agent-security-service / agent_security_engine.py
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Harden L4 SessionCorrelator with SQLite WAL persistence + .gitignore
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"""4-Layer AI Agent Security Engine (L1 Ingress, L2 Origin/Drift + HMAC Session Chain, L3 PreToolUse, L4 Correlation)."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
from difflib import SequenceMatcher
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
from pathlib import PurePath
import re
import sqlite3
import time
import unicodedata
import uuid
from typing import Any, Literal
OriginType = Literal["system", "user_turn", "trusted_tool", "untrusted_metadata"]
SideEffectScope = Literal["read", "write", "execute", "network"]
# Secret used for L2 cryptographic session tags (override via AGENT_SESSION_SECRET in prod)
_SESSION_SECRET = os.environ.get("AGENT_SESSION_SECRET", "shadowspark-dev-hmac-secret-2026").encode("utf-8")
PROMPT_DELIMITERS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"###",
"[INST]",
"[/INST]",
"<|im_start|>",
"<|im_end|>",
"<|system|>",
"<<SYS>>",
)
PROTECTED_BASENAMES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
".env",
".env.local",
".env.production",
"claude.md",
"soul.md",
"agents.md",
".claude.json",
"secrets.odt",
"id_rsa",
"id_ed25519",
})
# Tool-to-side-effect default mapping (Failure Mode 2: bind approval by side effect, not command name alone)
TOOL_SIDE_EFFECTS: dict[str, SideEffectScope] = {
"read_file": "read",
"list_dir": "read",
"search": "read",
"write_file": "write",
"edit_file": "write",
"delete_file": "write",
"run_command": "execute",
"bash": "execute",
"exec": "execute",
"http_request": "network",
"webhook": "network",
}
ORIGIN_POLICY_MATRIX: dict[OriginType, frozenset[SideEffectScope]] = {
"system": frozenset({"read", "write", "execute", "network"}),
"user_turn": frozenset({"read", "write", "execute"}),
"trusted_tool": frozenset({"read", "write"}),
"untrusted_metadata": frozenset(),
}
_INSTRUCTION_VERBS_RE = re.compile(
r"\b(ignore\s+previous|disregard|system\s+prompt|override|execute|run\s+command|curl\s+|wget\s+|rm\s+-rf)\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
def _is_hidden_unicode(ch: str) -> bool:
cp = ord(ch)
if unicodedata.category(ch) == "Cf":
return True
return (
0x200B <= cp <= 0x200F
or 0x202A <= cp <= 0x202E
or 0x2060 <= cp <= 0x206F
or cp == 0xFEFF
or 0xE0000 <= cp <= 0xE007F
)
def _is_c0_c1_control(ch: str) -> bool:
cp = ord(ch)
if ch in ("\t", "\n", "\r"):
return False
return cp < 0x20 or (0x7F <= cp <= 0x9F)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class IngressResult:
valid: bool
sanitized_text: str
stripped_unicode_count: int
violations: list[str]
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return asdict(self)
def validate_ingress(text: str) -> IngressResult:
"""L1 Ingress Filtering (§89): strip hidden Unicode, reject C0/C1 control chars and prompt delimiters."""
violations: list[str] = []
if any(_is_c0_c1_control(c) for c in text):
violations.append("L1_C0_C1_CONTROL_CHAR")
stripped_chars: list[str] = []
stripped_count = 0
for ch in text:
if _is_hidden_unicode(ch):
stripped_count += 1
elif not _is_c0_c1_control(ch):
stripped_chars.append(ch)
sanitized = "".join(stripped_chars)
for delim in PROMPT_DELIMITERS:
if delim in sanitized:
violations.append(f"L1_PROMPT_DELIMITER:{delim}")
return IngressResult(
valid=len(violations) == 0,
sanitized_text=sanitized,
stripped_unicode_count=stripped_count,
violations=violations,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class OriginRecord:
"""L2 Immutable Origin Record (§93, §95) hardened with HMAC-SHA256 multi-turn session chaining."""
origin_id: str
origin_type: OriginType
session_id: str
turn_index: int
content_hash: str
prev_tag: str
timestamp: float
hmac_tag: str
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return asdict(self)
def _compute_hmac_tag(
session_id: str,
turn_index: int,
origin_type: OriginType,
content_hash: str,
prev_tag: str,
) -> str:
payload = f"{session_id}:{turn_index}:{origin_type}:{content_hash}:{prev_tag}".encode("utf-8")
return hmac.new(_SESSION_SECRET, payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def create_origin_record(
sanitized_text: str,
origin_type: OriginType = "user_turn",
session_id: str = "default-session",
turn_index: int = 0,
prev_tag: str = "GENESIS",
) -> OriginRecord:
content_hash = hashlib.sha256(sanitized_text.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
tag = _compute_hmac_tag(session_id, turn_index, origin_type, content_hash, prev_tag)
return OriginRecord(
origin_id=f"org-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}",
origin_type=origin_type,
session_id=session_id,
turn_index=turn_index,
content_hash=content_hash,
prev_tag=prev_tag,
timestamp=time.time(),
hmac_tag=tag,
)
def verify_origin_record(
record: OriginRecord,
sanitized_text: str | None = None,
expected_prev_tag: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
"""Verify HMAC tag, optional payload hash, and multi-turn chain link."""
errors: list[str] = []
if sanitized_text is not None:
actual_hash = hashlib.sha256(sanitized_text.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(actual_hash, record.content_hash):
errors.append("L2_CONTENT_HASH_MISMATCH")
if expected_prev_tag is not None and not hmac.compare_digest(expected_prev_tag, record.prev_tag):
errors.append("L2_SESSION_CHAIN_BROKEN")
expected_hmac = _compute_hmac_tag(
record.session_id,
record.turn_index,
record.origin_type,
record.content_hash,
record.prev_tag,
)
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected_hmac, record.hmac_tag):
errors.append("L2_HMAC_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
return (len(errors) == 0, errors)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DriftMetrics:
token_drift_ratio: float
sequence_drift_ratio: float
added_tokens: list[str]
removed_tokens: list[str]
exceeds_threshold: bool
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return asdict(self)
def _tokenize(text: str) -> list[str]:
return re.findall(r"\w+|[^\w\s]", text.lower())
def compute_prompt_drift(baseline: str, candidate: str, threshold: float = 0.15) -> DriftMetrics:
"""L2 Baseline Drift Monitor (§95): token-level diff metrics."""
base_tokens = _tokenize(baseline)
cand_tokens = _tokenize(candidate)
if not base_tokens and not cand_tokens:
return DriftMetrics(0.0, 0.0, [], [], False)
matcher = SequenceMatcher(None, base_tokens, cand_tokens)
seq_drift = round(1.0 - matcher.ratio(), 4)
added: list[str] = []
removed: list[str] = []
for tag, i1, i2, j1, j2 in matcher.get_opcodes():
if tag in ("replace", "delete"):
removed.extend(base_tokens[i1:i2])
if tag in ("replace", "insert"):
added.extend(cand_tokens[j1:j2])
total = max(len(base_tokens), len(cand_tokens), 1)
token_drift = round((len(added) + len(removed)) / (2 * total), 4)
drift = max(seq_drift, token_drift)
return DriftMetrics(
token_drift_ratio=token_drift,
sequence_drift_ratio=seq_drift,
added_tokens=added[:25],
removed_tokens=removed[:25],
exceeds_threshold=drift > threshold,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DispatchDecision:
allowed: bool
tool_name: str
inferred_side_effect: SideEffectScope
origin_type: OriginType
reasons: list[str]
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return asdict(self)
def _references_protected_file(args: dict[str, Any]) -> str | None:
for val in args.values():
if not isinstance(val, str):
continue
for token in re.split(r"[\s;|&><'\"]+", val):
if not token:
continue
name = PurePath(token).name.lower()
if name in PROTECTED_BASENAMES or name.startswith(".env."):
return name
if "/.ssh/" in token.replace("\\", "/") or token.endswith(".pem"):
return token
return None
def evaluate_dispatch(
tool_name: str,
tool_args: dict[str, Any],
origin_record: OriginRecord,
side_effect: SideEffectScope | None = None,
verify_hmac: bool = True,
) -> DispatchDecision:
"""L3 PreToolUse Hook Enforcement (§90, §93.2): origin matrix, side-effect binding, protected file guard."""
reasons: list[str] = []
effective_scope: SideEffectScope = side_effect or TOOL_SIDE_EFFECTS.get(tool_name, "execute")
if verify_hmac:
ok, hmac_errors = verify_origin_record(origin_record)
if not ok:
reasons.extend(hmac_errors)
allowed_scopes = ORIGIN_POLICY_MATRIX.get(origin_record.origin_type, frozenset())
if effective_scope not in allowed_scopes:
reasons.append(
f"L3_ORIGIN_POLICY_DENIED:origin={origin_record.origin_type},side_effect={effective_scope}"
)
protected = _references_protected_file(tool_args)
if protected is not None:
reasons.append(f"L3_PROTECTED_FILE_ACCESS:{protected}")
# Side-effect escalation check: read tool smuggled with shell/write flags or traversal
for val in tool_args.values():
if isinstance(val, str) and ("../" in val or "..\\" in val):
reasons.append("L3_PATH_TRAVERSAL_DETECTED")
break
return DispatchDecision(
allowed=len(reasons) == 0,
tool_name=tool_name,
inferred_side_effect=effective_scope,
origin_type=origin_record.origin_type,
reasons=reasons,
)
@dataclass
class SessionState:
last_tag: str = "GENESIS"
turn_count: int = 0
cumulative_drift: float = 0.0
l3_denials: int = 0
anomalies: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
class SessionCorrelator:
"""L4 Asynchronous Correlation (§92): SQLite-persisted cross-turn ladder & metadata anomaly detector."""
def __init__(
self,
drift_ceiling: float = 0.35,
max_denials: int = 2,
db_path: str | None = None,
) -> None:
self.drift_ceiling = drift_ceiling
self.max_denials = max_denials
self.db_path = db_path or os.environ.get("AGENT_SESSION_DB", "/tmp/agent_security_sessions.db")
self._init_db()
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=5.0)
conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
return conn
def _init_db(self) -> None:
with self._connect() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_state (
session_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
last_tag TEXT NOT NULL,
turn_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
cumulative_drift REAL NOT NULL,
l3_denials INTEGER NOT NULL,
anomalies_json TEXT NOT NULL
)
"""
)
def get_session(self, session_id: str) -> SessionState:
with self._connect() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT last_tag, turn_count, cumulative_drift, l3_denials, anomalies_json "
"FROM session_state WHERE session_id = ?",
(session_id,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
state = SessionState()
self._save_session(session_id, state)
return state
return SessionState(
last_tag=row[0],
turn_count=int(row[1]),
cumulative_drift=float(row[2]),
l3_denials=int(row[3]),
anomalies=json.loads(row[4]),
)
def _save_session(self, session_id: str, state: SessionState) -> None:
with self._connect() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO session_state (
session_id, last_tag, turn_count, cumulative_drift, l3_denials, anomalies_json
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(session_id) DO UPDATE SET
last_tag = excluded.last_tag,
turn_count = excluded.turn_count,
cumulative_drift = excluded.cumulative_drift,
l3_denials = excluded.l3_denials,
anomalies_json = excluded.anomalies_json
""",
(
session_id,
state.last_tag,
state.turn_count,
state.cumulative_drift,
state.l3_denials,
json.dumps(state.anomalies),
),
)
def record_turn(
self,
origin: OriginRecord,
raw_text: str,
drift_delta: float = 0.0,
dispatch_decision: DispatchDecision | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
state = self.get_session(origin.session_id)
turn_anomalies: list[str] = []
chain_ok, chain_errs = verify_origin_record(origin, expected_prev_tag=state.last_tag)
if not chain_ok:
turn_anomalies.extend(chain_errs)
if origin.origin_type == "untrusted_metadata" and _INSTRUCTION_VERBS_RE.search(raw_text):
turn_anomalies.append("L4_METADATA_INSTRUCTION_LEAK")
state.cumulative_drift = round(state.cumulative_drift + drift_delta, 4)
if state.cumulative_drift > self.drift_ceiling:
turn_anomalies.append(f"L4_CUMULATIVE_DRIFT_EXCEEDED:{state.cumulative_drift}")
if dispatch_decision and not dispatch_decision.allowed:
state.l3_denials += 1
if state.l3_denials >= self.max_denials:
turn_anomalies.append(f"L4_REPEATED_DISPATCH_DENIALS:{state.l3_denials}")
if chain_ok:
state.last_tag = origin.hmac_tag
state.turn_count += 1
state.anomalies.extend(turn_anomalies)
self._save_session(origin.session_id, state)
return {
"session_id": origin.session_id,
"turn_count": state.turn_count,
"last_hmac_tag": state.last_tag,
"cumulative_drift": state.cumulative_drift,
"l3_denials": state.l3_denials,
"turn_anomalies": turn_anomalies,
"halted": len(turn_anomalies) > 0,
}
GLOBAL_CORRELATOR = SessionCorrelator()