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{
"case_id": "CS19",
"chunk_index": 0,
"section": "walande_community_relocation_malaita_province_solomon_islands",
"location": "Nusa Hope, New Georgia",
"country": "Solomon Islands",
"country_normalized": "Solomon Islands",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "New Georgia",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Nusa Hope Village Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Albert, S., Bronen, R., Tooler, N., Leon, J., Yee, D., Ash, J., Boseto, D., & Grinham, A. (2018). Heading for the hills: Climate-driven community relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska provide insight for a 1.5 C future. Regional Environmental Change, 18, 2261-2272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"doi": "10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8"
},
{
"title": "Human Rights Watch. (2025). There's just no more land: Community-led planned relocation as last-resort adaptation to sea level rise in Solomon Islands.",
"url": "https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/03/17/theres-just-no-more-land/community-led-planned-relocation-last-resort-adaptation"
},
{
"title": "International Organization for Migration. (2024). Climate mobility and relocation in Solomon Islands: Insights from community experiences and key stakeholders.",
"url": "https://publications.iom.int/books/climate-mobility-and-relocation-solomon-islands-insights-community-experiences-and-key-stakeholders"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Nusa Hope Village Relocation (Nusa Hope, New Georgia, Solomon Islands)\nSection: Walande Community Relocation, Malaita Province, Solomon Islands\n\n**Version 2 β Generated from source documents**\n\n**Sources reviewed:**\n- Human Rights Watch (HRW), *\"There's Just No More Land\": Community-led Planned Relocation as Last-resort Adaptation to Sea Level Rise in Solomon Islands*, March 2025.\n- Albert, S., Bronen, R., Tooler, N., Leon, J., Yee, D., Ash, J., Boseto, D., and Grinham, A., \"Heading for the hills: climate-driven community relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska provide insight for a 1.5 Β°C future,\" *Regional Environmental Change* 18 (2018): 2261β2272.\n- Allen, M., Monson, R., Cox, J., Oakeshott, D., and Maetala, R., *Climate Mobility and Relocation in Solomon Islands: Insights from Community Experiences and Key Stakeholders*, IOM, 2025 (research conducted 2021; hereafter IOM 2024/25).\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS19",
"chunk_index": 1,
"section": "overview",
"location": "Nusa Hope, New Georgia",
"country": "Solomon Islands",
"country_normalized": "Solomon Islands",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "New Georgia",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Nusa Hope Village Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Albert, S., Bronen, R., Tooler, N., Leon, J., Yee, D., Ash, J., Boseto, D., & Grinham, A. (2018). Heading for the hills: Climate-driven community relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska provide insight for a 1.5 C future. Regional Environmental Change, 18, 2261-2272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"doi": "10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8"
},
{
"title": "Human Rights Watch. (2025). There's just no more land: Community-led planned relocation as last-resort adaptation to sea level rise in Solomon Islands.",
"url": "https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/03/17/theres-just-no-more-land/community-led-planned-relocation-last-resort-adaptation"
},
{
"title": "International Organization for Migration. (2024). Climate mobility and relocation in Solomon Islands: Insights from community experiences and key stakeholders.",
"url": "https://publications.iom.int/books/climate-mobility-and-relocation-solomon-islands-insights-community-experiences-and-key-stakeholders"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Nusa Hope Village Relocation (Nusa Hope, New Georgia, Solomon Islands)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case Name and Location:** Walande Community Relocation, Malaita Province, Solomon Islands\n\n**Hazard(s):** Sea level rise, king tides (abnormally high tides), and cyclones, all worsened by climate change, leading to chronic coastal inundation and erosion. The structural vulnerability of living on an artificially constructed island β maintained by residents who added coral and rocks β compounded these hazards by inadvertently destroying coral reef protection and exposing the island to more wave action [HRW 2025, p. 18 fn. 33].\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Community-led planned relocation from a small artificial island approximately a few hundred metres off the coast of South Malaita to a 46-acre mainland site called Tetele on Maramasike (Small Malaita). The relocation was permanent, community-initiated, and executed largely without government support over several decades.\n\n**Scale:** The HRW report (2025) describes Walande as a community of 800 people at the mainland site at the time of the report [HRW 2025, p. 1]. The IOM 2024/25 report, citing Fanega (2020), states that the four coastal villages comprising the mainland Walande community (Haili, Tawaro, Takwarafi, and Tetele) together number approximately 1,440 people [IOM 2024/25, p. 17]. These two figures may reflect different reference dates or definitions of \"community.\" The 1,440 figure appears in the IOM report and is cited to a 2020 source; neither figure is directly verifiable against a census in the reviewed sources. The geographic scope covers the abandoned island (now fully submerged) and the Tetele mainland site.\n\n**Key Actors:** The Walande community itself was the primary driver and implementer. Governance was organized through a village-based committee and a Honiara-based Walande Association, which liaised with national government and external stakeholders [HRW 2025, pp. 26β27; IOM 2024/25, pp. 17β18]. External support was minimal: the Australian High Commission provided funds to clear the relocation site (1996); the Solomon Islands Office of Rural Service Development drew up a basic site plan (1996) [HRW 2025, p. 25; IOM 2024/25, p. 17]. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Programme provided US$50,000 for a sea wall (2021) [HRW 2025, pp. 32β33]. National and provincial governments were largely absent throughout the relocation. IOM, in partnership with Sustineo and Dignity Pasifik, conducted post-relocation community research informing the 2022 Planned Relocation Guidelines. HRW conducted qualitative fieldwork in September 2024.\n\n**Timeline:** Community discussions about relocation began in the late 1980s following Cyclone Namu (1986). A formal community relocation plan was adopted in 1996. Gradual family-by-family movement occurred from the mid-1980s through approximately 2009β2015; the 2009 king tides convinced most remaining residents to relocate, though two families remained on the island until the mid-2010s [HRW 2025, p. 19]. The island is now completely submerged β by June 2024, all buildings had disappeared and no part of the island was above sea level at high tide [HRW 2025, p. 21]. The Solomon Islands government published national Planned Relocation Guidelines in 2022; Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were still under development at the time of writing (2025) [HRW 2025, p. 2].\n\n**Key Outcomes:** The community successfully relocated the entirety of its membership to the mainland over a multi-decade period, demonstrating exceptional self-reliance and community cohesion. However, the relocation has not achieved a durable solution. Key ongoing challenges include: (1) the relocation site is itself now threatened by sea level rise and coastal erosion, with a partially collapsed sea wall and an estimated US$25,000 needed for repairs [HRW 2025, pp. 32β34]; (2) the 46-acre site is too small for a growing population, with no room for a health clinic and insufficient land for food gardens [HRW 2025, p. 36]; (3) land tenure remains insecure and unregistered, contested by neighbouring communities [HRW 2025, pp. 35β39]; (4) women face particular disadvantage under Malaita's patriarchal land tenure system [HRW 2025, pp. 40β42]; (5) food security is threatened by saline intrusion into swamp taro cropland [HRW 2025, pp. 32, 36]; and (6) the community has received very limited post-relocation government support. Some community members are already hoping to plan another relocation further inland; as one elderly resident told HRW: \"We look for higher ground β again\" [HRW 2025, p. 36].\n\n---\n\n### Narrative Summary\n\nWalande was once a thriving community living on a small artificial island a few hundred metres off the coast of South Malaita in Solomon Islands. For generations, residents had expanded the island by adding coral and rock to its base. But rising seas, more powerful king tides, and cyclones β including Cyclone Namu in 1986 and destructive king tides in 2009 β progressively destroyed homes and made the island uninhabitable. The 2009 king tides flooded the entire village, destroyed 16 houses, and within three days inundated three-quarters of the island. Two families remained until the mid-2010s; by 2024, the island had completely disappeared beneath the sea. Facing an existential threat with no viable alternative, the people of Walande decided β largely on their own initiative β to relocate to a 46-acre mainland site called Tetele, to which they held customary tenure claims dating to an agreement made in the 1940s.\n\nThe relocation was a remarkable act of community self-determination, but also a story of inadequate government support. Despite repeated requests for assistance β including help to clear and plan the site, secure land tenure, assess risks, and build infrastructure β government responses were minimal. The Australian High Commission funded site clearing in 1996, and the Solomon Islands Office of Rural Service Development drew up a basic site plan that year. Community leaders estimate that the relocation process cost many hundreds of thousands of dollars in total, with individual household reconstruction estimated at approximately US$23,000 per household by one community leader [HRW 2025, p. 43]. Every family contributed money, supplemented by remittances from Walande members working in Honiara and abroad. Community governance β centred on a village committee and the Honiara-based Walande Association β sustained the process over decades, and decision-making drew on traditional practices including community gatherings called by conch shell [HRW 2025, p. 26].\n\nMore than a decade after most families relocated, Walande has not achieved a durable solution. The mainland site is itself now being breached by rising seas. A sea wall built with US$50,000 in GEF grant funding in 2021 has partially collapsed, and the community lacks the approximately US$25,000 needed to repair it [HRW 2025, pp. 33β34]. The site is too small for a growing population. Swamp taro β a culturally vital staple crop β is failing due to saltwater intrusion. Land tenure remains insecure and contested, and neither provincial nor national authorities have yet formalized Walande's land claims despite repeated requests. Women face intensifying disadvantage as land scarcity entrenches patriarchal norms. Walande's story has become a significant reference point in debates about how planned relocations should be governed, financed, and supported β and what rights-respecting adaptation looks like in practice in small island developing states.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS19",
"chunk_index": 2,
"section": "coding_questions",
"location": "Nusa Hope, New Georgia",
"country": "Solomon Islands",
"country_normalized": "Solomon Islands",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "New Georgia",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Nusa Hope Village Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Albert, S., Bronen, R., Tooler, N., Leon, J., Yee, D., Ash, J., Boseto, D., & Grinham, A. (2018). Heading for the hills: Climate-driven community relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska provide insight for a 1.5 C future. Regional Environmental Change, 18, 2261-2272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"doi": "10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8"
},
{
"title": "Human Rights Watch. (2025). There's just no more land: Community-led planned relocation as last-resort adaptation to sea level rise in Solomon Islands.",
"url": "https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/03/17/theres-just-no-more-land/community-led-planned-relocation-last-resort-adaptation"
},
{
"title": "International Organization for Migration. (2024). Climate mobility and relocation in Solomon Islands: Insights from community experiences and key stakeholders.",
"url": "https://publications.iom.int/books/climate-mobility-and-relocation-solomon-islands-insights-community-experiences-and-key-stakeholders"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Nusa Hope Village Relocation (Nusa Hope, New Georgia, Solomon Islands)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Both Reactive and Proactive, with the balance shifting over time.\n\n**Narrative:** The Walande relocation contains elements of both reactive and proactive triggering, and the sequence matters for understanding the case.\n\nThe initial movements off the island beginning in 1986 were directly reactive. Cyclone Namu devastated the island, washing away houses and displacing dozens of families. Community members described having to evacuate to the mainland \"in the middle of the night\" without government assistance, and many subsequently experienced protracted displacement, unable to afford to rebuild their homes [HRW 2025, p. 19]. In this sense, early displacement was disaster-driven and reactive.\n\nHowever, the community's adoption of a formal relocation plan in 1996 β and the deliberate, staged movement of many families in the years before the 2009 king tides β reflects proactive planning. Community members explicitly described anticipating future risk and choosing to move before the next disaster. As Stephen M. (62) recounted: \"We moved before the [king tides could] destroy us first\" [HRW 2025, p. 23]. Community leader Henry T. (38) described convincing his parents to move: \"We saw the king tide and we were afraid β¦ We looked to the future and knew more was to come\" [HRW 2025, p. 21]. Albert et al. (2018) describe how several families \"made pre-emptive decisions to move after assessing the erosion rates and understanding the inevitability of the sea-level rise\" [Albert et al. 2018, p. 2266].\n\nThe 2009 king tides that flooded the entire village, destroyed 16 houses, and inundated three-quarters of the island acted as a final reactive trigger for most remaining residents, though the formal relocation plan had existed for over a decade by that point.\n\nBoth codes are supported. The long arc of the relocation (1986βmid-2010s) contains reactive displacement events that cumulatively produced a proactive community decision to plan and execute a permanent relocation. Early displacement events were reactive; the formal relocation planning was proactive.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of Households Affected, Number of Population Affected, Total Funding\n\n**Answer:**\n\n- **Date:** Process began following Cyclone Namu, 1986; formal relocation plan adopted 1996; primary relocation completed approximately 2009βmid-2010s; island fully submerged by 2024.\n- **Households:** Aerial imagery from January 1949 shows approximately 85 buildings on the island; satellite imagery from December 2003 shows approximately 90 buildings on the island and 80 on the mainland relocation site [HRW 2025, p. 20]. The precise number of households at the time relocation began is not confirmed in the reviewed sources.\n- **Population:** Approximately 800 people at the mainland site at the time of the HRW report [HRW 2025, p. 1]. The IOM 2024/25 report, citing Fanega (2020), states approximately 1,440 people across the four mainland villages (Haili, Tawaro, Takwarafi, and Tetele) [IOM 2024/25, p. 17]. These figures likely reflect different reference dates or community definitions; neither is independently verified in the reviewed sources.\n- **Total Funding:** Largely self-funded by community members. Community leaders estimate the total process cost \"many hundreds of thousands of dollars\" [HRW 2025, p. 43]. Individual household reconstruction was estimated at approximately US$23,000 per household by one community leader [HRW 2025, p. 43]. Known external funding: (a) Australian High Commission funds to clear the relocation site (1996) β exact amount not specified in reviewed sources [HRW 2025, p. 25]; (b) US$50,000 from the GEF Small Grants Programme for sea wall construction (2021) [HRW 2025, pp. 32β33]. No centralized funding figure is available; no government funding was provided for the relocation itself.\n\n**Uncertainty:** Precise household numbers for the original island community are not confirmed in reviewed sources. The total self-funded cost is an estimate from community leaders cited in HRW 2025. The Australian High Commission funding amount is not specified in any reviewed source.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Multiple Hazards.\n\n**Narrative:** The relocation was driven by a combination of interacting hazards. HRW (2025) identifies sea level rise, king tides, and cyclones as the primary hazards [HRW 2025, pp. 1, 18]. These are cascading: cyclones and king tides produce acute flooding events made more destructive by the underlying trend of sea level rise. Albert et al. (2018) confirm that Solomon Islands has experienced sea level rise rates of 7β10 mm/year over recent decades β approximately three times the global average β and that extreme events such as king tides were co-drivers of community movement [Albert et al. 2018, pp. 2262β2263]. The IOM 2024/25 report notes that Walande island was subject to \"coastal erosion, rising sea levels and tidal inundation\" [IOM 2024/25, p. 17].\n\nAdditionally, community members cited the precarious nature of life on an artificial island β including limited access to water, gardens, and schools β as a secondary driver of relocation [HRW 2025, p. 18]. These factors are not independent hazards in the strict codebook sense but contributed to the community's assessment that the island had become uninhabitable.\n\nThe codebook defines Multiple Hazards as \"two or more hazards impacting the same area\" or cascading hazards occurring concurrently. Both conditions are met: sea level rise, king tides, and cyclones interacted as co-drivers.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard (with climate change as a driving and intensifying factor).\n\n**Narrative:** The hazards β sea level rise, king tides, and cyclones β are natural hazards intensified by climate change. There is no evidence of technological or industrial hazards in this case. HRW (2025) situates these hazards firmly within the climate change adaptation context, citing IPCC projections on sea level rise [HRW 2025, pp. 12β13]. Albert et al. (2018) note that Solomon Islands experiences sea level rise rates three times the global average [Albert et al. 2018, p. 2262]. Per the codebook, \"Climate change\" as a standalone classification was discarded in the main analysis; the appropriate primary coding is Natural Hazard. Climate change is noted as a key driver and intensifying context in the narrative.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion), (Hurricane), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** Coastal Flooding/Erosion; Hurricane (cyclones).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Coastal Flooding/Erosion:** Clearly the primary hazard category. Sea level rise, king tides causing chronic inundation, and coastal erosion leading to the complete disappearance of the island are extensively documented across all three reviewed sources. The codebook defines this category as including \"storm surge, flooding, sea level rise, and wave erosion that significantly impact coastal regions.\" By June 2024, no part of the former island was above sea level at high tide [HRW 2025, p. 21].\n\n- **Hurricane:** Cyclone Namu (1986) triggered the first wave of displacement. Additional storm events are referenced throughout [HRW 2025, p. 18; IOM 2024/25, p. 10]. The codebook defines this category as \"tropical storms and hurricanes (cyclones or typhoons) and related storm surges, tornadoes, strong winds and flooding.\" Cyclones in the Pacific context are the codebook-equivalent of hurricanes.\n\nNo evidence supports coding for Riverine/Pluvial Flooding, Lake Flooding/Erosion, Wildfire, Volcano, Land Subsidence, Landslide/Debris Flow, Earthquake, or Tsunami as primary hazards in the Walande MR decision process. Note: a 2007 tsunami affected the separate Titiana community, which is a comparison case in the IOM report and is not the subject of this case study.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** Entire Community.\n\n**Narrative:** The relocation aimed at and ultimately resulted in whole-community relocation, though families moved in stages over time. HRW (2025) describes the community \"relocating their entire village\" to a 46-acre mainland site [HRW 2025, p. 1]. The community formally adopted a collective relocation plan in 1996. Movement occurred in waves across families and households over several decades; the last two families on the island departed in the mid-2010s [HRW 2025, p. 19]. The intent and outcome was whole-community relocation β not selective individual buyouts or partial retreat.\n\nThe IOM 2024/25 report confirms the entire island community relocated to four coastal mainland villages [IOM 2024/25, pp. 15, 17]. Albert et al. (2018) contrast Walande with the fragmented, family-by-family pattern seen at Nuatambu, implicitly classifying it as community-scale [Albert et al. 2018, p. 2265].\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** Communities.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary unit of retreat was the community as a whole β the entire population of Walande island, descending from four North Malaitan tribes, relocated collectively to the mainland site. HRW (2025) and IOM (2024/25) consistently describe the relocation as occurring at the community scale, not the household or individual scale [HRW 2025, p. 13; IOM 2024/25, p. 15]. Community infrastructure (church, school, community hall) was rebuilt at the new site, but this was secondary to the people-centred relocation. There is no evidence of industrial assets or hazard protection structures being the primary subject of retreat.\n\n---\n\n### Other Notes\n\nThe Walande case is notable as an example of an autonomous, community-led relocation with minimal external support β described by HRW (2025) as a \"last resort\" measure undertaken largely without government assistance [HRW 2025, p. 1]. It is explicitly contrasted in reviewed sources with government-supported relocations such as Taro (Solomon Islands) and Shishmaref (Alaska), both of which had more formal planning processes but had not achieved relocation despite decades of effort [Albert et al. 2018, pp. 2267β2268]. Walande represents a relatively rare case where a small island community executed a whole-community relocation primarily through its own resources and governance systems, yet continues to face risks that undermine the durability of the outcome.\n\nThe community self-identifies as Indigenous Peoples β members of four different tribes β as explicitly noted by HRW (2025) [HRW 2025, p. 15 fn. 21]. Importantly, HRW notes that \"community members do not have any original ancestral lands in southern Malaita,\" as their ancestors migrated from North Malaita for dolphin hunting and previously relocated from outer islands after a tsunami [HRW 2025, p. 17]. This is a significant nuance for understanding the land tenure situation.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS19",
"chunk_index": 3,
"section": "institutional_environment",
"location": "Nusa Hope, New Georgia",
"country": "Solomon Islands",
"country_normalized": "Solomon Islands",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "New Georgia",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Nusa Hope Village Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Albert, S., Bronen, R., Tooler, N., Leon, J., Yee, D., Ash, J., Boseto, D., & Grinham, A. (2018). Heading for the hills: Climate-driven community relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska provide insight for a 1.5 C future. Regional Environmental Change, 18, 2261-2272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"doi": "10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8"
},
{
"title": "Human Rights Watch. (2025). There's just no more land: Community-led planned relocation as last-resort adaptation to sea level rise in Solomon Islands.",
"url": "https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/03/17/theres-just-no-more-land/community-led-planned-relocation-last-resort-adaptation"
},
{
"title": "International Organization for Migration. (2024). Climate mobility and relocation in Solomon Islands: Insights from community experiences and key stakeholders.",
"url": "https://publications.iom.int/books/climate-mobility-and-relocation-solomon-islands-insights-community-experiences-and-key-stakeholders"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Nusa Hope Village Relocation (Nusa Hope, New Georgia, Solomon Islands)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Community Buyout/Retreat.\n\n**Narrative:** The Walande case is a collective community relocation β the codebook defines Community Buyout/Retreat as \"collective relocation of a neighborhood or settlement through coordinated planning and community engagement.\" The entire island community relocated to a shared mainland site. There was no government-administered property buyout program, no individual compensation mechanism, no leaseback or easement arrangement, and no managed realignment of infrastructure in the conventional sense (though community infrastructure such as the church and school were rebuilt at the new site). The 1996 formal relocation plan was adopted at the community level, and implementation was organized collectively [HRW 2025, pp. 25β27].\n\nThe term \"buyout\" in the codebook label should not be read literally here β no financial purchase of properties occurred. The community organized and financed the relocation collectively, with each family funding its own home reconstruction [HRW 2025, p. 26].\n\nNo evidence supports individual buyout/retreat or managed realignment of infrastructure as the primary scope.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process? (Litigation), (Legal authority over retreat), (Relevant regulations/acts), (Home acquisition), (Land acquisition), (Title(s) transfer), (Land rezoning), (Retreat land development), (Compliance & enforcement), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** Legal Authority Over Retreat; Relevant Regulations/Acts; Land Acquisition; Compliance & Enforcement. Note on Title(s) Transfer below.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Legal Authority Over Retreat:** A central finding across all sources is that Solomon Islands lacked any effective policy or legislation to guide community relocation at the time of Walande's move. Albert et al. (2018) note explicitly: \"Although the Solomon Islands government views climate relocation as a critical issue, there is currently no effective policy or legislation to guide relocation of human settlements\" [Albert et al. 2018, p. 2267]. The 2022 Planned Relocation Guidelines were published years after Walande's relocation was largely complete and have not yet been implemented [HRW 2025, p. 2].\n\n- **Relevant Regulations/Acts:** The absence of relevant regulations was a key barrier. HRW (2025) notes the governance vacuum and constraints posed by colonial legacies, weak institutions, and contested land claims [HRW 2025, p. 10]. The Customary Land Records Act is mentioned as a potential mechanism for recording land claims [HRW 2025, p. 39]. The 2022 Planned Relocation Guidelines now exist on paper but SOPs remain under development [HRW 2025, p. 11].\n\n- **Land Acquisition:** Walande's access to the Tetele mainland site rested on customary tenure claims, a historical land grant (mainland Chief Mou Paine's grant to Walande Chief Maelasi in the 1940s, approved by a British District Officer), and informal land sales and kinship-based arrangements with customary owners [HRW 2025, pp. 35β36; IOM 2024/25, p. 17]. No formal government land acquisition process was used. This created significant insecurity.\n\n- **Title(s) Transfer:** Walande community members' claims to Tetele are not formalized in government records. The community applied through provincial government channels to register its claim but received no response despite repeated requests [HRW 2025, pp. 37β38]. The Ministry of Lands acknowledged to HRW that \"we lack financial resources\" and \"we don't have a clear direction of how we can handle\" the situation until SOPs are finalized [HRW 2025, p. 38]. The core issue is not a formal transfer mechanism but the absence of any formalization or recording of existing customary claims. Coding \"Title(s) Transfer\" is noted as a partial fit; the relevant issue is the need for land recording and formalization rather than a transfer of title per se.\n\n- **Compliance & Enforcement:** Enforcement of any land-related decisions or protections is effectively absent. Neighbouring communities are contesting Walande's tenure with no formal dispute resolution mechanism in place [HRW 2025, pp. 35β36; IOM 2024/25, p. 20].\n\n- **Litigation:** Not coded. No formal litigation involving Walande specifically was identified in the reviewed sources, though the IOM report notes at least one land dispute at Aruligo that had proceeded to the High Court β a separate community.\n\n- **Land Rezoning; Retreat Land Development; Home Acquisition:** Not applicable. No government-administered rezoning, development permitting, or home acquisition program existed.\n\nProvincial and national authorities have not yet formalized Walande's land claims. HRW recommends this as an urgent action for both the Malaita Provincial Government and the Ministry of Lands [HRW 2025, pp. 8β9].\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project? (Local/Municipal only), (Provincial/State only), (Federal only), (Multiple funders), (International aid), (Individual), (NGOs), (Lenders), (Insurance)\n\n**Answer:** Multiple Funders β specifically Individual (community self-funding) and International Aid (Australian High Commission; GEF/UNDP Small Grants Programme); with negligible Local/Municipal or Federal funding.\n\n**Narrative:** The relocation was overwhelmingly self-funded by community members. HRW (2025) states: \"Every family contributed money to the relocation, both from villagers in Solomon Islands and through remittances from community members working in the nation's capital, Honiara, and abroad\" [HRW 2025, p. 26]. Community leaders estimate household reconstruction at approximately US$23,000 per family [HRW 2025, p. 43].\n\nKnown external funding: (a) The Australian High Commission provided funds to clear the mainland relocation site (1996) β amount not specified in reviewed sources [HRW 2025, p. 25; IOM 2024/25, p. 17]; (b) GEF Small Grants Programme provided US$50,000 for the sea wall (2021) [HRW 2025, pp. 32β33].\n\nThe Solomon Islands national government provided no substantive financial support to the relocation itself. International climate financing (Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund) was inaccessible to Solomon Islands due to accreditation barriers [HRW 2025, p. 50]. The LoCAL initiative (New Zealand, EU, UNCDF β US$15.6 million) was launched in 2024, well after the relocation was largely complete [HRW 2025, p. 52].\n\nThe funding picture illustrates a critical gap: the community bore costs that rights-based frameworks indicate should have been supported by government and international climate finance mechanisms [HRW 2025, pp. 43β44].\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process? (New industry), (New housing for BO recipients), (Assisting BO recipients to find housing in community), (Redevelopment of retreat lands), (Livelihoods supports), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** No evidence found in reviewed sources.\n\n**Narrative:** There is no mention in any of the reviewed sources of tax base considerations in the Walande relocation. The community self-organized the retreat without government planning processes that would typically include tax base analysis. Solomon Islands is a subsistence-based rural community context where formal tax base considerations are not directly applicable to this case.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process? (Market value), (Tax value), (Post-disaster value), (Additional incentives, bonuses and top-ups), (Free supports and services), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** No formal compensation mechanisms were provided.\n\n**Narrative:** No government compensation was offered or paid to Walande community members for their relocation. HRW (2025) documents that the community had to fund all home reconstruction itself (estimated approximately US$23,000 per household by one community leader), with no government subsidy or compensation payment [HRW 2025, p. 43]. The only external financial contributions were site-clearing funds from the Australian High Commission in 1996 and the GEF sea wall grant in 2021 β neither of which constituted compensation for displacement or property loss. The IOM (2024/25) research found that across all four communities studied, participants identified a clear need for government funding support but no compensation framework existed [IOM 2024/25, pp. 19β20].\n\nThe codebook categories of Market Value, Tax Value, Post-Disaster Value, Additional Incentives, and Free Supports and Services are all coded as absent. The absence of compensation mechanisms is itself a significant finding, representing a major gap relative to rights-respecting planned relocation standards [HRW 2025, pp. 43β44].\n\nCommunity self-funding is noted separately and should not be characterized as a compensation mechanism.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS19",
"chunk_index": 4,
"section": "planning_processes",
"location": "Nusa Hope, New Georgia",
"country": "Solomon Islands",
"country_normalized": "Solomon Islands",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "New Georgia",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Nusa Hope Village Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Albert, S., Bronen, R., Tooler, N., Leon, J., Yee, D., Ash, J., Boseto, D., & Grinham, A. (2018). Heading for the hills: Climate-driven community relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska provide insight for a 1.5 C future. Regional Environmental Change, 18, 2261-2272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"doi": "10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1256-8"
},
{
"title": "Human Rights Watch. (2025). There's just no more land: Community-led planned relocation as last-resort adaptation to sea level rise in Solomon Islands.",
"url": "https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/03/17/theres-just-no-more-land/community-led-planned-relocation-last-resort-adaptation"
},
{
"title": "International Organization for Migration. (2024). Climate mobility and relocation in Solomon Islands: Insights from community experiences and key stakeholders.",
"url": "https://publications.iom.int/books/climate-mobility-and-relocation-solomon-islands-insights-community-experiences-and-key-stakeholders"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Nusa Hope Village Relocation (Nusa Hope, New Georgia, Solomon Islands)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process? (Pre-retreat planning), (Immediate risks: 1β5 years), (Emerging risks: 5β10), (Anticipated future risks: 10β100), (Post-retreat follow-up)\n\n**Answer:** Pre-Retreat Planning; Immediate Risks (1β5 years); Anticipated Future Risks (10β100 years); Post-Retreat Follow-up (notably inadequate in practice).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Pre-Retreat Planning:** The community adopted a formal relocation plan in 1996, ten years after the first major displacement event, reflecting deliberate pre-retreat planning. The Solomon Islands Office of Rural Service Development drew up a site plan delineating house and infrastructure locations [HRW 2025, p. 25].\n\n- **Immediate Risks (1β5 years):** The 2009 king tides represented an acute triggering event, and the community's move in response addressed immediate risks to life and housing [HRW 2025, p. 19].\n\n- **Anticipated Future Risks (10β100 years):** Community members explicitly considered long-term climate trends. Henry T. (38) described: \"We saw the king tide and we were afraid β¦ We looked to the future and knew more was to come. We talked to our parents about our fears. We convinced them to move\" [HRW 2025, p. 21]. Albert et al. (2018) note that some families made \"pre-emptive decisions to move after assessing the erosion rates and understanding the inevitability of the sea-level rise\" [Albert et al. 2018, p. 2266].\n\n- **Post-Retreat Follow-up:** The Solomon Islands 2022 Planned Relocation Guidelines explicitly state that \"relocation is not an endpoint but one of the many steps in strengthening climate adaptation and resilience\" [HRW 2025, p. 34, citing the Guidelines]. However, in practice, post-retreat follow-up for Walande has been almost entirely absent. The community has received no post-relocation government monitoring or support, the sea wall has partially collapsed, land tenure remains insecure, and some members are hoping to plan a further relocation [HRW 2025, pp. 34, 36].\n\n**Emerging Risks (5β10 years):** This category is implicitly covered by the gradual movement across decades but is not explicitly distinguished as such in the sources.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process? (MCDA), (Adaptive management), (Bottom-up), (Top-down), (Multi-sectoral), (Single stage retreat), (Multi-stage retreat), (Degree of transparency), (Public-private partnerships), (Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions), (Bureaucracy reduction), (CBA), (Participatory/collaborative)\n\n**Answer:** Bottom-Up; Community-Led; Participatory/Collaborative; Multi-Stage Retreat; Coordination with Other Sectors and Jurisdictions (attempted but largely unsuccessful).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Bottom-Up / Community-Led:** This is the defining characteristic of the Walande case. The community initiated, planned, and executed the relocation using its own governance systems, with no meaningful top-down government direction. HRW (2025) quotes community leaders: \"We move on our own, for our safety, into this new site\" [HRW 2025, p. 11]. The IOM (2024/25) report found a unanimous view among Walande participants \"that a relocation should be initiated and led by the community\" [IOM 2024/25, p. 15].\n\n- **Participatory/Collaborative:** Community decision-making used traditional conch-shell gatherings with broad participation [HRW 2025, p. 26]. The IOM report notes that Walande's governance structure was seen as relatively more participatory than other communities studied, though women and youth identified gaps in inclusion [IOM 2024/25, pp."
}
] |