current practice: RMO prepares preliminary risk notes for each private sector deal (includes financial + non-financial risk). * Planned approach:   + Pre-screening criteria that are universally understandable and easy to apply (internally and externally).   + Governance reforms required to improve decision-making quality on private sector engagements. * Gap: No full methodology yet - concerns raised about readiness as IFAD expands into private sector financing. | |
+| 2. Capital Allocation for Risk. Is the capital allocation methodology also still in development? | * Principle: Capital prioritized for credit risk and concessionality (developmental risks), not operational or market risks. * Private sector & BRAM: Capital is allocated based on risk level, but no specific cap for private sector or BRAM portfolios. * Private sector loans do consume capital, depending on their risk. * Metric: Captured in the Corporate Risk Dashboard (quarterly). Available for review. | |
+| 3. Borrowing = Risk? Why is borrowing historically seen as risky in IFAD? | * Risk exists, yes. But no one’s “afraid.” Just cautious and aware. * Rational concerns: inability to repay → risks to IFAD's financial sustainability. * Negative carry might happen if borrowing finances concessional lending.   Marcus challenges this: IF BRAM loans are funded by borrowing and priced correctly, there should be no negative carry.   * Roger agrees that ALM is key. Notes fungibility of money makes clean separation tricky. * Also flags concern over **mission drift**: borrowing might cause IFAD to behave more like a commercial lender. | |
+| 4. Country Lending Limits (BRAM Portfolio). Has IFAD’s methodology for country risk allocation changed since receiving a credit rating? | * Methodology needed once BRAM was introduced. * Approach:   + Driven by country risk + target to maintain overall credit quality for portfolio.   + BRAM is used to balance the low credit quality of PBAS portfolio. * Responsibility: Risk management contributes but doesn’t drive allocations. | |
+| 5. Are you running scenarios to define optimal LIC vs UMIC mix? | * No, portfolio mix (e.g., 60:40 PBAS:BRAM, and 20% UMIC cap) is politically determined. * No formal calculation for optimality - these are institutional political decisions. * Final call lies with the President.   Marcus follow-up: So 20% cap is about politics and fear of mission drift, not risk?   * Disagrees slightly. While political, the cap does have risk implications. * Donors resist seeing IFAD allocate to UMICs they feel can self-finance. * Going against donor perceptions could jeopardize future contributions—this is a real risk (policy importance). * Roger prefers to talk about “risk,” not “fear.”   Marcus follow-up: Was rejection of Turkey’s BRAM request a political or risk decision?   * Roger: Doesn’t recall case specifically, but guesses it was political - donors’ views on the country can self-finance. | |
+| 6.Leverage ratio. Current leverage is 0.3, cap is 0.5. Has IFAD modeled the optimal leverage ratio? | * No single “optimal.” Depends on qualitative, developmental goals. * More leverage = more lending, but also higher risks and constraints from rating agencies. * Key concern is to preserve IFAD’s concessional model while remaining financially stable. | |
+| 7. Has IFAD’s risk methodology changed after receiving a credit rating? | * Yes, partly. Rating pushed for more sophistication in financial risk management. * But improvements were needed anyway—rating just accelerated things. | |
+| 8.IFAD’s Evolution: BRAM & Private Sector | Marcus & Roger agree:   * New tools like BRAM and private sector lending demand more robust, tailored risk management. * Sophistication must keep up as instruments diversify. | |
+| 9. What risk assessments or systems were in place in IFAD11 and 12? How to ensure doing the right thing? | * Risk management doesn’t judge if policies are “right.” It assesses the risk of not meeting policy objectives. * The Corporate Risk Dashboard offers ongoing monitoring of risks via KRIs from the Enterprise Risk Framework. * It identifies pain points and helps flag risks beyond tolerance. | |
+| 10. How are risks corrected or acted on? | * 3-lines-of-defence model.   + Risk owners responsible for mitigation.   + RMO provides oversight, tracks whether mitigations bring risk back into tolerance. * Risk Control Self-Assessments (RCSA) underway:   + FOD completed, LEG ongoing.   + Plan: full rollout across IFAD by 2027.   + These generate Action Plans that RMO follows up on. FOD haven’t finished the action plan. | |
+| Recommendations for the evaluation | * Reinforcement of the case for strong, institution-wide risk management. * Interested in CLE findings | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1.Concerns that critical decisions (like leverage and UMIC caps) are not grounded in analytics but politics/donor pressure, leading to underserved real demand. IFAD’s dual identity (UN + IFI) isn't inherently a reason, but it's often used as an excuse. | | |
+| 2.Marcus: Surprised by weak justification of negative carry—no such risk if asset-liability management is in place. | | |
+| 3. Roger gave vague answers on methodologies. Marcus believes IFAD has better risk practices than Roger showed but are poorly articulated. | | |
+| 4. Concern about over-centralization: President involved in too many decisions, even at junior levels (example of P2 level reassignment approvals) | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Get the 2024Q4 Corporate risk dashboard document from Roger | | Tianlin |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-10_CandidaSansone_FormerHRDirector_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 10 April 2025, Candida Sansone, Former HR Director | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Candida Sansone (CS)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Former HR Director, CSD, MSD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **10 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Barun, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of CS | * Reassigned mid-year in 2020 * Appointed HR director in 2022. Held this role during recalibration. * 6 months before leaving in 2024 CS was asked to complete a temporary assignment on recalibration. | |
+| 1. SB: How did you land on the principles of the redesigns for decentralization, recalibration, and reassignment? | * Design came from a small group of people (President, advisors, and a few others). * Structure was already known when CS was informed – It was meant to be only a small recalibration to better link and strengthen operations. | |
+| 1. SB: Did onsultation with the broader departments occur? | * President reached out to AVPs for feedback and changes, and AVPs were asked to provide direct feedback from there. * Initial design phase included staff town halls and open-door policy with recalibration team. | |
+| 1. How did the change agents work practically on the ground during the change management process? | * Implemented changes within 6 months; communicated in July that October and December were the main implementation dates. * No specific change agents, but it was clear the managers were part of the process. Completed as an informal measure, and managers felt these changes didn't belong to them therefore they didn't communicate the implementation information. * Given feedback, the team would set meetings to ensure voices were heard. The VP also met directly with some staff. * Recalibration didn't reduce the force, it was intended to increase opportunity and ensure no one lost their job. | |
+| 1. HK: Why was the time frame 6 months or less? | * President wanted to start the new structure on 1 January 2025. As it was only small adjustments, he wanted it done quickly. * Many senior staff positions were open that needed to be filled, alongside attempting to create the D2 position. Ideally, 2025 would be working in the new structure and make only tiny adjustments whereas 2024 would have the main changes implemented. * Each division and department would work within their own areas to adjust in 2025, too. | |
+| 1. HK: What reasons were behind the recalibration? Did this have to do with replenishments or on a strategic level? Was factor-level efficiency or cost-savings involved? | * Working on a new strategic framework at the same time. CS was not involved at the time. * Ideally looking to strengthen operations but to work together internally, as well as enhance the oversight role of the VP. Operations now all fall under the VP, previously seen as a ceremonial role. * They were clearly aiming to avoid increasing costs and believe they achieved some efficiencies. For example, they merged certain functions, such as through the creation of ODE. When reviewing positions, they took advantage of natural vacancies to eliminate roles that were no longer necessary. | |
+| 1. SB: How did you see competencies and skillsets of hired staff shift? What changes did you see? | * In 2019, a McKinsey study helped define needed skills and identify gaps; led to initiatives like the Operations Academy for Country Directors. * Needed to build capacity in key areas, especially as project procurement moved under Finance—requiring aligned skillsets. * ODE created to bring in impact-focused skills, replacing former research functions now done by other organizations. * Managers were expected to assess and address support needs but often didn't. | |
+| 1. SB: What was the HR strategy in skills processes, if any? How do the commitments inform skills development and recruitment strategy? | * Held to KPIs from cycles 11 and 12 to track commitments. * Thematic areas always existed but some needed strengthening and sub-skills—especially important alongside decentralization. * Hiring doesn't always align with strategic commitments; external factors influence staffing, and there’s no clear skills strategy or assessment. * Heavy reliance on consultants in 2024—highlighting a gap in in-house expertise. * Lack of P2 positions limits staff development; too many consultants vs. junior staff. * Consultants seen as flexible experts; in-house staff viewed as fixed resources with limitations. * Staff expected to be generalists with broad knowledge; technical depth often outsourced to consultants. | |
+| 1. SB: Moving from centralization to decentralization?    1. Has there been discussion on how to delegate some of the work to given to the CPO/CPC? | * Delegation of authority; Sub-delegations exist, but managers can delegate more if they choose. * Need for better ground-level awareness to inform decision-making. * Decentralized office setup is key, with corporate services managers acting as liaisons between the field and HQ. * HR is still evolving; aim is to increase corporate services presence in the field rather than remain fully centralized. * IFAD’s small size presents ongoing structural and resource challenges. | |
+| 1. BC: In your different roles, how do you see IFAD's budget process? Allocation, M&E, execution? Do you see the budget process supporting IFAD's ability to meet the mandate? | * Budgeting lacks strategic alignment—feels like funding is reduced yearly without clear links to the strategic framework or individual work plans. * No strong connection between roles, budgets, and performance indicators, unlike more structured, tiered systems in other organizations. * Force reductions happen out of necessity, even when they don’t match actual needs. * Hard to attract experts for short-term roles due to limited, ad hoc budgets. * Heavy reliance on temp staff, raising concerns about whether the core workforce fits long-term organizational needs—calls for a structural refresh. | |
+| 1. BC: How effective is the board on budget oversight? | * Improved communication on budget limits, with clearer messaging on what can be provided and where funds are going. * Past budget discussions were difficult, but there's progress with results-based management (RBM) and more transparency. * EB has a trusting relationship, though Corporate Services hasn’t been deeply involved. * Some questions on the budget remain, but overall, * EB is generally satisfied, especially compared to other UN or Rome-based agencies. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Recalibration Process Lacked Broad Ownership**  The 2024 recalibration was designed by a small group with minimal early involvement from key departments like Corporate Services. Managers didn’t fully own or communicate the changes, contributing to gaps in implementation. | | |
+| **Efforts Focused on Efficiency, Not Job Cuts**  The recalibration aimed to enhance operations and avoid job losses by reallocating resources, filling senior roles, and merging functions (e.g., creation of ODE). Vacant positions were used to streamline rather than cut staff. | | |
+| **Skills Gaps and Structural Weaknesses Persist**  Despite earlier efforts (e.g., McKinsey study, Operations Academy), the organization still lacks a coherent skills strategy. Heavy reliance on consultants, few junior roles (e.g., P2s), and underdeveloped in-house capacity hinder long-term sustainability. | | |
+| **Decentralization Introduced Operational and HR Challenges**  While decentralization aimed to improve operations and field-HQ coordination, structural challenges remain—such as limited delegation, inconsistent ground-level insight, and a corporate services presence that’s still too centralized. | | |
+| **Budgeting and Workforce Planning Lack Strategic Alignment**  Budget processes are reactive and disconnected from strategic frameworks or individual performance plans. Short-term funding and overuse of temporary staff signal a need for deeper workforce planning and a refresh of the staffing model. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-10_ECSA-ISA_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 10 April 2025, ECSA-ISA | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Franceso Ranalletta (FR), Leon Williams (LW), Lenyara Fundukova (LF)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **ECSA – ISA** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **11 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. To what extent has ECSA been consulted on big changes in IFAD 11 and 12? | * The start of the decentralization process was when staff felt their voices weren't heard for the first time; senior decision-makers viewed participation and raising valid concerns as resistance, but the process was unclear from the beginning. * Staff unification occurred resulting from this, leading to force management to listen to these staff concerns. * 2021 saw distribution of an open letter from ESCA, which led to a process started with limited engagement and communication to something constructive and institutional (between 2019-2023). | |
+| 1. HK: What happened when you reached out to the board with changes or directives? | * The EB is not homogenous, and every member state has its different political beliefs. The board was approached with strategic concerns because the staff are overinvolved in too many thematic areas for work. * The management style of the former and current Presidents is different. With current processes, ECSA is informed in every step of recalibration. * The EB hired an external consulting firm after LW wrote and released a report on the impacts on staff, but the firm's results have yet to be shared with anyone in-house. * ECSA uses the decentralization document to refer back to recommendations for senior management on how to approach future reforms but lacks confidence that management has taken the document into account; tendency to place little value on concerns raised by staff (seen as resistance), especially in a culture that is Presidential decree and not consensus. | |
+| 1. Staff POV on recalibration. | * Recalibration was announced as a soft change, but it was not. Still unable to assess its effectiveness because it's only just ended. Now need to see GS staff harmonization process that doesn't produce job loss but changes the process of GS staff. * Decentralization has changed the business model completely, where reassignment is the main tool to implement mobility which has a huge impact on staff welfare and the organization, but has poor results if the wrong person is put in the wrong location. * ECSA is not against geographic mobility, but the function of the mobility tools needs to be strongly and materially reviewed. * LW: "IFAD announces we're heading into a year of stability and then announces 2 reassignments in the same year.” * Lack of clarity and reasoning in the process of reassignment. At one point, there was overlap with decentralization, recalibration, and reassignment making staff feel unstable with where they should focus their efforts. All communication on this issue is met with lacking vision for the purpose and direction of how it will support IFAD's mandate more effectively/efficiently. | |
+| 1. SB: With decentralization, have there been staff that haven't been allocated to roles? What's happened to them as a result of reassignment? | * Contracts were relatively secure but in recent years its moved away from having clear processes and procedures in the harmonization process. If you don't accept your new role, it's seen as a resignation. Allow the front office to make decisions about your role without your consent. * No reassignment within 6 months leaves employees redundant; seen as a pathway to redundancy and indirect firing. Many unassigned have found a home, but some complicated cases forced others out of the organization (specific to health and performance-related issues). * The first iteration of recalibration was intended to clear out senior country directors and technical analysts which resulted in a "brain drain" and left them to re-hire the same staff as consultants. * Authoritative, top-down issue. | |
+| 1. SB: The first decentralization was covered in the first CLE, do you think there's anything that's been improved in the process? | * The process changes every time, but in the most recent reassignment, all staff with personal cases (medical, family problems, etc.) were taken into consideration. This is a change from the first decentralization process. * Improvements in certain areas like timing with the school year, etc. But the issue is many staff are forced into reassignment but then re-confirmed in the same position causing a strong mental toll. | |
+| 1. HK: Are things stabilizing in the shock value of these initiatives? | * Now IFAD is decentralized, but in 2015/2016 it wasn't so it was very difficult. * The average career length here now is 3.5 years, and many come here as a steppingstone in their careers as opposed to long-term careers like before decentralization. * Suggestions to re-evaluate if reassignment tools are compatible with IFAD's structure and staff. | |
+| 1. HK: If you agree with reassignment and decentralization, is it a better alternative than using the standard model? | * ECSA has proposed reassigning only CDs and program managers, as all the top-down reassignments only crowd the voluntary mobility that people would typically do for their own career development. * Reassignment could be welcomed, but if you put a former finance director in a CD role, what added value would they actually bring? Reassigning in the same job family would be better. | |
+| 1. HK: Any further comments? | * Review staff vacancy rates and ask for "clean data" as ECSA is skeptical of the numbers. * Lacking use of specialized agency status. * IFAD has always lived off the goodwill of the staff to overwork themselves, but its becoming a staunch business model (and with its approach to management) that staff are now disengaging and don't do extra. * Proper assessment of the workload and recognition of the work of staff. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Decentralization led to staff unrest and unification** due to poor communication, top-down decision-making, and disregard for staff input—seen more as resistance than valid concern. | | |
+| **Reassignment, decentralization, and recalibration overlapped without clarity**, creating instability and negatively impacting staff welfare, especially due to mismatched roles and lack of transparent processes. | | |
+| **The external consultancy’s findings remain unshared**, deepening staff distrust, while ECSA feels ignored despite offering reform recommendations through formal channels. | | |
+| **Mobility tools need urgent review**, as forced reassignments often lack strategic fit, overlook personal circumstances, and create indirect pathways to redundancy. | | |
+| **IFAD’s organizational culture has shifted**, resulting in shorter staff tenures, disengagement, and a decline in morale due to an overreliance on staff goodwill without adequate recognition or structural support. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
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_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-10_GiorgiaSalucci_RegionalTeamsManager_MSD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 10 April 2025, Giorgia Salucci, Regional Teams Manager, MSD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Giorgia Salucci (GS), Cecile Mbenoun (CM), Hilal Mudaser (HM), Robert Swinkels (RS), Sarah Mirmotahari (SM)** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **GS: Former Chief of FSU (Field Support Unit)**  **CM, HM (ESA), RS: Corporate Services Managers (CSM)**  **SM: Former CSM, Current PCD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **10 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Hansdeep, Federica** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. HK: Roles of the Interviewees 2. HK: No staff in HQ? | GS: Former chief of the FSU (2019-2025), Moving to PCD (July 2025).  RS: Worked in HR (2019-2022), CSM for APR (2023-Present)  HM: CSM for ESA  CM: CSM for WCA (2022-Present)  SM: FSU (2019-2024), PCD (2025-Present)   * FSU was never fully decentralized and have just started to move the CSMs into the field. | |
+| 1. HK: FSU will be called MSD? 2. HK: Functions of MSD | * MSD will be a merge between FSU and ADM. FSU is currently called MSD Regional Management Team, and this was done as part of recalibration. * Functions: Security, procurement, travel, privileges and immunities, facilities management, records management, mailing services, visas. | |
+| 1. SB: How were you engaged on the proposed organizational changes for your team before decisions were made? | * The team (and GS) was asked to present options and proposals to set up the new recalibration. * CSD created a new taskforce to generate ideas and suggestions for management considerations during decision-making; Efforts to involve colleagues in the production of ideas and suggestions, but no say in the final decision. HM co-led this with someone from ICT. | |
+| 1. SB: Were there opportunities to engage with the decision once it was made? | * Dialogue was present and AVP-CSD was keen in understanding implications of all options/proposals. * Formal and informal consultations with the CSD Fit-for-Purpose task force | |
+| 1. How was the decision communicated? | * The communication flow started with GS to keep her team informed, but there was no higher/top-down communication coming from anyone above GS besides the Intranet postings. * 1 October – written communication by change team on Intranet but there was no town hall or forum to discuss anything. They were called to a divisional meeting shortly after and a PCD representative also came to an FSU meeting to highlight the changes. * On this date, they immediately changed reporting lines from ADM to MSD and there was confusion and chaos on the operationalization of the new structure, further compounded by the appointment of the new MSD Director at the same time; "left blind” with an ineffective micro-organizational design. * GS is still currently in her role until July 2025 despite her team being decentralized because there was no plan for how to either absolve or find a replacement for her position. * Overemphasis at the macro-organizational level without analyses or information on the workload, job functions, or regrouping job families, resulting in an inefficient micro-organizational chain that is still causing issues months later. | |
+| 1. SB: You were consulted on the macro decisions but when it pertains to the individual, daily roles, did consultations occur at this level? | * Consultations at this level were not done properly and it didn't seem like a priority for the decision-makers. | |
+| 1. SB: Did you receive any feedback or communication on the proposals, feedback, and ideas you provided initially to the task force? | * All the ideas were discussed at a higher level above GS and her team; therefore, they were not part of the decision-making conversation. The team could not contribute further than clarifying the proposals and ideas. | |
+| 1. SB: To what extent was the change team available and accessible to staff to understand, talk through their concerns, and perform tasks typical of a change team? Or was this a change design team? | * The change team encouraged and invited staff to approach them with concerns, but this was not effective, and it did not seem the change staff felt comfortable performing these tasks anyways. * Reporting AVP was working to receive feedback and analysis from the departments and GS team, but the AVPs’ reports were not reflective of the concerns and opinions of the staff. Even then, it was the change team who could decide how to engage with the AVPs and what they proposed. | |
+| 1. HK: How did this impact field staff? Was it felt even more? | * Mitigated perceptions of field staff on this topic but were invited by the change team to provide input though they weren't involved outside of these invitations. Further, the input was not taken into account. * Differing perceptions of change design and change management even after the decision and implementation occurred; the changes focused on macro-level and could have included greater assessments at the micro-management level. | |
+| 1. SB: How have organizational practices adapted to be aligned with IFAD's decentralization, with respect to efficient and effective recruiting field personnel? How has your work changed with decentralization? | * FSU was the missing link between HQ and the field and played a mediatory/translatory role between the two, thus they were the front of decentralization. * FSU felt they embodied the new IFAD business model in terms of mentality and approach, so GS feels this recalibration has had an opposite effect. GS currently works in MSD that is a divisional monolith strongly based in HQ with no connection to the field and no readiness to shift. * There is the desire to see these centralized divisions change and adapt to what the beneficiaries need, how they need it, and make it simpler for them to get it, which is the opposite effect from what is occurring now in MSD after recalibration; abandon the old-fashioned business model and strengthen the set-up. | |
+| 1. SB: FSU seemed very client centric. Is MSD culture more HQ focused? | * MSD, PCD, and ICT are examples of three divisions that the field employees struggle to get on-time support with issues. This is mainly noted because of the time change, but some activities are required to be centralized for safety and security purposes. A solution to accommodate these clients and employees should be created. * The transformation by cutting FSU has created the perception that senior management (the decision makers) are bringing back an HQ-centered approach, despite a lack of clarity as to their roles and ongoing projects, especially with communications of these responsibilities not being widely disseminated. * There is also the opinion that while HQ organizational culture has changed, the response to the front lines hasn't been greatly impacted, and the social-cultural shift in Rome will come with time. This is a result of modifying structure too quickly with respect to the timeline of recalibration (rapid) versus decentralization (slow). | |
+| 1. SB: What are the impacts of workload on the staff? Are vacancies also linked to reassignment? Was there a spike in offboarding numbers? | * For CSMs, they have kept the same job profiles as before the merger while taking on greater responsibilities with the increasing portfolio. * In the last recalibration there weren't many people leaving for other duty stations, but the first quarter of 2024 was difficult after the 2023 reassignments. The workload was heavy, which impacted the maintained staff. * During 2019 reassignment there was a high number of resignations from movement to other duty stations. Now, the workforce understands relocation as a possibility, but this wasn't the case at that point in time. Many operated on the assumption they'd stay forever in Rome, so it felt shocking for those who had to relocate. | |
+| 1. HK: What is happening at your level with procurement? | * FSU was proactive in insuring IFAD was part of the UN reform initiatives; didn't want to limit collaboration to the RBA but also go beyond it. * Decentralization is made possible because of these agreements with agencies and organizations already in the field; FSU was at the forefront of efficiency agents in collaboration within the U.N.; collaboration in the field goes beyond the RBA. * Limitations present on the corporate level requirements – need to have corporate guides as enabling factors.   + EX: Offer a one-stop-shop for countries in travel because economies of scale are so big but can't be tapped into because of the time difference. * Tapping into the hosting agency team is a possibility but the hosting agreement won't allow it. Also, possibilities for using service labor agreements made with agencies like UNDP and FAO. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Recalibration and MSD Merger**: The recalibration aimed to adjust organizational structures but caused confusion, especially with the new reporting lines and leadership changes. | | |
+| **Consultation Challenges**: While CSD created a taskforce to generate ideas for the recalibration, GS's team was excluded from decision-making, leading to frustration. There was a lack of proper consultation, and input from staff was not effectively considered. | | |
+| **Communication Gaps**: While some communication efforts were made through the change team and Intranet postings, there were no town halls or direct discussions, resulting in unclear expectations and confusion, especially when reporting lines were changed abruptly. | | |
+| **Operational Chaos and Lack of Planning**: The transition was poorly planned, with an ineffective organizational design causing operational challenges. This included the decentralized structure and unclear plans for GS's role, leading to inefficiency and dissatisfaction within the team. | | |
+| **Field vs HQ Perceptions**: FSU, once a mediator between HQ and the field, felt the recalibration moved towards a more HQ-centric approach, creating a disconnect with the field. This perception of returning to an old-fashioned model opposed the intention to simplify processes for beneficiaries. | | |
+| **Decentralization vs Centralization**: While decentralization efforts were intended to bring IFAD closer to the field, the changes seem to have centralized decision-making back at HQ, frustrating field staff. There is also concern about the rapid pace of the recalibration and its mismatch with the slow pace of decentralization. | | |
+| **Workload and Staffing Issues**: The recalibration increased workloads, especially for CSMs who retained their roles but took on more responsibilities. Staff faced challenges from the heavy workloads and reassignment, leading to stress and resignations, particularly during the 2023 reassignments. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
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+|  | |  |
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+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-11_MarcoCamagni_LeadGlobalTechnicalSpecialistPMI_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 11 April 2025, Marco Camagni, Lead Global Technical Specialist PMI | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Marco Camagni** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Lead Global Technical Specialist – Rural Institutions. PMI** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **11 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Federica, Hansdeep, James** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| * + - 1. Role of MC | * CD for LAC pre-2013 * PTA on Value Chain, Specialist, 2013-2018 * Reassigned in 2018: CD in LAC * Reassigned in 2022: Moved back to PMI | |
+| * + - 1. SB: Major changes with recalibration? | * Ongoing discussions with senior staff of divisions for the major changes in recalibration. * Greater role to be given to PMI, ECG, and lead regional specialists. * Interfacing with the regional division front offices would be greater. * Emphasis on creating the workplan and managing resources in the best way. | |
+| * + - 1. SB: How were you engaged with the recalibration process? | * “Receiver of the recalibration process” * Also helped to create a new recalibration implementation strategy in OTD, but had no say in the recalibration decision generally (top-down). | |
+| * + - 1. SB: How was the reassignment process impacted your team’s capacity to deliver? | * Both staff were previously confirmed in their roles to remain in the same thematic area. * Now, with temporary assignments, there's a risk of being reassigned again—even if already confirmed. * It's nearly impossible to fully confirm staying in the same region or technical area. * Staff may be reassigned to new thematic areas, even if it's not a preferred or natural fit, which can be surprising. * Decision-making behind reassignments lacks transparency. * Continuing in the same technical field is increasingly difficult. * HR promotes experience diversification, encouraging staff to explore new roles—this has both positive and negative impacts. * Position availability is limited, especially at specific grades like P5 or P2. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: Do you agree with technical specialists moving into new roles? | * The setting is more or less the same moving from a CD to CD in a different place when you only need to adjust to a new context. * This isn’t a guarantee that someone would make a good CD as a former technical specialist, however. * The CDs are very good at front-facing but couldn’t move into a technical job because they’re not strong in it. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: What are your views or what do you hear from your colleagues on this topic? | * A technical person usually wants to make points about technical issues. Not everyone can be everything. * “We need to follow our vocation a little bit and develop those technical capacities in those [technical] positions.” | |
+| * + - 1. SB: What was the new skill area that IFAD needed to recruit as a result of the commitments being made? How did, or how do you think, they did that? | * SECAP skills and framework were required – important to work with ECG colleagues to properly incorporate these ideas and present them to the clients. * Important to align messaging and presentation of agendas to clients to avoid creating an "IFAD vs. government" perception. * Commitments and targets must be communicated carefully to avoid resistance. * Tensions arise when commitments are made without accompanying budgets. * Countries often hesitate to adopt mainstreaming themes when the financial burden falls on their loan resources. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: Staffing and workload management | * IFAD’s budget is very tight and significantly smaller than other IFIs, leading to stretched resources. * Heavy reliance on consultants, with rosters created for mission support—consultant pay comes from divisional budgets, creating tension. * Current challenge is managing consultant workloads and deciding which missions require IFAD staff vs. complementary consultants. * Limited human capacity makes it hard to cover all countries effectively, especially with a small budget and wide geographic scope. * Former CDs (e.g., in LAC) struggled to stay regionally engaged—remote support (e.g., Peru to Argentina) isn't always practical. * CDs juggle multiple countries and delegate to technical specialists, but coordination remains difficult and NLAs are restricted due to capacity limits. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: Fragility and income status – experience with these countries and how they’re being managed? | * SAFE training is essential for supervising projects in fragile contexts, but not all IFAD staff have completed it—should be prioritized for both regional and global staff. * IFAD now focuses on fragile *contexts* (e.g., specific cities or regions), not just fragile countries. * There are updated fragility guidelines, but budget constraints limit the ability to fully address all risks—prioritization and delegation to partners are key. * Grassroots organizations provide valuable local-level support, though technical input must be context-specific. * Technical staff need flexibility and awareness of local realities, avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches. * Former global missions under PTA gave broader perspective—current regional focus under recalibration risks losing that global anchor. * CDs manage large regional portfolios and must help define how global oversight and support remain relevant. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: One or a few facilitators with the regional directors/CDs? | * The process should be formalized better. * MC has bi-weekly meetings with his entire team to check in, but there’s a lack of clarity with other teams because everyone interprets the process in a different way. | |
+| * + - 1. JG: How have agricultural innovations contributed to environmental and climate action in fragile contexts? | * Movement limitations in fragile settings prompted interest in piloting ICT4D tools for remote technical and climate-related support. * These tools help operate in fragile areas without causing environmental harm. * Client demand for digital and climate-smart solutions has grown—it’s now a natural part of engagement. * Clients are increasingly asking for support in private sector engagement and digital development. * IFAD is using resources to scale existing solutions or invest in areas the private sector avoids. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: Are grant envelopes going down? | * The grant envelope is very small now but was once key for promoting innovation and piloting new ideas. * Some initiatives can be embedded in project design, but others need alternative support mechanisms. * Grants were a way to stimulate competition and creativity in programming. * For IFAD13, only $25 million was available for all national and regional grants—very limited. * The current grant envelope is better suited for regional initiatives, not country-specific ones. | |
+| * + - 1. JG: Role of private sector in fragile settings | * Farming forums are natural entry points for IFAD’s work and are being decentralized, with regional events planned for next year. * Goal is to host IFAD events at every level—regional and country—to increase engagement and relevance. * Emphasis on involving farm organizations not just as beneficiaries but also as implementing partners in future projects. * Country teams play a key role in presenting this approach to governments and securing their support. * These partnerships can support mainstreaming themes and align with IFAD’s comparative advantage of bottom-up, grassroots engagement. * There’s concern that recent shifts in IFAD’s direction could weaken its status as a trusted government partner—must clearly communicate IFAD’s unique value proposition. | |
+| * + - 1. JG: IFAD strategies in fragile contexts | * A core feature of IFAD’s identity is its focus on serving a specific segment of the rural population. * IFAD’s strength lies in "first/last mile" delivery—reaching communities other IFIs like the World Bank often do not. * Projects should be designed using participatory, bottom-up approaches, engaging directly with communities. * More time should be spent in project design to tailor interventions that create deeper, more meaningful impact. * Supervision missions should include a focus on ensuring projects uphold IFAD’s mandate and community-centered approach. | |
+| * + - 1. HK: Further Comments? | * Budget is the easiest focus, but key question is how to work more effectively and efficiently without increasing staff or funding. * Internal processes need simplification—too much time is spent on documentation and review instead of fieldwork. * Time spent on paperwork could be better used for missions and direct project support. * Some improvements have been made, but senior managers still handle tasks that could be safely delegated. * A strong culture of control remains in IFAD, limiting delegation and efficiency. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Recalibration & Organizational Change:** Recalibration was top-down with limited staff input, causing confusion in implementation. Key divisions like PMI and ECG are expected to play larger roles. The shift to regional focus risks losing global technical perspectives, and inconsistent understanding of the process hampers coordination. | | |
+| **Reassignment, Roles, and HR Practices**: Reassignments are often unclear, with staff moved into roles outside their expertise or preference. HR promotes role diversification, but limited positions—especially at P2 and P5—make continuity in technical tracks difficult. Technical specialists and CDs often lack alignment in skill sets. | | |
+| **Technical Expertise & Fragility:** SAFE training is essential but not widespread. IFAD’s approach has shifted from fragile countries to fragile contexts, requiring tailored solutions. Budget constraints limit response capacity, increasing reliance on local partners and demanding more flexibility from technical staff. | | |
+| **Budget, Efficiency, & Processes:** IFAD’s small budget limits staff capacity and increases reliance on consultants. Internal processes remain too bureaucratic, taking time from fieldwork. Delegation is limited due to a strong culture of control, and budget planning lacks alignment with staffing and strategy. | | |
+| **Client, Community & Govt. Engagement:** IFAD’s bottom-up model is a strength but must be clearly communicated to avoid tension with governments. Mainstreaming themes are resisted when costs fall on country loans. Country teams are key in securing buy-in and aligning messaging with IFAD’s mandate. | | |
+| **Innovation & Grants:** The grant envelope has shrunk significantly, limiting innovation. While some ideas can be embedded in project design, others need alternative funding. Current resources favor regional over country-specific initiatives, reducing flexibility for field-level experimentation. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
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_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-14_MalekSahli_LeadDevelopmentFinanceOfficer_FOD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 14 April 2025, Malek Sahli, Lead Development Finance Officer, FOD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Malek Sahli** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Lead Development Finance Officer, FOD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **14 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Hansdeep,** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of MS | * Covering 2 roles up to 2021: financial management team leader rand lead of the development finance team. * After became the lead of financial management. | |
+| 2. MF: What has IFAD done to do more with its capital? How has it approached this issue in line with other MDBs | * As a replenishment-driven organization, IFAD’s core function is to preserve its concessionality, unlike MDBs that rely on capital buffers. * Exploring ways to enhance deployable capital while maintaining concessionality and alignment with IFAD’s mandate. * Considering a pilot for partial credit guarantees tied to IFAD’s commitment capacity. * Focused on two key measures: improving debt-to-equity ratio and mobilizing private capital. | |
+| 3. MF: What are your current opinions on the debt to equity? | * This area is still under exploration—no final decisions or approvals yet. * Considering a shift from strict concessional/non-concessional matching to a more flexible, hybrid model with deployable capital, while identifying which safeguards must remain. * Evaluating the trade-offs of increasing borrowing capacity amid rising demand for non-concessional terms, especially given current debt and vulnerability challenges facing LICs and UMICs. * Exploring partial and co-guarantees with partners to mobilize larger financing envelopes and improve client outcomes beyond IFAD’s own lending capacity. | |
+| 4. MF: Why keep the 20% on UMIC BRAM loans if you’re running against it based on demand? | * Ongoing misperceptions exist that all LMICs qualify for concessional financing, though many do not. * LMICs are not naturally aligned with BRAM clients. * The 20% cap isn't seen as a barrier—non-UMIC terms can still be offered to LMICs where demand exists, supporting both financial and operational engagement. * UMIC engagement can be maintained by leveraging private sector funding through instruments like partial credit guarantees, reducing reliance on IFAD’s core grant envelope. | |
+| 5. MF: How much equity would you hold against a LMIC or UMIC? | * Guarantees are treated the same as loans in terms of loan equivalency, aiming for 100% loan equivalent. * Unlike loans, unfunded guarantees have a multiplier effect but require different liquidity considerations—not as stringent as loans with structured disbursement profiles. * Non-loan instruments expand IFAD’s ability to stay relevant and responsive to countries beyond traditional lending capacity. | |
+| 6. MF: How far down in your product preparation are you with non-loan instrument? i.e. partial guarantees, full guarantees. | * Management has called for this to be considered in IFAD13, but the process is still ongoing. * Early engagement has begun with the Board and Risk Committees, with strong backing as a presidential priority. * The IFAD13 report includes a commitment for management to explore how IFAD can enhance its role as a finance assembler, building on G20 recommendations. | |
+| 7. MF: Have you spoken about BRAM loan demand? Has the demand been present according to your expectation? | * A year before IFAD12, a survey targeting debt management teams and Country Directors identified $1.3B in BRAM demand from LICs and UMICs capable of absorbing non-concessional financing. * Market shifts in 2020 led governments to reprioritize due to debt constraints, delaying disbursements from projects with WB or ADB. * Many countries have now returned to market borrowing, signalling increased capacity to absorb non-concessional resources. * IFAD participates in the MDBs’ Sustainable Finance Working Group to advocate for redefining non-concessionality and enabling more nuanced assessments. * Success in influencing these frameworks could significantly boost BRAM demand. | |
+| 8. MF: Would you then go back and change the gearing ratio limit? Have you ever looked at what the maximum gearing ratio you can have in order to keep a double-plus rating? | * Discussion led by the CFO on how to move into more capital planning rather than approach. * Has looked at max gearing ratio to keep double-plus rating but prefers not to. Doesn’t have much perspective on this. | |
+| 9. MF: When you do guarantees, do you also provide guarantees if the financing is non-dollar/local currency? | * At this stage no. Many conservative measures in the pilot which is natural. * The institution has skilled people that are hired from many different backgrounds. * For currency, its better to start with hard currency that is maybe less attractive at the beginning but can be more prudent in the approach. Once the pilot is confirmed and the demand is there, you can create lessons learned to scale up and utilize it on the menu of financial instruments. | |
+| 10. MF: Is there pressure from governments, shareholders, etc. that IFAD should use less of ODA to cover operational costs so more of ODA is available for the actual lending or making guarantees? | * Continuous debate – members always look at DFI and IFAD to use taxpayer money in the most efficient way possible (maximizing capacity and not absorbing admin costs). * Initial signal on geopolitics (recent IDA 2021 replenishment; IDA stretched its budget). First signal from donors that donors will increase, remain flat, decrease, etc. * On the other side, donors today are sending signal calling the MDBs to use the other type of instruments that they’re making available (e.g. portfolio guarantees to free up capitals of MDBs, global externalities fund, philanthropic funds). * Panorama of ODA coming from fiscal donors will remain flat, but are being called to generate and create new tools and utilize them in the IFAD context. | |
+| 11. MF: Where do you see private sector activities moving at IFAD? Are the small-scale pilot activities enough to learn from? In 5 years time, how much is IFAD going to do in the private sector? | * Where IFAD was more sovereign on non-lending institutions. Grants provider and concessional loans, but that shape/diversity in type of assets didn’t necessarily lead to a shift in the mandate. * IFAD 13 gives first signal that there is an appetite. Bringing PS into balance sheet. * From here there will be lessons learned: PS transactions, environment that needs agility and innovation, intelligence, etc. * It’s done to put skin in the game for NSOs. * IFAD was good at structuring but not with putting skin in the game. | |
+| 12. MF: Could you imagine a private sector transformation occurring in IFAD or is this too much of a cultural shift? | * Cultural shift can be achieved * Main driver of this: is the existence first of demand? Is this demand sustainable and scalable? Or its only 1-2 transactions that may no longer be attractive to an extent. The main triggers IFAD should look at in developing its portfolio in public and private sectors.   + Relevance and existence of demand. | |
+| 13. MF: IFAD finances a lot of infrastructure. Is this normal or one-off situations? | * Always in IFAD, not new. * Capacity building versus infrastructural development with demand from countries. * Makes sense ^ if we keep using the same approach over 40-50 years, considers it a failure in learning lessons. * Should structure around what the country needs. | |
+| 14. HK: Any further comments? | * Aiming to reduce over-reliance on a small group of donors to avoid institutional risk. * Important to identify alignment between IFAD’s mandate and the development agendas of diverse partners. * Focus on enhancing and clearly communicating these alignments to build broader, more resilient support. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Capital Innovation: Exploration of hybrid financing models, including partial guarantees and non-loan tools, to expand deployable capital. These innovations help maintain concessionality while meeting growing demand. Liquidity and risk safeguards are key to implementation. | | |
+| Strategic Positioning: Aligning with global finance trends, advocating for nuanced definitions of concessionality and engaging in G20 and MDB discussions. IFAD13 signals a shift toward positioning as a finance assembler, using tools beyond traditional lending. | | |
+| Demand Driven Approaches: LICs and UMICs show strong demand for non-concessional finance, especially post-COVID. Focus on ensuring this demand is sustainable and structuring tools around real country needs. Flexibility and responsiveness are central. | | |
+| Institutional Risk: Reducing reliance on a few donors is key to institutional stability. IFAD is prioritizing alignment with diverse development agendas to broaden support. Conservative pilots and early Board engagement manage financial risk. | | |
+| Cultural Shift: A shift toward innovation, private sector engagement, and smarter risk-taking; aims to stay relevant by evolving beyond a sovereign lending model. Success depends on demand, internal capacity, and learning from early efforts. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-15_AllegraSaitto_DirectorandController_FCD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 15 April 2025, Allegra Saitto, Director and Controller, FCD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Allegra Saitto** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director and Controller, FCD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **16 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Hansdeep, Marcus, Barun, Sally, Federica, Tianlin** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Hansdeep: What were your roles and responsibilities (2019–2024)? | * Chief of Financial Reporting and Corporate Finance. * Managed accounting, external audits, financial reporting, and IFRS adoption (e.g., IFRS9). * Involved in accreditation (GCF, GEF) and rating processes. * Key player in MTM program and private placement issuance, including hedge accounting. * Recently appointed as Director and Controller (March 2025). * Coordinates sustainability reporting aligned with IFRS and MDB practices. | |
+| 2. Hansdeep: Role in supporting IFAD replenishments? | * Led historic and country-level financial analysis for replenishment scenarios. * Fed financial data into models based on audited statements. * Ensured timely instrument deposits and payment follow-ups. * Managed member country outreach and voting rights calculations. * Acted as the official record-keeper of pledges during events (e.g., Paris consultation). | |
+| 3. Marcus: IFAD12 Pledges vs. Payments | * Pledged: $1.281 billion. * Received: $1.260 billion (as of April 2025). * Shortfalls:   + Nigeria: pledged but not paid.   + Russia: pledged, but payment blocked due to sanctions although they are willing to pay. | |
+| 4. Marcus: IFAD11 Pledges vs. Payments | * Pledged: $1.105 billion. * Received: $1.097 billion. * Similar unpaid pledges from Nigeria. | |
+| 5. Marcus: 2024 Financial Statement | * Reviewed by Audit Committee (April 2025). * Executive Board approval scheduled for mid-May 2025. * Selected figures (assets, ratios) are available on the IFAD Intranet. | |
+| 6. Marcus: Leverage Ratio (2024) | Debt-to-capital available ratio: 31.4%. | |
+| 7. Marcus: UMICs Share in POLG | Not tracked by income status in FCD. Must contact DCO front office for UMIC-specific figures | |
+| 8. Marcus: Clarification: Pledged Amounts Include Supplementary Funds? | No. Only regular resources included, not supplementary funds. | |
+| 9. Marcus: Concessional Partner Loans and Grant Elements | * IFAD11: $51M grant element, counted as equity. * IFAD12: $23M grant element (also included in replenishment figure and receive voting rights). | |
+| 10. Barun: Reasons for the Income from Loans Jump (2022 vs. 2023)? From $80M to $124M: a 55% increase | * Main driver: market interest rate increase post-2022. * Small growth in ordinary loans, but market trends dominate the rise. | |
+| 11. Barun: Reasons for Loan Income further jum in 2024? | * Further increased to $132M. * Still a gap vs. expenses due to:   + Concessional grants (losses).   + Foreign exchange volatility (SDR/USD rate moved from 1.34 → 1.30 → rebounded to 1.34 by March 2025). | |
+| 12. Barun: Financial Sustainability: Profitability Analysis | * Positive margin: 1.2% (loan income + investment income − interest expenses). * Available in high-level reviews of 2023 & 2024 financial statements. * Grants skew P&L, but covered by replenishment, reflected positively in net equity (75%+ of total assets). * Structural deficit persists; not expected to fully cover operational expenses from income. | |
+| 13. Marcus: Calculating funding costs for ordinary/BRAM loans, changed from WB to IFAD funding costs? | * World Bank cost → IFAD funding costs because now IFAD has more experience and has its own rating, so IFAD funding cost is more representative * Basis points vary:   + USD loans: ~1.21–1.71%   + EUR loans: ~0.91–1.41% * Figures published on IFAD Intranet, calculated by Natalia Toski team of Treasury. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| 1. Structural Financial Deficit Is Persistent. IFAD will not cover operational costs via income — a finding consistent with previous CLEs (e.g., 2018, 2023). There’s no political will to do so, as IFAD defines financial sustainability as securing replenishment cycles (~$1.1–$1.5B every 3 years), not breakeven operations. | | |
+| 1. Barun flagged a long-tern structural deficit (causes of dinancial losses).    1. Grants and DSF are the major contributors to annual losses, though covered by replenishment.    2. Loan Margins are insufficient to cover expenses.    3. FX mismatch (SDR-denominated assets vs. USD liabilities) leading to recurring volatility. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Figures to be shared - done | | Allegra |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-15_NaoufelTelahigue_DinaSaleh_GianlucaCapaldo_NENRegion_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 15 April 2025, Naoufel Telahigue, Dina Saleh, & Gianluca Capaldo, NEN Region | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Naoufel Telahigue, Dina Saleh, and Gianluca Capaldo** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Dina: Current Chief of Staff and former NEN director**  **Naoufel: Current NEN Director**  **Gianluca: Portfolio Advisor, NEN** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **15 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Sally, Barun, Marcus, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. SB: What is the flow and process of target setting? | * Donor pressure increased as ODE trends plateaued, pushing IFAD toward more thematic diversity, co-financing, and collaborations like RAB—though these remained flexible, not rigid commitments. * IFAD11 had nearly 90 commitments; by IFAD13, this was reduced to 67 to better align ambition with available resources. Each commitment comes at a cost—time, money, or capacity. * Board-approved commitments are fixed and non-negotiable, even at mid-term; reporting requirements make them binding. * Internal consultations have improved, but commitment discussions remain high-level and lack operational detail. * Government buy-in is critical for mainstreaming themes; in regions like NEN, it’s hard to justify loans for nutrition or gender, unlike climate which has stronger political support. * NEN underperforms on gender and nutrition targets but performs better on climate due to higher demand. * Country teams face rising demands with shrinking budgets—missions are expected to deliver more with less. * Only $20K allocated for all initiatives, limiting reporting and delivery capacity. * While consultations have improved, growing ambition risks overreach. * Without a strategic approach and realistic target-setting, repeated underperformance becomes problematic—especially when targets continue to increase despite past trends. | |
+| 2. HK: Is there a process for cascading and allocating targets to different countries? | * At the start of the cycle, pipeline analysis helps project target delivery, tailor actions, and plan for course correction if targets are off track. * Country context matters—some governments resist discussing certain themes (e.g. nutrition) if they don’t perceive them as priorities. * Although targets are agreed at Board level, countries often push back during implementation, challenging alignment between institutional commitments and national ownership. | |
+| 3. HK: What happens when a country doesn’t reach their target? | * Divisions trade off commitments—if one can’t meet a target, another may compensate. * “Stock take” moments reveal that poor data capture, not performance, can skew results—many achievements go unreported due to lack of tools or resources (e.g., domestic co-financing). | |
+| 4. SB: What have been key skills to recruit in IFAD 11 & 12 Where did the skills come from? If you trained them, how effective was the training from within? | * Recruitment through supplementary funds allowed NEN to bring in technical expertise via temporary positions, bypassing core funding constraints. * A 2021 reorganization improved team configuration for COSOP and project design, enabling technical leads to take on stronger roles and better leverage available resources. | |
+| 5. SB: What is the impact of vacancies on workload? What is the impact on reassignment in creating vacancies and increasing workload? | * Vacancies carry institutional costs, but the vacancy pool fund allowed divisions to hire temporary staff and ease workloads, especially when filling roles with people familiar with IFAD. * The 2023 reassignment caused disruptions; with a limited internal pool, mismatches occurred—some staff were ill-suited or uninterested in their new roles. * Despite challenges, ECG received strong support and now benefits from a well-established team in Cairo. | |
+| 6 BC: Budgets for project designs and implementation have remained flat. What kind of constraints does this impose? Are there trade-offs you have to make to reach implementation targets? | * Budget shortfalls force real-time prioritization, though teams strive to maintain quality by leveraging project support and technical expertise. CDs also work overtime and often fill-in where cost savings can be met by not outsourcing work from consultants. * Supplementary funds act as a buffer, enabling high-quality design even with limited time and resources; strong personal networks and dedication helped maintain standards. * Historic design budgets were overly high (up to $900k), prompting a push for calibration based on project complexity and size; a one-size-fits-all model is inefficient. * SECAP-related costs and procurement delays remain key challenges; project configurations limit budget flexibility. * A future model using more cost-effective "top-up" mechanisms could support sustainability. Fragile contexts receive more funding (20-30% more), but sufficiency remains in question. | |
+| 7. MF: Are there any targets or pressure to use more BRAM loans or private sector loans?  a. MF: Demand and prioritization for loan amounts. Why?  b. MF: Concerns over mission drift? | * **7:** BRAM is essentially the same as PBAS, but its application depends on the country. * Higher concessionality can lead to more pushback from countries due to the cost involved. * BRAM is demand-driven, but allocation depends on the available grant envelope. * If a country doesn’t use its BRAM allocation, it is re-evaluated and potentially redirected to another country in need. * EX: TUR's BRAM Allocation: Turkey requested $75M but received only $25M, requiring a balance between credit allocation and Turkey’s needs, and their graduation path was a key consideration. * IFAD had to ensure sufficient resources for countries with BRAM demand, and some BRAM countries released funds, creating room for additional allocations. * In IFAD 12, countries could not fully express their desired BRAM amounts, only their demand. * Countries were asked to specify the BRAM amount needed, which helped in distributing BRAM loans more effectively. | |
+| 8. MF: Loans  a. Demand and prioritization for loan amounts. Why?  b. Concerns over mission drift?  c. Are there concerns over a drop in loans again? | * **A:** Countries are requesting support, but not all are on the priority list for funding. * Countries are prioritized based on factors like absorption capacity and financial sustainability. * A document outlines that up to 80 countries can access loans in each cycle, with analysis by NEN on country absorption capacity. Management reviews and decides on allocations. * The target of 80 countries was set during IFAD 11, with 66 countries previously considered. * To maintain core investment, BRAM is the main option for countries not on the priority list. * BRAM loans for UMICs are capped at 20%, as IFAD’s focus is on lower-income countries (LICs), with BRAM designed to prevent funds from going to wealthier nations. * **B:** DS wanted to tap into BRAM loans, but the EB and donors were adamant about not using their funding for richer countries. * The debate around BRAM loans requires a wider discussion, but it's complicated by geopolitical factors, as each donor wants to ensure their money doesn't go to countries like China. * **C:** Demand for IFAD Funding: Out of 415 letters, 413 have been received, with increased demand for IFAD funding despite other donors cutting their funding. * Positive Update: First-quarter update is positive, with only 2 letters pending. Countries are being asked to specify the amount of funding they want. * Unclear Drivers of Demand: Uncertainty about what is driving the demand for IFAD funding, as IFAD is still considered affordable, even with BRAM loans. | |
+| 9. JG: How has programmatic approach been used to approach challenges of the operations in all contexts, including fragile and LICs? | * EX. Morocco: Aligned with national programmatic approach over 2 cycles, focusing on poverty pockets; DS led a similar project in Egypt. * EX. Somalia: Started with a small investment, now has a $100M+ portfolio, like Montenegro’s growth. * Approach depends on the country; in Sudan, working on a programmatic approach to leverage $11M for projects aligned with national priorities. * DS emphasized the importance of multi-phase projects to highlight innovations, ensuring results can be scaled and implemented. | |
+| 10. SB: When getting your work through the system, what are your views on many centralized decisions being made that could be delegated to or beyond the CDs? | * Currently, delegation is mostly given to the CD, but in practice, it's still very centralized and heavy. * There's potential to improve delegation, but segregation of duties limits what can be delegated. * Non-objection is delegated to the CD, but can only be given to another CD, due to risk considerations. | |
+| 11. SB: To what extent can you inform and influence about who gets placed in your region? | * Unclear as NT was recently hired on. Regional directors must generally clear hiring reports but lack of clarity in recalibration contexts. | |
+| 12. SB: To what extent has training built skills and competency needed for the people on the ground? | * 40-50% of roles are crucial for operations, with ongoing shortages; reassignments often involve tradeoffs and context-specific challenges. * Reassignment model assumed flexibility for anyone to do any job; now, more logical and targeted reassignments are being made. * While some trainings in the academy are beneficial, mandatory courses (e.g., procurement) can be difficult and stressful, with concerns about the sustainability of long-term knowledge development after certifications. | |
+| 13. HK: Thoughts on Results-Based Lending? Support from policies? | * First-ever training in Morocco, 4 hours long, provided a clear understanding of design and implementation, coordinated with OPR for materials and support. * Policies on education or health require third-party verification. * RBL simplifies reimbursement by paying only when results are achieved, improving disbursement efficiency. * RBL requires a sophisticated M&E system; Morocco's system was streamlined to just 3 components for efficiency. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Donor Relations & Funding Demand:** Donor pressure has increased as ODE performance plateaued, prompting IFAD to diversify thematically and pursue more co-financing and institutional collaborations. Demand for IFAD funding remains high countries now being asked to specify funding amounts. However, some donors remain resistant to funding richer countries through instruments like BRAM, citing geopolitical concerns. | | |
+| **Resource Allocation & Financial Sustainability:** Though IFAD reduced its commitments between Cycles 11 to 13, board-approved commitments are fixed and cannot be modified mid-cycle. Teams often also face budget constraints, requiring real-time prioritization and trade-offs to maintain project quality. Vacancy pool funds and supplementary resources helped alleviate staffing gaps, though these come with institutional costs. | | |
+| **Project Design & Implementation:** Project design increasingly aligns with national programmatic approaches, as seen in Morocco, Somalia, and Montenegro, allowing IFAD to scale investments effectively. Multi-phase design helps showcase innovations and secure long-term results, particularly in fragile contexts. However, reassignment challenges persist, sometimes placing staff in roles that don’t match their expertise. Targeted reassignment has started to improve role alignment and project delivery. | | |
+| **Capacity Building & Training:** While some training initiatives—like the first-ever design training in Morocco—have proven valuable, others, particularly mandatory courses like procurement, are seen as burdensome and stressful. These trainings often lack long-term impact, with certification not translating into sustained knowledge retention. Coordination with technical teams like OPR has improved the quality of some sessions. Overall, there is a need for more strategic, ongoing capacity development. | | |
+| **Governance & Delegation:** Delegation of authority remains mostly centralized, with key decisions still controlled at HQ despite formal delegation to Country Directors. Limited delegation is often due to segregation of duties, especially for high-risk functions like non-objection, which only CDs can approve. Recent organizational recalibrations have added ambiguity to processes like recruitment reporting. There’s recognition that more effective and practical delegation could improve operational efficiency. | | |
+| **Procurement & Financial Processes:** Results-based lending models have improved disbursement efficiency by tying payments to achieved outcomes rather than contracts. In Morocco, the M&E system under RBL was streamlined to just three components, simplifying implementation. Policies related to education and health require third-party verification to ensure compliance. However, procurement inefficiencies and rigid project configurations continue to restrict budget flexibility. | | |
+| **Recruitment & Reassignment:** Recruitment for technical specialists remains a challenge, with most vacancies filled internally or through short-term supplementary-funded positions. The 2023 reassignment cycle caused disruptions, with a few staff placed in roles that didn’t match their skills or interests. While reassignments initially assumed full interchangeability, a more logical and targeted approach has since been adopted. Supplementary staff have helped fill critical roles, especially in regions like NEN. | | |
+| **Strategic Direction and Target Setting:** Without a strategic approach to target-setting, IFAD risks overcommitting and underperforming, especially when targets increase despite past shortfalls. At the start of each cycle, pipeline analysis helps tailor delivery plans and allows for timely course corrections. Country context plays a key role, as some governments resist certain themes like nutrition if they don't see them as priorities. Aligning targets with political realities and capacity on the ground remains a consistent challenge. | | |
+| **BRAM Loan Allocation:** BRAM loans function similarly to PBAS but are capped at 20% for UMICs to preserve IFAD’s focus on lower-income countries. Although demand is high, allocation is contingent on the grant envelope and country priority status. For example, Turkey requested $75 million but received only $25 million, reflecting a balance between demand, available credit, and their graduation status. The debate over BRAM allocations continues, shaped by donor reluctance to support wealthier countries and broader geopolitical considerations. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-15_RichardAiello_ChiefBPU_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 15 April 2025, Richard Aiello, Chief BPU | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Richard Aiello** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Chief BPU, PCD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **15 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of RA | * 2017 and Earlier: Learning and Development Chief * 2017-Present: Chief of HR Business Unit | |
+| 2. SB: Has there been a change in recruiting profiles (skills) based on IFAD’s commitments? | * Recruitment has been intense in recent years, averaging over 100 hires annually, with some years reaching 130–140 positions. * Hiring occurred across all areas, including new functions like RMO and evolving thematic areas. * The recruitment pressure affected all divisions and departments. * Shifts in thematic priorities and office locations also influenced staffing needs. | |
+| 3. SB: Are there specific or unique technical skills IFAD didn’t have that it needed to recruit? | * Needed to recruit for specialized RMO skills. * Technical gaps existed in financial expertise and required targeted hiring. * Procurement profiles needed reinforcement due to capacity gaps. * Recruitment was also necessary across all thematic areas to meet evolving needs.Top of Form | |
+| 4. SB: To what extent has training (and investments into it) translated into competence? Has investment built on the competence? | * Talent Management Unit is responsible for training initiatives. * Colleagues note that IFAD offers a wide range of trainings, such as the Operations Academy, to build operational skills. * Onboarding processes for new staff have improved, with greater engagement from the start. * Feedback on training has been positive, though effectiveness isn’t formally monitored. | |
+| 5. SB: How many performance management issues are resolved in skills or are skills-based? | * Talent Management Unit offers training for supervisors on performance management and key behaviors. * Managers receive coaching and support on specific challenges throughout the process. * RA plays a key role in supporting managers and staff during difficult performance or interpersonal dynamics. * IFAD enforces a rigorous management and probation process, urging managers to handle issues carefully and seriously. | |
+| 6. SB: Is setting targets based on feedback that staff are having targets they’re not sure they can deliver? | * Performance objectives follow a cascading structure from corporate to team and individual levels. * Each team and staff objective is linked to divisional and corporate goals. * Objectives are set through discussions between managers and staff, with management input when needed. * Objectives can be adjusted during the year if circumstances or context change. | |
+| 7. HK: There is a direct connection to CDs more than others on workload – how is this being managed; what’s the feedback? | * Objectives aim to align with and contribute to IFAD’s critical organizational goals. * No known cases of inappropriate or unrealistic objectives set for Country Directors (CDs). * Performance objectives are set through dialogue and are expected to be ambitious across all roles. * The process encourages discussion, and no objectives have been reported as impossible for CDs. | |
+| 8. HK: Are these corporate objectives linked to the replenishment commitments? | * Objectives are set on a yearly basis and don’t need to be the same every year (combination of strategic and behavioural/managerial objectives). | |
+| 9. SB: Are there factors that have influence vacancy rate and impact work-life balance? | * IFAD underwent a reorganization following the McKinsey study, creating new roles and functions. * A separation program led to 35–40 staff departures, with others also leaving for external opportunities. * These changes created a high volume of positions to recruit, prompting efforts to streamline and accelerate recruitment processes. * Vacancy rates peaked during reorganizations, but improvements were made; however, awareness of using temporary staff to fill gaps remains limited. | |
+| 10. HK: Reassignment was thought to reduce vacancy but have only increased it. Why? | * The reassignment process created many additional vacancies, as several roles remained unfilled afterward. * Decentralization also introduced new positions, further increasing recruitment needs. * An external consultant predicted recruitment would decrease post-reassignment, leading to downsizing of the recruitment team—but this assumption proved incorrect. * Many positions remained unfilled, requiring the recruitment team to search externally when internal candidates weren’t available. | |
+| 11. HK: Are roles opening up from people leaving? | * Reassignment often left 20–30 positions unfilled, prompting a push for external recruitment to bring in fresh skills, especially in areas like RMO and treasury. * IFAD expanded outreach beyond the UN system to IFIs and investment banks but struggled with competitiveness due to lower salaries. * At one point, recruitment was paused to build a pool of qualified candidates, expecting to fill grouped roles from that pool. * Recruitment delays impacted staff workload; the target of 90 days from BA closure was hard to meet, though recent process reforms have improved timelines, evolving since decentralization and the McKinsey study. | |
+| 12. HK: Role of decentralization and devolvement in the recruiting process. | * Recruitment volumes surged suddenly, placing heavy pressure on both the recruitment function and hiring divisions, with senior management closely overseeing quality. * The recruitment team itself was staffed with many temporary personnel, highlighting the need to strengthen internal systems as the process evolved. * Hiring managers struggled to balance recruitment duties with ongoing missions, creating tension and delays. * Since 2017, recruitment mechanisms have continuously evolved to keep pace with growing demands and organizational involvement. | |
+| 13. FR: With long periods of many changes, is the recruiting team accurately staffed now? | * Recruitment attention has significantly shifted from 2017 to 2024, with HR now expected to improve processes continuously. * Engagement from hiring managers has become crucial, with a focus on attracting diverse profiles (geographic, gender, and cultural diversity), including quotas for List B and C countries. * Recruitment delays occur if shortlists don’t meet diversity quotas, leading to revisiting the long-list and short-listing process, slowing down hiring. * Every recruitment step is now monitored by timelines, with HR regularly checking progress and holding managers accountable for delays. * A new P4 role in HR helps standardize processes, reducing reliance on temporary staff and improving organizational culture and recruitment practices. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Recruitment Pressure and Challenges:** Recruitment has been intense, averaging 100+ hires annually, with years reaching up to 140. New functions, like RMO, and shifts in thematic priorities created additional recruitment demands across all divisions. There were technical skill gaps, especially in financial expertise, procurement, and specialized areas like RMO, prompted targeted hiring. | | |
+| **Talent Management and Training:** Onboarding has improved with increased engagement, though training effectiveness isn’t formally monitored. Unit also supports supervisors with training on performance management and offers coaching for managers dealing with challenging staff dynamics. | | |
+| **Performance Management and Objectives:** Performance objectives are set through cascading structure. Objectives are dynamic and can be adjusted based on changing circumstances. No known cases of unrealistic objectives for CDs, and the process remains dialogue-based and ambitious. | | |
+| **Reorganization and Recruitment Efforts:** McKinsey study reorganization, along with the separation program, led to high recruitment volumes and the need to streamline the hiring process. Reassignment left many positions unfilled, pushing for external recruitment to meet new staffing needs. Recruitment volumes increase, placing pressure on both HR and hiring divisions, with senior management overseeing quality. | | |
+| **Recruitment Process Evolution:** Since 2017, recruitment mechanisms have evolved, with a focus on improving timelines and reducing reliance on temporary staff. Engagement from hiring managers is critical, with an increased emphasis on attracting diverse candidates. Recruitment delays led to regular monitoring of timelines, holding managers accountable for delays and improving overall efficiency. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-15_ThomasRath_OperationalPolicyandProgrammeDeliveryRisk_ODE_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 15 April 2025, Thomas Rath, Operational Policy and Programme Delivery Risk, ODE | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Thomas Rath** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Operational Policy and Programme Delivery Risk, ODE** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **15 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Federica, James, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of TG | * JPO for one year, consultant for three * CD, 2017-2021 outposted in Vietnam * Leader in OPR (now ODE) division for operational policy * Not involved in IFAD 12 consultations. Role focused on graduation policy, reviewing COSOP outlines and guidelines impacted by IFAD 12 commitments. | |
+| 2. SB: How has recalibration affected your role and your ability to meet commitments made by replenishments? | * More than just a name change. * Focus on delegation of authority. * ODE now includes QAG (Quality Assurance Group), merged with OPR; roles and responsibilities still need adjustment. * Ensures quality designs for loans and grants, acting as the last stop before board approval. * Focus on development effectiveness. * Provides guidelines for project implementation and restructuring. * Project design review remains with QAG. * Now handles COSOP review, which was previously under QAG. | |
+| 3. SB How did ODE work through the implementation details from the President’s decision? | * High-level decision made for recalibration. * Initially proposed ideas to management but later worked with the new director to clarify roles and responsibilities. | |
+| 4. SB In your career journey, are there new skills required for the office or field space with regards to the commitments? | * As a former CD, could leverage skills to help shape guidelines and policies to make them more operational. * Effort made to reduce the time from project design to completion to under 8 months, which was stressful for less experienced CDs at the time. * In the first year, managed three large tasks: COSOP reviews, RTA guidelines, and NSO guidelines. * Graduation policy was solidified during IFAD 12, with intense negotiations around List A versus List B. * Emphasis on centralizing skills in one place. * Diplomacy and managing expectations were key skills, especially in balancing stakeholder interests. | |
+| 5. SB Centralization of decision-making? | * Some decisions at IFAD can be further delegated; the process is currently being done step-by-step. * Delegations of authority are being revised. * Question raised about whether senior managers (e.g., the President) know more than others, considering the cautious, centralized approach. * While the President may have more insight in certain areas, AVPs, such as in finance, should be equally empowered to make decisions. * More empowerment is being given to regional directors, particularly in restructuring projects—RDs no longer need AVP approval to change the log frame. | |
+| 6. SB What is your view on the impact of reassignment on skills requirements and the ability to meet replenishment commitments? | * Strongly negative view on reassignment; the idea that "everyone can do everything" is flawed and needs more thoughtful consideration. * Example of a technical lead with no experience in project design, which can create significant challenges—"Blind leading the blind." * Rotation can be beneficial in early career years, but reassignment has often been random and disruptive. * A minimum of 3 years is needed to fully master a CD role, making early reassignment difficult. * Understands the intention behind pushing staff, but some CD roles may not be available, forcing unwanted moves to other positions. | |
+| 7. SB: Impact of reassignment on vacancies and workload – has this created any complications? | * Significant brain drain over the past 4–5 years due to early retirements and staff leaving; remaining staff feel isolated. * IFAD used to have a strong, supportive culture—staff rarely left, but that has changed. * Career mobility is limited; staff can’t apply for certain roles for 2.5 years after holding specific positions. * Job opportunities are bundled and posted once a year, reducing flexibility. * Staff mobility and career freedom have been significantly curtailed. | |
+| 8. HK: Impact on workload? A. HK: Why are there so many comments on documents? | * Outposting allows hands-on, in-person support, but leads to overwhelming workloads. * Technical staff often manage around 15 projects, covering both design and implementation. * Time pressure means people only skim documents before meetings but are still expected to provide input. * Surveys and interviews with CDs and technical staff revealed frustration with overly complex documents (e.g. SICUP report). * Despite guidance materials, there’s ongoing demand for leaner processes and fewer meetings due to excessive feedback and unrealistic timelines. * The issue lies more in how guidelines are implemented than in the documents themselves. * A: Staff provide many comments because they’re asked to, often focusing only on their technical area (e.g., livestock) without seeing the bigger picture. * A: Reviewer selection needs to be more strategic, as feedback can be contradictory. | |
+| 9. HK: Results-based lending and NSOs | * Gender mainstreaming commitments were made before clear definitions or frameworks were established. * New instruments should be launched with the right partners and a "learn by doing" approach. * A more practical, guided rollout should have been the directive from leadership. | |
+| 10. HK: Effect of multi-phase pragmatic approach? | * The tool is effective and originated as a replenishment commitment. * Some countries, like Mozambique, had already implemented similar approaches. * IFAD is actively gaining experience through these efforts. | |
+| 11. HK: Further comments? | * Caution is needed when committing to new instruments like NSOs, where IFAD has limited experience. * There’s pressure to commit, but commitments have increased significantly between replenishment cycles. * As funding declines, concerns grow about future replenishments and the risk of becoming overstretched or irrelevant. * IFAD needs to evaluate what’s working and let go of what isn’t. * Reassess whether technical staff or consultants are more effective. * Question remains whether reassignment has delivered the expected results. * A third of projects rated below moderately satisfactory triggered the redesign of the project cycle. | |
+| 12. JG: Approaches to fragility | * An updated fragility approach was drafted in 2023, including the creation of a new DCO unit (2 staff) as part of IFAD’s commitments. * The replenishment introduced a multi-phase program approach for fragile contexts. * Long-term project designs (6–8 years) are unsuitable for rapidly changing environments. * Projects should focus on resilience, with phased implementation (e.g., 3-year phases) to allow for institutional and community strengthening before larger investments. | |
+| 13. JG Mechanisms for ensuring operational performance | * SECAP assesses environmental and social risks at multiple stages of the project cycle. * Operations are responsible for managing delivery risks—financial, policy, institutional—serving as the first line of defense. * The risk management approach encourages internal reflection, especially from HQ in Rome. * Technical capacity has been weakened, highlighting IFAD’s limitations as a smaller institution compared to larger IFIs like the World Bank. | |
+| 14. JG: To what extent are IFAD’s operational guidelines enabling project teams to deliver interventions? | * Impact on nutrition has been modest, which is a significant concern. * Nutrition outcomes are hard to track due to the long-term nature of change. * Projects may lack sufficient nutrition sensitivity. * Cultural sensitivity also plays a role in limiting effectiveness. | |
+| 15 JG: How effective is IFAD in risk management? | * IFAD is improving its approach to managing multiple levels of delivery risk. * The risk-based approach was introduced during IFAD11 and is still relatively new. * Initial guidance was provided, and after eight years, implementation has improved. * Countries are increasingly using risk assessments to strengthen project design and understand impacts, including political risks. * Updated guidelines now support operations in countries with de facto governments, with strong involvement from the risk management office. | |
+| 16. JG: How well does current RMF support real-time learning and decision-making? | * Lots of progress has been made. Better consistency with RMF and getting information almost seamlessly into operations. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Organizational Changes:** IFAD's recalibration includes delegating more authority, with ODE now merging with QAG to improve loan/grant quality control and oversee COSOP reviews. While some roles remain unclear, there’s a focus on decentralizing decision-making, empowering regional directors, and revising delegations of authority. | | |
+| **Career Mobility and Staff Challenges:** Staff mobility is restricted, and a "brain drain" due to early retirements has left remaining staff feeling isolated. Career flexibility is limited, and workload pressures—especially for outposted staff—are high. Complaints about complex documents and excessive feedback continue, creating frustration. | | |
+| **Project Design & Implementation:** Efforts to reduce project design time have been challenging, with CDs facing stress from tight timelines. Simplified processes are still hindered by complex documents and overburdened staff, while reassignment issues persist, especially when staff lack expertise in certain areas. | | |
+| **Fragility and Risk Management:** IFAD has introduced a multi-phase approach for fragile contexts, with shorter project phases to build resilience. A refined risk management strategy focuses on internal reflection and handling delivery risks, positioning operations as the first line of defense. | | |
+| **Nutrition & Development Effectiveness:** Nutrition impact has been modest, partly due to cultural sensitivity and difficulty tracking long-term outcomes. IFAD is working to improve nutrition sensitivity and better align projects with local needs. | | |
+| **New Instruments and Commitments:** IFAD remains cautious about committing to new instruments like NSOs due to limited experience. There’s pressure to commit, but concerns over funding declines and the risk of becoming overstretched persist. | | |
+| **Gender Mainstreaming:** Gender mainstreaming commitments were made without clear frameworks. Future instruments need a more practical, "learn by doing" approach, with proper partners to ensure effective implementation. | | |
+| **Technical Capacity and Project Delivery:** IFAD's smaller size limits its technical capacity, but improvements are being made in project design and delivery. Focus is on balancing efficiency with quality, addressing resource challenges, and improving project consistency. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-16_BruceMurphy_ChiefofCorporateContentandRegionalOutreachTeam_ERD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 16 April 2025, Bruce Murphy, Chief of Corporate Content and Regional Outreach Team, ERD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Bruce Murphy** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Chief of Corporate Content and Regional Outreach Team, Acting Director of COM, COM, ERD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **16 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Barun, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of BM and COM department | * Joined IFAD COM in 2011 during IFAD 09 * The communications function has expanded significantly since IFAD9, which was seen as overly corporate, and consultation focused. * By IFAD11 and IFAD12, a full communications plan was developed, with the division becoming more formally established and integrated into IFAD13. * Communications now plays a dual role: raising awareness of IFAD's impact through storytelling and supporting decision-makers in justifying funding commitments. * The approach has become more sophisticated—building IFAD’s brand, utilizing social and media channels, and focusing on evidence-based messaging to demonstrate results. * Two teams present: Strategic Communications that focuses on media outreach and the Corporate Content team that oversees reports, graphics, speeches, etc. with HQ and field-presence. | |
+| 2. HK: What caused the shift to more prominent communications? | * Since before IFAD11, feedback from Member States and increased competition prompted a gradual move toward stronger branding and differentiation. * A key goal became defining and clearly communicating IFAD’s unique value proposition to donors in an easily understandable way. * Policymakers are active on social media, making digital presence crucial; four reputation surveys over 12 years revealed where audiences consume information and underscored the need for visibility. * Evidence-based insights showed that if IFAD doesn't proactively communicate, it risks being overshadowed by other IFIs already shaping the narrative. | |
+| 3. HK: Is there analysis on sector impact or outcomes for the work you do? How effective has this been on replenishment commitments? | * Difficult to directly link specific messaging to donor contributions, but outreach is clearly an enabling factor. * Communications teams continuously review metrics, especially on social media, where specific indicators (reach, engagement, etc.) are closely tracked. * Some outcomes are documentable—for example, high-level engagement like Macron's meeting with IFAD staff led to a tangible donation. | |
+| 4. HK: Is there anything besides the communication plans that has evolved? Anything you have been involved in with regard to the replenishments? | * Partnership between Comms and GPR divisions has grown stronger. * Messaging, media identity, and outreach efforts are now extensive and require unified themes approved by senior management. * Internal communications are prioritized both at HQ and in donor country boardrooms. * Countries are encouraged to showcase IFAD funding impacts to legitimize support. * Replenishment activities align with ongoing communication efforts using a coordinated, segmented approach. * Tailored strategies are developed for priority countries and themes, including donor country fact sheets. * A general message is promoted to empower all staff to act as IFAD brand ambassadors. | |
+| 5. HK: IFAD is moving towards more complexity. How has this affected your team? Have you been adapting to this increasing complexity? | * Increasing need for audience segmentation to tailor messaging effectively. * Collaboration with Treasury on BRAM and Private Sector products, including the Investor Impact Report (now on its third edition). * Outreach to senior officials involves explaining IFAD’s financial model, requiring strong internal coordination and clear messaging. | |
+| 6. HK: How have you managed with skillsets needed? Do you outsource? | * Significant outsourcing exists, but it's driven more by the complexity of IFAD’s business model than a lack of internal skills. * EX: Treasury/FOD is invited to brief Communications on BRAM and new initiatives due to their technical complexity. | |
+| 7. BC: Is there any other involvement of beneficiary countries in spreading the message? How does it work? | * IFAD’s operational work drives engagement with countries and informs replenishment narratives. * Coordination with ops teams has increased to better reflect country needs and results in partnership messaging. * For IFAD13, tailored regional outreach plans with comms elements were developed, allowing operational staff to contribute to the broader donor dialogue. This is a shift from IFAD 09 that involved a series of four meetings a month. * Starting with IFAD11, the demand paper became key—highlighting actual country demand, supported by intelligence from the field, not just donor requests. * Communications supports coherence by developing a unified brand, visual identity, and toolkits to avoid fragmentation across complex messaging. | |
+| 8. BC: What is the Food Systems Unit? Why is it housed in your department? | * Food Systems Unit is a smaller team in the department with a targeted mandate. * Work is led by its own director and closely tied to RBA collaboration and SDG efforts. * GPR’s global engagement team oversees food systems as a specific focus area, managing IFAD’s summit-related commitments. * The team emphasizes SDG alignment, global outreach, and partnership platforms to advance food systems goals. | |
+| 9. JG: How effectively has IFAD communicated lessons from the field? What more could be done to support institutional learning through the strategic storytelling? | * Improvements made by focusing communications on issues that matter most to its members. * Having comms officers in the field working with country teams enables daily intelligence gathering and access to impactful stories. * These officers cover nearly 200 projects across 100 countries, building trust with partners and project staff to gather the most relevant and compelling content. | |
+| 10. JG: For mainstreaming themes there is a lot of content available, but not so much for nutrition. How is nutrition being targeted with communicating results and successes? | * IFAD has produced various projects, including videos and beneficiary stories. * The size of the team makes it challenging to cover all mainstream areas effectively. * There's a focus on ensuring geographic and thematic distribution, but accessibility can be a barrier. * Priority is given to telling the most impactful stories, such as the World Fish project in Bangladesh and climate-related initiatives in East Africa. * IFPRI's guidelines for nutrition-sensitive value chains were recognized as one of the top 50 best publications, often linked to videos for wider outreach. | |
+| 11. HK: How do you manage the challenge of KM being weak? The idea that what you’re getting might not be enough? | * Knowledge gathering involves KM officers, but key individuals like Country Directors (CDs) are also crucial as knowledge holders and connectors to field staff. * KM and communications collaboration is vital—not limited to KM officers alone. Volume of KM work is too large for one team to cover entirely, but this isn’t seen as a barrier. * Continuous engagement with field staff is essential—not for promotional materials, but to collect insights and understand project status across timelines. | |
+| 12. HK: How has IFAD’s positioning changed over the past 6 years in terms of global community? | * Reputation survey provides valuable insights. * Increased familiarity with IFAD correlates with stronger, more consistent reputation. * Greater engagement leads to greater returns—"the more you put in, the more you get out." * Perceptions of IFAD's role remain consistent, focused on smallholders and value chains. * IFAD’s mandate is consistently rated higher than others in relevance and impact. | |
+| 13. JG: In what ways has regional outreach function contributed to amplifying the visibility and uptake of IFAD’s innovations or results across country programs? | * Regional officers play key roles (e.g., outreach, capacity building, partnerships) as part of a cohesive team. * Launched region-specific social media channels, gaining traction—including among government officials—allowing for more targeted, localized engagement. * Enables two-way communication: not just pushing content from HQ, but gathering feedback on regional interests. * Growth is promising but limited by available resources and personnel. * Importance of aligning the entire IFAD workforce around shared communication goals; regional comms plans emerged from this effort. * Under replenishment, there's a push for a holistic view—emphasizing that country-level developments matter just as much as capital-level ones; this is a broader IFAD responsibility, not just for the comms team. | |
+| 14. HK: Further comments? | * Replenishment is a labor-intensive process requiring early clarity and planning. * Critical to have a clear strategy even before the first official session begins. * Needs to be consultative but focused—build the case and momentum from day one. * Emphasis on collective IFAD effort and showcasing real impact on the ground. | |
+| 15. HK: How do you think people not in the communications department could build this momentum? | * Increasing internal comms capacity is part of the recalibration process. * Close collaboration with management and GPR to align efforts. * Replenishment discussions have been ongoing— the aim is to be ready to hit the ground running. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Communications is Central to Strategy/Replenishment**: Communications has evolved into a strategic function, playing a crucial role in shaping IFAD’s brand, supporting decision-makers, and driving replenishment efforts through early, coordinated messaging. | | |
+| **Field-Level Storytelling Builds Credibility**: Regional officers and field comms staff provide real-time insights that ground IFAD’s narrative in local realities, helping demonstrate impact and making donor engagement more authentic and persuasive. | | |
+| **Data-Driven, Audience-Centric Approach is Essential**: Effective communication relies on audience insights, social media metrics, and segmentation to tailor messaging, increase visibility, and reach key stakeholders—especially in an increasingly digital and competitive space. | | |
+| **Internal Alignment Strengthens External Impact**: Strong collaboration across divisions, consistent branding, and unified messaging ensure IFAD speaks with one voice. This internal coherence enhances trust and clarity in external engagement. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 16 April 2025, Hernan Alvadaro, AVP FOD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Hernan Alvadaro, Claudio di Benedetto** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **AVP FOD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **16 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Barun, Sally, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of HA | * Joined IFAD April 2023 as CFO. Leaving 31 May 2025. * Worked previously in Latin America for an MDB for 28 years. | |
+| 2. MF: When you do replenishment calculations, is there a minimum amount calculated to operate IFAD based on its commitments? | * IFAD's commitments are difficult to quantify precisely. * Approval capacity is tied to a 3-year cycle through the PoLG (Programme of Loans and Grants). * Scenario testing is used to assess financial appetite. * Recommendations are made on how to distribute resources between PBAS and BRAM, especially for concessional lending. | |
+| 3. MF: Was optimal capacity reached? Could this be increased if there were the political will to increase it? | * Lots of opportunities to reach optimal capacity. Also achieves the targets in terms of the delivery operations. * IFAD achieved its 95% delivery target. * Uses a forward-looking approach to learn from past performance. * Has the ability to boost lending capacity through borrowing. * Aims to raise more capital and access markets to expand resources. | |
+| 4. MF: Does it work to deploy concessional lending approaches that have a fixed or floating rate? | * It’s possible to have this because of the cpital adequacy position and this is one of the aspects still missing in IFAD’s financial model; how to take advantage and make the most to deploy the capital adequacy headroom that IFAD currently has. * Looking to continue raising funds in the capital market but fully connected with non-concessional loans. * This implies no negative carry because from the balance sheet POV, we’ll continue to fund non-concessional loans with capital market funds. Thus, it’ll be a positive spread in terms of matching the balance sheet and the equity. | |
+| 5. MF: How much equity do you need to back a BRAM loan in percentage? | * Have approximately 1 billion in EU equity that is proposed to be deployed. * Continue to raise funds from capital markets to be allocated to BRAM. Since BRAM is demand-driven, we can deploy an extra nominal amount to BRAM maintaining certain levels fo the private capital metrics including aiming or meeting the expectation of rating agency. * No specific computation for how much equity is held against the BRAM loan. It depends more on risk and appetite. * No specific computation for UMICs- general position of IFAD in terms of what is the optimal level of capital consumption for the loan portfolio in general. Obviously, the concessional loan portfolio consumes more capital than the BRAM portfolio or ordinary loan portfolio. | |
+| 6. MF: Moving forward, is there still a rationale for keeping a 20% limit on UMIC lending? | * Controversial discussions with the EB dating back to 2023. * The limit is a political threshold, not a financial one. Connected more to the expectation of the member state. * From a strict financial POV, there is no strong argument to establish a specific target for UMICs because if we accept that UMICs are part of the mandate, they’re part of the objective ambition to include freely and openly. | |
+| 7. MF: What is the cost of making a BRAM loan? | * Theoretical ran this scenario, but the cost varies depending on the administrative cost components. * Administrative expenses are excluded to remain in the competitive range of pricing in comparison with other organizations. * At the moment, BRAM loans are not priced to cover their full cost because the admin expenses are excluded. * Considered proper bond issue rather than private placements, but the main driver for this decision is the size or volume of the funding program, and its still small. | |
+| 8. MF: Where does IFAD find the most value when looking at private sector activities? What’s the best use of IFAD’s resources? | * Currently combining funds from balance sheet resources with the isolated private sector in a blended structure. * Overall needs to see what would be the final recommendation about the products that IFAD is aiming to offer through the private sector window. * The allocation of funds in the balance sheet is still small at only 90 million for the full IFAD 13 cycle. * This amount is not sufficient to bring meaningful participation of private sector recipients in our own balance sheet. | |
+| 9. HK: When you’re running your scenarios, what about the bigger picture in terms of delivery? E.g. resource acquisition leads to mobilization. | * Analyzing the implication in the overall business model of increasing lending capacity with an increasing PoLG and connecting it to decentralization. * Needs to demonstrate to the member state how to maximize their contribution to IFAD, which is the main challenge. | |
+| 10. SB: What’s the impact of the recalibration process on your team? To what extent were you consulted on the move? | * Natural step to bring more synergies between procurement and finance management. * Still too early to have concrete feedback, but much of it has been positive. | |
+| 11. SB: Impact of reassignment and decentralization to deliver the replenishment commitments. | * Being closer to the client is always productive. * The decentralization effect in the fiduciary system is fully positive. * Reassignment has not jeopardized their job function. Only 1 or 2 cases in the last 2 years that have significantly altered the performance of the team. | |
+| 12. SB: Is the training that’s been invested built necessary competence to facilitate the process? | * Training is one of the most important pillars to perform procurement and financial management responsibilities. * Consistently monitoring and promoting benchmark exercises to collect and identify best practices from other MDBs. * Fiduciary responsibility is a hands-on activity and through trainings we can increase and improve the team’s own capabilities. | |
+| 13. BC: What are the 2 or 3 key performance indicators that you used or have used to look at performance in your department? | * Department has recently incorporated some of the efficiency ratios. Team can calculate efficiency utilizing the loan portfolio instead of PoLG. * PoLG is a one-off capture of efficiency from the whole year and doesn’t fully capture all the activities related to the budgetary activities (e.g. supervision). * Use several KPIs in financial reporting and having a clean opinion from an external auditor is mandatory. * Another KPI in treasury management is achieving funding in the annual funding program. * Maintaining a strong A-plus rating provided by the S&P and aspiring to become a Triple-A in the future. | |
+| 14. BC: How o you see that assessment of political and operational risk in the current ODA context that is getting more difficult? | * Currently a double-plus rated agency. * To improve IFAD’s financial profile in general, there needs to be a focus on efforts in the business profile meaning shareholder support. This can be found through core contributions and also the policy importance. | |
+| 15. HK: Further comments? | * Capital optimization process is valuable, and its important to receive feedback on this interaction with the member state to validate next steps for the way forward. * Also looking at how to maximize/optimize the lending capacity of IFAD and not only on the concessional side, but for UMICs as well. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Financial Strategy: Optimizing balance sheet and working to deploy unused capital capacity. Developing a paper to optimize this shows positive shift in thinking and use of CLE financial architecture findings. Lending expansion through BRAM is a priority with political, not financial, limits on UMIC lending. | | |
+| Lending Model: BRAM loans are underprices by excluding admin costs, but keeps IFAD competitive. Efficiency is tracked more accurately using the loan portfolio than PoLG. | | |
+| Private Sector: Financing remains small ($90M) but is growing through blended structures. Clearer product offerings and increased balance sheet support are needed to scale impact. | | |
+| Governance, Risk, Ratings: Strong A+ rating with aims for AAA. Clean audits and financial KPIs support credibility and help secure donor trust and contributions. | | |
+| Decentralization: Approved client engagement from the financial side with proper consultation and minimal disruption. Training has also boosted operational capacity. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Share a draft of the financial paper of balance sheet optimziation (sometime in May) | | Hernan/Claudio |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 17 April 2025, Allegra Saitto, Director & Controller FCD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Allegra Saitto** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director & Controller, FCD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **17 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. MF: What is IOC? Within what time frame is a promissory note cached in? Does it always come or have people defaulted? | * IOC = instruments of contribution. Legally binding instrument to ratify the pledge. Pledges are voluntary expressions of willingness to contribute any further replenishment. Pledges are non-binding while the IOC is binding. * One historic case of default in Iran during the last regime change, and it’s the only promissory note not honored since IFAD’s 1st replenishment. * Notes are cached in 3 years. | |
+| 2. MF: In the IFAD 11 and 12 paper, it made a point that IFAD would develop new products and services for UMICs. Are you aware of this? | * Very marginal products created. At the end of IFAD 12 started working on partial guarantees. * Partial guarantees are not part of a finished product yet. They are substantially different from standard procedure because you need buy-in from the Audit Committee, EB, etc. Then role out products which is a journey IFAD is in the middle of. | |
+| 3. MF: Lending to UMICs used to be part of PBAS, but its not any longer. Is this correct? Could BRAM loans be financed out of equity? | * Not exactly correct. It depends on the availability of funds to loan to UMICs in this way, otherwise there is the BRAM loan. * Concessional loans would be funded by borrowing, and IFAD monitors the sustainability if it’s within the parameter of our capital and available within future thresholds to that equity. | |
+| 4. Standalone services | * Have been able to fully clear some historical years like Somalia that was in default since the 80s. * Carefully monitor situations in fragile countries to ensure repayments, especially in WCA, and have been able to acquire the money from them. * Takes care of everything pertaining to supplementary funds and other initiatives, like the setup of the Private Sector Trust Fund and the Rural Poor Resilience Trust Fund, and the rollout of GCF (GCF is important to the environmental climate finance). * Still adapting software to capture private sector deals and are currently speaking mainly about plain money loans. | |
+| 5. HK: Private Sector Trust Fund? | * Kicked off with a seed contribution for $25M under the previous replenishment and then received additional contribution from other donors. * Initially set up to create boundaries between assets and liability of the trust fund. * The trust fund is now at $150M. * The account is not liable in the case of the fault for un-lending. It’s a full pass through of money in and out. | |
+| 6. MF: Origin source of the ABC fund came from the PS Trust or somewhere else? | * ABC fund was piloted as the first equity investment prior to the private sector trust fund. It was made possible by supplementary funds and contributions from the EU and other member countries like Switzerland and Luxembourg. * Meant to invest in private sector operations in emerging markets. * IFAD acts as shareholders of record for the EU and Luxembourg. * $9M was invested and now the net asset value is at $5M (down 44%). | |
+| 7. MF: Of the private sector trust fund, there were $150M in contributions. Has there been a mark to market so you know what the NAV is? | * Not necessary to do a mark to market for this because they are pure contributions to IFAD and we don’t have liability to given any profit return to them. * The $150M is only for the PS trust fund. | |
+| 8. HK: For the PS trust fund, it must be year marked? | * The trust fund has a segregated ledger where all money is accounted that has arrived specifically for the trust fund. * For Canda’s contributions, IFAD reports back on those projects because it’s a returnable contribution and IFAD will have to return the funds when the money will be deployed and then repaid to IFAD. * Canda prioritizes the impact of the projects first over the return on investment. | |
+| 9. HK: With supplementary funds increasing, does this have an impact on a country’s core contributions? | * There is no substitution risk because they come from different parts of the budget in member countries. Money is ODA money and very specific, while other supplementary funds could come from climate, gender, etc. from spare money that the country has to give for specific projects or themes. | |
+| 10. HK: Automation software | * Always necessary to modernize and be up to speed in order to prioritize the future. * Modernize some of the platforms but peoplesoft is going to be under dismissal slowly from Oracle so the team needs to start thinking now to replace it or slowly transition to other solutions. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Trust Funds & Private Sector: The Private Sector Trust Fund has grown to $150M. The ABC Fund was a pilot equity investment that has since declined in value by 44%. | | |
+| Lending to UMICs & Fragile Contexts: Lending to UMICs depends on funding availability—otherwise BRAM loans apply. Fragile states like Somalia and some in WCA have improved on repayments, showing IFAD’s careful monitoring and ability to recover long-outstanding defaults. | | |
+| Guarantees and Instruments: IFAD is developing partial guarantees, but they are still in early stages and require extensive institutional approval. These products differ from traditional loans and represent a strategic shift requiring buy-in across governance bodies. | | |
+| Donors & Risk: IFAD tracks and reports on returnable contributions, such as Canada's, where repayment is expected. These funds are distinct from core ODA, reducing substitution risk and allowing thematic flexibility (e.g., climate, gender). | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Follow-up with Jose Mortemolina on adequacy computation | | Marcus |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 17 April 2025, Enika Basu, Senior Technical Advisor to the Associate VP, PMD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Enika Basu** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Senior Technical Advisor to the Associate Vice President, PMD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **17 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Barun, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Overview of the budgeting process | * We have a back of the envelope calculation of how much it costs to do a design process, how many consultants are required, supervision costs, etc. Based on this try to find ideal cost figures. Now always able to meet ideal costs we have to keep within our budget envelope and do many additional requests, but we try to maintain our budget envelopes that have been assigned. * The envelop is always becoming smaller and smaller for NLAs. NLAs budget is completely whatever is left after we’ve covered our priority, which is basically supervision. * Make money available for supervision – its up to the divisions to see where the risks are for the projects. Can’t afford SECAP specialists are fragility assessments for every project. * Process of prioritization of the resources available. * Since IFAD 10, thanks to corporate initiatives, IFAD 12 did significantly increase supervision costs (fought hard for this and not design costs). Had to compromise on other resources. Have to make compromises in the budget. (i.e. decrease policy engagement to make more money available for supervision). * Also contributes to replenishment commitments (also requires 85% of the projects that are 4+). Have to look at the quality of the portfolio. | |
+| 2. HK: How much was the supervision mission raised by? | * Went down to 45k but now went up to 75k. Giving 55k + 15k, (80k). Teams have the flexibility to use funds for what they want (i.e. if they used less for supervision, what to do with the extra money). * Also increased the cost of start-up missions; found out major reason for effectiveness lag was start up problems. $25k given for this.   + to 15 to 25k at some point. * Paper of the analysis – how much costs were across replenishments. | |
+| 3. HK: When the budget is limited, a lot of time is spent on jobs now decreasing efficiency if more than one person were to do it. Thoughts? | * If there were more resources available, everyone can do jobs better. * It’s an effort in prioritization for the country teams to decide how to supervise their projects. * And whatever is not spent from the supervision budget is never asked for back. * They only ask for money back from project design budgets. * Front office does not keep the budget. If there is money not utilized, front office only then recovers the budget (mainly from excess $ from project design) and reallocates it to divisions that do have design needs. * Recover savings to prioritize. One initiative created was the vacancy pool. * Regional directors are responsible/accountable for the way the budget is spent, but in case its not being spent, the front office would rather re-direct it somewhere where the needs are greater. * Vacancy Pool: The divisions get money directly for their vacant positions – the rest of the available money goes to the front office. Front office allocates this amount wherever. These are extremely important to have an anchor. Try to finance the regional business planning meeting (but not just operations; everyone who contributes to the regional program). | |
+| 4. BC: Please describe how the IFAD11 and IFAD12 replenishment commitments regarding mainstreaming cross-cutting themes (nutrition, gender, etc.) and core resource allocations to country categories (e.g., Fragile, LICs, etc.) were factored in when shaping the country work programs for the years 2019 to 2024. | * Work program already envisages the commitments. * Work plan is made up of the designs they’re going to take to the board. * Second part of the plan is the ongoing portfolio. * Knows what to prioritize (ex. Fragile contexts get extra $15k for supervision and taking into account when planning). * Can’t take additional accounts of design costs (can’t change based on the commitments). * Ensure 60% are nutrition-sensitive, but don’t guarantee more money that they have the budget to meet these priorities (to have all 60% of projects have the nutrition-specialty at the design phase). * More and more commitments being added but not additional money. * RDs have to make a decision on how to deliver the priorities with the given budget. | |
+| 5. BC – replenishments are configured and agreed without the promise of more budget. Puts stress and strain on staff and must move money to help but moving small amounts. | * Workload increases because there are certain expectations of standard of quality but sometimes can’t have this with the budget available. Should be more realistic in the commitments. But understand that list A wants IFAD to do more things but doesn’t come with increase in pay. Vicious cycle. | |
+| 6. BC: Did DCO receive any additional budget allocations from POB during 2024 or earlier years? | * Yes. Three percent carry over. * IFAD spends 97% of its budget. 3% rolls into the next year and funds something. * 2.4 million carry over to fund project designs for 2025. * There are conversations about discontinuing carry-over. | |
+| 7. BC: What proportion of DCO’s annual spend is funded on average from Supplementary Funds? | * Marginal – most is on the regular budget. * Compared to total budget, it’s very marginal. * HK: How does this work – asking for funds for supervising with supplementary funds?   + Give less budget regulatory money for supervision because they ask for supplementary funds.   + OTD (ECG and PMI) has the bulk of these funds. | |
+| 8. HK: Do you have to give a justification for this 3% carry-over money? Is there competition in-house? | * POB and VP approves these. * There is in-house competition. EMC prioritizes who receives the money. * EMC have always prioritized operations for the last 3 years. A lot of the vacancy pool funds are used to hire temporary staff. Ask regional divisions and submit lists more for hiring people. | |
+| 9. HK: The way the vacancy pool is used is mostly for filling up positions?  BC: How much is in the vacancy fund per year? | * Yes, and the other part of the 3% is retained for priority for regional needs, not in the front office. * Not a very big number – last time was $4M for the pool throughout the year. * Budget for staff and non-staff was $63M. For hiring staff it makes a difference. | |
+| 10. BC – operations operate on a flat budget but corporate has increased budget. Where does the money go? Within cluster one, a lot of the money has gone to ‘enable and support’ (aka decentralization costs, consuming a large chunk of IFAD’s budget). | * EB loves decentralization to service clients. * Not sure whether the costs of setting up and maintaining offices justifies the kind of client relationships you build with being a decentralized unit. * Does have an impact for decentralization with these offices, but unsure of what they get back from these offices in return. | |
+| 11. HK – no option to drop the ball on NLA – ironic because NLA is the point of decentralization. Budget allocation for NLA? | * Yes, and still present but only $5k/ country. * If govt. came and said they wanted help with something, they couldn’t have the money ready. * Micro-grants up to 10k that can be accessed without much bureaucracy. * They want bigger and fewer projects to save money on supervision and just costs in general. * If there are important engagements, they do give money from DCO budget to have extra activities that the regional teams can do (conferences, regional meetings, policy round tables, etc.) * Country teams are very resilient and find the resources to do KM. | |
+| 12. BC: Are budgets released by the AVP front office from the retained amount to the Divisions throughout the year, or at fixed intervals, say, quarterly? | * There is a budget dashboard – DCO. Monitored on a monthly basis. Quarterly basis they give reports on where spending occurs. Also prioritize by asking for money back that was not spent so DCO can re-allocate it back. * There are also annual DCO objectives – goal is that 90% of the budget needs to be committed by 1 Nov. When that doesn’t happen, is when money is moved between divisions. * Active budget management – continuously assess against utilization commitments. | |
+| 13. BC: is 1 Nov too late to set these targets? Other IFI operations think after 1 Sept is too late. | * This is not additional money, these assessments are continuous. Every quarter the status are done * Budget KPIs – commit * If one division has committed 87%, if you give the extra to another division, they might say its too late for us to use this $ effectively. This happens so that’s why they try to monitor on a regular basis * Share front end video of the dashboard. * Utilization rates by activity, by supervision, how much was committed. | |
+| 14. BC System of DCO and other divisions to report back on the level of spending? | * All data comes from corporate. Corporate data base. Receive monthly updates on what they’ve spent. * One data point – dashboard is only aggregated on the visualization of data. | |
+| 15. BC: What was the percent utilization of DCO’s budget in 2024? Was the percent higher than in prior years? | * 2024: 97% * 2023: 99% * 2022: 98% | |
+| 16. BC: PoLG in 2023 was $22B which is very high. What are the reasons for this? | * Negotiations couldn’t happen because of various reasons. * Didn’t ask for so much design money in 2024. The projects were already designed, the problem was they were just waiting to be negotiated and they can’t bring a project to the board with negotiations with the government. Many slipped due to extraneous situations. * Egypt – huge financial crisis in 2020 and wasn’t sure if they wanted to borrow anymore. IF they could sign and go to the board – but they also have to work with the government that has its own processes and priorities. * Previous allocations were communicated at the end of February of 2022 because BRAM was introduced. You had to first speak to govt about BRAM and country teams already made concept notes with certain figures in mind and then had to re-negotiate everything with the BRAM introduction. * 2023 had a huge drop because the backlog started in 2022 and had a domino effect. * Introduction of BRAM was the reason for these delays in pipeline and the re-sizing of the PBAS because all commitments didn’t come through and had to decide where to cut and allocate money. | |
+| 16. HK: How do the changes with President and VP roles in the hierarchy change things? | * Recalibration was meant to increase efficiency but it hasn’t, only added another layer to management. * VP’s role would be coordinating but now sees a lot of duplication of responsibilities between VP and AVP, like in the role of pipeline management. This is detrimental to people’s time. * There needs to be more delegate authority & it needs to be revised in order to reflect the recalibrated structure. | |
+| 17. JG: To what extent have IFAD’s corporate strategies and operational policies in IFAD 11 and 12 enabled country teams to implement mainstreaming themes effectively? Where do you see gaps in policy ambition and operational delivery? | * For mainstreaming we have set the bar too high which shoots ourselves in the foot. * Committed to things too high in comparison to what the World Bank or ADP, to the detriment of ourselves. * Should change the narrative on mainstreaming themes and highlight what we do well to show we’re actually using these funds for the mainstream, rather than inventing and committing to more higher roles. * Can do better with policies and procedures – we are small. * IFAD 12: 3 iterations of design procedure changes (esp. with organizational structure changes). This is detrimental to the process. Decentralized offices can’t keep up with all the changes happening in HQ, leading to further decreased efficiency. Room for improvement in how to be a more agile institution. | |
+| 18. JG: In your experience supporting the AVP, what have been the most important factors either enabling or constraining in turning successful project-level technical innovations into scalable solutions across country programs? | * Biggest challenge in portfolio management is to ensure innovations happen despite issues with fiduciary management, and how you balance the two. * Sometimes innovation takes a long time, but we also have obligations to meet certain targets for disbursement, project quality, implementation progress. Making those decisions to extend, not extend, etc. projects so they meet all these commitments we have in terms of quality and outputs is a challenge. * Also aligning projects with government priorities is a challenge because we don’t work in a vacuum in the country governments. | |
+| 19. JG: In your experience, how effectively have the operational and technical teams within PMD been able to work across divisions to ensure timely support teams particularly in fragile contexts? | * Interdivisional cooperation to respond to country needs: Took a bit of time. * Because the org. went through changing structure, country and regional team structures changes. Was a culture of working in silos but over the last year, there was a bigger focus of work on aligning objectives of the technical divisions of operations of the fiduciary divisions to see how we can respond as one team for the operations in the field. This is slowly happening. * Front office plays the role of facilitator and not gatekeeper, to facilitate regional and country operational teams. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+|  | | |
+|  | | |
+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 17 April 2025, Thomas Bousios, Director ICT, CSD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Thomas Bousios, Eilish O’Neill, David Huges** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director ICT, CSD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **17 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Barun, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Roles of the department during IFAD 11 and 12 | * Continuous planning and support throughout initiatives. * Team operates more effectively with structured plans. Use of technologies and tools enables faster execution. * Regulardiscussions to assess feasibility and monitor progress on commitments. Readiness levels vary across teams and initiatives. * Budget: Budget planning isn't immediate—requires upfront design, component mapping, and stepwise planning * Collaboration with PMD and OPR to create tools for monitoring, logframes, project design, and procurement—some praised by WB, ADB, and others. * Reform-driven automation tied to decentralization and HR programs. * Early adoption of AI (2 years ahead of peers). * Unexpected staff interest post-implementation, enabling internal capacity building. * Acted as an ICT enabler for new initiatives and projects. * Full implementation with IFAD involves embedding tools into systems and coordinating with relevant leads. | |
+| 2. BC: What are the main challenges faced by the division? | * Took on too much at once without staggering efforts; ideal approach would require more funding, but in its absence, careful planning was needed. * Organization tried to manage challenges but lacked sufficient time and budget from the start. * Culture of “doing more with less” became a point of pride. * Heavy reliance on consultants required strong monitoring and controls, especially with business delivery platforms. * IT was critical in ensuring smooth operations during decentralization—often had to build systems to support workflows that didn’t yet exist. * Despite challenges, strong collaboration with PMD enabled streamlined processes and adaptive problem-solving with limited information. | |
+| 3. BC: How do you see alignment with your work program and the wider strategic priorities of IFAD and the commitments? | * Over the years, ICT championed the movement directly informally and formally in planning periods, longer than the 1-year planning process. * Capital budget can be planned over 3 years. In the IT governance committee, they take strategic approach to the 3 years. For technologists like TB, this is indispensable. Job was to translate to the extent possible, the documents into a program of work. Commitments are broken down into smaller periods of time and the budget is another entry point (and wants to see more of this). * Small things that can be aligned to the wider priorities. * Used to house SDGs * Need to have a longer period to deliver better quality and faster. | |
+| 4. BC: IT’s work is closely connected to efficiency of the whole organization. Where do you think you’re best contributing to efficiency (beyond automation) and where you could do more (outside of current resources) to improve efficiency of the organization? What are the key performance indicators that you feel capture your contributions to the institution? | * In IFAD 11, systems for operations lifecycle didn’t exist; major achievement was digitizing and integrating the full lifecycle. * Client application process reduced from 53 days to 1 day during IFAD 11 via client portal improvements and KPI tracking. * Maintained a 1:1 approach—develop and launch policy and corresponding system simultaneously. * Developed a theory-based framework mid-IFAD 11 into IFAD 12, creating reporting/monitoring tools and platforms (e.g., RBI). * Enabled staff and managers with user-friendly tools, reducing reliance on IT. * Focused on enabling rather than limiting; created workflows even within rigid policy environments. * Exploring synergies between corporate IT and IT for development—aim to scale models across teams and projects. * Advises on select projects and promotes delivery at ground level through integrated digital approaches. | |
+| 5. BC: Do you have a corporate strategy for IT? Vision, roles, direction? | * Strategic oversight committee document exists and is updated annually. * Document reduced from 70 pages to just 4, improving clarity and usability. * Provides a clear theory of change with timelines for implementation. * IFAD 12 is focusing on organizational footprint, particularly on the corporate side. * Proactively address future challenges, though IT development timelines raise questions about strategic department functions. * Pre-budget cycle (summer) discussions help flag priorities and ensure alignment—“Don’t miss the bus.” * 5-year planning window helps align with future replenishment cycles. | |
+| 6. BC: What is your perspective on supporting those units (HR, budget, accounting) where efficiencies could be made? | * Changing systems requires major investment—estimated at $40–60 million. * Despite near completion, a new system was paused due to diverse and evolving needs. * External audits and evaluations consistently rate systems highly—green ratings are rare. * No trade-offs between areas—likely due to team structure and collaborative work style. * Internal setup supports effective delivery—key to organizational resilience. * IFAD’s story and approach resonate broadly. * Chose not to adopt SAP—existing systems were inherited. * SAP wouldn’t offer efficiency gains for field operations; focus is on practical enablement. * IFAD leverages agile tech—can deliver systems in just 2 months, unlike larger orgs. * Developed "Open" system—widely admired by peers; agile and adaptable to varied business needs. * Operates with compromises but proves that “small is beautiful.” | |
+| 7. HK: What do you mean about policies? What was the disconnect with policies? | * Not every situation requires a system. * ABC fund started years ago, with only one transaction (NSO loan)—no need for a full system for just one transaction. If transactions increase, then a system may be considered. * IFAD is committed to new areas but faces capacity constraints—must prioritize and be strict with project selection. | |
+| 8. HK: Have organizational changes impacted your unit? | * Small IT team creates significant struggles with limited capacity. * Only 1-2 people per position, making it challenging when individuals are reassigned, and skill sets don’t match. * Half the team is highly specialized; retraining is needed when team members leave, requiring 2-3 years to get new hires up to speed. * Results in "checking the box but not really helping"—tasks are completed without meaningful impact. * Increased workload for other team members when new hires lack necessary knowledge. * Tight project timelines led to unexpected low quality, as meeting deadlines negatively affected work performance. | |
+| 9. HK: Risk management – did your unit need specific skillsets? | * Had to take on significantly more work, spending considerable time on it. * Needed to define and understand cybersecurity, an emerging area, with only 1 person dedicated to it (expecting 6). * Now has a P2 for cybersecurity and outside monitoring services for vulnerabilities. * Reports on cybersecurity risks presented to RM committee and the board. * During COVID, lacked sufficient funding and resources for new products. * IFAD doesn’t have exclusive resource constraints but understands the financial position and uses this knowledge to advocate for needs. * Respects the process and strives to fulfil roles within budgetary limits. * Believes in the business and understands how resource allocation works within systems and processes. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Strategic Planning: IFAD’s long-term planning spans up to five years, with a focus on aligning the capital budget and work programs to strategic goals. Governance documents are updated annually, and there’s an emphasis on translating strategy into actionable tasks. | | |
+| IT: IFAD has digitized operations effectively, improving processes like client applications, but struggles with scaling systems due to limited IT resources. Agile technologies like the "Open" system allow flexibility, but cybersecurity and IT staffing remain areas of concern (i.e. one specialist at IFAD for a role that usually requires six). | | |
+| Decision-Making: IFAD’s decision-making balances top-down strategic guidance with bottom-up feedback, allowing flexibility in responding to evolving needs. Compromises are made, especially with smaller teams and limited resources. | | |
+| Organizational Structure: The small, specialized IT team structure creates knowledge transfer challenges, impacting efficiency during turnover, especially during reassignment. However, IFAD’s internal setup generally supports effective project delivery. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+| 22 April 2025, Anne Mottet, Lead Global Technical Specialist- Livestock, PMI | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Anne Mottet** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Lead Global Technical Specialist – Livestock, PMI** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **22 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Hannah** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of AM | * Global lead for livestock, based in PMI. * With IFAD for 2 years. * Provides (1) technical supervision and guidance on design and implementation, and (2) technical strategy guidance at the corporate level. * Works alongside two counterparts in Nairobi and Abidjan. * Focuses on Cluster 1: Sustainable production, within the broader clusters of sustainable production and rural finance/value chains. * Role remains the same post-recalibration; previously part of SKD, now part of OTD. | |
+| 2. JG: How effectively has IFAD supported pastoralist livelihoods? What more could be done to strengthen these communities? | * Recently completed an IFAD 8 to 12 stock take, providing an in-depth analysis of listed activities. * Focus on livestock in fragile countries, especially in West and Central Africa (WCA). * 25% of the budget is dedicated to livestock-related activities. * Strong emphasis on fragile countries in WCA and Asia. * Significant portfolio in Central Asia, focusing on livestock and mountainous pastoralism. | |
+| 3. JG: Are there differentiated approaches based on region? | * LAC differs from other regions, lacking a strong sector-based entry mechanism; few livestock/forestry projects were initially designed. * Entry often happens through capacity building for producer organizations, with groups requesting livestock-related assistance. * Approach in LAC is social targeting rather than sector-driven in other regions like WCA. * Even within different LAC countries, the approach varies; IFAD’s support is part of a broader menu of services for rural populations, with pastoralism being one of those services. | |
+| 4. JG: MISSED THIS Q | * Conflict-sensitive design is part of IFAD’s technical toolbox, with guidance notes from PMI to support projects in fragile contexts. * This is not a new area—PMI has established expertise in providing technical assistance for such settings. * Grievance mechanisms are essential in conflict zones; tools exist to guide design while allowing for necessary flexibility. * Example: In Central Asia, IFAD supported land rights transitions from central governments to communities, promoting stability and livelihoods. | |
+| 5. JG: How well has IFAD combined operations integrated livestock with other interventions (e.g. climate, smart agriculture, rural finance, value chains)? What could strengthen this integration in future programming? | * PMI developed a paper on livestock and climate, outlining key financing recommendations. * Livestock is integrated into many projects—21% are livestock-specific, and over 25% include livestock in broader value chain activities. * Though the dedicated livestock portfolio is small, about two-thirds of projects since IFAD8 involve livestock. * IFAD is improving tracking of climate impacts in livestock through a grant with FAO, which supports impact estimation and staff training. | |
+| 6. JG: How to integrate livestock production with crop production? Is there any thinking on this? How to promote one sector like agroforestry while simultaneously promoting livestock production? | * Livestock-based poverty is included in some IFAD activities. Country graduation does impact some of these activities. * Example: PRISM program provided livestock assets and seeds to support livelihoods and scale up graduation efforts. * In Rwanda, it reached 25,000 farmers, with 6,000–7,000 receiving seeds—showing promising results. * While underutilized in the past, this approach is gaining more focus under IFAD12. | |
+| 7. JG: How can livestock-related innovations be better scaled or adopted across regions? | * OTD's role is to understand the portfolio and ensure the best information is included in designs. * Regional adaptation and transferring experience to new designs provide significant leverage at the start. * Focus on increasing South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC). * IFAD is small and cannot be everywhere, so policy dialogue and engagement are key—being present at livestock conferences to showcase IFAD’s results. * Representation at larger forums is crucial for scaling. | |
+| 8. JG: How much is done in programs designed to integrated mainstreaming themes? What is their ability to actually address women’s and youth issues? | * Initially challenging to address gender in pastoralist communities but has become easier over time. * Scoring for gender and youth in livestock projects was better than expected in IFAD 12, with higher averages. * When space, finance, and capacity were provided, projects specifically targeted women beneficiaries. * IFAD 12 marked a turning point, with significant positive results now evident. | |
+| 9. JG: How much do you think SECAP can be a source of guidance during project design? | * SECAP focuses on safeguarding rather than providing technical guidance for improvement. * Its criteria are designed to ensure no harm is caused during implementation. * Technical guidance is provided by PMI, with notes from PMI’s perspective on technical aspects. * PMI ensures integration of other tools and collaborates with SECAP to ensure appropriate application, (e.g. discussions on slaughterhouses vs. at-home activities). | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Regional Differentiation: Approaches are adapted by region. Ex. Focusing on sector-driven livestock work in WCA and Asia, while using socially targeting, demand-based entry points in LAC. Flexibility supports relevance across diverse contexts. | | |
+| Livestock Integration: Livestock features in about two-thirds of IFAD projects, even if not central. Recent programs like PRISM show success in using livestock for poverty graduation, especially under IFAD12. | | |
+| Conflict & Fragility: IFAD has strong tools for conflict-sensitive design, including grievance mechanisms and land rights work. PMI leads technical guidance to ensure flexibility and effectiveness in fragile settings. | | |
+| Climate and Technical Capacities: Improving climate tracking in livestock through partnerships like FAO. PMI provides guidance on climate-smart investments, reflecting growing technical depth. | | |
+| Equity and Scale: Gender and youth outcomes have improved in livestock projects; Prioritization of South-South learning and global presence to scale its impact and visibility. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| [IFAD Livestock Stocktake 2010-2024](https://intranet.ifad.org/-/just-released-ifad-livestock-stocktake-2010-2024?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fintranet.ifad.org%2Fsearch%3Fp_p_id%3Dcom_liferay_portal_search_web_portlet_SearchPortlet%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26_com_liferay_portal_search_web_portlet_SearchPortlet_mvcPath%3D%252Fsearch.jsp%26_com_liferay_portal_search_web_portlet_SearchPortlet_keywords%3Dlivestock%2Bstocktake%26_com_liferay_portal_search_web_portlet_SearchPortlet_scope%3Dthis-site) | | Anne Mottet |
+| [Investing in Livestock- Nutrition & Climate Action](https://www.ifad.org/en/w/publications/investing-in-livestock-for-improved-and-resilient-livelihoods-nutrition-and-climate-action) | | Anne Mottet |
+| [Engaging with Pastoralists: Approach](https://www.ifad.org/documents/48415603/49812595/Pastoralism_Teaser.pdf/c906a806-3292-c32a-1b4e-a3386bb521b6?t=1726643326429) | | Anne Mottet |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 23 April 2025, Bernard Hein, Athur Mabiso, Tarek Ahmed, WCA, DCO | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Bernard Hein, Athur Mabiso, Tarek Ahmed** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **BH: Director WCA**  **AM: Lead Regional Economist, WCA**  **TA: Lead Portfolio Advisor, WCA** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **23 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Barun, Sally, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. SB: Key staff/HR-related issues that have hindered delivery of the replenishment commitments. | * Replenishment has improved over the past 2–3 cycles. * IFAD 11 report was strong and clearly outlined institutional priorities. * IFAD 12 introduced regional consultations to ensure regional alignment. * A regional engagement strategy was developed; even fragile states made pledges. * Some ministers lack understanding of the replenishment process, but Africa’s regional case showed strong ROI. * JPR is overly centralized—country directors (CDs) and regional directors (RDs) are overloaded. | |
+| 2. SB: How did you deliver against the replenishment commitments given how they were set? What were the factors that supported and hindered your ability to deliver on the targets committed to by the donors? | * Additional regional capacities were created to support institutional priorities—nutrition expert and youth thematic lead joined the team. * In the first year, planning did not adequately align with targets; in the second year, they re-planned to catch up on lagging priorities. | |
+| 3. SB: Skills and work-life balance | * Reassignments consistently impact operations and disrupt momentum. * Teams must manage under constant change and anticipate portfolio handovers when designing programs. * High vacancy rates are a recurring issue—started the year at 18%, reduced to 0, but returned within 6 months. * A recruitment plan was introduced to address vacancies, and delays in hiring were reduced. * IFAD remains understaffed, but staff are highly committed and willing to do more. * High turnover forced hiring of new, inexperienced staff; they adapted by learning on the job and seeking guidance from HQ. * The team includes many new members, but there is strong commitment to progress despite challenges. * Onboarding and collaboration are positive, though institutional memory and handover processes need improvement. | |
+| 4. SB: What is the reason for high turnover? | * There is a heavy workload, and the system is not very attractive. * G4/5 level staff perform twice the amount of work compared to their counterparts in HQ. | |
+| 5. HK: If there are mismatches in technical skills and a reassigned employee, how does the onboarding process change as a result of the skills of the new individual? | * Onboarding typically addresses this, depending on the individual’s profile. * BH dedicated significant time through an intensive 8-day process to ensure a technically experienced individual could effectively transition into the new CD role. | |
+| 6. MF: Were you explained the BRAM loans terms? Were you consulted regarding pricing and given volume targets? | * Country team struggles to internalize ideas; unclear what "demand" truly means in practice. * Hesitations and mistakes were seen in BRAM; despite this, there was excitement in WCA, with the envelope growing from $74M to $121M. * BRAM was not applied ad-hoc; it was based on RMO analysis. * Envelopes were identified, including the BRAM allocation. * RMO constraints in the BRAM process: countries were told they were eligible, but later RMO retracted eligibility. * IMF approval is a barrier; alignment between IMF, government, and IFAD on approval is lacking. * IFAD needs to calculate concessionality to present to the government for progress. * IFAD and IMF use different methods for calculating concessionality. * BRAM process was not always straightforward. | |
+| 7. MF: Do you source co-financing from international and/or domestic partners? | * Co-financing KPIs are assigned to the region. * KPIs are translated to the country level for implementation. * Methodology for capturing co-financing data is not optimal; adjustments are needed during the cycle to adapt. | |
+| 8. MF: Private sector co-financing? NSO Targets? | * During design, IFAD financing and private financing are clearly shown, along with other instruments like NSOs. * NSO targets are set by corporate and cascaded to the region. * The regional portfolio is aligned with these targets, evaluating the best opportunities to meet them. | |
+| 9. MF: Integration of ICT? | * Involvement is typically due to being called to meet demand from the technical division of PMI. * Currently working on a regional strategy for ICT4D and creating a stocktake report on it. | |
+| 10. JG: given fragile contexts in WCA – how has approaches adapted to these contexts? | * 46% of countries are in fragile contexts; 11 out of 24 in WCA are on the World Bank’s list of fragile and conflict-affected countries. * Guidelines for engaging in fragile contexts are being updated to improve effectiveness. * Flexibility is key in continuing to serve end beneficiaries in fragile environments. * LICs (Low-Income Countries) are identified early during the design phase; emerging LICs are addressed as issues arise. * For unforeseen risks, collaboration with other organizations (e.g., French Institute for Agriculture and Development) helps diversify partners and mitigate risks. * These partnerships help understand and address the underlying drivers of fragility. | |
+| 11. JG: How is WCA ensuring that operations are integrated with cross-cutting priorities (mainstream) to maximize transformation? | * IFAD is promoting a value chain approach, but internal technical capacity remains a challenge. * Projects often still operate in silos, focusing mainly on production rather than integrated delivery. * Efforts to overcome this have led to changes in delivery methods. * There has been a notable shift toward youth-focused projects; currently in the second generation of such initiatives. * Nutrition targets were initially overly ambitious and based on outdated project designs. * Early nutrition targets didn’t account for time lags in impact; now there’s improved alignment with a clearer theory of change. * Youth programming has shown significant impact, especially given the region's young population. | |
+| 12. BC: Adjustments to work programs and budget in lined with replenishment commitments. | * Earmarking budgets for nutrition or gender is easier in some countries than others; borrower incentives are needed. * Earmarking is more effective during the design phase than implementation, as it's easier to align with government priorities early. * Budget envelopes are determined at the corporate level; regional teams do not decide country allocations. * Regional teams can allocate supervision budgets or top-ups for fragile contexts. * $25,000 is provided for fragility assessments. * During design, governments prioritize visible investments like infrastructure. * Fragile context design includes small budget top-ups for fragility assessments. * Funding is consistently insufficient to meet all needs. | |
+| 13. HK: Further comments? | * A one-size-fits-all approach does not work in fragile contexts. * Significant gaps are emerging in service delivery within these areas. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Operational execution continues to face strain due to centralized systems, high staff turnover, and persistent understaffing, especially in fragile contexts. Despite these limitations, teams demonstrate strong commitment and adaptability, often compensating for systemic gaps through informal learning and inter-staff support. | | |
+| Efforts to mainstream cross-cutting themes such as youth, nutrition, and gender face difficulties due to outdated project designs, mismatched targets, and limited capacity for integrated delivery. While value chain and co-financing strategies are being advanced, weak methodologies and siloed project execution hinder full realization of intended outcomes. Institutional memory gaps and inconsistent onboarding further constrain long-term strategic coherence across portfolios. | | |
+| Nearly half of IFAD’s operations are in fragile contexts, requiring flexible, context-sensitive approaches that current systems only partially accommodate. Tools like BRAM and concessional financing face procedural and coordination hurdles, particularly due to misalignment between IFAD, governments, and external partners like the IMF. Still, regional innovation in risk mitigation and partner diversification reflects a growing institutional awareness of fragility's root causes and the need for adaptive engagement. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 23 April 2025, Juan Carlos Mendoza, Director, ECG | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Juan Carlos Mendoza** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director, ECG** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **23 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Sally, Barun, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of JC: | * Joined IFAD in February 2023. * Spent most of their career at the World Bank in operations and as an advisor for one of the VPs, leaving in 2014. * Became an advisor to the first head of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) when it was established. * Currently serving as Managing Director. | |
+| 2. JG: Mainstreaming themes not only addressed at only design but effectively integrated in projects. | * IFAD disproportionately relies on broad ventures. * Supervision reports are extremely long, focusing mainly on capturing core indicators. * There’s variability in the availability of budget for participation in missions. CDs tend to view mainstreaming themes as ancillary to the project, often preferring remote missions over in-person ones. * Most of the support comes through supplementary funds, with a particular need for supportive break management units to conduct training on themes like nutrition and gender.   PMU training is critical for implementation, and there’s ongoing demand for additional support in the regions. | |
+| 3. JG: Difficulties in observing outcomes for nutrition? Why? | * Outcomes for nutrition are different from other themes. * The 10 million target recorded as intending to help is not particularly realistic. * Nutrition is difficult to capture, and the low capacity of PMUs in this area makes it more technical. * It’s suggested that nutrition shouldn’t be a mainstream theme but rather a technical area within PMI. * The nutrition team is finally formed by nutrition experts, as previous members were non-experts, which resulted in a lack of technical expertise due to reassignment. * Supplementary funds from Norway helped build nutritional expertise. | |
+| 4. JG: Strategic lessons learned from implementing transformative approaches? How are these lessons informing a broad strategy for scaling systemic change? | * Government buy-in is crucial. Mainstreaming themes and indicators/targets are driven by the replenishment process, which is donor-heavy. * The key to success is internalizing these themes within the country and the CDs. * It’s not always easy to sell, so it’s important to present mainstreaming themes in a way that aligns with the expectations of the borrower, who may not always prioritize these issues. * If the CD can effectively present the rationale for mainstream themes, it can secure strong buy-in from the government, as long as it’s not perceived as just an IFAD requirement. | |
+| 5. JG: Which models (incl. climate finance, etc.) have demonstrated measurable results in enhancing inclusion? And what has been done to scale them effectively? | * IFAD faces a structural problem: projects aren’t large enough to drive systemic change at the national level, but they can bring about change at the project area level. * IFAD has the ability to do national projects, but there is uncertainty about being supportive of CVV in this context. * CVV is important, and any impact on lives is critical. * While IFAD is not a climate/environment institution, presenting climate resilience work as a means to improve livelihoods and incomes helps garner stronger buy-in from beneficiaries and governments. | |
+| 6. JG: How is ECG division working with other technical and operational teams? Especially in diverse and fragile contexts | * There’s a close relationship and well-established mechanisms to create project design teams, especially during the supervision phase. * In fragile contexts, social inclusion colleagues are not particularly strong. Social inclusion issues are critical, and formal networks can help drive more successful implementation. * The portfolio in fragile contexts is one from which they are still learning, and it’s difficult to single out specific challenges. * There is a disproportionate number of women-led households in fragile contexts, making gender an integral part of the work. * They work closely with PMI on designing rural finance mechanisms that directly impact women. | |
+| 7. HK: What are your thoughts about increasing mainstreaming themes, targets, etc.? How to balance? | * The current approach is not sustainable and inconsistent with what other IFIs are doing. * There’s a suggestion that ECG should be disbanded. * The ECG team should be integrated into other departments for a more intersectional approach. * Donors should be encouraged to relax the formal requirements for these very specific indicators. * Having a separate division for mainstreaming themes undermines the concept of mainstreaming itself. | |
+| 8. SB: | * With ECG, it’s clear that reaching targets in their regions is part of their objectives. * There are weaknesses in determining who is responsible for meeting these targets—Is it ECG staff or CDs? * Responsibility lies with both, but there remains a perception that these are primarily ECG’s targets, which is a cultural issue that needs to be addressed. * In the three years here, there have been efforts to internalize this responsibility within the institution, not just ECG, though it is still a work in progress. | |
+| 9. SB: | * Management tries to push back and make targets as realistic as possible. * Can provide technical inputs to explain why the targets should be different. * Ultimately, it comes down to a political decision. | |
+| 10. SB: | * The only change in ECG is reporting to someone with a different title. * Fundamentally, not much has changed. * 80% of time spent on projects, 20% on other tasks. * Mainstreaming themes, like nutrition, require significant time. For senior staff, it’s often closer to 60-40. * Expectation that ODE would take over some of these additional tasks. * The intent and purpose of ODE remain unclear, particularly regarding knowledge management—should ECG or ODE handle it? * The issue remains unresolved. * There are no time sheets, but the recalibration memo officially sets the expectation of 80-75% on project work, with the remainder on other tasks. | |
+| 11. SB: Skills requirement and new skills needed to build, procure/recruit to meet commitments? Where did the people come from? | * Nutrition: Received funding from Norway to hire new staff on temporary contracts, leading to 2-3 new positions in the budget over the last 2-3 years. The role of supplementary funds was crucial in making this transition. * Currently, only one person on the nutrition team isn’t a nutrition expert, showing improvement. * For other teams, gaps in expertise (e.g., no disability expert) are filled by hiring consultants for specific matters. * IndigenousPeople: Only two staff members, both experts in the field. * Gender and Disabilities: UN-wide reports on gender and disabilities are still handled by ECG, even though they’re not directly related to projects. This accounts for part of the 20%. * The new disability theme has modest targets, generally handled part-time by a gender specialist with consultant support. * External Initiative: IFAD’s grant to SPARK, an initiative for people with disabilities in Africa, has been instrumental. IFAD has learned a lot from SPARK in designing corporate initiatives for disabilities. | |
+| 12. SB: Impacts of reassignment? | * Many team members joined IFAD in the last 2-3 years and didn’t go through reassignment. Reassignment outside their area of expertise could have an impact. * For example, the indigenous people team was reassigned, but they were the only two experts in that area. * The impact of reassignment depends on the individuals involved and their learning curve. | |
+| 13. SB: Thoughts on vacancies | * Core budget positions have been addressed. * In the entire ECG, only two vacancies exist, both for newly approved positions. * Core positions are well-managed, but there’s heavy reliance on supplementary funds from fees. * Vacancies are largely due to the inability to offer long-term contracts, leading to higher turnover. * Temporary contracts require breaks in continuity, and hiring is limited to available cash, even if future funds (e.g., from climate) are anticipated. | |
+| 14. SB: Under resourcing in skills of people for mainstreaming requirements. How has the levels changed? | * Climate and nutrition issues addressed through supplementary funds; a new position created for the nutrition role. * Senior management is interested in developing nutrition skills. * Gender remains under-resourced, while Indigenous issues are generally better supported. * To develop themes, higher-level buy-in from CDs is more crucial than just additional funding. * ECG is also responsible for SECAP, but it’s not yet mainstream; a second new position is focused here. | |
+| 15. HK: Is nutrition funded by supplementary funds? | * Funds from Norway will run out this year. * The core budget will take over funding the nutrition role previously supported by Norway's supplementary funds. | |
+| 16. HK: How do you explain commitments? | * In the context of a flat budget, member states need to consider supplementary funds to address gaps. * However, supplementary funds don’t come with additional resources. | |
+| 16. BC: Given the commitments and targets in your area, what is your view on overall adequacy/inadequacy of regular budget for IFAD’s replenishment commitments? Is it fair to say ECG would not be able to deliver on the various targets to deliver were it not be for supp funds? | * For climate, supplementary funds directly support PoLG, with two distinct funding sources. * Mechanism in place for IFAD to meet international co-financing targets, unrelated to the climate theme. * Limited supplementary funds available for gender to meet targets. * Nutrition received one-off funding from Norway when targets were strengthened, but this is ending. * Senior management allocated core budget funds, but staff, like the gender specialist, are balancing other roles (e.g., working on disabilities theme). * Some budget allocated for specific initiatives, with consultants used for targeted project work, managed directly by ECG instead of CDs. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Leadership: Structural inefficiencies persist, with supervision reports often overly focused on indicators and a general tendency to deprioritize mainstreaming themes during project missions, especially due to limited budgets. The continued separation of the ECG team highlights broader institutional challenges, with growing suggestions to integrate it more fully into IFAD’s operational structure to enhance coherence and mainstreaming effectiveness. | | |
+| Themes like nutrition, gender, and climate face persistent internal challenges due to fragmented ownership and insufficient resources. Nutrition is seen as technically complex and poorly supported at the PMU level, making it a less practical candidate for mainstreaming. While there have been efforts to clarify roles between ECG and country teams, a cultural shift is still needed to fully embed thematic accountability across the organization rather than isolating it within ECG. | | |
+| Staffing: IFAD heavily depends on supplementary funding to maintain thematic expertise, with temporary contracts leading to high turnover and limited continuity. Staffing gaps are especially evident in niche areas, such as Indigenous Peoples and disability inclusion, where reliance on consultants is common. Reassignments that move staff outside their areas of expertise have undermined technical depth, and hiring remains constrained by cash availability rather than future budget expectations, limiting long-term planning and stability. | | |
+| IFAD’s ability to influence systemic national reforms is constrained by the relatively small size of its projects, which are better suited to localized change. Effective mainstreaming depends on presenting themes in ways that resonate with borrower governments, not just satisfying donor demands. However, political considerations, both internal and external, often shape decisions around target-setting, thematic priorities, and the degree of flexibility allowed in programming. | | |
+| Efforts to streamline project support are often undermined by overly complex processes and unclear responsibilities, such as confusion between ECG and new units like ODE. Staff are officially expected to spend most of their time on project implementation, but mainstreaming responsibilities often expand this load, particularly for senior staff. The lack of clear time-tracking mechanisms and realistic performance expectations further exacerbates inefficiencies. | | |
+| Mainstreaming themes such as gender and disability remain under-resourced and reliant on multitasking specialists and consultants for delivery. Initiatives like SPARK have supported IFAD’s learning and programming in disability inclusion, but structural support is limited. While the nutrition and Indigenous Peoples teams have seen improvements in staffing through supplementary funds, ongoing reliance on external financing makes these gains fragile, especially as donor contributions phase out. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 23 April 2025, Maine Astonitas and Ricardo Fort Meyer, LAC, DCO | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Maine Astonitas and Ricardo Fort Meyer** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **MA: Senior Portfolio Advisor, LAC**  **RFM: Former Lead Regional Economist, Current Consultant LAC** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **23 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Federica, Sally, Barun, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. BC: What kind of adjustments or changes need to be made to country programs, so they respond the commitments? | * Lack of alignment in time periods makes it difficult to link various strategic aspects, mainstreaming, and commitments. * COSOPs serve as the key framework for country strategies but many are similar, complicating the alignment of corporate revisions with inputs from country offices. * Specific demands from countries through COSOPs must be filtered and aligned with commitments and allocations. * Adapting to a dynamic portfolio is challenging, especially with shifting political cycles, as governments alternate between right-wing and left-wing, which impacts project priorities and requires flexibility, even mid-project, like during the MTR phase. | |
+| 2. BC: If changes have to be made to the country work programs to stay aligned with replenishments, does that include a change in budget? | * Unfunded mandates pose challenges, as high-level commitments come from the top-down, creating tension with governments if they have conflicting priorities. While projects in design have some flexibility, altering projects in operations is tricky due to financial and legal considerations. * Funding for grants has been decreasing over the past 5 years, leaving limited financial resources. * Meeting mandates requires extra resources, which are available, but the challenge lies in accessing them due to poorly planned internal windows for IFAD grants. * Lack of a regional strategy within the operations sector creates a gap between corporate-level mandates and country-level implementation, making it difficult to address new mainstreaming initiatives at the regional level. | |
+| 3. BC: Do mandates come from top-down? | * Working on increasing the number of projects incorporating climate finance, aiming to shift from 40% to 45%, which is challenging. * Year-by-year KPIs track domestic and international contributions. Loan projects are funded with a mix of IFAD and other organization funds, but conflicting messages arise due to concerns about IFAD's visibility. * Focusing more on fragility (priority for IFAD13), but currently only one fragile country (Haiti) is involved, so not all efforts can be concentrated on this area. * Emphasizing the need for a better understanding of operational contexts to allocate funding responsibly and strategically within country programs. | |
+| 4. SB: Performance targets and regional strategy | * A regional strategy can be developed, but it cannot be officially called a "strategy" due to governance issues, as any strategy requires board approval. | |
+| 5. SB: Top-down targeting setting | * Commitments from RMF are passed down to DCO objectives, and then to every staff member of IFAD. * Difficulty arises in meeting targets when there are no relevant countries or projects in the pipeline, and the targets lack flexibility. * Targets are divided equally across the 5 regions, leaving each region responsible for meeting its own target. * There's little flexibility for regions to compensate for others' shortfalls; regions are generally told they must meet their own targets. | |
+| 7. SB: Are new skills required because of the commitments? | * LAC lacks readiness to effectively engage with the private sector; CDs in LAC lack experience in this area, leading to mismatched expectations and slower operational timelines. * Private sector integration was heavily pushed in the last cycle, but implementation proved challenging due to limited institutional preparedness. * Efforts are now underway to improve capacity, including the establishment of a Private Sector Division, but the transition remains difficult. | |
+| 8. SB: Beneficiaries & Internal Policy | * Nearly half of IFAD’s beneficiaries in recent projects were from urban or peri-urban areas, but current internal policy restricts officially targeting these populations. * There is a disconnect between operational realities and policy limitations, as food markets and key activities often take place in transitional zones not formally recognized in project designs. * This constraint creates inconsistencies between internal studies, actual beneficiary data, and what is officially reported or allowed in project planning. | |
+| 9. SB: For nutrition, did you have to procure or build up skills related to food systems? Did you already have the relevant skills? | * Relies on specific thematic consultants for expertise. * Business models differ, with technical specialists focused on specific areas and country directors managing government relationships, but the skills between these roles are non-transferable. * Reassignments have highlighted the challenges of non-specialists trying to influence government decisions. | |
+| 10. SB: To what extent has training built competence to meet targets? | * Efforts are being made to identify the current needs of colleagues, as past training was largely HQ-driven. * HQ often dictates the training content, but the training tends to lack depth, making it hard to retain and apply the knowledge. * The emphasis is now on learning by doing in the region, allowing colleagues to acquire practical knowledge through experience. | |
+| 11. SB: Vacancy in high level position | * Regional economist position has been vacant since 2023, with no recruitment in place, despite willingness to fill the role. * Similar vacancy issue occurred with the regional analyst position, which was vacant for a year. * Higher-level positions take longer to fill, and the absence of a Regional Director (RD) contributes to delays. * There’s a capacity issue in knowledge dissemination; the challenge is not a lack of expertise but uncertainty about where to find answers or whom to ask. | |
+| 12. JG: What have been the biggest challenges across the portfolio? How has the region worked to strengthen implementation and responsiveness? | * Government priorities may require adjustments in project execution and restructuring. * Adaptability in projects (like Brazil during COVID) has been key to enabling good practices, with a significant shift in capabilities before and after COVID. * The bureaucracy is seen as cumbersome, especially when small projects (e.g., $5 million) face the same processes as larger projects (e.g., $50 million), which may not be efficient given varying client needs and commitments. | |
+| 13. JG: How is LAC ensuring operational coherence between investments and non-landing activities, such as policy, engagement, knowledge, management and partnership development to amplify development outcomes and learning across the region? | * The former regional director emphasized the importance of a regional strategy to improve organization and efficiency in distributing various projects and activities. * The goal is to take an innovative approach, focusing on scaling up initiatives at the regional level. * Collaboration with governments and grants is underway to explore new opportunities and approaches for production in an environmentally and climate-smart manner, along with public development partners like banks. | |
+| 14. JG: How have the economic context and policy environments in LAC shaped the relevance and effectiveness of IFAD’s country programs? | * Last year, IFAD began implementing the graduation policy for UMICs, which identifies a pathway towards graduation where countries no longer receive financial support, only Non-Lending Activities (NLA). * Brazil and China were set to graduate but have expressed reluctance to do so. * This poses a challenge for LAC, as 50% of the countries in the region are UMICs. If these countries no longer have the same opportunities to engage with IFAD as others, it could create issues. * UMIC allocation is reduced with each replenishment cycle. To maintain its innovation pathway, IFAD must continue engaging with UMICs, as these countries have the resources to experiment and scale up successful initiatives. | |
+| 15. JG: What are the key enabling factors or strengths in economics and systems perspective precisely for scaling successful innovations in areas such as rural finance, agroecology, or market linkages across IFAD- supported countries in the region? | * Innovation is limited by a lack of institutional tolerance for failure, which is essential for meaningful innovation. * Current systems don’t incentivize experimentation, learning, or scaling successful approaches—risk aversion dominates. * Evaluation frameworks and performance assessments are not designed to accommodate trial-and-error approaches. * Innovation is particularly constrained in lower-income contexts where basic interventions are prioritized; middle-income countries offer more room to test and refine new models. | |
+| 16. HK: BRAM loans | * Demand for IFAD loans is decreasing among countries with access to international markets, especially when other IFIs offer similar terms with larger funding volumes. * To remain relevant, IFAD must position itself as a partner for innovation in rural areas, offering unique value through piloting new ideas rather than competing solely on loan terms. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Technical and private sector skills often cannot be developed internally and must be externally sourced, compounding staffing challenges. | | |
+| Vacancies, especially in key roles, are more severe in some regions, worsening the burden of under-resourced mandates. | | |
+| Bureaucracy remains rigid regardless of project size, straining staff capacity and limiting operational agility. | | |
+| The absence of a regional strategy (unlike in WCA) hampers coherence, especially when corporate policies and targets are imposed top-down without local adaptability. | | |
+| Macro-level recalibration left micro- and mezzo-level teams without clear strategies, increasing staff overstretch and administrative burden. | | |
+| The decreasing demand for IFAD loans from countries with access to international markets highlights the growing competition from other IFIs offering similar terms with larger funding volumes. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 24 April 2025, Daniela Morra and Ilyasse Elbaroudi, SECAP Specialists | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Daniella Morra and Ilyasse Elbaroudi** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **DM: Senior Technical Specialist, SECAP**  **IE: Technical Specialist, SECAP** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **24 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. HK: Structure of the unit | * SECAP team was created after the SECAP 2021 edition came into force, with IE being the first to join. SECAP specialist joined in 2023, and a colleague covering WCA is based in Abidjan. DM also joined in 2023 as another regional lead. * There are currently five regional SECAP specialists, with IE covering LAC/NEN. * The coordinator, who is the lead technical specialist, oversees the overall strategy. * Efforts are underway to strengthen the "dotted line" between regional technical specialists and ECG regions. * The SECAP team was previously part of OPR, but now exists separately at HQ to focus on SECAP compliance, distinct from implementation and design. * ODE is the custodian of the SECAP policy, responding to corporate priorities and updating guidelines, while ECG is more operational and the regional SECAP team responds directly to local operations. | |
+| 2. JG: How has the role of SECAP evolved to strengthen the role of climate and environmental safeguards in design? What is needed to strengthen resilience on the ground? | * Mandate is to support ECG-PDT members, ensuring that both members have the resources and support needed to meet all requirements, including alignment of co-financing partners' operational policies and safeguard instruments with national requirements. * Enhancing implementation support to ensure compliance is maintained throughout monitoring after initial project implementation. * Limited capacity and resources make it challenging to balance the demands of monitoring and compliance with available budgets. * Capacity-building efforts over the past two years have focused on ensuring SECAP is operationalized effectively and training PMUs directly through various initiatives, utilizing available financial and human resources. * IFAD 12 introduced stricter requirements compared to IFAD 11, which did not apply to previous projects, requiring more factors to be considered. * Lack of budget continues to be an issue for conducting necessary studies. | |
+| 3. JG: High risk projects | * High-risk projects require an environmental and social impact assessment, which demands experienced consultants and is costly. * Budget constraints at the beginning of design led to requests for additional funding from PMD/DCO, with occasional support from the OPR SECAP team and ECG. * Amendments to SECAP requirements in early 2024 allowed deferral of studies, with funding sourced from the project budget. * Fewer than 10 high-risk projects in IFAD, with efforts to ensure budget availability during design or push for costs to be covered by the core project envelope. | |
+| 4. JG: How is IFAD working to ensure that environmental, social, and confict-sensitive considerations remain meaningful and feasible under such conditions? | * Engage SECAP early in the design phase to ensure effective integration of environmental and social safeguards. * Assess climate risk promptly during the design phase by conducting studies to identify relevant climate risks and considerations. * Use climate assessments to guide project design, identifying potential adaptation options and activities to be incorporated into the project. | |
+| 5. JG: What good practices have you observed in how SECAP has contributed to the designs? | * Engage SECAP early in the design phase to ensure proper integration of environmental and social considerations. * Assess climate risk as soon as possible during the design phase, conducting studies to identify pertinent climate considerations and risks. * Use climate assessments to inform project design, identifying adaptation options and potential activities to include in the project. | |
+| 6. JG: What are the main challenges country teams face in applying SECAP recommendations during project implementation? And how could SECAP guidance or support be adopted to better align with the field level realities? | * SECAP ratings during project design assess environmental, social, and climate risks, influencing project attention during implementation; performance ratings are part of standard practice. * Safeguards and monitoring are reactive, with progress often limited between supervision missions; efforts are underway to improve support through ICO or team engagement. * Guidelines for SECAP are still vague, and overall support remains reactive rather than proactive. * To manage costs, efforts are made to consolidate budgets by reducing missions and offering language support. * Capacity challenges in implementing SECAP requirements led to the launch of the *Sustained* program, aimed at building PMU and borrower capacity, with the first phase of training completed in ESA, WCA, and APR. | |
+| 7. JG: There is a focus on environmental risk, but since SECAP is so broad, social might go untapped. Do you have an impression of this at the design phase? | * APR design emphasizes social specialists, with land issues central to project design. * Most grievances in APR stem from water access and land resources; social factors need more attention and are dynamic throughout the project. * Voluntary land donations are not covered by SECAP, but proper land practices are still required. * Issues like GBV, human rights, and others are becoming core operational concerns in IFAD and will increase in prevalence across countries. | |
+| 8. JG: Safeguard and procurement links | * Strong linkage proposed in 2021 between SECAP and procurement processes. * SECAP screening identifies risks and evaluates their relevance to procurement; addresses risks if present. * Link fully integrated into project design and implementation since its creation. | |
+| 9. HK: Why ensure the need between safeguard and procurement? | * Ensure contractors consider ABC (Environmental, Social, and Governance factors) when working on projects. * Emphasize ethical sourcing of materials in the procurement of natural resources. * Provide oversight support to ECG and team members working with consultants. * Efforts are reviewed and checked by the QAS team for quality assurance. * Procurement specialists assess based on requirements and design documents, involving ECG specialists in the process. * A defined list of requirements is used to guide evaluation and ensure compliance. | |
+| 10. HK: Is this link working? What are some challenges? | * Varies across projects; not many have significant issues. * Procurement of natural resources can be constrained by certification requirements, which may act as a barrier depending on supplier sourcing. * PMUs lack the capacity to manage contractors according to SECAP and national requirements. * Monitoring contractors in remote areas can be challenging for PMUs. * For moderate-risk projects, PMUs aren’t mandated to have a SECAP specialist. * Most projects are designed with a framework approach, but PMUs may not always be aware of specific sites. * Implementation burden has shifted to the borrower, transferring risk from IFAD, raising the need for internalized risk management skills. * Unlike other MDBs, IFAD applies due diligence later in the process, while others do so from day one. | |
+| 11. HK: Do you think it's a good thing what other MDBs do, where due diligence is put day one on the borrower as opposed to doing it later, because expectations are built right at the start. | * The difference is inherent, but the focus is on strategically facilitating the design stage. | |
+| 12. HK: Country case studies showed that SECAP was onerous and the teams aren’t prepared for it. | * Need to recognize and prepare for a formalized framework, as no current ESM framework exists. * ESCMP is the plan with formalized activities, but the approach needs to be formalized to ensure due diligence isn’t weakened. * The approach relies on a streamlined design phase to guide follow-up, but PMUs lack awareness of SECAP requirements and necessary document reviews. * Stakeholder engagement is often treated as a one-off activity, though it should be an ongoing process. * Uncertainty exists about potential displacement or economic impact without clear knowledge of project locations. * Without a formal framework, documents must still be implemented under an ESCMP approach. | |
+| 13. HK: Are there any benefits or challenges moving from the programmatic approach? | * Transitioning to larger projects with higher impact and risk, particularly in infrastructure. * PMUs continue to face challenges in managing these larger projects. * SECAP risks may be underestimated, but high-risk projects place more emphasis on incorporating SECAP input, often with a full-time specialist. | |
+| 14. JG: For seeking prior informed consent in SECAP. What does this look like? | * SECAP triggers requirement for prior informed consent from affected peoples. * Applies to projects involving indigenous groups, land tenure, etc. * Part of stakeholder engagement process for the project. | |
+| 15. HK: What are your thoughts on SECAP policies? | * SECAP doesn’t have any policy, just guidelines. * Considered one of the best in class in terms of requirements compared to other MDBs. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 24 April 2025, Nigel Brett, Director, PMI | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Nigel Brett** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director, PMI** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **24 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Marcus, Sally, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. HK: Transformation Areas? | * Financial reforms, including BRAM and the graduation policy, enabled IFAD to borrow—this was critical for institutional sustainability. * In the private sector, a proper NSO (non-sovereign operations) pipeline is being built—a very new and potentially transformative area for IFAD. * Decentralization posed challenges in terms of speed and scale; the rapid move to 45% was difficult but ultimately successful, with staffing now exceeding 45% and a notably different staff distribution compared to three years ago. * Aside from these areas, most changes have been iterative, continuing IFAD’s existing work—characterized as "business as usual" rather than transformational. | |
+| 2. MF: Difficulties with opening BRAM—what are the challenges? Who had the fear of mission drift? How was mission drift defined? | * Some member states pushed back over concerns of mission drift, particularly during board discussions. * A core group of countries wants IFAD to maintain a focus on LICs and LMICs, with 40–45% of programs going to LICs—now increased to 60% of resources, rising with each replenishment. * There is reluctance and pressure from member states to reduce lending to UMICs, especially those above the graduation income threshold, leading to difficult discussions. * IFAD faces significant pressure to justify loans to UMICs, even though the current policy framework permits it; most of this pressure comes from List A countries. * There is widespread misunderstanding of the graduation policy—many board members incorrectly believe lending must stop once a country reaches the graduation GDI. * NB and others have made repeated efforts to clarify, but misconceptions persist. * Political realities—such as member states’ parliaments and constituencies opposing lending to countries like China—intensify the pressure. * Geopolitical dynamics heavily influence decision-making. | |
+| 3. MF: Are there statistics on lending by country type for BRAM? | * Doesn't recall exact details off-hand. * There’s high demand for BRAM, but not from certain UMICs like Mexico, Peru, or Indonesia, where ordinary term loans are now harder to process. * Contrary to expectations, demand is stronger from LICs and LMICs, not UMICs. * MF questioned why BRAM wasn’t pushed more toward countries that showed demand. * Lending was capped during IFAD12, limiting flexibility. * IFAD12 introduced new rigidities in the system that hadn’t existed before, making lending more difficult. * IFAD must maintain an overall concessionality level across its portfolio, which restricts shifting funds from lower-income to higher-income countries (e.g., can move funds from Côte d’Ivoire to Mexico, but not vice versa). * Even with available funds, some countries were regularly disappointed due to these constraints. * Suggests removing rigidity around reprogramming funds at the same or higher lending rate, which is currently restricted by IFAD’s financial model based on projected future reflows and overall program balance. | |
+| 4. MF: Do BRAM loans cover the cost of making them? | * The discussion is solely about ordinary term loans. * Returns on these loans are tied to global interest rate trends. * The biggest challenge during IFAD12 was the unexpected rise in interest rates, which caused some countries to reconsider taking BRAM loans. * Interest rate fluctuations will continue to be a significant factor affecting demand for ordinary term loans. * Top of Form * Bottom of Form | |
+| 5. MF: | * IFAD lacks the appropriate staffing and design support needed to scale this effectively. * No one involved in project design is specifically focusing on risk or structuring, unlike institutions like IFC. * These areas need to be strengthened for the initiative to be taken seriously—otherwise, it will remain a niche effort. | |
+| 6. SB: Did staffing issues have an impact? | * The main goal was to deliver the IFAD12 PoLG, but it came at a significant cost to staff. * Very little progress was made in 2022–2023. * By the start of 2024, less than half of the total IFAD12 PoLG had been approved. * Faced a nightmare scenario of needing to deliver the remaining half within one year, under the added pressure of high interest rates. * The process was far from smooth | |
+| 7. SB: Has increasing complexity impacted work? | * A key transformational reform would be shifting from annual budget approvals to a financing facility model—making the entire budget available at the start of the cycle. * This would enable more effective frontloading and earlier design work. * For example, starting design in the prior year (with guaranteed funding) led to 40% delivery in year one of the cycle. * The current system creates chronic delays: no work on 2025 designs began until the 2025 budget was approved. * With approvals typically slipping to December, valuable time is lost at the start of each year. | |
+| 8. SB: | * There’s a strong sense of camaraderie within teams, with only minor disagreements over budget allocations. * At the operational level, particularly within project development teams, things function well. * No major issues observed as a result of reforms introduced during IFAD11 and IFAD12. * The DCO service team model works effectively, with DCO covering costs like DSA and travel. * Supports the idea of having a single budget-holder for the design process—ideally the CDs—who can allocate funds as needed. | |
+| 9. SB: Skills to successfully implement mainstreaming themes? | * IFAD needs global technical leads in the areas where it operates. * These leads should clearly articulate issues within IFAD's mandate and ensure coherence across all operations, while also promoting IFAD’s best practices on a global stage and integrating external best practices. * The institution has lost many technical specialists due to the reassignment process, and this lack of continuity is a concern. * Forcing technical staff to move every few years (such as after three years) has been detrimental to their expertise and the institution's effectiveness. * Generalist staff don’t need to be experts in global technical areas, as long as they are skilled project managers. These roles can be more fluid, but technical specialists require a different kind of profile. * For normative functions in IFAD, it’s crucial to have specialists. For example, it doesn’t make sense to require a procurement specialist to be reassigned as a CD. * There’s a need for a critical mass of full-time, normative staff, rather than relying on consultants. | |
+| 10. SB: What is your experience in investment in training that leads to competence? | * IFAD has never truly invested in training, often trying to do it at a minimal cost. Despite this, they’ve done a good job given the limited resources, such as with initiatives like the Operations Academy. * A major issue during IFAD 11 and 12 was the president’s decision to leave staff with very junior national officers, which resulted in complaints about the lack of development opportunities. This led to a reduction in the average age and experience level of Country Directors (CDs). * This is particularly concerning because the effectiveness of IFAD’s operations is closely tied to how CDs present the institution and engage with stakeholders, and a less experienced team can impact the perception of the organization. | |
+| 11. HK: | * The issue isn't about recruiting the best person for the job, but rather about placing someone in a role because there's no other space available for them. This often comes with constraints, as it can result in less-than-ideal fits for positions that require specific expertise or experience. | |
+| 12. SB: | * He doesn’t believe there should be P4 level Country Directors (CDs). He argues that you don’t need a P4 or P5 for a country, and that CDs should ideally be at a P5 level. * In the context of UN Country Teams (UNCT), where everyone is at the D1-D2 level, sending a P4-level person from IFAD doesn’t work. This creates a mismatch in terms of seniority and influence within the broader UN system. | |
+| 13. SB: Technical staff and delivery commitments | * The reassignment process forces everyone to abide by strict rules, following the "3-4-7" approach, which means that after 7 years, the organization can place staff wherever it sees fit. Employees can volunteer to move after a certain period of time. * One region is going to lose 50% of its Country Directors (CDs) this year after just 3 years, which could significantly impact the region's continuity and stability. | |
+| 14. HK: Small pool at IFAD for reassignment, so all people have been put in the pool to reassign. | * There isn’t enough information on the exact numbers regarding staff movements. * There needs to be more flexibility in the reassignment process, as it currently feels too rigid. * A key weakness is the short time frame for CDs, as 3 years is too brief. This timeframe doesn't allow for adequate relationship-building, stakeholder engagement, and long-term program continuity. | |
+| 15. SB: | * The situation is challenging in the PMI area. * Staff are often "double-hatting," taking on multiple roles, which is impacting their work-life balance. * The vacancy hiring process is highly disruptive, affecting the continuity and stability of operations. | |
+| 16. SB: Many decisions are made at the senior level. What is the appropriate delegation to allow processes to flow? | * With IFAD’s decentralized staffing, it’s difficult to imagine moving away from senior-level decision-making. Decentralization of decisions would be ideal, but it seems challenging to achieve with the current structure. * 90% of staff hires have been decisions made by senior management through reassignment or management-driven processes, with the director playing a role in the decision-making. * The reassignment panel gives directors the chance to review profiles for a short period (around five minutes) and raise objections if they disagree with proposed candidates for open vacancies. | |
+| 17. BC: Budget allocations are not sufficient – is IFAD committing to more than it has the capacity to deliver? | * Unit costs at IFAD are significantly lower compared to other MDBs. * To manage this, IFAD has been reducing the number of designs—shifting from 239 projects to 200, which results in fewer overheads for managing country programs. * IFAD has also been quick to respond to demands in the replenishment cycle, sometimes agreeing to things too rapidly. While there are commitments that need to be made, there have been instances where IFAD volunteered additional commitments that weren’t asked for by donors, leading to what’s seen as "self-inflicted pain." | |
+| 18. BC: | * The Project Design Financing Facility (PDFF) allowed funds to roll over year after year, which wasn’t an issue if a mission spanned from December to January. * However, there is an organizational obsession with budgeting and spending within the confines of a single year, which limits flexibility and can be restrictive. | |
+| 19. JG: | * IFAD is doing okay on design inputs with enough staff to have Project Team Leaders (PTLs) for all designs. * There is a good working relationship with staff, but the focus should shift towards having a consulting budget rather than hiring more staff. The goal is to use more resources for technical consultants, ensuring the best available talent for designing projects. * Quality assurance has evolved over time. The best system was when QA had its own dedicated group made up of senior experts. Currently, it’s more of a checklist approach done by junior staff, which may not be as effective. * The transition from design to implementation is difficult. While there’s more control during the design phase, implementation is harder to influence. Governments have their own staff, and the context can be challenging. There are also limited resources in the Project Management Initiative (PMI) to support implementation. While there is some support during supervision, influence is minimal, with the Mid-Term Review (MTR) being one of the biggest opportunities to make an impact. | |
+| 20. JG: | * Still performing poorly in this area. While not worse or better than other organizations facing the same challenges, there’s definitely room for improvement. A longer-term programmatic approach, with a focus on building the capacities of local institutions, is the right direction. * Goes through phases (e.g., IFAD 10 and 11), where certain individuals become fixated on particular trends, such as reducing project lengths to a specific number of years, which seems misguided. * One area where IFAD has done well is with longer-term engagements, especially in second and third-phase projects. This is the direction to go in, particularly in challenging contexts and fragile situations. The focus should be on building the capacity of local organizations and the private sector. Too often, projects are designed to be overly ambitious with short timelines, expecting them to be sustainable despite lacking the necessary foundation. | |
+| 21. HK: Further Comments? | * Things are largely driven by member states, but reducing the number of commitments would be fantastic. * It’s important to reduce rigidity and allow for more flexibility in operations. * IFAD's comparative advantage lies in the strong relationships with member states. The organization has good working relationships with many borrowing countries, and they value IFAD’s involvement. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Budget Strategy: The multi-year budget facility and the PDFF are topics to explore further. It would be useful to dig into archives to understand the history and potential aging of IFAD's project portfolio, especially in light of funding cuts. | | |
+| BRAM: There’s a real need to assess the demand for BRAM and whether IFAD has truly lived up to its commitments. While BRAM was seen as a game-changer, there are questions about whether the organization has set and adhered to its parameters. | | |
+| Staff Characteristics: There's a key distinction between global technical specialists and other types of leads. At a cultural level, there is a need for more entrepreneurial thinking and agility. This shift could potentially help avoid the degradation and consequences of rigidity. Additionally, SB mentioned not having hired anyone himself in the last 8 years. | | |
+| Reassignment & Vacancies: The reliance on reassignment for filling vacancies is a point of concern. It seems this method is being used more frequently to staff roles. | | |
+| Project Operations: Regional projects face issues with ownership. There’s a noticeable lack of commitment and accountability, which hinders their success. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| PDFF Strategic Document | | Nigel Brett |
+|  | |  |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-24_YuktaKumar_SeniorSpecialist_Fragility_DCO_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 24 April 2025, Yukta Kumar, Senior Specialist, Fragility, DCO | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Yukta Kumar** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Senior Specialist, Fragility Unit, DCO** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **24 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of YK and fragility department | * Position created in September 2023, with role starting in April 2024. * Initially based for 6 months under former OPR, then shifted post-recalibration to DCO as its own unit. * One-person unit for 1.5 months before fragility specialist was hired. * Role clarified post-recalibration: to coordinate and implement IFAD’s approach to operations in fragile situations. * IFAD strategy (2016) still holds as grounding document; updated approach (2022-23) addresses operational gaps in fragile situations. * Difficult to assess IFAD 11/12, as there wasn’t much focus on fragility at that time. | |
+| 2. HK: How was fragility addressed before your unit was created? When did fragility become mainstream? | * Hasn't figured it out herself. * Strategy and pieces (e.g., small island approach) emerged, but unclear on IFAD’s consistent role and responsibility for delivery. * Believes responsibility mainly with advisors and operations, but no dedicated focus. Fragile countries on the WB list only engaged when relevant. * Fragility assessment wasn’t created until 2019. * Strategic and operational thinking on fragility was initially in NEN due to context, but as commitments changed, the approach to fragility evolved for the global transition. | |
+| 3. HK: Day-to-day role and responsibilities? | * 2 full-time staff with additional support from DCO staff. * Detailed action plan and external engagement strategy and guidance in place. * Actively working with the plan. * Updating fragility assessments and guidance. * Long processes involved. * Costing element: Resources and capacity to engage. * Hard to define resourcing accurately. * Previous costing focused on security and conflict, without nuance for fragile settings. * Easier to define conflict-ridden countries as fragile, but others also need consideration. * Completing an intensive costing exercise. * Operations often hide hidden costs that IFAD struggles to address due to lack of awareness. | |
+| 4. HK: Do you provide country-level support? | * Fragility assessment is a key focus. * Challenge in equating fragility to conflict, as fragility is a spectrum; each conflict has different drivers (e.g., Yemen vs. Somalia). * Updating the fragility assessment template to inform fragility approaches. | |
+| 5. HK: What is your role during implementation? | * Retroactive changes are difficult to implement. * If a project isn’t working, use the restructuring policy, especially for long-term projects. * Evidence is available, but fragility info is not immediately accessible. * Cannot retroactively apply changes within the department. * Can't simply change a project’s direction based on identifying conflict drivers; support is limited once a project is in progress. * Fragility drivers are critical; designing projects to the context can prevent the need for significant changes later. | |
+| 6. JG: How has IFAD adapted its delivery models to address the specific risks of fragile contexts? | * Lessons learned are well documented in the updated approach. * The exercise clearly identified operational gaps and provided specific recommendations for engagement. * Key operational policy changes include restructuring policy and procurement guidance for fragile situations. | |
+| 7. JG: Flexibility of procedures in fragile contexts | * Need to set realistic expectations based on what is achievable in any given context. * Some corporate pushes may not have been suitable for challenging implementation contexts. * Risk management is lacking, and there's hesitation to use restructuring despite its necessity. * Lack of understanding around when and where flexibility is appropriate. * Desire for flexibility due to crisis response needs, but IFAD is not positioned for that type of response. * Goals must adapt if the context changes; flexibility depends on how changes are managed. * Risk of drifting from the mandate, potentially putting IFAD at odds with the UN and other IFIs. | |
+| 8. JG: What tools, guidance, or mechanisms has IFAD developed for fragility contexts? | * Tools and guidance were a major gap; the 2016 fragility assessment template was insufficient. * A new template is being used for IFAD 13, in the final stages of finalization and being piloted with project teams, MDBs, and regional teams. * The goal is an action-oriented tool, moving beyond assessments for the sake of assessments. Focus is on reflection and integration into reviews. | |
+| 9. JG: How could the operational risk management be further strengthened to address them? | * Currently on a learning curve. * Joint workstreams with multiple departments. * Areas of work were highlighted, but not developed into overnight workstreams. * Strategy is in place, but there has been no dedicated specialization or focus for years. | |
+| 10. JG: How can IFAD better tailor its approach to inclusion when operating in fragile settings to ensure mainstream themes are sensitively implemented? | * Fragility is multi-dimensional, requiring a multi-dimensional approach. * Fragility assessments include economic, social, political, institutional, environmental, climate change, and security factors. * Viewing issues like gender through a siloed lens is insufficient; more holistic approaches are needed. * Minor conflicts are often strong indicators of potential larger conflicts. * Project logic is evolving: to achieve inclusive gender processes, institutions must be built first, considering the political-social context. * Fragility requires understanding critical drivers before they disrupt projects and aligning with the country’s priorities. * Collaborating with ECG to update their targeting policy and strategies. | |
+| 11. HK: Should fragility be a mainstream?  JG: Should vulnerability be a cross-cutting theme? | * Advocates for applying a fragility lens across all countries, viewing fragility as a spectrum. * Without recognizing fragility, it’s difficult to identify the most disruptive contextual factors. * Emphasizes the need for stronger context analysis over generic mainstreaming approaches. * Notes that mainstreaming often results in ineffective, copy-paste solutions. * Vulnerability and fragility are conditions, not thematic areas. * Resilience is a cross-cutting objective—building it helps reduce vulnerability. * The definition and expression of resilience vary by context. | |
+| 12. HK: Are additional resources given to fragile situations? | * Bulk funding is provided to higher-risk countries, using the World Bank fragility list—though the validity of this approach is under review. * Additional funding is allocated for SECAP and supervision activities. * This funding comes from a separate source, not from the project envelope (flows from POB to DCO to projects). * Covers activities like SECAP, fragility assessments, and related support. | |
+| 13. HK: Decentralization was meant to help fragile contexts. Does it? | * Important distinction between engagement and presence—physical presence doesn’t guarantee contextual understanding. * IFAD is not a frontline, results-implementing agency; direct interventions are rare. * In fragile contexts, most interactions (e.g., with high-risk organizations) are conducted online. * Emphasis on meaningful engagement over mere presence. | |
+| 14. HK: Data | * Fragile contexts are identified using the World Bank fragility list for data disaggregation. * WB list is useful for rough disaggregation and easy reporting but doesn’t capture the full spectrum of fragility. * True measure is whether a project is context-specific and can meet its goals. * Approach is practical due to limited time and resources of CDs and project leads. * Strong recommendation to conduct conflict assessments in cases of active conflict or high fragility. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Fragility Approaches: There has been a lack of dedicated focus on fragility, though a strategy is now in place, and workstreams have started. The fragility approach now includes a multi-dimensional perspective, considering economic, social, political, institutional, environmental, and climate factors, with gender and context-specific strategies central to project design. | | |
+| Resource Allocation: Resource allocation for fragile contexts remains a challenge, with previous costing focusing on conflict and security without accounting for broader fragile settings. An intensive costing exercise is underway to define necessary resources and identify hidden costs in operations. Flexibility in funding and risk management remain key challenges, with IFAD hesitant to use restructuring policies despite their importance in fragile settings. | | |
+| IFAD Response in Crisis Situations: Flexibility in response to crisis situations is needed but difficult due to IFAD's structure and capacity. Adjusting goals based on changing contexts requires careful management to avoid drifting from IFAD’s mandate and conflicting with other UN or IFI mandates. | | |
+| Funding: Funding for fragile contexts includes bulk allocations based on the World Bank fragility list, but this approach is being reviewed for its adequacy. Additional funding is provided for SECAP and supervision activities, which flow from POB to DCO to projects. However, physical presence in fragile contexts is not always necessary; meaningful engagement with local stakeholders, often conducted online, is emphasized for effective contextual understanding. | | |
+| Project Design in Fragile Contexts: Fragile contexts require strong conflict assessments, especially in high-risk areas, to ensure projects can meet their goals. The practicality of operations in fragile settings relies on context-specific planning, and there is strong advocacy for applying a fragility lens across all countries to identify and address disruptive contextual factors early in project design. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| [IFAD\_ Strategy for Engagement\_Fragile (2016).pdf](https://ifad.sharepoint.com/%3Ab%3A/r/sites/IFAD-CLEIFAD11andIFAD12/Shared%20Documents/General/07.%20HQ%20Interviews/DCO%20%28APR%2C%20ESA%2C%20LAC%2C%20NEN%2C%20WCA%2C%20PSD%29/Related%20Documents/IFAD_%20Strategy%20for%20Engagement_Fragile%20%282016%29.pdf?csf=1&web=1&e=keBybP) | |  |
+| [IFAD\_Updated Approach to Fragility (2024).pdf](https://ifad.sharepoint.com/%3Ab%3A/r/sites/IFAD-CLEIFAD11andIFAD12/Shared%20Documents/General/07.%20HQ%20Interviews/DCO%20%28APR%2C%20ESA%2C%20LAC%2C%20NEN%2C%20WCA%2C%20PSD%29/Related%20Documents/IFAD_Updated%20Approach%20to%20Fragility%20%282024%29.pdf?csf=1&web=1&e=0Kj6fc) | |  |
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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 25 April 2025, Carola Alvarez, Managing Director, ODE | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Carola Alvarez** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Managing Director, ODE** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **25 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Sally, Barun, Federica, Hannah** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. BC: How does RMF factor into setting replenishment targets? | * Recent discussion on assessing RMF targets and the feasibility of meeting them. * Issue with reporting on targets for completed projects during replenishment cycles, especially when approved in a previous cycle (e.g., approved in IFAD 8, finished in IFAD 12). * Structural issue in how targets are reported. * Question of whether to report on planned projects or assess projects approved within a replenishment cycle based on commitments, despite not having results yet. * Targets often not met due to difficulty in measuring them independently of priorities. * Need to be realistic when setting new targets, ensuring they align with actual portfolio capabilities and achievable deliverables. | |
+| 2. BC: Is it fair to say targets are regarded as stretched targets? | * Maybe for nutrition but the other ones are feasible. * Portfolio isn’t completely static, there are changes. | |
+| 3. BC: During replenishment consultations, are there discussions on what level of core resources would be adequate for achievement of those commitments and targets? | * Reforming budget by results experience. * Currently, no budget by results in IFAD. Broad business categories without clarity on how much specific programs (e.g., Ethiopia vs. India) cost. * Institutional Output Groups (IOGs) exist but they aren't tied to specific outputs or activities—just broad business functions. * PoLGs under the IOGs are 20, but products under other MDBs are broken down by loan number, allowing cost tracking (e.g., executing Program X in Sudan). IFAD lacks this breakdown, especially important in decentralized and fragile contexts. * Major area of improvement for IFAD is understanding and improving cost efficiency. * IFAD's cost-to-dollar lent ratio is higher compared to other institutions. | |
+| 4. BC: The average number of people reporting to any fund manager is lower than what you’d see in other organizations. | * Key questions: How much of IFAD's resources are directed towards operational vs. non-operational programs? Are corporate activities being done in the most cost-efficient way? * Lack of data for analysis, but interest in understanding cost drivers, such as office setups and cost per dollar lent. * Believes efficiency is lacking and processes are still done the old-fashioned way. | |
+| 5. BC: Costs in fragile countries? | * You don’t know how much budget by results. * Separate account that tracks budget expenditure by product on an excel sheet because CA can’t do it on the budget systems. | |
+| 6. BC: What are the main internal challenges IFAD faces? | * 2 main issues: deployment of technical expertise of OTD for the work program and moving research and knowledge to support research/design in the implementation of projects. * Focus on mobility rather than reassignment to deploy technical expertise when needed for the work program. * A system-based approach could improve efficiency. * Technical expertise should be integrated into program design and implementation. * Currently operating without clear direction ("flying blind"). * Move research and knowledge to better support project design and implementation. * Ensure ODE-based research is tied to decision-making on the ground and delivers value to the program. * Previous research lacked relevance to target achievement and real-world application. | |
+| 7. BC: Staff workloads | * Wants to know what staff are spending their time on, prioritizing important tasks over small things like emails. * Informs staff to focus on key priorities. * Unaware of issues until complaints arise, but staff rarely complain, leading to widespread issues. * Stresses the importance of tracking how staff spend their time at work for effective management. | |
+| 8. SB: What has been your exposure to the dynamic workforce planning method approach committee? What is your take on it in the context of the conversation around time and efficiency? | * Describes the process as highly inefficient. * Previously, staff positions were proposed and justified, then approved and funded through the budget. * This year, 5 positions approved but now need to go back to the dynamic workforce group for re-approval. * Despite being approved last year, still chasing after the approval and unable to post the vacancies. * The dynamic workgroup re-approves positions after the initial budget clearance. | |
+| 9. SB: To your knowledge, there’s no calculation HR does to show how many people you need that determines hiring practices? | * Ad-hoc analysis, just re-size general staff positions according to CA. * Only 3/5 positions have been advertised. Had to wait until end of March to start advertising despite December approval. | |
+| 10. SB: Replenishment target allocation | * Budget is annual, not multi-year. * Targets need approval and monitoring throughout the pipeline, which is front-loaded. * Distinction between planned results and achieved results. * At the beginning of replenishment, planned expectations often drive the process, sometimes missing targets. * Constant balancing act to ensure planned expectations can generate actual results. * Achieved results are measured based on completed projects in the replenishment cycle, but often include approvals from earlier cycles. * New indicators can hinder meeting targets due to the lag in results. * One major challenge is isolating IFAD's net-effect contribution to project outcomes. * IOE's approach of extrapolating net effects to other projects is not the most effective method; more emphasis is being placed on how results are achieved. | |
+| 11. MF: Have you looked into co-financing numbers? | * Net effect refers to the impact of the specific project IFAD chose to finance over others. * CA’s contribution is measured by the decision to select a project and its co-financing agreement. * The net effect reflects the value of choosing that project versus other potential projects. | |
+| 12. MF: Private sector operations | * Evaluating private projects differs from standard projects. * Need to develop methods for evaluating and measuring private projects. * IFAD has not previously focused on this but is now considering it. | |
+| 13. MF: LIC and UMIC BRAM demands | * Conducting a demand study to assess the potential demand. * Demand from UMICs depends on the offer available. * IFAD’s engagement with UMICs is complex due to the lack of volume and UMICs' preference for larger offerings. * Analysis for IFAD 14 has just started. | |
+| 14. MF: Having documentation on BRAM demand by country type | * Limited information available, leading to a "flying blind" situation, but it’s not a major concern due to limited impact. * Transaction costs are high, making small BRAM envelopes insufficient to convince countries to take these loans. | |
+| 15. HK: What would you have to say about results reporting and mechanisms for corporate results reporting? | * Coming from other multi-laterals, IFAD has a stronger set of results processes devoted to tracking than most MDBs have. Maybe it’s too much given the size and cost of the budget. | |
+| 16. HK: M&E Data | * Issue flagged within IFAD but less so in evaluations of other multilaterals, though it may still exist. * IFAD needs a more solid toolbox of trainings for PMUs to strengthen onboarding. * It's not just about having an M&E system/platform, but about proper training and knowing what to look for. * Operational Academy should be dedicated to PMUs to ensure their success. | |
+| 17. HK: When it comes to reporting on replenishments using more than one tool, do you agree with this? Any plans to streamline them? | * Has to do IFAD 12 completion report, devoting time and resources we don’t have to create a report repeating information IOE is already doing. * RIDE and RIME report. | |
+| 18. HK: Further comments? | * Supporting development effectiveness: Budget by results, where people spend time, strengthening PMUs | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Targets: Assessing RMF targets has revealed structural issues, particularly when reporting on targets for completed projects from previous replenishment cycles. There is difficulty in measuring targets independently of priorities, and a need for realistic target-setting aligned with actual portfolio capabilities. | | |
+| Budget Approach: IFAD lacks a clear budget-by-results approach, with broad business categories that don’t clarify specific costs for programs in different countries. A system-based approach could improve efficiency, with greater focus on understanding and optimizing cost efficiency in decentralized and fragile contexts. | | |
+| Technical Expertise: Technical expertise deployment is a significant issue, with a preference for mobility over reassignment. Integrating technical expertise into program design and implementation, along with ensuring research directly supports decision-making on the ground, would improve project relevance and outcomes. | | |
+| Recruitment/Vacancy: Recruitment processes are slow and inefficient, with positions often needing re-approval after budget clearance. The delay in filling positions, despite prior approvals, points to inefficiencies in the process, further exacerbated by reliance on temporary staff. | | |
+| Envelope Sizes: High transaction costs make small BRAM envelopes insufficient to convince countries to engage with IFAD loans. Despite these challenges, IFAD’s results tracking processes are more robust than many other multilateral institutions, though they may be too extensive given IFAD’s size and budget. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-25_GulnaraYunusova_DirectorandTreasurer_TRE_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 25 April 2025, Gulnara Yunusova, Director and Treasurer, TRE | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Gulnara Yunusova** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director and Treasurer, TRE** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **25 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **Tianlin** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1.Treasury Overview | * Functions: Manages liquidity (~20% of IFAD balance sheet, ~$2B), funding, ALM (Asset-Liability Management), middle office, and cash management. * Investment: Liquidity ESG-aligned; ~20% of balance sheet in liabilities. * Funding Linkage: All bonds are sustainable bonds tied to project outcomes. * Cash Management: Every inflow/outflow passes through Treasury. | |
+| 2.Size of Borrowing Program | * General: 1.1–1.2 billion USD per replenishment cycle. * 2024 Target: 500 million USD, unlikely to meet due to weak private placement markets. * Actual 2024 Borrowing: ~300 million USD (including pre-funding). * Current Focus: Drawing down EIB and KfW loans rather than relying on private placements. | |
+| 3.Access to Public Markets | * Reason for No Public Issuance: Board restriction — only private placements allowed. * Capacity: IFAD could technically justify public market access at current volumes. * Flexibility Introduced: Pre-funding of ~25% of next year's requirements. | |
+| 4.Positive Carry Strategy | * Approach: Positive carry achieved via duration management and investing at better credit spreads (AA+ rated, can invest at A- yields). * Investment Horizon: Securities maximum duration ~2 years; longer bonds swapped back to floating. * Returns: Treasury made $83M — greater than IFAD's annual loan book value. | |
+| 5.Re-examining Borrowing Limits | * Plan: Moving from leverage (debt-equity ratio) driven to capital-driven balance sheet management. * Objective: Maximize use of available capital instead of focusing on a rigid leverage ratio. * Implication: Possibility to expand concessional lending funded partially by debt. | |
+| 6.Managing Concessional Lending Expansion | * Debt Structure: Typical structure: 70% concessional resources, 30% debt. * Funding Strategy: Focused on managing borrowing interest cost rather than altering loan structures. | |
+| 7.BRAM Ceiling | * Original BRAM Cap: ~$1.1B, driven by risk tolerance and fundability, set in collaboration with RMO. * Policy Change in IFAD13: Decoupled funding plan from BRAM allocation; now based on capital risk tolerance. * IFAD13 BRAM Envelope: ~1 billion USD. | |
+| 8.Rating Agencies and Leverage Capacity | * No Updated Rating Exercise: IFAD did not run updated maximum leverage scenarios with rating agencies. * Internal View: Current leverage (0.5x) is trivial for rating agencies; key constraint is mission drift, not credit risk. | |
+| 9.Cost of BRAM Loans | * Funding Costs: Full pass-through of funding costs only started this year. * Operational Costs: Operating expenses covered via sustainable replenishment baseline, not recovered from borrowers. * Marginal Cost of Loans: Lower cost for larger BRAM loans, as structuring/supervision cost per loan decreases with volume. | |
+| 10.Resource Reprogramming Rules | * Flexibility: Can reprogram within concessional categories (super-highly concessional, blend, etc.). * Restriction: Cannot reallocate ordinary term loans into concessional or grants — to avoid hidden subsidization. | |
+| 11.Private Sector Lending (NSO) | * Cap in IFAD13: 90M borrowed + 18M grant resources. * Flexibility: Any increase beyond this needs Board approval unless rebalancing within existing POLG envelope. | |
+| 12.Commercial Paper Program | * Status: Actively pursuing establishment of a commercial paper program for liquidity management — target setup in 2025. | |
+| 13.Use of Guarantees (PCGs) | * Status: Exploring Partial Credit Guarantees (PCGs) to stretch capital without direct lending exposure. | |
+| 14.IFAD’s Dual Identity (UN agency vs. IFI) - is this why IFAD is timid? | * Observation: Tensions are natural; seen even at IFC. * Main Issue: Risk aversion at IFAD is exaggerated; need to set clear, IFAD-specific corporate policies. * Balance: Must ensure borrowing is meaningful for concessional operations — borrowing for its own sake not useful. | |
+| 15.Institutional Risk Appetite | * Financial Risk: Movement towards capital-driven risk management — no intention to relax risk policies. * Operational Risk: Concern about readiness for expanded private sector operations (systems/processes not fully in place). | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| RAC (Resources Available for Commitment) paper to be shared by Gulnara | | Gulnara |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-25_KatherineMeighan_ChiefLegalandGovernanceOfficer_OLG_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 25 April 2025, Katherine Meighan, Chief Legal and Governance Officer, OLG | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Katherina Meighan** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Chief Legal and Governance Officer, OLG** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **25 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Barun, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of KM | * Responsible for the work of LEG (legal) and SEC (office of the secretary). * LEG   + Involved in replenishments: governance, legal issues (new policies, frameworks, procedures)   + Prepare replenishment resolutions that puts the replenishments into effect. Approved by relevant gov council body. * SEC   + Governance and convening consultations   + Working with GPR and ABPERD   + Translation of documents   + Outreach to members (governance pov; how does this work, what to expect, etc.) | |
+| 2. BC: Within the legal framework, is there any flexibility for IFAD to have a multi-year budget provision mainly related to project work? | * Short answer = needs to investigate more specifically. * Generally, there is flexibility, but “devil is in the details.” Seeing how everything fits. | |
+| 3. SB: What resourcing is required to deliver against the expanding targets and themes? | * IFAD is working to reduce the number of replenishment commitments to better align with its core rural development mandate. * Although the number of indicators is decreasing, targets remain the same or are increasing, creating pressure. * There is ongoing discussion on whether mainstream themes should still be labeled as such, since they are already embedded in IFAD’s work. * Reducing commitments helps avoid overpromising and supports clearer focus, a concern raised by both the board and during replenishments. * A key challenge is donor misunderstanding that more commitments require a larger budget. | |
+| 4. SB: Within legal, there are new skills and required competencies. What are the new skillsets your team has needed to have to support delivery of the organization and their commitments? | * Financial architecture reform was a key driver, beginning in IFAD11 to stabilize and diversify the portfolio. * In IFAD12, efforts focused on solidifying reforms and building internal legal and finance expertise. * Created new legal, private sector, and climate teams to support borrowing, private placements, and lending to the private sector, including amending IFAD’s agreement to enable such activities. | |
+| 5. SB: How did you build these skills? | * Initially the only one in the department with relevant skills, as the role was new and included bond and note issuances. * Started by hiring a legal consultant and gradually repurposed roles, bringing in new staff with stronger financial skillsets. * Specialized financial expertise is difficult to recruit, so secondments with institutions like the WB, IMF, and IDB Invest were used to build capacity and facilitate knowledge exchange. | |
+| 6. SB: | * Not directly involved in managing the process. * Management team regularly assesses what is feasible, ambitious, or unrealistic. * Emphasizes open, honest dialogue with members about trade-offs and challenges. | |
+| 7. HK: As part of the consultations, do you sense this push and pull between member and donor countries? | * BRAM was created to address long-standing issues around funding access and flexibility. * IFAD's funding sources include replenishment, loan reflows, borrowing, and supplementary funds. * Borrowing provides financial stability and enables differentiated interest rates—core contributions go to LICs/LMICs, while UMICs can access funds at higher rates, benefiting from IFAD’s strong credit rating; BRAM balances political and economic needs. | |
+| 8. HK: How was the BRAM taken by donor countries? | * They were supportive being able to borrow from the market and we could get it cheaper. Helps UMICs to have a steady stream of funding at a lower rate. * Every country has their own politics. | |
+| 9. BC: Would it help if IFAD were to develop some way to cost the commitments? Would it better inform the replenishment consultations? | * Efficient tools like AI or policy frameworks can be useful due to ease of development. * Building detailed systems is often impractical for IFAD due to its small size and limited capacity. * High-level estimates may matter politically, but board decisions are often driven by country-specific priorities, not cost-efficiency. | |
+|  |  | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Commitments: Though the number of indicators is decreasing, rising mandates risk overextending IFAD, especially given persistent donor misunderstandings about the budget implications of expanded mandates. | | |
+| Financial Architecture: Starting in IFAD11, reforms enabled borrowing, private placements, and private sector lending—necessitating new legal, climate, and finance teams. These innovations aimed to stabilize funding and diversify delivery but demanded substantial internal restructuring and upskilling. | | |
+| Building Internal Capacity: The lack of specialized financial expertise was initially a barrier. IFAD addressed this through repurposing roles, targeted recruitment, and secondments with institutions like the WB and IMF, which helped transfer essential knowledge and build long-term capability. | | |
+| Top-Down Decision Making: Strategic decisions—particularly around financing—are shaped more by member-state politics than efficiency, making honest engagement and realism key to institutional sustainability. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Clarify response on budget question | | Barun |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-25_SaraMbago-Bhunu_MawiraChitima_FrancesoMaria_SaraKouakou_ESA_DCO_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 25 April 2025, Sara Mbago-Bhunu, Mawira Chitima, Franceso Maria, Sara Kouakou, ESA, DCO | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | Sara Mbago-Bhunu, Mawira Chitima, Franceso Maria, Sara Kouakou |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | SMB: Regional Director ESA  MC: Head of MCO in Addis Abba, CD  FM: Head of MCO in South Africa, CD  SK: Lead Portfolio Advisor ESA |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **25 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **James, Sally, Marcus, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. JG: Pastoralism approaches and engagement in operations | * There are different types of pastoralists, each with varying needs and practices. * The focus is on income, rangeland management, and restoration, which includes access to water and fodder. * Community-driven development allows pastoralists to define and guide operational strategies. * The approach has shifted from merely maintaining existing practices to building resilience in pastoral areas. * Since IFAD funding alone is limited, co-financing is required to expand reach and impact. * Conflict mitigation is a key focus, addressing resource-driven conflicts by improving access to water and pastures. * There is currently no rural finance program in pastoral areas due to the lack of relevant financial tools. | |
+| 2. JG: Developing guidelines for sustainable management of rangelands | * A project development team with multiple experts supports project designs. * Landscapes vary by country, with community-level systems for rotating pastures and respecting guidelines. * No regional guidelines: instead, guidance notes from ECG on sustainability measures are used. * Gaining significant experience in this area, leading to a $250M project in Kenya focused on protecting water towers. * In Tanzania, collaboration with the International Land Coalition has led to the development of tools for community planning in rangeland management. | |
+| 3. JG: What have been the most significant enablers and constraints in scaling up? | * Discussion with the development finance team. * Rural finance projects have not allowed clients to operate with sharia-compliant loans. * No credit lines available for sharia-compliant financing. * Regulations for interest-free banking have been created, and interest-free products are being developed. * After in-person visits, focus is on ensuring funding sources are sharia-compliant. * Aims to integrate sharia-compliant funding into normal financing (not under BRAM) and set aside grant and concessional funding as much as possible. | |
+| 4. MF: Demand for sharia compliant loans? | * Discussions with the development finance team regarding rural finance projects. * Rural finance projects have not allowed clients to operate with sharia-compliant loans. * No credit lines available for sharia-compliant financing. * Regulations for interest-free banking have been created, and interest-free products are now being developed. * After in-person visits, there’s a focus on ensuring the source of funding is sharia-compliant. * Believes sharia-compliant funding can be integrated into normal financing, but not under BRAM. * Efforts are being made to set aside grant and concessional funding as sharia-compliant where possible. | |
+| 5. MF: Do you have a target for traditional BRAM loans? By country type? How large is the appetite for BRAM? Private sector loans? NSOs? | * Sustainability is a key issue, particularly regarding pricing and financing. * Some countries are willing to borrow at higher terms, but RMOs are hesitant to lend higher volumes at these terms due to IFAD’s sustainability and risk appetite. * Other financing institutions offer higher-priced loans, but IFAD doesn’t have clear targets; once allocation targets are met, efforts are made to convince countries to accept the financing. * There is a large appetite for BRAM in ESA. * Questions around the size of this appetite and whether HQ is gathering demand data from countries: * (1) Which countries are willing to take on BRAM allocations and how much additional resource they can accept? * (2) Countries’ willingness to accept loans based on financing terms (PBAS vs. BRAM). * There’s a greater appetite for blended financing than for BRAM alone. * ODE is collecting letters and information on country demand. * IFAD 12 piloted private sector loans with no formal targets, but there are divisional-level targets. * Since IFAD 12, 5 NSOs showed more demand than anticipated; however, the private sector facility remains under-resourced. | |
+| 6. MF: Are you responsible for co-financing targets? | * There are targets for both domestic and international co-financing. * Targets are set at different levels for domestic and international co-financing. * Domestic co-financing includes private sector and rural financing institutions, as well as micro-finance institution loans, regardless of terms. * There’s been difficulty with NSOs, with concerns that ongoing operations might be underreported at the domestic level. * International co-financing includes both multilateral and bilateral sources. * ESA is actively engaged with multilateral organizations (e.g., WB) and positions IFAD as a competitive partner in co-financing. * Co-designing with partners, like the Green Climate Fund, is common, with pre-allocated funds (e.g., $XM). * Efforts focus on public sector and private sector financing, sometimes collaborating with GEFs. * Co-financiers contribute funds, as well as expertise in implementation and design. * Much of the co-financing work is done at the country level, where international co-financing is well mobilized. * Despite small IFAD grant envelopes, ESA effectively brings in international co-financing resources. | |
+| 7. SB: To what extent are targets informed by replenishment commitments? To what extent are they negotiable and achievable? | * Focus on increasing the number of female staff at P5 level and above. * Recruitment efforts aim to identify qualified women for higher-level positions without compromising quality. * The cascading system lacks a standardized framework; it's often customized by year or cycle. * At the ESA level, targets are cascaded based on resource allocations (PBAS, BRAM) and the pipeline, with a focus on which countries can help achieve targets. * A business planning meeting focused on mainstreaming themes and working on the pipeline to ensure target achievement. * This is a work in progress; challenges arise from government pushback and the lack of customized corporate-level targets. * Cascading Methodology: Targets are calculated by division, with co-financing targets varying by region based on ability to mobilize resources. * ODE manages targets and engages with donors; replenishment cycles are short, making it hard to complete targets before moving on to the next cycle. * Replenishment targets are seen as overly ambitious and should be revisited, especially regarding female representation at P5 level. * KPIs have been clarified, making targets and necessary actions more transparent. * In IFAD 11, the link between objectives and the strategic framework was unclear. | |
+| 8. SB: New skills sets needed? Where have you found or built these skills? | * Each replenishment adds new areas in IFAD 11 and 12, making overall delivery more challenging. * IFAD 12 focuses on decentralization, outposting technical teams, and introducing new expertise. * Nutrition has been an area where IFAD is building in-house capacity, but adaptation of internal capacities began in IFAD 11. * To cover expertise gaps in countries, IFAD recruits consultants on an ad-hoc basis to complement in-house skills. * Balancing in-house capacities with external expertise has shown mixed results. * Strategic partnerships at country, regional, and global levels are also a key focus. * Global partnerships, such as with UNV, ICT4D, and digital officers, are part of the strategy. * Global grants from IFAD incentivize innovations, connecting financing with new approaches and encouraging teams to think differently. * Most commitments happen at the project level, focusing on ensuring the right skills are available and encouraging PMUs to recruit the necessary expertise. | |
+| 9. SB: To what extent has training supported in building relevant competency? | * Favors action-based and experiential learning over traditional training. * Training is effective for onboarding, procedures, and compliance-related information. * Skill development depends on recruitment; strengthening ToRs helps ensure better candidate fit—IFAD11 ToRs were too generic. * Building mixed teams and strong regional leadership is now a priority to better address evolving needs. | |
+| 10. SB: Impact of reassignment on capacity to perform job duties. | * Reassignment and decentralization occurred simultaneously, creating complications in implementation. * Organization learned not to overburden a limited staff pool with multiple workstreams. * Career mobility is beneficial, but the process was overly intensive and not fully aligned with skills and needs. * The system aims to support career growth and make staffing more demand-driven rather than supply-pushed. * Lack of structured handover in IFAD11 created challenges; future cycles aim to address this. * Staff are preparing early for the next reassignment cycle, including taking external courses to build relevant skills. * The first reassignment in 2018 was difficult due to unclear procedures; IFAD11 saw improvements but remained challenging. * Lessons learned include the need for better planning, clear career incentives, and recognition that not all staff can fit any role. * Delivery was maintained thanks to staff commitment, despite panic during the last reassignment. * Mobility was implemented with minimal disruption by reassigning staff within the same duty stations, though this can concentrate impacts within single divisions. | |
+| 11. SB: Impact of vacancies on staff workload, work-life balance, and ability to meet commitments/targets. | * In the last two years, staffing issues have been less problematic; more significant during IFAD11. * Vacancy pool funds enabled temporary staff hires, helping fill director and program officer roles and close divisional gaps. * Decentralization influenced staffing decisions—emphasized that structural changes shouldn't be based solely on vacancies. * However, changes often occur only once a vacancy arises, which delays the filling process until a decision is made. | |
+| 12. BC: Were budget shifts needed across the countries during each of the 3-year cycles? | * Changes made between IFAD11 and IFAD12, with aspirations for cost-based budgeting; however, still mainly driven by design and supervision needs from DCO contexts. * Budgeting loosely tied to project design averages by country; funds remain in generic budget lines and often can't be reallocated when designs are cancelled. * Growing ambitions face reduced budgets; policy engagement efforts rely heavily on grant funding, used to meet minimum targets; unclear budgeting logic for PS phase, with a shift toward budgeting based on overall financing volume and oversight needs. * Stronger focus on engaging fragile countries, with some budget flexibility (e.g., requesting extra funds for higher-cost conflict assessments tied to commitments). | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Operations & Rural Finance Projects: Co-financing is required to scale impact, and conflict mitigation efforts address resource-driven conflicts by improving access to water and fodder (mainly in Pastoralist communities). There is no current rural finance program due to the lack of appropriate financial tools for pastoral areas. Rural finance projects face challenges with sharia-compliant loans, as no credit lines are currently available for such financing. Efforts are underway to integrate sharia-compliant funding into regular financing mechanisms, aiming to reduce reliance on grants and concessional funding while meeting local needs. | | |
+| ESA Co-Financing: ESA has actively engaged in co-financing, collaborating with multilateral and bilateral organizations to mobilize resources. Despite limited IFAD grant envelopes, ESA has successfully attracted international co-financing, especially for public and private sector projects. Co-designing initiatives with partners like the Green Climate Fund enhances project design and implementation. | | |
+| Target Setting: The cascading system for target allocation remains a work in progress, with challenges arising from government pushback and lack of standardized frameworks. Resource allocations are tied to regional targets based on the ability to mobilize resources. | | |
+| Organizational Change: IFAD’s decentralization and reassignment processes have faced challenges, particularly around staffing and career mobility. While mobility is beneficial, it has been difficult to align skills and needs, leading to overburdened staff. | | |
+| Budget: Funds remain in generic lines and often cannot be reallocated when project designs are canceled. There is a growing focus on engaging fragile countries, with some flexibility in budgeting to address higher-cost assessments tied to specific commitments. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

_backend/data/meeting_minutes_data/2025-04-28_StellaAtela_Director_PCD_CLE.md

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 28 April 2025, Stella Atela, Director, PCD | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Stella Atela** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Director, PCD** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **28 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Federica, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of SA: | * Joined July 2024 in the middle of recalibration. | |
+| 2. SB: Impact of recalibration on the team? How did it impact the ability to meet replenishment commitments? | * Made a positive impact, with the opportunity to review and align the PCD structure with recalibration. * Perception of PCD not offering sufficient business services; focus was more on operational rather than strategic/corporate needs. * High vacancy rate required boosting hiring, which was reactive rather than proactive. * HR business partners were needed in the field; decentralization has helped address this. * Focus on addressing pain points related to the quality of services. | |
+| 3. SB: Role of HR in Recalibration | * SA took over the remaining tasks as the implementer, ensuring initiatives align with the organization and consider affected people. * Focus on the practicality of people processes. * Currently working closely with divisions to implement the recommended/improved structure. * Collaborating with directors to ensure efficient workflow. | |
+| 4. SB: What is your role facilitating the microstructure process during recalibration? | * Three phases: design, implement, and optimize. * Macro structure was clear, but many department and team leads were new (either recently hired or newly created teams). * PCD’s basic role is to ensure incoming directors understand the rationale behind restructuring, answer questions, own the decisions, and figure out how to move forward. * Leaders are responsible for putting together the resourcing plan. * The structure is still being put in place and is not yet complete. * Focus on reporting lines and establishing effective ways of working between teams, with varying levels of support. * The high-level structure was defined, but optimization is left to lower-level divisions. | |
+| 5. SB: What was the role of HR during the change management and staff engagement process? | * Design phase was before SA arrived. * The communication was laid out by OPB. * Role of HR was to make sure communication happened. Providing clarity on why we’re restructuring, what to expect when, etc. | |
+| 6. Impact of vacancy rate on work-life balance and workload allocation? | * Recruitment staff are sourced from consultants and temporary staff, supervised by P3. * Vacancy rate (16.34%) was highlighted by the President; it's meant to measure organizational efficiency but isn't a suitable metric to analyze during reorganization. * In 2024, 121 regular positions and 10 supplementary fund positions were recruited. * Vacancy rate reduced to 12% by the end of 2024, currently at 10.78%. * Aiming for lower vacancy rates but targeting turnaround time between role opening and filling. Moving toward a proactive recruitment approach to minimize workload impact on colleagues. * High vacancy rates lead to reliance on short-term staff (consultants/temporary), which should be accounted for when measuring vacancies. | |
+| 7. SB: Role of SA’s team in determining the right number of staff to take on a defined workload? | * Shared role between HR and POB: POB handles organizational structure, while HR focuses on determining the optimal structure. * No information has been found to determine the optimal organization by headcount; only the structure has been examined. * OPV is focused on strategy and workforce planning. * HR aims to assess the pipeline, identify strengths, and determine how to provide support. | |
+| 8. SB: Impacts on performance management process for lacking capacity on operational teams to achieve targets/commitments. | * There may be a disconnect between divisional and corporate goals, possibly due to too many activities that align with corporate priorities. * Opportunity to streamline divisional contributions for clearer alignment with corporate priorities, and potentially re-define corporate priorities to better reflect desired outcomes. * PCD aims to ensure clear understanding and alignment with priorities, with an opportunity to streamline the department’s activities as well. * For 2026, the focus is on achieving streamlined clarity. | |
+| 9. SB: What is the HR/PCD role in augmenting skills development and career pathing to ensure the investment you make in training translates to competence and facilitates impact? | * Volume of training is not translating to competence; training should be directly linked to role needs and provide opportunities to apply learned skills. * Need to improve in identifying gaps and determining the best ways to close them (e.g., skills, goals) to fully deliver on position commitments. * This is an area they aim to develop moving forward. | |
+| 10. HK: What other KPIs does HR contribute to under efficiency? | * Focus is on reducing the time a position remains vacant, though it's not an active KPI. * Encouraging the team to track the time from vacancy announcement to filling. * Goal is to fill positions within 1-3 months, which is considered ambitious in the current context. | |
+| 11. HK: Further comments? | * Look at the ways to optimize the current ways we’re delivering HR resources. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Recalibration & Structure: The PCD structure is still being optimized at lower levels, with many new departments leads. The restructuring process is ongoing, and PCD’s role is to ensure new directors understand the rationale and take ownership of decisions. | | |
+| Vacancy: High vacancy rates have been an ineffective measure of organizational efficiency during the reorganization. Efforts are now focused on reducing vacancy turnaround time, minimizing the workload impact on colleagues, and addressing the reliance on temporary staff. | | |
+| Staff Training & Competence: Despite significant training efforts, competence has not improved, as training isn’t always aligned with specific role needs. Addressing skill gaps and providing opportunities to apply learned skills is a key focus. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| HR delivery document – unclear which study this references | | Stella Atela |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 29 April 2025, Alberto Cogliati, Former Chief Risk Officer | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Alberto Cogliati** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Former Chief Risk Officer – RMO** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **29 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. MF: Were you disappointed when Chief Risk Officer role moved down from ABP level? | * President's decision was disappointing but acknowledged as his choice. * Topic was discussed directly with him. * Decision stemmed largely from IFAD’s broader restructuring plan. | |
+| 2. MF: When you were there, the issue of MDBs doing more with capital were discussed. IFAD hasn’t focused on it. Did you ever push for bigger limits? Because the bigger limits are feasible under the framework. | * To assess IFAD’s alignment with G20 recommendations, understand its evolution over the past 5–6 years. * Significant risk management progress made; risk culture development lagged. * Progress isn’t linear—requires organizational buy-in. * IFAD built a solid, scalable framework—not a perfect system—tailored for its unique structure. * G20 recommendations are bank-focused; IFAD is a financial institution with different constraints. * IFAD faced capability gaps; chose a cautious approach, aligned with advice from rating agencies. * Member countries hesitant about leveraging; institutional caution shaped by external funding reliance. * Broader context of IFAD's development explains its more gradual pace compared to others. | |
+| 3. HK: Board members weren’t convinced on leveraging. What argument did you give them as to why we should? | * EB members rotate frequently, affecting continuity. * IFAD began as a pure concessional fund and evolved gradually, especially after receiving a credit rating. * Leverage development tied to political dynamics and cautious member country input. * Institutional mindset shift needed due to IFAD’s transformation. * Concerns around lending and leveraging, particularly in fragile states, shaped decisions. * IFAD’s political nature required inclusive frameworks—couldn’t favor only high-rated borrowers. * BRAM created to balance needs: fragile states received more concessional funds; others accessed ordinary terms. | |
+| 4. MF: Rating agency discussions; did the agency set the leverage of 0.3 or 0.5? Did you discuss with them what the max rating possible if you wanted to keep the double A+ rating? | * Team developed a system to identify leverage levels that maintained at least an AA+ rating. * Complexity came from factoring in fragile contexts and how rating agencies would assess them. * Established leverage ratios aligned with rating agency expectations and IFAD’s realities. * Adopted a cautious strategy aiming for AA+ rating. * Development agencies endorsed the approach as prudent and secure. | |
+| 5. MF: BRAM loans are demand driven. Türkiye case. | * No risk concerns if additional financing is provided under BRAM’s framework. * Financing requires both demand and eligibility—countries must be entitled to request and receive support. * Political decisions influence allocation; not solely under Risk Management Office’s (RMO) authority. * Additional resources intended for countries most in need. * No recollection of the Türkiye case. | |
+| 6. MF: Target rating for BRAM? Who sets the target? | * Rating agencies assess but do not dictate or implement policies. * BB rating involves straightforward calculation based on ordinary loan portfolio and preferred creditor status. * Helps determine safe expansion limits for ordinary lending. * Ensures leveraging won’t compromise overall credit rating. | |
+| 7. MISSED Q | * Rating agencies don’t provide directives; IFAD presents plans, and agencies respond with approval or concerns. * Their role is evaluative, not advisory. * Credit rating assessments are robust and based on IFAD’s disclosed intentions and frameworks. | |
+| 8. MF: How was limit of BRAM loans set? | * Borrowing capacity partly depends on how much replenishment funding can support ordinary lending. * Finance and Risk teams determined an amount to ensure adequate backing for lending activities. * Calculations were aligned with the targeted credit rating. * Also factored in projected borrowing demand. * Detailed methodologies and documentation from 2021 are available for technical review. | |
+| 9. HK: Further comments? | * Criticism of the approach of ticking boxes without fully understanding the consequences or rationale of IFAD/Risk processes. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Risk culture development remains uneven. Progress has been technical, not behavioral, with limited organization-wide buy-in. Sustained change requires embedding risk awareness beyond systems into staff behavior and decision-making. | | |
+| G20 recommendations, designed for banks, don’t fully align with IFAD’s hybrid model. Rating agencies assess IFAD’s frameworks but don’t direct them, supporting a cautious strategy aimed at maintaining an AA+ rating. IFAD’s approach reflects a balance between ambition and risk containment. | | |
+| Lending decisions are influenced more by geopolitical concerns than risk assessments. This limits the autonomy of technical units and reinforces institutional caution. | | |
+| Misunderstandings persist among board members around lending frameworks and ratings, despite available documentation. Some reforms are seen as box-ticking rather than substantive improvements. Better communication and training are needed to bridge technical and political divides. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+|  | |  |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 29 April 2025, Edward Gallagher and Francesco Ranalletta, Budget, POB | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Edward Gallagher, Francesco Ranalletta** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **EG: Director, Budget, POB**  **FR: Senior Budget Specialist, POB** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **29 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Barun, Hannah, Hansdeep, Federica** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. BC: Is there an adequate strategic guidance on budget? If not, how would you improve it? | * Working to improve the guidance departments receive, with a focus on aligning ADPs and budget preparations. * For 2025, a cascade of corporate objectives will be broken down into departmental and divisional objectives. For 2026, medium-term outcomes are being developed, with the aim for teams to have their work plans ready by the end of 2025. * Efforts are being made to streamline and improve the cascade process, ensuring alignment with strategic goals. * Aiming for a results-focused approach similar to the World Bank, moving away from incremental budgeting. * Encouraging teams to define specific outputs to be achieved with their allocated budget. * Emphasizing that without clear outputs, funding will not be provided. Work plans must align with IFAD's core commitments and focus on results. * Preparing a document for the VP to review, which may also be shared with IOE, outlining these plans and strategies. | |
+| 2. BC: Do you see 2026 cycle starting with strategic direction from the top which we’ve identified to the AVPs of the things we want to focus on (regarding budget)? | * Developed four corporate objectives, aiming to convert 4-5 items into medium-term outcomes for corporate level, ensuring alignment with the president’s expectations. * Wants to move towards a 3-year budgeting cycle, breaking down each replenishment into 3-year plans with corresponding work plans. * Focus on delivering the work program with emphasis on fragility, private sector, and disability. * For the 2025 budget, no increase outside these focus areas, with a linear link in the initial budget phase. * Everything should align with the 3-year IFAD cycle and the strategic framework, with a cascading framework from there. * Limit focus to a subset of strategic indicators, given the overwhelming number of indicators and commitments. * Wants to track progress against 4-5 key indicators outlined in the replenishment paper. * Improving but needs better alignment between budget design, spending, and mapping it to the year pipeline for future projections. | |
+| 3. BC: Without supplementary funds, IFAD could not have met their commitments. What are your views on adequacy of budget to meet the commitments? Is IFAD taking on too many things? Given available budget, how do/will you know that departments are distributing their regular budget allocations to align with the commitments and targets? (Focus on DCO) | * Additional positions for nutrition would require cuts elsewhere in the organization. * Decentralization commitments were written into IFAD 12 paper, but the process was more costly than anticipated. * Decentralization challenges with EB: The increase in offices was met with resistance, but it was necessary for IFAD's transformation despite the high costs. * Affordability issues: Due to IFAD's small size, there is a limitation in accessing resources compared to other institutions, especially under a zero-real growth model. * Use of all available resources is crucial. Cross-fertilization of funding has helped achieve replenishment goals. * Concern over reliance on supplementary funding for positions: Core funding needs to support essential roles. * Once decentralization steps are taken, it's difficult to cut back. Mainstreaming themes complicate this during EB discussions. * "Zero isn't going away" – need to find ways to balance new commitments with fiscal constraints. * Decentralization is seen as a necessary means to enhance results despite added stress. * Article 2 of IFAD's founding document is key for understanding the fund’s objectives from a financing perspective. | |
+| 4. BC: IFAD has moved into youth, gender. Is this mission drift? | * If we cannot prove or lack data showing that investing in women in Africa is increasing results or value, we should reconsider our approach. * There is likely data available, but we need to start using more strategic language, such as: "Invest in people we believe will enhance the results" or "Target specific demographics to maximize results and impact." | |
+| 5. HK: Political economy – to what extent does presentation of data influence EB decision-making? | * The importance of evidence-based discussions with the board is increasing moving forward. * Demonstrations and evidence have shown it is possible to educate the board effectively. * Example: Should the focus on climate continue, given that IFAD 13 already includes climate as a key commitment? * Data strengthens discussions and makes them more robust. * In the past, outcomes have not been sufficiently clear or measurable. * Observes no significant absorption of funds. * No supplementary funds have been allocated to nutrition; all requirements have been covered by the main budget. * Logical assumption: If a requirement is funded from the budget, it suggests the budget is sufficient; the claim that funds were inadequate does not hold. * For the 2022-2024 budgets, mainstreaming themes have been prioritized, though the effectiveness of these priorities remains uncertain. | |
+| 6. BC: Is IFAD taking on too much to do things it doesn’t have the money for? (And the lack of system for costing these commitments). Would replenishment consultations be better informed with a costing system? | * The conversation with the EB highlighted the challenge of being required to do more without receiving additional funding. * It was not feasible to cost things within IFAD 12 due to the lack of appetite for the time and effort involved. * There is a need for more resources, but the board is unwilling to allocate additional funds, creating a dilemma of where to cut without compromising commitments. * The UK proposed cutting SKD two years ago, citing its size as a concern. * Solving this issue may be difficult without internal consequences; it would be helpful to clearly communicate the need for increased resources in specific areas, along with necessary cuts in others, during EB meetings. | |
+| 7. BC: Why is there no scope for budget increases? Is it because IFAD doesn’t cover its costs? If IFAD cover costs out of income, would budget increases be easier? | * IFAD is forced to adopt a zero-based budgeting approach for 2026, earlier than expected, due to feedback from EB countries. * There is no direct link between income and costs in budget discussions; this disconnect complicates budget increases. * The private sector is seen as a potential solution to reduce the administrative burden on the main budget, but this raises concerns about mission drift and impacts on IFAD's credit rating. * The demand for BRAM loans is uncertain, as they are costly and currently focus on specific countries; the long-term need for these loans will unfold over time. | |
+| 8. BC: How would you know if BRAM are paying for their costs? | * The costing mechanism is based on the best available data. | |
+| 9. BC: In IFAD 13 replenishment consultations, fund will ensure its fit-for-purpose for work aligned with budget resources. What speaks to you there in shaping your department’s priorities coming out of the IFAD 13 consultations? | * Focus on returning to the core mandate and back to basics. * Emphasis on achieving tangible results and ensuring the impact on rural poor populations is maximized. * Desire for clarity on how funds are spent and how much goes toward impacting the rural poor. * Internal consistency is key: 3-year annual budgets should align with IFAD 13 paper commitments without reinventing the process. * Concern about the gap between the promise of increased admin resources in replenishment papers and the reality in budget allocations. * Issue with excessive indicators; advocates for focusing on 4-5 key impact indicators for better management and review. | |
+| 10. BC: Do you see any areas where you can achieve greater flexibility? | * ORMS database tracks anticipated beneficiaries 7-10 years out, aligning with results-based budgeting. * Prefers cost forecasting over timesheets, like other IFIs, to improve cost allocation. * The dissolution of PDFF reduced carry-forward from 6% to 3%, but aiming for greater flexibility in forecasting and cost management. * The vacancy pool is valuable for enhancing the pipeline, ensuring unused funds are redirected to maintain project flow. * Ensuring allocated design funds are spent appropriately and not reallocated to other phases without proper justification. * The 2023 budget introduced reclassification of direct and indirect costs, with a focus on exploring a three-year cycle for better financial tracking. * There’s a push to shift design and supervision costs to grants instead of using the main budget, to ensure project-specific costs are appropriately charged. | |
+| 11. SB: How does IFAD determine how many staff it needs to deliver the replenishment commitments? | * Constant issue in IFAD (2018/19), discussed in senior management, but no tangible solution was found; McKinsey study was commissioned. * After the study, discussions with AVPs began to address budget and capacity gaps. * Over a couple of years, staff positions increased, and an internal dynamic workforce committee was established for annual gap assessments. * Gaps still exist in private sector and nutrition expertise. * Last year, the gap was in SECAP on the operational side, which was targeted for filling. * Fieldwork has increased demand for technical services and skills from governments. | |
+| 12. SB: Are the mainstream themes unfunded mandates? | * Study was sent to each department head for review. * Previous restructuring resulted in 50 new positions, with a net loss of 1. * The number of staff positions has significantly increased. * As a donor, there is an assumption that cuts can always be made to meet donor requirements. * Work-life balance improves after leaving IFAD. * It would be beneficial if the EB could relinquish some control, as they did during decentralization. * To accommodate additional mainstreaming tasks, there needs to be a conversation about the associated costs. | |
+| 13. SB: Recalibration | * Hired a project manager to handle content and time planning, with external support for agenda setting and structure. * Proper project management and clear roles between project manager and implementers were key. * Town halls held to gather feedback and communicate changes to each department. * Initial structural changes appeared small but involved significant personnel movement. * Detailed, technical groups were formed to manage the specifics and ensure operations continued smoothly. * From a project perspective, the approach worked well compared to similar projects, with ample opportunities for feedback and communication. | |
+| 14. SB: What is your response that opinions were not taken into consideration during recalibration? | * Not all feedback can be incorporated during the design phase. * Significant effort was made to explain the final design and its rationale. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Draft POB guidance on linking departmental work plans to corporate and departmental objectives for the 2026 budget planning process. | | Edward Gallagher |
+| 2012 paper prepared by Ed on options to increase flexibility in budgeting for core service delivery (project deign, implementation and support). | | Edward Gallagher |
+| Paper prepared by Ed on dissolution of PDFF and the options for its replacement (need to clarify if this is the same paper as #2 above). | | Edward Gallagher |
+
+|  |  |

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+|  |  |
+| --- | --- |
+| 29 April 2025, Executive Board – List A | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Canada, Norway, Italy, Germany, Austria, United States, France, Switzerland, Netherlands, United Kingdom.** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Executive Board** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **29 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Marcus, Barun, Hannah, Anoop, Mona, Tianlin, Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Should IFAD aim to help closing the gap which implies increasing its activities or should IFAD focus its limited resources to existing/established activities? | **Canada**: dilemma between growth or focus is not new. Message was clear across the board with some nuance; IFAD to strike balance to have ambition while remaining in its own needs. Canada is supportive of the ambition of the two previous cycles. Looking forward, quality has to be prioritized over quantity – facing a new global context with funding. IFAD went through some different reforms (business model, restructure, etc.) wants to see some stock take, learning lessons. Also recalling the challenges of the previous cycles where the ratings happened in the last part of the cycle. Co-financing: important and recognizes this, all types. Helps IFAD to achieve and max impact but in previous RIDE reports there were declines in projects with high levels of co-financing; better understand why there is this inverse correlation to further expand resource mobilization.  **Germany**: At the end of the day, it’s nice to look at financing gaps and to know if these numbers are substantial enough. IFAD is limited by core financing; by going to the credit rating and capital markets, but limits linked to risk and to the credit rating. Surprising if there’s a huge increase just because we want more; it’s a challenging time for many countries with money challenges. Needs to be realistic with how much you can fill this gap. Supplementary financing – don’t want an org driven by this, want it done by co-financing.  **Norway**: Norway is one of the strongest partners, need more volume to reach G1 and 2. IFAD must increase leverage and efficiency when national resources are going internally now in global context. Improved governance and fair, progressive taxation for all. Good governance is essential with a financial framework. National resource mobilization is key…how is IFAD dealing with this in operations.  **Italy**: The financing gap estimates are varied but the order of magnitude is such that we have to be realistic that IFAD is no way able to fill this level of financing gap. IFAD is a niche institution, but this doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have the ambition to grow. For financing, the overall of IFAD financial architecture took effect in IFAD 12 – CLE could assess the difference in impact between the two cycles. IFAD 11 was traditional architectures (core resources), IFAD 12 allowed increasing leverage from core resources and reflows; useful to assess what to do in IFAD 14. Focus on doing well what IFAD is doing, not exclude the growth, depending on the availability of resources from donors.  **Austria**: Sees IFAD as a specialized institution that focuses on comparative advantages (niche) and IFAD is about quality and not volume. Can strike the right balance. Partnership with RMAs and other MDBs is important. Financial sustainability is also important.  **Netherlands**: Not sure it’s fair to measure the gap because there’s also critiques that there’s too much with too little focus; not just doing smallholder development but the question points to this gap. Conclusion is that IFAD should not continue to grow because it spreads HR too thin.  Switzerland: Stay in the niche, but growth can be different things, and a big financing gap can be addressed in several ways. Important for IFAD to look at new partnerships with small banks to grow in those directions (account for 2/3 of agricultural financing). Grow while staying in its niche.  **USA**: Questionable financing gap – secretary gave speech: fund and bank serve a critical role in the system, but mission creep has struggled to stay in the lane of the mission. Limited capacity to address financing needs, should be focused on delivering on its mandate, playing role on architecture effectively (for the countries who are most poor). Focus on quality over volume. Continue to leverage participation, leadership, and institutions to push them to deliver their core mandates effectively and efficiently. Important to take lessons learned from IFAD 12 and should inform stuff going forward. Irrespective on how finance gap is calculated, its evident the PS will be present in an important part of accelerating productivity and financial growth in agriculture. | |
+| 1. Do you believe that lending larger volumes to poor smallholder farmers in UMICs can lead to mission drift for IFAD?  (Second potential question and if such lending can be done without impacting IFAD's lending to LICs and LMICs?) | **Norway**: Believes 100% core resources should be used in LIC and LMICs however if lending to UMICs will increase the portfolio, should be considered.  **Italy**: Doesn’t think lending to UMICs will erode lending to LIC/LMICs. While it’s not to be interpreted as mission drift, the phenomenon shouldn’t be brought to a large magnitude to avoid the possible shortcomings. Lending to UMICs should be taken into consideration for the positive financial impact for IFAD’s balance sheet.  **Switzerland**: Can have pos effect in balance sheets and peer learning. Good to utilize funding with SSTC projects. Question is how much structural resources are needed for these resources? The costing of this evaluation could help understand this.  **Netherlands**: Agrees with Norway. Favor of BRAM for UMICs but want to see it on the base of full cost recovery – currently eats into the capacity of IFAD.  **Austria**: Agrees w NDL and Norway. | |
+| 1. How important are private sector lending (NSO lending) activities for the Board, should they become a significant part of IFAD's activities or stay small? | **Canada**: Recognizes important of PS engagement. Similar to growth, it’s the lessons learned. Advise for a gradual approach. Monitor internal capacities as it comes up.  **Norway**: Should be considered by IFAD if it will increase impact for rural sector.  **Italy**: shares POV as Canada.  **Switzerland**: Recognizes the value of PS engagement in IFAD’s mission. Pushed for it in the past. Extent to which NSO should grow depends on the ability to enhance IFAD’s impact without diverting the resources from its primary mission.  **Netherlands**: As long as IFAD uses its niche, and sovereign and NSO can be complementary. Doesn’t want IFAD to be another bank, the project/programs in the PS should be in the framework of the sovereign ops where these ops reduce the risk.  **Austria**: Agrees with Norway and NDL. Sees role of PS, more of challenge to manage expectations and depict clearly what is possible for IFAD. Should remain where comparative advantage is. | |
+| 1. Do you believe that IFAD should implement a costing methodology to provide EB members with the costs of delivering each commitment, in order to inform the replenishment consultations? | **Norway**: Seems to be a good idea, IFAD should consider. Wants to know if there are arguments for not doing it.  **Germany**: discussions on this – reminded management that they want this and look forward to seeing these links. For methodology, adds to the insight. Anything that makes the lessons in the past years with increases in budget from decentralization, it wasn’t clear to all members when they subscribed to the process, what costs in the budget were implicated during the decentral process. It needs a methodology and transparency. Have asked for budget documents previously, but certain items weren’t available for EB members to know where the resources are going.  **USA**: Important to weigh both sides, why wouldn’t it be useful and what costs? IFAD deploys through financial resources but that’s not the sole means it delivers impact. It needs to continue to deliver and do it at a greater impact, some of it by policy impacts. The org should be held accountable to this.  **Canada**: Welcomes more information on incremental costs to better inform decisions on replenishment. For return to zero growth in 2026, this is what they’ll monitor closely soon. Having a smart/transparent budget, made progress, but on staff costs there’s an area of improvement with transparency.  **Netherlands**: Clear that all kinds of additional demands by donors have a cost attached. More insights on costs would be useful. View could be rough guesstimates; costly to develop a whole system.  **UK**: Would be good to hear how other IFIs so this to ensure IFAD takes on board good practice from other IFI replenishment processes. | |
+| 1. How are staffing requirements (headcounts, skills sets, etc.) considered by the Executive Board when the replenishment commitments, specifically related to increasing targets and including new thematic areas, are agreed? 2. What factors are explored by the Executive Board when it considers the organisational restructuring initiatives and the potential impact on the ability of IFAD to meet its replenishment commitments? | **Netherlands**: Should do a better job here. Usually, the board hasn’t realized enough what it takes with all the demands; don’t attach several staff to it. Other evaluations show number of staff is critical, and this is where we should improve to know how much staffing is required (i.e. more staffing needed in fragile contexts).  **Germany**: It is an important factor of the quality of IFAD’s work. Becomes important regarding new replenishment cycle starting and major restructuring and have adjustments to be made. Reflects budget outlays. Sometimes areas you’re overworked, you get a feeling that not everything is always in order, and the difficulties is they don’t want to micromanage, but this needs certain information on the interpretation of HR policy (vacancy problems and strategies, hurting the most, costs and benefits). How does reorganization/recalibration affect IFAD’s abilities?  **Norway**: It is natural to leave it up to IFAD to optimize operations. But there’s concern over diminishing core resources as a result.  **Canada**: Limit to the information that could be anticipated or estimated. More can be helpful; lessons learned for EB on demanding wider impact without increasing contributions. Signal to be more careful and look at this aspect more closely; keep in mind not to stretch the staff too thin. On recalibration, Canada agrees with Germany, to use more monitoring to measure impact of these issues. | |
+| 1. From the Board’s perspective, how well has IFAD delivered on its operational commitments under IFAD11 and IFAD12—particularly in fragile and climate-vulnerable contexts where risks to delivery and inclusion are highest? 2. How effective has the integration of mainstreaming themes—gender, climate, nutrition, and youth—into operations been in the view of the Board, and what could be improved to ensure these themes are implemented, not just included in design documents? | **USA**: Importance of focusing on the core mandate and avoiding mission creep; concerned now can distract institutions like IFAD from fulfilling their mandate. With gender, for example, administration is focusing on creating equal opportunity and fostering an environment for that. While it is appropriate for an institution to focus on the rural poor, fundamentally important for IFAD to focus on these and not serve political ideologies that don’t serve the institution.  **Norway**: IFAD should maintain mainstreaming themes in gender, youth, and nutrition. Essential to fight poverty.  **Austria**: Supports Norway. Successful mainstreaming themes depends on when the themes are integrated into project design, it’s not coming it at the end of the implementation. Gender, youth, climate need to be included. Gender, not only for design but for the transformational approach and should continue to target.  **Canada**: Should have cross-cutting themes; learned from previous cycles. Integration of these themes improve the quality of programming. With performance over previous cycles, would expect ratings improve over the course. MOPAN assessment: noted increasing selectivity in programs that should be improved (improving partnerships to have greater buy-in at country level).  **Netherlands**: All about government ownership – cross-cutting issues work well with this. And can improve overall impact. Starts with dialogue with the government, if govt doesn’t want it, we should have frank discussions on it.  **Germany**: Mainstreaming themes need to be monitored and brought in early in the process; very important for Germany. Fragility- performance at design and performance at ratings. Importance for board members to understand the reporting and overall performance of IFAD and governments.  **France**: Welcomed the focus on climate and wants targets to be maintained in these themes (gender, nutrition, youth). Nutrition is a priority and could have a better way to evaluate and monitor these initiatives, so they impact.  **UK**: Supportive of mainstreaming themes. Well-identified reflecting in what needs to be a holistic approach in operations. Linked to targeted and differentiated approaches in varying countries. Effectiveness of the themes: at one point are mainstreaming themes actually mainstream if we have to separate them out there? Nutrition is one are lagging behind (look into why) and therefore what needs to be done to address their more effectively). Youth, not sure how effective this has been; haven’t had the same level of reporting back of results.  **Switzerland**: Just to stress that we very much support the mainstreaming of the themes as said by many others before - UK made most points, just to add that coherence between ambitions and capacities, competences and resources are ensured. Nutrition performance has been quite unsatisfactory. Needs to be conscious of the resources IFAD has when putting increasing number of targets. | |
+| 1. What role do you see for the Executive Board in helping IFAD strengthen its operational delivery - through oversight, policy direction, or engagement on results- and how can accountability systems be enhanced to better support this role? | **UK:** Look at how projects are implemented. See the approval but don’t get to see the implementation. Also, effectiveness lag, and wants more oversight to see the time gaps. Dashboards are helpful and could be replicated more. On results, needs to keep looking at them (have RIDE). Moving away from having specific targets but needs a sense of what good looks like, how do we get a sense if IFAD achieves what it sets out to do or not.  **Netherlands**: cross-cutting issues are important because potentially increase impact of projects/programs, but also increase complexity of the programs. Requires monitoring with support of the government. Close monitoring is required and depends on the PMUs. PMUs should be strong enough and if not, IFAD should support and do regular monitoring. Transparency here would be nice (monitoring reports online from PMUs).  **Switzerland**: Needs to have basic availability of resources in PMUs and competency for the PMUs to enhance things.  **Germany**: Some of the lessons discussed that you have more regular interaction of these questions throughout the year. Sometimes they are overloaded with 3 major reports that come at the same time and then there is a big whole. Never have enough time to do everything. Helpful more consecutive evaluations than a bunch at once (even COSOPs want to be brought to the board for approval because they might be losing sight at the country level). | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| **Barun**  1. Some Board members would welcome information - even if it is ballpark - on the costs of various commitments during replenishment consultations as it would provide an insight currently missing.  2. Other EB members wanted an assessment of the benefits and costs of implementing a costing system and wanted to know the arguments against having such a system as well as the practices of other IFIs.  3.  There was a stark (and fully expected) divide on mainstreaming themes between the European chairs and the U.S. representative - a clear signal (I believe) of issues that will come to the fore in the IFAD14 consultations. | | |
+| **Sally**   1. There is some awareness that an understanding of the staffing requirements linked to the replenishment commitments warrants consideration - even if some members felt this was IFAD's responsibility to resolve. 2. There is a sensitivity towards the extent to which staff are stretched in meeting the various requirements and a consciousness that the EB should monitor this. 3. There is a sense that IFAD would benefit from a period of stability relating to organizational changes and that the impact of the most recent changes needs to be evaluated to determine their impact. | | |
+| **Marcus**  1. No one seemed to say that IFAD should remain small. Whilst remaining niche and focused IFAD should nonetheless aim to maximize impact by leveraging or by bringing in more co-financing.  2.  Helping LICs and LMICs should remain the focus but lending more to UMICs would not necessarily be considered mission drift.  3.  Growing the private sector lending operations is viewed positively. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
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+| 30 April 2025, Executive Board – List B/C | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Cameroon, Venezuela, Algeria** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Executive Board** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **30 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus, Sally, Barun, James, Hansdeep, Tianlin, Mona, Hannah** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Should IFAD aim to help closing the gap which implies increasing its activities or should IFAD focus its limited resources to existing/established activities? | **Mexico**: Difficult for IFAD to completely cover financing gaps. IFAD should continue its activities and enhance its impact through its programs.  **Brazil**: Very difficult to close the gap. Should continue to rely on other partners (MDBs). IFAD should focus on its activities and efficiency and rely on co-financing with MDBs. Keep doing what we’re doing. Very new for IFAD with relationship to the national development bank. Good partnership that IFAD should rely on. | |
+| 1. Do you believe that lending larger volumes to poor smallholder farmers in UMICs can lead to mission drift for IFAD?  (Second potential question and if such lending can be done without impacting IFAD's lending to LICs and LMICs?) | **Brazil**: DO not see that lending to poor smallholder farmers in UMICs does not compromise IFADs mission. Emphasize the critical role UMICs play in the sustainability of IFAD and the lending portfolio. Impact on credit rating. Can access the market on more favorable conditions. Lending to small farmers in UMICs shouldn’t be seen as a mission drift. Supports lending to these farmers and pursuing in partnership with other national dev. Banks and other co-financing partners.  **Cameroon**: Confused by the question. The loans are just towards UMICs to serve small farmers. Doesn’t know how to handle it. Loans to countries and not farmers directly. Does IFAD even have the money to give a loan to a UMIC country. Concerns over big or smallholder farmers and if the money that is delegated to a richer country is truly earmarked for the poorest of the poor.  **Mexico**: Agree with Brazil. Important to highlight IFAD’s principle of universality regardless of where the poverty is located, it would be mission drift to not include them. Financial tools take into account and should be balanced. Financial health needs to be safeguarded in its lending and lending to UMICs is an important part of this health. IFAD maintains universal elements and focusing on impact and also the financial health to meeting necessary financial commitments. | |
+| 1. How important are private sector lending (NSO lending) activities for the Board, should they become a significant part of IFAD's activities or stay small? | **Brazil**: Recognize the role PS engagement plays in the investment gap. Can help mobilize resources and NSOs can be a valuable instrument to catalyze finances, but only when it can be done with the purpose to scale-up aligned with IFAD’s mandate and leads to inclusive outcomes. However, with IFAD’s focus on the most focused groups, NSO activities should be done cautiously and remain a complementary tool within IFAD’s broader toolkit.  **Mexico**: Current international environment requires it, and the strategy 2025-2030 calls for PS. Important that PS contributes to IFAD’s work and minimize risk. Crucial to remain credit rating during this process. | |
+| 1. Do you believe that IFAD should implement a costing methodology to provide EB members with the costs of delivering each commitment, in order to inform the replenishment consultations? | **Brazil**: Beneficial for IFAD to implement this. Enhance transparency and allow EB understand the incremental costs and better inform decision-making and accountability. Other IFIs (WFP) have methodologies. IFAD’s cost structure depends on project location, \_\_\_. What’s to understand how complex it would be to develop the methodology and length of implementation if built?  **Mexico**: Questions the development and cost-complexity of it. Cost-benefit analysis for this; lacking information for an informed decision. If benefits are higher and represents a means of having better informed decisions in transparency and accountability measures, they’ll consider it but want more info.  **Cameroon**: Always has had costs so wants to know how processes have been done before. | |
+| 1. To what extent are the following two areas considered by the EB In the replenishment commitments, including their potential impact on the ability of IFAD to meet its replenishment commitments?    1. Staffing requirements (headcounts, skillsets, etc.)    2. Organizational Restructuring Initiatives | **Brazil**: Important to plan HR resources. Mainstreaming themes require financial resources but also the human resources to deliver.  **Mexico**: This has been improving but not taking every decision. We set targets and sometimes don’t know the costs but should be presented when the negotiation of the strategy is being discussed, not afterwards. Issues in negotiating the budget because there’s not enough money to deliver on the targets.  **Cameroon**: Small organization. No prospect for it to become mirrored what people have in their minds. The discussion on addressing staff issues and going about organizational restructuring…according to the fund that there is very little discussions about extension of IFAD. Doesn’t know really if we can answer properly this question. | |
+| 1. From the Board’s perspective, how effectively has IFAD delivered on its operational commitments under IFAD11 and IFAD12, and what could be done to further improve the delivery?    1. Integration of mainstreaming themes.    2. In fragile and climate-vulnerable contexts where risks to delivery and inclusion are the highest? | **Brazil**: Considering that IFAD has established a new unit to deal directly with fragile contexts and considering how projects operate in Brazil, for operations IFAD is effective in reaching targets and commitments. With RMF, there are documents they see regarding the mainstreaming themes, perception is that LAC lots of the results have been achieved. Nutrition is a difficult indicator to reach but in LAC overall, IFAD has done good work. The amount of resources aren’t big so sometimes the indicators don’t change which might be a problem.  **Mexico**: Perception of delivery is good but hard to measure delivery in terms of replenishment. Variance in success of projects. Changes in replenishment makes it hard to compare progress and identify factors some projects to do better than others. Sometimes results don’t depend solely on IFAD (government performance impacts). Government performances were not included in approach paper, but its relevant. Mainstreaming themes: have to be careful that importance of it will tire us in the design of projects that increases complexity, and the countries may not be able to deliver. Think about ways to balance introduction of mainstreaming with being able to have practice projects and problems that can be implemented. | |
+| 1. What role do you see for the Executive Board in helping IFAD strengthen its operational delivery - through oversight, policy direction, or engagement on results- and how can accountability systems be enhanced to better support this role? | **Brazil**: The board should continue to demand robust data and assure policies are aligned with IFAD’s mandates and commitments strategies are being met. Ensuring better integration between evaluation findings and operational changes to support a more transparent culture.  **Mexico**: EB has to adopt and recommend actions to ensure IFAD meets mandates. Accountability systems are key for progress that might require adjustments for policies and strategies. Data and reporting on progress made (and extraordinary reporting) on targets and expected results, to be able to reflect on the way forward.  **Cameroon**: The EB should continue to play its governance role. Very cautious to give another broad direction towards the way EB should perform their duties. The EB has a role and should continue to play it. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
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+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
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+| 30 April 2025, Jack Rossiter, Senior Technical Specialist, ASAP | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Jack Rossiter** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Senior Technical Specialist, ASAP Manager Environment & Climate** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **30 April 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Marcus and Hansdeep** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of ASAP | * ASAP initiated in 2012 with $316M in contributions, directly linked to PoLG, mainly for climate adaptation (almost 100%), with some allowance for mitigation activities. * Supported 44 projects (41 active) from 2012-2025. * ASAP II (2016): Smaller investment ($17M), focused on technical assistance instead of grants. * ASAP+ (2021) reverted to a grant facility, part of the Rural Resilience Program with $92M in contributions. 10% focused on technical assistance, 11 projects (most in inception or Year 1). * ASAP+ governed by an advisory committee (7 donors, meeting annually). * No additional commitment authority for ASAP+ resources; all $92M committed. Target for ASAP+ resource mobilization is $500M, with no set date. * Shifting from open UN contributions to targeting philanthropies and donors, with thematic and geographic earmarking. * Need for more flexible funding to engage with new donors; resource mobilization involves a mix of ERD and ASAP, led by JR. * ASAP falls under supplementary funds | |
+| 2. MF: Will the focus remain the same (i.e. climate change) for ASAP? Or change? | * Focus will remain on climate adaptation. * By Q4 2024, a new strategic approach for ASAP will be developed. * Impact areas expanded to include other strategic areas, like biodiversity, to attract donor contributions. * Plans to program new areas within ASAP. | |
+| 3. MF: The UK is a major donor? | * The UK hasn't contributed additional funds. * They provided a large amount to ASAP I but are reluctant to invest more in subsequent iterations. | |
+| 4. MF: Is it the same entities donating in each replenishment of ASAP? | * FCDO is being targeted for funding. * Uncertainty around DFRA's international engagement and how it aligns with funding goals. | |
+| 5. HK: Is the pressure on ASAP+ for delivering the climate focused targets? | * 45% of financing comes from PoLG. * Country demand for climate finance exceeds available supply. * ASAP grants range from $3M to $10M, which doesn’t fully cover the financing gap for climate projects. * GCF and other major players step in to address larger financing needs. * GCF focuses on normative approaches and scaling at the national level, similar to GEF adaptation fund, with country allocations between $8M-$20M. * GCF offers grants for scaling but also seeks innovative projects for catalytic investment. * ASAP I was more normative, focused on providing grants. | |
+| 6. MISSED Q | * ASAP operates as a catalyst, not just in the margins. * When ASAP was established, GCF was just starting, and adaptation finance was a new concept in 2012. * Expanding into private sector engagement for adaptation, focusing on scale and economically sustainable options. * Innovation, biodiversity, gender-nexus, and information systems are key focus areas. * Need to be more strategic and focused to achieve greater impact and attract more donors. * Lack of strategic approach would hinder success in resource mobilization. | |
+| 7. HK: How are you becoming more innovative? What will you rely on? | * Use grants to introduce new financial systems and mechanisms. * Carry out normative processes that are costly for the private sector. * Seek innovative ways to involve the private sector in adaptation finance. | |
+| 8. HK: Looking forward to IFAD 14, do you know which donors are willing to contribute? | * Planning to engage with board members in two weeks to gauge interest. * GPR and ASAP have different focuses: GPR has a broader central mandate, while ASAP requires one-on-one donor engagement. * GPR prioritizes ACC (additional climate contributions), but donors are confused about the distinction between ACC and ASAP. * ACC was the initial foundation of ASAP, but ASAP later moved under supplementary funds, and the current president re-established ACC. * Donors are unclear about the differences between these funds. * Internal politics are complicating the ACC situation. | |
+| 9. HK: Further Comments? | * Delivery is a challenge for ASAP. * ASAP was initially focused on fragile countries. * Denmark targeted 3 African countries, but no results yet, leading to donor disengagement and difficult expectations management. * Donors are funding UNDP, FAO, etc., for on-the-ground operations, making IFAD’s operations slower. * Delays in delivering results are often due to difficulties in signing legal agreements, posing reputational risks for ASAP. * IFAD has centralized unrestricted fees under PLV, limiting access to certain fees and reducing flexibility. * Delivery risks are high, with many projects (even in non-fragile contexts) struggling to launch. * Fragmentation within IFAD projects cause confusion in PMUs and negatively impacts operations, with ASAP feeling the consequences. | |
+| 10. HK: Unrestricted fees? | * ASAP fees were originally managed by the ASAP team in ECG, then moved to the supplementary trust fund. Now, all fees are centralized unless specified for other uses. * ASAP is now unrestricted and placed in the central pool, removing control from ECG, requiring approval through the annual decision process. * The move aimed to provide more flexibility across IFAD but has impacted supplementary funds, which previously had clearer oversight of fee use. * The change occurred last year before JR’s return. * Lacking authority over DCO to directly influence PMUs or CDs, engagement with directors and DCO is required before involvement. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+| Despite past investments, key donors like the UK have not reinvested, and outreach to actors like FCDO continues amid uncertainties. Internal efforts are led by ERD and JR, but fragmentation between ACC and ASAP has created confusion and diluted messaging. | | |
+| ASAP operates as a supplementary fund with a catalytic role, distinct from central PoLG funding, and complements larger mechanisms like GCF, which support scaled, national-level adaptation work. ASAP’s grants—typically $3M–$10M—cannot fill the full financing gap but offer strategic value through innovation and entry points for adaptation finance. There’s growing ambition to align ASAP with private sector engagement, biodiversity, and economic sustainability to remain competitive and relevant. | | |
+| Delivery remains a serious challenge—especially in fragile contexts—with legal hurdles, donor disengagement, and weak results (e.g., Denmark’s Africa portfolio) undermining trust. IFAD’s slow implementation relative to more nimble actors like UNDP or FAO compounds these issues. Delays pose reputational risks, particularly when donor expectations are high and unmet. | | |
+| Centralization of ASAP fees under PLV has reduced flexibility for ECG and created bureaucratic bottlenecks, limiting the ability to respond quickly or allocate resources effectively. Previously clearer oversight under ECG has been replaced by annual approval processes, weakening strategic use of fees. The decision was meant to increase institutional flexibility but has instead hampered tailored fund management. | | |
+| ASAP lacks direct authority over PMUs or CDs, requiring cumbersome engagement with senior directors or DCO, which limits agility in implementation. Broader fragmentation in IFAD’s operational model, including overlapping priorities and unclear lines of control, confuses PMUs and reduces impact. ASAP feels these effects acutely, as its success depends on alignment across multiple layers of the institution. | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Funding table and updated ASAP strategic approach (in folder) | | Jack Rossiter |
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+| 05 May 2025, Johannes Linn, Former Chair of Replenishment Committee | |
+| **Interviewee Name:** | **Johannes Linn** |
+| **Position / Department/ Division:** | **Former Chair of the Replenishment Committee for IFAD 11** |
+| **Date of Interview:** | **05 May 2025** |
+| **Interview Conducted by:** | **Sally, Barun, Hansdeep, Hannah, Marcus, James, Tianlin** |
+| **Notetaker:** | **AnnaLyssia** |
+
+|  |  |  |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Interviewee responses structured** | | |
+| *Sr consultant question* | *Response* | |
+| 1. Role of JL | * Chaired three replenishment consultations, leading meetings and playing a central role in document preparation. * Provided substantive and editorial input on multiple drafts of consultation materials. * Represented IFAD in capital visits, coordinating independently of the President. * Not involved in project implementation or in monitoring replenishment commitments. * Only direct implementation-related contribution was a case study on IFAD’s experience with mainstreaming scaling, prepared by JL. | |
+| 2. MF: What were the main concerns from the EB members about borrowings in general? | * EB concerns centered on the fact that IFAD is not like the World Bank; it’s a fund, not an MDB, and lacks its own paid-in or callable capital. * IDA pursued a parallel process with a similar strategy to address EB member concerns. * Ministries of Finance in countries, like Germany, were hesitant to take on any risk associated with IFAD borrowing. * IFAD's gradual approach to borrowing, including organizing sovereign loans and demonstrating capacity in loan finance, helped reduce concerns over time. | |
+| 3. MF: BRAM loans | * Involved with IFAD 12 only in an advisor/consultant role, reviewing documents, but involvement waned over time. * IFAD 12 marked the introduction of BRAM (the new risk management framework). | |
+| 4. MF: Did the issue of mission drift come up? What were the concerns? | * The problem with the replenishment process was that it wasn’t strategic enough, focusing on priorities driven by specific members. * Too much was loaded onto the process, making it unmanageable ("donkey couldn’t move"). * There was no general call among the membership to prioritize the numerous objectives; instead, there were excessive commitments that diluted accountability. * This led to micromanagement rather than focusing on broad, strategic goals. | |
+| 5. MF: Opinion on lending to UMICs | * Management should be stronger in resisting overloading the agenda driven by diverse interests within the EB membership. * Lending to UMICs is a core issue for all MDBs, including the WB. * For IFAD 11, the 90% rule mandated that 90% of lending go to non-UMIC countries, which was a hard-fought compromise to prevent removing funding for LAC countries. * While MDBs should engage with UMICs, the issue is often framed as mission drift, a perspective the speaker disagrees with. | |
+| 6. MF: ODA is in short supply and equity is not growing. IFAD is willing to cover operational costs rather than increasing the equity base? | * There is always a question about how much IFAD costs to deliver its results. * The focus is on budget and administrative costs as a share of total financing; unclear if it solely covered administrative costs or included operational ones. * There is an emerging realization about the equity in the institution, though this debate has not yet fully occurred. | |
+| 7. MF: Should IFAD ask for callable capital in future replenishment to back the borrowings? | * Callable capital was previously considered and is worth revisiting. * Callable capital is a key tool for leverage in MDBs, and its role was misunderstood by the panel, especially in discussions around capital adequacy, with some labeling it as "failing capital." * If members are willing to contribute, callable capital should be considered as a potential financial instrument, though changes to the statutes may be required, which is a challenging process. * Financially, callable capital remains a unique leverage tool for MDBs. | |
+| 8. BC: Reduction in total number of commitments between IFAD 11 to 13. What is the total inventory of commitments IFAD handles, and in this context for an institution our size, this is too much for us to digest (with a budget that has always been constrained)? | * Unfunded mandates are a key issue, with additional mandates being created without considering budgetary implications. * A fundamental criticism is the lack of budgetary oversight in the replenishment design process, as consultative bodies have no authority over budgets—only the membership board does. * There's no structured process to align budget and cost systems with growing mandates. * Teams on the front-line face significant challenges with limited budgets and increasing delivery mandates. * This is a fundamental issue for IFAD, though not unique to the organization. | |
+| 9. BC: Replenishment experience at IFAD versus other organizations. | * The GCF replenishment process was more conflictual, with structural tension between parties and early unanimity rules that stalled key decisions. * A major turning point was shifting board decision-making from unanimity to majority rule, which helped bridge divides and move the process forward. * As chair, actively traveled and engaged with capitals for IFAD in coordination with the President and JL; did not travel for GCF. * Aside from governance dynamics, the replenishment processes were otherwise not fundamentally different. | |
+| 10. BC: Gap in income and operational costs. | * Replenishment contributions cover certain overhead costs; the core debate was about the reasonableness of budgetary costs relative to IFAD’s size and delivery, not about self-financing. * On the lending side, there’s recognition that cost recovery plans may be necessary, though feasibility remains uncertain given IFAD’s cost structure. * Acknowledges that cost efficiency is a valid and ongoing concern. | |
+| 11. JG: How did IFAD level replenishment process work to strengthen the country level impact, particularly through strategic planning, ops partnerships? And to what extent where these translated into improved delivery? | * Uncertain about implementation details, but decentralization was heavily driven by the former President and strongly executed during IFAD11 as part of the replenishment agenda. * The scaling agenda centers on achieving long-term, sustainable impact at scale. * IFAD performed strongly and had high influence during IFAD11, but was less impactful in IFAD10. * Replenishment agreements included commitments related to operational effectiveness. * At the policy level, teams—especially in smaller countries—lack resources and consistent analytical capacity to stay engaged and support effective policy dialogue. * Questions remain about whether IFAD has the depth of expertise to deliver frontline policy engagement consistently. | |
+| 12. JG: How effective did this ambition influence operational practices, and this linkage could be enhanced? | * Authored a document on scaling for IFAD. * Believes IFAD has made progress over the past 20 years toward achieving lasting impact through more effective engagement, though it remains a work in progress. * Observes that IFAD still struggles to shift from project-focused delivery to building scalable platforms that can attract and be sustained by other funders. | |
+| 13. JG: During IFAD 11, emphasis on improving institutional efficiency? How did you see these reforms improving effectiveness, and what lessons might be drawn for future replenishments? | * IFAD’s responses to business model concerns were underdeveloped at the time and only evolved later. * It’s unclear whether the institutional redesigns were effective or smooth, especially as they occurred alongside a difficult decentralization process. * There was a disconnect between what was articulated and what was ultimately implemented. | |
+| 14. SB: To what extent did they consider staffing implications on the targets and the themes they introduce as part of the replenishment negotiation process? | * Staffing issues were not directly addressed in discussions. * The challenge of delivering on unfunded mandates hasn’t been a major concern; there was no inquiry into how they would perform if fully funded. * Board members consistently avoid engaging with this issue. | |
+| 15. HDB: To what extent were replenishment consultations built on lessons learned? | * During IFAD09, there was a lack of institutional memory and continuity, prompting JL to call for greater attention to these areas and to resource mobilization. * On his own initiative, JL documented step-by-step processes, despite not being asked, to strengthen institutional continuity. * Contributed to establishing clearer processes and improving the monitoring of replenishment commitments. * Helped evolve the monitoring system into a well-developed and structured process. | |
+| *Key take-aways* | | |
+|  | | |
+|  | | |
+|  | | |
+| *Follow-up actions* | | *Person responsible* |
+| Callable capital paper by JL | | Johannes Linn |
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