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| [ | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS34", | |
| "chunk_index": 0, | |
| "section": "overview", | |
| "location": "San Antonio, Texas", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "Texas", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β San Antonio", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, A., & Brokopp Binder, S. (2017). A Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?. Housing Policy Debate, 27(3), 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, Alex, and Sherri Brokopp Binder. 2017. βA Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?β Housing Policy Debate 27 (3): 372β92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209.", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: San Antonio (San Antonio, Texas, United States)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case Name and Location:** San Antonio, Texas Floodplain Buyout (Wheatley Heights, Plumnear, Briarglen, and Martinez Creek neighbourhoods), San Antonio, Texas, United States.\n\n**Hazard(s):** Riverine and pluvial flooding. On October 17, 1998, southeastern Texas was struck by severe storms, producing approximately 20 inches of rain in a 24-hour period in a city that typically receives less than 30 inches of rain annually. Fraser et al. (2003, p. 20) note the event was \"labeled a '500-year' storm in some watersheds.\" The resulting runoff caused severe flooding from Salado Creek, Upper Olmos Creek, Leon Creek, and the San Antonio River.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Voluntary individual property buyout program funded primarily through FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). The City of San Antonio acquired over 400 flood-damaged structures in the floodplain, offering homeowners pre-flood fair market value for their properties. The acquired land was converted to open space, and the Wheatley Heights site was later redeveloped into a sports complex (Zavar 2019).\n\n**Scale:** Over 400 structures were acquired across the Wheatley Heights, Plumnear, Briarglen, and Martinez Creek neighbourhoods (Fraser et al. 2003; Greer & Binder 2017). Zavar (2019) specifies that approximately 200 properties in the Wheatley Heights neighbourhood were acquired after flooding along the Salado Creek. The affected areas included low-income minority neighbourhoods. Precise population counts are not reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Key Actors:** The City of San Antonio was the primary implementing agency, taking the notable step of committing city funds before receiving guaranteed federal reimbursement. FEMA provided HMGP funding (Fraser et al. 2003 state the buyout \"would ultimately receive nearly $10 million to help buy out over 400 structures\"). The Texas Division of Emergency Management served as the state intermediary. Housing counselors β drawn from community-based organizations already working in the affected neighbourhoods β played an important implementation role. Post-buyout, the nonprofit Eastside Christian Action Group (ECAG) and Community of Churches for Social Action led redevelopment of the Wheatley Heights site into a sports complex (Zavar 2019).\n\n**Timeline:** The flood occurred on October 17, 1998. San Antonio initiated the buyout within approximately two months of the flood (Fraser et al. 2003). Greer & Binder (2017) indicate the program operated for more than two years. Post-buyout land-use transformation continued after the retreat, including later redevelopment: in 2007, Bexar County leadership announced use of the Community Venues Program to develop amateur sports facilities at the site; groundbreaking occurred in October 2010, with the Wheatley Heights Sports Complex subsequently opening (Zavar 2019).\n\n**Key Outcomes:** The San Antonio buyout is described in the reviewed sources as one of the nation's largest buyout programs (Fraser et al. 2003). Notable achievements include removal of over 400 structures from the floodplain; reduced future flood risk for relocated households; creation of public open space including parks, hiking and biking trails (Fraser et al. 2003); and, eventually, a community sports complex in Wheatley Heights (Zavar 2019). The program also experienced significant challenges: frustration with federal and state bureaucracy; mistrust among some residents, including a lawsuit in San Antonio over buyout-related concerns (later dropped; Fraser et al. 2003); questions about the genuinely voluntary nature of participation; and persistent equity concerns about the impact on low-income and minority residents. Zavar (2019) argues that the sports-complex memorial narrative foregrounded future opportunity while downplaying the history of Wheatley Heights and the displacement of its residents.\n\n---\n\n**Narrative Summary**\n\nIn October 1998, San Antonio, Texas, experienced catastrophic flooding when severe storms delivered approximately 20 inches of rain in a single day, causing rivers and creeks to overflow into residential areas. Hundreds of homes were flooded or rendered uninhabitable. The hardest-hit areas were low-income and minority neighbourhoods, including the predominantly African American Wheatley Heights and the predominantly Hispanic Martinez Creek community. Facing pressure from advocates for low-income housing and criticism about slow response, city officials moved unusually quickly: within two months of the disaster, San Antonio committed its own funds to begin the buyout before federal reimbursement was guaranteed β a decision that city officials described as stressful but necessary to signal that help was coming (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\nThe buyout program acquired over 400 properties, funded primarily by FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, making it one of the nation's largest buyout programs at the time (Fraser et al. 2003). Homeowners were offered pre-flood fair market value for their properties, and the process was formally voluntary. A notable feature of the San Antonio program was its effective use of housing counselors β individuals already doing housing outreach in the affected neighbourhoods β who helped communicate the program to residents and relay concerns back to city staff. Fraser et al. (2003) describe this as one of the highlights of the San Antonio buyout. The acquired land was converted to open space; the former mayor articulated a vision of turning creeks \"from a negative into a positive,\" envisioning recreational amenities similar to the San Antonio River Walk (Fraser et al. 2003). Fraser et al. (2003) also note that as a result of the disaster and buyout, San Antonio became more focused on stormwater management and hazard mitigation.\n\nDespite these achievements, the program was not without controversy. Many residents across all study sites reported feeling pressured to participate, with the vast majority stating that alternatives were not practical (Fraser et al. 2003). Residents in Wheatley Heights were particularly mistrustful, with a lawsuit filed against the city over buyout-related concerns, though it was later dropped (Fraser et al. 2003). Bureaucratic friction between the city, state, and federal agencies caused significant frustration. Decades later, scholars examining the post-buyout landscape noted that the memorial and sports complex built on the Wheatley Heights site emphasized future opportunity and the contributions of those who developed it, while minimally acknowledging the displacement of former residents or the neighbourhood's history β a pattern raising important questions about equity, cultural heritage, and whose stories are preserved in managed retreat programs (Zavar 2019).\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS34", | |
| "chunk_index": 1, | |
| "section": "coding_questions", | |
| "location": "San Antonio, Texas", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "Texas", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β San Antonio", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, A., & Brokopp Binder, S. (2017). A Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?. Housing Policy Debate, 27(3), 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, Alex, and Sherri Brokopp Binder. 2017. βA Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?β Housing Policy Debate 27 (3): 372β92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209.", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: San Antonio (San Antonio, Texas, United States)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Reactive.\n\n**Narrative:** The San Antonio buyout was triggered directly by the October 1998 flood event. Fraser et al. (2003) describe the city as acting in the aftermath of the disaster β moving within two months β motivated by pressure from advocates for low-income housing and criticism that the city had not acted quickly enough. Greer & Binder (2017) classify this buyout alongside other post-disaster buyout programs initiated in response to a hazard event. There is no evidence in the reviewed sources of pre-event planning or proactive acquisition strategies for these specific properties prior to the 1998 flood.\n\nAlthough Fraser et al. (2003, p. 21) note that \"as a result of the disaster and resulting buyout, San Antonio has now become more focused on storm water management and hazard mitigation,\" this shift occurred after the buyout and does not alter the reactive character of the original trigger.\n\n**Code selected:** **Reactive.** No evidence supports a Proactive classification.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Date:** Flood: October 17, 1998 (Fraser et al. 2003). Buyout initiated: within approximately two months of the flood, approximately December 1998 (Fraser et al. 2003). Program operational for more than two years (Greer & Binder 2017). Post-buyout land-use transformation continued thereafter, with the Wheatley Heights Sports Complex groundbreaking in October 2010 and the sports complex announced in 2007 (Zavar 2019).\n\n**Number of households/structures acquired:** Over 400 structures (Fraser et al. 2003; Greer & Binder 2017). Zavar (2019) specifies approximately 200 properties in the Wheatley Heights neighbourhood specifically.\n\n**Number of population affected:** Not reported in the reviewed sources. The affected areas are described as low-income minority neighbourhoods (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\n**Total funding:** Fraser et al. (2003, p. 20) state that the buyout \"would ultimately receive nearly $10 million to help buy out over 400 structures.\" This refers to HMGP federal funds. The City of San Antonio also committed its own funds in advance of federal reimbursement (Fraser et al. 2003); the specific dollar amount of the city's advance contribution is not quantified in the reviewed sources. HMGP provides 75% of buyout costs, with a 25% match required from state or local government (Greer & Binder 2017; Fraser et al. 2003); whether the match was fulfilled by the state, city, or through CDBG-DR funds is not specified for San Antonio in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Single Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat decision was driven exclusively by riverine and pluvial flooding associated with the October 1998 storm event. No other hazard type is mentioned in the reviewed sources as contributing to the decision to pursue a buyout. Fraser et al. (2003) describe \"severe storms, flooding, and tornadoes\" as components of the broader weather event, but the buyout decision itself targeted properties in the flood-affected floodplains of Salado Creek, Upper Olmos Creek, Leon Creek, and the San Antonio River β all consequences of the same rainfall event.\n\n**Code selected:** **Single Hazard.**\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The flooding was caused by extreme natural precipitation β approximately 20 inches of rain in a 24-hour period β resulting in overflow from multiple creek and river systems (Fraser et al. 2003). No technological, industrial, or human-infrastructure failure is identified in the reviewed sources as causing or contributing to the flooding that triggered the buyout. Climate change is not discussed in relation to this event in any of the reviewed sources.\n\n**Code selected:** **Natural Hazard.**\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion), (Riverine/Pluvial Flooding), etc.\n\n**Answer:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding.\n\n**Narrative:** The flooding was caused by extreme rainfall causing rivers and creeks β Salado Creek, Upper Olmos Creek, Leon Creek, and the San Antonio River β to overflow into residential areas (Fraser et al. 2003). The buyout program targeted properties in these creek and river floodplains. Fraser et al. (2003, p. 20) describe \"severe flooding from Salado Creek, Upper Olmos Creek, Leon Creek, and the San Antonio River\" resulting from the rainfall event.\n\n**Code selected:** **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding.** No other hazard type applies.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** Neighbourhood (with Individual Homes as the unit of acquisition).\n\n**Narrative:** The buyout was concentrated in specific flood-affected neighbourhoods within San Antonio β Wheatley Heights, Plumnear, Briarglen, and Martinez Creek β rather than affecting the entire city or an entire watershed (Fraser et al. 2003). Within those neighbourhoods, the acquisition operated at the individual parcel level, with each homeowner independently offered a buyout. Zavar (2019) specifies approximately 200 of the 400+ acquired properties were in the Wheatley Heights neighbourhood alone, indicating substantial neighbourhood-scale concentration.\n\n**Codes selected:** **Neighbourhood** and **Individual Homes** (as the unit of acquisition). Both are appropriate: the geographic scope was neighbourhood-level, while the mechanism operated at the individual property level.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** Individuals and Groups/Neighbourhoods.\n\n**Narrative:** The retreat involved individual homeowners selling their properties and relocating. However, the affected households were concentrated in specific named low-income minority neighbourhoods. Fraser et al. (2003) describe the programme's geographic clustering across Wheatley Heights, Plumnear, Briarglen, and Martinez Creek. The Martinez Creek neighbourhood association was described as \"quite vocal about requesting city assistance\" (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 20), suggesting a degree of collective neighbourhood-level identity and advocacy. However, no evidence exists that entire neighbourhood groups were relocated together to a shared receiving area β individual households relocated independently.\n\nNo critical infrastructure, hazard protection structures, or industrial assets were retreated as part of this programme.\n\n**Codes selected:** **Individuals** and **Groups/Neighbourhoods.** \"Communities\" is not coded, as no collective relocation to a shared destination occurred.\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General information)\n\nThe San Antonio case is notable for its speed of implementation: city officials committed municipal funds before federal reimbursement was guaranteed, sending an early signal to affected residents that assistance was coming. Fraser et al. (2003, p. 20) describe this as giving the buyout \"an unprecedented start.\" The program is described as one of the nation's largest buyout programs (Fraser et al. 2003). Equity concerns regarding its impact on low-income and minority residents are a persistent theme across the reviewed sources. The case also illustrates the common pattern of reactive post-disaster buyouts in the United States during the late 1990s.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS34", | |
| "chunk_index": 2, | |
| "section": "institutional_environment", | |
| "location": "San Antonio, Texas", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "Texas", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β San Antonio", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, A., & Brokopp Binder, S. (2017). A Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?. Housing Policy Debate, 27(3), 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, Alex, and Sherri Brokopp Binder. 2017. βA Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?β Housing Policy Debate 27 (3): 372β92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209.", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: San Antonio (San Antonio, Texas, United States)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Individual buyout/retreat.\n\n**Narrative:** The San Antonio program operated as a voluntary individual property acquisition program. Each homeowner was approached individually and offered pre-flood fair market value for their property (Fraser et al. 2003; Greer & Binder 2017). There is no evidence in the reviewed sources that the program involved coordinated collective relocation of households to a shared new community, or that it employed easements, leaseback arrangements, or infrastructure realignment. The primary focus was acquiring individual parcels from willing sellers and converting the land to open space.\n\n**Code selected:** **Individual buyout/retreat.**\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Relevant regulations/acts; Home acquisition; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Retreat land development; Litigation.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** The buyout operated under FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) regulations. Key requirements included: properties must be within a presidentially declared disaster area; participation must be voluntary (agencies cannot use eminent domain); homeowners must be offered pre-event fair market value; and acquired land must be maintained as open space in perpetuity (Greer & Binder 2017; Fraser et al. 2003). FEMA contributes 75% of buyout costs, with a 25% match required from state or local government; CDBG-DR funds may serve as the match in some cases, though this is not specified for San Antonio in the reviewed sources (Greer & Binder 2017).\n\n- **Home acquisition / Land acquisition:** The city engaged in formal property acquisition processes including appraisals, title searches, lot surveys, and closings. Fraser et al. (2003, p. 8) describe these as standard components paid for by the implementing agency under HMGP.\n\n- **Title(s) transfer:** Property titles transferred from private homeowners to the City of San Antonio as part of standard acquisition procedures (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\n- **Retreat land development:** FEMA regulations required acquired land to remain as open space in perpetuity. Post-buyout, the Wheatley Heights site was eventually developed into a sports complex β a permissible open-space use. The Community Venues Program funding for the sports complex was announced in 2007, with groundbreaking in October 2010 (Zavar 2019).\n\n- **Litigation:** Fraser et al. (2003, p. 43) state: \"In San Antonio and North Dakota, residents brought lawsuits against the city over buyout-related concerns. While both lawsuits were dropped...\" In Wheatley Heights specifically, Fraser et al. (2003, p. 21) note \"there were rumors of a class-action lawsuit over the claim that the city had purposely flooded their neighborhood.\" The sources indicate a lawsuit was filed but dropped, not merely rumoured.\n\n**Note on Compliance & Enforcement and Moratoria:** Greer & Binder (2017) discuss moratoria on construction permits and the substantially damaged declaration as tools used in some HMGP-related buyout programs (e.g., Kinston). Their use in San Antonio specifically is not documented in the reviewed sources. City officials noted they could invoke condemnation power but stated they did not do so (Fraser et al. 2003). These are therefore not coded as confirmed San Antonio-specific legal elements.\n\n**Codes selected:** Relevant regulations/acts; Home acquisition; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Retreat land development; Litigation.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Multiple funders β Federal (FEMA/HMGP) and Local/Municipal (City of San Antonio).\n\n**Narrative:** The primary federal funding source was FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). Fraser et al. (2003, p. 20) state the buyout \"would ultimately receive nearly $10 million to help buy out over 400 structures.\" The City of San Antonio also committed its own municipal funds in advance of federal reimbursement: \"The City Council was able to make the decision that we needed to do something, even without any guarantee that there would be any backup from the state or federal level\" (city official, San Antonio, quoted in Fraser et al. 2003, p. 30). City officials noted \"we are still paying the price today for having gone out front like that\" (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 30).\n\nThe Texas Division of Emergency Management served as the state intermediary for HMGP administration, but its direct financial contribution is not quantified in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Code selected:** **Multiple funders** β specifically **Federal** (FEMA/HMGP as the dominant source) and **Local/Municipal** (City of San Antonio advance and match funding). Provincial/State involvement as intermediary is noted but financial contribution is not confirmed in reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Redevelopment of retreat lands (post-buyout). Limited direct evidence of tax-base considerations in the buyout decision itself.\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources do not document tax-base maintenance as an explicitly stated goal of the buyout decision process. The most relevant evidence relates to post-buyout land use. Former Mayor Howard Peak articulated a goal of turning creeks \"from a negative into a positive\" β creating recreational amenities rather than sources of flood risk and crime (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 21). This implies a longer-term economic and civic value framing.\n\nRegarding the later sports-complex development, Zavar (2019, p. 139) notes the plaque at the Wheatley Heights Sports Complex acknowledges a tourism tax applied to hotels and rental cars in Bexar County as the funding source for the athletic complex, and that for a neighbourhood with a median household income approximately $25,000 lower than the county average, the complex \"offers an opportunity for reinvestment in the community and growth.\" Zavar (2019) also notes that cost β including the loss of tax base from property acquisition β is a primary reason many buyout communities do not develop high-utility land uses on acquired sites.\n\nTax-base maintenance as a formal planning objective of the original buyout decision is not evidenced in the reviewed sources. The evidence points to a recreational and quality-of-life framing in the immediate post-buyout period, with economic development dimensions emerging later in the sports complex phase.\n\n**Code selected:** **Redevelopment of retreat lands** (post-buyout phase). Other categories (new industry, new housing for buyout recipients, livelihoods supports) are not evidenced for San Antonio.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Market value; Free supports and services.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Market value:** Under HMGP requirements, homeowners were offered pre-flood fair market value for their homes, as determined by a licensed appraiser (Greer & Binder 2017; Fraser et al. 2003). This is the standard applied in San Antonio, as in all HMGP-funded buyouts. Some residents felt the compensation was insufficient given their circumstances (Fraser et al. 2003), but this reflects dissatisfaction rather than a policy of below-market compensation.\n\n- **Free supports and services:** Closing costs and real estate transaction costs β including appraisals, title searches, lot surveys, and closing costs β were covered by the implementing agency (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 8). Housing counselors were provided at no cost to residents. Moving expenses are not required under HMGP (Greer & Binder 2017), and there is no specific evidence of moving expense assistance in San Antonio.\n\n- **Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups:** Unlike some other programs (e.g., Greenville and Kinston post-Floyd, which offered supplemental state funds of up to $75,000), there is no mention in the reviewed sources of San Antonio offering financial incentives beyond fair market value. Greer & Binder (2017, Figure 1) classify the San Antonio buyout as a Type 1 program β low financial incentives (homes purchased at fair market value) and low government involvement beyond the property purchase, with the notable exception of housing counselors as a support service.\n\n- **Post-disaster value:** No evidence that compensation was set below pre-flood fair market value in San Antonio.\n\n**Codes selected:** **Market value; Free supports and services.**\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS34", | |
| "chunk_index": 3, | |
| "section": "planning_processes", | |
| "location": "San Antonio, Texas", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "Texas", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β San Antonio", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, A., & Brokopp Binder, S. (2017). A Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?. Housing Policy Debate, 27(3), 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Greer, Alex, and Sherri Brokopp Binder. 2017. βA Historical Assessment of Home Buyout Policy: Are We Learning or Just Failing?β Housing Policy Debate 27 (3): 372β92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209.", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2016.1245209" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: San Antonio (San Antonio, Texas, United States)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Immediate risks (1β5 years); Pre-retreat planning (procedural); Post-retreat follow-up (partial evidence).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Immediate risks (1β5 years):** The buyout was driven by recognition that properties in the floodplain were imminently vulnerable to re-flooding. City officials explicitly framed the buyout as a response to acute post-disaster conditions. The rapid pace β beginning within two months of the flood β reflects a focus on addressing immediate risk (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** Limited and procedural rather than long-term strategic. The program involved appraisals, eligibility assessments, and application processes prior to property transfers, consistent with HMGP requirements. There is no evidence of pre-flood strategic planning for these specific acquisitions.\n\n- **Anticipated future risks (10β100 years):** Implicitly present β the perpetual open-space requirement reflects long-term risk reduction β but not explicitly articulated as a planning horizon in the reviewed sources for this case.\n\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Partial evidence. The sources document post-buyout land-use transformation continuing for over a decade (sports complex groundbreaking in 2010; Zavar 2019), and Fraser et al. (2003) note San Antonio's increased focus on stormwater management following the buyout. However, no formal post-retreat monitoring or welfare evaluation of relocated households is documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Codes selected:** Immediate risks (1β5 years); Pre-retreat planning (procedural); Post-retreat follow-up (partial). \"Anticipated future risks\" not coded, as it is not explicitly articulated in the sources for this case.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Top-down; Multi-sectoral; Single stage retreat; Degree of transparency (limited/inconsistent); Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions (attempted, with significant difficulties); Participatory/collaborative (limited β housing counselors as the primary mechanism); Cost-benefit analysis (required by HMGP).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Top-down:** Planning was led by the City of San Antonio in coordination with state and federal agencies. Residents had little input into program design. Across all four Fraser et al. study sites, 61% of respondents reported that flood victims had \"very little or no input in the way the buyout program was implemented\" (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 39). This is a cross-site finding, not San Antonio-specific, but the sources describe the San Antonio program as similarly top-down in structure.\n\n- **Multi-sectoral:** The program involved FEMA, HUD (in background), Texas Division of Emergency Management, city planning, public works, community development organizations, and housing counselors. However, this coordination was frequently described as dysfunctional: \"city staff were extremely frustrated by the length of time and amount of red tape necessary to move ahead with the buyout\" (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 20).\n\n- **Single stage retreat:** Properties were acquired in a single programmatic wave rather than a phased approach.\n\n- **Degree of transparency:** Inconsistent. The use of housing counselors was intended to improve transparency and was effective in San Antonio. However, city officials received inconsistent guidance from different agencies, which was communicated to residents and undermined clarity (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\n- **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions:** Attempted but difficult. San Antonio city officials complained of receiving different guidance from state and federal FEMA representatives, and expressed frustration with having to navigate multiple agency layers (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\n- **Participatory/collaborative:** Largely absent from formal program design. The Martinez Creek neighbourhood association advocated effectively (Fraser et al. 2003), and housing counselors served as a community interface, but residents had minimal formal input into program design.\n\n- **Cost-benefit analysis (CBA):** HMGP requires applicants to demonstrate cost-effectiveness; acquisition of substantially damaged homes (where repair costs exceed 50% of pre-flood value) is deemed cost-effective by default (Fraser et al. 2003; Greer & Binder 2017). Specific details of the San Antonio CBA are not reported.\n\n**No evidence for:** Adaptive management, Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), multi-stage retreat, public-private partnerships as a formal planning element, bureaucracy reduction.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Hazard maps & models; Housing assessment; CBA (required by HMGP).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Hazard maps & models:** FEMA's 100-year floodplain maps were used to determine property eligibility. Properties within the 100-year floodplain that were substantially damaged were deemed cost-effective for acquisition (Fraser et al. 2003; Greer & Binder 2017).\n\n- **Housing assessment:** Licensed appraisers determined pre-flood fair market values for properties (Fraser et al. 2003; Greer & Binder 2017). This constitutes a basic housing/property assessment.\n\n- **CBA:** Required as part of HMGP application (Fraser et al. 2003). Specific details of the San Antonio analysis are not reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n- **Process guidance:** Notably absent. A recurring theme in the sources is the lack of federal guidance. As quoted in Fraser et al. (2003, p. 35), one Kinston city official (describing the broader context experienced across sites) noted: \"We had assumed that after the Missouri floods in '93 that FEMA and everybody knew the protocol, had developed the protocols. We were absolutely stunned to find out that nobody knew a thing.\" San Antonio officials similarly described trial-and-error implementation (Fraser et al. 2003).\n\n**No evidence found for:** CC projection models, demographic projections, social vulnerability assessments, MCDA, socioeconomic projections, formal new site evaluation process.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Availability of existing housing (acknowledged as a challenge); Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities (individual relocation); no formal receiving-area plan documented.\n\n**Narrative:** San Antonio's buyout program did not establish formal receiving-area plans or construct new housing for displaced residents. Relocated households were expected to find their own replacement housing. The city provided housing counselors to assist residents in identifying options, but this fell short of a comprehensive receiving-area strategy.\n\nAcross the four Fraser et al. (2003) study sites, over 60% of survey respondents reported concern about finding affordable housing. The sources do not document specific receiving-area planning for San Antonio.\n\nOne notable exception documented in Fraser et al. (2003, p. 27): \"In one San Antonio neighborhood, a group of residents relocated directly across the street from their flooded homes (an area not designated as floodplain) in order to retain their sense of home.\" This was a spontaneous, resident-driven response, not a planned receiving-area strategy.\n\nUnlike some comparable programs (e.g., Kinston's post-Floyd buyout, which created new apartments, senior housing, and housing on vacant lots; Grand Forks, which built new subdivisions), the San Antonio program is classified by Greer & Binder (2017) as low government involvement β limited presale services (housing counselors), with no government-facilitated receiving-area development.\n\n**Codes selected:** Availability of existing housing (challenge acknowledged); Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities. No evidence for: construction of new housing, identifying priority areas, social carrying capacity assessment.\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer:** Natural use; Multi-purpose use; Demolition/infrastructure removal/asset retirement; Rezoning (by operation of HMGP open-space requirement); Ownership transfer; Commemoration; Recognition of retreat land benefits; Site design & restoration; Planting/landscaping (for Wheatley Heights sports complex site).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n-" | |
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