Spaces:
Running
Running
File size: 35,450 Bytes
91c5efa | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 | """Reference matcher for the PromptGate rule pack.
Zero dependencies: standard library only, no torch, no transformers, no network.
The rules themselves live in `rules.json`; this module only compiles and applies
them, so you can audit or fork the rules without touching code.
Quick start
-----------
from promptgate_rules import RuleEngine
engine = RuleEngine.load_default() # reads ./rules.json
report = engine.assess("Ignore all previous instructions.")
print(report["verdict"], report["severity"])
masked, mapping = engine.redact(text, report["findings"])
CLI
---
python promptgate_rules.py "Ignore all previous instructions."
cat prompt.txt | python promptgate_rules.py
This matcher is verified to produce the same verdicts as the PromptGate Space
on every case in the `promptgate-eval` dataset.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import binascii
import json
import math
import os
import re
import sys
import unicodedata
from collections import Counter
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
__all__ = ["RuleEngine", "shannon_entropy", "luhn_ok", "__version__"]
__version__ = "1.0.0"
RX_FLAGS = re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE | re.UNICODE
DEFAULT_RULES_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "rules.json")
ROT13_TABLE = str.maketrans(
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ",
"nopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLM",
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- helpers
def shannon_entropy(value: str) -> float:
"""Guarantees: returns bits-per-character entropy >= 0.0 for any string."""
try:
if not value:
return 0.0
counts = Counter(value)
total = float(len(value))
return -sum((c / total) * math.log2(c / total) for c in counts.values())
except Exception:
return 0.0
def luhn_ok(digits: str) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True only when the digit string satisfies the Luhn checksum."""
try:
if not digits.isdigit() or not (13 <= len(digits) <= 19):
return False
total = 0
parity = len(digits) % 2
for idx, ch in enumerate(digits):
d = ord(ch) - 48
if idx % 2 == parity:
d *= 2
if d > 9:
d -= 9
total += d
return total % 10 == 0
except Exception:
return False
def _clip(value: float, lo: float = 0.0, hi: float = 1.0) -> float:
"""Guarantees: returns a float inside [lo, hi]."""
try:
return max(lo, min(hi, float(value)))
except Exception:
return lo
def normalize_for_matching(text: str, leet_map: Dict[str, str],
token_rx: Any, spaced_rx: Any,
zero_width_rx: Any, control_rx: Any) -> Tuple[str, List[int]]:
"""Guarantees: returns de-obfuscated text plus a per-character map back to original offsets."""
try:
chars: List[str] = []
index_map: List[int] = []
for position, ch in enumerate(text):
if zero_width_rx is not None and zero_width_rx.fullmatch(ch):
continue
if control_rx is not None and control_rx.fullmatch(ch):
continue
for folded in unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", ch):
chars.append(folded)
index_map.append(position)
interim = "".join(chars)
if token_rx is not None and leet_map:
for match in token_rx.finditer(interim):
token = match.group(0)
letters = sum(1 for c in token if c.isalpha())
if letters < 2 or letters / len(token) < 0.4:
continue
if not any(c in leet_map for c in token.lower()):
continue
for offset in range(match.start(), match.end()):
low = chars[offset].lower()
if low in leet_map:
chars[offset] = leet_map[low]
if spaced_rx is not None:
interim = "".join(chars)
drop = set()
for match in spaced_rx.finditer(interim):
for offset in range(match.start(), match.end()):
if not interim[offset].isalnum():
drop.add(offset)
if drop:
chars = [c for i, c in enumerate(chars) if i not in drop]
index_map = [v for i, v in enumerate(index_map) if i not in drop]
return "".join(chars), index_map
except Exception:
return text, list(range(len(text)))
def decode_base64_text(chunk: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Guarantees: returns the decoded text of a base64 chunk, or None when it is not text."""
try:
raw = base64.b64decode(chunk + "=" * (-len(chunk) % 4), validate=True)
if not raw or len(raw) > 8000:
return None
text = raw.decode("utf-8", "strict")
printable = sum(1 for c in text if c.isprintable() or c in "\n\r\t")
return text if printable / max(1, len(text)) > 0.85 else None
except Exception:
return None
def is_private_ipv4(value: str) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True for loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT, multicast and reserved IPv4."""
try:
parts = [int(p) for p in value.split(".")]
if len(parts) != 4 or any(p < 0 or p > 255 for p in parts):
return True
a, b = parts[0], parts[1]
if a in (0, 10, 127) or a >= 224:
return True
if a == 192 and b == 168:
return True
if a == 169 and b == 254:
return True
if a == 172 and 16 <= b <= 31:
return True
if a == 100 and 64 <= b <= 127:
return True
return False
except Exception:
return True
def _finding(kind: str, score: float, start: int, end: int, text: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Guarantees: returns a finding dict with type, score, span and a short match."""
try:
snippet = text[start:end]
except Exception:
snippet = ""
if len(snippet) > 120:
snippet = snippet[:117] + "..."
return {"type": str(kind), "score": round(_clip(score), 3),
"span": [int(start), int(end)], "match": snippet}
def _dedupe_findings(items: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns findings sorted by position with duplicates removed."""
try:
seen = set()
uniq: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in sorted(items, key=lambda f: (f["span"][0], -(f["span"][1] - f["span"][0]), -f["score"])):
key = (item["type"], item["span"][0], item["span"][1])
if key in seen:
continue
seen.add(key)
uniq.append(item)
result: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in uniq:
contained = False
for other in uniq:
if other is item or other["type"] != item["type"]:
continue
if (other["span"][0] <= item["span"][0] and other["span"][1] >= item["span"][1]
and (other["span"][1] - other["span"][0]) > (item["span"][1] - item["span"][0])
and other["score"] >= item["score"]):
contained = True
break
if not contained:
result.append(item)
return result
except Exception:
return items
def _suppress_overlaps(items: List[Dict[str, Any]], priority: Dict[str, int]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns findings where overlapping spans keep the highest-priority type."""
try:
ordered = sorted(items, key=lambda f: (-priority.get(f["type"], 0),
-(f["span"][1] - f["span"][0]), f["span"][0]))
kept: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in ordered:
s, e = item["span"]
if any(not (e <= k["span"][0] or s >= k["span"][1]) for k in kept):
continue
kept.append(item)
return sorted(kept, key=lambda f: f["span"][0])
except Exception:
return items
# ------------------------------------------------------------- rule engine
class RuleEngine:
"""Guarantees: applies the PromptGate rule pack offline and never raises to the caller."""
def __init__(self, pack: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Guarantees: compiles every pattern in the pack, skipping any that will not compile."""
self.pack = pack or {}
self.version = str(self.pack.get("version", "unknown"))
self.thresholds = dict(self.pack.get("thresholds") or
{"block": 0.80, "sanitize": 0.35, "min_score": 0.30})
heur = dict(self.pack.get("heuristics") or {})
self.entropy_threshold = float(heur.get("entropy_threshold_bits_per_char", 3.60))
self.entropy_min_length = int(heur.get("entropy_min_length", 24))
self.base64_min_length = int(heur.get("base64_min_length", 32))
self.base64_min_entropy = float(heur.get("base64_min_entropy", 3.2))
self.phone_min_digits = int(heur.get("phone_min_digits", 9))
self.phone_max_digits = int(heur.get("phone_max_digits", 15))
self.injection = self._compile_list(self.pack.get("injection") or [], "family")
self.secrets = self._compile_list(self.pack.get("secrets") or [], "type")
self.pii = self._compile_pii(self.pack.get("pii") or {})
priority = dict(self.pack.get("priority") or {})
self.pii_priority = dict(priority.get("pii") or {})
self.secret_priority = dict(priority.get("secrets") or {})
self.rx_entropy = self._compile_one(heur.get("entropy_candidate_pattern"))
self.rx_base64 = self._compile_one(heur.get("base64_candidate_pattern"))
self.rx_zero_width = self._compile_one(heur.get("zero_width_pattern"))
self.rx_control = self._compile_one(heur.get("control_char_pattern"))
self.rx_rot13 = self._compile_one(heur.get("rot13_mention_pattern"))
self.rx_rot13_override = self._compile_one(heur.get("rot13_decoded_override_pattern"))
self.rx_fence = self._compile_one(heur.get("code_fence_pattern"))
self.rx_placeholder = self._compile_one(heur.get("placeholder_pattern"))
self.rx_hex_hash = self._compile_one(heur.get("hex_hash_pattern"))
self.rx_version_context = self._compile_one(heur.get("version_context_pattern"))
self.skip_private_ipv4 = bool(heur.get("skip_private_ipv4", True))
self.base64_rescan = bool(heur.get("base64_decode_and_rescan", True))
self.base64_attack_score = float(heur.get("base64_decoded_attack_score", 0.92))
self.invisible_base_score = float(heur.get("invisible_char_base_score", 0.80))
self.leet_map = dict(heur.get("leet_map") or {})
self.rx_leet_token = self._compile_one(heur.get("leet_token_pattern"))
self.rx_spaced_run = self._compile_one(heur.get("spaced_run_pattern"))
self.rx_digest_context = self._compile_one(heur.get("digest_context_pattern"))
self.normalization_enabled = bool(heur.get("normalization_enabled", True))
self.normalization_factor = float(heur.get("normalization_score_factor", 0.95))
self.rot13_rescan_score = float(heur.get("rot13_full_rescan_score", 0.90))
self.rx_meta_context = self._compile_one(heur.get("meta_context_pattern"))
self.meta_context_factor = float(heur.get("meta_context_score_factor", 0.30))
# ---------------------------------------------------------- loading
@staticmethod
def _compile_one(pattern: Optional[str]):
"""Guarantees: returns a compiled pattern or None; a bad pattern never raises."""
if not pattern:
return None
try:
return re.compile(pattern, RX_FLAGS)
except re.error:
return None
@classmethod
def _compile_list(cls, rows: List[Dict[str, Any]], key: str) -> List[Tuple[str, float, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns (label, score, compiled) triples, dropping uncompilable rows."""
out: List[Tuple[str, float, Any]] = []
for row in rows:
rx = cls._compile_one(row.get("pattern"))
if rx is None:
continue
try:
score = float(row.get("score", 0.5))
except Exception:
score = 0.5
out.append((str(row.get(key, "unknown")), score, rx))
return out
@classmethod
def _compile_pii(cls, spec: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns compiled PII detectors keyed by type, never raising."""
out: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for name, row in (spec or {}).items():
if not isinstance(row, dict):
continue
entry: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for field, target in (("pattern", "rx"), ("pattern_v6", "rx_v6"),
("pattern_bare_date", "rx_bare"),
("pattern_with_context", "rx_ctx")):
rx = cls._compile_one(row.get(field))
if rx is not None:
entry[target] = rx
for field, target in (("confidence", "confidence"), ("confidence_v6", "confidence_v6"),
("confidence_bare_date", "confidence_bare"),
("confidence_with_context", "confidence_ctx")):
try:
if row.get(field) is not None:
entry[target] = float(row[field])
except Exception:
continue
if entry:
out[str(name)] = entry
return out
@classmethod
def load_default(cls, path: str = DEFAULT_RULES_PATH) -> "RuleEngine":
"""Guarantees: loads rules.json from disk and returns a ready engine."""
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
return cls(json.load(handle))
@classmethod
def from_hub(cls, repo_id: str = "NagaYu/promptgate-rules",
filename: str = "rules.json", **kwargs: Any) -> "RuleEngine":
"""Guarantees: downloads the rule pack from the Hub (needs huggingface_hub installed)."""
from huggingface_hub import hf_hub_download # optional dependency
return cls.load_default(hf_hub_download(repo_id=repo_id, filename=filename, **kwargs))
# -------------------------------------------------------- detection
def detect_injection(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns injection findings with type/score/span/match, never raising."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return []
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for family, score, rx in self.injection:
for m in rx.finditer(text):
if m.end() - m.start() < 2:
continue
out.append(_finding(family, score, m.start(), m.end(), text))
out.extend(self._detect_encoded(text))
out.extend(self._detect_fence_flood(text))
out.extend(self._detect_obfuscated(text, out))
out = self._downgrade_meta_context(text, out)
return _dedupe_findings(out)
except Exception:
return []
def _looks_base64(self, chunk: str) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True only for strings that plausibly decode as base64 data."""
try:
if len(chunk) < self.base64_min_length:
return False
has_lower = any(c.islower() for c in chunk)
has_upper = any(c.isupper() for c in chunk)
has_digit = any(c.isdigit() for c in chunk)
if not ((has_lower and has_upper) or has_digit):
return False
if shannon_entropy(chunk) < self.base64_min_entropy:
return False
padded = chunk + "=" * (-len(chunk) % 4)
try:
raw = base64.b64decode(padded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
return False
if len(raw) < 12:
return False
printable = sum(1 for b in raw if 9 <= b <= 13 or 32 <= b <= 126)
return (printable / len(raw)) > 0.80 or shannon_entropy(chunk) > 4.2
except Exception:
return False
def _downgrade_meta_context(self, text: str,
findings: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: scales down findings that sit inside a documentation-writing task."""
try:
if self.rx_meta_context is None:
return findings
for item in findings:
start = int(item.get("span", [0, 0])[0])
if self.rx_meta_context.search(text[max(0, start - 90):start]):
item["score"] = round(item["score"] * self.meta_context_factor, 3)
item["meta_context"] = True
return findings
except Exception:
return findings
def _detect_obfuscated(self, text: str, already: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: re-runs the patterns on de-obfuscated text and maps hits back to real spans."""
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
if not self.normalization_enabled:
return out
normalized, index_map = normalize_for_matching(
text, self.leet_map, self.rx_leet_token, self.rx_spaced_run,
self.rx_zero_width, self.rx_control)
if not normalized or not index_map or normalized == text:
return out
for family, score, rx in self.injection:
for m in rx.finditer(normalized):
start, end = m.span()
if end - start < 2 or start >= len(index_map):
continue
real_start = index_map[start]
real_end = (index_map[end - 1] + 1) if (end - 1) < len(index_map) else len(text)
if any(f["type"] == family
and not (real_end <= f["span"][0] or real_start >= f["span"][1])
for f in already):
continue
item = _finding(family, min(1.0, score * self.normalization_factor),
real_start, real_end, text)
item["normalized"] = True
out.append(item)
return out
except Exception:
return out
def _has_injection_signal(self, text: str, min_score: float = 0.60) -> bool:
"""Guarantees: True when decoded text matches a strong injection pattern."""
try:
for _family, score, rx in self.injection:
if score >= min_score and rx.search(text):
return True
return False
except Exception:
return False
def _detect_encoded(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns encoded/obfuscated payload findings, never raising."""
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
if self.rx_base64 is not None:
for m in self.rx_base64.finditer(text):
chunk = m.group(0)
if (self.rx_digest_context is not None
and self.rx_digest_context.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 24):m.start()])):
continue # a hash or fingerprint, not a smuggled payload
if self._looks_base64(chunk):
score = 0.55 + min(0.30, len(chunk) / 1200.0)
if self.base64_rescan:
decoded = decode_base64_text(chunk)
if decoded and self._has_injection_signal(decoded):
score = self.base64_attack_score
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", score, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_zero_width is not None:
for m in self.rx_zero_width.finditer(text):
score = self.invisible_base_score + min(0.15, (m.end() - m.start()) / 20.0)
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", score, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_control is not None:
for m in self.rx_control.finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", 0.55, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_rot13 is not None:
for m in self.rx_rot13.finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", 0.45, m.start(), m.end(), text))
if self.rx_rot13_override is not None and len(text) < 20000:
decoded = text.translate(ROT13_TABLE)
for m in self.rx_rot13_override.finditer(decoded):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", 0.80, m.start(), m.end(), text))
# Only report this when the attack is visible *after* decoding:
# rot13 is a no-op on non-ASCII text, so a plain-text attack
# would otherwise be relabelled as an encoded payload.
if (decoded != text and self._has_injection_signal(decoded, 0.80)
and not self._has_injection_signal(text, 0.80)):
out.append(_finding("encoded_payload", self.rot13_rescan_score,
0, min(len(text), 200), text))
except Exception:
return out
return out
def _detect_fence_flood(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: flags injected code-fence delimiters, never raising."""
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
if self.rx_fence is None:
return out
fences = list(self.rx_fence.finditer(text))
if len(fences) >= 3 and len(fences) % 2 == 1:
m = fences[-1]
out.append(_finding("delimiter_escape", 0.70, m.start(), m.end(), text))
elif len(fences) >= 6:
m = fences[0]
out.append(_finding("delimiter_escape", 0.45, m.start(), m.end(), text))
except Exception:
return out
return out
def detect_pii(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns PII findings; credit cards are only reported when Luhn passes."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return []
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
email = self.pii.get("EMAIL", {})
if email.get("rx") is not None:
for m in email["rx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("EMAIL", email.get("confidence", 0.95), m.start(), m.end(), text))
card = self.pii.get("CREDIT_CARD", {})
if card.get("rx") is not None:
for m in card["rx"].finditer(text):
digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", m.group(0))
if luhn_ok(digits):
item = _finding("CREDIT_CARD", card.get("confidence", 0.96),
m.start(), m.end(), text)
item["match"] = "*" * max(0, len(digits) - 4) + digits[-4:]
out.append(item)
phone = self.pii.get("PHONE", {})
if phone.get("rx") is not None:
for m in phone["rx"].finditer(text):
raw = m.group(0)
digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", raw)
if not (self.phone_min_digits <= len(digits) <= self.phone_max_digits):
continue
stripped = raw.strip()
ip_rx = self.pii.get("IP_ADDRESS", {}).get("rx")
if ip_rx is not None and ip_rx.fullmatch(stripped):
continue
parts = stripped.split(".")
if len(parts) == 4 and all(p.isdigit() for p in parts):
continue
has_sep = bool(re.search(r"[\-.() \u3000]", raw))
plus = raw.lstrip().startswith("+")
if not (has_sep or plus or len(digits) in (10, 11)):
continue
if luhn_ok(digits) and len(digits) >= 13:
continue
conf = 0.88 if plus else (0.74 if has_sep else 0.55)
out.append(_finding("PHONE", conf, m.start(), m.end(), text))
ip = self.pii.get("IP_ADDRESS", {})
if ip.get("rx") is not None:
for m in ip["rx"].finditer(text):
if self.skip_private_ipv4 and is_private_ipv4(m.group(0)):
continue
if (self.rx_version_context is not None
and self.rx_version_context.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 14):m.start()])):
continue
out.append(_finding("IP_ADDRESS", ip.get("confidence", 0.72),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
if ip.get("rx_v6") is not None:
for m in ip["rx_v6"].finditer(text):
if m.group(0).count(":") >= 4:
out.append(_finding("IP_ADDRESS", ip.get("confidence_v6", 0.55),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
dob = self.pii.get("DATE_OF_BIRTH", {})
if dob.get("rx") is not None:
for m in dob["rx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("DATE_OF_BIRTH", dob.get("confidence", 0.85),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
if dob.get("rx_bare") is not None:
for m in dob["rx_bare"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("DATE_OF_BIRTH", dob.get("confidence_bare", 0.50),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
postal = self.pii.get("POSTAL_CODE", {})
if postal.get("rx") is not None:
for m in postal["rx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("POSTAL_CODE", postal.get("confidence", 0.58),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
if postal.get("rx_ctx") is not None:
for m in postal["rx_ctx"].finditer(text):
out.append(_finding("POSTAL_CODE", postal.get("confidence_ctx", 0.78),
m.start(), m.end(), text))
return _suppress_overlaps(_dedupe_findings(out), self.pii_priority)
except Exception:
return []
def detect_secrets(self, text: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Guarantees: returns secret findings from prefixes, JWTs and high-entropy strings."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return []
out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for kind, score, rx in self.secrets:
for m in rx.finditer(text):
raw = m.group(0)
if self.rx_placeholder is not None and self.rx_placeholder.search(raw):
continue # documentation placeholder, not a live credential
item = _finding(kind, score, m.start(), m.end(), text)
item["match"] = (raw[:6] + "***" + raw[-4:]) if len(raw) > 14 else "***"
out.append(item)
if self.rx_entropy is not None:
for m in self.rx_entropy.finditer(text):
chunk = m.group(0)
if not any(c.isdigit() for c in chunk) or not any(c.isalpha() for c in chunk):
continue
if self.rx_hex_hash is not None and self.rx_hex_hash.match(chunk):
continue # digest, not a credential
if self.rx_placeholder is not None and self.rx_placeholder.search(chunk):
continue
if (self.rx_digest_context is not None
and self.rx_digest_context.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 24):m.start()])):
continue # "SHA256:..." is a fingerprint, not a secret
entropy = shannon_entropy(chunk)
if entropy < self.entropy_threshold:
continue
conf = _clip(0.40 + (entropy - self.entropy_threshold) * 0.35, 0.40, 0.85)
item = _finding("HIGH_ENTROPY_STRING", conf, m.start(), m.end(), text)
item["entropy"] = round(entropy, 3)
item["match"] = chunk[:6] + "***" + chunk[-4:]
out.append(item)
return _suppress_overlaps(_dedupe_findings(out), self.secret_priority)
except Exception:
return []
# ------------------------------------------------------- redaction
def redact(self, text: str, findings: Any) -> Tuple[str, Dict[str, str]]:
"""Guarantees: returns (masked_text, mapping); the mapping is returned, never logged."""
try:
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return "", {}
flat: List[Tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]] = []
if isinstance(findings, dict):
for category, items in findings.items():
if isinstance(items, list):
for item in items:
if isinstance(item, dict) and "span" in item:
flat.append((str(category), item))
elif isinstance(findings, list):
for item in findings:
if isinstance(item, dict) and "span" in item:
flat.append((str(item.get("category", "risk")), item))
if not flat:
return text, {}
prefixes = {"pii": "PII", "secrets": "SECRET", "injection": "RISK"}
flat.sort(key=lambda pair: (pair[1]["span"][0], -(pair[1]["span"][1] - pair[1]["span"][0])))
claimed: List[Tuple[int, int]] = []
planned: List[Tuple[int, int, str]] = []
mapping: Dict[str, str] = {}
counters: Dict[str, int] = {}
assigned: Dict[Tuple[str, str], str] = {}
for category, item in flat:
start, end = int(item["span"][0]), int(item["span"][1])
if start < 0 or end > len(text) or end <= start:
continue
if any(not (end <= cs or start >= ce) for cs, ce in claimed):
continue
claimed.append((start, end))
label = "{}_{}".format(
prefixes.get(category, "RISK"),
re.sub(r"[^A-Z0-9]+", "_", str(item.get("type", "UNKNOWN")).upper()).strip("_") or "UNKNOWN")
original = text[start:end]
placeholder = assigned.get((label, original))
if placeholder is None:
counters[label] = counters.get(label, 0) + 1
placeholder = "<{}_{}>".format(label, counters[label])
assigned[(label, original)] = placeholder
mapping[placeholder] = original
planned.append((start, end, placeholder))
masked = text
for start, end, placeholder in sorted(planned, key=lambda t: -t[0]):
masked = masked[:start] + placeholder + masked[end:]
return masked, mapping
except Exception:
return text if isinstance(text, str) else "", {}
# ------------------------------------------------------ assessment
def assess(self, text: str, thresholds: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Guarantees: always returns a verdict of allow/sanitize/block plus scored findings."""
result: Dict[str, Any] = {
"verdict": "allow", "severity": 0.0,
"scores": {"injection": 0.0, "pii": 0.0, "secrets": 0.0},
"counts": {"injection": 0, "pii": 0, "secrets": 0},
"risk_types": [], "findings": {"injection": [], "pii": [], "secrets": []},
"thresholds": dict(self.thresholds), "rules_version": self.version, "error": None,
}
try:
merged = dict(self.thresholds)
if isinstance(thresholds, dict):
for key, value in thresholds.items():
try:
merged[str(key)] = float(value)
except Exception:
continue
result["thresholds"] = merged
min_score = _clip(merged.get("min_score", 0.30))
text = text if isinstance(text, str) else ""
injection = [f for f in self.detect_injection(text) if f["score"] >= min_score]
pii = [f for f in self.detect_pii(text) if f["score"] >= min(min_score, 0.5)]
secrets = [f for f in self.detect_secrets(text) if f["score"] >= min(min_score, 0.4)]
inj_max = max((f["score"] for f in injection), default=0.0)
families = {f["type"] for f in injection}
injection_risk = 0.0
if injection:
injection_risk = _clip(inj_max * (1.0 + 0.06 * (len(families) - 1)) + 0.02 * (len(injection) - 1))
secret_risk = _clip(max((f["score"] for f in secrets), default=0.0))
pii_risk = _clip(min(0.50, 0.22 + 0.08 * len(pii))) if pii else 0.0
severity = _clip(max(injection_risk, secret_risk, pii_risk))
if injection_risk >= merged.get("block", 0.80):
verdict = "block"
elif secrets or pii or severity >= merged.get("sanitize", 0.35):
verdict = "sanitize"
else:
verdict = "allow"
result.update({
"verdict": verdict,
"severity": round(severity, 3),
"scores": {"injection": round(injection_risk, 3), "pii": round(pii_risk, 3),
"secrets": round(secret_risk, 3)},
"counts": {"injection": len(injection), "pii": len(pii), "secrets": len(secrets)},
"risk_types": sorted(families | {f["type"] for f in pii} | {f["type"] for f in secrets}),
"findings": {"injection": injection, "pii": pii, "secrets": secrets},
})
return result
except Exception as exc:
result["error"] = {"code": "assess_failed", "message": str(exc)[:300]}
return result
def _cli(argv: List[str]) -> int:
"""Guarantees: prints one JSON assessment for argv text or stdin and returns an exit code."""
text = " ".join(argv[1:]) if len(argv) > 1 else sys.stdin.read()
engine = RuleEngine.load_default()
report = engine.assess(text)
print(json.dumps(report, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
return 0 if report["verdict"] != "block" else 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(_cli(sys.argv))
|