File size: 27,039 Bytes
8ca1978 3266911 accc89a 8ca1978 8628c98 8ca1978 9c77d16 8ca1978 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 a724795 9c77d16 8628c98 a724795 9c77d16 8ca1978 9c77d16 8ca1978 9c77d16 8ca1978 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 a724795 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 8628c98 9c77d16 a724795 9c77d16 8ca1978 9c77d16 8ca1978 9c77d16 8ca1978 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 | """
ALLI Code Generation Contract Specification -- Phase 7, Step 7.1 & Step 7.2
Standardizes the schema-driven DAG-to-Python synthesis pipeline.
Provides Pydantic models, validation utilities, literal formatters,
dependency rules, and deterministic SHA-256 artifact fingerprinting.
"""
import ast
import hashlib
import json
import keyword
import math
import re
from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
# ─── 1. DEPENDENCY RULES & BANNED MODULES ─────────────────────────────────────
# Standard library modules that must NEVER appear in requirements.txt
STANDARD_LIBS: Set[str] = {
"abc", "argparse", "array", "ast", "asyncio", "base64", "binascii", "bisect",
"builtins", "calendar", "cmath", "collections", "colorsys", "concurrent",
"contextlib", "contextvars", "copy", "csv", "ctypes", "datetime", "decimal",
"difflib", "dis", "doctest", "email", "enum", "errno", "faulthandler",
"fcntl", "filecmp", "fileinput", "fnmatch", "fractions", "functools",
"gc", "getopt", "getpass", "gettext", "glob", "graphlib", "gzip", "hashlib",
"heapq", "hmac", "html", "http", "imaplib", "imghdr", "importlib", "inspect",
"io", "ipaddress", "itertools", "json", "keyword", "linecache", "locale",
"logging", "lzma", "mailbox", "mailcap", "marshal", "math", "mimetypes",
"mmap", "modulefinder", "msilib", "msvcrt", "multiprocessing", "netrc",
"nntplib", "numbers", "operator", "optparse", "os", "pathlib", "pdb",
"pickle", "pickletools", "pkgutil", "platform", "plistlib", "poplib",
"posix", "pprint", "profile", "pstats", "pty", "pwd", "py_compile",
"pyclbr", "pydoc", "queue", "quopri", "random", "re", "readline",
"reprlib", "resource", "rlcompleter", "sched", "secrets", "select",
"selectors", "shelve", "shlex", "shutil", "signal", "site", "smtpd",
"smtplib", "sndhdr", "socket", "socketserver", "spwd", "sqlite3", "ssl",
"stat", "statistics", "string", "stringprep", "struct", "subprocess",
"sunau", "symtable", "sys", "sysconfig", "syslog", "tarfile", "telnetlib",
"tempfile", "termios", "test", "textwrap", "threading", "time", "timeit",
"tkinter", "token", "tokenize", "tomllib", "trace", "traceback", "tracemalloc",
"tty", "turtle", "turtledemo", "types", "typing", "unicodedata", "unittest",
"urllib", "uu", "uuid", "venv", "warnings", "wave", "weakref", "webbrowser",
"winreg", "winsound", "wsgiref", "xdrlib", "xml", "xmlrpc", "zipapp",
"zipfile", "zipimport", "zlib", "zoneinfo"
}
# Internal ALLI namespaces that must NEVER be imported as Python modules
BANNED_IMPORTS: Set[str] = {
"core", "control", "data", "primitive", "function", "system",
"language_core", "lambdas", "library_inspector", "database", "api", "workflow", "trigger"
}
# Allowlisted standard library modules safe for user-selected lang.import & staged execution.
SAFE_RUNTIME_STDLIB_MODULES: Set[str] = {
"math", "statistics", "json", "datetime", "re", "random", "itertools",
"functools", "collections", "decimal", "fractions", "uuid", "hashlib",
"base64", "urllib.parse", "string", "csv",
}
# Restricted host/OS modules blocked from lang.import, staged binding, and dotted fallback.
RESTRICTED_HOST_MODULES: Set[str] = {
"os", "sys", "subprocess", "socket", "shutil", "importlib",
"builtins", "ctypes", "pickle", "marshal", "pty", "pathlib", "posix",
} | BANNED_IMPORTS
# Authoritative pinned packages for external dependencies
PINNED_PACKAGE_VERSIONS: Dict[str, str] = {
"requests": "2.31.0",
"urllib3": "2.2.1",
"pandas": "2.2.2",
"numpy": "1.26.4",
"scipy": "1.13.0",
"pydantic": "2.7.0",
"httpx": "0.27.0",
"fastapi": "0.110.0",
"langchain": "0.1.0",
"openai": "1.0.0",
"torch": "2.2.2",
"scikit-learn": "1.4.2",
"matplotlib": "3.8.4",
"sympy": "1.12",
}
# Dangerous callables and modules blocked by AST safety inspection (Phase 7 Gate)
DANGEROUS_CALLABLES: Set[str] = {
"eval", "exec", "compile", "__import__", "globals", "locals",
"vars", "dir", "breakpoint",
}
DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = {
("os", "system"), ("os", "popen"), ("os", "spawn"), ("os", "spawnl"),
("subprocess", "Popen"), ("subprocess", "call"), ("subprocess", "run"),
("subprocess", "check_output"), ("subprocess", "check_call"),
("shutil", "rmtree"), ("posix", "system"), ("pty", "spawn")
}
DANGEROUS_SPECIAL_ATTRS: Set[str] = {
"__builtins__", "__globals__", "__subclasses__", "__bases__", "__class__",
"__dict__", "__code__", "__closure__", "__mro__", "__qualname__",
"gi_frame", "f_globals", "f_locals", "f_builtins", "f_code", "tb_frame",
}
DANGEROUS_IMPORTS: Set[str] = {
"ctypes", "pickle", "socket", "code", "pdb",
"subprocess", "shutil", "importlib", "pty", "posix", "marshal", "builtins",
"sqlite3", "inspect", "multiprocessing", "threading", "asyncio", "webbrowser", "signal",
} | BANNED_IMPORTS
# ─── 2. CONTRACT MODELS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class CodegenDiagnostic(BaseModel):
"""Structured diagnostic reported during code generation preflight or synthesis."""
code: str = Field(..., description="Canonical diagnostic code (e.g. 'DAG-001', 'CODEGEN-UNSUPPORTED-NODE')")
message: str = Field(..., description="Human-readable description of the condition")
severity: str = Field(default="error", description="Diagnostic severity: 'error', 'warning', or 'info'")
node_id: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Graph node identifier")
port_id: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Input or output port handle identifier")
fix_suggestion: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Remediation guidance")
class SourceMapEntry(BaseModel):
"""Maps a generated Python statement range back to a canvas node."""
node_id: str = Field(..., description="Unique graph node ID")
line_start: int = Field(..., description="1-based starting line of generated statement")
line_end: int = Field(..., description="1-based ending line of generated statement")
target_var: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Variable assigned by this step")
statement_label: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Human readable node label")
class CodegenRequest(BaseModel):
"""Payload contract for Python code generation."""
nodes: List[Dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Visual graph nodes")
edges: List[Dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Visual graph edge connections")
graph: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = Field(default=None, description="Alternative graph bundle payload")
name: Optional[str] = Field(default="alli_workflow", description="Workflow/file project name")
execution_order: Optional[List[str]] = Field(default=None, description="Topological execution order override")
dependencies: Optional[List[str]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Explicit package dependencies")
pin_exact: bool = Field(default=True, description="Enforce exact pinned versions (==) in requirements.txt")
class CodegenArtifacts(BaseModel):
"""Comprehensive generated artifacts returned by the backend codegen engine."""
success: bool = Field(..., description="Whether code generation succeeded without blocking errors")
python_code: str = Field(..., description="PEP 8 compliant, standalone Python source code")
requirements_txt: str = Field(..., description="Pinned pip requirements.txt file contents")
dockerfile: str = Field(..., description="Production Dockerfile container specification")
filename: str = Field(..., description="Target Python filename (e.g. 'workflow.py')")
dependencies: List[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Discovered external pip package names")
execution_order: List[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Topological execution order of nodes")
diagnostics: List[Dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="List of diagnostics/errors")
source_map: List[Dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Source mapping entries to nodes")
generator_version: str = Field(default="1.0.0", description="Authoritative generator version")
graph_fingerprint: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="64-char SHA-256 graph fingerprint")
metadata: Dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Metadata including SHA-256 hashes")
# ─── 3. SANITIZATION & LITERAL FORMATTING UTILITIES ───────────────────────────
def sanitize_identifier(name: Any, fallback: str = "var") -> str:
"""
Sanitizes user-provided or node-derived identifier into a valid Python variable name.
Preserves alphanumeric characters and underscores, avoids keywords and numeric prefixes.
"""
if not name or not isinstance(name, str):
return fallback
# Replace invalid characters with underscore
cleaned = re.sub(r"[^a-zA-Z0-9_]", "_", name.strip())
# Prepend underscore if identifier starts with a digit
if re.match(r"^[0-9]", cleaned):
cleaned = f"_{cleaned}"
# Avoid Python reserved keywords (e.g. 'def', 'class', 'import', 'for')
if keyword.iskeyword(cleaned):
cleaned = f"{cleaned}_val"
# Avoid builtins conflict
if cleaned in ("print", "input", "sum", "min", "max", "id", "type", "format", "open"):
cleaned = f"{cleaned}_val"
return cleaned if cleaned else fallback
def format_literal(val: Any, data_type: str = "any") -> str:
"""
Formats a raw value into a safe, deterministic Python literal string.
Ensures safe escaping for strings, quotes, booleans, None, and collections.
Rejects or safely handles non-finite numbers (inf, nan).
"""
if val is None:
return "None"
dt = str(data_type).lower().strip()
# 1. Explicit integer type
if dt in ("int", "integer"):
try:
return str(int(val))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return "0"
# 2. Explicit float/number type
if dt in ("float", "number"):
try:
f = float(val)
if math.isnan(f) or math.isinf(f):
raise ValueError("Non-finite float values are not supported in code generation")
# Preserve float decimal format
s = str(f)
return s if "." in s or "e" in s.lower() else f"{s}.0"
except (ValueError, TypeError) as e:
if "Non-finite" in str(e):
raise
return "0.0"
# 3. Explicit boolean type
if dt in ("bool", "boolean"):
if isinstance(val, str):
return "True" if val.strip().lower() in ("true", "1", "yes") else "False"
return "True" if bool(val) else "False"
# 4. Explicit string/text type (Deterministic JSON quoting handles quotes, newlines, Unicode)
if dt in ("str", "string", "text"):
return json.dumps(str(val), ensure_ascii=False)
# 5. Collections: List
if dt == "list":
if isinstance(val, list):
formatted_elements = [format_literal(elem) for elem in val]
return f"[{', '.join(formatted_elements)}]"
if isinstance(val, str):
s = val.strip()
if s.startswith("[") and s.endswith("]"):
return s
return "[]"
# 6. Collections: Dict
if dt == "dict":
if isinstance(val, dict):
formatted_entries = [
f"{json.dumps(str(k), ensure_ascii=False)}: {format_literal(v)}"
for k, v in val.items()
]
return f"{{{', '.join(formatted_entries)}}}"
if isinstance(val, str):
s = val.strip()
if s.startswith("{") and s.endswith("}"):
return s
return "{}"
# 7. Type-inferred formatting fallback
if isinstance(val, bool):
return "True" if val else "False"
if isinstance(val, int):
return str(val)
if isinstance(val, float):
if math.isnan(val) or math.isinf(val):
raise ValueError("Non-finite float values are not supported in code generation")
s = str(val)
return s if "." in s or "e" in s.lower() else f"{s}.0"
if isinstance(val, list):
formatted_elements = [format_literal(elem) for elem in val]
return f"[{', '.join(formatted_elements)}]"
if isinstance(val, dict):
formatted_entries = [
f"{json.dumps(str(k), ensure_ascii=False)}: {format_literal(v)}"
for k, v in val.items()
]
return f"{{{', '.join(formatted_entries)}}}"
# String heuristic
if isinstance(val, str):
s = val.strip()
if s.lower() == "true":
return "True"
if s.lower() == "false":
return "False"
if s.lower() in ("none", "null"):
return "None"
# Check numeric literal strings
try:
if "." in s:
f = float(s)
if not (math.isnan(f) or math.isinf(f)):
return s
else:
int(s)
return s
except ValueError:
pass
return json.dumps(val, ensure_ascii=False)
return repr(val)
# ─── 4. HASHING & AST VALIDATION WITH SECURITY INSPECTION ──────────────────
def compute_codegen_hash(artifacts: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
"""
Computes a deterministic 64-character SHA-256 hex digest for generated artifacts.
Ensures identical code generations produce identical hashes.
"""
canon = {
"python_code": artifacts.get("python_code", ""),
"requirements_txt": artifacts.get("requirements_txt", ""),
"dockerfile": artifacts.get("dockerfile", ""),
}
encoded = json.dumps(canon, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
RESTRICTED_HOST_MODULE_ATTRS: Set[str] = {
"os", "sys", "subprocess", "shutil", "importlib",
"ctypes", "pickle", "marshal", "pty", "builtins", "posix",
}
from language_core.workspace_env_contracts import validate_env_key
_BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES: Tuple[str, ...] = ("/etc", "/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/root", "/home")
_BLOCKED_PATH_SEGMENTS: Tuple[str, ...] = (".git", ".ssh", ".aws", ".gnupg")
_BLOCKED_FILENAMES: Tuple[str, ...] = (".env", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "authorized_keys")
def _is_unsafe_literal_path(raw_path: str) -> bool:
norm = raw_path.replace("\\", "/").strip()
if "\x00" in norm or norm.startswith("//") or norm.startswith("~"):
return True
parts = [pt for pt in norm.split("/") if pt]
lower_parts = [pt.lower() for pt in parts]
if ".." in parts:
return True
if any(lp in _BLOCKED_PATH_SEGMENTS or lp in _BLOCKED_FILENAMES or lp.startswith(".env.") for lp in lower_parts):
return True
lowered = norm.lower()
if any(lowered == pf or lowered.startswith(pf + "/") for pf in _BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES):
return True
return len(norm) >= 2 and norm[1] == ":" and norm[0].isalpha()
class SecurityASTVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
"""
Static Abstract Syntax Tree security visitor.
Inspects synthesized code for dangerous callables (eval, exec, __import__),
arbitrary subprocess/system invocations, restricted paths, and introspection tampering.
"""
def __init__(self):
self.diagnostics: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
self._allowed_os_environ_attrs: Set[int] = set()
def visit_Assign(self, node: ast.Assign):
for target in node.targets:
if (
isinstance(target, ast.Subscript)
and isinstance(target.value, ast.Attribute)
and isinstance(target.value.value, ast.Name)
and target.value.value.id == "os"
and target.value.attr == "environ"
):
if isinstance(target.slice, ast.Constant) and isinstance(target.slice.value, str):
ok_k, code_k, err_k = validate_env_key(target.slice.value)
if ok_k:
self._allowed_os_environ_attrs.add(id(target.value))
else:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Restricted environment key '{target.slice.value}' in os.environ assignment: {err_k} (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": f"Avoid writing reserved environment variable ({code_k}).",
})
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call):
if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):
if node.func.id in DANGEROUS_CALLABLES:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Dangerous callable '{node.func.id}()' is prohibited in generated code (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove unsafe dynamic evaluation or execution calls.",
})
elif node.func.id in ("getattr", "setattr", "delattr"):
if len(node.args) >= 2:
if not isinstance(node.args[1], ast.Constant) or not isinstance(node.args[1].value, str):
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Dynamic reflection via '{node.func.id}()' with non-literal attribute is prohibited in generated code (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Use explicit static attribute access.",
})
elif node.args[1].value.startswith("__") or node.args[1].value in DANGEROUS_SPECIAL_ATTRS:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Dunder reflection via '{node.func.id}()' is prohibited in generated code (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove dunder attribute introspection calls.",
})
elif node.func.id == "open" and node.args and isinstance(node.args[0], ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.args[0].value, str):
if _is_unsafe_literal_path(node.args[0].value):
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Restricted or traversal file path in open() is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Use a relative filename inside the working directory.",
})
elif isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute):
attr_name = node.func.attr
if isinstance(node.func.value, ast.Name):
mod_name = node.func.value.id
if (mod_name, attr_name) in DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Dangerous method '{mod_name}.{attr_name}()' is prohibited in generated code (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove arbitrary system command execution or shell invocations.",
})
elif mod_name == "os" and attr_name == "getenv" and node.args and isinstance(node.args[0], ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.args[0].value, str):
ok_k, code_k, err_k = validate_env_key(node.args[0].value)
if not ok_k:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Restricted environment key '{node.args[0].value}' in os.getenv(): {err_k} (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": f"Use an application env key instead of reserved/invalid key ({code_k}).",
})
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Attribute(self, node: ast.Attribute):
if node.attr in RESTRICTED_HOST_MODULE_ATTRS:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Restricted host module attribute '.{node.attr}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove access to host OS or runtime reflection modules.",
})
if (
isinstance(node.value, ast.Name)
and node.value.id == "os"
and node.attr not in {"getenv", "path", "makedirs"}
and not (node.attr == "environ" and id(node) in self._allowed_os_environ_attrs)
):
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Restricted OS access 'os.{node.attr}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove restricted os attributes.",
})
if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id == "sys" and node.attr != "stdin":
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Restricted sys access 'sys.{node.attr}' is prohibited; only sys.stdin is allowed (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove restricted sys attributes.",
})
if isinstance(node.value, ast.Attribute) and (node.value.attr, node.attr) in DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Chained dangerous attribute '{node.value.attr}.{node.attr}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove unsafe chained system execution calls.",
})
if node.attr in DANGEROUS_SPECIAL_ATTRS:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Prohibited access to internal introspection attribute '{node.attr}' (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Avoid dunder attribute reflection exploits.",
})
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Import(self, node: ast.Import):
for alias in node.names:
root_mod = alias.name.split(".")[0]
if root_mod in ("os", "sys") and alias.asname:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Aliased import of restricted module '{alias.name}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": "Remove aliased import of 'os'.",
})
if root_mod in DANGEROUS_IMPORTS:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Import of restricted or dangerous module '{alias.name}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": f"Remove import of '{alias.name}'.",
})
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_ImportFrom(self, node: ast.ImportFrom):
if node.module:
root_mod = node.module.split(".")[0]
if root_mod in ("os", "sys"):
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Import from restricted module '{node.module}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": f"Remove import from '{node.module}'.",
})
if root_mod in DANGEROUS_IMPORTS:
self.diagnostics.append({
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Import from restricted or dangerous module '{node.module}' is prohibited (line {node.lineno}).",
"fix_suggestion": f"Remove import from '{node.module}'.",
})
self.generic_visit(node)
def inspect_generated_ast_security(python_code: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""
Inspects synthesized Python AST for security violations (banned modules, dangerous callables,
introspection tampering). Returns list of CodegenDiagnostic dictionary objects.
"""
try:
tree = ast.parse(python_code)
visitor = SecurityASTVisitor()
visitor.visit(tree)
return visitor.diagnostics
except SyntaxError as e:
return [{
"code": "SYNTAX-ERROR",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"Syntax error in synthesized code: {str(e)}",
"fix_suggestion": "Ensure generated Python code has valid syntax.",
}]
except Exception as exc:
return [{
"code": "CODEGEN-SECURITY-VIOLATION",
"severity": "error",
"message": f"AST parsing failed: {str(exc)}",
"fix_suggestion": "Verify code validity.",
}]
def validate_generated_ast(python_code: str, check_security: bool = True) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""
Validates that synthesized Python code compiles into a valid Abstract Syntax Tree
and passes security AST inspection (rejecting eval, exec, os.system, etc.).
Never executes the code; only inspects AST structures statically.
Returns (True, None) if valid and safe, or (False, error_description) if invalid or unsafe.
"""
try:
tree = ast.parse(python_code)
if check_security:
visitor = SecurityASTVisitor()
visitor.visit(tree)
if visitor.diagnostics:
first_diag = visitor.diagnostics[0]
return False, f"[{first_diag['code']}] {first_diag['message']}"
return True, None
except SyntaxError as e:
return False, f"SyntaxError at line {e.lineno}, col {e.offset}: {e.msg}"
except Exception as e:
return False, f"AST Parse Error: {str(e)}"
|