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45.4 kB
| [ | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 0, | |
| "section": "overview", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: Case Study Questionnaire (Version 2)\n\n**Case ID:** CS12\n**Case study title:** Dhye village community relocation to Thangchung (Tsawale–Chawale), Upper Mustang, Nepal\n**Country:** Nepal — **Global North/South:** South — **Region:** Lo-Ghekar Damodarkunda / Surkhang VDC, Upper Mustang (Lo / \"Lo-pa\"), Mustang District, Dhaulagiri Zone\n\n> Scope note: This document synthesizes only the four reviewed sources [1]–[4]. Dhye is a slow-onset, climate-driven, community-initiated relocation of an entire Gurung/Tibetan-Buddhist subsistence village. It differs substantially from the buyout-style managed-retreat cases the RFR questionnaire was primarily designed around (no government buyout, no compensation mechanism, no formal acquisition program). Where the questionnaire assumes a formal program, that is flagged as \"N/A\" or \"limited evidence\" rather than forced into a category.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 1, | |
| "section": "general_information", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: GENERAL INFORMATION\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive / Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Mixed — predominantly **Reactive** to a slow-onset hazard, but with strong **Proactive / anticipatory** community-led planning elements.\n\n**Narrative:** Sources describe a decades-long deterioration in water and agricultural conditions, and frame relocation as an adaptation strategy [1,3,4]. Snowfall has diminished, springs and ponds have dried, and irrigation water has become insufficient, progressively forcing households out: \"Ten of the 24 local households have already moved to different locations, one going as far as India\" [1]; per-household cultivated land fell from 70 ropani to 30 ropani over 20 years and roughly 75% of land lies uncultivated [2,3]. In that sense the trigger is reactive to accumulating loss. However, the decision to move the *whole* village was taken in advance of complete collapse, \"as a last resort\" [1], and was deliberately planned — with site selection, hydrological feasibility study, and land-suitability analysis [2,3] — an anticipatory dimension consistent with proactive adaptation. Prasain explicitly frames resettlement as \"the best adaptation option\" and calls for \"proper policy on climate change adaptation, and its timely implementation that could have averted this situation\" [3].\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Reactive\" is the primary code because action follows demonstrable degradation of water and agricultural resources. \"Proactive\" is noted as a secondary characteristic because the community planned a managed, collective move ahead of total failure, not as a post-disaster emergency evacuation.\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:** Date — deterioration documented over ~40 years; formal documentation and relocation planning concentrated ~2012–2019. Households — 26 total in Dhye; 10 already relocated at time of study [3]. Population — reported as 131 in 2018 (72 male, 59 female) [3] and 163 in 2019 (88 male, 75 female) [2], likely reflecting different survey timing and out-migration. Total funding — **No source reports a formal relocation budget**; available evidence points to limited NGO technical and material support rather than a documented funding envelope.\n\n**Narrative:** Source accounts differ on population (131 in 2018 [3]; 163 in 2019 [2]), reflecting out-migration and survey timing rather than contradiction; both agree on 26 households. Bernet et al. report \"ten of the 24 local households have already moved,\" with 14 remaining [1]. No source reports a total relocation cost or allocated funding envelope; the move has proceeded incrementally with households bearing much of the burden (see Funding sources).\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard / Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple Hazards** (cascading, climate-driven).\n\n**Narrative:** The dominant hazard is slow-onset **drought / water scarcity** caused by diminished and erratic snowfall and declining precipitation, drying springs and ponds [1,2,3]. This cascades into agricultural failure, pasture/rangeland degradation, livestock loss, and desertification (barren land up 58%, 1979–2009) [4]. Soil erosion is cited as a driver of the community's earliest historical migration (Ghayu to Jhong) [2], and the *receiving* site at Thangchung carries **riverine flood** risk — it sits on flood debris at the confluence of the Kali Gandaki, Dhye Khola, and Tsarang Khola; \"flood had occurred from Dhye Khola in the past\" [2] — which was assessed in site selection [2,3]. Human–wildlife conflict (crop raiding by blue sheep, livestock depredation by snow leopard) is a further cascading consequence of the broader ecosystem change [4].\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Multiple Hazards\" — the decision integrates drought/water scarcity, ecosystem/rangeland decline, and flood risk at the destination, which the codebook treats as multiple/compound/cascading.\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard / Natural Hazard / Climate Change)\n\n**Answer:** **Climate change.**\n\n**Narrative:** All four sources attribute the hazards to anthropogenic climate change: upper Mustang warming ~0.13 °C/yr (1987–2009) [4]; rising maximum temperature (~0.05 °C/yr) and declining relative humidity and precipitation near Dhye [3]; Mann-Kendall trends showing rising temperature and shifting precipitation [2]. The villagers are repeatedly described as among \"the world's poorest communities [who] often suffer the most from the effects of climate change, though they have contributed the least to its causes\" [1], and as \"Nepal's first climate refugees\" [2]. The codebook identifies \"Climate change\" as the appropriate origin code when hazards are climate-change driven, distinct from the general \"Natural hazard\" category.\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion; Riverine/Pluvial Flooding; Lake Flooding/Erosion; Wildfire; Volcano; Land Subsidence; Landslide/Debris Flow; Earthquake; Tsunami; Hurricane; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Other (drought / water scarcity / desertification — primary driver)**; **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding** (assessed at the receiving site, Thangchung, as part of site suitability analysis).\n\n**Narrative:** The decisive hazard does not map cleanly to the bracketed flood-centric list; it is **\"Other\": drought-driven water scarcity** from diminished snowmelt-fed flows [1,2,3]. **Riverine flooding** is relevant specifically to the destination site evaluation: ~166.5 ha at Thangchung is flood-prone and Dhye Khola has flooded before [2]; flood risk at the receiving site was explicitly considered in the MCDA suitability analysis and site planning [2,3]. Soil erosion is mentioned as a historical driver of the community's earliest migration (Ghayu to Jhong) [2] but is not described as a mass-movement / landslide/debris-flow event and is therefore **not coded** as Landslide/Debris Flow, which the codebook defines as mass movement of soil or rock down a slope. Coastal, lake, wildfire, volcano, earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, and land subsidence are **not applicable** based on the reviewed sources.\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes; A few streets; Neighbourhood; Entire community; Sub-watershed; Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** **Entire community.**\n\n**Narrative:** The defining feature of this case is the decision to \"move the entire village\" of 26 households as a collective unit to a single relocation plain at Thangchung [1,3]. Although individual households had already left piecemeal (10 of 26) [3], the planned managed action is whole-community resettlement.\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals; Groups/Neighbourhoods; Communities; Critical infrastructure; Hazard protection structures; Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** **Communities** (with an **Individuals/Groups** dimension for households that left independently beforehand).\n\n**Narrative:** The intended action is relocation of an entire community [1,3]. The earlier, unplanned departures of individual households (some as far as India) represent an \"Individuals/Groups\" pattern of distress migration that preceded and motivated the collective decision [1,2].\n\n### Other notes (General)\n\nDhye's relocation is the community's **third historical migration** (Ghayu → Jhong → Dhye, over approximately 500–1,000 years), but only this third move (Dhye → Thangchung) is attributed to climate change [2]. All villagers share the Gurung surname, follow Tibetan Buddhism, accept the Dalai Lama as spiritual leader, and speak Lowa (Tibetan) [3] — a culturally distinct, place-rooted community, which is central to the socio-cultural coding below. The term \"Indigenous\" is used here as an analytical characterization consistent with this cultural distinctiveness, not as a term found verbatim in the sources. Elevation of Dhye is reported as ~3,800 m [4], ~3,860 m [2], and ~3,920–4,000 m [1,3], reflecting different survey conventions and transliterations; spelling also varies (Dhye/Dhe/Dheye/Dhey).\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 2, | |
| "section": "institutional_environment", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat; Community buyout/retreat; Leasebacks, easements and buffers; Other acquisition tools; Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** **Other acquisition tools** — specifically, community-led planned relocation/resettlement without buyout or acquisition.\n\n**Narrative:** There is no government purchase of properties, no compensation, and no acquisition instrument of any kind. The community collectively decided to abandon ancestral land and resettle on a plain at Thangchung [1,3]. \"Community buyout/retreat\" (as defined in the codebook: collective relocation through coordinated planning) was considered as the nearest fit but is misleading because \"buyout\" implies an acquisition mechanism that is entirely absent here. \"Other acquisition tools\" with the explicit note of **community-led resettlement / planned relocation without buyout** is the more accurate coding. The community initiated and drove the process \"after failing to receive substantive outside assistance\" [3].\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process? Are there legal frameworks/regulations guiding it? (Litigation; Legal authority over retreat; Relevant regulations/acts; Home acquisition; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Land rezoning; Retreat land development; Compliance & enforcement; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Limited evidence.** Closest applicable: **Land acquisition / land use** (informal use of government land at the receiving site) and **Other** (a community petition for formal \"climate refugee\" recognition).\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources describe almost no formal legal architecture for the relocation. The community used **132 ha of government land at Chawale** for an apple-farming cooperative (\"Dhye Thangjung Agricultural Cooperative Organization,\" formed 2011) [2], implying some arrangement over government land, but no documented title transfer or statutory program. Residents sought to be officially recognised as \"climate refugees\" and distributed a local-language pamphlet of findings to \"convince the concerned line agencies to officially recognize them\" [3], but no enabling act, litigation, rezoning, or compliance framework is reported. Prasain explicitly calls for the need \"to make proper policy on climate change adaptation, and its timely implementation\" [3] and recommends facilitating relocation \"with legal process for resettlement\" — indicating such legal process was largely **absent**.\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project? (Local/Municipal only; Provincial/State only; Federal only; Multiple funders; International aid; Local/Municipal; Provincial/State; Federal; Individual; NGOs; Lenders; Insurance)\n\n**Answer:** Predominantly **Individual** (households bearing much of the burden), with NGO technical and material support; **no evidence of a formal relocation funding program or substantive government funding.**\n\n**Narrative:** Households financed their own departures and the early cooperative investment [2]. External involvement came from **NGOs**: the Swiss NGO **Kam For Sud** led the assessment and proposed low-tech irrigation and drinking-water support at the relocation site [1], and **Care Nepal** built water taps and trained villagers in vegetable cultivation [2]. These constitute technical and material assistance rather than a documented transfer of relocation funds. Prasain emphasises that residents acted \"after failing to receive substantive outside assistance\" [3], confirming that government funding was effectively **absent / sought but not received**. Because no formal relocation budget is documented, \"NGOs\" and \"International aid\" are noted as sources of technical/material support in the narrative, but the primary funding code is **Individual**.\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process? (New industry; New housing for BO recipients; Assisting BO recipients to find housing; Redevelopment of retreat lands; Livelihoods supports; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Livelihoods supports** (apple/horticulture cooperative economy) — coded; conventional municipal tax-base considerations are **N/A** in this subsistence context.\n\n**Narrative:** A formal municipal tax base is not a frame in these sources. The economically analogous consideration is **livelihood restoration**: the community established an apple/walnut/apricot/peach cooperative on 132 ha at Chawale (8,000 apple plants, harvesting since ~2015) explicitly to sustain incomes after relocation [2]. \"Livelihoods supports\" best captures this; the remaining options (new housing for buyout recipients, redevelopment of retreat lands) are not applicable.\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered? (Market value; Tax value; Post-disaster value; Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups; Free supports and services; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **None / N/A.**\n\n**Narrative:** No compensation mechanism is described in any source. Because this is a self-organized relocation rather than a buyout, residents received no market-value, tax-value, or post-disaster payments. The only external support was NGO technical and material assistance (water infrastructure proposals, agricultural training) [1,2], which is coded under funding and livelihoods rather than compensation.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 3, | |
| "section": "planning_processes", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process? (Pre-retreat planning; Immediate risks 1-5 yrs; Emerging risks 5-10; Anticipated future risks 10-100; Post-retreat follow-up)\n\n**Answer:** **Pre-retreat planning**, **Immediate risks (1–5 yrs)** and **Anticipated future risks (10–100 yrs)** — a multi-decade horizon.\n\n**Narrative:** Planning explicitly looks forward: the relocation site was chosen partly because ~12% of its 363 km² catchment is glaciated, \"promising a reliable water source for the next few decades at least\" [1], and a hydrological study confirmed an absolute minimum Dhye River flow (31 lps, 20-year return period) \"enough to meet irrigation demand\" after all 26 households resettle [3]. This combines immediate need (current water failure) with a longer-horizon site security assessment. Pre-retreat planning is evidenced by the NGO and research assessments preceding the move [1,3]; post-retreat follow-up is **not yet documented** in the reviewed sources.\n\n### What planning elements were considered? (MCDA; Adaptive management; Bottom-up; Top down; Multi-sectoral; Single-stage; Multi-stage; Degree of transparency; Public private partnerships; Coordination w/ sectors & jurisdictions; Bureaucracy reduction; CBA; Participatory/collaborative)\n\n**Answer:** **MCDA; Bottom-up; Multi-stage retreat; Participatory/collaborative; Degree of transparency.**\n\n**Narrative:** Sherchan applied **Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)** to compare Dhye and Thangchung Chawale across agriculture, water, slope, erosion, flood, livelihood, health, and transport criteria, scoring Thangchung 0.7585 vs Dhye 0.3048 [2] — a clear multi-criteria planning element. The process is **bottom-up / community-initiated**: \"relocation project was well accepted by the whole population of Dhye, and had been initiated by them\" [3]. It is inherently **multi-stage**: households have departed gradually over decades, with whole-community resettlement as the culminating stage [1,3]. Research was **participatory/collaborative** — farmers helped shape research design through FGD/KII and initial consultation with Kathmandu-based Dhye residents [3] — and **transparency** is evidenced by a local-language pamphlet of findings distributed to residents and stakeholders [3]. There is **no evidence** of top-down government direction, formal CBA, or public-private partnerships.\n\n### What decision support tools were used? (CBA; MCDA; Housing assessment; Hazard maps & models; CC projection models; Demographic projections; Process guidance; Social vulnerability assessments; Socioeconomic projections; New site evaluation process)\n\n**Answer:** **MCDA; Hazard maps & models; CC projection models; Demographic projections; New site evaluation process; Social vulnerability assessments.**\n\n**Narrative:** This case is unusually rich in decision-support analytics for a small community. Tools include: **MCDA** land-suitability scoring [2]; **GIS hazard maps** for soil, slope, erosion, aspect, land use, and flood at the receiving site [2]; **climate-projection / trend models** (linear regression and best-fit models projecting temperature doubling by 2161 [4]; Mann-Kendall temperature/precipitation trends [2]; NASA/DHM regressions and NDVI vegetation analysis [3]); **demographic projections** (population trend analysis 1971–2011 [2]); and a formal **new-site evaluation** (hydrological feasibility of Dhye River flow at Thangchung [3]; catchment/glaciation assessment [1]). **Social vulnerability** is documented through low HDI, Human Poverty Index, and Global Hunger Index values [3]. No formal CBA or housing assessment is reported.\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas? (Availability of existing housing; Identifying priority areas; Construction of new housing; Individuals vs neighbourhoods/communities; Social carrying capacity)\n\n**Answer:** **Identifying priority areas; Construction of new housing/settlement; Social carrying capacity** (water sufficiency assessed).\n\n**Narrative:** Thangchung (Tsawale–Chawale) was specifically **identified and evaluated** as the priority receiving site through MCDA and hydrological study [2,3]; the community already owns the plain [1]. Initial **development at the site** is underway (apple cooperative; planned full-village settlement) [2]. **Social carrying capacity** was directly assessed: the hydrological analysis tested whether Dhye River flow would suffice \"after all the 26 HHs resettle at Thangchung,\" concluding it would [3]. The receiving-area work explicitly addresses whether the site can sustain the whole community long-term.\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands (the abandoned Dhye lands)? (Allow hazard-resilient rebuilding; Reducing/eliminating servicing; Community involvement; Natural use; Multi-purpose use; Demolition/removal; Decontamination; Rezoning; Site design & restoration; Planting/landscaping; Commemoration; Maintenance; Ownership transfer; Conservation land trust; Recognition of retreat land benefits)\n\n**Answer:** **Limited evidence.** Closest: **Natural use / abandonment**, with continued seasonal **maintenance** (some residents return for planting and harvest).\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources focus on the *receiving* site and say little about planned future uses for the vacated Dhye lands. Many fields are simply abandoned (~75% uncultivated due to water scarcity) [2,3], and \"many Dhye farmers visit the village only at time of plantation and harvesting\" [3], implying residual seasonal use rather than a deliberate retreat-land management plan. No demolition, restoration, conservation trust, or commemoration scheme is documented. This is a clear evidence gap.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 4, | |
| "section": "community_engagement", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT\n\n### What degree of choice was provided to affected people? (Completely voluntary; Voluntary w/ incentives or future restrictions; Voluntary w/ strong persuasion; Involuntary w/ some opt-out; Completely involuntary/mandatory)\n\n**Answer:** **Completely voluntary** (community-initiated and unanimous).\n\n**Narrative:** The relocation was decided by the community itself: \"the Dhye farmers unanimously decided to leave their habitats en masse and resettle at Thangchung\" [3], and the project \"had been initiated by them\" [3]. There is no external authority compelling the move; if anything, residents sought and did not substantively receive external support. The \"choice,\" however, is constrained by environmental and survival necessity — voluntary in governance terms but driven by progressively unliveable conditions, a nuance worth preserving.\n\n### What land user groups were involved or considered? (Homeowners; Leased land owners; Renters; Commercial; Community/NGO; First Nations/Indigenous; Government)\n\n**Answer:** **Homeowners (subsistence landholders); Community/NGO; First Nations/Indigenous (analytical characterisation); Government (limited).**\n\n**Narrative:** The affected people are a culturally distinct community — all villagers share the Gurung surname, follow Tibetan Buddhism, accept the Dalai Lama as spiritual leader, and speak Lowa (Tibetan) [3]. They are subsistence **landholders/homeowners** (not renters or commercial operators). **NGOs** (Kam For Sud, Care Nepal) and, peripherally, **government** line agencies (rural municipality, ACAP, DHM, DADO) are involved [1,2,3]. The \"First Nations/Indigenous\" code is retained as an analytical characterisation of this culturally distinct, place-rooted community; the exact term \"Indigenous\" does not appear verbatim in the sources.\n\n### What actors participated in the governance structure? Is there evidence they shaped outcomes? (Funders; Affected community; Receiving communities; Political champions; Government agencies; Public; Private sector—consultants; Private sector—affected/receiving area; First Nations/Indigenous communities; NGOs/CBOs; Academics/researchers)\n\n**Answer:** **Affected community (decisive); NGOs/CBOs; Academics/researchers; Government agencies (limited).**\n\n**Narrative:** The **affected community** shaped the outcome most directly, initiating and approving the move and forming the agricultural cooperative [2,3]. **NGOs** (Kam For Sud, Care Nepal) provided technical assessment and material support [1,2]. **Academics/researchers** (the authors of [2], [3], [4] and Bernet's interdisciplinary team [1]) produced the analytics that underpinned and validated the decision. **Government agencies** appear mainly as data sources (DHM, DADO) and as bodies the community lobbied for climate-refugee recognition, with limited direct governance influence [3]. No political champion or private consultant is documented as shaping outcomes.\n\n### Who ultimately made decisions? (Property owners; Government; Community; Hazard experts; Financial institutions)\n\n**Answer:** **Community.**\n\n**Narrative:** Decision authority rests with the community of Dhye, who decided unanimously to relocate [3]. Researchers and NGOs informed and validated but did not decide; government did not direct the move.\n\n### Was the engagement approach explicitly incorporated? (Visualization; Community engagement; Transparency; Ongoing updates; Mapping; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Community engagement; Transparency; Mapping.**\n\n**Narrative:** Engagement was built into the research and assessment process: household surveys of all houses, FGDs and KIIs, and initial consultation with Dhye residents in Kathmandu to co-design the questionnaire [3]. **Transparency** is evidenced by the local-language pamphlet of findings shared with residents and stakeholders so they could \"publicize their plight and seek official recognition as climate refugees\" [3]. **Mapping** (GIS land-suitability and hazard maps, satellite imagery, NDVI analysis) was integral to the process and communicable [2,4]. These were participatory rather than top-down communications.\n\n### What community resources supported the transition? (Homeowner BO caseworker; Temporary housing advisor; Relocation assistance; Real estate hazard advisor; Community capacity building; Livelihood restoration support; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Livelihood restoration support; Community capacity building** (NGO-enabled).\n\n**Narrative:** The clearest transition resource is **livelihood restoration**: the cooperative apple/fruit enterprise at Chawale designed to provide post-move income [2], plus Care Nepal's vegetable-cultivation training and water taps [2] and Kam For Sud's proposed low-tech irrigation/drinking-water support at the relocation site [1]. These also constitute **community capacity building**. Formal buyout caseworkers, housing advisors, or real-estate advisors are **N/A** (no buyout program).\n\n### What supports were provided to facilitate engagement? (Psychosocial; Case workers; Community engagement support; Childcare; Transportation; Community liaison; Tech support; Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Community liaison** (informal); **Tech support** (technical/agricultural extension) — limited.\n\n**Narrative:** Support was modest: an informal **community-liaison** dynamic via Kathmandu-based Dhye residents who helped researchers establish trust, update the questionnaire, and fix the field schedule [3], and **technical support** from NGOs (water infrastructure proposals, agricultural training) [1,2]. No psychosocial services, childcare, transportation assistance, or formal case-management are documented — a notable support gap given the cultural and emotional weight of abandoning an ancestral village.\n\n### What language or framing was used to engage the community? (Links to community resilience-building; Frame as opportunity; Managed/planned/facilitated/assisted; Retreat; Relocation; Resettlement; Migration; Movement; Community visioning; Part of community visioning; Other terms)\n\n**Answer:** **Migration; Relocation; Resettlement; Movement (\"moving down\"); Links to community resilience-building.** The literature and local advocacy materials also use \"**climate refugee**.\"\n\n**Narrative:** The literature uses several overlapping terms: \"**relocation**\" and \"**resettlement**\" [2,3], \"**migration**\" and \"**moving down**\" [1,3,4], and the contested label \"**climate refugee**\"/\"Nepal's first climate refugees\" [2,3] — used in source and advocacy materials but not a legally conferred status. Sherchan's recommendation to build a \"**climate-smart/resilient village community so they do not need to migrate again**\" links the move to **community resilience-building** [2]. The framing is largely necessity- and survival-oriented (\"last resort\" [1]) rather than opportunity-framed, though the apple-economy narrative introduces a modest opportunity dimension.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 5, | |
| "section": "socio_cultural_considerations", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: SOCIO-CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS\n\n### What special considerations for First Nations / Indigenous communities were included? (Framing & language; Decision-making context; Importance of non-market values; Place attachment; Ancestral lands; Culturally important sites; Support for land back; Reserve land limitations; Communal lands; Historical forced relocations; Land and identity links)\n\n**Answer:** **Place attachment; Ancestral lands; Culturally important sites; Non-market values; Communal lands; Historical relocations; Land and identity links.**\n\n**Narrative:** Dhye is a culturally distinct Gurung community (Tibetan-Buddhist, Lowa-speaking) [3], and socio-cultural stakes are high. **Ancestral lands and place attachment** are strong: this is the community's long-standing home (approximately 300–400 years) within a deeper migration heritage (Ghayu → Jhong → Dhye) [2]. **Culturally important sites** include \"exquisitely painted caves in vertical cliffs over Dhye and the Kali Gandaki River\" [3] and the broader Buddhist landscape. **Non-market and identity values** are emphasised — relocation threatens \"cultural values, indigenous practices and ancestral heritages\" and risks community identity loss [2,3]. The lands are effectively **communal** (all villagers share the Gurung surname) [3]. The community's **history of repeated relocation** is documented, though earlier moves were not attributed to climate change [2]. These factors make the case a clear instance of land–identity linkage under climate stress.\n\n### What equity considerations were addressed? (Equity in retreat compensation; Reducing historical inequities; Vulnerable & marginalized members; Homeowners vs renters vs communal owners; Fairness in decision-making; Cultural & built heritage impacts; Continued access to services; Intergenerational equity)\n\n**Answer:** **Vulnerable & marginalized community members; Cultural & built heritage impacts; Continued access to services; Intergenerational equity;** and climate **justice framing**.\n\n**Narrative:** A central equity theme is **climate injustice**: these are among \"the world's poorest communities [who] often suffer the most from the effects of climate change, though they have contributed the least to its causes\" [1], with low HDI (0.482), Human Poverty Index (41), and Global Hunger Index (20–29.0) [3]. **Cultural/built heritage impacts** are significant (painted caves, ancestral village) [3]. **Continued access to services** was a key decision criterion — Thangchung was favoured partly for shorter distance to health post (1 hour vs. 3 hours) and transport access [2]. **Intergenerational equity** appears in the skewed demography: youth and children have been leaving and the primary school closed for lack of students, threatening community continuity [3]. Compensation equity is **N/A** (no compensation mechanism exists).\n\n### What resilience, Build Back Better (BBB), or DRR goals were achieved? (Resilient infrastructure; Reduced hazard exposure; Increased community resilience; Maintain/enhance social capital; Maintain/enhance housing; Maintain/enhance ecosystems; Maintaining tax base; Enhancing tax base)\n\n**Answer:** **Reduced hazard exposure; Increased community resilience; Maintain/enhance social capital** (intended). Ecosystem and infrastructure outcomes are **mixed/uncertain**.\n\n**Narrative:** The relocation's core DRR logic is **reduced exposure** to water scarcity by moving to a glacier-fed, more water-secure catchment [1,3]. Moving as a *whole community* is intended to **maintain social capital** (\"for the collective survival of the community\") [3], and the apple cooperative aims to **increase economic resilience** [2]. However, BBB outcomes are not guaranteed: the receiving site is **flood-prone** (on flood debris at a three-river confluence) with poor drinking-water quality, prompting Sherchan's recommendations for flood mitigation, tree-crop planting to reduce flood proneness, and water treatment [2] — indicating a **maladaptation risk** if these measures are not implemented. No formal tax-base or resilient-infrastructure program is documented.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 6, | |
| "section": "cross_cutting_themes", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: CROSS-CUTTING THEMES (notes not captured above)\n\n**Planning Processes:** Dhye is a strong example of **slow-onset, community-led, anticipatory relocation** used as climate adaptation rather than post-disaster buyout — closer to \"managed migration/resettlement\" than to North-American buyout programs. It demonstrates **phased/gradual retreat** (decades of household departures culminating in collective move) and **multi-solving / co-benefits** thinking via the apple-economy transition [2]. It also illustrates **maladaptation risk**: relocating onto a flood-prone debris plain trades one hazard for another unless flood mitigation and water treatment are implemented [2]. A climate-trend model projects mean annual temperature doubling by 2161 [4], underscoring the multi-generational planning horizon.\n\n**Institutional Environment:** A defining feature is **institutional absence** — the community acted largely without government funding, legal framework, or compensation, \"after failing to receive substantive outside assistance\" [3]. The case is repeatedly used to argue for **proactive climate-adaptation policy** and formal resettlement legislation that did not exist in time [3]. NGOs (Kam For Sud, Care Nepal) partially filled the institutional gap through technical and material support rather than funded programming.\n\n**Community Engagement:** Engagement is **endogenous** — the community is both decision-maker and initiator, with researchers and NGOs in supporting roles [3]. This inverts the top-down dynamic common in buyout cases and offers a model of **community-driven** retreat, though it also reflects the community being largely **left to manage the process without substantive outside support**.\n\n**Socio-Cultural Considerations:** The case foregrounds **cultural distinctiveness, place attachment, and heritage loss** under climate change, including the contested **\"climate refugee\"** framing used by the literature and local advocacy materials [2,3]. **More-than-human** dimensions are notable: climate-driven range shifts bring blue sheep and snow leopards into conflict with people, compounding livelihood stress [4].\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS12", | |
| "chunk_index": 7, | |
| "section": "additional_notes", | |
| "location": "Dhye, Mustang District", | |
| "country": "Nepal", | |
| "country_normalized": "Nepal", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "Mustang District", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Dhye Community Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. Climatic Change, 148, 279-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2187-1" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bernet, D., et al. (2012). Moving down or not? Moving a whole village as a last resort in Upper Mustang, Nepal. KAM for Sud/SUPSI.", | |
| "url": "https://kamforsud.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Climate-Change-Report-Part-4-Dheye-1.pdf" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Aryal, A., et al. (2014). Climate change and human-wildlife conflict in the Trans-Himalaya region of Nepal. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-013-0902-4" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Dhye Community Relocation (Dhye, Mustang District, Nepal)\nSection: ADDITIONAL NOTES AND LESSONS LEARNED\n\n1. **A rare Global-South, slow-onset, community-initiated managed retreat.** Dhye contrasts sharply with reactive, government-run buyout cases: there is no buyout, compensation, or acquisition instrument, and the community itself drives the process [1,3]. It expands the RFR sample toward *anticipatory, community-led* relocation under water scarcity rather than flood disaster.\n\n2. **Analytically sophisticated for its scale.** Despite minimal institutional support, the decision was backed by MCDA, GIS hazard/suitability mapping" | |
| } | |
| ] |